Persons and Family Relations
claim that the marriage is null and void because no
Void and Voidable Marriage
Mallion vs. Alcantara
Facts: On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P.
Mallion filed a petition 1 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent
Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order
No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the
Family Code, citing respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits,
the RTC denied the petition in a decision 2 dated
November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner
"failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant
the grant of the relief he is seeking." 3 The appeal
filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise
dismissed in a resolution 4 dated June 11, 1998 for
failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95
attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999
another petition 5 for declaration of nullity of
marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time
alleging that his marriage with respondent was null
and void due to the fact that it was celebrated
without a valid marriage license. For her part,
respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss
6 dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of
the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping.
Issue: Should the matter of the invalidity of a
marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite
prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised
in the same proceeding where the marriage is being
impugned on the ground of a party's psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?
Ruling: In both petitions, petitioner has the same
cause — the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent. What differs is the ground upon which
the cause of action is predicated. These grounds
cited by petitioner essentially split the various
aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the
resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual
status of petitioner and respondent's marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the
valid celebration of the same took place due to the
alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP
4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded
that the marriage had been solemnized and
celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now
bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a
marriage license which petitioner raises now could
have been presented and heard in the earlier case.
Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as
regards every matter offered and received to sustain
or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for
that purpose and of all other matters that could have
been adjudged in that case.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded
the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner
is now deemed to have waived any defects therein.
For this reason, the Court finds that the present
action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the
decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC,
Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP
4341-95.
De Castro vs. De Castro
Facts: Reinel and Annabelle met and became
sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage
license in Pasig City in September 1994. They had
their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994,
and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When
the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired.
Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu
of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit
dated March 13, 1995stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The couple got married on the same
date. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner
and respondent went back to their respective homes
and did not live together as husband and wife. On
November 13, 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child
named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro.
Since the child’s birth, the mother has been the one
supporting her out of her income as a government
dentist and from her private practice. On 4 June
1998, respondent filed a complaint for support
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City.

In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is
married to petitioner and that the latter has
“reneged on his responsibility/obligation to
financially support her “as his wife and Reinna Tricia
as his child.”
P: Marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit
they jointly executed is fake. He also said that he was
only forced by Annabelle to marry her to avoid
the humiliation that the pregnancy sans marriage
may bring her. He added that he did not obtain
parental consent; the never lived together as H & W;
he never saw nor acknowledged said child.TC:
Marriage not valid because it was solemnized
without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus
obliged to give her support.
CA denied P’s appeal. Prompted by the rule that a
marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate
court declared that the child was born during the
subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage.
Issue: W/N marriage is valid
Ruling: NO; child is illegitimate R argues that P
cannot collaterally attack the validity of the marriage
through an action for support. The Court ruled that
the validity of the marriage can be collaterally
attacked so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case, as per Niñal v. Badayog.
However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. Under
the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented
that petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating
that they had been living together for more than five
years. However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was
asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the
affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity
in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for
a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicant’s name for
a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there
was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could
push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were
not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.
Re: Support of child The child is P’s illegitimate
daughter, hence, entitled to support.
The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists
petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of
respondent, admitted that he is the father of the
child. That Reinna Tricia is the child of the
respondent with the petitioner is supported not only
by the testimony of the latter, but also by
respondent’s own admission in the course of his
testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was
his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts,
he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or
clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex.
As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner
became pregnant which ultimately led to their
marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While
respondent claims that he was merely forced to
undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken
of the occasion reveal otherwise.
DOCTRINE: Under the Family Code, the absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any
of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the
evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented
an affidavit stating that they had been living together
for more than five years.24 However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit
when she was asked during cross-examination, thus'
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a
mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage
license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The
aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties
to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage
license.26 In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there
was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could
push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were
not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.
So vs. Valera
Facts: Renato and Lorna first met in 1973 and lived
together as husband and wife, without the benefit of
marriage, before they got married in 1991. In the
course of their relationship, they had 3 children and
established a communications business. In 1996,
Renato filed with RTC a petition for the declaration of
the nullity of his marriage with Lorna. He alleged that
their marriage was null and void for want of the
essential and formal requisites. He also claimed that
Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to exercise
the essential obligations of marriage, as shown by
the following circumstances: Lorna failed and refused
to cohabit and make love to him; did not love and
respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not
give him emotional, spiritual, physical, and
psychological help and support; failed and refused to
have a family domicile; and failed and refused to
enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal
and family life with him.
RTC: It nullified the marriage, concluding that Lorna
was PI to comply with her martial obligations.
CA: The Republic through the OSG, appealed to the
CA, which reversed and set aside the RTC decision
and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It ruled
that Renato failed to prove Lorna’s PI because her
character, faults, and defects did not constitute PI
warranting the nullity of the parties’ marriage. The
CA reasoned out that while Lorna “appears to be a
less than ideal mother to her children, and loving
wife to her husband,” these flaws were not physical
manifestations of psychological illness. The CA
further added that although Lorna’s condition was
clinically identified by an expert witness to be an
“Adjustment Disorder,” it was not established that
such disorder was the root cause of her incapacity to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
prosecution also failed to establish that Lorna’s
disorder was incurable and permanent in such a way
as to disable and/or incapacitate Lorna from
complying with obligations essential to marriage. The
CA likewise held that her subsequent refusal to
cohabit with him was not due to any psychological
condition, but due to the fact that she no longer
loved him. Finally, the CA concluded that the
declaration of nullity of a marriage was not proper
when the psychological disorder does not meet the
guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in the case
of Molina. Renato filed a MR but was denied.
Issue: W/N the marriage is null and void due to
psychological incapacity?
Ruling: NO. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA
and ruled that the totality of evidence presented by
Ramon failed to establish Lorna’s psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations. The Supreme Court did not give much
credence to the testimony and report of Renato’s
expert witness. The report of the psychologist was
not sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to
warrant the conclusion that PI existed that prevented
Valera from complying with marital obligations. In
the first place, the facts on which the psychologist
based her conclusions were all derived from
statements by the petitioner whose bias in favor of
his cause cannot be doubted. Her reading may not at
all be completely fair in its assessment. We say this
while fully aware that the psychologist appeared at
the petitioner’s bidding and the arrangement
between them was not pro bono. The “Particulars”
and the “Psychological Conclusions”
disproportionate with one another; the conclusions
appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as
they are from isolated incidents, rather than from
continuing patterns. The “particulars” are, as it were,
snapshots, rather than a running account of the
respondent’s life from which her whole life is totally
judged. Thus, we do not see her psychological
assessment to be comprehensive enough to be
reliable.
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent,
we note that she lived with the petitioner for 18
years and begot children with him born in 1975,
1978 and 1984 – developments that show a fair level
of stability in the relationship and a healthy degree
of intimacy between the parties for some eleven (11)
years. She finished her Dentistry and joined her
husband in the communications business – traits that
do not at all indicate an irresponsible attitude,
especially when read with the comment that she had
been strict with employees and in business affairs.
The petitioner’s Memorandum itself is very revealing
when, in arguing that the Marriage Contract was a
sham, the petitioner interestingly alleged that
(referring to 1987) “[S]ince at that time, the
relationship between the petitioner and respondent
was going well, and future marriage between the
two was not an impossibility, the petitioner signed
these documents.”
The Supreme Court also noted that there was no
proof that Lorna’s psychological disorder was
incurable. The psychologist’s testimony itself
glaringly failed to show that the respondent’s
behavioral disorder was medically or clinically
permanent or incurable as established jurisprudence
requires. Neither did the psychologist testify that the
disorder was grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
In Molina, SC ruled that “mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes and occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, the root cause should be a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.” In the present
case, the psychologist simply narrated adverse
“snapshots” of the respondent’s life showing her
alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not
convincingly prove her permanent incapacity to meet
her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or
psychological illness that gave rise to this incapacity;
and that this psychological illness and consequent
incapacity existed at the time the marriage was
celebrated.
Given the foregoing, the Supreme Court ruled that
based on the evidence, psychological incapacity was
not proved:
Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude
that we have a case here of parties who have very
human faults and frailties; who have been together
for some time; and who are now tired of each other.
If in fact the respondent does not want to provide
the support expected of a wife, the cause is not
necessarily a grave and incurable psychological
malady whose effects go as far as to affect her
capacity to provide marital support promised and
expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired
and to give up on one’s situation and on one’s
husband are not necessarily signs of psychological
illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled.
When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut
the marital knot to allow the parties to go their
separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not
available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited
remedy that addresses only a very specific situation
– a relationship where no marriage could have validly
been concluded because the parties, or one of them,
by reason of a grave and incurable psychological
illness existing when the marriage was celebrated,
did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and,
thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.
Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to
provide any permanent remedy.
Republic vs. CA
Facts: On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and
Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court
Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated
without the knowledge of Castro's parents.
Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the
processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as
husband and wife since the marriage was unknown
to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971,
when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the
couple decided to live together. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. On
October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was
adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of
Cardenas.

Desiring to follow her daughter in US, Castro applied
for annulment of her marriage with Edwin on the
ground that no marriage license issued to Cardenas
prior to the celebration of their marriage. As proof,
Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification
from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila
certifying that the marriage license does not appear
in the latter’s records.
The trial court denied the petition. It held that the
said certificate is inadequate to establish the alleged
non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the
celebration of the marriage between the parties.
Castro appealed to respondent appellate court, and
the appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial
court. It declared the marriage between the
contracting parties null and void and directed the
Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage
contract.
Issue: W/N the marriage between Angelina Castro
and Edwin Cardenas lacking of marriage license is
valid.
Ruling: Not valid. The Court affirmed the decision of
appellate court that the marriage without marriage
license shall be null and void. Being one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a
license would render the marriage void ab initio.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these
essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Ninal vs. Bayadog
Facts: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa
Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie,
petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to
Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the
children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1
year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. They
instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived
together for at least 5 years exempting from securing
the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident
on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito
was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file
for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage
after his death?
Ruling: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for
absence of the marriage license. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit
and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma,
only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito
and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living
with each other that has already lasted for five years,
the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place
and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties
and any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.
Apiag vs. Cantero
Facts: The wedding of Maria Apiag (one of the
complainants) and Esmeraldo Cantero (respondent-
judge) took place on August 11, 1947. They begot
two children, Teresita and Glicero (complainants).
Thereafter, Esmeraldo left the conjugal home and
abandoned his wife and children without any means
of support. Later on, the complainants learned that
Esmeraldo contracted another marriage with Nieves
Ygay and they have 5 children of their own. In all the
documents filed by Esmeraldo such as his sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, personal data
sheet, income tax return, and insurance policy with
GSIS, he misrepresented himself as being married to
Nieves. Herein complainants charged Esmeraldo with
gross misconduct for allegedly having committed
bigamy and for falsifying public documents.
In his comment, Esmeraldo denied the validity of the
marriage alleging that it was dramatized and that his
parents called him to appear in a certain drama
marriage and was forced to sign a duly prepared
marriage contract. He pressed the idea that his
consent was not freely given. The fact, however, is
undisputed that he and Maria were engaged in a
love affair which resulted in the pregnancy of the
latter prior to the marriage. It is only for the
preservation of the family name that their parents
agreed to their marriage but not to live together as
husband and wife.
To bolster his defense, Esmeraldo alleged that Maria
has been living with another man during her public
service as a teacher and have begotten a child,
named Manuel Apiag. He argued the “he who seek
justice must seek justice with clean hands.” He didn’t
file any annulment or judicial declaration of the
alleged marriage because he believed that said
marriage was void from the beginning. Thus, nothing
is to be nullified because the marriage never existed.
However, in view of the complainants’ request in
their letter to the respondent dated September 21,
1993, both parties have agreed that Teresita shall: (1)
get ¼ of the retirement that Esmeraldo will receive
from GSIS; (2) be included as one of the beneficiaries
in case of the latter’s death; (3) inherit the properties
of the latter; and (2) receive and collect Php 4000
monthly as support.
