Ideological Justifications For Restricti

Original Article
Ideological justifications for restrictive

immigration policies: An analysis
of parliamentary discourses on immigration
in France and Canada (2006–2013)
Paul May
Queen’s University, John Watson Hall, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada.
E-mail: paul.may@queensu.ca
Abstract In this paper, I analyze the parliamentary discourses on immigration in France

and Canada from January 2006 to December 2013 in order to answer the question: What
arguments are put forward in parliamentary arenas in order to justify more restrictive
immigration policies? Despite their different models of integration and citizenship, France
and Canada are facing very similar discussions, involving the same arguments and the same
theoretical reflections. Critical discourse analysis shows that immigration is an extremely
divisive issue in the political landscape: in both countries, right-wing political parties try to
restrict in the name of economic imperatives, while left-wing political parties seek to
establish more liberal policies. This finding goes against some studies, which argue that
right-wing political parties, influenced by the neoliberal ideology, call for more open
borders to immigration. Within the debates, references to national histories, models of
integration, and civic values are not especially prominent, especially when compared with
the omnipresent discourses of economics. The justifications for more restrictive immigra-
tion policies often reveal the dominant position of a global ideology prioritizing values of
competitiveness and cost-effectiveness in an era of post-Fordist capitalism. The treatment
of refugees, asylum seekers, and illegal immigrants is a paradigmatic example of the trends I
have identified. These kinds of immigrants are often at the heart of justifications for
implementing restrictive measures. Our empirical material shows that Roma people are
particularly targeted by these restrictions in both countries.
French Politics (2016) 14, 287–310. doi:10.1057/s41253-016-0004-7;
published online 19 August 2016
Keywords: immigrants; immigration; refugees; Canada; France; parliamentary

debates; Roma; left–right; multiculturalism
The comparative literature on evolution of immigration policies is most often based

on quantitative methodologies (CITLAW, 2013; Koopmans et al, 2012; Banting
2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 14, 3, 287–310
www.palgrave.com/journals
May
and Kymlicka, 2013; Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2013). In these works,
several indicators are developed in order to assess the evolution of public policies
on immigrants in different countries, according to different categories.1 These
studies make it possible to track changes over time and to identify which countries
have adopted more restrictive or more liberal policies2 (Koopmans, 2013b; Vink
and Helbling, 2013). However, these works do not allow us to identify the reasons
given to justify these changes.
This paper intends to fill this gap by analyzing parliamentary discourses on
immigration. Which arguments are put forward in order to justify more restrictive
immigration policies? The debate on immigration policies embodies conceptions of
who belongs within the borders of the nation (Martin, 2011). Analyzing the
immigration debates allows us to identify the competing visions of the nation
offered by the different parliamentary actors and different political parties. This is
of great importance for understanding the role of ideas and ideologies in the
formulation of public policies. In this respect, the empirical materials used in my
analysis complement the quantitative data of the current literature by identifying
the discursive mechanisms used to justify implementation of restrictions for
potential immigrants.
I analyze the cases of France and Canada, and cover the period from January
2006 to December 2013. My analysis reveals that, in spite of the significant
differences between the two countries, there are impressive similarities between the
parliamentary discourses. The same points of ideological disagreement and the
same arguments exist in both countries. References to national histories, models of
integration, and civic values are not especially prominent, especially when
compared with the omnipresent discourses of economics. The justifications for
more restrictive immigration policies often reveal the dominant position of a global
ideology, which prioritizes values of competitiveness and cost-effectiveness in an
era of post-Fordist capitalism. However, beside this dominant economic paradigm,
we can see rationalization of racial stereotypes. Populations that originate from
poor geographic areas have their freedom of movement severely limited in the
name of economic efficiency. Analysis of laws in both countries reveals that,
behind supposedly neutral and objective arguments, some communities are
targeted, for example, the Roma.3
After an overview of the current literature and a description of my theoretical
framework, the results of my research will be presented in three parts. The first
section illustrates the sharp ideological divide between discourses drawn on by left-
wing political parties, which emphasize cosmopolitan Kantian values (human
rights, equality, nondiscrimination), and discourses supported by right-wing
political parties, which stress the needs of the national economy. In the second
part of this article, I focus on the discourses of these right-wing political parties. In
both countries, there is a systematic distinction between two types of potential
immigrants: the small number of highly skilled workers whom governments strive
288 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 14, 3, 287–310
Ideological justifications for restrictive immigration policies
to attract, and unskilled workers, who are depicted as a threat to national economic
wealth and competitiveness. Such immigrants are often characterized as being an
unattractive and undesirable economic burden, justifying the implementation of
more restrictive immigration policies. A third section reveals that Roma
populations are targeted in both France and Canada. My analysis shows the
interconnection of race and class: racial stereotypes are reinforced by the economic
origin of immigrants. In that respect, these discourses about illegal immigrants and
refugees are paradigmatic examples of representations of the migration issue dating
from the beginning of the twenty-first century, in which economic imperatives help
policymakers to draw a typography that distinguishes between ‘‘desirable’’ and
‘‘undesirable’’ immigration.
Overview of the Current Literature
Several databases have been developed to measure forms of evolution in the rights
of immigrants using quantitative methodology. Kymlicka and Banting’s Multicul-
turalism Policy Index depicts the evolution of multicultural policies and
immigration policies since 1980 (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013). A score is
assigned to different aspects of immigration policies, with an overall score
calculated in order to assess the degree of liberalization. The Migrant Integration
Policy Index (MIPEX, 2013) includes a total of 148 indicators developed from
analysis of the legislation of 34 countries. The Citizenship Law EUDO Indicators
(CITLAW) project of the European University Institute of Florence measures
changes to a given country’s naturalization processes through a coding procedure.
These databases are very helpful in ascertaining the general shape of the changes in
policies toward immigrants in Western democracies, making it possible to identify
countries with more liberal or more restrictive legislative trajectories. Moreover,
we can see which specific aspects of the legislation (naturalization, visas, family
reunification, and so on) are more restrictive and which ones are more
accommodating. The indexes focus on integration measures (equality and
antidiscrimination policies, MIPEX, education rights, Koopmans), and also on
barriers to immigration. For example, MIPEX refers to conditions for becoming a
permanent resident in terms of level of language, waiting time, and duration of the
permit (Koopmans, 2013a, b). As highlighted by Vink and Helbling (2013), it is
necessary to deepen these quantitative analyses with qualitative means.
The academic literature shows that immigration restrictions were inspired by a
specific conception of the nation and national identity. In the case of the United
States, several authors have shown that immigration restrictions were justified by a
colonial design of race relations, marked by the idea of the superiority of British
culture (Pottie-Sherman, 2013, p. 559; Herbert, 2009; Martin, 2011). This reveals
an identity concept of the nation in which the racial is the determining variable in
2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 14, 3, 287–310 289
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the membership of the political community. Here, I am attempting to answer the

