Read carefully the following honor pledge and sign your name.

“I affirm that I will not give or receive any unauthorized assistance on this exam, and that all
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

work will be my own.”

::::::::::::::::::::::

认真阅读以下诚信承诺并签名。
“ 我承诺我不会提供或获取任何未经允许的帮助，本次考试所有工作都由我本人完成。”
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

Signature/签名: Student ID/学号:

Final Exam for Intermediate Microeconomics

Monday 4:00-9:00PM, January 2nd, 2023

《中级微观经济学》期末考试
2023 年 1 月 2 日，星期一，下午 4:00-9:00

(There are a total of 120 points for these questions, but the maximum you will receive
for this exam is 100. That is, your final score is min{your score on this exam, 100})
(本试卷的题目总计 120 分，但本次考试成绩最高只计 100 分，即最终成绩为 min{卷面分数, 100})

Part I. True or False. Evaluate the following statements and justify your claim (explain or propose
a counter-example). Points will be awarded based ONLY on your reasoning, not on the “True/False”
answer itself, even if correct. [This part has 5 questions. Each question worths 4 point.]
第一部分：判断对错，并给出判断的依据（解释或举反例）
。仅回答“对/错”不得分。[本部分共有 5
道题，每道题目 4 分。]

1. A preference that exhibits satiation, as depicted on slide #32 in Topic01.pdf, is convex.

如 Topic01.pdf 第 32 页 ppt 所示的具有餍足特征的偏好是凸状的。

Page 1 of 24
2. In the long-run, since the firm can choose whichever short-run it would like to be in, its long-run
marginal cost must be no larger than any of its short-run marginal costs.

在长期，因为企业可以选择在其任何一个短期状态下生产，因此其长期边际成本一定不会比其任何
一个短期边际成本高。

3. For a good with perfectly inelastic ordinary demand, there will be no efficiency loss from a quantity
tax on the good.

假设一个商品的一般需求完全无弹性，那么对该商品征收一个数量税不会带来效率损失。

Page 2 of 24
4. Privatizing some public services such as mass transit is generally efficiency improving, since those
publicly operated programs almost invariably operate at a loss.

私有化一些公共服务，如公共交通，总体来说是有助于效率提升的，因为那些公共服务项目几乎都
在亏损运行。

5. Compared to uniform pricing, price discrimination by a monopolist always leads to further decrease
in the welfare of every consumer.

与单一定价相比，垄断者进行价格歧视一定会使得每一个消费者的福利都进一步下降。

Page 3 of 24
Part II. Graphs and Short Answers. [This part has 5 questions. Each question worths 8 point.]
第二部分：作图与简答题。[本部分共有 5 道题，每道题目 8 分]

1. Take a look at our income tax vs. quantity tax example on slide #63-70 in Topic02.pdf. XiaoFang
starts to think innovatively in a reversed order. She first considers a lump sum income tax T , so
consumer’s budget constraint is p1 x1 + p2 x2 = m − T with optimal consumption (x∗1 , x∗2 ). Then she
considers a quantity tax t which satisfies tx∗1 = T , i.e., it collects the same amount of tax revenue
as the income tax. Under the quantity tax, the consumer’s budget is (p1 + t)x1 + p2 x2 = m. Using
similar logic as on our slides, XiaoFang reaches an opposite conclusion: since (x∗1 , x∗2 ) is clearly
affordable under the budget constraint with the quantity tax, the consumers must be better off
compared to the income tax! What’s the problem with XiaoFang’s analysis?

请看我们在 Topic02.pdf 中第 63-70 页幻灯片上的对比收入税与数量税的例子。小方创造性的从一

个相反的顺序开始思考。她首先考虑一次性收入税 T ，
这样消费者的预算约束是 p1 x1 +p2 x2 = m−T ，
其最佳消费是 (x∗1 , x∗2 )。然后她考虑一个满足 tx∗1 = T 的数量税 t，也即它获得的税收收入与收入税
相同。在数量税下，消费者的预算为 (p1 + t)x1 + p2 x2 = m。使用与我们幻灯片上类似的逻辑，小
方得出了一个相反的结论：因为 (x∗1 , x∗2 ) 在数量税的预算约束下显然是可以负担得起的，因此，与
收入税相比，消费者的福利一定会更好！请问小方的分析有什么问题呢？

Page 4 of 24
continued...

