1. Monte De Piedad vs.

Gov’t of the Philippines – Doctrine of Parens Patriae

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine Treasury is competent to file a complaint against Monte de Piedad for the
reimbursement of the money intended to relief the victims of the 1863 Philippine earthquake.

RULING:

The Philippine Treasury upheld the right of Government of the Philippines to file a case as parens patriae in
representation for legitimate claimants, the intended beneficiaries or their heirs, and to assert the protection of the
rights of the general population. In accordance to the doctrine of parens patriae, the government, being the protector
of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest.
No other party has been entrusted with such right. Thus, as “guardians” of the people, the government has the right
to take back the money that was intended for the relief of the earthquake victims. The beneficiaries of charities,
often incapable of asserting their rights, look unto the sovereign authority for their protection. In their incapability,
the Government shall stand and act as parens patriae for representation. This inherent power of the state does not
cease to exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic. Rather, it now resides in the
legislative department of the state, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and
right and is clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any cases whatever.

2. Cabanas vs. Pilapil – Doctrine of Parens Patriae

FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He
also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by
his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then took
charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance
proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance
policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended
beneficiaries.

ISSUE:
WON the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy.

HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever
any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a
litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should
not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child, and it is assumed that
the mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in
consonance with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent
(mother) is observed.

3. Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. Corazon Aquino – De Jure and De Facto Government
FACTS:
1.On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power.

2.On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of
power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes.

The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are
the judge.

The Supreme Court further held that:

 The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country.
 It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
 The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

4. Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff - Sovereignty

FACTS:

During the Japanese occupation, herein petitioner, Ramon Ruffy, a Provincial Commander of the Philippine
Constabulary, retreated in the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy. He organized and led a guerrilla outfit
known as Bolo Combat Team or Bolo Area. The said Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th Military District, which
has been recognized and placed under the operational control of the US Army in the South Pacific. Sometime later,
Col. Jurado effected a change of command in the Bolo Area. Major Ruffy who was then acting as Commanding
Officer for the Bolo Area was relieved of his position. Later on or on October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col Jurado was slain
allegedly by the petitioners. It was this murder which gave rise to petitioner ‘s trial.

The trial court convicted petitioner and he now filed this instant petition with the contention that he was not subject
to military law at the time the offense for which he had been placed on trial was committed. Petitioners contended
that by the enemy occupation of the Philippines, the National Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating and
governing the existence of the Philippine Army including the Articles of War, were suspended and in abeyance
during such belligerent occupation. He also assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War which provides that
―any person subject to military law who commits murder in the time of war should suffer death or imprisonment
for life, as the court martial may direct. Petitioner argued that the said law was in violation of Article VII, section 2
of the Constitution since 93d of Article of War fails to allow a review by the Supreme Court of judgments of courts
martial imposing death or life imprisonment.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner was subject to military law at the time the alleged offense was committed.
2. Whether 93d of Articles of War was constitutional.

HELD:
YES, petitioner was subject to military law at the time the alleged offense was committed. The rule that laws of
political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded or in abeyance during the military
occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and
does not bind the enemies in arms.

By the occupation of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine army did not cease to
be fully in the service, though, in a measure, only in measure, they were not subject to the military jurisdiction, if
they were not in active duty. In the latter case, like officers and soldiers on leave of absence or held as prisoners of
war, they could not be held guilty of breach of the discipline of the command or of a neglect of duty x x x; but for an
act unbecoming of a gentleman or an act which constitutes an offense of the class specified in the 95th Article of
War, they may in general be legally held subject to military jurisdiction and trial.

Moreover, petitioners, by their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the General
Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of
War. As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under the orders of a duly
established and duly appointed commanders of the United States Army and thus covered by Article 2 of the Articles
of War which provides for persons subject to military law.

YES, 93d of the Articles of War was constitutional. It does not violate Article VII, section 2 of the Constitution,
which provides that ―the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. Court Martial are agencies of executive
character, and one of the authorities ―for ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the
constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation. Unlike courts of law,
they are not a portion of the judiciary.

The court martial are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President
as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and
utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.

5. Peralta vs. Director of Prisons - Sovereignty

Postliminy - it is an international law wherein the right in virtue of which persons and things taken by the enemy are
restored to their former state, when coming again under the power of the nation to which they belong.

Facts: Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and
control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries was prosecuted for the crime
of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and
Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 “was a political instrumentality of the military forces of
the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and void
ab initio,” that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines and “the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights”; that the petitioner herein is
being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and
“that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code.”
The Solicitor General states that, in his own opinion, the acts and proceedings taken before the said Court of Special
and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the imprisonment of the petitioner, should now be denied
force and efficacy, and therefore the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. Reasons are: that the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the summary procedure prescribed therefor, by said
Ordinance No. 7 are tinged with political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 does not
afford a fair trial, violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the Constitutional rights of accused
persons under their legitimate Constitution.

