Pert BURL} See cars Bieler Chai} eg erat) Operations Ry elstot a get 9 Attacks eet) Ui euled Leer eg Patrolling. PU stythelightningpress.com Small Unit TACTICS Planning & Conducting Tactical Operations Third Edition (SUTS3) The Lightning Press Fd Dr. Christopher Larsen Norman M. WadeThe Lightning Press 2227 Arrowhead Blvd. Lakeland, FL 33813 24-hour Order/Voicemail: 1-800-997-8827 SMARTbooks@TheLightningPress.com www.TheLightningPress.com (SUTS3) The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed. Planning & Conducting Tactical Operations SUTS3 is the third revised edition of The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, completely updated for 2019 to include ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense (Jul ‘19), ADP 3-0 (Jul ‘19) and FM 3-0 Operations w/Chg 1 (Dec ‘17), FMs 3-90-1 & -2 (May ‘13), ATP 3-21.8 Infantry Platoon and ‘Squad (Apr ‘16), ATP 3-21.10 Infantry Rifle Company (May ‘18), TC 3-21-76 The Ranger Handbook (Apr ‘17), and the latest versions of more than 20 additional references. Copyright © 2019, Christopher Larsen & Norman M. Wade ISBN: 978-1-935886-77-8 All Rights Reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or other means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing by the publisher. Inquiries should be ad- dressed to The Lightning Press. Notice of Liability The information in this SMARTbook and quick reference guide is distributed on an “As Is” basis, without warranty. While every precaution has been taken to ensure the reliability and accuracy of all data and contents, neither the author nor The Lightning Press shall have any liability to any person or entity with respect to liability, loss, or damage caused directly or indirectly by the contents of this book. If there is a discrepancy, refer to the source document. This SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive information restricted from public release. “The views presented in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or its components.” SMARTbook is a trademark of The Lightning Press. About our cover photo: U.S. Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) engage opposing forces in a simulated exercise during Saber Junction 18 at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, Sept. 26, 2018. (U.S. Army photo by Cpl. Gabrielle Weaver) Credits: Photos courtesy of HJ Images; photos by Jeong, Hae-jung. All other photos cour- tesy Dept. of the Army and/or Dept. of Defense and credited individually where applicable Printed and bound in the United States of America. View, download FREE samples and purchase online: WWW. TheLightningPress.com(SUTS3) Notes to Reader Planning & Conducting Tactical Operations Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit actions. The nature of close combat in land operations is unique. Combatants routinely come face-to-face with one another in large numbers in a wide variety of operational environments comprising all types of terrain. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, forces close with and destroy or capture them. ‘An offensive operation is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers. Offensive operations impose the commander's will on an enemy. The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain a physical and psychological advantage. The four types of offensive operations are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit ‘defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, econo- mize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. Defensive operations are a counter to an enemy offensive action, and they seek to destroy as much of the attacking enemy forces as possible. Friendly forces use three types of defensive operations to deny enemy forces advantages: area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook translates and bridges operational-level doctrine into tactical application — in the form of tactics, techniques and procedures — and provides the “how to” at the small-unit level as a ready reference at the battalion, company, platoon, squad and fire team level SUTS3 is the third revised edition of The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, completely updated for 2019 to include ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense (Jul ‘19); FM 3-0 Operations w/Chg 1 (Dec ‘17), FMs 3-90-1 & -2 (May '13), ATP 3-21.8 Infantry Platoon and Squad (Apr '16), ATP 3-21.10 Infantry Rifle Company (May ‘18), TC 3-21-76 The Ranger Handbook (Apr '17), and the latest versions of more than 20 additional references. cs Fe ead ‘doe > be ee : SMARTbooks - DIME is our DOMAIN! SMARTbooks: Reference Essentials for the Instruments of National Power (D-I-M-E: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic)! Recognized as a “whole of government” doctrinal reference standard by military, national security and government professionals around the world, SMARTbooks comprise a comprehensive professional library. SMARTbooks can be used as quick reference guides during actual operations, as study guides at education and professional development courses, and as lesson plans and checklists in support of training. Visit www.TheLightningPress.com! Introduction-1SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARThook, 3rd Ed. (Planning & Conducting Tactical Operations) The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook translates and bridges operational-level doctrine into tactical application ~ in the form of tactics, techniques and procedures -- and pro- vides the “how to” at the small-unit level as a ready reference at the battalion, company, platoon, squad and fire team level. SUTS3 is the third revised edition of The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, completely updated for 2019 to include ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense (Jul ‘19), ADP 3-0 (Jul ‘19) and FIM 3-0 Operations w/Chg 1 (Dec ‘17), FMs 3-90-1 & -2 (May ‘13), ATP 3-21.8 Infantry Pla- toon and Squad (Apr ‘16), ATP 3-21.10 Infantry Rifle Company (May ‘18), TC 3-21-76 The Ranger Handbook (Apr ‘17), and the latest versions of more than 20 additional references. sage eos ADP 3-90 FM 3-90-2 ATP 3-21.10 ATP 3-21.8 TC 3-21.76 plus 20+ more! SUTS3 chapters and topics include tactical fundamentals, the offense; the defense; train, advise, and assist (stability, peace, and counterinsurgency operations); enabling opera- tions (reconnaissance, security operations, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, and encirclement); special purpose attacks (ambush, raid, counterattack, spoiling attack, demonstrations and feints); urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold region, mountain, and jungle operations); patrols and patrolling. Chap 1: Tactical Fundamentals Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit actions. The nature of close combat in land operations is unique. Combatants routinely come face-to-face with one another in large numbers in a wide variety of operational en- vironments comprising all types of terrain. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, forces close with and destroy or capture them Chap 2: The Offense An offensive operation is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain con- trol of terrain, resources, and population centers. Offensive operations impose the com- Mmander's will on an enemy. The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain a physical and psychological advantage. The offense compels an enemy to react, creating new or larger weaknesses the attacking force can exploit. The four types of offensive operations are movement to contact, attack, exploita- tion, and pursuit. 2-IntroductionChap 3: The Defense A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. Defensive operations are a counter to an enemy offensive action, and they seek to destroy as much of the attacking enemy forces as possible. Friendly forces use three types of defensive operations to deny enemy forces advantages: area defense, mobile defense, and retro- grade. Chap 4: Train, Advise, Assist Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence missions, tasks, and ac- tions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support other instruments of national power as represented by interagency partners, as well as cooperate with international organizations and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. Stability is achieved through the process of stabilization through the balanced application of the instruments of national power in partnership with the host nation (HN) and local communities. Peace operations are crisis response and limited contingency operations, and normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations is the combination of measures undertaken by a government, some- times with USG and multinational partner support, to defeat an insurgency. Chap 5: Enabling Operations Commanders direct enabling operations to support the conduct of the offensive, defen- sive, and stability operations and defense support of civil authorities tasks. Enabling op- erations are usually conducted by commanders as part of their shaping operations or sup- porting efforts. The tactical enabling tasks discussed in this chapter are reconnaissance, security, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, and encirclement operations. Chap 6: Special Purpose Attacks An attack is a type of offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. Subordinate forms of the attack have special purposes. Spe- cial purpose attacks are the ambush, counterattack, demonstration, feint, raid, and spoil- ing attack. The commander's intent and the mission variables determine which of these forms of attack to employ. Commanders conduct each of these forms of attack, except for a raid, as either a hasty or a deliberate operation. Chap 7: Urban & Regional Environments Army doctrine addresses five regional environments: desert, cold, temperate, mountain, and jungle. Another area of special consideration involves urban area. The continued