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Factors Affecting Probabilistic Judgements in Children and Adolescents
Factors Affecting Probabilistic Judgements in Children and Adolescents
Factors Affecting Probabilistic Judgements in Children and Adolescents
Author(s): Efraim Fischbein, Maria Sainati Nello and Maria Sciolis Marino
Source: Educational Studies in Mathematics , Dec., 1991, Vol. 22, No. 6 (Dec., 1991), pp.
523-549
Published by: Springer
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Studies in Mathematics
ABSTRACT. Six hundred and eighteen pupils, enrolled in elementary and junior-high-school
classes (Pisa, Italy) were asked to solve a number of probability problems. The main aim of
the investigation has been to obtain a better understanding of the origins and nature of some
probabilistic intuitive obstacles. A linguistic factor has been identified: It appears that for
many children, the concept of "certain events" is more difficult to comprehend than that of
"possible events". It has been found that even adolescents have difficulties in detaching the
mathematical structure from the practical embodiment of the stochastic situation. In problems
where numbers intervene, the magnitude of the numbers considered has an effect on their
probability: bigger numbers are more likely to be obtained than smaller ones. Many children
seem to be unable to solve probability questions, because of their inability to consider the
rational structure of a hazard situation: "chance" is, by itself, an equalizing factor of
probabilities. Positive intuitive capacities have also been identified: some problems referring to
compound events are better solved when addressed in a general form than when addressed in
a particular way.
INTRODUCTION
bilities in elementary and junior high school classes in Italy. Our strong
belief is that the introduction of a new topic must always be preceded by a
systematic psycho-didactical investigation. This is true for mathematics
education in general but it is especially true for probabilities. The cultural
environment, the ensemble of existing curricula concerning other domains,
the socio-economic level of the population, the philosophy behind the
didactical methodology etc., may have a certain impact on the children's
receptivity for the respective topic. This assertion is particularly true for
probabilities.
Just one example, mentioned to one of us by a colleague. One of his
doctoral students came from a country in which 'chance' games were very
common. This student was averse to the idea that chance events can be
expressed mathematically. In order to formalize a stochastic experience,
one has to consider only the mathematical, ideal structure of a chain of
events and to eliminate the influence which some concrete irregularities
may have. But this student was deeply convinced that, in a chance game, it
is impossible to disregard the personal ability of the gambler. This personal
ability is the core of the game. The idea of pure chance had no meaning for
this student.
The present investigation dealt with a number of concepts which we have
considered to be adequate for an introductory course on probabilities. But
for the present paper we have selected only those topics and findings which,
in our opinion, presented new aspects and which could stimulate new
interpretations referring to the intuitive background of probabilistic think-
ing. The main topics considered were: Types of events (impossible, possible
and certain events); the role of different embodiments of the same mathe-
matical structure; compound events. In most of the problems the subjects
had to consider the sample space related to a certain event. Therefore, this
may be considered the central notion to which we refer in the present
paper.
THE METHOD
The Subjects
The subjects were 618 pupils enrolled in six schools in the region of Pisa,
Italy. They represented three groups of subjects: 211 subjects in elementary
classes (grades 4 and 5), 278 subjects in junior-high school classes (grades
1, 2 and 3 without prior instruction in probabilities) and 130 subjects
(grades 1, 2 and 3) with prior instruction in probabilities. We do not have
a clear image of the nature of this instruction mainly because in Italy there
is not an established tradition of teaching probability. Elementary school,
grades 4-5, correspond to 9-11 year old pupils and junior high school,
grades 1, 2, 3, correspond to 11-14 year old pupils.
The Questionnaires
The Procedure
RESULTS
The results are exposed and analyzed successively for each pair of parallel
questions. The terms "correct" and "incorrect" are sometimes used in the
text. We are aware that such a distinction is not an absolute one. Children,
as well as adults, possess representations and interpretations which have to
be respected in their own right, which have their reasons, and may be
adequate in certain situations. But in order to avoid the terms "correct"
and "incorrect" we would have to often repeat long explanations which
would lengthen the paper and make reading more difficult. "Correct"
means simply what is usually accepted in a standard probability text-book.
On the other hand, one has to take into account that, sometimes,
children give apparently "correct" answers for wrong reasons. The paper
copes with this difficulty by presenting the main types of justifications the
subjects offer for their answers.
