PART II MORAL AGENT “if | were surrounded by angels who were purely rational and had no inclinations at all, | couldn't do anything for them. | couldn't make them happy; | couldn't make them ead, | would be entirely useless as ¢ moral agent.” ‘Thomas Pogge Learning Outcomes At the end of this section, students are expected to: 1. know human act and its essential qualities; 2. explain the relationship between voluntariness and moral accountability; 3. lear the hierarchies of values; 4. identify and articulate Kierkegaard’s Existential Stages and Kohlberg's Moral, Development; 5, capture and analyze the role of feeling in moral decision-making; make use of the indispensabilty of reason and impartiality in moral dectsion- making; check the real-life cases against the seven-step modal, that uses feeling, reason, and impartiality; and 8. appreciate the vital role of moral courage in executing good moral decision.CHAPTER 3, VOLUNTARINESS AND MORALRESPONSIBILITY In the preceding chapter, one argued that it would be disservice to one’s self and to others to judge hastily without taking into consideration the person's individuality and rootedness in history, culture and religion. Instead of judging, everybody is enjoined to practice understanding and tolerance. Understanding, however, does not excuse the agent from responsibility of his or her acts (if found that he or she really is responsible); nor is tolerance absolute, that is, there are some things that one can very well tolerate but there are others that are beyond. toleration. In this chapter, one examines the very nature of human act for the purpose of identifying when (if ever) an agent is excused from moral responsibility. One will also argue that although practices may differ, the values behind such practices may just be the same. And, whenever, one value clashes with another, there is hierarchy among values and that there are values that are more universal than othersCONCERNING HUMAN ACT AND HUMAN VALUATION Being a normative discipline, what concerns Ethics even more than the morality or immorality of an act is whether or not the agent is morally responsible and, therefore, culpable for his or her actions. When can the responsibility be not ascribed to the agent? When can the agent be excused from the culpability of his or her acts? To address the foregoing questions, let one go back to the definition of human act. Human Act and the Question on Moral Responsibility Ethics is generally defined as the study of the morality (formal object) of human act (material object). This definition has one simple and yet profound implication: before one can say whether the act (and the agent) is morally right or morally wrong, one must determine first whether or not the agent really is responsible for the commission of such amact. Glenn (1959) defines human act as “an act that proceeds from the deliberate free will of man (p. 3)” The very nature, then, of a human act - that is, what makes an act a human act - is the presence of knowledge, freedom and voluntariness. These, especially the last one, are what make the act morally accountable to the agent. In other words, in the absence of these, the agent can neither be called moral or immoral. This, in turn, ‘excuses the agent from any moral responsibility. To illustrate this point further, let one re-present the following essential elements of a human act Gualdo, 2012, p. 26): 1. Theact must he deliberate. This means that the agent does the act consciously, that heor she knows what he or she is doing (including the possible consequences of the act) and is aware that he or she is doing the act. 2. Theact must be free. This means that the agent doing the actis free from constraint (restriction) or duress (force or threats). 3. The act must be voluntary. This means that the act must emanate from the will (Poluntas) of the agent. This makes the act his or her own. Of the three elements, all of which are essential, Glenn called voluntariness as the “formal essential quality of a human act” (12). In other words, what makes human act human ultimately is the voluntariness with which the act is committed. As a matter of course, voluntariness necessitates knowledge and freedom, is Imowledge and freedom one cannot truly will the commission of an act. Therefore, in the final analysis, this voluntariness is what makes the agent morally responsible for his or her actions. In other words, in the absence of such voluntariness, one can say that an act is not really the agent’s and, therefore, excuses him or her from responsibility thereof. in the absence of.But when can one say that an act is not voluntary? The simple and immediate answer to this question is when an actis out of the control of the agent such as natural operations of the body and reflexive responses to stimuli. ‘These include breathing, blinking of an eye, sneezing, yawning, scratching, and the like. In “committing” these acts, even though they are actually the agent's acts, they are not really the agent's in so far as agency in Ethics is concerned. In other words, there is no morality ascribe to them; consequently, the agent is not morally responsible for them. A more complicated answer to the question of voluntariness is the existence of the so-called voluntary natural acts. What makes this complicated is the fact that such acts are natural, that is, they are normal functions emanating from our nature and/or are important for our biological survival. However, although they are natural, commission of them has to be willed. It is not something done out of reflex and are within the control of the agent. In other words, unless the agent wills its commission, these acts