COR3001 – Big Questions – G11

Final Essay

Question 1: Is terrorism ever morally permissible?

Done by: Darren Tay Jun Hao

Essay Word Count: 1499 words

Introduction
Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence against non-combatants, typically
perpetrated by non-state actors intended to induce fear to further the terrorists’
political agenda. Terrorism is often thought to be morally impermissible due to
the intentional killing of non-combatants and the fact that the idea of using
individuals as a mere means goes against Kantian deontology. However, unlike
other moral issues, the moral status of terrorism admits degrees of moral
justification, and I contend that although terrorism is usually morally
impermissible, there are exceptions where terrorism can be morally permissible.
That is to say, a terrorist act might be morally justified to an extent, contingent
on the degree to which it satisfies the conditions necessary and sufficient for
justified terrorism. As Walzer (1997) observes, “It is at least possible to imagine
oppression so severe that terrorism aimed systematically at political division
might be morally defensible.” All that is required is a case which satisfies the
conditions for morally justified terrorism. I will discuss two scenarios where this
holds true, namely, when terrorism maximises expected net utility, and when it
satisfies the Jus Ad Bello conditions.

Consequentialism
One major account of the morality of terrorism is provided by consequentialism:
terrorism, like everything else, should be judged solely by consequences. When
its rationally expected consequences are good on balance, it will be morally
justified. As Leon Trotsky famously said, given a paramount end, the question
of the means becomes one of expediency rather than principle. A
consequentialist moral theory is one that states that the right actions are those
that bring about the best consequences. In using hedonistic utilitarianism to
examine the permissibility of terrorism, we would have to evaluate the benefits
of terrorism against its consequences. Nielsen (2008) states that terrorist acts
must be justified by their moral consequences. Terrorism is thought to be
morally justified when (1) they are politically effective weapons in a
revolutionary struggle and when (2) everything considered, there are strong
reasons for believing that through terrorism, there will be less injustice, suffering
and degradation in the world than would otherwise have been the case. Along
the same line, if the act of terrorism brings about greater expected net utility and
the best consequences, then it can be said that terrorism is morally permissible.
Just Cause
Herein lies another case we can say about the morally permissible nature of
terrorism, particularly as we conjoin that discussion with the Just War theory. To
examine the moral requirement of fighting justly; terrorism, we must look at the
tenet that is non-combatant immunity. Terrorism, which necessarily targets non-
combatants, is therefore, morally problematic in the sense that it violates the
non-combatant immunity. However, Smilansky (2004) and Walzer (1997)
brought up the case of ‘supreme emergencies’ and the Anti-Oppression
Exception. It states that it would be morally permissible for weak forces to
engage in terrorism when fighting unjust oppression, such as combating
oppressive regimes (Alhoff, 2012). Essentially, terrorism is thought to be morally
permissible if a people or community finds itself in extremis, where terrorism is
the last resort. In a sense, terrorism can only be considered (i) in the face of a
“moral disaster”, such as an imminent threat of extermination or genocide, and
(ii) when there are good reasons to believe that terrorism is the last resort and
the only solution of preventing said disaster. Fundamentally, the moral good of
terrorism can sufficiently countervail the moral harm of violating the principle of
non-combatant immunity. This fulfils the consequentialist train of thought and
provides a just cause for terrorism. As such, we will examine two cases;
genocide and oppressive tyrannical regimes.

Firstly, in the case of a genocide, where there is a deliberate killing of a large

number of people from a particular nation or ethnic group, terrorism might be
appropriate as a form of negative utilitarianism, where the amount of suffering is
minimised instead, to maximise the expected net utility.

In oppressive tyrannical regimes, where people are often suffering under an

authoritative government, terrorism could be permissible as a means to topple
these regimes. But morally justified instances of terrorism, when or if they do
obtain, have the role of helping victims of significant forms of injustice to revolt
against their oppressors, thereby enabling the group to establish itself as a free
and equal society. Terrorism may serve the same purpose as Rawls (1971)
says civil disobedience serves in a nearly just democratic society: it can
maintain and strengthen just institutions. The difference, most would hold, is
that terrorism utilizes violence or the threat thereof, while civil disobedience
(traditionally construed) does not. This may surprise some that violent acts
could possibly have a positive role in a democratic society and that violence can
sometimes lead to peace, solidarity, democracy and justice. Although in some
cases peaceful means of change are more likely to lead to positive change,
terrorist violence of a revolutionary nature can more easily remove forces of
oppression from a state, it would seem.