The issues presented and decisions held by the
investigating judge and court administrator are as
follows:
That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria
Apiag on August 11, 1947 is void;
No. Respondent knows that the marriage cannot be
dissolved without a judicial declaration of death.
Respondent's second marriage with Nieves Ygay was
therefore bigamous for it was contracted during the
existence of a previous marriage.
The absence of his first wife complainant Maria
Apiag for more than seven (7) years raise the
presumption that she is already dead, that there was
no need for any judicial declaration;
No. There’s still a need for judicial declaration
presumptive death and of nullity of marriage.
The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to
him because assuming that he committed the
offense, he was not yet a member of the judiciary;
No. We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion
of the respondent that he cannot be held liable for
misconduct on the ground that he was not yet a
lawyer nor a judge when the act(s) complained of
were committed. The infraction he committed
continued from the time he became a lawyer in 1960
to the time he was appointed as a judge in October
23, 1989.
The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already
prescribed;
No. On the charge of falsification, it was shown with
clarity in his Personal Data Sheet for Judges, Sworn
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth,
Income Tax Return (pp. 99-102, rollo), that he had
committed a misrepresentation by stating therein
that his spouse is Nieves Ygay and (had) eight (8)
children (with her) which is far from (the) truth that
his wife is Maria Apiag with whom he had two (2)
children.
The charges have no basis in fact and in law.
No. Aside from the admission, the untenable line of
defense by the respondent presupposes the
imposition of an administrative sanction for the
charges filed against him. "A judge's actuation of
cohabiting with another when his marriage was still
valid and subsisting — his wife having been allegedly
absent for four years only — constitutes gross
immoral conduct" (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran Jr., 249 SCRA
447). It is evident that respondent failed to meet the
standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.
Issues: W/N Esmeraldo committed gross misconduct
for abandonment, failing to give support, marrying
for the 2nd time without having first obtained judicial
declaration of nullity, and falsification of public
documents.
W/N Esmeraldo’s 2nd marriage with Nieves Ygay is
valid, notwithstanding that there was no judicial
nullity of the former’s marriage with Maria.
Ruling: No. Misconduct, as a ground for
administrative action, has a specific meaning in law.
It only covers such performance of duties as an
officer and not such only affects his character as a
private individual. The acts imputed to Esmeraldo
clearly pertain to his personal life and have no direct
relation to his judicial function. It is necessary to
separate the character of the man from the
character of the officer.
Yes, the second marriage is valid. Article 40 or the
NCC provides that marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration of nullity before any party can
remarry. This was enunciated in Wiegel v. Sempio-
Diy. However, prior decision of the Supreme Court in
Odayat v. Amante states that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of void
marriages. The latter case is applicable to the
foregoing because the second marriage of Esmeraldo
to Nieves took place before the promulgation of the
Wiegel case and before the effectivity of the Family
Code.
In line with this, the charge of falsification of public
documents will not prosper because the bigamy
complaint was not found. Esmeraldo believed in
good faith that the first marriage was void and it in
this belief that shows his lack of malice in filling up
the public documents.
Mercado vs. Tan
Facts: In 1976, Dr. Vicent Mercado and Thelma Oliva
were married. In 1991, Mercado contracted a
marriage with Consuelo Tan. Tan did not know of the
previous and subsisting marriage of Mercado. Tan
filed bigamy against Mercado. After a month,
Mercado filed an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Oliva. In 1993, marriage between
Mercado and Oliva was declared null and void.
Issue: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite
of filing the declaration of nullity of the former
marriage.
Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle
applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as “void.” In the case at bar, Mercado only
filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by
then, the crime had already been consummated. He
contracted second marriage without the judicial
declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense
in a bigamy charge.
Ty vs. CA
Facts: Private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes married
Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on
March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church
wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4,
1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab
initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church
wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null
and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his
marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed
Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in
ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court
of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church
wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil
Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160,
praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared
null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage
license when they got married. He also averred that
at the time he married petitioner, he was still
married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he
married petitioner the decree of nullity of his
marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The
decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was
rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil
marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private
respondent, pointed out that his claim that their
marriage was contracted without a valid license is
untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No.
5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as
Exhs. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this
document when it was submitted in evidence.
Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated
August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil
marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated
on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said
Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents
were submitted as evidence during trial and,
according to petitioner, are therefore deemed
sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the
civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner
took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment
declaring his prior marriage as null and void is
undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private
respondent and petitioner had a church wedding
ceremony on April 4, 1982.
RTC= Private respondent, Nullified marriage with
petitioner for lacking marriage license CA= affirmed
Issue: W/n the decree of nullity of the first marriage
is required before a subsequent marriage can be
entered into validly
Ruling: No. In the present case, the second marriage
of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was
found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of
license and consent, there was no need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he could contract a
second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude
that private respondent’s second marriage to
petitioner is valid.
Where the second marriage of a person was entered
into in 1979, before Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA
499 (1986), during which time the prevailing rule was
found in Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977),
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954) and People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957), there was no need for
a judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack
of license and consent, before such person may
contract a second marriage. —A recent case applied
the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of
the case.
In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a
municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a
second marriage. The judge claimed that his first
marriage was void since he was merely forced into
marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the
issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied
Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the
second marriage took place and all the children
thereunder were born before the promulgation of
Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there
is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at
that time. Similarly, in the present case, the second
marriage of private respondent was entered into in
1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule
was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of
license and consent, there was no need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he could contract a
second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude
that private respondent’s second marriage to
petitioner is valid.
The provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied where to do so would prejudice
the vested rights of a party and of her children.—We
find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so
would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and
of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,
the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there
be impairment of vested rights.
Dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated
November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the
marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private
respondent
Morigo vs. Morigo
Facts: Appellant, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barreta
were boardmates in Bohol for 4 years. They lost
contact with each other afterwards. After several
years, Lucio received a card from Lucia from
Singapore. They exchanged more letters and became
sweethearts.
Lucia returned to the Philippines and left again for
Canada to work. The two still maintained contact.
Lucia came back and asked Lucio to join her in
Canada. They agreed to get married in Bohol. Lucia
then went back to Canada and left Lucio in the
Philippines. A year after, she filed a petition for
divorce in Ontario which was granted.
Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol and
filed a complaint to annul his earlier marriage. This
was based on the ground that no marriage ceremony
took place.
Lucio was charged with bigamy and was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC.
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court
discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to
Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo
v. Court of Appeals , the trial court ruled that want of
a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a
charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should
not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void
even if such be the fact but must first secure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry again.
Lucia's divorce is not recognized in the Philippines or
anywhere because neither spouses are domiciled in
Canada. The court of Ontario will have no jurisdiction
over determining their matrimonial status.
Lucio contended that he acted in good faith. The
appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit. However, the denial was by a split vote. The
dissent observed that as the first marriage was
validly declared void ab initio, there was no first
marriage to speak of.
Issue: W/N the petitioner committed bigamy
Ruling: NO. The elements of bigamy are the
following:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved,
or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid
had it not been for the existence of the first.
The trial court found that there was no actual
marriage ceremony between Lucio and Lucia. There
was only mere signing of the marriage contract
without a solemnizing officer. The marriage was
declared void ab initio. The first element was not
present.
Note:
This case is different from Mercado v. Tan in which
there was actually a marriage solemnized twice --
before a judge where a marriage certificate was
issues and before a priest. The first marriage
appeared to have transpired even if later it was
declared void ab initio. Hence, it was held that
entering a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration constitutes
bigamy. This applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as void.
Tenebro vs. CA
Facts: A was married to B. During the existence of
the marriage, A subsequently contracted a marriage
with C. C, upon learning of the prior marriage, filed a
case for bigamy against A. A claims as a defense that
the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity, is an
indicator that his marriage lacks the essential
requisites for validity, and such retroacts to the date
of celebration of the second marriage, thus there
being no valid second marriage, there can be no
bigamy.
Issue: Whether a judicial declaration of the nullity of
a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of
psychological incapacity, is a defense in a criminal
case for bigamy.
Ruling: It is not. The subsequent judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as Philippine
penal laws are concerned, and A is still criminally
liable for bigamy for contracting the second or
subsequent marriage (SoSM) during the subsistence
of a valid marriage (SoaVM). A’s marriage is null and
void ab initio, regardless of psychological capacity or
incapacity, since a marriage contracted during the
SoaVM is automatically void. The nullity of the
second marriage is not per se a defense in bigamy. In
any case, there is no reason to distinguish between
the 2 grounds for purposes of bigamy. Bigamy is
consummated by the mere act of contracting a SoSM
during the SoaVM.
The fourth element of bigamy is that the SoSM has
all the essential requisites for validity (citing Reyes).
The nullity of a marriage under Art 36 is NOT an
indicator that A’s marriage lacks the essential
requisites for validity. The second marriage of A has
all the essential (legal capacity and consent freely
given) and formal (authority of solemnizing officer,
marriage license, and marriage ceremony) requisites
for the validity of marriage, and thus is valid for
purposes of bigamy.
Dissenting Opinion:
In bigamy, the fourth element is that the second
marriage should be valid, except on the ground of
existence of a prior marriage. If the marriage is void
ab initio on grounds other than the existence of the
first marriage (including psychological incapacity),
then legally there exists no second marriage and
there can be no bigamy. (Note: the dissent uses a
different version of the fourth element of bigamy
from the main opinion)
Jones vs. Hortiguela
Facts: Marciana Escano married Arthur Jones in
Cebu. Arthur Jones secured passport to go abroad
and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him.
Proceedings were institute by Marciana Escaño, to
have her husband judicially declared an absentee.
The court issued an order declaring Arthur W. Jones
an absentee. Pursuant to the provisions of article
186 of the Civil Code, with the proviso that said
judicial declaration of absence would not take effect
until six months after its publication in the official
newspapers. The court issued another order for the
taking effect of the declaration of absence,
publication thereof having been made in the Official
Gazette and in "El Ideal." Felix Hortiguela and
Marciana Escaño were married before the justice of
the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the
certificate of marriage. Marciana Escaño dies. As
Marciana Escaño had died intestate, her widower
Felix Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator
of her entire estate, and in an order issued on May 9,
1932, Angelita Jones, her daughter by her first
marriage, and Felix Hortiguela, her widower by her
second marriage, were declared her only heirs.
Issue: Whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged
marriage to Marciana Escaño was celebrated. (read
in Ma’am’s book as when to start couting the period
of absence by the first husband to enable the spouse
present to validly remarry.)
Ruling: YES. Marriage between Felix Hortiguela and
Marciana Escaño is valid. Section III, paragraph 2,
General orders, No. 68. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the
former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his
or her former spouse to be living, that such former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believe at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Court did not agree with
Angelita.
Angelita contends that the declaration of absence
must be understood to have been made not in the
order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23,
1921, and that from the latter date to May 6, 1927,
the date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6
years and 14 days elapsed; and in accordance with
section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No. 68,
the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and
Marciana Escaño is null and void. Starting point
(court order declaring Jones an absentee and
published)
April 23, 1921 May 6, 1927 = less than 7 years
The Courts Says…
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee.
Declaration of Absence
Its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the
estate of the absentee. The absence of former
husband should be counted from January 10, 1918,
the date on which the last news concerning Arthur
was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927,
more than nine years elapsed. therefore, valid and
lawful. Starting point (applied for passport and last
hear from) January 10, 1918 May 6, 1927 = more
than 7 years
Republic vs. Nolasco
Facts: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet
Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet
started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months.
It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he
brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got
married in January 1982. Due to another contract,
Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received
a letter from his mother informing him that his son
had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco
went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s
whereabouts. He did so by securing another
seaman’s contract going to London. He wrote
several letters to the bar where they first met but it
was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a
declaration of presumptive death of Janet.
Issue: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded
belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s
efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show
that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was
already dead because instead of seeking assistance
of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even
secured another contract. More so, while he was in
London, he did not even try to solicit help of the
authorities to find his wife.