will not be committed. Examples of voluntary natural acts are eating, walking, running, whistling and all other actions that are done without advertence (conscious attention) but are not reflexive and could very well be stopped by the agent. These acts are normally devoid of, moral property (amoral). At times, however, if they are advertently and freely committed for the sake of an end (intention), they assume moral property. Corollarily, when this happens, the agent committing them becomes morally responsible for such acts. The most complicated answer to the question of voluntariness involves actions that are neither natural operations (or normal functions) of the body nor reflexive. Actions such as choosing a degree or course, courting a woman, going or not going to church, taking someone else's property, helping a poor old woman, not telling the truth, and all those acts classified as human acts. These acts are normally voluntary. Due to the existence of the so-called modifiers, however, there are times that the voluntariness is diminished oreven eliminated.‘The aforementioned modifies are five in number. They are as follows (Glenn, p. 25): ignorance (absence of necessary knowledge), concupiscence (passions or strong emotions), fear (isturbed state of mind due to an impending danger), violence (coerce someone to do something) and habie (actions done repeatedly and with ease). These modifiers are called as such because they modify the very nature of human acts, that is, they affect ‘the voluntariness of the act performed. They either increase or decrease or even crase voluntariness. ‘What follows are the principles emanating from the above-mentioned modifiers Glenn, pp. 45-47) which, together with the principle of indirect voluntariness (Glenn, p. 19) and the principle of double effect (Glenn, pp. 22-23), constitute what one calls the Ten Basic Principles of Morality: 1. Invincible ignorance (cannot be possibly overcome) destroys the voluntariness of anact. Vincible ignorance (can be possibly overcome with due diligence) does not destroy but lessens the voluntariness of an act. Affected ignorance (willed or positively fostered) in one way lessens the voluntariness and in another way increases it. Antecedent concupiscence (spontaneous passion) does not destroy but lessens the voluntariness of an act.5. Consequent concupiscence (stirred or fostered passion), however great, does not lessen the voluntariness of an act. 6. Anact done from fear, however great, is simply voluntary, although it is regularly also conditionally involuntary. 7. Acts elicited by the will are not subject to violence; external acts caused by violence, to which due resistance is offered, are in no wise imputable to the agent. 8. Habit does not destroy voluntariness; and acts from habit are always voluntary, at east in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure. 9. ‘The agent is responsible for the foreseeable evil effect of an act that he or she is free to avoid. 10. The agent may perform an act, not evil in itself, from which both good and evil effects flow provided that the evil effect does not precede the good effect; there is sufficient reason for doing the act; and that the good effect is the one intended, the evil effect being only secondary and unintentional. Notice that based on the foregoing, only three principles acknowledge the conditions that render an act involuntary, namely: invincible ignorance, fear (conditionally) and due resistance (to violence). And even in the use of fear, although fear conditionally renders an act involuntary, it does not excuse the agent from the moral responsibility. As Glenn explained, “Fear does not excuse an evil act which springs from it (p. 42).” In other words, only acts emanating from ignorance that is impossible to conquer and acts emanating from violence that is duly resisted are the conditions that allow the agent to be truly excused from moral responsibility.At this point, let one go back to the concept determinism and the alleged absence of moral responsibility. ‘The claim of biological or genetic determinism is that the agent's actions are brought about by his or her genetic or hormonal make-up - that he or she has no control of them ~ and therefore is not responsible for them. The difficulty in assessing this claim lies in the fact, which the proponents themselves acknowledged, that so far there is not enough evidence to make such daim conclusive. Granting that the claim is already conclusive, still biological determinism does not render the act involuntary. Just like habit, the existence of such predisposition to evil acts does not guarantee commission of such acts. The agent, once his or her condition is brought to his or her attention, has the duty to seck professional help in order to prevent him or her from committing evil acts. The agent, therefore, is still morally responsible for his or her actions. In the case of Waldroup, his actions may be involuntary in so far as he momentarily “snapped,” if we are to believe the argument in his defence. However, he is still responsible for those acts in so far as he technically allowed such actions to happen by not seeking professional help before the inevitable could happen. This, of course, presupposes that he was or was made aware of his condition and that professional help was available. Concerning behavioural determinism, the argument for involuntariness is even weaker. Granted that persons are just products of their past experiences ~ that they are just conditioned by their past ~ this does not really erase their options. A person still has the choice of doing or not certain acts. The influences of the past, no matter