In question Al, we have considered the rolling of a die and the subjects
were asked to indicate whether the event of obtaining a certain number is
impossible, possible or certain. The events considered were: (a) An even
number; (b) a number smaller than 7; (c) a number bigger than 6; (d) a
number bigger than 0; (e) the number 5.
In question BI, one has considered the tombola game with numbers
from 1 to 90 and, as above, the subjects had to indicate whether the events
of obtaining a certain number was impossible, possible or certain. The
numbers mentioned were: (a) An odd number; (b) a number smaller than
91; (c) 100; (d) a number bigger than 0; (e) 31.
Looking at the data (see Tables IA and IB) the following remarks can be
made: At both age levels the majority of pupils identify adequately possi-
ble, impossible and certain events. The meaning of these terms are the
following in our framework. "Possible: 0 < P(E) < 1; "Impossible":
P(E) = 0; "Certain": P(E) = 1. There is a slight improvement with age at
all items. It seems that, for most items, instruction had a positive effect, but
this effect is slight and rather inconsistent. The most surprising result is that
TABLE IA
Possible, impossible and certain events. The symbol (P) stands for: "With previous probability
instruction". Percentages of various categories of answers
Items a b c d e a b c d e a b c d e
The
expected
answer Ps C IMP C Ps Ps C IMP C Ps Ps C IMP C Ps
No
answer 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.9 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 0 1.5 0 1.5 0
Correct 89.2 62.7 82.3 81.4 86.3 95.0 71.2 84.2 89.9 88.5 96.9 84.6 98.5 92.3 98.5
Incorrect 8.8 35.3 15.7 16.6 11.7 4.3 28.1 14.4 8.7 10.1 3.1 13.9 1.5 6.2 1.5
TABLE IB
Items a b c d e a b c d e a b c d e
The
expected
answer Ps C IMP C Ps Ps C IMP C Ps Ps C IMP C Ps
No
answer 4.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.7 1.4 2.2 1.4 2.2 2.9 1.5 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
Correct 79.8 55.0 94.4 69.7 70.6 85.6 63.3 93.5 77.7 78.4 92.3 63.1 92.3 76.9 86.1
Incorrect 15.6 42.2 2.8 27.5 25.7 13.0 34.5 5.1 20.1 18.7 6.2 33.8 4.6 20.0 10.8
the category of questions which yielded the lowest rates of adequate answers
according to the above definition is that referring to certain events. To a
question like: "By rolling a die, does one obtain a number smaller than 7?",
only 63% of junior high school subjects who got an elementary instruction
in probabilities, answered adequately: "The event is certain".
We are used to thinking that the concept of "possible" is the most sophis-
ticated one and that, for younger children, it is the logic of "yes" and "no"
which is the only one that makes sense. It seems that the concept of certitude
is much more complex than expected, while that of possible develops earlier!
Our explanation is that, usually, one tends to relate the notion of
"certain" to that of "uniqueness". As an effect of introducing the idea of
multiplicity of possible results, the notion of possible comes naturally into
mind. But there is a certain nuance which has to be taken into account.
When asking: "Will one get a number bigger than 0?" the percentages of
answers "the event is certain" are much higher (always higher than 80
percent). In this case too, a certain event is associated with a multiplicity of
possible outcomes. The only explanation we have found is that "bigger
than 0" appears to the child as a totality - a kind of unity. One does not
need to envisage a repertoire of possibilities (which would lead to the idea
of multiplicity). The "totality" is suggested, directly, without any analysis.
Justifications
The following symbolism is used for indicating the grade to which the
quoted subjects belong: E means "elementary" classes (4 or 5). For
"It is possible", says a child, "because it is probable that one may obtain
also the number 3" (E4). That is, every number (between one and six) may
be obtained. The certain totality is decomposed in the child's mind into a
number of possibilities.
The same idea, but expressed differently: "It is possible, because the
numbers begin with 1 and end with 6" (E5), or "It is possible because with
a die one may obtain the 6 or 5 or any other number smaller than 7" (ES).
With regard to the question referring to a number smaller than 91 (the
tombola problem): "It is possible because, among all the numbers, one
may obtain 87, 76, 74..." (E4)..
In fact the whole problem of the concepts "possible, impossible, certain"
is psychologically more complex. Many children identify "rare" with
impossible. "Will one obtain 31?" (in the tombola game). "It is impossi-
ble", answers the child, "because the probability is very small" (E4). Or:
"It is impossible, because among 90 numbers there is only one 31" (Ml).