Bienvenido vs. CA
Facts: Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in
Manila on October 3,1942. On February 6, 1962,
without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being
dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another
marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho
(Luisita) with whom he had been living since 1953
and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio
Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on May 22,
1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan
where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio’s
marriage when, because of their quarrels, one or the
other left the dwelling place for long periods of time.
In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at
various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan. In
1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido,
who had been estranged from her husband, Luis
Rivera. He lived with her from June 1968 until
Aurelio’s death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her,
the last time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City.
Petitioner’s daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as
did Aurelio’s son, Chito, who lived with them for
about a year in 1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the
lot on Delgado Street in which they were staying
from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette
Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of sale and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his name, Aurelio
was described as single. On November 26, 1984,
Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in
favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum
of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in
petitioner’s name on January 11, 1985.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito
brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of
the property to petitioner and the payment to them
of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was
a forgery and that in any event it was executed in
fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
In answer petitioner Nenita claimed that she and the
late Aurelio had purchased the property in question
using their joint funds which they had accumulated
after living together for fourteen years, that the sale
of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with
respondent Luisita’s consent; and that she was a
purchaser in good faith.
Issue/s: Whether the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita
is valid.
Whether the deed of sale between Aurelio and
Nenita is valid.
Ruling: RTC: (What is the RTC’s basis for grant or
denial of the appeal?) On August 29, 1989, the trial
court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the
property to petitioner and dismissing the complaint
of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of
petitioner to be genuine and respondents Luisita and
Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property
until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late
Aurelio who had represented himself to be single.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the
trial court denied their motion.
Court of Appeals: (What is the CA’s basis for grant or
denial of the appeal?) On appeal the respondents
prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court and declared
respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in
dispute. Although Luisita had admitted that as early
as 1985 she knew that Nenita had been staying in
the premises, the appellate court held that
respondents’ action was not barred by laches
because Luisita allegedly did not know that Nenita
had obtained title to the property.
On the merit, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the
absence of proof to the contrary, Aurelio’s first wife
must be presumed to have been absent for seven
years without Aurelio having news of her being alive
when Aurelio contracted a second marriage. On this
premise, it held (1) that the property in dispute
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and
Luisita and (2) that the sale of the property to Nenita
was void for the same reason that donations
between persons who are guilty of concubinage or
adultery are declared void under Art. 739 of the Civil
Code.
Supreme Court: (What is the SC’s basis for grant or
denial of the appeal?) The decision appealed from is
REVERSED and another one is entered, DISMISSING
the complaint against petitioner and DECLARING the
deed of sale executed in her favor and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 326681 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City issued in her name to be
VALID.
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on
respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelio’s
marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order
to be considered valid. They failed to discharge this
burden. Instead the contrary appears.
It has been held that the first exception refers to the
subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and
not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the
period of seven years had lapsed. 6 This exception
cannot be invoked in this case in order to sustain the
validity of Aurelio’s marriage to Luisita because
apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first wife.
At the time of his second marriage to Luisita, he and
Luisita had already been living together as husband
and wife for five years. In fact the couple begot a
child, in 1961, even before their marriage in 1962.
Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the
property in question was property of the conjugal
partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because
there was no such partnership in the first place. The
sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner’s
ownership is evidenced by a deed of absolute sale 7
executed with all the solemnity of a public document
and by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued
in due course in her name. Indeed, the property in
question was acquired by Aurelio during a long
period of cohabitation with petitioner which lasted
for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew
respondent Chito to be Aurelio’s son way back in
1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio
to be married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio
represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner
was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio’s child
by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no
basis for the Court of Appeals’ ruling that Nenita was
not a buyer in good faith of the property because she
ought to have known that Aurelio was married to
Luisita.
Armas vs. Calisterio
Facts: Teodorico died intestate and was survived by
his wife, Marietta. Teodorico was the second
husband of Marietta who had been previously
married to James, who disappeared without a trace.
Teodorico and Marietta were married without having
secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead. Antonia, surviving sister of
Teodorico, claiming to be sole surviving heir of
Teodorico, alleged that the marriage between
Teodorico and Marieta was bigamous and thus, null
and void. The RTC ruled that the marriage between
Marietta and teoderico is void; hence, Antonia was
declared as the sole heir of teoderico. The CA
reversed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between
deceased Teodorico and Marietta is valid and thus,
Marietta can inherit from Teodorico.
Ruling: The second marriage, having been contracted
during the regime of the Civil Code, is valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration
of presumptive death of James.xxxThe conjugal
property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence
having been adduced to indicate another property
regime between the spouses, pertains to them in
common. Upon the dissolution with the death of
Teodorico, the property should be divided into 2
equal portions: one portion to the surviving spouse
and the other portion to the estate of the deceased
spouse.
The successional right in intestacy of a surviving
spouse over the net estate of the deceased,
concurring with the legitimate brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is ½ of the inheritance, the brothers
and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to
the other half. Brothers and sisters exclude nephews
and nieces except only in representation by the latter
of their parents who predeceased or are
incapacitated to succeed.
Republic vs. Bermudez-Lorino
FACTS: Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in
June 1987. The wife was unaware that her husband was a
habitual drinker with violent attitude and character and had
the propensity to go out with his friends to the point of being
unable to work. In 1991 she left him and returned to her
parents together with her three children. She went abroad to
work for her support her children. From the time she left him,
she had no communication with him or his relatives. In 2000,
nine years after leaving her husband, Gloria filed a verified
petition with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial
Proceedings in the Family Law. The lower court issued an
order for the publication of the petition in a newspaper of
general circulation. In November 7, 2001, the RTC granted the
summary petition. Although the judgment was final and
executors under the provisions of Act. 247 of the Family Code,
the OSG for the Republic of the Philippines filed a notice of
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death under Art 41 of the Family
Code were duly established.
Ruling: Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary
Judicial Proceeding in the Family Law, sets the tenor for cases
scoured by these rules, to wit: Art 238. Until modified by the
Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceeding. Such cases shall be decided in an expedition’s
manner without regards technical rules. The judge of the RTC
fully complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously
rending judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal
offer of evidence by the petitioner.
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on
the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed
the appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and
reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of
November 7, 2001 was immediately final and
executory. As it were, the Court of Appeals
committed grave reversible error when it failed to
dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on
ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express
provision of law, the judgment was not appealable.
Petition Denied.
Republic vs. CA (458 SCRA 200)
Facts: Regional Trial Court granted the petition for
declaration of presumptive death and
accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had
left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier,
presumptively dead. The Republic, through the OSG,
sought to appeal the RTC’s order by filing a Notice of
Appeal. RTC disapproved the Notice of Appeal since
RTC believed that the present case is a special
proceeding that needs a record of appeal to perfect
the appeal. The Republic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. The Republic
then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals which was also denied on the same grounds.
ISSUE: WON a petition for declaration of the
presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a
special proceeding
Ruling: NO. A petition for declaration of presumptive
death is a summary ordinary proceeding and not a
special proceeding.
It is an ordinary proceeding since Rule 109 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which enumerates the cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a record
on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected,
does not include declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse in its enumeration.
It is a summary proceeding since Article 41 of the
Family Code provides that a petition for declaration
of presumptive death for the purpose of contracting
the subsequent marriage is a summary proceeding.
Not being a special proceeding, the petition
therefore does not need a record of appeal to
perfect the appeal. Rule 41, Section 2 subsection (a)
of the Revised Rules of Court provide that a record of
appeal is only needed in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate
appeals where the law or these Rules so require.
Manuel vs. People
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first
married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who,
according to the former, was charged with estafa in
1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen
again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B.
Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only
21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the
two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio
City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first
marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got
rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in
fact already married when he married him. She then
filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo
Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his
declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with
Gandalera was done because he believed in good
faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he
did not know that he had to go to court to seek for
the nullification of his first marriage before marrying
Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him
sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and
10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f
P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he
alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy
because when he married the private complainant,
he did so in good faith and without any malicious
intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with
modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment
was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years.
Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner acted with malice or
deliberate intent when he married private
complainant?
Ruling: The petition is denied for lack of merit. The
petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or
evil intent when he married the private complainant.
As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a
felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not
an excuse because everyone is presumed to know
the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a
spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only
after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive
death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged
and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will
have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such
judgment is proof of the good faith of the present
spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus,
even if the present spouse is later charged with
bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot
be convicted of the crime. The court ruled against
the petitioner.
2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts
of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriage with the private complainant were willful,
deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s
acts are against public policy as they undermine and
subvert the family as a social institution, good morals
and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent
victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred
from claiming moral damages. Considering the
attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds
the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be
just and reasonable.
Republic vs. CA (477 SCRA 277)
Facts: On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a
petition in the Regional Trial Courtbfor the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia
“Lea” A. Julaton.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and
Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan,
Samar. He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea
arrived home late in the evening and he berated her
for being always out of their house. He told her that
if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be
better for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not
reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work
the following day, Lea was still in the house, but
when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was
nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely
went to her parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño,
Catbalogan, Samar. However, Lea did not return to
their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, he inquired Lea’s
whereabouts but to no avail.
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila
to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave
after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea
may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed.
However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for
Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in
Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying.
When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she
had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s
whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth.
Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On
his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but
still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997
and again looked for his wife but failed.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance
to the local police station. The police authorities
issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also
reported Lea’s disappearance to the National Bureau
of Investigation on July 9, 2001.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment
granting the petition.
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals which rendered judgment on August 4,
2003, affirming the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the declaration of presumptive
death of the wife is valid
Ruling: No. In view of the summary nature of
proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of one’s
spouse, the degree of due diligence set by the Court
in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse
must be strictly complied with. It is the policy of the
State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the
family. Since marriage is an inviolable social
institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to
protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-
founded belief that his wife is already dead and that
he exerted the required amount of diligence in
searching for his missing wife, the petition for
declaration of presumptive death should have been
denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of
Appeals. For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse
present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead before
the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage. The law does not define what is meant by
a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es
menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en
motivos racionales.” The Court finds and so holds
that the respondent failed to prove that he had a
well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the
trial court, that his spouse Rosalia “Lea” Julaton was
already dead. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside.
Republic vs. Tango
Facts: On March 9, 1987, Ferventino and Maria were
married4 in civil rites before then Mayor Ignacio
Bunye of Muntinlupa City. None of Maria’s relatives
witnessed the ceremony as they were opposed to
her relationship with Ferventino. The two had only
spent a night together and had been intimate once
when Maria told Ferventino that she and her family
will soon be leaving for the United States of America
(USA). Maria assured Ferventino, however, that she
will file a petition so he can live with her in the USA.
In the event that said petition is denied, she
promised to return to the Philippines to live with
him. On March 13, 1987, Maria and her family flew
to Seattle, USA.
Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year
before she stopped responding to his letters. Out of
resentment, he burned all the letters Maria wrote
him. He claims to have forgotten her address since.
Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find
Maria. Upon inquiry from the latter’s uncle, Antonio
Ledesma, in Las Piñas, Ferventino learned that even
Maria’s relatives were unaware of her whereabouts.
He also solicited the assistance of a friend in Texas,
Capt. Luis Aris of the U.S. Air Force, but to no avail.
Finally, he sought the aid of his parents Antonio and
Eusebia in Los Angeles, and his aunt Anita Castro-
Mayor in Seattle. Like, Ledesma though, their
attempts to find Maria proved fruitless. The next 14
years went by without any news of Maria.
On the belief that his wife had died, Ferventino filed
a verified petition5 dated October 1, 2001 before the
Ligao City RTC for the declaration of presumptive
death of Maria within the contemplation of Article
41 of the Family Code.
When the case was called for initial hearing on
January 8, 2002, nobody entered any opposition. On
July 22, 2002, Ferventino presented evidence ex
parte and testified in court about the details of his
search. On July 23, 2002, Branch 11 of the Ligao City
RTC issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring
MARIA JOSE V. VILLARBA, wife of FERVENTINO U.
