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1.4 Re-Representação e Informação Emergente em Três Casos de Resolução de Problemas
1.4 Re-Representação e Informação Emergente em Três Casos de Resolução de Problemas
DONALD PETERSON
University o/Birmingham
1. Introduction
An interesting case of creative thought is to be found in problem solving through
re-representation. We are presented with a problem in its original representation,
in which condition it is laborious if not impossible to find a solution, and we then
discover a new way of formulating the problem which renders it dramatically easier
to solve.
The phenomenon is well recognised. As Holyoak (1990) puts it "People do not
always simply establish a representation of a problem and then perform search;
rather, they sometimes change their representation in major ways". As Boden
(1990: 94) puts it "In general, problem solving is critically affected by the rep-
resentation of the problem that is used by the problem-solver". Re-representation
has been advocated as a practical technique in mathematical problem solving (polya,
1948), and the Gestalt school of psychology has given particular attention to the
're-structuring' of problems prior to their solution (Duncker, 1945; Ohlsson, 1984;
see also Boden, 1987: 333-344).
It might seem natural to characterise such re-representations as 're-description
of problems under useful new concepts'. The purpose of the present chapter is to
investigate the question whether this characterisation is adequate. To this end we
examine three problems and possible solutions through re-representation, and we
answer our question in the negative. The re-representations considered do crucially
involve the introduction of useful new concepts, but they also crucially involve
extra 'emergent information' which can be calculated once the new concepts are
introduced (and which in some cases is then built into a diagram). It is the presence
of this emergent information, and the calculation which generates it, which make
the cases below more than re-descriptions under new concepts.
The Four Knights Problem is initially presented as follows. Given the chess con-
figuration in Figure I, the task is to find the minimum number of standard knight's
moves necessary to interchange the positions of the black pair and the white pair
of knights, within the constraints of the nine square board.
81
T. Dartnall (ed.), Artificial Intelligence and Creativity, 81-92.
© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
82 DONALD PEI'ERSON
G H ·1
We look first at the situation of a single knight. We define a state to be the positioning
'of the knight on a square of the board. Thus the set of states is: {A, B, C, D, E,
F, G, H, I}. Where a single knight's move allows transition from a state S to a
state T, we say that S has access to T, and notate this as 'a(S, T)'. The access
relation is symmetrical, that is, a( S, T) ¢} aCT, S). We define a route as a series
of states such that each state has access to the next.
The circular structure will constrain the movements of four knights, just as it
constrains the movements of one. Thus, using our new information, we can re-
represent the Four Knights Problem diagrammatically in the manner of Lauriere
(1990: 47) as in Figure 2.
In the diagram, a knight can move to one or other of its adjacent positions, and
our task is to find the length of the shortest sequence(s) of moves required to change
the present configuration into one in which points G and I are occupied by white
knights, and points A and C are occupied by black knights. All that is required is
to move each knight in sequence one position in a clockwise direction, continuing
until the goal state is reached. This will involve sixteen individual knight's moves.
Variations on this procedure are possible, but it is clear that they will not reduce the
number of moves required. The answer to the problem, therefore, is •sixteen' .
A B C
D E F
G H I
Although easy to state, the problem in this form has a large search-space of 9!
(362,880) and is by no means easy to solve. However, by using a method originally
devised by Sloman (1989: xxiii-xxiv) we can re-represent the problem so as greatly
to reduce its search space.
In looking for useful new concepts we abstract away from the physical represen-
tation of the grid. We notice that it constitutes a set of 8 triples of slots (the rows,
columns and diagonals of the grid), with an intersection pattern. And we notice that
each slot belongs to a given number of triples. For example, the slot A belongs to
three triples: (A, B, C), (A, E, I) and (A, D, G). The number of triples to which a
slot belongs we call its level.
When a number is assigned to a slot in a triple, the other slots in the triple
will have to be filled in accordance with the '15 constraint', and so we define a
completion pair of a number n to be a pair of numbers (different to each other and
different to n) between 1 and 9 which together with n add up to 15. And the number
of completion pairs a number has we again call its level.
We notice that if a number is to be allocated to a slot, then it must have enough
completion pairs to fill up all the triples in which that slot occurs. So we have
the levels constraint: in allocating a number to a slot, the number's level must be
greater than or equal to the slot's level.
On the basis of the above we now calculate the levels of the slots, and the completion
pairs and levels of the numbers 1 to 9.
Again, this information concerning levels and completion pairs is additional and
emergent relative to the initial representation.
RE-REPRESENTATION AND EMERGENT INFORMATION 85
The re-representation of the problem comprises the two tables above, together with
the levels constraint. We pick a slot and allocate a number to it, consistently with
the levels constraint. We then fill up whatever rows, columns and diagonals the
slot belongs to by using the number's completion pairs, consistently with the levels
constraint. We carry on, observing the levels constraint and the '15' constraint, and
backtracking if necessary, until the grid is complete, and the result will be a magic
square. If we start by filling the middle slot E, there is only one choice, namely
5, and the remainder of the task is simply to allocate the four relevant completion
pairs appropriately.
The initial representation of the problem is as follows. Three missionaries and three
cannibals have to cross a river, from the left to the right bank. They have a boat
which can take one or two people (any person or pair of people from among the
86 DONAlD PETERSON
six). However, if at any time, on either bank, the cannibals outnumber the mis-
sionaries, the latter will be eaten. So the problem is to find the shortest sequence(s)
of crossings which will get them allover the river safely.
Again, we may find solutions to the problem by experiment with such things
as cutlery on a table. However it is not easy to see whether the sequences of
river crossings we find are of minimum length. We look therefore for a helpful
re-representation of the problem.
The table indicates that a given state in the left-hand column has access by single
L-transitions to those states in the middle column, and by single R-transitions to
those states in the right-hand column.