trend worldwide of urban growth and the shift of populations from rural to urban areas continues to affect Army operations. The urban environment, consisting of complex terrain, dense populations, and integrated infrastructures, is the predominant operational environment in which Army forces currently operate. Chap 8: Patrols & Patrolling The two categories of patrols are combat and reconnaissance. Patrols that depart the main body with the clear intent to make direct contact with the enemy are called combat patrols. The three types of combat patrols are raid patrols, ambush patrols (both of which are sent out to conduct special purpose attacks), and security patrols. Patrols that depart the main body with the intention of avoiding direct combat with the enemy while seeing out information or confirming the accuracy of previously-gathered information are called reconnaissance patrols. The most common types reconnaissance patrols are area, route, zone, and point. Leaders also dispatch reconnaissance patrols to track the enemy, and to establish contact with other friendly forces. Introduction-3(SUTS3) References The following references were used in part to compile The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook. Additionally listed are related resources useful to the reader. All references are available to the general public and designated as “approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.” The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive information restricted from public release. Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs) ADP 1-02* ‘Aug 2018 Terms and Military Symbols ADP 3-0" Jul 2019 Operations ADP 3-90* Jul 2019 Offense and Defense ADP 3.07" Jul 2019 Stability ADP 5-0" Jul 2019 The Operations Process Army Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (ATPs/ATTPs) ATP 3-21.8* Apr 2016 Infantry Platoon and Squad ATP 3-21.10" May 2018 Infantry Rifle Company ATTP 3-06.11 Jun 2011 Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain ATTP3-07.31* May 2019 Peace Ops (Multiservice TTPs) ATP 3-90.97" Apr 2016 Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations Field Manuals (FMs) and Training Circulars (TCs) FM 3-0* Oct 2017 Operations (w/Change 1, Dec 2017) FM 3-22* May 2017 Army Support to Security Cooperation FM 3-24* May 2014 Insurgencies and Countering insurgencies FM 3-90-41 Mar 2013 Offense and Defense, Volume 1 FM 3-90-2 Mar 2013 Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks, Volume 2 FM 6-0 May 2014 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (wiChange 2, Apr 2016) FM 7-0 Oct 2016 Train to Win in a Complex World FM 90-3 Aug 1993 Desert Operations FM 90-5 Aug 1993 Jungle Operations TC 3-21.76" Apr 2017 The Ranger Handbook Joint Publications (JPs) JP 3-0" Oct 2018 Joint Operations (w/Change 1) JP 307.3, Aug 2012 Peace Operations JP 3-07" Aug 2016 Stability UP 3-20" May 2017 Security Cooperation UP 3-24" Apr 2018 Counterinsurgency * Denotes new/updated reference since last publication (SUTS2) 4-References(SUTS3) Table of Contents Tactical Fundamentals |. The Art & Science of Tactics . |. Tactics Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). Il. The Tactical Level of Warfare .... Ill. The Art and Science of Tactics ... Close Combat Common Tactical Concepts. IV. Solving Tactical Problems. V. Hasty vs. Deliberate Operations....... VIL RISK ose sesen Risk Management Process jn. Il. The Army’s Operational oe |. Unified Land Operations....... Il. Decisive Action : Operations (Unified Logic Chart)... Elements of Decisive Action Ill. Unified Action A. Joint Operations... B. Multinational Operations........ IV. Train to Win in a Complex World Ill. Large-Scale Combat ceetatone em: 3-0 0 wiChg 41, 2017).....1-21 |. Overview. . 1-21 Range of Miltary Operations. 4-24 Il. Joint Operations, Unified Action, & the Range of witry Operations. soe 1-22 Ill. Large-Scale Combat Operations seen 24 IV. The Multi-Domain Battle . Positions of Relative Advantage SS V- Operational Framework 1-25 ‘Area of Operations.......... eo Area of Influence Area of Interest... i aoe Deep, Close, Support, and Consolidation Areas... 1-27 Decisive, Shaping, Sustaining Operations ot Main and Supporting Efforts.. VI. Paths to Victory (WIN). IV. Tactical Mission Tasks . A. Mission Symbols B. Actions by Friendly Forces 1-30 C. Effects on Enemy Forces 1-31 Taxonomy of Army Tactics...... 1-32 Table of Contents-1V. Understand, Visualize, Describe, Direct, Lead, Assess. |. Understand .. Il. Visualize... Ill. Describe on A. Commander's Intent B. Planning Guidance... ©. Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)... D. Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEF!) IV. Direct sees ae Elements of Combat Power. The Six Warfighting Funetions .. V. Lead. Seer VI. Assess Activities of the Operations Process VI. Troop Leading Procedures.. Performing Troop Leading Procedures (Steps) Analysis of Terrain and Weather ......... METT-TC (Mission Variables) i OAKOC - Military Aspects of the Terrain VII. Plans and Orders ... |. Warning Order (WARNORD) Il, Operations Order (OPORD) lll. Techniques for Issuing Orders VII. Preparation and Pre-Combat Inspection we. |. Preparation ....... Il. The Pre-Combat Inspection (PCI) .. IX. Rehearsals. |, Rehearsal Techniques Il, Rehearsal Types X. The After Action Review (AAR) |. Types of After Action Reviews II. After Action Review Steps..... Ill. ARs - A Small Unit Perspective The Offense The Offense |. Types of Offensive Operations Il. Purposes of the Offense Ill. Forms of Maneuver.. IV. Common Offensive Control Measures... 2-6 V. Transition 2-8 VI. Characteristics of Offensive Operations 2-10 |. Movement to Contact.. Meeting Engagement. |. Organization Il. Planning & Preparation... lil, Conducting the MTC - A Small Unit Perspective - 2-Table of ContentsIl. Attack. Hasty vs. Deliberate Attacks. |. Organization Il, Planning & Preparation........... os Ill Conducting the Attack - A Small Unit Perspective ... Ill. Exploitation... Conducting the Exploitation - A Small Unit Perspective. lOmanzaion ee Il. Planning & Preparation. Ill, Execution : IV. Pursuit |. Organization A. Frontal Pursuit. B, Combination Pursuit. Il, Planning & Preparation Ill, Conducting the Pursuit - A Small Unit Perspective V. Small Unit Offensive Tactical Tasks |. Breach . one Il, Defeat... lll. Destroy IV. Seize. V. Suppress ... VI. Support by Fire. VIL. Cleat. coo Vill. Attack by Fire.. VI. Actions on Contact The Defense The Defense .. |. Purposes of the Defense Il. Types of Defensive Operations. lll. Characteristics of the Defense. oo IV. Common Defensive Control Measures... \V. Transition |. Area Defense... |. Organization Il. Forms of Defensive Maneuver. Defense In-Depth Forward Defense. Il Planning & Preparation Ill, Conducting the Area Defense - A Small Unit Perspective .. IV. Priorities of Work in the Defense . Il. Mobile Defense 1. Organization «2... A, The Fixing Force B. The Striking Force. Table of Contents-3II. Planning & Preparation ae lil, Conducting the Mobile Defense - A Small Unit Perspective ons 18 Ill. Retrograde .. |. Delay.... A. Delay Within a Sector ee B. Delay Forward of a Specified Line for a Specified Time . ‘i 3-22 I. Withdrawal... Sener eee A Assisted. B. Unassisted lll. Retirement IV. Small Unit Forms o of the Defense Order of Events... |. Defense of a Linear Obstacle Il, Perimeter Defense. Ill. Reverse Slope Defense. Train, Advise Train, Advise & Assi: ‘Security Force Assistance (SFA) |. Military Engagement, Security Goons ration & Deterrence.. Il. Stability in Operations eee |. Stability in Operations......... Stability Operations (Army Definition)... Stability Actions (Joint Definition)... Stabilization Efforts. End State Conditions in Stabilization Efforts... II. Stability Within the Range of Military Operations. Ill. Small Unit Stability Tasks. A. Establish and Occupy a Lodgement Area or a. Forward Operating Base (FOB) B. Monitor Compliance with an Agreement ......ccscscssssessseeeeseens 4-11 C. Establishing Observation Posts and Checkpoints... 412 D. Search cocaine E. Patrol... F. Escort a Convoy. G. Open and Secure Routes........ H. Conduct Reserve Operations |. Control Crowds. Ill. Peace Operations (PO).. 1. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).... 2. Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO). 3. Peace Building (PB) 4. Peacemaking (PM). 5. Conflict Prevention : IV. Counterinsurgency Operations s (COIN) |. Insurgency Il, Governance and Legitimacy.... 4-Table of Contents1. Reconnaissance... Reconnaissance Objective... I. Reconnaissance Fundamentals......... I, Organization ......... Ill Planning & Preparation is IV. Forms of the Reconnaissance...... A. The Area Reconnaissance. Single-Team Method ... Double-Team Method Dissemination of Information... B. The Route Reconnaissance Recon Push Recon Pull... C. The Zone Reconnaissance... D. Reconnaissance in Force (RIF). E. Special Reconnaissance. ll. Security Operations . |. Security Operations Tasks... Security Fundamentals...... A. Screen B. Guard C. Cover... D. Area Security... * Local Security * Combat Outposts. Il. Fundamentals of Security Operations .. Ill. Troop Movement. |, Methods of Troop Movement... Il, Movement Techniques. IV. Relief in Place |. Organization Il, Planning & Preparation. Hasty or Deliberate... : Ill, Conducting the Relief in Place - A Small Unit Perspective . Techniques: Sequential, Simultaneous or Staggered. V. Passage of Lines |. Conducting the Relief in Place - A Small Unit Perspective Departing the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT)... Reentering the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT).. II. Organization ... a VI. Encirclement Operations... |. Offensive Encirclement Operations .. I. Defending Encircled......esscssee A. Breakout from Encirclement B. Exfiltration Table of Contents-5Special Purpose Attacks Special Purpose Attacks. |. Ambush Near Ambush. Far Ambush |. Organization A. Near Ambush .. B. Far Ambush... : II, Planning & Preparation... A. Near Ambush B. Far Ambush... oe lll. Conducting the Ambush - A Small Unit Perspective . etd A. Near Ambush...... : en ee B. Far Ambush. IV. Ambush Categories Deliberate ....ccsesese Hasty cress Area Ambush Point Ambush Il. Raid. |. Organization ‘A. Security Team B. Support Team. C. Assault Team ll, Planning & Preparation... lil. Conducting the Raid - A Small Unit Perspective. A. Infiltrate to the Objective .. 