TANGO, presumptively dead within the meaning of
Article 41 of the Family Code.
This prompted the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), for the Republic, to file a Notice of Appeal.7
Acting thereon, Presiding Judge Romulo SG.
Villanueva of the Ligao City RTC had the records of
the case transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, treating the case as an
ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, affirmed the RTC’s Order.
ISSUE: WON Tango has established a basis to form a
well-founded belief that his absent spouse is already
dead
WON the Office of the Solicitor General is correct in
filing a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals
(MAIN ISSUE)
RULING: Family Code and accordingly, refine our
previous decisions thereon. Article 238 of the Family
Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the
rules that govern summary court proceedings in the
Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the
procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases
provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the
cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three
of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3
hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings
filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217,
insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same
title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be
immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the
court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows
that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s
judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party
may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs
and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing
party may then file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the
court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment which are the proper
subject of an appeal.
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious
procedural lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in
the Court of Appeals instead of a petition for
certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving due course
to said appeal and ordering the transmittal of the
records of the case to the appellate court. By no
means did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction
to review the judgment of the RTC which, by express
provision of law, was immediately final and
executory. Adding to the confusion, the Court of
Appeals entertained the appeal and treated the
same as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court. As it were, the Court of Appeals
committed grave reversible error when it failed to
dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express
provision of the law, the judgment was not
appealable.
Before us, petitioner filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But,
even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal at
this level, the hands of the Court are tied. Without a
doubt, the decision of the trial court had long
become final. Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence
is the principle that a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As
such, it may no longer be modified in any respect
even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it
will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.
In light of the foregoing, it would be unnecessary, if
not useless, to discuss the issues raised by petitioner.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on
the fundamental principle of public policy and sound
practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the
judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final on some definite date
fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule
are the correction of clerical errors, the so called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision which render its execution unjust and
inequitable. None of the exceptions obtains here to
merit the review sought.
Republic vs. Matias-Dagdag
Facts: Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan
Dagdag and begot two children. Avelino would
disappear for months without explanation and
attend to drinking sprees with friends and return
home drunk when with the family; forced his wife to
have sexual intercourse and if she resisted, would
inflict injure to the latter. He left his family again and
never heard of him. Erlinda was constrained to look
for a job to fend for themselves. Erlinda then learned
that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and
that he escaped from jail who remains at-large at
date.Erlinda filed for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court
rendered a decision declaring the marriage void
under Artcile 36 of the Family Code. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals raising that
the lower court erred in declaring the apellee's
marriage to Avelino Dagdag null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity of the latter,
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, the
psychological incapacity of the nature contemplated
by the law not having been proven to exist.
However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court
Issue: Whether or not immaturity and
irresponsibility, habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive
from justice constitutes psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code to declare the
marriage null and void.
Ruling: No. The ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina case is reiterated herein in which the
Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
“the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Codeas regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state.
Antonio vs. Reyes
Facts: Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie
Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a
year after their first meeting, they got married at
Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church
wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was
born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things. She even did not conceal
bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented
to her husband as adopted child of their family. They
were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for
reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a
petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared
null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Issue: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the
Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null
and void.
Ruling: Psychological incapacity pertains to the
inability to understand the obligations of marriage as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them.
The petitioner, aside from his own testimony
presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who
attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of
Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated
his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which amounts
to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic
ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of
fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe that made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage. The root
causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been
medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s
psychological incapacity was considered so grave
that a restrictive clause was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibited by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent. It would be difficult
for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the
basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case
is incurable considering that petitioner tried to
reconcile with her but her behavior remain
unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has
established his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris
Facts: The couple’s relationship before the marriage
and even during their brief union was not all bad.
During that relatively short period of time, Armida
was happy and contented with her life in the
company of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a
responsible and loving husband. Their problems
began when Armida started doubting Brix’s fidelity. It
was only when they started fighting about the calls
from women that Brix began to withdraw into his
shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called
marital obligations. Brix could not understand
Armida’s lack of trust in him and her constant
naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix
could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy.
Petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity in
the RTC. RTC denied the petition where they ruled
that epilepsy does not amount to psychological
incapacity and s were not evidences were not
sufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner filed for
motion for reconsideration which was denied having
no evidence that respondent was mentally or
physically ill. Petitioner appealed to the CA, CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision. Petitioner gain filed for
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
CA. Thus, she filed for a petition for review of
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was psychological
incapacity in the case.
RULING: NO. The term “psychological incapacity” to
be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. The root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which
the petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she
arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed
personality disorder called “schizoid,” and why he is
the “dependent and avoidant type.” In fact, Dr.
Dayan’s statement that one suffering from such
mixed personality disorder is dependent on others
for decision lacks specificity; it seems to belong to
the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan’s
information that respondent had extramarital affairs
was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when
asked as to the root cause of respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was
vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that
such disorder “can be part of his family upbringing.”
The SC finds the respondent's alleged mixed
personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house"
attitude whenever they quarrelled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and
his preference to spend more time with his band
mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage
Bier vs. Bier
Facts: Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier met
respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier through his
sister. On July 26, 1992, six months after their first
meeting, they were married at the UST Santissimo
Rosario Parish Church. Everything went well for the
first three years of their marriage. As petitioner was
based in Saudi Arabia as an electronics technician at
Saudia Airlines, the parties decided to maintain two
residences, one in the Philippines and another in
Saudi Arabia. They took turns shuttling between the
two countries just so they could spend time together.
The couple started experiencing marital problems
after three years of marriage. She started becoming
aloof towards him and began to spend more time
with her friends than with him, refusing even to have
sexual relations with him for no apparent reason. She
became an alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She also
started neglecting her husband's needs and the
upkeep of their home, and became an absentee wife.
After being gone from their home for days on end,
she would return without bothering to account for
her absence. As a result, they frequently quarreled.
Finally, on April 10, 1997, respondent suddenly left
for the United States. Petitioner has not heard from
her since.
On April 1, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill her essential marital obligations to petitioner.
After trial, trial court rendered judgment granting the
petition. Respondent Republic of the Philippines,
through the OSG, appealed the decision of the RTC
to the CA. the appeal was granted. Decision of
the trial court was reversed and set aside. CA held
that petitioner failed to comply with the guidelines
laid down in Molina as the root cause of
respondent's psychological incapacity was not
medically or clinically identified. Worse, the same
was not even alleged in the petition filed in the
court a quo. As such, it granted the appeal and
reversed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the CA decision. The
same was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the petition should be
denied because of its non-observance from the
requirements laid down in the Molina case and
whether the totality of evidence constitutes
psychological incapacity.
RULING: The guidelines set in Molina incorporate the
three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: “psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
“medically or clinically identified.” What is important
is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Dr. Tayag's report, which found respondent to be
suffering from psychological incapacity, particularly a
narcissistic personality disorder, relied only on the
information fed by petitioner. This was admitted by
petitioner in his petition for review on certiorari and
memorandum filed in this Court. Furthermore, as
already stated, the report also failed to identify the
root cause of respondent's narcissistic personality
disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception
of the marriage.
Although there is no requirement that a party to be
declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or a psychologist
(as a condition sine qua non), there is nevertheless
still a need to prove the psychological incapacity
through independent evidence adduced by the
person alleging said disorder.
In the case at bar, petitioner was able to establish
that respondent was remiss in her duties as a wife
and had become a happy-go-lucky woman who failed
to attend to her husband's needs and who eventually
abandoned him. However, the totality of her acts, as
testified to by petitioner and his brother, was not
tantamount to a psychological incapacity, as
petitioner would have us believe. Habitual
alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure or refusal to meet
one's duties and responsibilities as a married person
and eventual abandonment of a spouse do not
suffice to nullify a marriage on the basis
of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be due to
some psychological (as opposed to physical) illness.
Petition is denied and CA decision affirmed.
Lim vs. CA
Facts: Petitioner Nelly Lim and private respondent
are lawfully married to each other. Private
respondent filed a petition for annulment of such
marriage on the ground that petitioner has been
allegedly suffering from a schizophrenia “before,
during and after the
marriage and until the present.” After the issues
were joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial on
the merits ensued. Private respondent’s counsel
announced that he would present as his next witness
the Chief of the Female Services of the National
Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of
Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Petitioner’s
counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the
testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is
privileged since the latter had examined the
petitioner in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from
schizophrenia.Petitioner's counsel argued that having
seen and examined the petitioner in a professional
capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying
under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-
patient relationship. Counsel for private respondent
contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be
presented as an expert witness and would not testify
on any information acquired while attending to the
petitioner in a professional capacity. The trial court
denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify.
Issue: Whether or not the information given by the
physician in her testimony in open court a privileged
communication.
Ruling: No. The physician may be considered to be
acting in his professional capacity when he attends to
the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative
treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have
been made to the physician to enable him "safely
and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by
the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the
tenor only of the communication that is privileged.
The mere fact of making a communication, as well as
the date of a consultation and the number of
consultations, are therefore not privileged from
disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is
not stated." One who claims this privilege must
prove the presence of these aforementioned
requisites. Dr. Acampado was presented and
qualified as an expert witness. She did not disclose
anything obtained in the course of her examination,
interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover,
the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical
problem did not refer to and had no bearing on
whatever information or findings the doctor
obtained while attending to the patient. There is, as
well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the
questions propounded to her relating to the
hypothetical problem were influenced by the
information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise
stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever
information or knowledge she had about the
petitioner which was acquired by reason of the
physician-patient relationship existing between
them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the
trial court cannot then be excluded.
In order that the disqualification by reason of
physician-patient privilege be successfully claimed,
the following requisites should concur: (1) the
privilege is claimed in a civil case; (2) the person
against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the information
while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity; (4) the information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; (5)
the information was confidential and if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation of the patient.
Salita vs. Magtolis
Facts: Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were
married. A year later, their union turned sour and
they separated in fact. Subsequently, Erwin sued for
annulment on the ground that Joselita was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of their marriage
although the same became manifest only thereafter.
Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition,
Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial
court granted. Subsequently, in his bill of particulars,
Edwin specified that at the time of their marriage,
Joselita was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of their
marriage in that she was unable to understand and
accept the demands made by his profession – that of
a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine – upon
petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently
complained of his lack of attention to her even to her
mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to
lose his job. Still Joselita was not contented with the
Bill of Particulars. She argued that the assertion in
the bill of particulars is a statement of legal
conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an
averment of ultimate facts as required by the Rules
of Court. The trial court issued an order upholding its
sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her
responsive pleading. The petition for certiorari was
denied due course by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner insist that the allegations in the Bill of
Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an
averment of facts, and fails to point out the specific
essential marital obligations she allegedly was not
able to perform, and thus render it insufficient if not
irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She
rationalizes that her insistence on the specification
of her particular conduct or behavior with the
corresponding circumstances of time, place and
person does not call for information on evidentiary
matters because without these details she cannot
adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to
the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the allegations in the petition
for annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of
particulars filed in amplification of the petition is
sufficient.
Ruling: Yes. Private respondent has already alleged
that “petitioner was unable to understand and
accept the demands made by his profession x x x
upon his time and efforts x x x x” Certainly, she can
respond to this. To demand for more details would
indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts
– facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts.
For sure, the additional facts called for petitioner
regarding her particular acts or omissions would be
evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not
the function of a motion for bill of particulars.