following: What are the arguments put forward to justify implementation of more
restrictive immigration policies? This raises two subsidiary questions: who
proposes more restrictive policies? What are the different conceptions of the
nation in competition? Finally, are the arguments underpinning more restrictive
immigration policies the same in both countries?
Theoretical Framework and Methodology
Immigration policy and nation-building must be seen as the two sides of a single
coin (Pottie-Sherman, 2013, p. 559). Immigration policies are about constructing an
ideal citizenry, determining who should be admitted, and creating an ‘‘other,’’
against which the ideal citizen is defined (Herbert, 2009; Behdad, 2005). This
process occurs both externally, through the establishment of rules about who may
enter, as well as internally, via the treatment of individuals within the nation.
Therefore, national boundaries are socially constructed, and, invariably, within
these are individuals and groups whose interests (whether political, economic, or
religious) do not coincide with those outlined by the government. When
governments regulate the movement of people across political boundaries, they
determine who can enter their jurisdiction and on what terms. By doing so, they
work with a concept of what their nation is and should be. The nation-building
design is always a subject of debate because there are competing definitions of
nationhood.
In the case of Canada and in France, the historical role of immigration in the
nation-building project has always been a matter of harsh debate. Weil (2003) and
Kymlicka (2001) characterize the development of Canadian and French national
identity as enduring opposition between, on one hand, inclusive civic narratives of
liberalism (and republicanism, in the French case), and, on the other hand,
‘‘ascriptive inegalitarianism’’ in which the law is used to define who is excluded
from the polity. These narratives, definitions, or claims to nationhood prescribe
very different immigration policies. Studying parliamentary debates is crucial to
understanding the ideology underlying restrictive policies. Of course, the
arguments put forward in parliaments do not necessarily correspond to the actual
motivation of members of parliament. As noted by Yuvaci (2013), there is a form
of self-censorship. However, analyzing parliamentary debates is essential for
observing social representations about immigrants, immigration, and citizenship.
Parliamentary discourse refers both to recurrent and recognizable patterns of
meaning, and to production and reproduction of shared common-sense knowledge.
Therefore, it is crucial to identify the participating actors, their social functions and
goals, and the political institutions involved (Van Dijk, 2000).
I strive to identify the rhetoric used to justify these changes by using a form of
critical discourse analysis (CDA) methodology. The procedures for this study were
specifically adapted from Henry and Tator (2002) and Van Dijk (2000) who use
CDA to analyze text and talk about immigration. Henry and Tator (2002), drawing
on Van Dijk’s work, offer a set of questions, or ‘‘motifs,’’ for use as guides in
analyses of immigration discourse, including statements concerning ‘‘who belongs
in the country?’’; ‘‘who should be admitted to (or removed from) the country?’’;
‘‘what are the goals of immigration restrictions?’’; and ‘‘what new actions are
required to protect our space, our national identity/citizenship and culture?’’ (Henry
and Tator, 2002, p. 109).
Discourse analysis is a multidisciplinary approach that examines the context
and content of oral and written discourses. It can be defined as ‘‘an approach to
the analysis of language that looks at patterns of language across texts as well as
the social and cultural contexts in which the texts occur’’ (Paltridge, 2006, p. 1).
It identifies concepts, language and the narrative frames constructed in discourse.
This approach is characterized by its objective to expose, measure, and identify
the ‘‘ideological’’ content of political discourse (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). I rely
on the definition of ideology of Michael Freeden (2003) that defines ideology as
following: ‘‘A political ideology is a set of beliefs, opinions, and values that (1)
exhibit a recurring pattern; (2) are held by significant groups (3) compete over
providing and controlling plans for public policy (4) do so with the aim of
justifying, contesting, or changing the social and political arrangements and
processes of a political community.’’ Ideologies are the basic frameworks for
organizing the social (18 Language and Pace) cognitions shared by members of
social groups, organizations, or institutions. In this respect, ideologies are both
cognitive and social. They essentially function as the interface between the
cognitive representations and processes underlying discourse and action, on one
hand, and the societal position and interests of social groups, on the other hand.
(Van Dijk, Language and Pace). These ideologies are produced and reproduced
through discursive practices, permeating the entire social body in a top-down
process. Signs of such ideological reproduction can thus be revealed and tracked
by identifying and analyzing these ideological discourses, which are inherently
political: ‘‘ideology, for CDA, is seen as an important aspect of establishing and
maintaining unequal power relations.’’ Some authors (Bourdieu, 2001; Jacobs,
1998, p. 353) have pointed out that CDA entails a tautological risk: it is tempting
to postulate the existence of a dominant ideology (racism and xenophobia, for
example), and find evidence of it at the discursive level. To avoid these pitfalls, I
have opted for a different approach to CDA. I have started from the premise that
no ideology determines the debate a priori, but that we are dealing with a
plurality of discursive practices in competition. I have used the ‘‘grounded theory
method’’ (Guillemette, 2006; Corbin and Strauss, 2008) in combination with the
principles of CDA and ‘‘linguistic pragmatics.’’4 The grounded theory method is
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a research method which operates in a different way than traditional social