The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by the petitioner and the Solicitor
General as impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are: that court may interrogate the accused and witnesses
before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be
considered unfavorable to him; that if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the
defendant is guilty, he may be immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the court is not appealable, except in
case of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the
Supreme Court composed of three Justices.

Issues:

1) WON of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction was valid

2) WON of the sentence which imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation was valid

3) If they were then valid, WON, by the principle of postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner is now
serving fell through or ceased to be valid from the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the
Commonwealth Government

Ruling: Before proceeding further, and in order to determine the law applicable to the questions involved in the
present case, the question involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth Government; because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the
occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of
the Philippines can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the
light of another act of the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as
defined in the usages of nations.

(1) Yes. Valid. It is well established in International Law that “The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in
the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, — it is drawn entirely
form the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through
special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through
the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district. The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a
governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the
Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of
political complexion, for it is mere a governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling
within its jurisdiction.

With respect to the Summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, there is also no question as to the power of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. A belligerent “occupant may where
necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the
administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless temporarily alter the laws, especially the
Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the laws regarding procedure. The only
restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new
ones, especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure are those imposed by the Hague
Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
conscience. It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration does not violate those precepts.

(2) Yes. Valid. Although the crimes covered are defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized
by said Act No. 65 with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity,
incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and
safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations.

The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons charged or connected with the
supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries; and the
penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than those provided by the Revised Penal
Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said Act were taken out of the territorial law or Revised
Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial law by international jurists in order, not only to prevent food and
other necessaries from reaching the “guerrillas” which were harassing the belligerent occupant but also to preserve
the food supply and other necessaries.

(3) Yes. It did cease. We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
and Dizon, supra, that all judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be
valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine
to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be
considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General
Douglas MacArthur. It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary and proper to invoke the
proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur declaring null and void all laws, among them Act No. 65, of the so-
called Republic of the Philippines under which petitioner was convicted, in order to give retroactive effect to the
nullification of said penal act and invalidate sentence rendered against petitioner under said law, a sentence which,
before the proclamation, had already become null and of no effect.

6. Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons - Sovereignty

Postliminy - it is an international law wherein the right in virtue of which persons and things taken by the enemy are
restored to their former state, when coming again under the power of the nation to which they belong.

FACTS: Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious
physical injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from arresto mayor to
prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision on the sole ground that said court was only
a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for the
issuance of writ of habeas corpus from petitioner.

ISSUE: Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid?

HELD: Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and valid for the sentence which petitioner is
now serving has no political complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes a
new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate
government but taken out of territorial law and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent
occupant which is necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier.
Such is the case at hand, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Analysis:

1. This case happened on Japanese Regime under Philippine Commonwealth.

2.Governments was considered de facto at that time however judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained
good and valid after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, except those a political complexion.

3.The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese occupation, would seem to fall under the
following definition of de facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United States: But there is another
description of government de facto, called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, he
more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics (1) that its existence is
maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and
lawful government; and (2) that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who
by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts
though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over
districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but
they may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. (MacLeod vs.
United States [1913], 229 U.S., 416.)

4.The sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was charged with and convicted of
an offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code.

5.This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on the ground that
the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Director of Prison in the provincial
jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur –not consider unlawful imprisonment since decision of Court of Appeals in North Luzon is
valid and binding -the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Definitions: Writ of habeas Corpus= a writ requiring a person to be brought before a judge or court, especially for
investigation of a restraint of the person's liberty, used as a protection against illegal imprisonment.

Doctrine

– A punitive or penal sentence becomes that of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not
defined in the municipal laws or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate
government but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as new offense committed against the
belligerent occupant.

Type of Action/Appeal:

Petition for writ of habeas corpus by Alcantara on the ground that he was unduly deprived of liberty due to rendition
of the judgment against him for felony of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries by CFI
Ilocos Sur, which was affirmed with modification by Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon.

Facts

– Aniceto Alcantara was convicted in the CFI Ilocos Sur in Criminal Case 23for the felony of illegal discharge of
firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon his appeal, the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon in Baguio City
modified his sentence to an indeterminate sentence ranging from 4 mos. and 21 days of arrestomayor to 3 years, 9
mos. and 3 days of prision correctional
Issues

– W/N the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon had jurisdiction over the case of Alcantara, on the ground that it was
a validly-created court (Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was created during the Japanese occupation) and that it
has authority to hold sessions in Baguio City, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 3?