Ultimate facts have been defined as those facts
which the expected evidence will support. As stated
by private respondent, the term does not refer to
the details of probative matter or particular evidence
by which these material elements are to be
established. It refers to the facts which the evidence
on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which
will be required to prove the existence of those
facts. There being no reversible error, the instant
petition is denied and the question resolution of
Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Krohn vs. CA
Facts: On June 14, 1964, petitioner Ma. Paz
Fernandez Krohn and private respondent Edgar
Krohn, Jr. married each other. However, their
relationship went sour and they separated in fact in
1973. In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the
confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz. In 1990,
Edgar later filed a petition for annulment, citing the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report on the said
petition. In her answer, Ma. Paz merely denied it as
“either unforced or irrelevant.” When Edgar took the
witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of
the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report, he
was stopped by an objection because it allegedly
violated the rule on privileged communication
between physician and patient. Ma. Paz then
submitted a Manifestation expressing her
“continuing objection” to it. The trial court then
issued an Order admitting the Confidential
Psychiatric Evaluation Report and later denied Ma.
Paz’s Motion to Reconsider Order. Upon appeal to
the Court of Appeals, it dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report on Ma. Paz should be admitted as
evidence in their annulment case? -YES.
Ruling: In Lim v. Court of Appeals, the Court
discussed the following requisites in order that
privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the
privilege is claimed in a civil cases; (b) the person
against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information
while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity; (d) the information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and,
(e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of
the patient."
In this case, the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is not one duly authorized to practice
medicine. He is merely the patient's husband who
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical
practitioners. This clearly does not fall within the
claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be
considered a circumvention of the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and
effect of the testimony of the physician who
examined the patient and executed the report.
Santos vs. CA
Facts: Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia
Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia
left for the U.S. She did not communicate with
Leouel and did not return to the country. In 1991,
Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a
complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC
dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the
dismissal.
ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at
the very least to communicate with him, for more
than five years constitute psychological incapacity?
RULING: No, the failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with her husband Leouel for more
than five years does not constitute psychological
incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL
ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Art. 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. Undeniably and
understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all
the specific answers to every individual
problem. PETITION IS DENIED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
Facts: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi were married
for 10 months. But still their marriage was not
consummated because the husband refuses to have
sexual intercourse with his spouse. Even if she
already made efforts, they still failed to consummate
their marriage by performing coitus. The spouses
decided to undergo a medical check up to see if
there was something wrong with them. The Doctor
found out that there was nothing wrong with their
organs and that the man was not impotent.
Issue: Is the failure of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife from the time of the
marriage until their separation on March 15, 1989 a
ground for psychological incapacity
Ruling: One of the essential marital obligations under
the Family Code is “to procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual
relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of this Court
clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.
Psychological incapacity, which a ground for
annulment of marriage (which is different from
divorce), contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity. Among the grounds for
annulment of marriage, psychological incapacity is
the more (if not the most) commonly used. It is also
one of the more controversial provisions of
the Family Code (Article 36). The guidelines
(shortened here) in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 were handed down by the
Supreme Court in Molina:
1. The plaintiff (the spouse who filed the petition in
court) has burden of showing the nullity of the
marriage. Our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family, so any doubt is resolved in
favor of the existence/continuation of the marriage.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
“the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted
as root causes.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
Republic vs. Olaviano Molino
Facts: Roridel O. Molina filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. Roridel and Reynaldo were married at San
Agustin Church in Manila. Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility. Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila which made Roridel the
sole breadwinner of the family. The couple had a
very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged. Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown
that he was psychologically incapable of complying
with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who
thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it
would be to the couple's best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them
from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage
from the start. Reynaldo admitted that they could no
longer live together as husband and wife. Reynaldo
stated that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to:
1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage
2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals
3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle
their finances.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied
by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue/s: Whether or not irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personality constitute psychological
incapacity.
Ruling: In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity ...and that
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,
Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no
clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (not physical)
illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely
showed that she and her husband could not get
along with each other. There had been no showing of
the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his
alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made
to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part and of being "conservative, homely
and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is not indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity.
Hernandez vs. CA
Facts: Lucita Estrella Hernandez, petitioner, filed a
petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to
private respondent, Mario C. Hernandez on the
ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She
alleged that from the time of their marriage up to
the time of the filing of the suit, the respondent
failed to perform his obligation to support the family
and contribute to the management of the
household. He devoted most of his time engaging in
drinking sprees with his friends. During their
marriage, he cohabitated with another woman with
whom he had an illegitimate child. He also had affairs
with different women which endangered the health
of the petitioner for infecting her with a sexually
transmitted disease (STD). She averred that
respondent was irresponsible, immature and
unprepared for the duties of a married life. A
petitioner’s friend, Ester Alfaro testified and
confirmed that the petitioner was once hospitalized
because she was beaten up by the respondent.
Alfaro tried to talk to the petitioner but was accused
by the latter of meddling with their marital life.
Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the
family, the respondent be ordered to give support to
their three children in the total of P9000 every
month; that she be awarded the custody of their
children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner
of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio
Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite,
purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep
which respondent took with him when he left the
conjugal home.
Issue: Whether or not the court will grant the
petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the respondent.
Ruling: No. Petitioner failed to establish the fact that
at the time they were married, private respondent
was suffering from a psychological defect which in
fact deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities; It was not sufficiently proved that
private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling
his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological
nature, and not merely physical.
The respondent’s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is
suffering from a psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Expert testimony
should have been presented to establish the precise
cause of private respondent’s psychological
incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at
the inception of the marriage.
Marcos vs. Marcos
Facts: Brenda Marcos, the petitioner, married the
respondent Wilson Marcos twice on September 6,
1982 and May 8, 1983 respectively and had five
children. After Ferdinand Marcos was overthrown
during the EDSA revolution, the respondent left the
military service and engaged in various business
ventures with which he had never succeeded. This
had created quarrels between the couple which
ended up with the respondent hitting and beating his
wife, herein petitioner. Consequently, the couple
separated in 1992. And on October 16, 1994, though
they have already led separate lives, the respondent
arrived in their residence resulting to a bitter quarrel
which turned to be violent in the end. Subsequently,
herein petitioner suffered physical injuries from her
husband.
Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage in
the RTC assailing Article 36 of the Family Code. The
court ruled the respondent to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not
been established by the totality of the evidence
presented. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children,
petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was
enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
RULING: The court ruled the negative. The
testimonies of petitioner, the common children,
petitioner's sister and the social worker – were not
enough to sustain a finding that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated. Article 36 of the Family
Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. And to prove the
spouse’s psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage is to meet the three basic
requirements: gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability.
In the case at bar, the petitioner herein failed to
exhaust and present all possible evidence to show
that her husband is psychologically incapacitated.
There was no evidence that herein respondent had
presented such defects before their marriage and
that they are incurable.
Sin vs. Sin
Facts: FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, the petitioner,
was married with Philipp Sin, a Portuguese citizen in
January 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented
their respective documentary and testimonial
evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed
Florence’s petition and throughout its trial, the State
did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal
Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation
dated November 1994 stating that he found no
collusion between the parties, he did not actively
participated therein. Other than having appearance
at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.
Issue: Whether the declaration of nullity may be
declared even with the absence of the participation
of the State in the proceedings.
Ruling: Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in
all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial
court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification briefly stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the
petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that
the State participated in the prosecution of the case
thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
Pesca vs. Pesca
Facts: The petitioner and respondent were married
and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity on the part of her
husband. She alleged that he is emotionally
immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and
violent. The Petitioner as well as her children
suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their
children left the home. Her husband was imprisoned
for 11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared
their marriage null and void. CA reversed the
decision of the trial court, stating that petitioner had
failed to establish that the respondent showed signs
of mental incapacity, that incapacity is grave,
preceded the marriage and is incurable, that such
incapacity is psychological, that the root cause has
been identified medically/clinically and has been
proven by an expert and that such incapacity is
permanent and incurable in nature. Petitioner
argued that the doctrine enunciated in Santos v. CA
as well as the guidelines set out in Republic v. CA and
Molina should have no retroactive application.
Petitioner further argues, the application of the
Santos and Molina case should at least only warrant
a remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings and not its dismissal.
Issue: Are the guidelines for psychological incapacity
in the Molina and Santos cases should be taken in
consideration in deciding this case?
Ruling: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid
down by the SC before a case would fall under the
category of psychological incapacity to declare a
marriage null and void. This decision has force and
effect of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in
nature.
The Court held that the “doctrine of stare decisis”
ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the legal maxim – “legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law.
The interpretation or construction placed by the
courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as
of the date the statute was enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of the Court finds itself later overruled,
and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of the parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith (“lex prospicit, non respicit”). Petitioner
utterly failed, both in her allegations and in her
evidence to prove psychological incapacity on the
part of the respondent.
Republic vs. Tanyag San Jose
Facts: Manolito San Jose and Laila Tanyag-San Jose
got married and had two children. For nine years, the
couple stayed with Manolito’s parents. Manolito was
unemployed and was addicted to gambling and
drugs. As for Laila, she sold fish at the wet market of
Taguig. On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and
transferred to her parents’ house. On March 9, 1999,
Laila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Testifying for Laila, Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical
psychologist at the National Center for Mental
Health, declared that from the psychological test and
clinical interview she conducted on Laila, she found
Manolito, whom she did not personally examine, to
be psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties of a husband. RTC denied Lalila’s petition. CA
reversed RTC’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not Manolito is psychologically
incapacitated
Ruling: NO. The mere fact that a spouse is jobless
and cannot support the family is not a ground to
declare a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The term refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. The term "psychological
incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady
so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of the
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
The report of Dr. Tayag shows that her conclusion
about Manolito‘s psychological incapacity was based
on the information supplied by Laila which she found
to be ―factual. Undoubtedly, the doctor‘s conclusion
is hearsay. It is unscientific and unreliable. Dr. Tayag's
Psychological Report does not even show that the
alleged anti-social personality disorder of Manolito
was already present at the inception of the marriage
or that it is incurable. Neither does it explain the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor
identify its root cause. It merely states that "such
disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply
immersed within the system and continues to
influence the individual until the later stage of life."
Manolito's alleged psychological incapacity is thus
premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as
well as his inability to support his family and his
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Manolito's state or condition
or attitude has not been shown, however, to be a
malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or
debilitating psychological condition.
Zamora vs. CA
Facts: Bernardino Zamora and Norma Mercado-
Zamora were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City.
After their marriage, they lived together but did not
produce any child. In 1972, Norma left for the United
States to work as a nurse. She returned to the
Philippines for a few months, then left again in 1974.
Thereafter, she made periodic visits to Cebu City until
1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen.
Bernardino filed an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage anchored on the alleged "psychological
incapacity" of Norma. To support his position, he
alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere
thought of having children as evidenced by the fact
that she had not borne him a child. Furthermore, he
also alleged that respondent abandoned him by
living in the US and had in fact become an American
citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived
together for not more than three years.
On the other hand, respondent denied that she
refused to have a child. She portrayed herself as one
who loves children as she is a nurse by profession
and that she would, from time to time, borrow her
husband's niece and nephews to care for them. She
also faulted her husband for the breakup of their
marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her.
He allegedly had two affairs with different women,
and he begot at least three children with them.
The CA ruled that the mere refusal of Norma to bear
a child is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
since even if such allegation is true, it is not shown or
proven that this is due to psychological illness.
Petitioner argues that:
In the case of Santos v. CA, the court only required
"the well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable." However, no expert opinion is helpful or
even desirable to determine whether Norma, in this
case, has been living abroad and away from her
husband for many years; whether she has a child;
and whether she has made her residence abroad
permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship; and
Among the essential marital obligations embraced by
Articles 68-71 of the Family Code is to procreate
children through sexual cooperation which is the
basic end of marriage. To live together under one
roof for togetherness spells the unity in marriage.
The marriage has been existing for twenty four years
but throughout this period, respondent deliberately
and obstinately refused to comply with the essential
marital obligation to live and cohabit with her
husband.
Issue: WON there can be a declaration of nullity of
the marriage between petitioner Bernardino and
respondent Norma on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Ruling: NO. It is true that the SC has stated in prior
cases that the examination of the person by a
physician in order for the former to be declared
psychologically incapacitated was likewise not
considered a requirement. What is important,
however, is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological
condition. If the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to. The
complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged.