science research. Rather than beginning with a hypothesis, the first step is data
collection through a variety of methods. From the data collected, the key points
are marked with a series of codes, which are extracted from the text. The codes
are grouped into similar concepts in order to make the data more workable. From
these concepts, categories are formed, which are the basis for the creation of a
theory, or a reverse engineered hypothesis. This contradicts the traditional model
of research, where the researcher chooses a theoretical framework, and only then
applies this model to the phenomenon to be studied. These questions were used
as broad guides to identify the ‘‘semantic macrostructures’’ in the parliamentary
debates. Following Van Dijk (2000), the more microstructural aspects of the text
were also examined. These microstructural aspects include, for example,
discourses that may have been ‘‘implied’’ or assumed but not expressly or
openly stated (2000, p. 92). The corpus of texts has been systematically analyzed
at two levels: the explicit argumentative layer was charted using the ‘‘grounded
theory method,’’ while the implicit argumentative layer was analyzed using the
tools of discourse analysis.
After identifying key words in the parliamentary databases from 2006 to 2013, I
used lexical analysis with the Nvivo software program to highlight specific
discursive constructions in parliamentary debates (Bayley, 2004). The coding
procedure occurred over a two-step process, following a semi-inductive approach
(Rourke et al, 2001). With coder B, we first read the debates in their entirety and
compiled a list of coding units inspired by the literature review. We then identified
the phrases and ‘‘clusters of meaning.’’ After this first step, the hierarchical coding
structure contained 32 nodes.5 We then gradually refined the coding procedure by
creating new nodes based on themes I considered relevant for inclusion. This
introduction of new codes enriched the tree structure with a total of 58 codes.6
I then conducted an inter-coder reliability test in order to gauge the impacts of
subjective differences of the coding procedure between two researchers. I used
Cohen’s kappa coefficient for the test. The test shows a value equal to 1 in the case
of complete agreement between the two coders, whereas a value B0 indicates that
there is no agreement between coders. With a result of 0.69, the empirical coding
fell within the range of ‘‘substantial’’ agreement between coders (Landis and Kock,
1977).
The Choice of France and Canada and the Laws
I have analyzed parliamentary debates from January 2006 to December 2013 in

Canada and France in order to identify the reasons put forward to justify more
restrictive policies toward immigrants. I have chosen to study those two countries
because they have developed very different models of integration and management
of cultural diversity: Republican assimilationism in France (Schnapper, 2007;

Favell, 2001), multiculturalism in Canada (Banting et al, 2007), and are the heirs of
very different historical, geopolitical, and colonial legacies (Choudhry, 2007;
Kymlicka, 2007. In Kymlicka’s Multicultural Policy Index, France scored 2 while
Canada scores 8. Their integration philosophies are also very different. France is
well known for having fairly liberal access to citizenship, but it has not adopted any
sort of multicultural model to accommodate immigrants. Canada is known as one
of the standard-bearers of multiculturalism, but maintains a selective immigration
system. My analysis begins in 2006 because, according to the academic literature,
immigration policies have become more restrictive in both countries since that
year. I analyzed the debates around the following seven bills. I chose these bills
because I had found in a number of indexes that many immigration indicators
(MIPEX, CITLAW) had begun declining in 2006.
Each time, the left was in opposition and the right in power. However, my intent
was not necessarily to study cases in which a right-wing party was in power and a
left-wing party in opposition. Here I am using the categorization conducted by
several researchers, who believe that the UMP and the CCP are political parties of
the right, and that, despite their differences. They define themselves as belonging
both to the right and are opposed both to another great party called ‘‘left’’ and
‘‘progressiste.’’ I am also using the Comparative Manifesto Project, to WZB,
including the database of political parties (indicator of right-wing position).
In France:
• Loi relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration (July 24th, 2006);

• Loi relative à la maı̂trise de l’immigration à l’intégration et à l’asile (November
17th, 2007);
• Loi relative à l’immigration, à l’intégration et à la nationalité (June 16th, 2011).
In Canada:
• The Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and
special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act (C-3,
February 14th, 2008);
• The Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced
Refugee Reform Act, the Marine Transportation Security Act and the Depart-
ment of Citizenship and Immigration Act (C-11, June 29, 2010);
• The Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (C-35, March 23,
2011);
• The Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and
special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act (C-31,
July 2012).
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Description of the Laws
In France, the Loi relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration (July 2006) established

a series of barriers to new immigrants. It increased the time needed for spousal
reunification (18 months instead of 1 year), while the minimum resource
requirements for foreign spouses were changed to take only work-related income
into account and to exclude other forms of wealth. Automatic regularization, which
used to occur after ten years of living in France, was no longer valid, and the
10-year resident card became conditional on acquisition of a French language
diploma. The time needed for a foreign spouse to obtain a residence card was
extended to three years instead of two. The Loi relative à la maı̂trise de
l’immigration à l’intégration et à l’asile (November 2007) added new barriers to
family reunification. A test assessing the ‘‘degree of knowledge of the French
language’’7 was added as a requirement for applicants seeking family reunification.
A ‘‘reception and integration contract for families’’8 was added as well, binding its
signatories to comply with the rule that ‘‘parents ensure the good integration of
their children’’ [My translation]. Failure to uphold the contract can be punished by
suspension of family allowances and nonrenewal of the resident’s permit.
Moreover, the resources required to qualify for family reunification are higher.
The Loi relative à l’immigration, à l’intégration et à la nationalité (June 16th,
2011) aimed to reduce illegal immigration by reforming expulsion procedures. It
increased the maximum length of detention for illegal immigrants from 35 to
42 days, and limited access to legal aid in the National Court of Asylum (Cour
nationale du droit d’asile). New mechanisms were introduced to enable the State to
assign people to places of residence and to also require them to wear an electronic
bracelet.
Canada tells a similar story. Between 2006 and 2015, the ruling Conservative
Party of Canada proposed and passed multiple laws to restrict immigration. The Act
to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special
advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act (2008)
introduced the participation of a ‘‘special advocate’’ designated by the Minister of
Justice. This measure applies only to noncitizens, who do not have the same
procedural safeguards as they would in the criminal justice system. The Act to
amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee Reform
Act, the Marine Transportation Security Act and the Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Act (2010), raised concerns among critics about the protection of
legitimate refugees who may be affected by the law’s creation of a list of ‘‘safe
countries’’ and a 1-year ban on applications based on humanitarian grounds. The
Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2011) created a new
criminal offense by extending the prohibition against representing or advising
persons for consideration. The Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential

amendment to another Act (2012) contains the most important changes. It allows
the immigration minister to designate a list of so-called ‘‘safe countries’’ without
consulting a committee of experts in human rights. Rejected refugee claimants
from countries not on the ‘‘safe country’’ list are no longer able to appeal the
decision to the Immigration and Refugee Board. Claimants from countries on the
safe country list can ask for a judicial review by the Federal Court, but can also be
deported before the court makes a decision. This is intended to limit the number of
supposed ‘‘bogus refugees’’ seeking to enter the country under false pretenses.
Further restrictions include biometric identification methods to be implemented for
people who apply for visas to visit Canada.
A Sharp Left–Right Dichotomy
Analysis of the empirical material depicts a sharp dichotomy between political