Verdict

– Petition for writ of habeas corpus by Alcantara was DENIED

Held

– The Court held that the sentence served by Alcantara (illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical
injuries) is a criminal act that has no political complexion. A punitive or penal sentence becomes that of a political
complexion when it penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal laws or acts already penalized by the
latter as a crime against the legitimate government but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as new offense
committed against the belligerent occupant. It cited the case of Co Kim Cham vs Valdez, where the Japanese
Republic (of the Philippines) and the Phil. Executive Commission were governments de facto, and the judicial acts
of the courts thereof were good and valid and remained as such even

7. Laurel vs. Misa –

FACTS: Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus. He was then charged and held for the crime
of treason during the Japanese occupation. He anchors his petition based on the theory that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot
be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for
the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUES:1. Whether sovereignty of the legitimate government and allegiance of citizens was suspended
during the Japanese military occupation
—
NO2. Whether there was a change in sovereignty over the islands
—
NORATIO: A citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in fidelity and
obedience, tohis government or sovereign. It cannot be equated to the qualified or temporary allegiance
w/c a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the
protection he receives. In the same way, such foreigner remains liable to prosecution for treason against
his own government or sovereign, to which he owes absolute and permanent allegiance. This absolute and
permanent allegiance is not severed by enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government is
not transferred to the occupier, a theory adopted in the Hague Convention of 1907. Thus, it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government.

The existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence at least during the
period of ‘suspension’. What may be suspended is the exercise of rights of sovereignty with the passing of
control of the government to the occupant. However, the military occupant is enjoined to respect or
continue in force laws unless in conflict with laws and orders of the occupier. Such laws and orders must
come within the limitations prescribed by the Hague convention, meaning that such action must be.

What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of
the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which
prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in
abeyance during military occupation. The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change
of form of government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because
it is an offense to the same government and same sovereign people.
8. Macariola vs. Asuncion –
Facts:

On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of an
appeal.

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of lots was not
signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R.
Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot 1184 A
– E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of Title No,
2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge
Asuncion and his wife.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot 1184-E to
the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and his wife Victoria was the
Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the following
provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H
of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against Asuncion.

Issue:

Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge" but was
reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon
who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr.
Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two
orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property was no longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this
Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been abrogated because
whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated,
unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers cannot
partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official capacity. The Judge
and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their respective shares to 3rd parties,
and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed
in the different branches of the Court of First Instance from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation
of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their
interest in the corporation contravenes against Canon 25.

9. Vilas vs. City of Manila

Facts

Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the
City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City
of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the
Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been
extinguished.

Issue

Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the City of Manila to its creditor?

Held

No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation organized
under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new
city is entitled to all property and property rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court
held that only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended.
Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors
of the old City of Manila.
10. Garcia vs. Chief of Staff

Facts:

On December 1, 1961, the plaintiff Mariano E. Garcia, filed with the lower courts an action to collect a sum of
money against the Chief of Staff and the Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines et. Al. The
complaint alleged: that by reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff he was deprived of his sight or vision rendering
him permanently disabled; and that by reason of the unjustified refusal by defendants of plaintiff's claim, the latter
was deprived of his disability pension from totalling no less than P4,000 and suffered thereby moral damages and
attorney's fees the amount of P2,000.00.

The PVA and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court; that the complaint states no
cause of action; and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. On March 2, 1962 the lower
courts, rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action has prescribed. Motion for
reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed this appeal.

Issues:

WON the lower court has jurisdiction on the said matter and dismissing the complaint on the ground it being the
money claim against the government.

Ruling:

The order dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi:

We have to uphold the order of dismissal, not necessarily on the same ground as found by the lower court; but for
the reason that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being a money claim against
the government. A claim for the recovery of money against the government should be filed with the Auditor General,
in line with the principle that the State cannot be sued without its consent. As stated in Commonwealth Act 327 in all
cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General
shall act and decide the same within sixty days. The well-established rule that no recourse to court can be had until
all administrative remedies had been exhausted.

OR

Facts: The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, an action to collect a sum of money against
the above defendants. He suffered injuries while undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca,
Pampanga. He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant General’s Office
which later disallow his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff, the same Adjutant
General’s Office denied the claim, alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610
which took effect January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was deprived of his
sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the
claim, plaintiff was deprived of his disability pension from July 1948 totalling no less than P4,000 at the rate of
P20/mo and suffered moral damages and attorney’s fees the amount of P2,000. The Philippine Veterans
Administration and the Chief of Staff of AFP file separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies before coming to court; that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of
action is barred by the statute of limitations. Acting on the said Motion, the Court of First Instance, on March 2,
1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that action has prescribed. Motion for
reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court is right in dismissing the complaint.

