Set 1

1. Q: A proposal to change a provision of the 1987 Constitution has been put forth as
follows: Original Text: "The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them"
Proposed text: "The Philippines is a democratic and socialist State. Sovereignty
resides in the party and all government authority emanates from it." (2019 BAR)

(a) Is this an amendment or revision? Explain.

A: The proposal is a revision. Using the qualitative test provided in the case of
Lambino v. COMELEC, the main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish
such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount
to a revision." In this case, the proposal to change where the sovereignty resides—
from the people to the party—definitely alters the nature of the Philippine
government, thus satisfying the test. (Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153,
October 25, 2006)

(b) Briefly explain the process to revise the 1987 Constitution.

A: Any revision of the Constitution may be proposed by

1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.

The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a

constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention.

The revision shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days
after the approval of such amendment or revision. [Art XVII, Sec 1, 3 & 4, Const.]

2. Q: a. What do you understand by state immunity from suit? Explain.

b. How may consent of the state to be sued be given? Explain. (1999, 2017 BAR)

A: a. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT means that the State cannot be sued
without its consent. A corollary of such principle is that properties used by the State
in the performance of its governmental functions cannot be subject to judicial
execution.

b. Consent of the State to be sued may be made expressly as in the case of a

specific, express provision of law as waiver of State immunity from suit is not
inferred lightly (e.g. C.A. 327 as amended by PD 1445) or impliedly as when the State
engages in proprietary functions (U.S. v. Ruiz, U.S. v. Guinto) or when it files a suit
in which case the adverse party may file a counterclaim (Froilan v. Pan Oriental
Shipping) or when the doctrine would in effect be used to perpetuate an injustice
(Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360).

3. Q: Several senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines received

invitations from the Chairperson of the Senate Committees on National Defense and
Security for them to appear as resource persons in scheduled public hearings
regarding a wide range of subjects. The invitations state that these public hearings
were triggered by the privilege speeches of the Senators that there was massive
electoral fraud during the last national elections. The invitees Brigadier General
Matapang and Lieutenant Coronel Makatuwiran, who were among those tasked to
maintain peace and order during the last election, refused to attend because of an
Executive Order banning all public officials enumerated in paragraph 3 thereof from
appearing before either house of Congress without prior approval of the President to
ensure adherence to the rule of executive privilege. Among those included in the
enumeration are "senior officials of executive departments who, in the judgment of
the department heads, are covered by executive privilege." Several individuals and
groups challenge the constitutionality of the subject executive order because it
frustrates the power of the Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation under
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Decide the case. (2015 BAR)

A: Under Section 5, Article XVI of the Constitution, the President is the

Commander- in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. By virtue of this
power, the President can prevent the Brigadier General Matapang and Liutenant
Colonel Makatwiran from appearing before the Senate to testify before a legislative
investigation. (Guidani v. Senga, 2006) The provision in the Executive Order which
authorized Department Secretaries to invoke executive privilege in case senior
officials in their departments are asked to appear in a legislative investigation is
unconstitutional. It is upon the President that executive power is vested. Only the
President can make use of Executive Privilege. (Senate v. Ermita, 2006)

4. Q: Sec. 3, Art. XI of the Constitution states that "no impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
What constitutes initiation of impeachment proceedings under the provision? (2017
BAR)

A: It is initiated by the filing of a verified complaint by any member of the

House of Representatives or any citizen upon resolution of endorsement by any
member thereof. If the verified complaint is filed by at least 1/3 of all its members of
the House of Representatives, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment,
and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. [1987 Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3 (4)]

5. Q: Margie has been in the judiciary for a long time, starting from the lowest court.
Twenty (20) years from her first year in the judiciary, she was nominated as a Justice
in the Court of Appeals. Margie also happens to be a first-degree cousin of the
President. The Judicial and Bar Council included her in the short-list submitted to
the President whose term of office was about to end – it was a month before the next
presidential elections. Can the President still make appointments to the judiciary
during the so-called midnight appointment ban period? Assuming that he can still
make appointments, could he appoint Margie, his cousin? (2014 BAR)

A: NO, the President cannot make appointments to the Court of Appeals. The
President can make appointments only to the Supreme Court two months before a
presidential election until the end of his term, but not to the rest of the Judiciary like
the Court of Appeals. Under Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, vacancies
in the Supreme Court shall be filed within ninety (90) days from the occurrence of
the vacancy. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, vacancies in the lower
courts shall be filled within ninety (90) days from submission of the list of nominees.
These appointments are screened by the Judicial and Bar Council, and the process
necessarily precludes or prevents the President from making purely political
appointments to the courts, which is what is sought to be prevented by the
prohibition. (De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010)

Assuming that he can still make appointments, the President may appoint his
first cousin as Justice of the Court of Appeals. The prohibition in Section 13, Article
VII of the Constitution against appointment by the President of relatives within the
fourth degree by consanguinity or affinity does not extend to appointments to the
Judiciary.

6. Q: While Congress was in session, the President appointed eight acting Secretaries.
A group of Senators from the minority bloc questioned the validity of the
appointments in a petition before the Supreme Court on the ground that while
Congress is in session, no appointment that requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, can be made without the latter's consent, and that an
undersecretary should instead be designated as Acting Secretary. Should the petition
be granted? (2013 BAR)

A: No, the petition should not be granted. The Department Head is an alter
ego of the President and must enjoy his confidence even if the appointment will be
merely temporary. The Senators cannot require the President to designate an
Undersecretary to be the temporary alter ego of the President. (Pimentel v. Ermita,
472 SCRA 587)

7. What is the concept of expanded judicial review under the 1987 Constitution? (2015
BAR)

A: The 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political doctrine when
it expanded the power of judicial review of the court not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but
also “to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government” as stated in the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. The new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly, the Supreme Court, the power to review even the political decisions of
the executive and the legislature and declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. (Cruz, 2014)

8. Q: State whether or not the following acts are constitutional:

A law prescribing as qualifications for appointment to any court lower than the
Supreme Court, Philippine citizenship, whether naturalborn or naturalized, 35 years
of age on the date of appointment, and at least eight years as a member of the
Philippine Bar (2018 BAR)

A: The law prescribing as a qualification for appointment to any lower court

mere Philippine citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized, would be
unconstitutional with respect to appointments to collegiate courts (CA, CTA,
Sandiganbayan) because all appointees to these courts must be natural-born citizens.
(Article VIII, Section 7)

9. Q: Towards the end of the year, the Commission on Audit (COA) sought the
remainder of its appropriation from the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM). However, the DBM refused because the COA had not yet submitted a report
on the expenditures relative to the earlier amount released to it. And, pursuant to the
“no report, no release” policy of the DBM, COA is not entitled to any further releases
in the meantime. COA counters that such a policy contravenes the guaranty of fiscal
autonomy granted by the Constitution. Is COA entitled to receive the rest of its
appropriations even without complying with the DBM policy? (2014 BAR)

A: YES. COA is entitled to the rest of its appropriations even without

complying with the DBM policy. That the no report, no release policy may not be
validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed,
such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without
violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which provides: “Sec. 5. The
Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.” (CSC v. Department of Budget and
Management, July 22, 2005)

10. Q: What is the doctrine of "void for vagueness"? In what context can it be correctly
applied? Not correctly applied? Explain (2010 BAR)
A: A statute is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. It applies to both
free speech cases and penal statutes. However, a facial challenge on the ground of
vagueness can be made only in free speech cases. It does not apply to penal statutes
(Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 632
SCRA 146)