parties identified with the right and left on the issue of immigration. Here again I
base my right–left typology on the Comparative Manifesto Project. These results
cannot be extrapolated to other political parties of other countries because I am
doing a comparison between two countries. However, similarities were found in the
cases of France and Canada. The typology developed by Cochrane is clearly valid:
and it is in line with the studies that show that the right tends to be anti-immigration
and the left pro-immigration. Christopher 2015. Left and Right: The Small World of
Political Ideas. (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press, (Forthcoming)).
Right-wing political parties (the Conservative Party of Canada and the Union
pour la Majorité in France) call for more restrictive immigration policies, whereas
left-wing political parties (the New Democratic Party and Green Party in Canada,
and the Parti Socialiste, Parti Communiste and Les Verts in France) call for fewer
barriers for immigrants. These differences in approach are apparent not only in
legislation, but also in the discourse of parties in the parliamentary arenas. It should
be emphasized that the discourse of the Liberal Party of Canada is very similar to
the discourse of the New Democratic Party on immigration issues and opposes the
legislation proposed by the Conservative Party of Canada.
In Canada and in France, left-wing political parties (the New Democratic Party
and Green Party in Canada, to which I should add the Liberal Party of Canada, and
the Parti Socialiste, Parti Communiste and Les Verts in France) consider many
aspects of immigration legislation proposed by right-wing political parties to be
inconsistent with broader commitments to human rights. Therefore, human rights-
based discourses are prevalent and often oppose arguments from the right. Tables 1
and 2 illustrate this trend, showing the coding references for the theme of ‘‘human
rights/women’s rights’’ in France and Canada.
What does ‘‘human rights’’ mean for parliamentarians using this term? The
theme of human rights refers to nondiscrimination and the existence of universal
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Table 1: Adjectives and nouns related to the words ‘‘skilled immigration’’ and ‘‘unskilled immigration’’
(all laws studied, Canada)
Skilled immigration Unskilled immigration
Attract Illegal immigrant

Highly skilled workers Irregular/unofficial (status)
Skill/competence Refugee/real refugee
Competition Healthcare system
Resource Family
Our economy Cost
Economic migrant Asylum seeker
Human capital Asylum application
New immigrants Immigration consultant
Efficiency Fake refugees
Protect our immigration system
Table 2: Adjectives and nouns related to the words ‘‘skilled immigration’’ and ‘‘unskilled immigration’’
(all laws studied, France) [My translation.]
Skilled immigration Unskilled immigration

9
‘‘Selected immigration’’ Unwanted immigration
High-skilled workers Irregular/unofficial (status)
Attract Illegal
Economic Marriage
Controlled/ordered/regulated (policies) Family reunification
Control the migration flow Integration
Economic immigration Delinquency
Professional immigration Asylum
Pro-active policy Massive
Workforce
Sectors of the society
human rights, which should not be subject to national or cultural barriers.

Parliamentarians often point their fingers at encroachments on universal principles.
The concept is similar to the definition by Jack Donnelly in the fourth chapter of his
book, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice.
I found a total of 281 references to human rights by all the left-wing political
parties in the debates around June 2011’s Loi relative à l’immigration, à
l’intégration et à la nationalité, while only 71 references to human rights were
made by their right-wing counterparts (UMP and Union Centriste). The pattern was
similar in Canada, where in debates over the law passed in July 2012 (C-31) the
New Democratic Party employed the term ‘‘human rights’’ 231 times while the
Conservative Party of Canada used it only 42 times. In comparison, the other nodes
had fewer references: for debates on the French 2011 legislation, there were 9
coding references concerning national identity, 14 Islam, 16 delinquency, and 42

the Republic. With respect to Canada’s Bill C-31, there was one coding reference
concerning national identity, 4 on Islam and 19 on multiculturalism (Tables 3, 4).
Although France and Canada have very different models of integration and
citizenship, the arguments used by left-wing political parties in both countries are
very similar. Parliamentarians on the left present their opposition to restrictive
immigration measures in the name of human rights and their country’s tradition of
hospitality.
Concretely, the fact that legislation increases the obstacles to a normal family life
for immigrants is repeatedly denounced by the left: the increase of mandatory
resources for family reunification (France’s Loi relative à l’immigration et à
l’intégration of 2006), the introduction of a language test (Loi relative à la maı̂trise
de l’immigration à l’intégration et à l’asile of 2007), and restrictions on
sponsorship for family members (Canada’s Bill C-31 of July 2012) are portrayed
by left-wing political parties as being in violation of the right to live a normal
family life as promoted by the United Nations. Furthermore, the creation of ‘‘safe
country’’ designations is singled out as an attempt to delegitimize the refugee
claims of some candidates (Loi relative à l’immigration, à l’intégration et à la
nationalité of 2011, Canadian Bills C-11 of 2010, and C-31 of 2012). Similarly, the
stricter legal frameworks concerning illegal aliens, including the extension of the
retention period (Loi relative à l’immigration, à l’intégration et à la nationalité of
2011) and more barriers to the legal defense of refugees (Canadian Bills C-11 of
2010, and C-35 of March 2011) are also seen as violating several articles of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the European Convention on Human
Rights. Restrictions on family reunification have a negative impact on women: they
create additional barriers to the job market and increase their financial dependence
on their husbands. For this reason, the topic of women’s rights is very present in the
speech of members of leftist political parties.
Right-wing parties take a different stance on immigration issues. Analysis of
empirical materials reveals that right-wing political parties in both countries
propose restrictive measures: language tests, citizenship tests, higher barriers to
family reunification, and increased surveillance of illegal immigrants. This is
clearly apparent in the details of the laws proposed during the time period
2006–2013.
In both France and Canada, all these legislative measures fall in line with more
restrictive policies for immigration and family reunification. Immigration is a
dividing issue in the political landscape in both countries: left-wing political parties
strongly oppose the measures mentioned above while right-wing political parties
push for more restrictive immigration laws. Taking this dichotomy into account, I
now turn my focus to the discourses of right-wing members of Parliament. What
are the arguments put forth to justify more restrictive immigration policies? What
ideology structures these discourses and frames these visions of immigration?
298
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Table 3: Number of references concerning various nodes concerning Bill C-31 in Canada
Political parties Coding references related to:
Human Women’s Delinquency Canadian Language Islam+secularism Unemployment National

rights rights multiculturalism skills identity
NDP 231 62 2 5 32 2 22 0
Liberal 36 13 3 9 17 0 13 0
Conservative Party of 42 21 18 3 48 1 49 1
French Politics
Canada
Bloc Québécois 12 8 1 0 9 0 7 0
Green Party of 30 18 0 2 11 1 9 0
Canada
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2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419
Table 4: Number of references concerning various nodes concerning the 2011 legislation in France
Political Coding references related to:

parties
Human Women’s Delinquency French Language Islam + Unemployment National
rights rights Republic learning secularism identity