Held: The SC uphold the order of dismissal for the simple reason that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, it being a money claim against the government. It was already held in the case of New
Manila Lumber vs. Republic in L-14248, 4/28/60, that a claim for the recovery of money against the government
should be filed with the Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State can not be sued without its consent.

Commonwealth Act 327 provides:

Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the
Auditor General shall act and decide the same within 60 days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays after their
presentation….

Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim,
may within 30 days from receipt of decision, take an appeal in writing to (c) the Supreme Court, if the appellant is a
private person or entity.

The well-established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative remedies had been exhausted
and that actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative officer could
grant relief is applicable to this case. The order dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

On July 31, 1950 the defendant,

Hon. Sotero B. Cabahug accepted
the bid of Allied Technologists,
Inc. for
the furnishing of the architectural
and engineering services in the
construction of the Veterans
Hospital
at the price of Php 302,700. The
architectural requirements were
submitted by Allied Technologies
through Enrique Ruiz, Jose
Herrera and Pablo Panlillo and
were approved by the United
States Veterans
Administration and a contract was
signed due to the technical
objection to the capacity of the
said
company in the practice of
architecture and upon the advice of
the Secretary of Justice. The
defendants
allegedly took 15% of the sum due
to Allied Technologies, Inc. at the
time of the payment of the contract
price since Panlillo asserted that he
is the sole architect of the Veterans
Hospital, excluding Ruiz and
Herrera, the assertion of which was
abetted by defendant Jimenez. The
plaintiffs were to be deprived of
their share of professional services
and their professional prestige and
standing were to be gravely
damaged unless the defendants are
prevented from recognizing
Panlillo as the sole architect.
Furthermore, the second cause of
action is Title II of the contract
where at any time prior to six
months
after completion and acceptance of
the work under Title I, the
Government may direct Allied
Technologists, Inc. to do the
services stated in said Title II yet
nevertheless the completion the
government declined to direct the
plaintiffs to perform the job.
Issues:
Whether or not the appellants'
complaint against the government,
without the government's consent,
qualifies.
Ruling:
The court decided that the suit
should be answered not by the
government but to its officials to
compel
them to act following the rights to
be established by the contending
architects or to prevent them from
making payment and recognition
until the contending architects
have established their respective
rights
and interest in the funds retained
and in the credit for the work done.
The order of dismissal is hereby
reversed and set aside, and against
the defendant-appellees.
On July 31, 1950 the defendant,
Hon. Sotero B. Cabahug accepted
the bid of Allied Technologists,
Inc. for
the furnishing of the architectural
and engineering services in the
construction of the Veterans
Hospital
at the price of Php 302,700. The
architectural requirements were
submitted by Allied Technologies
through Enrique Ruiz, Jose
Herrera and Pablo Panlillo and
were approved by the United
States Veterans
Administration and a contract was
signed due to the technical
objection to the capacity of the
said
company in the practice of
architecture and upon the advice of
the Secretary of Justice. The
defendants
allegedly took 15% of the sum due
to Allied Technologies, Inc. at the
time of the payment of the contract
price since Panlillo asserted that he
is the sole architect of the Veterans
Hospital, excluding Ruiz and
Herrera, the assertion of which was
abetted by defendant Jimenez. The
plaintiffs were to be deprived of
their share of professional services
and their professional prestige and
standing were to be gravely
damaged unless the defendants are
prevented from recognizing
Panlillo as the sole architect.
Furthermore, the second cause of
action is Title II of the contract
where at any time prior to six
months
after completion and acceptance of
the work under Title I, the
Government may direct Allied
Technologists, Inc. to do the
services stated in said Title II yet
nevertheless the completion the
government declined to direct the
plaintiffs to perform the job.
Issues:
Whether or not the appellants'
complaint against the government,
without the government's consent,
qualifies.
Ruling:
The court decided that the suit
should be answered not by the
government but to its officials to
compel
them to act following the rights to
be established by the contending
architects or to prevent them from
making payment and recognition
until the contending architects
have established their respective
rights
and interest in the funds retained
and in the credit for the work done.
The order of dismissal is hereby
reversed and set aside, and against
the defendant-appellees.
On July 31, 1950 the defendant,
Hon. Sotero B. Cabahug accepted
the bid of Allied Technologists,
Inc. for
the furnishing of the architectural
and engineering services in the
construction of the Veterans
Hospital
at the price of Php 302,700. The
architectural requirements were
submitted by Allied Technologies
through Enrique Ruiz, Jose
Herrera and Pablo Panlillo and
were approved by the United
States Veterans
Administration and a contract was
signed due to the technical
objection to the capacity of the
said
company in the practice of
architecture and upon the advice of
the Secretary of Justice. The
defendants
allegedly took 15% of the sum due
to Allied Technologies, Inc. at the
time of the payment of the contract
price since Panlillo asserted that he
is the sole architect of the Veterans
Hospital, excluding Ruiz and
Herrera, the assertion of which was
abetted by defendant Jimenez. The
plaintiffs were to be deprived of
their share of professional services
and their professional prestige and
standing were to be gravely
damaged unless the defendants are
prevented from recognizing
Panlillo as the sole architect.
Furthermore, the second cause of
action is Title II of the contract
where at any time prior to six
months
after completion and acceptance of
the work under Title I, the
Government may direct Allied
Technologists, Inc. to do the
services stated in said Title II yet
nevertheless the completion the
government declined to direct the
plaintiffs to perform the job.
Issues:
Whether or not the appellants'
complaint against the government,
without the government's consent,
qualifies.
Ruling:
The court decided that the suit
should be answered not by the
government but to its officials to
compel
them to act following the rights to
be established by the contending
architects or to prevent them from
making payment and recognition
until the contending architects
have established their respective
rights
and interest in the funds retained
and in the credit for the work done.
The order of dismissal is hereby
reversed and set aside, and against
the defendant-appellees.
On July 31, 1950 the defendant,
Hon. Sotero B. Cabahug accepted
the bid of Allied Technologists,
Inc. for
the furnishing of the architectural
and engineering services in the
construction of the Veterans
Hospital
at the price of Php 302,700. The
architectural requirements were
submitted by Allied Technologies
through Enrique Ruiz, Jose
Herrera and Pablo Panlillo and
were approved by the United
States Veterans
Administration and a contract was
signed due to the technical
objection to the capacity of the
said
company in the practice of
architecture and upon the advice of
the Secretary of Justice. The
defendants
allegedly took 15% of the sum due
to Allied Technologies, Inc. at the
time of the payment of the contract
price since Panlillo asserted that he
is the sole architect of the Veterans
Hospital, excluding Ruiz and
Herrera, the assertion of which was
abetted by defendant Jimenez. The
plaintiffs were to be deprived of
their share of professional services
and their professional prestige and
standing were to be gravely
damaged unless the defendants are
prevented from recognizing
Panlillo as the sole architect.
Furthermore, the second cause of
action is Title II of the contract
where at any time prior to six
months
after completion and acceptance of
the work under Title I, the
Government may direct Allied
Technologists, Inc. to do the
services stated in said Title II yet
nevertheless the completion the
government declined to direct the
plaintiffs to perform the job.
Issues:
Whether or not the appellants'
complaint against the government,
without the government's consent,
qualifies.
Ruling:
The court decided that the suit
should be answered not by the
government but to its officials to
compel
them to act following the rights to
be established by the contending
architects or to prevent them from
making payment and recognition
until the contending architects
have established their respective
rights
and interest in the funds retained
and in the credit for the work done.
The order of dismissal is hereby
reversed and set aside, and against
the defendant-appellees.
11 – Ruiz vs. Cabahug
Doctrine:

The general rule is that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in court without their consent.
However, this rule does not apply when the suit is against an officer or agent of the state, and the relief demanded
does not require affirmative official action on the part of the state. In such cases, the jurisdiction of the courts to
enjoin the officers or agents from trespassing or damaging private property is well-established.

Action:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing plaintiffs' amended complaint

Facts:

On July 31, 1950 Hon. Sotero B. Cabahug (Secretary of National Defense) accepted the bid of the Allied
Technologists, Inc., to furnish the architectural and engineering services in the construction of the Veterans Hospital
at a price of P302,700. The plans, specifications, sketches and detailed drawings and other architectural
requirements submitted by the Allied Technologists through its architects, Enrique J. L. Ruiz, Jose V Herrera and
Pablo D. Panlilio were approved by the United States Veterans Administration in Washington, D.C. When the
officials of the Department of National Defense paid the Allied Technologists the contract price for the architectural
engineering service, they retained 15 per cent of the sum due, for the reason that Mr. Panlilio has asserted that he is
the sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital to the exclusion of his fellow architects Ruiz and Herrera, an
assertion aided and abetted by Col. Nicolas Jimenez. This action deprived Mr. Ruiz and Mr. Herrera monetary value
of their professional services and damaged their professional prestige and standing.

Issues:
Whether or not the government can be sued for withholding the 15% of the sum and depriving the plaintiffs of their
share.

Ruling:

The order of dismissal is hereby reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings. With costs against the defendants-appellees.

Ratio Decidendi:

The case is a not a suit against the government, which could not be sued without its consent. It was found that the
government has already allotted the full amount for the contract price; it was the defendant-officials which were
responsible for the allegation. This was to be directed to the officials alone, where they are compelled to act in
accordance with the rights established by Ruiz and Herrera or to desist from paying and recognizing the rights and
interests in the funds retained and the credit for the job finished. The order of dismissal was reversed and set aside
and the case was remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings with cost against the defendants.

