Moot Respondent 1

TEAM: GROUP 6
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE / ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
SLP(C) NO: 5236 /2022
UNDER ART 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION
In the matter of
AISHAT SHIFA (APPELANTS)
V/s
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA (RESPONDENTS)
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS
5. ISSUES RAISED
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BY THE PETITIONER IS MAINTAINABLE?
A. THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER IS NOT MAINTAINABLE
B. THE GOVERNMENT ORDER IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF PROMOTING LITERACY
AND EDUCATION AS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
2. WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN

THE ISLAMIC FAITH AND PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION? IF SO, DO STUDENTS
HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEEK PERMISSION TO WEAR A HEADSCARF TO A SECULAR SCHOOL AS A MATTER
OF THEIR RIGHT?
2.1 WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN THE
ISLAMIC FAITH AND PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
A. WEARING OF HIJAB IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTISE.
B. SECULARISM AND RELIGION
C. PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE 25 IS UNNECESSARY AS WEARING OF HIJAB IS NOT BEING A MATTER OF

FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE
2.2 WHETHER IT IS THE RIGHT OF STUDENTS TO SEEK PERMISSION TO WEAR A HEADSCARF TO A SECULAR
SCHOOL IF WEARING A HIJAB IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE?
3. WHETHER THE DIRECTION ISSUED IS VIOLATIVE OF PROVISIONS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION

OF INDIA?
3.1 WHETHER A STUDENT CITIZEN IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME IS EXPECTED TO SURRENDER HER
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER A19/21 AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR ACCESSING EDUCATION IN A STATE
INSTITUTION?
A. GOVT. ORDER IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19(1)(A)
B. GOVT. ORDER IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21

8. PRAYER

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
 AIR - ALL INDIA REPORTER

 Art -ARTICLE
 Const – CONSTITUTION
 ERP -ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTISE
 Ind -INDIAN
 Ors -OTHERS
 SC - SUPREME COURT
 SCC - SUPREME COURT CASES
 SCJ -SEALED COVER JURISPRUDENCE
 SCR - SUPREME COURT REPORTS
 SLP -SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
 Vs -VERSUS
 Gov -GOVERNMENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
 Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police Calcutta 1983 4 SCC 522.

 Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat 1974 AIR 1389, 1975 SCR (1) 173
 Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar's statement debates on Fundamental Rights in the Advisory Committee in
April 1947
 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684
 Bihar State Madarasa Education Board v. Madarasa Hanfia Arabic College
 Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments. v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt. (AIR
1954
 Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 360
 Fatima Hussain Syed v Bharath Education Society and ors AIR 2003 Bom 75
 Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp SCC 1
 Inedible Creative Private Ltd. & OR’s. V. Government of West Bengal & Ors (2020) 12 SCC 436
 Javed & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 369
 Kesavananda Bharati Sripadgalvaru and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and Anr. (1973) 4 SCC 225: AIR 1973
SC 1461
 LPA No. 196 of 2008 decided on 31.7.2008.
 M. Ajmal Khan v. The Election Commission of India, rep. by its Chief Election Commissioner, New
Delhi-I & Ors 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 794: (2006) 5 CTC 121
 Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar 1958 AIR 731, 1959 SCR 6
 Mohammed Dubai Corporal No. 781467-G v. Union of India & Ors (2017) 2 SCC 115
 Mohammed Zubair Corporal No. 781467-G v. Union of India & Ors.
 Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors (1985) 2 SCC 556
 N.K. Mohd. Sulaiman Sahib v. N.C. Mohd. Ismail Saheb & Ors., AIR 1966 SC 792
 No. 786505-N Leading Aircraftsman Ansari Aaftab Ahmed v. Union of India & Ors.
 S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram & Ors., (1989) 2 SCC 547
 S.R Bommai v. Union of India 1994 AIR 1918, 1994 SCC (3) 1
 Shayara Bano v Union of India AIR 2017 9 SCC 1 (SC)
 Shirur Mutt v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, (1954) SCR 1005
 Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors (1958 AIR 255)
 Subramainan Swamy V. Union of India, Ministry of Law and ors (2016) 7 SCC 221
 Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan (1963 AIR 1638, 1964 SCR (1) 561)
 Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India & Anr (2012) 6 SCC 1
 Union of India V. Singh, AIR 1990 SC 1098
 Valia Peedikakkandi Katheessa Umma & Ors. v. Pathakkalan Narayanath Kunhamu & Ors., AIR 1964
SC
 Young Lawyers Association (Sabarimala Temple, In Re) v. State of Kerala (2019) 11 SCC 1; 2018 (8)
SCJ 609
ARTICLES, BOOKS, COMMENTARIES, DICTIONARIES & JOURNALS
1) M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Lexis Nexis, Gurgaon, 8th edn.,2018).
2) J N. Pandey, Indian Constitutional Law (Central Law Agency 59th edn., 2018)
3) Paras Diwan, Muslim Law in Modern India (Allahabad Law Agency 2023end)
ONLINE SITES
1) Manupatra
2) Live Law
3) Bar and Bench
4) SCC Online
STATUTES
1) The Constitution of India,1950