"Is it possible to get 5 when rolling a die?" "It is impossible", says the child
"because it is only one probability among 6" (M3). "It is impossible
because someone believes that he will win and afterwards it does not come
out" (M2). Impossible identified with uncertain: "Will one obtain an even
number?" "It is impossible because one cannot be sure" (E4).
We have seen, so far, that some of the children tend to identify "certain"
with "possible" but the reverse may also occur. "Will one obtain the 31?"
"It is certain because in the tombola there is 31" (E5). "Will one obtain an
even number?" "It is certain because from 1 to 90 there are even and
uneven numbers" (M2). Children also tend to substitute mathematical
meanings with subjective expectations: "If an event is rare, according to my
experience, it will not occur", affirm some children. On the other hand, "If
(for instance) 31 may occur then it should occur to somebody, why should
it not be myself?" (M3).
The main didactical recommendation, following from the above findings,
is that it should not be taken for granted that children understand
spontaneously the meaning of the terms "impossible", "possible" and
"certain". Children have to be trained to distinguish between rare and
TABLE IIA
Throwing 3 dice simultaneously or successively. (Percentages) For the two types of unequal
probabilities see the text.
TABLE IIB
Tossing 3 dice simultaneously or successively. (Percentages) For the two types of unequal
probabilities see the text.
* "3 (coins) x one time ("una volta") = 3 (times) one coin" (M3).
* "It is not important whether I toss the coins in different moments
or in the same moment, in both cases there is the same probability"
(MP3).
It is important to use the type of questions mentioned here in the
instruction process. From our results one may conclude that there are
many children, even in junior high school classes, who do not detect the
identical mathematical structure in practically different situations. What the
child does not understand is that the situations have to be considered as
mere embodiments for ideal experiments, that mathematics deals with
ideal, abstract operations and entities. To teach the child that probability is
a branch of mathematics and, consequently, it has to do with abstract
ideal, formally defined objects - like geometry or arithmetic - is one of the
main tasks of the instruction process. Comparing different embodiments of
identical mathematical structures is an effective procedure for attaining that
aim, not only formally, but also intuitively. The affirmation that mathemat-
ics deals with abstract, ideal, formally defined objects does not imply that
mathematics deals with objective, eternally fixed entities. Mathematics has
an historical character and mathematical concepts are, in fact, psychologi-
cally conditioned. Definitions and interpretations change. But it is generally
accepted today that every mathematical theory is based on a system of
axioms explicitly formulated. Axioms may be replaced with the condition
that they will not lead to contradictions. As mentioned above, the terms
"correct" and "incorrect" used sometimes in the present text have only a
relative character. As a matter of fact, we see the process of learning and
understanding as a reciprocal process of communication between a referent
situation and the mathematical structure. "Any theory", says Feller, "nec-
essarily involves idealization, and our first idealization concerns the possi-
ble outcomes of an 'experiment' or 'observation'. If we want to construct
a model, we must at the outset reach a decision about what constitutes
a possible outcome of the idealized experiment" (Feller, 1960, p. 8). For
example: "When a coin is tossed, it does not necessarily fall head, or tail:
it can roll away or stand on its edge. Nevertheless, we shall agree to regard
'head' and 'tail' as the only possible outcomes of the experiment" (Feller,
op. cit., p. 7).
The child who learns about probabilities has to get used to this type
of idealization process, governed by formal conventions as it happens
in other branches of mathematics, and first of all in geometry. The
terms "correct" or "incorrect" used sometimes in the present text
have their meaning established with regard to such commonly accepted
conventions.
Questions A3 and B3
"Let us consider the rolling of two dice. Is it more likely to obtain 5 with
one die and 6 with the other, or 6 with both dice? Or is the probability the
same in both cases?"
"When tossing two coins which result is more likely: to get 'head' with one
coin and 'tail' with the other, or to get 'head' with each of the two coins;
or is the probability the same for both results?"
One might assume that some children have considered the pairs as
ordered pairs and then the correct answer would be that the couples (5, 6)
and (6, 6) are equiprobable. This is also true for the couples (H, T) and
(H, H). But this was never the case. Analyzing the justifications, it became
clear that no order was considered and that the very frequent "equiprob-
able" type of answer was mostly justified by the effect of chance or by
considering separately the two elements 5 and 6 or H and T.