12. Festejo vs. Fernando

FACTS:
Carmen Festejo filed a suit
against Isaias Fernando,
Director of the Bureau of Public
Works, for
taking possession of three
parcels of land she owned and
causing an irrigation canal
to be
constructed thereon without
obtaining first a right of way,
without her consent and
knowledge,
and against her express
objection. Festejo demanded the
return of the land and its
restoration to
its former condition.
ISSUE:
Is Fernando immune from suit
for being a public officer?
HELD:
No, Fernando is not immune
from suit for being a public
officer.
ART. 32 of the Civil
Code provides that any
public officer or employee,
or any private
individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner
impedes or
impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the
latter for
damages:
xxx
(6) The right against deprivation
of property without due process
of law;
The defendant committed acts
outside the scope of his
authority. When he went
outside the
boundaries of the right of way
upon plaintiff's land and
damaged it or destroyed its
former
condition and usefulness, he
must be held to have designedly
departed from the duties
imposed
on him by law. There can be no
claim that he thus invaded
plaintiff's land southeasterly of
the
right of way innocently.
Surveys clearly marked the
limits of the land appropriated
for the right
of way of this trunk
highway before construction
began.
Ordinarily the officer or
employee committing the tort is
personally liable therefor, and
may be
sued as any other citizen and
held answerable for whatever
injury or damage results from
his
tortious act.
If an officer, even while acting
under color of his office,
exceeds the power conferred on
him by
law, he cannot shelter
himself under the plea that
he is a public agent.
It is a general rule that
an officer-executive,
administrative quasi-judicial,
ministerial, or
otherwise who acts outside the
scope of his jurisdiction and
without authorization of law
may
thereby render himself
amenable to personal liability in
a civil suit. If he exceeds the
power
conferred on him by law, he
cannot shelter himself by the
plea that he is a public agent
acting
under the color of his office,
and not personally. In the eye of
the law, his acts then are wholly
without authority.
FACTS:
Carmen Festejo filed a suit
against Isaias Fernando,
Director of the Bureau of Public
Works, for
taking possession of three
parcels of land she owned and
causing an irrigation canal
to be
constructed thereon without
obtaining first a right of way,
without her consent and
knowledge,
and against her express
objection. Festejo demanded the
return of the land and its
restoration to
its former condition.
ISSUE:
Is Fernando immune from suit
for being a public officer?
HELD:
No, Fernando is not immune
from suit for being a public
officer.
ART. 32 of the Civil
Code provides that any
public officer or employee,
or any private
individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner
impedes or
impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the
latter for
damages:
xxx
(6) The right against deprivation
of property without due process
of law;
The defendant committed acts
outside the scope of his
authority. When he went
outside the
boundaries of the right of way
upon plaintiff's land and
damaged it or destroyed its
former
condition and usefulness, he
must be held to have designedly
departed from the duties
imposed
on him by law. There can be no
claim that he thus invaded
plaintiff's land southeasterly of
the
right of way innocently.
Surveys clearly marked the
limits of the land appropriated
for the right
of way of this trunk
highway before construction
began.
Ordinarily the officer or
employee committing the tort is
personally liable therefor, and
may be
sued as any other citizen and
held answerable for whatever
injury or damage results from
his
tortious act.
If an officer, even while acting
under color of his office,
exceeds the power conferred on
him by
law, he cannot shelter
himself under the plea that
he is a public agent.
It is a general rule that
an officer-executive,
administrative quasi-judicial,
ministerial, or
otherwise who acts outside the
scope of his jurisdiction and
without authorization of law
may
thereby render himself
amenable to personal liability in
a civil suit. If he exceeds the
power
conferred on him by law, he
cannot shelter himself by the
plea that he is a public agent
acting
under the color of his office,
and not personally. In the eye of
the law, his acts then are wholly
without authority. FACTS: Plaintiff Carmen Festejo filed an
action against defendant Isaias Fernando, Director of Bureau of Public Works for unlawfully taking possession of
portion of her three parcels of land and causing the construction of irrigation canal without obtaining right of way
and without her consent or knowledge. The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiff Festejo. On appeal, defendant
Fernando invoked his being a public officer of the government of the Philippines and thus, enjoys immunity from
suit and should be absolved from liability for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant Fernando may invoke immunity from suit.

RULING: No. Ordinarily, the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable and may be sued as any
other citizen and be held answerable for whatever injury.