Page 5 of 24
2. Suppose XiaoMing and XiaoLan have the same income and same tastes over Ultraman cards and
“other goods.” The only difference between them is that XiaoLan has a coupon that allows her to
buy as many cards as she wants at 50% off. On a graph with Ultraman cards on the horizontal
axis and “other goods” as numeraire on the vertical axis, illustrate the most XiaoMing is willing
to pay for the coupon (mark it as M on the vertical axis). Illustrate the least XiaoLan would be
willing to accept to give up her coupon (mark it as L). If Ultraman cards are normal good for
both XiaoMing and XiaoLan, will they be able to make a deal? Interpret.

假设小明和小兰的收入相同，对奥特曼卡片和“其他商品”的偏好也相同。他们之间唯一的区别是，
小兰有一张优惠券，可以以 50% 的折扣购买任意数量的奥特曼卡片。在横轴为奥特曼卡片，纵轴
为“其他商品”的图中，画出小明愿意为此优惠券支付的最高价格（在纵轴上标记为 M ）
。画出小
兰愿意接受的放弃优惠券的最低金额（标记为 L）。如果奥特曼卡片对小明和小兰来说都是正常商
品，他们能不能达成这笔交易？试解释。

Page 6 of 24
continued...

Page 7 of 24
3. Suppose the government imposes a quantity tax t on a monopoly which has no ability to price-
discriminate and then gives the tax revenue back to the monopoly. Discuss, using words, math or
graphs, whether the monopoly would be better-off or worse-off compared to without the tax.

假设政府向一个不具有价格歧视能力的垄断企业征收一个 t 的数量税，并将税收收入返还给此垄断
企业。试用文字、数学或图线讨论该垄断企业相比于征税之前变得更好了还是更差了。

Page 8 of 24
4. An intellectual property right (IPR) provides its holder a limited period of monopoly right in the
market for the relevant product. IP laws protect the right holders from IP infringers. There are
two kinds of damage measures provided by IP laws in IPR infringement trials: “lost profit” or
“unjust enrichment.” Lost profit is the profit that the IP rights holder lost due to the presence of
the infringer; and unjust enrichment is the amount of money that is earned by the infringer in the
market. Compare, using words, math, or graphs, the relative size of the two damage measures.
Which measure do you think is more appropriate? Which one is more feasible in practice?

知识产权（IPR）为其权利人提供了相关产品一段时间内在市场上的垄断权。知识产权法保护权利
人免受知识产权侵权者的侵害。在知识产权侵权审判中，知识产权法规定了两种损害赔偿措施：
“利
润损失”或“不当得利”。利润损失是指知识产权权利人因侵权人的存在而损失的利润；而不当得
利是指侵权人在市场中赚取的金额。请用文字、数学或图线来比较这两种赔偿措施的相对大小。你
认为哪种措施更合适？哪一个在实际中更可行？

Page 9 of 24
5. Student Hongmiao Chen’s undergraduate thesis1 analyzed the price dispersion on our campus, i.e.,
the same good was sold at different prices in different convenience stores. Below is part of a table
extracted from her thesis. Based on what you have learned in this class, do you agree or disagree
with the following statements in explaining the price differences between the two stores?

(a) Zijing #5 is able to sell at overall higher prices because of its convenient location, such that
students are willing to pay higher prices for the same good in Zijing #5.
(b) Tmall stores sell at generally lower prices because they have better supply chain system, such
that they are able to obtain lower purchase prices from suppliers.
(c) Students do not have good knowledge of the prices of goods from different stores; consequently
stores exploit this fact to strategically set different prices.