The first of the two problems has also been used by Lecoutre and
Durand (1988). They discovered that most of the subjects answered,
incorrectly, that the two events have the same probability and that this bias
is very resistant. Various attempts to change it did not have a significant
effect (for instance, coloring the two dice differently). Lecoutre and Durand
identified a number of "models" used by the subjects to justify their
answers. In the case of the answer "the two probabilities are different"
Lecoutre has found justifications like: "It is more seldom to obtain twice
the same result", but also a correct combinational type of justification
("Because there are more possibilities with the other combinations than
with the doubles") (Lecoutre and Durand, op. cit., p. 364).
With regard to the answers of the type "the same probability" Lecoutre
and Durand also mention some patterns ofjustifications: "It is a hazard guess
in both cases", "The dice are thrown at the same time" or "The two results
(5 or 6), have the same chance" (ibid.). Let us now come to our findings.
TABLE IIIA
Comparison between P(6, 6) vs. P(5, 6 and 6, 5). (Percentages) For the two types of miscon-
ceptions see the text.)
TABLE IIIB
Comparison between P(H, H) vs. P(H, T and T, H). (Percentages) For the two types of
misconceptions see the text.
In Table IIIA - Type I means: same probability for obtaining the couple
(6, 6) or the couple (5, 6).
Type II: The couple (6, 6) is more likely.
For Table IIIB - Type I: The couples HT and HH are equiprobable.
Type II: It is more likely to get the couple HH.
The percentages of the two types of misconceptions are calculated on the
basis of the total number of errors.
Inspecting Tables IIIA and IIIB one can clearly see that only a small
proportion of answers indicate that the probabilities are different. We deal
here with a well-known misconception. The two outcomes (either 6, 6
and 5, 6 or TH and HH) are considered equivalent at all age levels by
most of the subjects without, as we said above, implying a given order.
There is also no improvement with instruction. On the contrary, there
are less correct answers in older children who received a certain instruc-
tion than in younger children who did not receive any instruction in
probabilities!
Our first explanation of this finding was that there is no natural intuition
for evaluating the probability of a compound event. As a matter of fact,
things seem to be much more complex, as one will see later on when
considering other types of compound events (which reveal the existence of
a natural intuition in this respect!).
With regard to the presently discussed problem, one deals with a special
type of compound event. Lecoutre and Durand refer to the term "echange-
abilite" considered to be more fundamental than the notion of indepen-
dence and which may explain the above bias. It seems that, naturally, the
various possible orders of a set of elementary results are not counted
separately (for instance HT and TH or 5-6 and 6-5) when defining the
magnitude of the sample space. It is this special type of compound event
based on order which is intuitively deficient.
Analyzing the nature of the misconceptions, one can see that almost all
of these answers affirm that the two outcomes have the same probability.
The idea that the probability of the couple 5-6 (the order being indifferent)
is twice that of 6-6 can be reached only by getting some representation of
the corresponding sample space. The basic justification offered by the
children is that, in both cases, one deals with chance events. "The probabil-
ity is the same because one may obtain 6-6 and 6-5 or none of these
results" (E4). "In my opinion the probability is the same because the
obtained number is a surprise" (E4). "The probability is the same because
there is the same number of 6 and of 5 in both dice" (M2). "The same,
because one cannot know which faces one will obtain with both dice"
(M1). "The probability is the same, because one cannot determine some-
thing which depends only on the motion of a small object like a die, which
is thrown by each person in a different manner" (M3).
It is interesting to consider also the justifications given by junior high
school pupils who received a certain instruction in probabilities. By consid-
ering these justifications, one can learn something about why these students
gave lower percentages of correct answers than younger ones without
instruction.
"Each die is independent from the other. The probability that with one die,
one will obtain a certain number is 1/6 and it is the same probability that
one will obtain the same number with the other" (MP3).
It is clear that this student has been taught probabilities. He used the
basic notions he has been taught: the concept of independence and the fact
that the six faces are equiprobable. Combining these two ideas and
considering the two possible outcomes 5 and 6 separately (simple events)
one comes to the conclusion that the couples, 5-6 and 6-6 have the same
probability!
Two main ideas are then used to justify the equality of the probabilities
of getting 6-6 and that of getting 5 and 6: (a) The more primitive idea that
both events are the effect of chance and therefore there is no reason to
expect one more than the other; and (b) The more sophisticated idea that
5 and 6 are equiprobable and therefore every event, representing a binary
combination of them, has the same probability.