Les Verts 44 20 1 2 0 0 12 0
Parti 198 86 2 4 2 2 26 1
communiste
UMP 125 42 7 22 7 8 41 5
French Politics
Parti Socialiste 302 201 2 8 4 2 55 3

RDSE 19 5 1 1 0 0 9 0
PRG 40 6 1 1 0 1 7 0
Union 36 12 2 4 1 1 3 0
Centriste
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A Selective Immigration at the Service of Post-Fordist Capitalism
The debate is framed through discourses in which immigration cannot be presented

as a monolithic catchall. One of the key elements of right-wing party discourses in
France and Canada is that immigration issues are addressed through the
requirements of post-Fordist capitalism. High-value service economies based on
technological innovation require a highly skilled workforce. In light of this, the
term ‘‘immigration’’ combines two distinct meanings in these debates: immigration
policy facilitates the entry of the kind of highly skilled workers needed while it also
denies entry to others less suited for the service economy. The perceived needs of
the post-Fordist economy are also put forth in a systematic manner in parliamentary
debates as justification for restrictive immigration policies. Social scientists, such
as Bernard (2000), see the key features of a post-Fordist economy as growing
economic polarization between multiskilled workers and the unskilled, together
with a decline in national or industrial collective bargaining; and a shift from
postwar Keynesian welfare states to political regimes that are more concerned with
international competitiveness and innovation, with full employability as opposed to
jobs for life, and with more flexible, market-friendly forms of economic and social
governance. This leads to an imperative of efficiency and competitiveness that is
seen as being inherent to the new age of capitalism, and are the prime values of an
ideological matrix that leads to a distinction between the two types of immigration.
In this form of global capitalism, in which ‘‘competitiveness clusters’’ attract the
best talents, immigration is viewed ambivalently. Although the words ‘‘selection’’
and ‘‘sorting’’ do not appear in the parliamentary debates, semantic analysis shows
that a discursive distinction is developed between the two types of immigration.
Right-wing political parties never present immigration in an entirely negative
manner, but always in a way that reproduces these dual intents. Right-wing parties
aim to attract highly skilled immigrants while simultaneously discouraging
potentially unskilled immigrants, who are seen as an economic burden on the
national community. The discourses put heavy emphasis on the different potential
for economic integration of individual immigrants: skilled immigrants bringing
competencies as entrepreneurs, innovators, and ‘‘human capital’’ to the post-Fordist
economy are sought, while unskilled immigrants are to be warded off.
I used NVivo software to count the number of times the words ‘‘skilled
immigration’’ and ‘‘unskilled immigration’’ were used by members of right-wing
political parties. I then studied the adjectives used in conjunction with both ‘‘types’’
of immigration. Tables 1 and 2 below summarize the results of my research on all
laws studied in both Canada and France.
For the right-wing parties, immigration needs to benefit the economy. Despite
France and Canada’s different models of integration and citizenship, there are
striking similarities between the discourses in both countries. The lexical field used
by right-wing members of Parliament reiterates narratives related to entrepreneurial

management: a good immigration policy has to ‘‘attract’’ ‘‘skills,’’ and ‘‘talents,’’
and ‘‘value-added,’’ and increased ‘‘efficiency’’ are required to compete in a
‘‘global economy.’’ Moreover, the aim is to attract ‘‘young,’’ ‘‘dynamic’’ workers,
with ‘‘qualities’’ (especially students) suited for the contemporary economy.
While the French debate is dominated by a dichotomy between ‘‘selected
immigration’’ (‘‘immigration choisie’’) and ‘‘tolerated immigration’’ (‘‘immigration
subie’’), Canadian members of Parliament use the expression ‘‘skilled workers.’’
Much of the right-wing discourse reveals a stated desire to attract only the most
competitive elements of the immigrant population. In line with this conception,
Nicolas Sarkozy’s policy of ‘‘selective immigration’’ explicitly aimed to address
such economic interests:
This policy implements various instruments in order to attract the best talents
to France and meet the targeted needs of the French economy (…) Economic
studies show that immigration is an engine of economic growth, which can be
optimized depending on the skill level of immigrants (François-Noël Buffet,
UMP, debates around Loi de 2006, France). [My translation.]
Students, who are a potential population of future skilled workers, are viewed in a
positive light, which can be observed in the positive discursive referents applied to
them. These policies aim at attracting and retaining future students, banking on the
‘‘economic potential’’ such immigrants represent.
In opposition to this frame of ‘‘positive immigration’’ is the framing of low-
skilled immigration, depicted as a ‘‘massive, ‘‘uncontrolled flow’’ of ‘‘low-skilled
foreigners.’’ The vocabulary associated with low-skilled immigration is different:
‘‘waves of migration,’’ ‘‘are destabilizing,’’ ‘‘worrying’’ and ‘‘upsetting’’ the
citizens. The absence of specific qualifications for a segmented labor market is
pointed to as an obstacle to economic integration, which would lead to a potential
burden on the national community. According to this vision, the means by which
unskilled immigrants arrive are different from those by which skilled migrants
arrive: the former are considered likely to be cases of family reunification, refugee
status, or illegal immigration. The question of marriage is central here: it is seen
primarily as a way for low-skilled immigrants to join the target country. This is
particularly true in France, where the node related to marriage is large, and spousal
reunification is seen primarily as a way for low-skilled migrants to settle in the
country.
We can also see differences emerging between the two countries. In Canadian
parliamentary debates, Mexico is presented as an exporter of unskilled immigra-
tion, leading the government to require visas for Mexican visitors to Canada. Since
2009, Mexicans have been required to apply for a temporary resident permit in their
country before coming to Canada whereas before they did not have to. (Canada
thus aligns its policies with those of the United States, which also requires visas
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from Mexican nationals). In French parliamentary debates, sub-Saharan Africa and