陈洪淼同学的本科毕业论文1 研究了我们校园的价格离散现象，即同样的商品在不同的便利店售价
不一致的现象。上面是从她论文的一个表格中摘取的一部分。根据你在本课程所学的知识，讨论你
是否同意下面这些解释这两个商店价格差异的理由。

(a) 紫 5 便利店整体售价更高是因为其便利的位置，从而同学们愿意为紫 5 便利店的完全相同的

商品支付更高的价格。
(b) 天猫超市整体售价更低，是因为他们有更好的供应链体系，从而能够从进货商那里获得更低的
进价。
(c) 同学们并不十分了解商品在不同便利店的价格，因此便利店可以利用这一点策略性的制定不
同价格。

1
Her thesis was awarded the University Outstanding Undergraduate Thesis.
1
她的论文获得了校级优秀本科毕业论文。

Page 10 of 24
continued...

Page 11 of 24
Part III. Calculations and Proofs. [This part has 4 questions and 60 points in total]
第三部分：计算与证明。[本部分共有 4 道题，共计 60 分]

1.【Marshallian vs. Hicksian demand】Suppose your tastes for good 1 and 2 can be represented by
1/3 2/3
utility function u(x1 , x2 ) = x1 x2 . Suppose the price of good 1 is p1 , the price of good 2 is 1,
and you income is I.

(1) Calculate your Marshallian demand of good 1 and 2, as functions of p1 , I. [4pt]

(2) Suppose p1 = 4, I = 12. What are your optimal consumption of the goods (x∗1 , x∗2 ), and the
corresponding optimal level of utility u∗ ? [2pt]
(3) Calculate your Hicksian demand of good 1 and 2, as functions of p1 , u. [4pt] [Hint: If you
are not familiar with the Hicksian demand calculations, the cost minimization problem for the
producers can provide some useful hints (e.g., PS5 Q1(b), or slide #70-73 in Topic04.pdf). ]
(4) Sketch on a price-quantity diagram the Marshallian and Hicksian demand curves for good 1
passing through the point (x∗1 , p1 = 4); write down the two demand functions. [4pt]

1/3 2/3
【马歇尔 vs. 希克斯需求】假设你对商品 1 和 2 的偏好可以用效用函数 u(x1 , x2 ) = x1 x2 表示。
假设商品 1 的价格是 p1 ，商品 2 的价格是 1，你的收入是 I。

(1) 计算你对商品 1 和 2 的马歇尔需求，表示为 p1 , I 的函数。[4 分]

(2) 假设 p1 = 4, I = 12。计算你对商品的最优消费 (x∗1 , x∗2 )，以及相应的最佳效用水平 u∗ 。[2 分]
(3) 计算你对商品 1 和 2 的希克斯需求，表示为 p1 , u 的函数。[4 分] [提示：如果你不熟悉希克斯需
求的计算，生产者的成本最小化问题可以提供一些有用的提示（例如 PS5 Q1(b)，或 Topic04.pdf
中第 70-73 页幻灯片）。]
(4) 在价格-数量图上画出通过点 (x∗1 , p1 = 4) 的商品 1 的马歇尔和希克斯需求曲线，并写下这两个
需求函数。[4 分]

Page 12 of 24
continued...

Page 13 of 24
continued...

Page 14 of 24
2.【The exchange】Recall our Ultraman cards game. Suppose we form a small market with one seller
and one buyer. The seller owns one card and her willingness to sell is 10 Yuan. The buyer’s
willingness to pay for the card is 25 Yuan. Players’ endowments are money and card. Like in our
game, the card is not divisible (money is infinitely divisible).

(1) Illustrate in an Edgeworth box the core for this exchange economy between the buyer and
seller, with the seller on the lower-left corner. [5pt]
(2) Suppose the seller’s utility function is us = 10x + money; the buyer’s utility function is
√ √
ub = 25 x + 5 money, where x is the number of Ultraman cards. Calculate the Walrasian
equilibrium. [5pt]

【交换】回顾我们的奥特曼卡片游戏。假设我们形成一个小市场，有一个卖家和一个买家。卖家拥
有一张卡片，她的出售意愿是 10 元。买家为这张卡片的支付意愿是 25 元。参与者的禀赋是金钱
和卡片。与我们的游戏一样，卡片是不可分割的（钱是无限可分割的）。

(1) 在一个埃奇沃斯盒子中画出这个买家和卖家的交换经济体的核，将卖家画在左下角。[5pt]
√ √
(2) 假设卖家的效用函数是 us = 10x + money；买家的效用函数是 ub = 25 x + 5 money，其中
x 是奥特曼卡片的数量。计算瓦尔拉斯均衡。[5pt]

Page 15 of 24
continued...