On the other hand, most of the subjects who affirm that the couple (6, 6)
or the couple (H, H) are less probable do so because they consider that
identical results appear less often than different results:
One has also to mention that some of the 13 to 14 year old pupils, who
received some instruction in probabilities, were able to find the correct
answer and to justify it correctly:
"It is more probable to obtain a 5 and a 6 because there are two poss-
ibilities (5, 6) and (6, 5) while (6, 6) represents only one possibility" (MP3).
"It is more probable to obtain an H and a T because one may obtain with
one coin H and with the other T and vice versa" (MP3).
Questions A4 and B4
"One rolls two dice. Which is more probable: to obtain the same number
with both dice, or different numbers?"
"One tosses two coins. Which is more likely: to obtain the same face with
both coins or different faces? Or is the probability the same?"
TABLE IVA
Two dice. The probability to get the same number compared with the probability to get
different numbers. (Percentages). See the text for the two types of misconceptions
TABLE IVB
Two coins. The probability to get the same faces compared with the probability to get
different faces. (Percentages). See the text for the two types of misconceptions
The results are expressed in Tables IVA and IVB. Explanations for the
two main types of misconceptions:
"It is more likely to obtain different numbers because one seldom obtains
the same numbers" (ES).
Multiplicative Evaluations
"It is more likely to obtain different numbers because, in order to get equal
numbers, we have 6 possibilities but for obtaining two different numbers
one has 30 possibilities" (MP3).
"The probability is the same because the results cannot be predicted" (M2).
"The probability is the same because one may obtain either the same or
different faces" (E5).
"The probability is the same because one may obtain HT, HH, TH, TT"
(MP3). The same pupil gave the erroneous answer: "The same probability",
also to the corresponding specific question. It is the generality of the
(a) Some of the subjects possess the capacity to evaluate intuitively the
magnitude of the sample space corresponding to a stochastic experi-
ment.
(b) This intuitive capacity improves spontaneously with age.
(c) This capacity is aroused by generalized forms of questions (which
evoke the idea of multitude).
(d) The proportion of correct evaluations of sample spaces (when comparing
probabilities) is greater if the sample space is richer (better results were
obtained with the dice than with the coins in the A4 and B4 problems).
Two other pairs of questions of a different type are also devoted to the
concept of compound event. In these questions, sums of couples of
numbers obtained by throwing two dice are considered. One hypothesis
was that the magnitude of the sum considered may play a role in determin
ing the probability estimation. More specifically, we supposed, initially,
that, intuitively, the naive subject would bet on greater sums (bigger
numbers) no matter the magnitude of the corresponding sample space.
This was based on the more general assumption that in naive subjects
the notion of sample space does not develop itself spontaneously. As we
have already seen, this assumption has been contradicted by some of our
findings.
The two pairs of questions whose analysis follows explore the same
problem with different means.
Questions AS and BS
Question AS: "Considering the sum of the points obtained when rolling a
pair of dice, will you bet on 3 or on 6? Why?"
Question B5: "Considering the sum of the points obtained when rolling a
pair of dice, would you bet on 7 or on 10? Why?"
TABLE VA
Two dice. Comparison between the probabilities to get the sums 3 and 6. (Percentages). For
the two types of errors, see the text
TABLE VB
Two dice. Comparison between the probabilities to get the sums 7 and 10. (Percentages). For
the two types of errors see the text
"I will bet 6 because, in the case of 3, one wins only with I and 2, while in
the case of 6 one wins with 1 and 5, 4 and 2, 3 and 3" (MP3).
This child has certainly an intuitive idea of the role of the magnitude of
the sample space, but he considers only a part of it (that is, without
considering the order as a factor of differentiating outcomes).
There are also a few cases of children who were able to indicate all the
possible outcomes which constitute the expected event.
"(I bet) on 6 because it may be obtained from more numbers, that is: 1 and
5, 4 and 2. . ." (and the child mentions all the possibilities) (ES).
"The 10, because in order to get 7 one has only 4 and 3, and 3 and 4 while
for 10 one has 5 and 5, 6 and 4, 4 and 6" (MP3).
(a) The child indicates the bigger number without any reference to the
constitutive outcomes.
(b) The child indicates only some of the possible outcomes, which leads
him to an erroneous evaluation.
(c) The child decribes all the possible pairs but does not understand that
each pair of different numbers has to be considered twice, that is
considering the order too.
(d) The child is able (even spontaneously) to imagine all the possible
outcomes, and consequently, to conclude correctly.
Some of the answers point to the equality of the possibilities. In this case,
the child refers only to the general ideas of chance and good luck.