Example
To tie in an example where terrorism is thought to be morally permissible, let us
examine the case of the African National Congress’s (ANC) internal resistance
to apartheid in South Africa. Apartheid was characterized by an authoritarian
political culture which ensured that South Africa was dominated politically,
socially, and economically by the nation's minority white population. The Blacks
were segregated from the other races and were prohibited from using public
facilities and participating in social events. They were also denied proper
housing, being evicted and forced to live where the whites dictated.
Employment opportunities were also stripped from them, with black children
being forced into manual labour and menial jobs that the government deemed fit
for them. Although the government had the power to suppress virtually all
criticism of its policies, there was still strong opposition to the apartheid. Black
African groups, with the support of some whites, held demonstrations and
strikes and in the 1950s, the ANC then initiated its defiance campaign of
passive resistance. Subsequent civil disobedience protests targeted curfews,
pass laws and “petty apartheid” segregation in public facilities. Organised
destruction of private property and violence were not employed, as the ANC
stuck strictly to passive resistance. However, after many years, although the
ruling National Party sought to reform the apartheid system, they continued to
deny political rights to black South Africans. This stirred a new wave of anti-
apartheid social movements and the oppositions deemed adopting a passive
stance simply did not help their oppression. These resistance groups then
escalated into violence to the point where the National Party (NP) had to call for
a state of emergency in 1986, detaining thousands of political opponents
without trial. There was also increasing external pressure from international
countries due to the dissatisfaction at the NP’s treatment of the black South
Africans. Caving in to external pressure and political unrest, the apartheid was
then abolished in 1991, where the first multi-racial general election was held in
April 1994. In essence, the ANC fought back against oppression from the whites
to restore their rights, freeing themselves from previously imposed restrictions.
This fits Smilansky’s description of limited and narrowly focused terrorism aimed
at abolishing tyranny, and it is arguably justified, since the ANC only became
increasingly militant after peaceful means failed to produce results. Given the
terrible conditions and oppression the South Africans were under during
apartheid, and that terrorism seemed to be a last resort, it satisfied the Just War
conditions and maximised expected net utility. Thus, it can be said to be morally
permissible.

Fotion’s stance
Fotion (1981) finds standard consequentialist assessments of terrorism too
permissive and argues that there is always an alternative to terrorism and is
therefore morally impermissible.

Whilst his stance has merit, it does not always hold true in the case of supreme
emergencies, where there are no alternatives. Ethnic cleansings and genocidal
attacks are intentional acts meant to destroy a group; no amount of
appeasements nor concessions could possibly have swayed such intentions,
such as Hitler’s extermination of the Jews. When these groups are cornered in
these scenarios, terrorism is their last resort in ensuring their survival, to which
they have a duty to protect themselves in self-defence or other-defence. As
such, I hold that in cases where a people finds themselves in extremis,
terrorism could be a last resort with no available, feasible alternatives, and thus,
is morally permissible.

Conclusion
Terrorism is often morally impermissible due to the loss of expected net utility
and the fact that it goes against Kantian deontology. However, there are certain
cases where it can be morally permissible. These cases hold true when
terrorism maximises expected net utility, when it satisfies the Jus Ad Bello
conditions, and when it is used as a weapon against oppression, genocide, and
other cases of supreme emergencies. It is ever more difficult to uphold the
absolutist position that terrorism is always morally impermissible, for it takes
only one catastrophic scenario that can only be averted by terrorism to
invalidate the argument, as we have observed. (1499 words)
 References

Allholf, F. (2012). Terrorism, Ticking Time-Bombs, and Torture: A Philosophical

Analysis. The University of Chicago Press.
https://doi.org/10.7208/9780226014821

Fotion, N. (1981). The Burdens of Terrorism: Values in Conflict. New York:

Macmillan, 463–70.

Nielsen, K. (2008). On justifying violence. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of

Philosophy, 24(1), 21–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748108601924

Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap

Press of Harvard University Press.

Smilansky, S. (2004). Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion. Ethics, 114(4), 790–

805. https://doi.org/10.1086/383443

Walzer, M. (1997). Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations. Basic Books.