the Maghreb are identified as the main sources of unskilled immigrants. Large
numbers of potential immigrants, and their association with poverty and lack of
qualifications, generate strong migratory pressures. These factors are considered to
lead to ‘‘low quality’’ immigration, penalizing the country in the global competition
for skilled labor against other attractive destinations. During the debates on the
2006 Act, Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy underlines the fact that:
The statistics from the European Commission are overwhelming: 54 % of
immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa with a university degree
choose to reside in Canada and the United States, while 87 % of those who
have not completed primary or secondary education are in Europe (Nicolas
Sarkozy, UMP, debates around the Loi de 2006, France). [My translation.]
The need to attract the best and to reject low-skilled immigrants takes an air of
urgency in the international context. The lexical field relating such concerns to
international competition is very present in the bills I studied. Both the French and
the Canadian right explicitly mention it:
Today, as everyone knows, the most competent and talented migrants go to
the Americas, while the less educated are welcomed in Europe. We could say
that we will have won, when […] young Indians will choose to settle in
France or Europe rather than go to Boston in the US (Denis Badré, UDF,
debates around Loi de 2006, France). [My translation.]
We now live in a globally competitive world, where countries that can attract
the best and the brightest from around the world will best be able to compete
internationally (Parm Gill, CPC, Debates around Bill C-31 of 2012, Canada).
Here, immigration is depicted as a potential economic resource providing a
comparative advantage over other national economies. In this representation,
countries thus compete to implement the best immigration system and attract the
most advantageous elements. According to this frame, representations of other
countries’ experiences are frequently drawn on in order to justify more restrictive
immigration policy. When the French and Canadian members of Parliament
mention foreign immigration policies, it is almost always to emphasize this
perceived need to compete with rival economies.
There is global competition, especially between Europe and the United States
to attract some ‘‘migration elite’’ (…) this competition also exists among
members of the European Union: for example, the conditions offered to high-
skilled workers by Germany are much more favorable than those offered by
France. It therefore seems appropriate to offer the most favorable terms
possible, within the framework set by the Directive (Richard Young, Loi de,
2011). [My translation.]
I should mention that these provisions are far more modest than those used in
most other liberal democratic countries like Australia, New Zealand, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and most European countries (Jason
Kenney, Canadian Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multicultural-
ism, CPC, Debates around Bill C-31 of 2012, Canada).
From this perspective, the EU is seen as legitimizing a two-track policy toward
immigrants. The EU Blue Card Directive of May 2009 (2009/50/EC) allows highly
skilled non-EU citizens to work and live in any country within the European Union.
In France, right-wing political parties underline the need for a transcription of
European directives into French law. When the term ‘‘European Union’’ is used, it
is to justify restrictions because the EU pushes immigration to be controlled, and
illegal immigration to be avoided. (see Jean Bizet, UMP, debates around Loi 2011,
France).
Barriers to low-skilled immigration and the will to attract highly skilled workers
appear to be two sides of the same coin. Selected according to the criteria of
competence, skilled immigrants are depicted as a path to prosperity and low-skilled
workers as a drain on resources and an undue burden on global competitiveness. As
populations of the latter are much larger than those of the former, the discourse on
selective immigration leads de facto to a call for tightened borders as part of
immigration reform, with the experience of other nations and economic compe-
tition frequently cited to justify more restrictive policy. The absence of references
to national identity or to a substantial conception of the political community is
striking. However, it is interesting to note that countries such as France and
Canada, which have universalist traditions, do not escape discourse of exclusion on
national, and even ethnic, bases.
Roma and Refugees at the heart of the debate
The current literature that tracks the evolution of immigration policies over the last
few decades (MIPEX, CITLAW, MCP) does not include policies regarding
refugees and asylum seekers among the categories analyzed. However, as I will
show in this section, right-wing parties strongly emphasize the disadvantages of
hosting too many refugees and asylum seekers in order to justify a more restrictive
general immigration policy. These types of migrants are presented as a foil to the
desirable, skilled immigrants described in the previous section. Of particular
interest is that discussions on refugees and asylum seekers target a particular
community: the Roma.
The use of keywords gives an idea of the frequency of this theme: the node
‘‘refugee’’/‘‘asylum seekers’’ is very present in the laws studied, and are associated
with Roma. In the French debates of 2011 and in the Canadian debates of 2012,
these three nodes intersected 22 % of uses (i.e., incidences in which one of the two
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terms is used and the other is also used in the same sentence or in the preceding
sentence). Somewhat surprisingly, Roma are even more at the heart of the debate in
Canada than in France, although the country is not part of the European Union, and
therefore not subject to the free movement provisions of the Schengen Agreement.
Even though the term ‘‘Roma’’ appears only a few times, the discussion turns
around the financial burden they are supposed to represent. Coding references
associated with the ‘‘Roma’’ node overlap with 69 % of coding references
associated with the ‘‘financial cost’’ node. This means that in 69 % of the cases
when there is reference to financial cost, reference is made to Roma.
How then, are coercive measures against Roma justified? While some
differences are noted between the two countries, on the whole, the arguments
are, again, very similar, as we can see in the two quotations bellow, extract from the
parliamentary debates of the laws of the two countries:
Finally someone recognized that the open wallet approach of the past,
offering free education, free Medicare, and a welfare cheque to anyone who
touched Canadian soil making a refugee claim was not the right thing to do.
(…) Over 90 percent, and in some years 95 percent, of the target group, the
Roma claimants, didn’t even show up for their oral hearings. They rode on
the taxpayer (Eve Adams, CPC, Debates around Bill C-31 of 2012, Canada).
It is just amazing that we are getting so many claims from the European
Union. Out of those claims, and this is where the word ‘‘bogus’’ comes in,
when they actually need to appear before the Immigration and Refugee
Board, 95 % of those claimants never show up to defend their case. They are
saying that they are sorry that they have wasted our time and have taken our
money but that they will go back home now. What we are hearing is that they
are getting off the plane or the boat, coming from countries like Hungary, the
Roma in particular, saying that they are a refugee and then ask for the cheque
(James Bezan, CPC, Debates around Bill C-31 of 2012, Canada).
In both countries, the arguments revolve almost entirely around financial
considerations. National identity is never put forth to justify a more repressive
policy toward illegal immigrants. There is no reference to a social norm or a
historical national identity threatened by illegal immigration; the words ‘‘national
cohesion,’’ ‘‘assimilation,’’ and ‘‘national history’’ never appear in the range of time
I studied.
As Table 5 shows, we have a vision of capitalism and financial considerations:
Table 5 has to be read as follow: when UMP members of parliament mention
‘‘health benefit,’’ in 48 % of the cases reference is made to refugees. When the PCC
members of parliament mention health benefit, 87 % of the time they associate it
with refugees.
Table 5: Coding references in common with the node ‘refugees’
Semantic Coding references in common with the Coding references in common with the
macrostructures node ‘‘refugees’’ France (UMP) in % node ‘‘refugees’’ (CPC) in %
Health 48 87
benefit/social
benefit
Taxpayer 32 77
(contributable)
Bogus 3 32
claims/false
refugees
Hungary/ 25 35
Romania/
Bulgaria
Unskilled 19 27
Roma 18 29
In Canada, the members of the Conservative Party of Canada express concern