Questions A6 and B6
Question A 6. Luca and Paolo play with a pair of dice. If the sum of the
points is 3, Luca is the winner. If the sum of the points is 11, Paolo is the
winner. Which of the following answers seems to you to be the correct one?
Why?
TABLE VIA
Two dice. Comparison between the probabilities to get the sums 3 and 11. (Percentages). For
the two types of errors see the text
TABLE VIB
Two dice. Comparison between the probabilities to get the sums 2 and 12. (Percentages). For
the two types of errors see the text
(the chances are equal) increases with age but not as an effect of instruc-
tion. The younger subjects and those who possess some experience with
probabilities gave less than 50% correct answers.
With question B6, the situation is different. Very few subjects do not
answer at all. The percentage of correct answers increases with age, and in
all three groups more than half of the subjects answered correctly.
Considering the results obtained with both questions, it is obvious that
the magnitude of the numbers is a decisive factor of the choice. Two
questions have to be answered: (a) Why do the subjects prefer the bigger
number? (b) Why is the second problem easier?
Some of the subjects refer to the pairs of numbers the sum of which is 3
and 11 respectively.
"They have the same chances: Luca must obtain (2,1) and Paolo (5,6)"
(MP3).
Almost all of these subjects who consider correctly the numbers 1 and 2
and 5 and 6 respectively do not see that each pair has to be considered
twice. Again, there is no natural intuition supporting the idea that each
pair is in fact a compound event. But the range of explanations is richer:
"Luca and Paolo have the same chance because one does not know which
number one will get" (E5).
"The chance is the same because 3 is too low and 11 is too high" (M3).
"Paolo has a higher chance because he has the bigger number" (E4).
"Paolo is advantaged because with two dice one obtains almost always
numbers bigger than 3" (MI).
"Paolo is advantaged: in fact, for Paolo 1 and 10, 2 and 9, 3 and 8, 7 and
4, 6 and 5, 5 and 6, 4 and 7, 3 and 8, 2 and 9, 1 and 10; for Luca 2, 1 and
1, 2" (MP3).
"Paolo is more advantaged because with dice it is more likely to obtain big
numbers" (MP3).
There are two main types of justifications for the choice of the bigge
number: (a) Some of the subjects simply chose the bigger number beca
"it is bigger"; (b) Others try to identify the pairs which would yield 11
forget the limitation imposed by the conditions of the game (the 6 being
the biggest possible number). We suppose that even those subjects who,
without explaining, chose the number 11 as being more likely, have in fact
in mind, tacitly, the multiplicity of possible combinations (but also forget-
ting the specific limitations of the dice game).
Although the two questions A6 and B6 are apparently similar, the results
obtained are different: higher percentages of correct answers ("the proba
bilities are equal") have been obtained with question B6 as compared with
question A6. A plausible explanation seems to be the following. In question
B6, the two numbers considered are 2 and 12, which may be obtained only
in one way (I + I and 6 + 6). This makes easier the task of producing
(tacitly or explicitly) the corresponding sample spaces (what Tversky and
Kahneman call "the heuristic of availability" (1973)). Let us consider some
examples referring to correct answers:
"The probability is the same because with the two dice, one may obtain
12(6 + 6) and 2(1 + 1)" (ES).
"The same probability, because by rolling two dice, one may get 2 as one
may get 12" (E4).
The main justification for the incorrect choice of 12 is based on the idea (as
it was for question A6) that 12 may be obtained as a result of more possible
combinations than 2. That is, in this case too, the subjects forget the
constraints imposed by the dice game.
"Piero has the bigger chance because 2 may be obtained only with two equal
numbers while 12 may be obtained also with different numbers" (M2).
"Piero has the advantage because 2 is obtained only with (1, 1) while 12
has more possibilities to be obtained: (6, 6) (8, 4), (7, 5), (3, 9)" (MP3).
There were also a few subjects who forgot completely the conditions of
the game and simply considered that the higher number always wins.
"Piero has the advantage because in a dice game if one has 10 more points
you are absolutely sure to win" (M2).
But beyond the effect of these factors - except the last one - one may
postulate the existence, in naive subjects, of an intuitive capacity to
evaluate the magnitude of the sample space corresponding to a certain
stochastic experience. This finding corroborates those related to formerly
analyzed questions (in which the subjects were asked to compare the
probabilities of obtaining identical versus different results when rolling a
couple of dice or tossing two coins).
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