Again, to state the obvious, this new information is calculated and presented
using new concepts. The initial representation of the problem concerns missionaries,
cannibals, a river and a boat, while the above table concerns states and transitions.
As a first re-representation of the problem, we can simply use our extra information
as stated in the table itself.
At each stage in constructing a route from our start state s( 3, 3) to our goal state
s(O, 0), we look up the states to which the current state has access. We follow the
constraint that we alternate between the L-transition and the R-transition columns
of the table (just as the boat alternates in direction of crossing). We record the states
visited, and we use this as a record of the route, and as data for checking for loops
in it. A loop occurs if transformations of the same type (L or R) are applied to the
same state twice, and in this case we backtrack to find alternative transitions. In
this way we discover that there are just four loop-free routes, each involving twel ve
states and eleven transitions, and so the answer to the problem is 'eleven'.
1 The original diagram gives all states, but nol all transitions.
88 DONALD PETERSON
illegal states, hollow arrow heads indicate R-transitions, and filled arrow heads
indicate L-transitions (two arrow heads being placed on the same shaft).
The task is now to find the shortest sequence(s) of arrows of alternating type
from 3,3 to 0,0 in the diagram. This can be done by 'pivoting' on arrow heads of
the same type-that is, the type of arrow head used to enter a node should be the
same as that used to leave it.
The diagram expresses the same information as the preceding table, but it has
the advantage of utilising our capacities for spatial perception and reasoning. In
particular, using the diagram, it is very easy at each stage to perceive what moves
are possible.
We now try alternative definitions of states and transitions such that the boat's
position is incorporated into the definition of a state rather than that of a transition.
When there are m missionaries and c cannibals on the left bank, and the boat is in
position b we notate this state as s( m, c, b). When a transition moves m missionaries
and c cannibals (in either direction), we notate this as 't( m, c)'. When there is a
transition from state S to state T, we say that S has access to T, and we notate this
as a(S, T). The access relation is symmetrical.
The set of possible transitions is {t( 1, 0), teO, 1), t(2, 0), teO, 2), t( 1,1), t( 1,1)}.
The set of legal states is {s(O, 0, L), s(O, 0, R), s(O, 1, L), s(O, 1, R), s(O, 2, L),
RE-REPRESENTATION AND EMERGENT INFORMATION 89
s(O, 2, R),s(O, 3, L), s(O, 3, R),s(I, 1, L), sCI, 1, R),s(2, 2, L), s(2, 2, R),s(3, 0,
L), s(3, 0, R), s(3, 1, L), s(3, 1, R), s(3, 2, L), s(3, 2, R), s(3, 3, L), s(3, 3, RH.
Again, by hand or computer we can calculate the pattern of access relations as
given in the table below. We note that four of the legal states do not appear in the
table, since they are not accessible from any other legal state.
Alternatively, in the manner of Thomas (1974: 259),2 we can represent the same
information in a diagram as in Figure 4.
The task now is simply to find a route through the diagram from s(3, 3, L) to
s(O, 0, R). This is very easy, since what has been revealed is a surprisingly simple
structure, and in finding a route through it, only two choices are involved. The
diagram should be read topologically, and its 'u' shape is incidental.
2 The original diagram omits the state s(O, 1, L).
90 DONALD PETERSON
Again, the diagram expresses the same infonnation as does the preceding table,
but it allows our capacities for spatial perception and reasoning greater opportunity
to assist us. In particular, for each state, the accessible states correspond to the
spatially adjacent circles in the diagram. Spatial neighbourhood has been made to
reflect conceptual neighbourhood, and spatial neighbourhood is relatively easy to
perceive (see Freksa, 1991).
S. Discussion
S.l. USEFUL NEW CONCEPTS
It is of course true that our re-representations involve 'useful new concepts', though
a few qualifications to this are required.
The relevant concepts are useful in that they allow the generation of re-represent-
ations, which in turn render the problems much less complex to solve. To be fair,
the benefits of reduced searCh-space and reduced load on working memory have
to be balanced against the effort of producing a re-representation, and this effort
may seem especially worthwhile when the task has to be repeated often, or when
generalisation to a class of problems is achieved.
The relevant concepts are new in that they are not used in the initial problem
statements. However, they need not be altogether new, and certainly need not be
new to the person who devises the re-representation. In Boden's tenns, they need be
RE-REPRESENTATION AND EMERGENT INFORMATION 91
neither H-creative nor P-creative (Boden, 1990: 32). The application of the concepts
of states and transitions, for example, would come most easily to someone with a
knowledge of search techniques in artificial intelligence. What is 'new' about the
concepts in question, then, is their application to the problem at hand.
the same problems. Rouse Ball and Coxeter (1974: 193-221), for example, provide
several alternatives for Magic Squares. Second, what is given here is an abstract
(or 'conceptual' or 'logical') analysis which asserts that in the cases considered
the given elements are present. This is neutral regarding the manner of implemen-
tation of these elements, and to derive a concrete cognitive theory of the process
of re-representation or an algorithm for automated re-representation, it would be
necessary to decide, for example, what to assign to discrete modules, how these are
to interact, and how the elements of calculation and conceptual innovation are to
be achieved.
6. Conclusion
Problem solving through re-representation is a particular case of creative thought,
and we have addressed the question whether it is adequately characterised as 're-
description of problems under useful new concepts'. We answer the question in the
negative, since we find that in the cases considered the 'inspiration' of conceptual
change is partnered by the 'perspiration' of calculation, and the result is not just
re-description but emergent information.
Acknowledgements
For many useful comments and suggestions, I am very grateful to Ben du Boulay,
Terry Dartnall, Aaron Sloman, and in particular to Antoni Diller.
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