6-20 B. Actions on the Objective 6-21 Ill. Counterattack 6-23 |. Planning a Counterattack .. 6-24 Il. Preparing a Counterattack 6-24 Organization of Forces....... 6-25 Ill. Executing a Counterattack.... 6-26 IV. Spoiling Attack .. V. Demonstrations and Feints . Demonstrations Feints. Tactical Deception. era Military Deception (MILDEC) in Support of Operations... 6-30 6-Table of ContentsUrban & Regional Environments Urban & Regional Environments (Overview) |. Urban Operations ... - Urban Operations (UO) - Understanding the Urban Environment - Threat FING. seseee Il Isolate the Building Cordon. ese Ill, Assault @ Building ..... A. Entering a Building B. Clearing ROOMS ......... C. Moving in the Building... IV. Follow Through : Il. Fortified Areas .. Characteristics. |. Find... UN Fix, Ill Finish (Fighting Enemies in Fortifications)... os A. Securing the Near and Far Side-Breaching Protective Obstacles B. Knocking out Bunkers. C. Assaulting Trench Systems. \V. Follow Through....... Ill. Desert Operations |. Desert Environments : ll. Desert Effects on Personnel lll. Mission Command Considerations IV. Tactical Considerations. IV. Cold Region Operations 1. Cold Regions....... Il. Cold Weather Effects on Personnel........r.0- Ill. Mission Command Considerations IV, Tactical Considerations.......sccnseene V. Mountain Operations . |. Mountain Environments. Il. Effects on Personnel... Ill, Tactical Considerations IV. Mission Command Considerations... VI. Jungle Operations.. |, Jungle Environments Il. Effects on Personnel.... S Ill, Mission Command Considerations IV, Tactical Considerations...... Table of Contents-74) Patrols & Patrolling Patrols and Patrolling ... Combat Patrols i Reconnaissance Patrols. |. Organization of Patrols Il, Planning & Conducting a Patrol Ill, Elements of a Combat Patrol... A. Assault Element B. Support Element C. Security Element I. Movement ce I. Traveling... Il. Traveling Overwatch... Ill, Bounding Overwatch IL. Combat Formations Fire Team Formations. Primary Formations |. The Line...... II. The File Ill. The Wedge Ill. Crossing a Danger Area... |, Patch-to-the-Road Method ll. Heart-Shaped Method ........ lll. Bypass Method IV. Box Method...... V, Crossing Large Open Areas... IV. Establishing a Security Halt Rally Point... : |. Cigar-Shaped Method... |. Wagon Wheel Method os Ill. Priorities of Work at the Objective Rally Point (ORP) On Point. es En Route Rally Point (ERP) Objective Rally Point (ORP)... V. Establishing a Hide Po: Considerations....... I. Back-to-Back Method ....00nennn, ll. Star Method On Point. ee Site Selection Site Sterilization. VI. Establishing a Patrol Base Site Selection... é |. The Triangle Method... II. Planning Considerations Ill. Security Measures IV. Priorities of Work...... 8-Table of Contents2 eee) a ao gs hf eo =I Pr I. The Art & Science of Tactics Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense & Defense (Jul '19), chap. 1. I. Tactics Tactics is the employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other. ADP 3-90 is the primary publication for the offense and defense at the tactical level. It is authoritative and provides guidance in the form of combat-tested concepts and ideas modified to take advantage of Army and joint capabilities. It focuses on the tactics used to employ current capabilities to prevail in combat. Tactics are not prescriptive. Tacticians use creativity to develop solutions for which enemy forces are neither prepared nor able to cope. ms ui ya a a y Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide commanders and staffs with the fundamentals to develop solutions to tactical problems. (Dept. of Army photo by CPL Gabrielle Weaver) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) Tactics always require judgment and adaptation to a situation’s unique circum- stances. On the other hand, techniques and procedures are established pattems or processes that can be applied repeatedly with little or no judgment to a variety of circumstances. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide commanders and ‘staffs with the fundamentals to develop solutions to tactical problems. The solution to any specific problem is a unique combination of these fundamentals, current TTP, and the creation of new TTP based on an evaluation of the situation. Commanders determine acceptable solutions by mastering doctrine and current TTP. They gain this mastery through experiences in education, training, and operations. II. The Tactical Level of Warfare The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which battles and engage- ments are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrange- (Tactical Fundamentals) I. The Art & Science of Tactics 1-1ment, movement, and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to enemy forces to achieve assigned objectives. The strategic and operational levels of warfare provide the context for tactical operations, and they are discussed in JP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0. Without this context, tactical operations may be reduced to a series of disconnected actions. Engagements ‘An engagement is a tactical conflict, usually between opposing, lower echelon maneuver forces (JP 3-0). Brigades and lower echelon units generally conduct en- gagements. Engagements result from deliberate closure with or chance encounters between two opponents. Battles A battle consists of a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement. Battles affect the course of a campaign or major operation, as they determine the outcome of a division or corps echelon achieving one or more significant objectives. Battles are usually operationally significant, if not operationally decisive. The outcomes of battles determine strategic and operational success and contribute to the overall operation or campaign achieving a strategic purpose. The outcomes of engagements determine tactical success and contribute to friendly forces winning a battle. Levels of Warfare Echelons of command, sizes of units, types of equipment, or components do not define the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of warfare. Instead, the level of warfare is determined by what level objective is achieved by the action. National assets, including space-based and cyberspace capabilities previously considered principally strategic, provide important support to tactical operations. The levels of warfare help commanders visualize a logical nesting of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate echelon of command. Advances in technology and a complex information environment compress time and space relationships. This reality blurs the boundaries between the levels of warfare. In a world of constant and immediate communication, a single event may affect all three levels of warfare simultaneously. III. The Art and Science of Tactics Army leaders at all echelons master the art and science of tactics—two distinctly different yet inseparable concepts—to solve the problems that will face them on the battlefield. A tactical problem occurs when the mission variables; mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil consid- erations (METT-TC) of the desired tactical situation differ from the current tactical situation. (See FM 6-0 for a discussion of the mission variables.) A. The Art of Tactics The art of tactics is three interrelated aspects: the creative and flexible array of means to accomplish missions, decision making under conditions of uncertainty when faced with a thinking and adaptive enemy, and the understanding of the effects of combat on Soldiers. An art, as opposed to a science, requires exercising intuition based on operational experiences and cannot be learned solely by study. Leaders exercise the art of tactics by balancing study with a variety of relevant and practical experiences. Repetitive practice under a variety of realistic conditions increases an individual's mastery of the art of tactics. eaten nm 2 FI es Fy Fl Fy = as iD al Fundamentals) I. The Art & Science of TacticsClose Combat Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul ‘19), p. 1-11. The nature of close combat in land operations is unique. Combatants routinely come face-to-face with one another in large numbers in a wide variety of operational environ- ments comprising all types of terrain. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, Army forces close with and destroy or capture them. The outcome of battles and engagements depends on the ability of Army forces to close with enemy forces and prevail in close combat. Close combat is warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets. Units involved in close combat employ direct fire weapons supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires, and nonlethal engagement means. Units in close combat defeat or destroy enemy forces and seize and retain ground. Close combat at lower echelons contains many more inter- actions between friendly and enemy forces than any other form of combat. (Dept. of Army photo by Staff Sgt. Steven M. Colvin.) Close combat is most often linked to difficult terrain where enemies seek to negate friendly advantages in technology and weapon capabilities. Urban terrain represents one of the most likely close combat challenges. The complexity of urban terrain and the density of noncombatants reduce the effectiveness of advanced sensors and long-range weapons. Operations in large, densely populated areas require special considerations. From a planning perspective, commanders view cities as both topographic features and a dynamic system of varying operational entities containing hostile forces, local popula- tions, and infrastructure, Effective close combat relies on lethality informed by a high degree of situational under- standing across multiple domains. The capacity for physical destruction is the foundation of all other military capabilities, and it is building block of military operations. Army forma- tions are organized, equipped, and trained to employ lethal capabilities in a wide range of conditions. The demonstrated lethality of Army forces provides the credibility essential to deterring adversaries and assuring allies and partners. An inherent, complementary relationship exists between using lethal force and applying military capabilities for nonlethal purposes. In wartime, each situation requires a different mix of violence and constraint. Lethal and nonlethal actions used together complement each other and create multiple dilemmas for opponents. During operations short of armed conflict, the lethality implicit in Army forces enables their performance of other tasks effectively with minimal adversary interference. (Tactical Fundamentals) I. The Art & Science of Tactics 1-3 fe gS eel ie ay re ch] at Ss ingLeaders apply the art of tactics to solve tactical problems within their commander's intent by choosing from interrelated options, including— + Types and forms of operations, forms of maneuver, and tactical mission tasks. + Task organization of available forces and allocation of resources. + Arrangement and choice of control measures. a Ey aa 7] Pe Ooo a9 Pad a D + Tempo of the operation + Level of necessary risk. Combat is a lethal clash of opposing wills and a violent struggle between thinking and adaptive commanders with opposing goals. Commanders strive to defeat their enemies. Defeat is to render a force incapable of achieving its objectives (ADP 3-0). Commanders seek to accomplish missions that support operational or strategic purposes while preventing their enemies from doing the same. These options that support operational or strategic purposes represent a starting point for developing a course of action (COA) to a specific tactical problem. Each decision represents a choice among a range of options. Each option balances competing demands and requires judgment. Tacticians use experience and creativity to outthink their opposing enemy commanders. The mission variables have many combinations that make each new tactical situation unique. Because enemy forces change and adapt to friendly moves during operations, there is no guarantee that the current plan remains valid throughout a single operation. Creative and Flexible Application of Means The first aspect of the art of tactics is the innovative application of the means avail- able to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative against enemy forces. These means include friendly capabilities, organizations, and materiel. Effective employment of available means requires an understanding of how friendly forces fight the offense and defense. Effective employment also requires understanding the enemy's objec- tives and methods it uses to organize and operate its forces. Military forces that seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and employ movement and maneuver operate in more than just the land domain. Tactical through strategic land operations depend on the ability of Army forces to affect the behavior and capabili- ties of enemies, adversaries, and the local population in their area of operations (AO). The ability to influence relevant actors requires an understanding of the information environment and the ways that information affects them and military op- erations. Affecting their behavior and capabilities requires friendly forces effectively integrating information operations, cyberspace operations, and electronic warfare capabilities, as appropriate, to the lowest possible echelons. Decision Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty The second aspect of the art of tactics is decision making under conditions of uncer- tainty in a time-constrained environment. Leaders need a high degree of creativity and clarity of thought to understand the implications and opportunities afforded in chaotic and ambiguous situations. In this environment, the Army requires leaders who act decisively (based on their experiences), accurate running estimates, and leaders with good judgment. While detailed planning provides a level of awareness before a battle, leaders who develop situational understanding through action are the ones most likely to seize the initiative and exploit fleeting positions of relative advantage. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judg- ment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). Decision making in an uncertain environment demands leader involvement. Com- manders and staffs need to master the fundamentals of the military decision-making process before they can abbreviate the process. When time does not allow for developing multiple COAs, commanders apply staff input and their experiences to 1-4 (Tactical Fundamentals) I. The Art & Science of Tacticsdirect a suitable solution. Units use warning orders to maximize paralle! planning and share information with subordinates as early as possible. The use of liaison officers and collaborative systems accelerate the process. 3 rY Fs i ie Ese) Understanding the Effects of Combat on Soldiers The third and final aspect of the art of tactics is the understanding of the effects of combat on Soldiers. This understanding is what differentiates actual combat from the circumstances encountered during training. Friction resulting from violence, death, and chance characterize combat. Continuous combat operations—the conduct of the offense and defense—take a toll on Soldiers, severely straining their physical and mental stamina. The emotional responses resulting from combat influence human behavior. Loss of stamina degrades courage, confidence, and discipline. If left un- checked, these effects can result in decreased vigilance, slowed perception, inability to concentrate, poor decision making, and an inability to perform routine tasks Success in combat depends on understanding the emotional and physical aspects of combat as well as understanding the aspects of numerical and technological superi- ority. Tacticians account for these aspects of combat. They seek to cause and exploit fear and physical weakness to erode and ultimately defeat enemy forces. Leaders must be alert to indicators of fatigue, fear, lapses in discipline or ethical standards, and reduced morale among both friendly and enemy forces. Effective leaders counter these effects on friendly forces while exploiting the effects on enemy forces. Maintaining tactical pressure causes enemy forces to react continuously and affords them no chance to recover. Pressure provides friendly forces opportunities to exploit while enemy forces become increasingly unable to mount effective resis- tance, which can lead to their collapse. Leaders factor the negative effects of combat on human endurance into their plans, and they understand the subtle difference between pushing Soldiers to their limits to exploit success and risking the collapse of unit cohesion. Artful tactics require commanders to accept risk when formulating and executing plans. Success during operations depends on a willingness to embrace risk as op- portunity rather than treating it as something to avoid. The best COA may be the one with the greatest risk. Successful commanders balance the tension between protect- ing their force and accepting risks to accomplish their mission. B. The Science of Tactics The science of tactics is the understanding of those military aspects of tactics—ca- pabilities, techniques, and procedures—that can be measured and codified. The science of tactics includes the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organiza- tions and systems. It also includes techniques and procedures used to accomplish specific tasks. The science of tactics is straightforward. Much of what subordinate doctrine publications contain are the science of tactics—techniques and procedures for employing the various elements of the combined arms team. A combined arms team is a team that uses combined arms—the synchronized and simultaneous appli- cation of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially (ADP 3-0). Mastery of the science of tactics is necessary for leaders to understand physical and procedural constraints. These constraints include the effects from mission variables or the effects of rules of engagement on friendly and enemy force capabilities. IV. Solving Tactical Problems Asa part of mastering the Army profession, leaders train for various tactical situ- ations, learn to recognize their important elements, and practice decision making under realistic conditions. They develop these abilities through years of professional military education, self-study, practical training, and operational experiences. These experiences sharpen the intuitive faculties required to solve tactical problems. Re- (Tactical Fundamentals) I. The Art & Science of Tactics 1-5ere mn < F; a Fy Ey o EI Fa EY a Common Tactical Concepts Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense & Defense (Jul ‘19), pp. 2-4 to 2-17. ‘Tacticians need to understand common tactical concepts, military definitions, and the tactical echelons and organizations they employ in the performance of offensive and de- fensive tasks. Many of these are discussed in greater detail within The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook or other books within the SMARTbook series. Joint Interdependence. Army forces perform tactical offensive and defensive tasks as members of an interdependent joint force, applying land power as part of unified action. See pp. 1-22 to 1-23. Principles of Joint Operations. JP 3-0 defines the twelve principles of joint operations - Objective, Offensive, Mass, Maneuver, Economy of force, Unity of command, Security, Surprise, Simplicity, Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy - and provides general guidance for conducting military operations. Refer to JFODSS. Operational Variables and Mission Variables. Army planners use the operational variables to describe the conditions of an operational environment. Upon receipt of a mis- sion, Army leaders filter relevant information categorized by the operational variables into the categories of the mission variables for use during mission analysis. Refer to BSS5. The Army's Tactical Doctrinal Taxonomy. While an operation's primary element is offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities, different units involved in that operation may be conducting different types and subordinate forms of operations. See p. 1-32. Warfighting Functions. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADP 3-0). See pp. 1-38 fo 1-39 Defeat Mechanisms. A defeat mechanism is the method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition (ADP 3-0). Tactical forces at all ech- elons use combinations of the four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. Refer to AODS6. Basic Tactical Concepts Area of Influence. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control (JP 3-0). See p. 1-26. Area of Interest. An area of interest is that area of concem to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). See p. 1-26. Area of Operations. An area of operations is an operational area defined by a com- mander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). See p. 1-26. Avenue of Approach. An avenue of approach is a path used by an attacking force lead- ing to its objective or to key terrain. See p. 1-48. Combined Arms. ADP 3-0 defines combined arms as the synchronized and simultane- ous application of all elements of combat power that together achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially. Committed Force. A committed force is a force in contact with an enemy or deployed on a specific mission or course of action which precludes its employment elsewhere. A force with an on-order mission is considered a committed force. Concept of Operations. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the man- ner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions to achieve the end state (ADP 5-0). Refer to BSS5. 1-6 (Tactical Fundamentals) I. The Art & Science of TacticsDecisive Engagement. A decisive engagement is an engagement in which a unit is con- sidered fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate itself. In the absence of outside assistance, the action must be fought to a conclusion with the forces at hand Defeat in Detail. Defeat in detail is achieved by concentrating overwhelming combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating the entire force at once. A smaller force can use this technique to achieve success against a larger enemy. Economy of Force. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces to expend the minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts in order to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts (JP 3-0). It is a principle of war. Flanks. A flank is the right or left limit of a unit. For a stationary unit, flanks are desig- nated in terms of an enemy's actual or expected location. For a moving unit, the direction of movement defines the flanks. Mutual Support. Mutual support is that support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities (JP 3-31) Operational Framework. An operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). Piecemeal Commitment. Piecemeal commitment is the immediate employment of units in combat as they become available instead of waiting for larger aggregations of units to ensure mass, or the unsynchronized employment of available forces so that their combat power is not employed effectively. Piecemeal commitment subjects the smaller committed forces to defeat in detail and prevents the massing and synchronizing of combat power with following maneuver and sustainment elements. However, piecemeal commitment may be advantageous to maintain momentum and to retain or exploit the initiative. Reconstitution. Reconstitution involves actions that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources (ATP 3-21.20). Reserve. While joint doctrine has three definitions for reserve, this definition applies to Army tactical operations: A reserve is that portion of a body of troops that is withheld from ac- tion at the beginning of an engagement, in order to be available for a decisive movement. Rules Of Engagement (ROE). Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent mili- tary authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04). Supporting Distance. Supporting distance is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil situation (ADP 3-0). Supporting Range. Supporting range is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit's weapons systems (ADP 3-0) Tactical Mobility. Tactical mobility is the ability of friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield relative to the enemy. Tactical mobility is a function of the relation- ship between cross-country mobility, firepower, and protection. The terrain, soil condi- tions, and weather affect cross country mobility. Uncommitted Forces. An uncommitted force is a force that is not in contact with an en- emy and is not already deployed on a specific mission or course of action. Commanders use uncommitted forces to exploit success or avoid failure. Weighting the Decisive Operation or Main Effort. The decisive operation is the opera- tion that directly accomplishes the mission (ADP 3-0). Weighting the decisive operation or the main effort is a basic tactical concept closely associated with the mass and maneuver principles of war. The purpose for weighting the decisive operation or main effort is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time (Tactical Fundamentals) I. The Art & Science of Tactics 1-7 2 eee] as ee ie ho} lag = cpeated deployments to similar areas require examinations of previously successful operations to stay ahead of adaptive and learning enemies. Leaders begin developing their foundation for solving tactical problems by mastering the science of the profession. This requires them to master the use of their systems and understand methods to employ terrain to their advantage. Leaders learn to com- municate their concepts of operations clearly with technically precise and doctrinally consistent verbiage, using commonly understood and accepted doctrinal terms and concepts. Commanders apply tactics, an understanding of the situation, and judgment to cre- ate unique solutions appropriate to accomplishing the mission and the other specific mission variables. Usually several solutions exist for one problem, and some will be more effective than others. An ideal solution is decisive and postures the unit for fu- ture missions, while also providing the greatest flexibility for response to unexpected enemy actions within the higher commander's intent. ‘Success in tactical problem solving results from the aggressive, intelligent, and de- cisive use of relative combat power. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADP 3-0). Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The elements facilitate Army forces accessing joint and multinational fires and assets. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as warfighting functions. Commanders win by initiating combat on their own terms—at a time and place of their choosing—and by maintaining the initiative to make the enemy react. Commanders maintain the initiative to enable friendly forces to disrupt enemy deci- sion making, This is particularly important during transitions between the offense and defense because retaining the initiative minimizes an enemy force's ability to react effectively to changes in friendly dispositions. Offensive action is the key to achieving decisive results. Commanders conduct the offense to defeat enemy forces or gain control of terrain to produce the effects re- quired by their higher commander. Circumstances may require defending; however, tactical success normally requires shifting to the offense as soon as possible. The offense ends when forces accomplish their missions, reach their limit of advance (LOA), or approach culmination. Those forces then consolidate, resume the attack, or prepare for other operations. Commanders seek to initiate combat on the most favorable terms, Doing so allows the massing of effects against selected enemy units in vulnerable locations. Main- taining the initiative allows a commander to shift the decisive operation to exploit opportunities as they arise. Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by— + Gaining a position of relative advantage (physical, temporal, cognitive, or virtual) over enemy forces by maneuvering more rapidly than enemy forces. + Employing firepower to destroy critical enemy capabilities and systems. on 8 4 Fi a + Conducting information operations, cyberspace operations, and electronic warfare activities to isolate and degrade enemy decision-making abilities. + Denying enemy forces what they require for success, such as terrain, airspace, population centers, support of the population, and facilities. + Sustaining and protecting subordinate forces before, during, and after battles. + Maintaining a better understanding of the tactical situation than enemy forces and exploiting it + Planning beyond the initial operation and anticipating its branches or sequels. + Continuously consolidating gains to defeat all forms of enemy resistance. Momentum complements and helps maintain the initiative. Momentum reflects a unit's combat power and the velocity and tempo of its operations. Concentrating 1-8 (Tactical Fundamentals) I. The Art & Science of TacticsV. Hasty vs. Deliberate Operations Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense & Defense (Jul ‘19), p. 1-5. a <8 ie eo i Fe A Fe Hasty Operation Ahasty operation is an operation in which a commander directs immediately available forces, using fragmentary orders, to perform tasks with minimal prepa- ration, trading planning and preparation time for speed of execution. Command- ers mentally synchronize the employment of available forces before issuing fragmentary orders. Hasty operations exploit the advantages of combined arms to the maximum possible extent. For example, the 9th Armored Division's seizure of the bridge at Remagen in March 1945 illustrates a hasty operation conducted with the forces immediately available. Commanders consider tangible and intangible factors, such as subordinate training levels and experience, a po- tential enemy reaction, time and distance, and the strengths of each subordinate and supporting unit to achieve the required degree of synchronization. Deliberate Operation A deliberate operation is an operation in which the tactical situation allows the development and coordination of detailed plans, including multiple branches and sequels. Commanders conducting deliberate operations task-organize forces to accomplish a specific mission. That tasked combined arms team conducts extensive rehearsals and shaping operations to create the conditions for the conduct of the force's decisive operation. For example, the 1st Infantry Division's breaching operation during the opening hours of the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm in February 1991 illustrates a deliberate operation Most operations occur somewhere between a hasty operation and a deliberate opera- tion. The operations process helps in the development of a common operational pic- ture to facilitate decision making and to communicate decisions and other information between friendly forces. The sheer amount of obtainable data in the information age complicates the distinction between hasty and deliberate operations. Commanders discern intelligence from collected information to shape their decisions. Commanders who understand this nuance can focus on knowledge that enables their abilities to anticipate opportunities and build flexibility into plans. (Tactical Fundamentals) I. The Art & Science of Tactics 1-9mn bE) iS fa Ey FE) o =! Fd Ea fa [otkel ai VI. 1-10 combat power at the decisive point, supported by rapid maneuver, places an enemy in a disadvantageous position. Commanders maintain focus and pressure, control- ling the tempo of operations while seeking and exploiting opportunities. Maintaining momentum requires continuously assessing the situation and making risk decisions with regard to resourcing the main effort. ‘A thorough understanding of an operational environment greatly helps commanders to develop tactical solutions and allows them to drive the operations process. Com- manders who make and implement decisions faster than a hesitant enemy, even to a small degree, gain an accruing advantage Transitions among operations are difficult and may create unexpected opportunities for friendly or enemy forces. Commanders and their supporting staffs quickly recog- nize such opportunities, acting on branches or sequels prepared during the planning process. Improvisation may be necessary to cope with unforeseen circumstances, particularly those arising from consolidating gains. Consolidate gains is activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Ultimately, solutions to tactical problems result from the collective efforts of a com- mander's plan and the ability of subordinate leaders to execute it. Commanders are responsible for training their subordinates. The result of that rigorous and realistic training leaves commanders fully confident in their subordinates’ mastery of the art and science of tactics and in their ability to execute a chosen solution Risk Choices and the cost of those choices characterize all operations. Commanders decide if they can accomplish their mission based on current intelligence of the enemy situation and an assessment of the assets available (including time) and the means to coordinate and synchronize those assets. If those assets are not available, commanders choose to take additional time to plan, resource, and prepare for an operation, or they articulate where and how they will assume risk. Commanders may act on limited combat information in a time-constrained environ- ment. Combat information is unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user's tactical intelligence requirements (JP 2-01). Commanders must understand the inherent risk of acting only on combat information, since it is vulnerable to enemy deception and can be misinterpreted. The intelligence staff helps commanders as- sess combat information used in decision making. Commanders cannot be successful without a willingness to act under conditions of uncertainty, which demands balancing risks with taking advantage of opportunities. No amount of intelligence can eliminate all uncertainties and inherent risks of tactical operations. Commanders will never have absolute situational understanding. A lack of information must not paralyze the decision-making process. The more information a commander collects concerning the mission variables, the better that commander is able to make informed decisions. Less information means that a commander has a greater risk of making a poor decision for a specific situation. Knowing when there is enough information to make a decision within the higher commander's intent and constraints is part of the art of tactics and is a critical skill for all leaders. To shape success, commanders take the minimum time necessary to plan and pre- pare. Reduced coordination at the start of an operation may result in less than opti- mal effects on the enemy. However, that reduced coordination may offer increased speed and momentum and, potentially, surprise. The more time a commander takes to prepare for an operation, the more opportunity the enemy has to prepare. (Tactical Fundamentals) I. The Art & Science of TacticsBold decisions that are adequately informed give the best promise of success. Com- manders accept risk when making decisions because there will always be a degree of uncertainty. Opportunities come with risks. The willingness to accept risk is often the key to exposing enemy weaknesses. There are times when leaders cannot find ways of addressing all of the risk and should consider if the outcome is worth the risk. Situational understanding, running estimates, and planning reduces risk. In some circumstances, commanders can forego detailed planning, extensive re- hearsals, and significant changes in task organization. Their prior self-development, training, and experience allows them to assess and create overwhelming combat power at decisive points. For example, an attacking battalion task force encountering enemy security elements just moving into position can conduct actions on contact to destroy these elements without the loss of momentum. Actions on contact are a series of combat actions, often conducted nearly simultaneously, taken on contact with the enemy to develop the situation. Friendly commanders determine what must be done to preserve combat power and create conditions for success. 4 =f a Eg os Ss | = ir Every military decision includes risk. Commanders exercise judgement when deciding where to accept risk. As shown in figure 1-1, commanders have several techniques available to reduce the risk associated with a lack of information and in- telligence in a specific operation. Some of these techniques for reducing risk require the commitment of additional resources. Deciding what resources to divert to reduce risk is part of the art of tactics. In general terms, risk is the exposure of someone or something valued to danger, harm, or loss. Risk is an expression of the probability and implications of an activity or event, with positive or negative consequences tak- ing place. It is a measure of the likelihood of something going right or wrong, and the associated impact, good or bad. Risk Reduction Factors Less information More information and intelligence and intelligence Tr X More uncertainty Less uncertainty More risk to force Less risk to force Commander employs: Commander employs: + More reconnaissance and + Smaller reconnaissance and surveillance surveillance + Larger reserve + Smaller reserve Fewer security formations Faster speed of operations More distributed operations + More security formations + Slower speed of operations + Less distributed operations Ref: ADP 3-90 (Jul ‘19). Figure 1-1. Risk reduction factors. Because risk is part of every operation, it cannot be avoided. Commanders analyze risk in collaboration with subordinates to help determine what level of risk exists and how to mitigate it. When considering how much risk to accept with a COA, command- ers consider risk to the force and risk to the mission against the perceived benefit. See following page for overview of the risk management process from ATP 5-19. (Tactical Fundamentals) I. The Art & Science of Tactics 1-11Ref: ATP 5-19 (w/Change 1), Risk Management (Apr ‘14), chap. 1 Risk Management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission ben- efits. (JP 3-0) The Army no longer uses the term “composite risk management.” Term replaced with joint term “risk management.” 1. Identify the hazards 5. i 2. Supervise and evaluate Assess the hazards 3. Develop controls and make risk decisions 4. Implement controls Ref: ATP 5-19, fig. 1-1. A cyclical, continuous process for managing risk. 1. Identify the hazards hazard is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. Hazards exist in all environments—combat operations, stability operations, base support operations, training, garrison activities, and off-duty activities. The factors of mission, enemy, ter- rain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) serve as a standard format for identification of hazards, on-duty or off-duty. 2. Assess the hazards This process is systematic in nature and uses charts, codes and numbers to present a methodology to assess probability and severity to obtain a standardized level of risk. Hazards are assessed and risk is assigned in terms of probability and severity of adverse impact of an event/occurrence. 