Page 16 of 24
continued...

Page 17 of 24
3.【Tax water input or punish pollution output】Below is a slightly modified (and roughly translated)
excerpt from an interview in September 2022 given by Director Xinmin Xiao, the former director
of the Science and Technology Promotion Centre, Ministry of Water Resources.2

“There are some industrial firms with very large water consumption; their discharge is
also large: 70% of water usage turns into sewage discharge. Sewage treatment is costly,
at around 20 Yuan/ton. Firms try ways to secretly discharge the sewage and evade
inspection, which has become a headache for environmental regulation. In fact, we can
include the 20 Yuan/ton of sewage treatment fee into the water price in accordance with
the relation that 70% of the water usage becomes sewage discharge, so that the price of
water rises from the original around 7 Yuan/ton, to 21 Yuan/ton. The price of water
use is raised, and firms would have high motivation to save water. Since the sewage
charges have already been paid, there is no need for secret discharges. This change in
management would make a big difference in water saving and sewage reduction.”

Consider a price-taking firm with production function y = w1/3 x1/3 where w is water usage and x
is the other input. Suppose the input prices are pw = 7 per ton and px = 1, the output price is
py = 63. Sewage is generated as e = 0.7w, with a social cost of pe = 20 per ton of sewage.

(1) If the firm can discharge secretly without being caught, calculate its production plan and profit.
What would the total social welfare be after taking into account the pollution cost? [4pt]
(2) Suppose the government can monitor the sewage discharge at zero cost. Consider the two
different water management systems discussed by Director Xiao: (a) charge a pollution fee at
pe = 20 Yuan per ton of sewage output e; (b) tax the water use at 0.7 × pe = 14 Yuan per
ton according to the water-sewage relation. Compare firm’s production plans under the two
systems. Calculate the corresponding profits. [4pt]
(3) Suppose the firm can choose to invest in two different technologies: an “efficiency-improving”
technology which changes the production function to y = (3w)1/3 x1/3 , or a “pollution-abating”
technology which reduces the sewage to e = 0. Further suppose the two technologies have the
same cost fixed at c = 100. Now the the government implements the water management system
(2)(a), i.e., the pollution fee scheme. Calculate and compare the firm’s profit under the two
technologies. Which technology would the firm choose to invest? [4pt]
(4) Following (3), what if the water management system (2)(b) is in place, i.e., the water tax
scheme? Which technology would the firm choose to invest? Discuss the relation between
the water management system and the technology investment chosen by the firm, i.e., which
management scheme is more likely to induce an investment in efficiency-improving technology,
and which is more likely to induce a pollution-abating technology? [4pt]
(5) In (3), compare the water usage under the two technologies. Which technology is relatively
more water-saving? Can you perhaps speculate, why Director Xiao prefers one water manage-
ment system over the other, besides the issues of monitoring sewage discharge? [4pt]
2
The full interview can be found at https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Bfavv0Xw2AlsbPyHL69Glg. The topic is about
water saving and conservation. There are a lot of economics in the interview! I recommend you read it.

