People vs Hon.

Judge Purisima

Facts:

26 people were charged for the mere act of carrying deadly weapons pursuant to P.D. 9, penalizing the
illegal possession of deadly weapons. Respondent Judge Purisima, et. al. dismissed or quashed all the
informations filed in their respective courts for failing to allege that the carrying outside of the accused’s
residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance of or on the occasion of, connected
with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Based
on the literal import P.D. 9, the People argue that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive
activities as such are essentially a malum prohibitum .

Issue:

Whether or not the mere carrying of deadly weapons constitute a crime under P.D. 9.

Ruling:

When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and
scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and
applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.

In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in these cases —

the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
controlling factor, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if
strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.

As regards the purpose of P.D. 9 contemplated in its preamble, the carrying of deadly weapons outside
the residence must be related to subversive or criminal activities to constitute a crime. Penalizing the
mere act of carrying deadly weapons would lead to injustice, hardships and unreasonable
consequences, never intended by a legislative measure. Hence, the mere carrying of deadly weapons do
not constitute a crime under P.D. 9.

S.D. Martinez vs William Buskirk

A delivery wagon was used to deliver some forage. The defendant’s cochero tied the driving lines of the
horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside the wagon to unload the
forage; while unloading the forage, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and
made some other noise, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away.
The driver was thrown out from the wagon and was unable to stop the horses resulting to a collision
with a carromata riden by Carmen Ong Martinez, severely wounding Carmen Ong with a serious cut
upon her head.

Van Buskirk presented evidence that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the
accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero.

However, the court ruled that the defendant is guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him for
P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day October, 1908,
and for the costs of the action. Hence, the appeal

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant may be held liable for the negligence of his cochero.

Ruling:

No. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by
the evidence in this case. Leaving the horses unhitched is not in itself negligence.

There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil Code,
which provides that “Masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. The liability referred to in this article shall cease
when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the damage.”

It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and
tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several
years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving
them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away
up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the
horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident
was the custom or universal practice of all cochero who delivered merchandise.

CIR vs. Primetown Property Group

Facts:

Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of
income tax respondent paid in 1997 as he was not liable for income taxes because he suffered losses.
Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding
tax from real estate sales to the BIR. Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.

on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in the CTA. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed
beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. The CTA
found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or
credit commenced on that date.

The two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was
equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed
731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition was filed within the two-year prescriptive period.

RULING:

Yes, the petition was filed within the two-year prescriptive period.

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is
equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the
Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal
periods.

(Lex posteriori derogat priori- a later law takes precedence over an earlier one)