LEONOR B. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. TEOFILA M.

CATAPANG, Respondent
G.R. No. 164110 February 12, 2008

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of land
covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay Mahabang
Ludlod, Taal, Batangas. With the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the
aforementioned co-owners, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot
adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of land sometime in 1992. The house
intruded, however, on a portion of the co-owned property.

Leonor visited the property and was surprised to see a part of respondents house
intruding unto a portion of the co-owned property. She then made several demands
upon respondent to demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the portion
encroaching on their property. Catapang, however, refused and disregarded her
demands.

Leonor filed a complaint for forcible entry against Catapang before the MCTC of
Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of petitioner, ruling that consent of only
one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify Catapang’s construction of the
house and possession of the portion of the lot in question.

Motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, respondent filed a petition for
review with the CA, which reversed the RTCs decision. The CA held that there is no
cause of action for forcible entry in this case because respondents entry into the
property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be
characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of
action for forcible entry.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible
entry case filed by another co-owner against the person who was given the consent
to construct a house on the co-owned property

RULING:

No. Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others,
make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the
co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to the
making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in
common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any
encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The
construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it
is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from
all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned
property.

Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for
forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the
absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any
right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under
the classification through strategy or stealth.

The petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 46623. December 7, 1939

MARCIAL KASILAG, Petitioner, v. RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE,

SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO, Respondents.

Facts:
The parties, Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrocio, entered into a contract of
mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead to secure the
payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. Ambrocio must pay the debt
with interest, within 4 1/2 years, to settle the mortgage. The parties agreed that
the tax on the land and its improvements, during the existence of the mortgage,
should be paid by Ambrocio. They also agreed that within 30 days from the date of
the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking
that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued
under the provisions of RA 496 (The Land Registration Act).

Furthermore, they agreed that should Ambrocio fail to redeem the mortgage within
the stipulated period of 4 1/2 years, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of
the land to Kasilag, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid
interest.

It was also stipulated in the contract that in case the motion to be presented under
clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contract of sale of sale
would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force.

One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that Ambrocio
was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its
improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal
contract whereby she conveyed to Kasilag the possession of the land on condition
that he would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of
the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon.
Issue/s:
 Whether or not the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith
because he was
unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is
invalidated.
 Whether or not ignorance of the law may be a basis of good faith.

Ruling:
From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor
presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case,
the question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
Manresa, commenting on article 434 in connection with the preceding article,
sustains the affirmative. He says:

"We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded
upon an error of law. When the acquisition appears in a public document, the
capacity of the parties has already been passed upon by competent authority, and
even established by appeals taken from final judgments and administrative
remedies against the qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote
under such circumstances; but, unfortunately, private documents and even verbal
agreements far exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be
ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and
apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly
unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and
another and different thing is possible and excusable error arising from complex
legal principles and from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines.

But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still,
ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the
intervention of certain persons, compliance with certain formalities and appreciation
of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation of doubtful
doctrines. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code. Volume IV, pp. 100,
101 and 102.)

According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the
basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact
that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In
accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded
belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land.
In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know,
as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are
attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited
by section 116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, asto the
petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may,
therefore, be the basis of his good faith. We do not give much importance to the
change of the tax declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner appear as
the owner of the land, because such an act may only be considered as a sequel to
the change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to about
which we have stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible and
excusable. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking
possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.