about the financial burden imposed by people who engage in the refugee process
but do not complete it. According to CPC members of Parliament, the fact that
these claims are not brought to an end means they are unfounded. They then
denounce the ‘‘too easy’’ access of asylum seekers to the medical system, arguing
that such claims represent a considerable cost to the Canadian taxpayer: (‘‘$170
million per year,’’ according to Bob Zimmer, CPC, Debates around Bill C-31 of
2012, Canada). The vast majority of European applicants are Roma from the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Hungary (5000 applications in
2010) and the Czech Republic, marking them as the unnamed target populations of
such legislation.
The Canadian Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
(certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to
another Act (C-31, July 2012), intends to limit the number of asylum seekers that
are ‘‘illegitimate,’’ which includes refugees from the European Union (5800 in
2010, up 14 % from 2009). The 2012 law allows the government to require
biometric data from applicants looking to work or study, and also provides new
means to fight against illegal immigration. Moreover, a new reform of asylum
system is in place: a list of ‘‘safe countries’’ has been drawn up, and asylum seekers
from these countries are penalized through shorter lead times and limited rights of
appeal. According to Minister Kenney, asylum seekers from ‘‘safe’’ democratic
countries would generally not need Canada’s protection and are instead seen to be
seeking asylum in the hopes of ‘‘enjoying the social welfare and all kinds of other
social programs’’ (Randy Kamp, CPC, Debates around Bill C-31 of 2012, Canada).
May
In France, as we saw at the beginning of this text, the 2007 law establishes a
transitional regime that imposes restrictions on the movement of workers from the
new EU member states, Romania and Bulgaria. These conditions are almost as
strict as those that applied to non-EU countries. Romanians and Bulgarians rarely
get permission to work and must prove they possess sufficient resources and
insurance so as to not constitute an ‘‘unreasonable cost to the French social
assistance system’’ (Jean-Pierre Sueur, UMP debates around Loi de 2006), and Art.
L. 121-4-1. Loi de 2011 [My translation.]. Citizens of these countries have limits on
their rights of movement and residence: after three months, the right of residence is
subject to the condition of having a job (employed or self-employed), having
student status, or having health insurance and sufficient resources.
Both in France and in Canada, immigration laws target the Roma without
explicitly naming them. Even though the title and summary of the laws do not
explicitly mention this community, analysis of the empirical material reveals that
Roma are targeted both in France and in Canada to justify restrictive immigration
policies. Accused of being an ‘‘unreasonable burden’’ and ‘‘enjoying the generosity
of the social welfare,’’ they are categorized as unwanted, very poorly qualified
immigrants. It is important to note here that the parliamentary databases and
indexes never explicitly mention refugees (or the Roma) as the reason for
implementing more restrictive immigration policies. Only deeper analysis of
parliamentary debates allows us to shed light on that aspect of immigration
policies. Under the rhetoric of neutrality and technical expertise, parliamentary
discourses clearly target individuals along ethnic lines. Here we can see that
neoliberal reasoning leads, de facto, to the creation of racial distinctions among
immigrants. Migrants who are not qualified, who are refugees, or who are
undocumented, are excluded from the nation or asked to remain apart. Through its
application of rules that are on the surface neutral and rational, neoliberalism
organizes society in accordance with racial criteria. The ideal citizen is highly
skilled, very mobile, and competes successfully in the ‘‘global race for talent.’’
Recruiting foreign talent goes hand in hand with rejecting people who are less
qualified, refugees, and family reunification. Demands for highly skilled workers
target individuals who are highly skilled, and therefore people from developed
countries who have had the means to do higher education.
Conclusion
The debate over immigration is revealing of the way nations see themselves. The
reasons given within the walls of parliament in order to justify more restrictive
immigration policies have often promoted a conception of identity and membership
in the nation.
First, in both countries, right-wing political parties are the source of much of the
impetus for more restrictive immigration, and engage in discourses which tend to
be critical of traditionally liberal conceptions of immigration. Such openness is in
reality limited to certain categories of skilled workers, and does not concern the
majority of unskilled workers, as has been the case at other periods in history.
Discourse analysis shows instead that immigration is an extremely divisive issue on
the political landscape: the right intends to limit it in the name of economic
imperatives, while the left is opposed to these measures. This dichotomy reveals
antagonistic conceptions of the nation: Kantian principles are opposed to
predominance of defense of the interest of the national community. Ideology is
very prominent, although it is beneath the surface in parliamentary debates, and the
distinction between left and right is a relevant lens for understanding the evolution
of immigration policies toward greater restrictiveness.
Second, although France and Canada have very different models of integration
and citizenship, there are highly similar reasons put forward in order to justify the
implementation of more restrictive immigration policies in the parliamentary
arenas of the two countries. Discourse analysis of right-wing parties shows a
mindset in which immigration is a potential resource intended to benefit the host
country’s economy in the global competition introduced by post-Fordist capitalism.
According to this frame, a distinction is made between skilled immigration that
should be promoted and mass, unskilled immigration that should be deterred or
prevented. The latter would justify the implementation of more restrictive policy
and even limitation of immigrants’ rights. These specific needs draw the outline of
a migration policy that distinguishes types of populations based on their level of
education and employment skills. This leads to a negative perception of areas that
provide low-skilled immigration: Mexico and South America for Canada, the
Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa for France. While models of integration,
citizenship, culture, and national history are mentioned marginally in parliamentary
debates, they do not seem to have any significant influence on policies dealing with
the issue of immigration.
Third, the issue of refugees and asylum seekers is discussed broadly in the
parliamentary arenas of both countries in order to justify more restrictive
immigration policy. However, the discussion in the current literature (MIPEX,
CITLAW, MCP) does not include refugees and illegal immigrants among the
indicators measuring changes in immigration policies. My analysis shows that
taking those factors into account is essential to the understanding of the evolution
of immigration policies. Treatment of refugees and illegal immigrants is the
paradigmatic example of the trends I have identified: presented as a ‘‘cost’’ or a
‘‘burden’’ to society, and their living conditions are made more difficult by the
introduction different enforcement measures. Moreover, even if it is not always
explicitly stated in the bills, my empirical material shows that Roma people are
particularly affected by these restrictions in both countries. Future studies on the
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evolution of immigration policies must include the issues of refugees, asylum