The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and
the evidence presented, considered in totality,
should be sufficient to convince the court of the
psychological incapacity of the party concerned.
Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his
allegation that private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal
to cohabit with him and to bear a child was strongly
disputed, as the records undeniably bear out.
Furthermore, the acts and behavior of private
respondent that petitioner cited occurred during the
marriage, and there is no proof that the former
exhibited a similar predilection even before or at the
inception of the marriage.
Navarro vs. Navarro
Facts: Petitioner and respondent were college
sweethearts. At the time they got married, both in
civil and church ceremonies, they were awaiting their
first child. Since petitioner was still a medical
student, while respondent was a student of
pharmacy, they lived with petitioners parents, on
whom they were financially dependent. Eventually,
their union bore four children.
Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly
complained that he didn’t have time for her; and
that she constantly quarreled with him even before
marriage when he could not give her the things she
wanted. He added that she was not supportive of his
career. Even marriage counseling did not
work. Petitioner stated that when they quarreled,
she refused to have sex with him and even told him
to look for other women. He filed the petition for
nullification of their marriage when he found out
their eldest daughter had been made pregnant by a
man whom respondent hired to follow him.
Abdona T. de Castro, a marriage counselor duly
accredited by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, testified that when petitioner saw her
on April 6, 1994, he was distraught, harassed, and
unhappy. She concluded from meetings with the
petitioner that the marriage was dysfunctional,
destructive, and reconciliation was out of the
question since he claims he would go insane if he
were to go back to his wife. Relying on the view of
another expert, one Dr. Gerardo Velasco, witness de
Castro opined that professionals are per
se incapacitated to perform the essential obligations
of marriage because they spend a lot of time in the
pursuit of their profession and have very little time to
spend with their family. She concluded that
respondent was also psychologically incapacitated to
perform the marital obligations because she knew,
from the start, that her husband was going to be a
doctor, yet she did not give him the support and
understanding that was expected of a doctors wife.
A psychologist, Dr. Natividad Dayan, who conducted
a psychiatric test on petitioner, testified that tests
showed that petitioner was a perfectionist, short-
tempered, critical, argumentative and irritable when
people do not meet his expectations. He married
Cynthia only after he got her pregnant. He had
depressions and tended to escapism when beset
with problems. He was vocal about his marital
problems. He believed that the lack of
communication, absence of quality time, inadequacy
in problem-solving, and many problems caused the
failure of the marriage.
Issue: Whether the marriage is void on the ground of
the parties psychological incapacity.
Ruling: Petitioner failed to show that any
psychological incapacity in either of the two parties
existed at the time of the celebration of
marriage. The marriage still subsists.
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. Psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage. These include the obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.[5].
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations,[9] it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological illness[10] existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. Both petitioner and
respondent have not shown proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral
element in their personality structure that effectively
incapacitates them from accepting and complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.[13]
Republic vs. Cabantug-Baguio
Facts: Lynnette and Martini, a seaman working
overseas, became pen pals in 1995. In 1996, the two
met in person during Martini’s vacation after the
expiration of his contract on board an ocean-going
vessel. On August 12, 1997, Martini, then 32, and
Lynnette, then 34, contracted marriage, following
which they moved to the house of Lynnette’s parents
at 33-B La Guardia Extension, Lahug, Cebu City.
Martini, however, stayed there only on weekends,
and during weekdays he stayed with his parents in
Looc, Lapu-lapu City. While Lynnette suggested that
the two of them stay in the house of Martini’s
parents, Martini disagreed, claiming that there were
many already living with his parents. Lynnette
noticed that every time she conversed with Martini,
he always mentioned his mother and his family, and
she soon realized that he was a "mama’s boy." And
she noticed too that when she would call up Martini
at his parent’s house and his mother was the one
who answered the call, she would deny that he was
around. In 1998, after Martini again returned
following an almost 10-month contract overseas, he
stayed with Lynnette. When in 1999 Martini again
disembarked, he stayed with his parents. On the
insistence of his mother, Martini’s monetary
allotment was shared equally between her and
Lynnette. Lynnette had since January 1999 not heard
from Martini. And since April 1999, Lynnette stopped
receiving her share of the allotment, drawing her to
inquire from Martini’s employer who informed her
that he had already disembarked on even month.
She soon found out that Martini was in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. When Lynnette and Martini finally met
in Cebu City, he told her that they are not compatible
and should just part ways. The last time the couple
talked was on October 14, 1999 when Martini was at
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) about
to depart for abroad. Since then, Martini never
communicated with Lynnette. On investigation,
Lynnette learned that Martini declared in his
employment records that he was "single" and named
his mother as principal allottee. RTC and CA ruled in
favor of Lynnette.
Issue: Whether the marriage between Lynnette and
Martini is null and void on the ground of Martini’s
psychological incapacity.
Ruling: The Solicitor General’s arguments persuade.
Article 36 of the Family Code on which Lynnette
anchors her complaint provides that "[a] marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization." Article 36 must be read in
conjunction with the other articles in the Family
Code, specifically Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 which
provide different grounds to render a marriage
void ab initio, as well as Article 45 which dwell on
voidable marriages, and Article 55 on legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these
various circumstances are not to be applied
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the
matter.
In fine, for psychological incapacity to render a
marriage void ab initio, it must be characterized by
(a) Gravity – It must be grave and serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable, or even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Almelor vs. RTC
Facts: The petitioner, Manuel Almelor married
Leonida in 1989. Both of them are medical
practitioners. They had 3 children. However 11 years
later, Leonida filed a petition for the annulment of
their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. She stated that her husband is a harsh
disciplinarian to their children which caused them to
habitually fight. Then, she also narrated that Manuel
is a homosexual as evidenced by his peculiar
closeness with his male friends and this was
concealed to her prior to their marriage. She once
caught Manuel talking to a man intimately over the
phone. Subsequently, she saw Manuel kissing
another man which confirmed all her fears. The RTC
then ruled their marriage is null and void not
because of Psychological Incapacity but rather due to
fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his
homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed
the RTC’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between is void
due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of
his homosexuality.
Ruling: No. The marriage is not void due to fraud by
reason of Manuel’s concealment of his
homosexuality. The SC emphasized that
homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a
marriage. It is the concealment of homosexuality
that would. In the case at bar however, it is not
proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower
court should not have taken the public’s perception
against Manuel’s sexuality. His peculiarities must not
be ruled by the lower court as an indication of his
homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are
not sufficient enough to prove so. Even granting that
Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in
the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged
and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from
Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated
by such.
Laurena vs. CA
Facts: Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena (petitioner)
and Jesse Lauro Laurena (respondent) got married
on December 19, 1983 at Saint Augustine Church in
Intramuros, Manila. They have two children, Mark
Jordan who was born on July 2, 1985 and Michael
Joseph who was born on November 11, 1987. On
October 19, 1993, petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage against the
respondent. Petitioner alleged that respondent was
psychologically incapable of assuming the essential
obligations of marriage, and the incapacity existed at
the time of the celebration of the marriage although
she discovered it only after the marriage. Petitioner
alleged that respondent’s psychological incapacity
was manifested by his infidelity, utter neglect of his
family’s needs because he gives priority to the needs
of his parents, irresponsibility, insensitivity, and
tendency to lead a bachelor’s life. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with regard
to the denial of the petition for annulment of
marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
Issue: Whether or not Jesse Lauro Laurena
(respondent) is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
Ruling: No, Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena
(petitioner) failed to establish the respondent’s
psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity, repeated
physical violence, homosexuality, physical violence or
moral pressure to compel petitioner to change
religious affiliation, and abandonment are grounds
for legal separation but not for declaring a marriage
void. She failed to prove psychological incapacity or
identify its root cause. She failed to establish that
respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable
and it was existing at the time of the celebration of
their marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
gravity, judicial antecedence and incurability.
Te vs. Te
Facts: Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent
Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-
Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was
attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as the latter
already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to
court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It
was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward
refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her
persistence, however, made him relent. They left
Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing
their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing
the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996.
Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward
to his parents’ home. Eventually they got married
but without a marriage license. Edward was
prohibited from getting out of the house
unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and
her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the
house, and stayed with his parents. Edward’s
parents wanted them to stay at their house but
Rowena refused and demanded that they have a
separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was
better for them to live separate lives and they then
parted ways. After four years in January 2000,
Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s
psychological incapacity.
Issue: Whether the marriage contracted is void on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted
more or less six months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May,
and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral
pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis
of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent
personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support,
for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, and allows others to make most
of his important decisions (such as where to live). As
clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around
him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense
of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations on account
for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse,
and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and
domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and
incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is
thus, declared null and void.
Ting vs. Ting
Facts: Petitioner Benjamin Ting married respondent
Carmen Velez-Ting (whom he met in 1972 in medical
school). They resided at Carmen’s family home, and
Benjamin would later work for Velez Hospital owned
by Carmen’s family. After 18 years of marriage,
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, citing that
Benjamin was a habitual drunkard and a gambler,
and that he would refuse to give financial support to
his family.
Lower court declared marriage null and void,
referring to Dr. Onate’s findings that Benjamin was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
essential obligations of marriage. Said decision was
sustained by the Court of Appeals although having
initially reversed it.
Issue: Whether or not the husband was
psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling: NO, Benjamin is not psychologically
incapacitated. As such, Carmen’s petition is denied
and their marriage cannot be nullified. There is no
abandonment of the doctrine of Molina (which
outlined 8 guidelines for interpretation and
application of FC Article 6). It is merely suggested
that these stringent requirements be relaxed,
particularly on the guideline on expert opinions
which are not in all cases available to the parties.
Also, the need for expert opinion is not a sine qua
non condition in granting petitions for nullifying
marriages.
In this case, since the parties have full capacity to
avail of expert opinions, then these should be
presented and accordingly weighed in court. Carmen
failed to prove that petitioner’s defects were present
at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Prior
to their marriage, she already knew that he would
occasionally drink and gamble, but such is
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological
defect that is incurable. Evaluation of two
psychiatrists do not strengthen respondent’s
allegations. Dr. Onate testifies that petitioner’s
behavior is a positive indication of a personality
disorder while Dr. Obra maintained that there is
nothing wrong with his personality. Greater weight
should be afforded to the latter’s testimony since it
had additionally considered a report by a psychiatrist
in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin,
as well as Obra’s interview with his brothers.
Presumption always favors validity of the marriage.
In this case, the evidence of psychological incapacity
is inadequate to declare Benjamin psychologically
incapacitated.
Azcueta vs. Republic
Facts: Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). Marietta averred that Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Marietta
complained that despite her encouragement,
Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and always
depended on his mother for financial assistance and
for his decisions. It was Rodolfo’s mother who found
them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the
monthly rental. Rodolfo also pretended to have
found work and gave Marietta money which actually
came from Rodolfo’s mother. When Marietta
confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told
her his parents could support their needs. They had
sex only once a month which Marietta never
enjoyed. When they discussed this, Rodolfo told
Marietta that sex was sacred and should not be
enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not
ready for a child. When Marietta asked Rodolfo if
they could move to another place, he did not agree
and she was forced to leave and see if he would
follow her. He did not.
Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived with
Rodolfo’s family, corroborated Marietta’s testimony
that Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and relied
on the allowance given by his mother who also paid
the rentals for the room the couple lived in. The
psychiatrist who examined Marietta testified that she
found the latter to be mature, independent, focused,
responsible, had a direction and ambition in life, and
was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage. Based on
information gathered from Marietta, the same
psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder characterized by loss
of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to
make his own decisions and dependency on other
people. The psychiatrist explained that the root
cause of the disorder was a cross-identification with
Rodolfo’s mother who was the dominant figure in
the family considering that Rodolfo’s father, a
seaman, was always out of the house. She added
that the problem began during the early stages of
Rodolfo’s life but manifested only after his marriage.
She stated that the problem was severe, because he
would not be able take on the responsibilities of a
spouse, and incurable, because it began in early
development and had been deeply ingrained in his
personality. She, thus, concluded that Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
duties and responsibilities.
Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite
service of summons on him. The City Prosecutor
found no collusion between the parties. Based on
the evidence presented by Marietta, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void ab initio.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC’s decision,
arguing that the psychiatric report was based solely
on the information given by Marietta, and there was
no showing that the alleged psychological disorder
was present at the start of the marriage or that it
was grave, permanent and incurable. The Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision. Marietta, thus,
brought the case to the Supreme Court on a petition
for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically
incapacitated to justify a declaration that his
marriage to Marrieta is void ab initio under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Ruling: Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital duties because of his Dependent
Personality Disorder. His marriage to Marietta was
declared void ab initio.
Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove
her husband’s psychological incapacity. As held in
Marcos vs. Marcos [397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no
requirement that the respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist
as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
What matters is whether the totality of evidence
presented is adequate to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Marietta’s testimony was
corroborated in material points by Rodolfo’s close
relative, and supported by the psychiatrist’s
testimony linking the manifestations of Rodolfo’s
psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
great respect from the appellate courts because the
trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which
may indicate their candor or lack thereof. Since the
trial court itself accepted the veracity of Marietta’s
factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the
conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by her expert witness.
The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity
was alleged in the petition, medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by testimony of an
expert witness with more than 40 years experience
in the field of psychology and psychological
incapacity, and clearly explained in the trial court’s
decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13
February 2009), “(b)y the very nature of Article 36,
courts, despite having the primary task and burden
of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.”

Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also
established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. Witnesses
were united in testifying that from the start of the
marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence
on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were
already evident. These manifestations of Rodolfo’s
Dependent Personality Disorder must have existed
even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early
development and a by-product of his upbringing and
family life.
Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had
been shown to be grave so as to render him unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
Court of Appeals’ opinion that Rodolfo’s requests for
financial assistance from his mother might have been
due to embarrassment for failing to contribute to the
family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a
child was a “responsible” realization since he was
unemployed, were dismissed by the High Court for
being speculative and unsupported by evidence. The
Supreme Court likewise disagreed with the Court of
Appeals’ finding that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and
overdependence on his mother could be attributed
to immaturity, noting that at the time of his
marriage, Rodolfo was almost 29 years old. Also, the
expert testimony identified a grave clinical or medical
cause for Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent
Personality Disorder.
A person afflicted with Dependent Personality
Disorder cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect
and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is
unable to make everyday decisions without advice
from others, allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live), tends to
agree with people even when he believes they are
wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order
to get approval from other people, feels
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te vs.
Te, supra)
One who is unable to support himself, much less a
wife; one who cannot independently make decisions
regarding even the most basic matters that spouses
face every day; and one who cannot contribute to
the material, physical and emotional well-being of
his spouse, is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the marital obligations within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed
with Dependent Personality Disorder is automatically
deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform
his/her marital obligations. The court must evaluate
the facts, as guided by expert opinion, and carefully
examine the type of disorder and the gravity thereof
before declaring the nullity of a marriage under
Article 36.
Finally, it has been established that Rodolfo’s
condition is incurable, having been deeply
ingrained in his system since his early years.
***
A person afflicted with Dependent Personality
Disorder cannot assume the essential marital
obligations. This is not to say, however, that anyone
diagnosed with Dependent Personality Disorder is
automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated
to perform his/her marital obligations. The court
must evaluate the facts. (Azcueta vs. Republic, G.R.
No. 180668; 26 May 2009)
Halili vs. Halili
Facts: Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a
petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona
M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). He alleged that he wed respondent in civil
rites thinking that it was a "joke." They never lived
together as husband and wife, but maintained the
relationship. However, they started fighting
constantly a year later, at which point petitioner
decided to stop seeing respondent and started
dating other women. It was only upon making an
inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not
"fake." Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be
suffering from a mixed personality disorder,
particularly dependent and self-defeating personality
disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr.
Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that
petitioner's personality disorder was serious and
incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply
with his essential marital obligations to respondent.
It thus declared the marriage null and void. On
appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of
the trial court on the ground that the totality of the
evidence presented failed to establish petitioner's
psychological incapacity. The case was elevated to
the Supreme Court (SC). The SC affirmed the CA's
decision and resolution upholding the validity of the
marriage. Petitioner then filed this motion for
reconsideration reiterating his argument that his
marriage to respondent ought to be declared null
and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity.
Issue: Is the dependent personality disorder of Lester
Halili can be considered as ground for nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code?
Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the motion for
reconsideration and that petitioner is indeed
suffering from psychological incapacity that
effectively renders him unable to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Hence, the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is
declared null and void. In the recent case of Te v. Yu-
Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court
reiterated that courts should interpret the provision
on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case
basis - guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines and by
decisions of church tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature
of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must consider as
essential the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental disposition of the parties.
In the case, the psychological report and testimony
of Dr. Dayan, stated that petitioner's dependent
personality disorder was evident in the fact that
petitioner was very much attached to his parents and
depended on them for decisions. Petitioner's mother
even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help
when he felt confused on what action to take upon
learning that his marriage to respondent was for real.
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of
persons suffering from a dependent personality
disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-
denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating
attitude. This could be seen in the way petitioner
allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father
who treated his family like robots and, later, by
respondent who was as domineering as his
father. When petitioner could no longer take
respondent's domineering ways, he preferred to hide
from her rather than confront her and tell her
outright that he wanted to end their marriage.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioner's
personality disorder was grave and incurable and
already existent at the time of the celebration of his
marriage to respondent.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner
had a psychological condition that was grave and
incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court,
in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with
diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-
term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-
term. Thus, such disorders affect all areas of
functioning and, beginning in childhood or
adolescence, create problems for those who display
them and for others.
Najera vs. Najera
Facts: Digna Najera filed with the RTC a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative
Prayer for Legal Separation, and Designation as
Administrator of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.
Digna alleged that she and Eduardo are residents of
Bugallon, Pangasinan, but Eduardo is presently living
in the U.S. There were married on January 31, 1988;
they are childless. Digna claimed that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, Eduardo was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, and
manifested only after the marriage as shown by the
following facts:
At the time of marriage, Digna was employed as an
accounting clerk and Eduardo was jobless. He did not
exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent
on Digna for support. While employed as a seaman,
Eduardo did not give Digna sufficient financial
support. When Eduardo came home from his ship
voyage, he started to quarrel with Digna and falsely
accused her of having an affair. He became a
drunkard, started smoking marijuana and also forced
her into it. When she refused, he insulted her
through “unprintable words”. Quarreling was
constant and he continued with his vices. He also
attempted to kill her with a bolo but she was able to
parry the attack. Eduardo left the family home taking
along all their personal belongings. Petitioner prayed
that an order be issued appointing her as the sole
administrator of their conjugal properties and
judgment be rendered declaring their marriage void
ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent filed his answer wherein he denied the
allegations and averred that petitioner was incurably
immature, of dubious integrity, with very low
morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the
subject house and lot were acquired through his sole
effort and money.
From the interviews of Psychologist Cristina Gates to
Digna (not Eduardo since he was abroad), it was clear
that Eduardo is afflicted with psychological hang-ups
which are rooted in the kind of family background he
has (his parents are separated and his brothers are
also separated from their respective wives). Based on
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Eduardo is
afflicted with a borderline personality disorder.
Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances
is known to cause irreparable damage organically.
Psychologist Gates also testified that the chances of
curability of respondent’s psychological disorder
were nil.
Digna contends that her evidence established the
root cause of the psychological incapacity of Eduardo
which is his dysfunctional family background. Hence,
respondent could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, particularly the duty of complying
with the obligations essential to marriage. RTC
rendered a decision that decreed only the legal
separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not
the annulment of their marriage. CA also affirmed
the decision of RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s
evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of FC.
Ruling: No, the totality of the evidence submitted by
petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Republic vs CA laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code. The guidelines incorporate three basic
requirements that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by a) gravity; b) juridical antecedence,
and c) incurability. It is important that the presence
of evidence can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition. If the totality of evidence is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
In the case at bar, the root cause of Eduardo’s
psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven
by experts or shown to be medically or clinically
incurable. Psychologist Gate’s conclusion that
Eduardo was psychologically incapacitated was based
on facts relayed to her by Digna and was not based
on the evaluation of the respondent; thus, her
findings are unscientific and unreliable.
The court also agrees with CA that the evidence
presented by Digna in regard to the physical violence
and grossly abusive conduct of Eduardo and his
abandonment without justifiable cause for more
than one year are grounds for legal separation only
and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36
of FC.
Petitioner also argued that the Court of Appeals
failed to consider the Decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal and failed to follow
guideline no. 7 in Republic vs CA which states:
The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
Petitioner’s argument is without merit. The basis of
the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT is
not grounded on causes of psychological nature, but
to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights
and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.
Though the factual basis of the decision of the NAMT
is similar to the facts established by petitioner, the
decision of the NAMT confirming the decree of
nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on
the psychological incapacity of respondent.
Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the
conclusion of Psychologist Gates regarding the
psychological incapacity of respondent is supported
by the decision of the NAMT.
Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua
Facts: Rowena and Edward were sweethearts but
Edward’s family did not approve of their
relationship.
They had “secret marriage” in order not to
antagonize Edward’s parents. They, however, never
lived together; Rowena stayed with her sister
in Fairview, Quezon City, while Edward lived with his
parents in Novaliches. Sometime in the year 1998,
Rowena found Edward cohabiting with one Cynthia
Villanueva (Cynthia) in his house in Novaliches. He
denied having an affair with Cynthia. Rowena filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Edward. Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner
also presented a certified true copy of their marriage
contract; and the testimony, curriculum vitae, and
psychological report of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy
Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she
administered the following tests on Rowena: a
Revised Beta Examination; a Bender Visual Motor
Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a
Draw a Person Test; a Sach’s Sentence Completion
Test; and MMPI.
She thereafter prepared a psychological report with
his findings. According to his evaluation, the
character traits of Edward reveal him to suffer
Narcissistic Personality Disorder – declared to be
grave, severe and incurable. However, at the end of
his findings, Dr. Tayag incorporated his personal idea
about love. Love, according to him, means:
“Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be
boundless as it goes beyond the expectations people
tagged with it. In love, “age does matter.” People love
in order to be secure that one will share his/her life
with another and that he/she will not die alone.
Individuals who are in love had the power to let love
grow or let love die – it is a choice one had to face
when love is not the love he/she expected.”
The Regional Trial Court nullified the marriage of
Rowena and Edward. The Republic, through the OSG,
appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA
reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and denied
the nullification of the parties’ marriage. In its ruling,
the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report
did not mention the cause of the Edward’s so-called
“narcissistic personality disorder;” it did not discuss
the Edward’s childhood and thus failed to give the
court an insight into the Edward’s developmental
years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she
came to the conclusion that the Edward’s incapacity
was “deep-seated” and “incurable.” Thus, the instant
case.
Issue: Whether Dr. Tayag’s Report is sufficient to
justify the nullification of their marriage.
Ruling: NO. When the case reached the Supreme
Court, it ruled that Rowena failed to establish the
Edward’s psychological incapacity. As to the findings
of Dr. Tayag, the Supreme Court notes that said
findings was based mainly on her assessment of
Rowena.
The Court states:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions
about Edward’s psychological incapacity were based
on the information fed to her by only one side –
Rowena – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be
doubted. While this circumstance alone does not
disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her
report, testimony and conclusions deserve the
application of a more rigid and stringent set of
standards in the manner we discussed above. For,
effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed Edward from the
prism of a third party account; she did not actually
hear, see and evaluate Edward and how he would
have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.
The Court therefore ruled that:
“We find these observations and conclusions
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant
the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed
that prevented Edward from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify
the root cause of Edward’s narcissistic personality
disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception
of the marriage. Neither did it explain the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor
show that Edward was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not
physical, nature.”