Ramona R. Locsin, et al. v. Hon. Judge Vicente P. Valenzuela and Spouses

Joseph and Helen Schon
G.R. Nos. L-51333 and L-52289; February 19, 1991
Feliciano, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners Locsin, Guanzon, Sibug, Perez Ylanan and Benedicto were co-owners
of a large tract of agricultural land known as "Hacienda Villa Regalado" located in
Barrio Panubigan Canlaon City, Negros Occidental. The tract of land was covered by
TCT No. T494 containing an area of (3,033,048) square meters, more or less. A
portion of this land, known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 and consisting of an area of
60.07464 hectares, was subject to the lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent
Helen Schon. The bulk of this lot was cultivated by respondent lessees-tenants
(Panaligan, Marquez, Pedros, etc.) who customarily delivered the rentals to Helen
Schon. After the onset of the martial law P.D. 27 was promulgated decreeing the
"Emancipation of Tenants." The tract of land owned in common by petitioners,
including the portion thereof subject to Helen Schon's usufructuary rights, fell
within the scope of the "Operation Land Transfer". Petitioners through counsel
sought the opinion of the DAR as to who (petitioners or respondent Helen Schon)
should be entitled to receive the rental payments which continued to be made by
the respondent-tenants to Helen Schon. The DAR District Officer rendered an
opinion that the rental payments were properly considered as amortization
payments for the land and as such should pertain to the landowners and not to the
usufructuary.

ISSUES:
(1)As between the naked owners and the usufructuary, who should be entitled
to the amounts paid by the tenants?
(2)What is the legal character of the payments made by the tenants–payments
on the price of the land itself (amortization payments for the price of the
land as such should belong to the landowners and not to the usufructuary) or
civil fruits of the land?

HELD:
(1.) The naked owners – herein petitioners. Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared
part of the land reform area and subjected to Operation Land Transfer, the
payments made on and after 21 October 1972 by the private respondent
tenants-farmers constituted amortization payments on the cost of the land that
they were required to pay under PD No. 27. These payments, therefore, legally
pertain to petitioners, the former landowners as part of the compensation for
 the dominion over land of which they were deprived by operation of PD 27.
Those payments cannot be characterized as rentals like those which had been
paid to Helen Schon as usufructuary prior to the promulgation of PD 27 and
prior to the effectivity of Operation Land Transfer.

Rights retained by Helen Schon as a usufructuary, after the effectivity of PD 27

– the usufruct which had therefore existed as a jus in re aliena in favor of Helen
Schon was effectively extinguished by PD No. 27. To hold, as private respondent
Helen Schon apparently urges, that her usufruct was not extinguished but rather
remained impressed upon the land passing on to the new owners, would
obviously defeat the very purpose of the land reform statute. PD 27 was enacted
to "emancipate" the tenants from the "bondage of the soil" by giving to tenants-
farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating upon the assumption
that they would work harder to improve their lot in life if they became landowner
rather than mere tillers of somebody else's land. To hold Helen Schon as entitled
to continue enjoying, as usufructuary, the natural or civil fruits of Lot No. 2-C-A-
3, would be to set at naught the major purpose projected by PD 27 and
maintained by E.O 228.

(2.) Amortization payments. Article 609 of the Civil Cod provides that “Should
the thing in usufruct be expropriated for public use, the owner shall be obliged
either to replace it with another thing of the same value and of similar
conditions, or to pay the usufructuary the legal interest on the amount of the
indemnity for the whole period of the usufruct. If the owner chooses the latter
alternative, he shall give security for the payment of the interest.”

Article 609 should be applied in this case. So long as her rights as usufructuary
persist under the instrument which gave birth to such rights, respondent would
be entitled to a replacement reasonably equivalent to the land previously
burdened with her usufructuary right, or to legal interest. Thus, from the monies
that she actually received from private respondent tenant-farmers on and after
21 October 1972, respondent Helen Schon is entitled to retain an amount
equivalent to the legal interest on said amounts for every year that the usufruct
would by its own terms have continued to exist had it not been extinguished by
operation of PD No. 27; the balance of such amounts received by her shall be
turned over to petitioners. She is also entitled to the same right in respect of the
balance of the price of the land petitioners presumably received from the Land
Bank. Private respondents are directed to deliver to petitioners the amounts paid
to them by private respondent tenants-farmers beginning on 21 October 1972,
after deducting therefrom an amount equivalent to simple legal interest thereon
computed at six (6%) percent per annum on the amount received each year.