seekers, and illegal immigrants because these groups are regularly cited in order to
justify implementation of measures restricting immigration.
Immigration restrictions can be explained by underlying structural causes, which
transcend national paradigms: migratory pressure from poor countries has led to the
establishment of coercive measures, and relegates the institutional and historical
differences to the background. My analysis, however, reveals the dominance of a
transnational managerial ideology that views immigration solely through the prism
of the needs of the post-Fordist economy (Castles, 2013). Managerial rhetoric
engenders policy that excludes certain categories of people along ethnic lines.
Although the arguments put forward in parliaments are presented as rational, they
result in the legitimation of racial barriers to the mobility of some populations.
Despite their different models of integration and citizenship, France and Canada are
facing very similar discussions, involving the same arguments and the same
theoretical reflections. These two countries seem to see the same actors performing
largely the same play on different stages.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University), Michel Wieviorka

(École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales), and Alberto Spektorowski (Tel
Aviv University) for their helpful comments on this article.
Notes
1 Each of these indexes uses different criteria. CITLAW indicators are calculated for 36 States and use
all 45 basic indicators such as ius sanguinis, ius soli, residence-based ordinary naturalization, on
specific grounds: voluntary renunciation and withdrawal/lapse. Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel
compare ten Western countries on four points across time (1980, 1990, 2002, 2008) in eight
substantive policy fields: nationality acquisition, marriage migration rights, protection against
expulsion, antidiscrimination provision, access to public service employment, political representation
rights, cultural and religious rights in the education system, and other cultural and religious rights.
MIPEX measures integration policies in all the European Union Member States plus Norway,
Switzerland, Canada, and the USA up to 2010. Using 148 policy indicators, MIPEX creates a rich,
multidimensional picture of migrants’ opportunities to participate in society by assessing
governments’ commitment to integration. The Multiculturalism Policies Index tracks the evolution
of immigrant rights and multiculturalism at three different dates (1980, 2000, 2010).
2 I draw my definitions of the terms ‘‘liberal’’ and ‘‘restrictive’’ from the current literature. Christian
Joppke defines a liberal policy in the following terms: ‘‘non-discriminatory immigration policies,
liberalized citizenship rules,’’ and a general distancing from the old idea of ‘‘assimilation’’ (Joppke
2004). A ‘‘restrictive’’ immigration policy seeks to reduce the number of entries into the country, and
to make access to permanent residency and citizenship more difficult.
3 Roma people are now widely recognized as one of the EU’s largest minority groups with an estimate
of more than 10 million Roma living in Europe. The term ‘‘Roma,’’ first chosen at the inaugural
World Romani Congress held in London in 1971, is now widely accepted across the European Union
as a generic term to describe a diverse range of communities. It refers to a variety of groups of people
who describe themselves as Roma, Gypsies, Travelers, Manouches, Ashkali, Sinti, and other titles.
For a more complete definition, see: Guy et al (2004).
4 Linguists commonly make a distinction between semantics, which has to do with the meaning of
individual words and phrases, and linguistic pragmatics, which has to do with various aspects of
intention, interpretation, and application that need to be taken into account to fully understand how
language is used and understood. This distinction is meant to underline the fact that people
commonly intend more than they actually say, and that our understanding of the full intention of an
utterance depends very much on common-sense inferences and knowledge about the situations in
which things are said.
5 The 32 nodes were skilled immigration, unskilled immigration, financial cost, Roma, refugees/
asylum seekers, students, marriage, family reunification, unemployment, economic efficiency/com-
petitiveness, United States, other European countries, national identity, Islam, Republic, delin-
quency, laxism, human rights, women’s rights, Maghreb, Mexico, multiculturalism, Africa, selected
immigration (immigration choisie), migratory flow, globalization, master/control, order/overflow/
overwhelm/disorder, extreme right/xenophobia, pragmatism/realism, working class, and European
Union.
6 The other 26 nodes were retirement pension, welfare state, husband/wife, social insurance, Italy,
Germany, Sweden, Spain, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, drug, children’s rights, open borders, closed
borders, Union, workers, European Commission, European Union, job market, difficulty of
integration, language learning, social housing (logement social), smuggler (passeur de clandestins),
and secularism (laı̈cité).
7 My translation of ‘‘degré de connaissance de la langue française.’’
8 My translation of ‘‘contrat d’accueil et d’intégration famille.’’
9 My translation of ‘‘immigration choisie.’’
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Ideological justifications for restrictive

Abstract In this paper, I analyze the parliamentary discourses on immigration in France

Keywords: immigrants; immigration; refugees; Canada; France; parliamentary

The comparative literature on evolution of immigration policies is most often based

Overview of the Current Literature

the membership of the political community. Here, I am attempting to answer the

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

a research method which operates in a different way than traditional social

The Choice of France and Canada and the Laws

I have analyzed parliamentary debates from January 2006 to December 2013 in

of cultural diversity: Republican assimilationism in France (Schnapper, 2007;

• Loi relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration (July 24th, 2006);

Description of the Laws

In France, the Loi relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration (July 2006) established

Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential

A Sharp Left–Right Dichotomy

Analysis of the empirical material depicts a sharp dichotomy between political

Skilled immigration Unskilled immigration

Attract Illegal immigrant

Skilled immigration Unskilled immigration

human rights, which should not be subject to national or cultural barriers.

coding references concerning national identity, 14 Islam, 16 delinquency, and 42

Political parties Coding references related to:

Human Women’s Delinquency Canadian Language Islam+secularism Unemployment National

Political Coding references related to:

Ideological justifications for restrictive immigration policies

Parti Socialiste 302 201 2 8 4 2 55 3

A Selective Immigration at the Service of Post-Fordist Capitalism

The debate is framed through discourses in which immigration cannot be presented

by right-wing members of Parliament reiterates narratives related to entrepreneurial

from Mexican nationals). In French parliamentary debates, sub-Saharan Africa and

Roma and Refugees at the heart of the debate

Table 5: Coding references in common with the node ‘refugees’

In Canada, the members of the Conservative Party of Canada express concern

evolution of immigration policies must include the issues of refugees, asylum

I would like to thank Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University), Michel Wieviorka

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