3. Develop controls and make risk decisions The process of developing and applying controls and reassessing risk continues until an acceptable level of risk is achieved or until all risks are reduced to a level where benefits outweigh the potential cost. 4. Implement controls Leaders and staffs ensure that controls are integrated into SOPs, written and verbal orders, mission briefings, and staff estimates. 5. Supervise and evaluate 1-12 (Tactical Fundamentals) I. The Art & Science of TacticsBr loidor-1) ll. The Army's Operational Concent Ref: ADRP 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17), chap. 1 and 3. pa c g =| Cy = c 3 = | c ADP 3-0 describes how the Army conducts operations as a unified action partner us- ing the Army's operational concept—a fundamental statement that frames how Army forces, operating as part of a joint force, conduct operations (ADP 1-01). The Army's operational concept is unified land operations. ADP 3-0 discusses the foundations, tenets, and doctrine of unified land operations, which serves as a common reference for solving military problems in multiple domains and the framework for the range of military operations across the competition continuum. It is the core of Army doctrine, and it guides how Army forces contribute to unified action. I. Unified Land Operations Unified land operations is the Army's warfighting doctrine, and it is the Army's operational concept and contribution to unified action. Unified land operations is an intellectual outgrowth of both previous operations doctrine and recent combat experi- ence. It recognizes the nature of modern warfare in multiple domains and the need to conduct a fluid mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or DSCA simul- taneously. Unified land operations acknowledges that strategic success requires fully integrating U.S. military operations with the efforts of interagency and multinational partners. Army forces, as part of the joint force, contribute to joint operations through the conduct of unified land operations. Unified land operations is the simultane- ous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action. The goal of unified land operations is to establish conditions that achieve the JFC’s end state by applying landpower as part of a unified action to defeat the enemy. Unified land operations is how the Army applies combat power through 1) simultane- ous offensive, defensive, and stability, or DSCA, to 2) seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, and 3) consolidate gains. Military forces seek to prevent or deter threats through unified action, and, when necessary, defeat aggression. II. Decisive Action Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authority tasks. Army forces con- duct decisive action. Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while syn- chronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three elements: of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines elements of DSCA and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland defense. Refer to AODS6 (w/Change 1): The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTboOk (Guide to FM/ADP 3-0 Operations & the Elements of Combat Power). Completely updated with the Jul 2019 ADPs, Chg 1 to the 400-pg AODSS includes operations (ADP 3-0), large-scale combat operations (FM 3-0 w/Chg 1), and refocused chapters on the elements of combat power: command & control (ADP 6-0), movement and maneuver (ADPs 3-90, 3-07, 3-28, 3-05), intelligence (ADP 2-0), fires (ADP 3-19), sustainment (ADP 4-0), & protection (ADP 3-37). (Tactical Fundamentals) II. The Army’s Operational Concept 1-13Decisive action begins with the commander's intent and concept of operations Decisive action provides direction for an entire operation. Commanders and staffs refine the concept of operations during planning and determine the proper allocation of resources and tasks. Throughout an operation, they may adjust the allocation of resources and tasks as conditions change. ultaneity The simultaneity of decisive action varies by echelon and span of control. Higher echelons generally have a broader focus than lower echelons when assigning re- sponsibilities to subordinates. The higher the echelon, the greater the possibility that all elements of decisive action occur simultaneously within its area of operations. At lower echelons, an assigned task may require all the echelons’ combat power to ex- ecute a specific task. For example, in some form a higher echelon, such as a corps, always performs offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil author- ity operations simultaneously. Subordinate brigades perform some combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, but they generally are more focused by their immediate priorities on a specific element, particularly during large-scale ground combat operations. Unified land operations addresses combat with armed opponents amid populations. This requires Army forces to shape civil conditions. Winning battles and engagements is important, but it is not always the most significant task in a strategic context. Shaping civil conditions with unified action partners is generally important to the success of all campaigns, and thus it is a critical component of all operations. Unified land operations span the entire competition continuum. They are conducted to support all four Army strategic roles. The relative emphasis on the various elements of decisive action vary with the purpose and context of the operations being conducted. fealty 1 = Ej ee Ey 3 oD = cE a Tasks conducted outside the United States Defense Defense Stability Stability Defense Defense Support A conducted Support of Civil Authorities SS of Civil OTe RSE Authorities Gece foueeue encase The mission determines the relative weight of effort among the elements. Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul ‘19), fig. 3-1. Decisive action. Elements of Decisive Action Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authority tasks. Army forces con- duct decisive action. Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while syn- chronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three elements of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines elements of DSCA and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland defense. See following pages (pp. 1-16 to 1-17) for discussion of the elements of decisive action. 1-14 (Tactical Fundamentals) II. The Army’s Operational ConceptOperations (Unified Logic Chart) Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul 19), Introductory figure. ADP 3-0 unified logic chart. rs = Ps 0 ig ry Pa Ese) 59 conduct of fat operatons i Peon Unified Action The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). + ‘Operational USS. Army strategie roles in support of the joint force Environment Win human context ‘Shape Prevent Prevalin large-scale onsoliate gains land operations operational confit ‘round combat a” PMESILPT environments METT-TC + Lionopesens” Unified Land Operations (The Army's Operational Concept) The simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense Tocope win |Support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational an operational | environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and Snmy pres | consolidate gains as part of unfied action, Amy forces conduct— LH. Executed through, Eee ca) oon — rice ‘understood constructs, Operations Structure co Develop operations. Cognitvely Providea Provide basic Provide an characterized by— linktactical broad process options for _intellectual actions to for conducting visualizing and organization strategic operations» describing for common objectives | operations critical tasks Operational Operations Operational Combat toe poo Art Process Framework Power Simuitaneity Mission Endstatoand Plan ‘Aves ofoperations Warfighting command condone Aimy design funcbons Deptn io" Deop. cose a . consciéeten, + Command and Synchronization ah cnn :MOMP | mannan contol Flexatty ‘ston Decisive points Troop eading seas + Movement and ae Lines of Decisive ee combined rms Me rapere shpng ana +Intotigence Acherance tolaw lnesofefot Execute ‘poratons a otwar Tern + Sustainment °° ‘Assess Main and mney Estabish and Phasing and supporting ofr ‘maintain socurty tanaitone Information ‘create tiple Culminaton Leadership slommas for eu ‘Operatonal reach Basing Risk DSGA ~~ datansa suppor of Su auhorios MOM miltary decision-making process METETO_ mission, enemy, fora and weather, roops and support avaliable, time avalable, and civilian considerations PMESILPT poitea:rultary, economic, social, information, Infastucture, physical nvrenment, and time Us. hited Staten (Tactical Fundamentals) II. The Army’s Operational Concept 1-15fl 5 > = io = o 3 Fd aa fa errr mander's will on an enemy. The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain a physical and psycho- logical advantage. In the of- fense, the decisive operation is a sudden action directed toward enemy weaknesses and capitalizing on speed, surprise, and shock. If that operation fails to destroy an enemy, operations continue until enemy forces are de- feated. The offense compels an enemy to react, creating new or larger weaknesses the attacking force can exploit. See pp. 4-2 to 4-3 and SUTS2: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 2nd Ed (ADP 3-90) 2. Defensive Operations A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop condi- tions favorable for offensive or stability operations. Normally the defense cannot achieve a decisive victory. However, it sets conditions for a coun- teroffensive or a counterat- tack that enables forces to regain the initiative. Defensive operations are a counter to an enemy offensive action, and they seek to destroy as much of the attacking enemy operations elsewhere. Elements of Decisive Action Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul ‘19), pp. 3-3 to 3-4 and table 3-1, p. 3-2. Decisive action requires simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. 