Aspillaga vs. Aspillaga
Facts: Rodolfo Aspillaga filed a petition for
annulment of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora
Aspillaga. Aurora alleged upon her return to Manila,
she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo
brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita
Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that
Rodolfo’s cohabitation with her cousin led to the
disintegration of their marriage and their eventual
separation.
During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba
explained that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated. The RTC found the parties
psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage.

The CA reversed the RTC decision and declared the
marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora Aspillaga valid.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
motion was also denied. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage is void on the
ground of the parties’ psychological incapacity.
Ruling: No. As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995), it has
been categorically ruled that:
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
In the instant case, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that
the psychological conditions were grave or serious
enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba
was able to establish the parties’ personality
disorder; however, he failed to link the parties’
psychological disorders to his conclusion that they
are psychologically incapacitated to perform their
obligations as husband and wife. The fact that these
psychological conditions will hamper their
performance of their marital obligations does not
mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity
as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity.
It must be stressed that psychological incapacity
must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or
“neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations (Republic v. CA). The intention of the law
is to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage (Tongol v. Tongol, G.R.
No. 157610, October 19, 2007).
Psychological disorders do not manifest that both
parties are truly incapacitated to perform the basic
marital covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that
shows incurability of these disorders. Incompatibility
and irreconcilable differences cannot be equated
with psychological incapacity as understood
juristically. As to Rodolfo’s allegation that Aurora was
a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to convince.
While disagreements on money matters would, no
doubt, affect the other aspects of one’s marriage as
to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a
ground to declare a marriage null and void. In fact,
the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
disagreements regarding money matters are a
common, and even normal, occurrence between
husbands and wives.
Paz vs. Paz
Facts: Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage against her husband Jordan. She alleged
that Jordan was psychologically incapable of
assuming the essential obligations of marriage such
as he has uncontrollable tendency to be self-
preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his
predisposition to become violent and abusive
whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied.
That he had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts
and had the habit of hanging out and spending a
great deal of time with his friends. Jeanice further
alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on and
attached to his mother and even demanded from his
mother a steady supply of milk and diapers for their
son. And worse he threatened to hurt Jeanice and
did not provide financial support to his son when
Jeanice left their conjugal home.
Jeanice claim was substantiated by Psychologist
Cristina R. Gates (Gates) who testified, based on the
testimonies given by Jeanice to Gates, that Jordan
was afflicted with "Borderline Personality Disorder as
manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency
and instability." Gates concluded that Jordan’s
psychological maladies antedate their marriage and
are rooted in his family background. Gates added
that with no indication of reformation, Jordan’s
personality disorder appears to be grave and
incorrigible.
Despite the denial of Jordan that he is not
psychologically incapacitated; and that Jeanice was
merely motivated by her inability to cope with the
struggles of marriage, the trial court declared the
marriage null and void based on the findings of
Gates.
Issue: Whether Jordan is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Ruling: Jeanice Failed to Prove Jordan’s Psychological
Incapacity. Jeanice’s petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family
Code which provides:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c)
incurability. It must be confined "to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage."
In Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, the Court
explained:
(a) Gravity – It must be grave and serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Judicial Antecedence – It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable, or even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Although there is no requirement that a party to be
declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or a psychologist,
there is nevertheless a need to prove the
psychological incapacity through independent
evidence adduced by the person alleging said
disorder. Correspondingly, the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
In this case, the Court notes that the report and
testimony of Gates on Jordan’s psychological
incapacity were based exclusively on her interviews
with Jeanice and the transcript of stenographic notes
of Jeanice’s testimony before the trial court. Gates
only diagnosed Jordan from the statements of
Jeanice, whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be
doubted. Gates did not actually hear, see and
evaluate Jordan. Consequently, Gates’ report and
testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no
personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was
testifying on. Gates’ testimony should have thus
been dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.
The incidents cited by Jeanice do not show that
Jordan suffered from grave psychological maladies
that paralyzed Jordan from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. What the law
requires to render a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not
refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. The
mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" does not constitute
psychological incapacity. Furthermore, Gates did not
particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" which
showed that Jordan indeed suffers from Borderline
Personality Disorder. Gates also failed to explain how
such a personality disorder made Jordan
psychologically incapacitated to perform his
obligations as a husband nor Jordan’s condition was
incurable.
Domingo vs. CA
FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto
Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
She did not know that Domingo had been previously
married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to
know the previous marriage when the latter filed a
suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she
came home from Saudi during her one-month leave
from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited
with another woman and had been disposing some
of her properties which is administered by Roberto.
The latter claims that because their marriage was
void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is
unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand,
Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of
marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in
order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of properties acquired during the
marriage.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for judicial
declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.
Ruling: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is
indeed required for purposed of remarriage.
However, it is also necessary for the protection of the
subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that
his or her partner was not lawfully married marries
the same. With this, the said person is freed from
being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states
that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common
children and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated
in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for
separation of property will simply be the necessary
consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s
suggestion that for their properties be separated, an
ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that
purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property
according to the regime of property relations
governing them.
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy
Facts: Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked the
Family Court for the declaration of Nullity of his first
marriage on 1978 with petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel
on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to
one Eduardo A. Maxion on 1972. Lilia, however,
claimed that such previous marriage was null and
void for having been vitiated by force upon both her
and the first husband and that the first husband was
at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married
to someone else.
Ruling: Status of the First Marriage
Petitioner’s first marriage which was allegedly
vitiated by force committed against both parties, if
true, will make the marriage voidable, not void.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated by force committed against
both parties because assuming this to be so, the
marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art.
85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is dear
that when she married respondent she was still
validly married to her first husband, consequently,
her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil
Code).
Judicial Declaration of Nullity of First Marriage
The first marriage though void still needs according
to Supreme Court, a judicial declaration of such fact
and for all legal intents and purposes she would still
be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl
Wiegel, therefore there is no need of introducing
evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other.
Accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent Karl Wiegel would be regarded VOID
under the law.
Valdez vs. RTC
Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were
married on January 5, 1971 and later had 5 kids. On
June 22, 1992, Antonio sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC.
The RTC of Quezon City rendered judgment and
declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 of
the FC on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity to comply with their essential marital
obligations and ordered the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Art. 147 of the FC
and to comply with the provisions of Art. 50, 51 and
52 of the FC. Consuelo sought a clarification of the
order of the court and asserted that the FC did not
have provisions for the liquidation of common
property in “unions without marriage”.
The court explained in an order dated May 5, 1995
that the property including the family home acquired
during their union are presumed to have been
obtained through joined efforts and the property
would be owned by them in equal shares and the
liquidation and partition of property would be
governed by the regime of co-ownership.
The court also explained that Art 102 does not apply
since it refers to the procedure for liquidation of
conjugal partnership property. Art 129 also does not
apply because it refers to procedures for liquidation
of the absolute community of property. Antonio
moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion
was denied.
Issues: WON Art 147 is the correct law governing the
disposition of property in the case at bar
WON Art 147 applies to marriages declared null and
void pursuant to Art. 36

Ruling: In void marriages, the property relations of
the parties during the cohabitation period is
governed by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 148. In
the case at bar, Art. 147 applies because there was
no legal impediment to their marriage and they were
capacitated wherein the word capacitated refers to
legal capacity of a party to contract marriage
Notes: The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes
and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is hereby
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity to comply with their essential marital
obligations; The three older children, Carlos Enrique
III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose
which parent they would want to stay with. "Stella
Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the
custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdes. "The petitioner and respondent shall
have visitation rights over the children who are in the
custody of the other. The petitioner and respondent
are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation
of their common properties as defined by Article
147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code,
within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Alleged Errors: "Article 147 of the Family Code does
not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated. "Articles 50, 51 and 52
in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases
where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including
a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses.
"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to
marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of
the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same
may be read consistently with Article 129. "It is
necessary to determine the parent with whom
majority of the children wish to stay."
Carino vs. Carino
Facts: SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted 2 marriages
during his lifetime. The first was on June 20, 1969
with Susan Nicdao Carino, the petitioner of the case
at bar with whom he had 2 children and the second
was on November 10, 1992 with Susan Yee Carino,
the respondent, with whom he had no children.
Santiago has been cohabiting with Susan Yee since
1983 but became bedridden in 1988 and died 13
days after the second wedding.
Both Susans filed for monetary benefits and financial
assistance. Susan # 1 was able to collect 146K while
Susan # 2 was able to collect 21K. On December 14,
1993, Susan Yee filed an instant case for collection of
sum of money against Susan Nicdao. Susan Yee
wanted at least half of the 146K. Susan Nicdao failed
to file her answer and was declared in default.
Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to Santiago
took place during the subsistence of, and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She,
however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it
only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met
petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the
deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum
of money, respondent contended that the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the
required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of
the deceased and the petitioner which bears no
marriage license number;[5] and 2) a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, which summarily stated that
there was no record of a marriage license. The trial
court ruled in favor of Susan Yee. Upon appeal, the
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court
Issues: WON the absolute nullity of marriage may be
invoked to settle claims to death benefits
Ruling: Art 40 clearly gives the court authority to
invoke the absolute nullity of a marriage for
purposes other than remarriage provided that
sufficient testimonial or documentary evidence be
presented.
Since the 1st marriage was solemnized in 1969, the
CC was therefore the law in force. Under the CC, the
absence of a marriage license, with certain
exception, renders a marriage void ab initio. And the
1st marriage is not part of the exceptions and as was
decided in the Republic vs. CA the certification issued
by a local civil registrar is sufficient as evidence to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license.
But going back to Art. 40, a judicial decree declaring
the marriage as void is required in order to remarry.
But none was issued. So in effect, the marriage of marriage was still subsisting and was liable. On
Susan Yee is bigamous and also void ab initio. appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

Since both marriages are void ab initio, (there’s no
absolute community or conjugal partnership of
property) the property regime would therefore be
governed by Art. 147 and 148 of the FC.
The second marriage was bigamous because of a
legal impediment – the prior marriage so Art. 148
governs. Under Art. 148 the property regime is one
of co-ownership, wherein wages, salaries and
properties acquired by each a party, belongs to that
part exclusively.
And since the disputed 146K is from AFPMBAI, Pag-
ibig, NAPOLCOM, etc. are remunerations, incentives
and benefits from governmental agencies earned by
the deceased as a police officer, and unless proven
otherwise, it can be assumed that Susan Yee did not
contribute money, property or industry in the
acquisition of these monetary benefits and the
monetary benefits therefore belong to the deceased
alone or to his legal heirs.
Issue: W/N the element of previous legal marriage is
present in order to convict petitioner Mercado of
bigamy.
Ruling: Yes. The element of previous legal marriage is
present in this case. Under Article 40 of the Family
Code “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgement declaring such
previous marriage void”. In this case, petitioner
Mercado contracted a second marriage even though
there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity in his
first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to
have the first marriage declared void only after Tan
had filed a complaint charging him of bigamy. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, Mercado is liable for bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.

As for the marriage with Susan Nicdao, Art. 147

applies because both parties were legally capacitated
and there were no legal impediments and the only
reason the marriage is void is because of the absence
of a marriage license. The difference bet 147 and 148
is that wages and salaries earned by either party
during the cohabitation period will be split equally
between them even if only one party contributed. So
under Art 147, Susan Nicdao is entitled to half of the
remunerations and the other half belong to the legal
heirs of Santiago, who are in this case, the children of
Susan Nicdao.

Mercado vs. Tan

Facts: Dr. Vincent G. Mercado and Maria Consuelo

Tan got married on June 27, 1991 in Bacolod City. A
Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by
them. Mercado entered in that document his status
as “single”. Unknown to Tan, Mercado was already
married to Thelma Oliva. The first marriage was
solemnized in Cebu City on October 10, 1976. Oliva
bore Mercado two children. Tan therefore filed a
complaint for bigamy (Art. 349, RPC) against
Mercado in Bacolod City. Mercado, in his defense,
said that his first marriage was already declared null
and void and that Tan had knowledge of his first
marriage. The trial court ruled that Mercado’s first