13. Merritt vs. Gov’t of PH

FACTS:

Merritt, while riding his motorcycle, was hit by an ambulance owned by the Philippine General Hospital. A driver
employed by the hospital drove it. In order for Merritt to sue the Philippine government, Act No. 2457 was enacted
by the Philippine Legislature authorizing Merritt to sue the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. A suit was then filed before the CFI of Manila, which fixed
the responsibility for the collision solely on the ambulance driver and determined the amount of damages to be
awarded to Merritt. Both parties appealed from the decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of damages and
defendant in rendering the amount against the government.

ISSUE:

WON defendant, Government of the Philippines, waived its immunity from suit as well as conceded its liability to
the plaintiff when it enacted Act No. 2457.

HELD:
NO. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability
to the plaintiff, create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized.
It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.

OR

Facts:

Merritt was riding on a motorcycle towards the western part of Calle Padre Faura at a speed of ten to twelve miles
an hour. Upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the
General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center
thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle
Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft
Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck Merritt, who was already six feet
from the southwestern point or from the post place there. As a result, Merritt was so severely injured. By authority of
the United States, Act 2457 was enacted, authorizing the Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
Philippine Islands and authorizing Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Government is legally liable

Held:

Government is not liable. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been
caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable.

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable for the acts of its
agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903,
supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

● While consent to be sued was granted through a special law, the government was not held liable for damages,
because under the attendant circumstances the government was not acting through a special agent.

The Government of the Philippines Islands is only liable, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they
act as special agents. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. The special agent acts in representation of the state and
being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any
executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the
functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations. The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly
empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which
gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged
with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by
the law of civil responsibility. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

OR
FACTS: Plaintiff was riding a motorcycle going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura when the General
Hospital Ambulance turned suddenly and unexpectedly, struck him. This resulted to a collision. Plaintiff was so
severely injured. He had one or more fractures of the skull. and apparently was slightly deaf, slight weakness in his
eyes and in his mental condition. Plaintiff got hospitalized for more than 2 months and was incapacitated to work
for6 months. Plaintiff brought a case against the Government of the Philippine Islands before the CFI of the city of
Manila. The Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2457 authorizing the plaintiff to bring suit against the
Government for the determination of who is responsible for the accident and also to determine the amount of
damages, if any. The Trial Court ruled that the collision was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur. It awarded
damages to the Plaintiff. Both parties filed their respective appeals. Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in
limiting the awarded amount to 5000 for general damages and in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely
disabled for only 2 months. The Defendant also claimed that the trial court erred in finding that the collision was due
to the negligence of the chauffeur, and in holding that the government is liable for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff .

ISSUE/S: W/N, in enacting the Act No. 2457, the Government of the Philippines simply waive its immunity from
suite.

W/N the Government concede its liability to the plaintiff in enacting Act No. 2457.W/N the State is responsible or
legally liable for the damages in this case.

RULING: YES, in enacting Act No. 2457, the Government waived its immunity from suit. Act No. 2457 authorized
the plaintiff to bring action against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision. The Act was
passed to answer the question as to who is responsible to the collision and to determine the amount of damages, if
any. While in this case, the Government waived its immunity from suit through Act No.2457, the Court said that by
consenting to be sued, the State does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense. "Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government’s liability to any cause not previously
recognized.NO, the State is not responsible or legally liable for the damages in this case. The court then discussed in
this case the liability of the Government for the negligent acts of its officers, agents and employees. Since it has
been established that the collision was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, the Court used Paragraph 5 of
Article 1903 of the Civil Code which provides that: "The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special
agent , but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. "It follows therefrom that the
State by virtue of such provision of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because
neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the
public service and in the appointment of its agents…The State is only liable, for the acts of its agents, officers and
employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article1903,and that the chauffeur
of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, par. 6The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.

14. Republic vs. Purisima –

FACTS: The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P.
Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of-reiterated doctrine of the non-
suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to
dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for
the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent
Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
ISSUE: Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. operate as
a waiver of the national government from suit?

HELD: NO.

The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a statute, not through any agreement made by
counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration. Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract
between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which, according
to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The
consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by
Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no
binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.

15. Amigable vs. Cuenca

FACTS:

Amigable is the registered owner of a lot covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title, where no annotation in favor of
the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues.

It appears that said avenues already existed since 1921. In 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the
Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot, which had been appropriated by the government. The
claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it. Amigable then filed in the court a quo a complaint
against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for
the recovery of ownership and possession of the land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought
the payment of compensatory damages for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages, attorney’s fees and the
costs of the suit. The Government had not given its consent to be sued.

ISSUE:

WON the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.

HELD:

YES. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the
legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. The
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have
been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party
entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it “have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to
appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment.” If there were an observance of procedural
regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there
was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is not too much to say that
when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no
thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.