how strong, do not render him or her incapable of exercising a rational choice. A teacher, for example, who does not compromise the lesson or the purpose of the subject in favour of an easy, accommodating teaching-delivery system has the actual choice of not doing the same. A parent who disciplines his or her child with the “rod” has the actual choice of doing otherwise. A person who violates the rules has the actual choice of obeying them, just as a person who obeys the law has the actual choice of violating ‘them. ‘Their past may have strong influences in their chosen actions, but the fact that they choose said actions makes the actions voluntary and the agents morally responsible. In the final analysis, while it is true that it would be unfair to hastily call on people who have done something wrong, it is equally unfair (for them and for others) to just let them be. While we understand where they are coming from, our understanding, our sympathy, does not and cannot excuse them from their moral responsibility.Universality of Values What of ethical relativism? Do differences in religion and cultural practices really prove that morality is essentially relative and is, therefore, not as binding as we are led to believe? Does ethical relativism render the agent not morally responsible for his or her actions? In his book The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Rachels (2010, pp. 21) explored this question: How much do cultural differences really differ? He gave as an example the cultural practice of not eating beef. An outsider cannot understand why some people have this practice. But an outsider can very well understand the prohibition of eatinga relative. Only after realizing that the people who do not eat beef believe in reincarnation can the outsider understand why they have such a practice. The difference, Rachels said, is “in our belief system, not in our values. We agree that we shouldn't eat Grandma; we disagree whether the cow could be Grandma (p. 21)” Again, practices may differ, but the values for and in accord of which may be the same. Values like respecting the elderly are common among cultures although the expressions (pagmamano or beso-beso) are different. The value of meaningful suffering may be the same at least for some religious groups but the expression may not necessarily be through self-flagellation, Contrary to what the ethical relativists hold, Rachel's is of the view that there is an objective morality (p. 23). This objectivity lies in the universality of (at least some) values. “Take, for example, the value of caring for the young. This value is true across all cultures no matter how primitive some cultures may be. It is because the survival of the young, means the survival of the group; that unless the young survives into adulthood, there ‘would be nobody to replace the old ones who would eventually die.Another universal value is telling the truth. As no culture could possibly survive if everybody is lying, this value is definitely true across all cultures. The proscription against stealing and or murder is, for certain, also universal for the very reason that the society will cease to exist unless the value of respect for another person's life and property are practiced. Indeed, there are universal moral norms. They are the norms that, according to Rachels, “all societies must embrace, because those rules are necessary for society to exist (p.23).” Concerning practices, Rachels added this standard, “Does the practice promote or hinder the welfare of the people affected by it? (p. 25)" ‘The Hierarchy of Values German philosopher Max Scheler (1874-1928), although not directly saying that there is a universal value, theorized that values are hierarchical. Being a phenomenologist who believed that the primary aim of phenomenology is “to arrive immediately at the ‘sel given’ ~ that which is given immediately without the interference of symbols of whatever kind” (Dy, 1998: 87), Scheler thought of values as more of the objects of feelings rather than the mind. Hence, values are preferred rather than chosen. For Scheler, values are either positive or negative Gustice - injustice), with the positive always preferred over the negative. And among values there is a hierarchy such that it is but natural that the higher the value the more it is preferred relative to the others. Concerning the hierarchy itself, let the following brief discussion suffice. A more detailed discussion is presented later in the section “Feelings”.Concerning the hierarchy itself, let the following brief discussion suffice. A more detailed discussion is presented later in the section “Feelings” Scheler orders values, in ascending order, this way (Dy, 1992, pp. 94-95): sensory values (pleasant-unpleasant), vital values (noble-vulgar), spiritual values (ustice- injustice), and holy and unholy (absolutes). A concrate example of valuation following this hierarchy would be: the ideal society or heaven or salvation or God is higher than justice (with justice being normally valued for the sake of the ideal society); justice is higher than life (with life at times being sacrificed for the sake of justice, ic., killing in self-defence); life is higher than pleasure (with pleasure often sacrificed for the sake of life, ic., quitting cigarette and drinking for the sake of longer life). What concerns us presently is the reasoning behind such hierarchy, for although preferring is not the jurisdiction of reason, ordering of values is. Explaining Scheler, Dy enumerated the five essential characteristics by which a value is considered higher than another (pp. 96-97). They are as follows: 1. Avalue is higher if it contains in its essence (not in its carrier or goods) the ability ‘to exist through time - to endure. Based on this characteristic, health (lifetime) is definitely higher than eating ice cream (momentary). 