1. Offensive Operations An offensive operation is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers. Offensive operations impose the com- Offense ‘Types of Offensive Operations + Movement to contact * Attack + Exploitation * Pursuit Purposes + Dislocate, isolate, disrupt and destroy enemy forces + Seize key terrain + Deprive the enemy of resources + Refine intelligence + Deceive and divert the enemy + Provide a secure environment for stability operations Defense Types of Defensive Operations * Mobile defense + Area defense + Retrograde Purposes + Deter or defeat enemy offensive operations + Gain time + Achieve economy of force + Retain key terrain + Protect the populace, critical assets and infrastructure + Refine intelligence forces as possible. They preserve control over land, resources, and populations, and retain key terrain, protect lines of communications, and protect critical capabilities against attack. Commanders can conduct defensive operations in one area to free forces for offensive See pp. 4-2 to 4-3 and SUTS2: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. (ADP 3-90) 1-16 (Tactical Fundamentals) II. The Army’s Operational Concept3. Stability Operations A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. These operations support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government. Stability involves coercive and construc- tive action. Stability helps in building relationships among unified action partners and promoting U.S. security interests. It can help establish political, legal, social, and eco- nomic institutions in an area while supporting transition of responsibility to a legitimate authority. Commanders are legally required to perform Stability minimum-essential stabil- Stability Operations Tasks ity operations tasks when + Establish civil security controlling populated areas of operations. These include security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. See pp. 4-4 to 4-5 and TAA2: The Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & + Establish civil control + Restore essential services + Support to governance + Support to economic and infrastructure development + Conduct security cooperation Purposes | Stability SMARTbook, 2nd + Provide a secure environment Ea. (ADP 3-07) + Secure land areas + Meet the critical needs of the populace 4. Defense * Gain support for host-nation government avi « Shape the environment for interagency and Support of Civil host-nation success Authority + Promote security, build partner capacity, and provide | Defense support of civil au- access thorities is support provided + Refine intelligence by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD Defense Support of Civil Authorities Component assets, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tasks National Guard forces (when + Provide support for domestic disasters the Secretary of Defense, in + Provide support for domestic CBRN incidents coordination with the Gover- + Provide support for domestic civilian law enforce- nors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code status) in ment agencies + Provide other designated support Purposes _ response to requests for as- * Save lives sistance from civil authorities + Restore essential services for domestic emergencies, + Maintain or restore law and order law enforcement support, + Protect infrastructure and property Seances + Support maintenance or restoration of local government | for special events. (DODD + Shape the environment for interagency success 3025.18). DSCA is a task executed in the homeland and U.S. territories. It is performed to support another primary agency, lead federal agency, or local authority. When DSCA is authorized, it consists of four types of operations. National Guard forces—Title 32 or state active forces under the command and control of the governor and the adjutant general—are usually the first forces to respond on behalf of state authorities. When Federal military forces are employed for DSCA activities, they remain under Federal military com- mand and control at all times. See pp. 4-6 to 4-7 and HDS1: Homeland Defense & DSCA SMARTbook. (JP 3-28) (Tactical Fundamentals) II. The Army’s Operational Concept 1-17 c ot 5 o % x Pa este)Transitioning in Decisive Action Conducting decisive action involves more than simultaneous execution. Command- ers and staffs must consider their units' capabilities and capacities relative to each element of decisive action. Commanders consider and balance the elements while preparing their commander's intent and concept of operations. They determine which elements to accomplish simultaneously and which require phasing, whether additional resources are necessary, and how to transition emphasis from one to another, III. Unified Action Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, andior integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organiza- tions, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during theconduct of operations, Military forces play a key role in unified action before, during, and after operations. The Army's contribution to unified action is unified land operations. The Army is the dominant U.S. fighting force in the land domain. Army forces both depend upon and enable the joint force across multiple domains, including air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace. This mutual interdependence creates powerful synergies and reflects that all operations are combined arms operations, and all combined arms operations are conducted in multiple domains. The Army depends on the other Services for strategic and operational mobility, joint fires, and other key enabling capabilities. The Army supports other Services, combatant commands, and unified action partners with ground-based indirect fires and ballistic missile defense, defensive cyberspace operations, electronic protection, communications, intelli- gence, rotary-wing aircraft, logistics, and engineering The Army's ability to set and sustain the theater of operations is essential to allowing the joint force freedom of action. The Army establishes, maintains, and defends vital infrastructure. It also provides the JFC with unique capabilities, such as port and airfield opening; logistics; chemical defense; and reception, staging, and onward movement, and integration of forces. Interagency coordination is a key part of unified action. Interagency coordination is within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and participating United States Government departments and agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 3-0). A. Joint Operations Single Services may perform tasks and missions to support DOD objectives. However, the DOD primarily employs two or more Services (from two military departments) ina single operation across multiple domains, particularly in combat, through joint operations. Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces (JP 3-0). A joint force is a force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JP 3-0). Joint operations exploit the advantages of interdependent Service capabilities in multiple domains through unified action. Joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) to achieve a desired military end state. The end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives (IP 3-0). See also pp. 1-22 to 1-23. Lelhel 8 a 2 5 Fy = 5) Fa = ae a 1-18 (Tactical Fundamentals) II. The Army’s Operational ConceptB. Multinational Operations Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul ‘19), pp. 1-7 to 1-8. Alliance An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members (JP 3-0). Military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (commonly known as NATO), allow partners to establish formal, standard agree- ments. Coalition A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Nations usually form coalitions for specific, limited purposes. A coalition action is an action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually in a narrow area of com- mon interest. Army forces may participate in coalition actions under the authority of a United Nations’ resolution. Multinational operations present challenges and demands. These include cultural and language issues, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of respec- tive forces, the sharing of information and intelligence, and the rules of engagement. Commanders analyze the particular requirements of a mission in the context of friendly force capabilities to exploit the multinational force's advantages and compensate for its limitations, Establishing effective liaison with multinational partners is critical to situ- ational awareness. Multinational sustainment requires detailed planning and coordination. Normally each nation provides a national support element to sustain its forces. However, integrated multinational sustainment may improve efficiency and effectiveness. When authorized and directed, an Army theater sustainment command can provide logistics and other support to multinational forces. Integrating support requirements of several nations’ forces—often spread over considerable distances and across international bound- aries—is critical to the success of multinational operations and requires fiexibility, patience, and persistence. Refer to TAA2: Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & PE NEBP® stability SMARTbook (Foreign Train, Advise, & Assist) for further Gigi cell discussion. Topics include the Range of Military Operations (JP . 3-0), Security Cooperation & Security Assistance (Train, Advise, & Assist), Stability Operations (ADRP 3-07), Peace Operations (JP 3-07.3), Counterinsurgency Operations (JP & FM 3-24), Civil- Military Operations (JP 3-57), Multinational Operations (JP 3-16), Interorganizational Coordination (JP 3-08), and more. (Tactical Fundamentals) II. The Army’s Operational Concept 1-19 rs a i is fy PETE}