OR

Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. She had a transfer
certificate title issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation
or negotiated sale, 6,167 square meters of land was used for the construction the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

On March 27, 1958, AMigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting the payment for her lot.
The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General and was disallowed it in his 9thIndorsement dated December 9,
1958.

Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of the portion of the lot used. In answer, the defendants
interposed the following defenses:

1. The action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the office of the Auditor General

2. The right of action for the recovery of the any amount which might be due to Amigable had already prescribed.

3. The action being a suit to the government, the claim for moral damages and other costs have no valid basis
since the government did not give its consent to be sued.

4. Since it was only the province of Cebu who had misappropriated the lot, Amigable has no cause of action
against the defendants.

Issue:

Can Amigable properly sue the government?

Ruling:

Yes. In its decision, the Court cited Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, which also involved a claim for
payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City. Where the
government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without
thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

16. Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime
because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by
the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes,
the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years
ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the
taking.

FACTS:

Victoria Amigable rightfully owned a lot in Cebu City which was used by the government for Mango and Gorordo
Avenues without her permission and without proper negotiation of sales. Because of this, she filed a case in CFI
Cebu.

Defendants argue that 1) Action was premature; 2) Right of action has already been prescribed; 3) Government
cannot be sued without its consent and; 4) Cebu already agreed to use the land as such.
CFI rendered a decision which states that Amigable cannot restore and recover her ownership and possession of the
said land and thus dismissed the complaint on grounds that state may not be sued without its consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Amigable may rightfully sue the government without its consent.

HELD:

In the case of Ministerio vs Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away
property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

Here, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has
not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains as the rightful
owner of the lot.

She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes
of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes,
the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation of the exact amount, price or value of the lot at
the time of the taking.

17. Santiago vs. Republic

FACTS: Here petitioner Ildefonso Santiago2filed on August 9, 1976 an action in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City naming as defendant the government of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director
of the Bureau of Plant Industry.3His plea was for the revocation of a deed of donation executed by him and his
spouse in January of 1971,4with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the donee. As alleged in such complaint, such
Bureau, contrary to the terms of the donation, failed to "install lighting facilities and water system on the property
donated and to build an office building and parking [lot] thereon which should have been constructed and ready for
occupancy on or before December 7, 1974.5That led him to conclude that under the circumstances, he was exempt
from compliance with such an explicit constitutional command. The lower court, in the order challenged in this
petition, was of a

different view. It sustained a motion to dismiss on the part of the defendant Republic of the Philippines, now named
as one of the respondents, the other respondent being the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II. It
premised such an order on the settled "rule that the state cannot be sued without its consent. This is so, because the
New Constitution of the Philippines expressly provides that the state may not be sued without its consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state’s immunity from suit can be applied in this case.

RULING: No. The Court’s decision goes no further than to rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency
being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. He has the
right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It is
made to accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is the negation of arbitrariness and
inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its adherence to the highest
ethical standards, which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people, the repository of the
sovereign power. The judiciary under this circumstance has the grave responsibility of living up to the ideal of
objectivity and impartiality, the very essence of the rule of law. Only by displaying the neutrality expected of an
arbiter, even if it happens to be one of the departments of a litigant, can the decision arrived at, whatever it may be,
command respect and be entitled to acceptance. The writ of certiorari prayed for is granted and the order of
dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified, set aside and declared to be without force and effect. The Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure set
forth in the Rules of Court. No costs.

18. Froilan vs. Pan Shipping

FACTS

Defendant Pan Oriental took possession of the vessel in question after it had been repossessed by the Shipping
Administration and title thereto reacquired by the government, following the original purchaser, Fernando Froilan’s,
default in his payment of the unpaid balance and insurance premiums for the said vessel.

Pan Oriental chartered said vessel and operated the same after it had repaired the vessel and paid the stipulated
initial payment, thereby exercising its option to purchase, pursuant to a bareboat charter contract entered between
said company and the Shipping Corporation.

The Cabinet resolved to restore Froilan to his rights under the original contract of sale on condition that he’s hall pay
a sum of money upon delivery of the vessel to him, that he shall continue paying the remaining installments due, and
that he shall assume the expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the vessel.

However, Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Froilan’s rights under the contract of sale, for the
reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said
authority to the property, Froilan having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon.

Consequently, Froilan paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender
possession of the vessel, he filed an action for in the CFI of Manila to recover possession thereof and have him

declared the rightful owner of said property.

Moreover, the Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the
possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.

ISSUES

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim?

RULINGS

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint in
intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel.
It is a settled rule that when the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested itself
of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Having done so, it
becomes subject to judicial action and processes.

In the case at bar, The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. The
immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts.

In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and
comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up
whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state.