Page 18 of 24
 【对用水征税，还是对污染收费】下面这段话摘录自水利部科技推广中心原主任肖新民在 2022 年 9
月的采访，有轻微删改2 。

“有一些工业企业，用水量很大，排污量也大，70% 都变成污水排出去了。污水处理又要
钱，可能一吨就得 20 元，企业为了省钱，出现了一些偷排现象，成为了环保的老大难问
题。其实，只要把 20 元一吨的污水处理费按照用水量的 70% 折合到取水端，加到用水
水价里，使水价从原来可能是 7 元一吨，转变为 21 元一吨。用水价格变相提高了，用水
企业的节水积极性就高。由于排污费已经交过了，也就不需要偷排了。管理方式的改变
会使得节水减排的效果大不相同。
”

考虑一家价格接受型企业，其生产函数 y = w1/3 x1/3 ，其中 w 是用水量，x 是其他投入。假设投入

品价格为 pw = 7 元每吨，px = 1，产出品价格为 py = 63。污水的产生量为 e = 0.7w，每吨污水
的社会成本为 pe = 20。

(1) 如果该企业能够偷偷排污而不被发现，请计算其生产计划和利润。考虑排污成本后，总社会福
利会是多少？[4 分]
(2) 假设政府能够以零成本监测污水排放。考虑肖主任讨论的两种不同的水资源管理制度：
（a）对
（b）根据水和污水的关系，为每吨用水征收 0.7 × pe = 14
污水 e 征收污染费每吨 pe = 20 元；
元的税。比较这两种制度下企业的生产计划。计算企业相应的利润。[4 分]
(3) 假设企业可以选择投资两种不同的技术：一种是“效率提高型”技术，其会将生产函数改变为
y = (3w)1/3 x1/3 ，另一种是“污染减排型”技术，其能将废水排放降低为 e = 0。进一步假设
两种技术的成本都固定为 c = 100。政府现在实施水资源管理制度（2）
（a），即污染收费方案。
计算并比较企业在两种技术下的利润。该企业会选择投资哪种技术呢？[4 分]
(4) 继续（3）的讨论，如果执行的是水资源管理系统（2）
（b）
，即用水征税方案，会发生什么？企业
会选择哪种技术进行投资？请讨论水资源管理制度与企业选择的技术投资之间的关系，即哪种
管理制度更有可能激励提高效率的技术投资，哪种更有可能激励减少污染的技术投资？[4 分]
(5) 在（3）中，比较两种技术下的用水量。哪种技术相对来说更节约用水呢？你是否可以据此猜测
一下，除了排污监测的问题之外，肖主任为什么对两种水资源管理制度有不同的偏好？[4 分]

2
采访全文在 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Bfavv0Xw2AlsbPyHL69Glg 采访的主题是关于水资源节约与保护。整个采
访中涉及到很多经济学知识！推荐大家阅读。

Page 19 of 24
continued...

Page 20 of 24
continued...

Page 21 of 24
4.【Cournot vs. collusion】In a duopoly market, two firms both have constant marginal cost c. The
inverse market demand is given by p(y) = a − by.

(1) Solve for the Cournot equilibrium and the profit for each firm. [4pt]
(2) Suppose the two firms collude to form a cartel and split the profit equally. Solve for the market
equilibrium and the profit for each firm. [4pt]
(3) Now one firm cheats on the cartel agreement. Given the other firm still produces as in part
(2), what would be the cheating firm’s optimal output? What would be its profit? [4pt]
(4) Compare the profits in part (1) (2) and (3). Discuss, using words or maths, how in practice
the firms might form stable collusion from purely a profit-maximizing perspective (e.g., the
answer is not a legally-binding cartel agreement). [4pt]

【古诺竞争 vs. 合谋】在一个双寡头垄断市场上，两家企业都有着恒定的边际成本 c。逆市场需求由

p(y) = a − by 给出。

(1) 求解古诺均衡和每个企业的利润。[4pt]
(2) 假设两家企业合谋形成一个卡特尔并平分利润。求解市场均衡和每家企业的利润。[4pt]
(3) 现在，一家企业在卡特尔协议上作弊。如果另一家企业仍然按照第（2）部分的规定进行生产，
那么作弊企业的最佳产量是多少？它的利润会是多少？[4pt]
(4) 比较第（1）
（2）和（3）部分的利润。用文字或数学讨论，在现实中，仅从利润最大化的角度，
企业如何可以形成稳定的合谋（即答案不是“具有法律约束力的卡特尔协议”）。[4pt]

Page 22 of 24
continued...

Page 23 of 24
continued...

Page 24 of 24