2. Higher values are less divisible. This means that higher are the values that can be shared by many without being diminished compared to values whose goods are commensurate to the number of people who partake. Based on this characteristic, sensory values are naturally of the lowest order since a pizza, for example, can only satisfy so many. 3. Avalueis higher if it generates other values. This means that higher are the values that makes other values valuable. Joy, for example, is higher than life since life becomes valuable because of joy. Love is also higher than life since life becomes meaningful or valuable because of love. 4, Thehigher the value, the deeper it produces inner satisfaction or fulfilment in the possession of its good. This means that higher are the values that independently gives deeper satisfaction compared to values that only gives satisfaction in relation to another. Pleasure, for example, is lower than joy because it is shallower compared to the latter. The feeling of pleasure is never enough since one will still look for other values even when experiencing pleasure. 5. Avalue is higher if it is independent of the organism experiencing it. This means that the lesser the value is associated with the one experiencing it, the higher it is. Naturally, sensory pleasures, since they are dependent on the senses of the one experiencing them, is the lowest. Spiritual values and the holy, since they transcend the individual, are naturally higher.Relativism and Moral Responsibility It can be argued, then, that since there is a hierarchy of values and there values more absolute than others, nobody is excused from the responsibility of his or her advertent, free and voluntary actions. Cultural or religious differences in practices notwithstanding, the agent is responsible for the acts he or she has committed. But where does this responsibility lie? Its in choosing practices that promote positive values over practices that promote negative values, practices that promote lesser values (in degree of importance) instead of practices that promote greater values or the other way around. As Dy explained, “Good is the realization of a higher value in place of a lower value, of a positive value instead of a negative one. Evil is the realization of lower value in place of a higher value or of a negative value instead of a positive value” (p. 97). Killing in itself, for example, is morally neutral. It is instinctively disapproved, yes, because it prima facio seems to realize a negative value (death) instead of a positive value (life). However, when it “actually” realizes that (eath, as in cases of random killing) or a lower value (revenge for self-satisfaction, which is often confused with justice) instead of a higher value (preservation of life), then it is evil. But, if it actually realizes a positive value (self preservation in self-defence) instead of a negative value (death), then killing is morally good. ‘The emphasis here, as Dy pointed out, is actually preferring one value instead of or in place of another. “The realization of a lower value does not necessarily mean evil, nor does the realization of a higher value mean good” (p. 98). They only become good (or evil) when they realize positive instead of negative (or negative instead of positive) or higher instead _of lower (or lower instead of higher) values,On the Question of Tolerance From the foregoing discussions (hierarchy and absoluteness of values), one can easily see that tolerance is never absolute. Again, if there is hierarchy among values, then one ‘would normally choose the positive instead of the negative, the higher instead of the lower, the more absolute instead of the relative. However, because of what Scheler calls a “damaged and deceived ordo amoris” (order of the heart), one may actually choose the negative instead of the positive, the lower instead of the higher. In some cases, tolerance may be uncalled for. Indeed, it would be easy for one to tolerate such cultural practices that are queer at worst for as long as they do not sacrifice higher values. Picking one's nose in public, for ‘example, may appear gross for some people but it poses no threat to life or to justice or to the integrity of the society. Self-flagellation, too, may appear wrong to some but it does not endanger the social-fabric (although it may endanger the agent's life but he is doing it for the sake of love for his mother, with love being a higher value than life). However, it would be very hard to tolerate practices that sacrifice positive for a negative value, higher fora lower value, relative over absolute value. Take, for example, the Holocaust (which was in declared purpose a form of eugenics). The Nazi killed (negative value: death) the Jews simply because Hitler did not like (lower value: displeasure) them. Another example of intolerable cultural practices is the so-called rape culture, which is viewed by many as more about exercising male dominance than sexual pleasure. It cannot be tolerated for it does not serve a higher value; domineering or bravado being a base “value” (brute) is definitely lower than the respect for the other person's purity and dignity. Tolerance, indeed, is not absolute. In simpler terms, we may not agree whether it is right or wrong to let a pregnant woman hop on the bus or jeepney before of you (considering that both of you are in a hurry), we can definitely agree that it is wrong to push that pregnant woman out of your way.