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS, THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,

HEREBY HUMBLY SUBMIT TO THIS HON’BLE COURT’S JURISDICTION
UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UNION OF INDIA.
THE RESPONDENT WOULD LIKE TO HUMBLY SUBMIT THAT THIS SPECIAL

LEAVE FOR APPEAL IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Karnataka Education Act, 1983 passed by Government of Karnataka, specifies that all student studying
in schools and colleges within the state ought to conduct themselves in brotherly manner, outstrip their
group identity and enlarge inclinations towards social justice. The Act was enacted with a view to promote
secular outlook through education.
The Karnataka Government passed an order by exercising the power conferred to it under Section 133 of the
Karnataka Education Act, stating that all schools within the state must compulsorily adhere to the
established uniform and carrying hijab within the campus of schools may not be regarded as exception. The
impugned government order has been issued abovementioned Act.
Aishat Shifa and Tehrina Begum are second-year students at the Government Pre-University College in
Kundapura, Karnataka. They both adhere to the Islamic faith and wear the hijab, a religious headscarf.
The repercussion of the said order was that the Muslim ladies carrying the hijab was not permitted to enter
in educational institutions.
Aishat Shifa and Tehrina Begum appealed to the Deputy Commissioner of Udupi, seeking a directive from
the college authorities to allow them to continue their studies. However, the Deputy Commissioner did not
take any decisive action on their request.
Faced with this situation, the two students filed Writ Petitions before the Karnataka High Court. Initially, the
case was heard by a single judge of the High Court, who recognized its significance and referred it to the
Chief Justice for the formation of a larger bench.
Subsequently, a three-judge bench, appointed by the Chief Justice, thoroughly examined the matter and
issued an order on March 15, 2022, dismissing the Writ Petitions. This dismissal is now being challenged in
a higher court.
Hence, an appeal had been preferred before the Supreme Court against the judgement of Karnataka High
Court.

ISSUES RAISED
B. THE GOVERNMENT ORDER IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF PROMOTING LITERACY
AND EDUCATION AS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
2. WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL

RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN THE ISLAMIC FAITH AND PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF
THE CONSTITUTION? IF SO, DO STUDENTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEEK PERMISSION TO
WEAR A HEADSCARF TO A SECULAR SCHOOL AS A MATTER OF THEIR RIGHT?
2.1 WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN

THE ISLAMIC FAITH AND PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
C. PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE 25 IS UNNECESSARY AS WEARING OF HIJAB IS NOT BEING A MATTER OF

FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE
2.2 WHETHER IT IS THE RIGHT OF STUDENTS TO SEEK PERMISSION TO WEAR A HEADSCARF TO A SECULAR
SCHOOL IF WEARING A HIJAB IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE?
3. WHETHER THE DIRECTION ISSUED IS VIOLATIVE OF PROVISIONS ENSHRINED IN THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?
3.1 WHETHER A STUDENT CITIZEN IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME IS EXPECTED TO SURRENDER HER
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER A19/21 AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR ACCESSING EDUCATION IN A STATE
INSTITUTION?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is humbly submitted that the Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by the petitioner is not justifiable in the
Supreme Court due to the absence of a substantial legal question or evident injustice. The case lacks a
significant impact on the general public, making the SLP unnecessary and suggesting it should be treated as
a regular appeal. It underscores the constitutional validity of the Government Order, emphasizing that pre-
university colleges are open to students of all backgrounds. The prohibition of religious attire aligns with
Article 14's mandate of equal treatment. Additionally, the right to education remains accessible, provided
students adhere to the uniform policy. The Government Order is portrayed as consistent with the State's goal
of promoting education and equality, in line with the Constitution.
2. WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL

It is humbly submitted that the wearing of Hijabs/Headscarves by Muslim women does not constitute an
Essential Religious Practice. Rather, it is considered a cultural practice with no direct nexus to religious
doctrine. The hijab's evolution can be traced to historical socio-cultural conditions during the time when the
Quran was written, primarily as a measure to ensure the security and modesty of women. It is crucial to note
that covering one's head is not mandated as a religious obligation in the Holy Quran; it is a recommended
practice. In light of the jurisprudence established by the Supreme Court in various prior cases, essential
religious practices must adhere to specific criteria. For an act to be considered an essential religious practice,
it should meet these established indicia. Furthermore, it is essential to recognize that schools maintain their
own codes of discipline and uniform regulations that each student is required to adhere to. During school
hours, students may not assert their right to manage their religious affairs independently, as these regulations
are established to maintain order and uniformity within the educational institution.
Thus, the appellants' request to wear hijabs/headscarves should be evaluated with respect to the same and be
denied as it is not an essential religious practice.

It is humbly submitted that the concept of freedom of expression, especially in the context of wearing
uniforms in educational institutions. It recognizes that freedom of expression must be balanced with
reasonable restrictions, particularly in school settings. The Karnataka Education Act of 1983, which stresses
the importance of maintaining discipline and uniformity in educational institutions to foster holistic
development and national integration. It argues that the wearing of a uniform is a regulatory provision that
does not infringe upon freedom of expression but reinforces the right to equality. The significance of
fraternity and dignity within a secular school environment, asserting that promoting a uniform appearance
among students contributes to a sense of equality. Hence, the government's order aligns with constitutional
rights and upholds the principles of the Karnataka Education Act and secularism.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER IS

MAINTAINABLE?
It is humbly submitted that the petitioner's Special Leave Petition (SLP) is not maintainable in the Supreme
Court due to the absence of a substantial question of law or gross injustice. This case does not significantly
impact the general public's interests, rendering the SLP unnecessary. Instead, it suggests that a regular appeal
in the court suffices, as there is no manifest injustice. The order issued by the Karnataka High Court,
emphasizing the need for a uniform code for all students irrespective of their community or identity, is
deemed fully constitutional.
The submission before this Hon’ble Court contends that the Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by the
petitioner is not maintainable in the Supreme Court, primarily due to the absence of any substantial question
of law or any egregious injustice being inflicted. In this case, it is crucial to highlight that there exists no
circumstance that significantly impacts or harms the interests of the general public, thus rendering the SLP
unnecessary. It is posited that this case can be appropriately filed as a regular appeal in the court since it
does not involve any manifest injustice that would warrant the elevation to a Special Leave Petition.
The order issued by the Carnatic High Court is asserted to be fully in consonance with constitutional
principles, as it affirms the necessity for a uniform code to be followed by all students, irrespective of their
community or identity. This assertion lends support to the argument that the SLP is not warranted in this
case.
Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) represent a distinct class of appeals that may deviate from the standard
hierarchy of courts and tribunals. Article 1361 of the Indian Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court the
authority to grant Special Leave to Appeal in instances where gross injustice has been discerned in
judgments or orders delivered by any court or tribunal within the country. The Supreme Court, being the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, holds the absolute power of constitutional interpretation. SLPs are
generally entertained in cases involving substantial questions of law or where egregious injustice is
manifest.
However, in the present case, it is observed that the Islam students are contesting the purported violation of
their "derivative rights" rather than their "substantial or substantive rights." The primary contention revolves
1
Article 136 in The Constitution of India 1950
around whether students can assert their religious beliefs within a secular educational institution.
Consequently, the issues raised do not ascend to the level of constituting substantial questions of law
pertaining solely to the interpretation of the Constitution, as the right claimed by the appellants is already
enshrined in the Constitution.
Therefore, it is firmly established that if there is no infringement of substantial rights and no glaring injustice
has occurred, the Special Leave Petition should not be deemed maintainable in the Supreme Court. This
serves as a fundamental principle in ensuring the judicious allocation of the Court's resources and the
adherence to due legal process.2
B. THE GOVERNMENT ORDER IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF

PROMOTING LITERACY AND EDUCATION AS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
It is humbly submitted that the pre-university college is open to all students of all castes and religions. The
doors of such institutions are not closed to any student of any community. The object of the State is to
provide an opportunity for the students to study in the secular schools. It is for the students to avail such a
facility. If a particular student feels that she cannot compromise with the wearing of headscarf or of any
other student to wear any outwardly religious symbol, the school would be justified not to allow such
student, in the larger interest of treating all the students alike as a part of mandate of Article 14, which is
central to the theme of Part III of the Constitution. The headscarf is not permitted in the school for the
students who are studying in Class 10+1 or 10+2. The students have many years ahead of them where they
can carry on their religious faith but the Government Order mandating wearing of uniform cannot be faulted
with since the object is in tune with the principles of the Constitution.
In Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India & Anr 3 it was held that the right of
education has been read into right to life in Article 21. The argument is that a child who is denied right to
access education is not only deprived of his right to live with dignity, but he is also deprived of his right to
freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 4 The right to education is
thus a part of Article 21. The State has not put any restriction to avail such right of education. The right of
education is available to every student. The State has only regulated the right in a manner that students come
to the school to attend classes only in the prescribed uniform, and the same has been done to achieve the
statutory and constitutional goals. The students cannot assert that they have a right to education. But they
would avail such right as per their own wish and in the manner which they consider appropriate. Schools are
to prepare the students for their future endeavours in life. Discipline is one of the attributes which the
2
Union of India V. Singh, AIR 1990 SC 1098
3
Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India & Anr. (2012) 6 SCC 102
4
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
students learn in schools. Defiance to rules of the school would in fact be antithesis of discipline which
cannot be accepted from the students who are yet to attain adulthood. Therefore, they should grow in an
atmosphere of brotherhood and fraternity and not in the environment of rebel or defiance. The argument that
the school is insisting on surrendering or curtailing the right to wear a headscarf as a precondition to access
the education is not tenable as the right to education is available but only condition is that the students
should attend the classes in prescribed uniform.
The Government Order cannot be said to be contrary to the legitimate State goal of promoting literacy and
education. Article 21A5 is not applicable as all the students are over 14 years of age. The students have a
right to education under Article 21, but not of insisting on wearing something additional to the uniform, in a
secular school, as a part of their religion. In fact, the Act itself contemplates providing of opportunities and
facilities in a healthy manner and maintaining the dignity of childhood and youth so that there is no moral or
material abandonment. The uniform for the students has been prescribed.
So that there is no distinction between the students coming from diverse background and that each student
grows in an environment of equality, fairness and equal opportunities. The uniform is an equalizer of
inequalities. Therefore, prescribing uniform for children at an impressionable age is not only important but
has a salutary effect on the mental development of the child to grow in the environment of oneness. The said
object is in tune with Article 39(f)6 of the Constitution of India which reads as thus: “39(f) that children are
given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity
and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material
abandonment.”
Hence, the Government Order cannot be said to be contrary to the State goal of promoting literacy and
education as mandated under the Constitution. The Government Order only ensures that the uniform
prescribed is adhered to by the students and it cannot be said that State is restricting the access to education
to the girl students through such an Order.
2.WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL

Religious practices should not be based solely on superstitious beliefs; rather, they should be integral to the
core of a faith. The wearing of the hijab or headscarf does not constitute an 'essential religious practice'
5
Article 21A of the Indian Constitution.
6
Article 39(f) of the Indian Constitution.
within the Islamic faith. The Holy Quran does not contain explicit injunctions regarding the hijab, which is
instead rooted in cultural traditions without a direct connection to religious doctrine. Examining the
historical context illuminates the origins of the hijab, revealing its foundation in the socio-cultural conditions
prevailing during the Quran's composition. It primarily functioned as a means to ensure the security and
modesty of women, reflecting the societal norms and values of that era. Notably, covering one's head is not a
religious mandate in the Holy Quran; rather, it is a recommended practice. In accordance with legal
precedents established by the Supreme Court in various prior cases, essential religious practices must meet
specific criteria to receive constitutional protection. These criteria typically include historical religious
significance, deeply ingrained religious beliefs, and an integral connection to core religious tenets.
Furthermore, it is imperative to acknowledge that educational institutions have their own codes of discipline
and uniform regulations, which all students are obliged to follow. Within the school environment, students
cannot unilaterally assert their right to independently manage their religious affairs, as these regulations are
instituted to maintain order and promote uniformity within the educational institution.
2.1 WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL

THE CONSTITUTION?
It is humbly submitted that the act of wearing a hijab or headscarf should not be regarded as an
indispensable religious practice within the Islamic faith, and consequently, it should not fall under the
protective umbrella of Article 25 of the Constitution.7
The essential part of a religion refers to the core beliefs upon which a religion is founded, serving as the
cornerstone upon which the superstructure of the religion is built. These essential parts or practices are
integral to the very essence of a religion, and without them, the religion would lose its fundamental
character. To determine whether a particular part or practice is essential to a religion, it is necessary to assess
whether the nature of the religion itself would undergo a fundamental change in its character or belief
system without that specific part or practice. In the context of wearing a hijab, it is acknowledged that it may
constitute a practice or an ideal within the Islamic faith. However, to elevate it to the status of an essential
religious practice, additional evidence must be presented to establish that the failure to wear a headscarf
would jeopardize a person's identity as a believer in the faith.
7
Art 25 of the Indian Constitution
It's important to note that the origins of hijab can be traced back to the Arabic verb "Hajaba" which is
associated with the concept of "hiding." The word "hijab" itself does not appear in the Quran, although
commentators may have referred to it. The understanding of hijab goes beyond a mere piece of clothing; it
encompasses various dimensions, including visual, spatial, ethical, and moral aspects. In essence, hijab
serves to hide, distinguish, protect, and potentially affirm the religious identity of Muslim women. However,
when examining its religious significance, it's crucial to consider the Quran's stance. The Holy Quran does
not explicitly mandate the wearing of hijab or headgear for Muslim women. Instead, it provides
recommendations related to modesty and appropriate clothing. These recommendations are seen as non-
obligatory, as there are no prescribed penalties or punishments for not wearing hijab in the Quran. The
apparel, therefore, primarily serves as a means to gain access to public places while maintaining modesty. It
was introduced in a historical context to enhance women's security and enablement, rather than being a
figurative constraint. Verse 31 of Surah 24 of the Holy Quran is cited to support the argument that wearing a
headscarf is not inherently essential to Islamic practice. It is contended that while wearing a headscarf may
be a religious practice, it does not constitute an essential aspect of the religion, as non-compliance with this
practice would not render a believer as non-Muslim. It is humbly submitted that when determining whether
a practice is an essential religious requirement, it is essential to consider whether it is prescribed as
obligatory within the religion. If a practice is optional and not integral to the core beliefs of the faith, it
cannot be considered an essential religious practice. This principle aligns with the Indian Young Lawyers
Association's8 perspective.
The interpretation of the Holy Quran in the Hedaya had been quoted by this Court in a number of
judgments.9 For instance, in the case of Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar 10, the Court ruled that the
sacrifice of a cow was not an obligatory and essential practice within the religion of Islam, citing Surah
XXII, Verses 28 and 33, and Surah CVIII from the Holy Quran. The Court emphasized that there was no
material to establish that cow sacrifice was an obligatory religious act for Muslims, concluding that it could
not uphold the claim of the petitioners. In the case of Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors. 11, the
Court determined that Muslim Personal Law did not accommodate cases in which a divorced wife was
unable to maintain herself financially. While a subsequent statute nullified the effects of this judgment, it
underscored that the personal law was not approved by the Court. In the landmark case of Dr. M. Ismail
Faruqui & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 12 the Court clarified that offering prayer or worship is a religious
8
Young Lawyers Association (Sabarimala Temple, In Re) v. State of Kerala (2019) 11 SCC 1; 2018 (8) SCJ 609
9
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731; Valia Peedikakkandi Katheessa Umma & Ors. v.
Pathakkalan Narayanath Kunhamu & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 275; N.K. Mohd. Sulaiman Sahib v. N.C. Mohd. Ismail Saheb &
Ors., AIR 1966 SC 792; and Shayara Bano v. Union of & India Ors., (2017) 9 SCC 1.
10
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731
11
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors (1985) 2 SCC 556
12
Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 360
practice, but worship at any location is not necessarily an essential or integral part of that practice unless the
place holds particular significance to the religion. The Court noted that mosques were not considered
essential parts of the Islamic religion, as Muslims could offer prayers anywhere. In Javed & Ors. v. State of
Haryana & Ors.,13 the Court rejected the argument that marrying less than four women or abstaining from
procreating a child from each wife in the case of permitted bigamy or polygamy was irreligious or against
the dictates of Islam. The Court held that no religious scripture or authority mandated such practices as
essential.
Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police,14 Calcutta, dealt with the performance of the
Tandava dance and its religious significance. In this context, the court ruled that the Tandava dance, when
performed in public, could not be considered a religious rite. This decision highlighted that not all practices
claimed as religious rites necessarily fall under the protection of Article 25. Acharya Jagadishwarananda
Avadhuta-II emphasized that the protection guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 extends to various aspects
of religious practices, including rituals, ceremonies, and modes of worship. These protections are granted to
elements that are considered essential or integral to a religion. The determination of what constitutes an
essential or integral part of a religion should be based on the religion's doctrines, practices, tenets, and
historical background.
A practice did not become sanctified as a religious act solely because it was permitted by law. 15 The
definition of essential religious practices should primarily rely on the doctrines and beliefs of the religion
itself. It emphasized that religion encompasses more than just doctrines; it also includes various practices
considered essential for one's spiritual well-being. The Quranic principles regarding women's dress codes
focus on lowering the gaze rather than hiding the face behind a hijab. While the Quran imposes no specific
restrictions on women, the Hadiths were employed to impose stricter regulations. However, these practices
have lost their sanctity over time, and the Hadiths reflect contradictory principles compared to the Holy
Quran, diminishing the relevance of the prevailing practices. The understanding of what constitutes an
essential religious practice should consider not only legal aspects but also the intrinsic doctrines, beliefs, and
historical context of the religion. It is a nuanced perspective that respects the complexity of religious
freedom and its various expressions within diverse faiths.
Thus, from the above contentions it is evident that to be categorized as an "essential religious practice," a
practice must meet certain defining characteristics. It should possess a fundamental significance within the
religion, rooted in tradition and history. This practice should either predate the religion itself or be integral to
its origin and cultural context. Furthermore, it must serve as a cornerstone of the religion, with its
13
Javed & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 369
14
Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police (1983 4 SCC 522)
15
Shayara Bano v Union of India AIR 2017 9 SCC 1 (SC)
abandonment or alteration resulting in a substantial transformation of the faith. Additionally, it should hold a
binding and compelling nature, signifying a sense of religious obligation and duty within the community. It
is hereby contented that merely having a long history or being mentioned in religious texts is not sufficient
for constitutional protection as an essential religious practice. Since there has been no mention as to wearing
of the Hijab/Headscarf, it is not an essential religious practise. It is humbly submitted that from the above
contentions with respect to sources and precedents, wearing of Hijab/Headscarf cannot be considered as an
Essential Religious Practice.
It is humbly submitted that secularism is a foundational and enduring principle in India's polity, promoting
religious tolerance, harmony, and the equal treatment of all religions within the country's diverse society.
This principle existed even before it was formally added to the Constitution through the 42nd Amendment in
1976. India's history reflects its role as a sanctuary for numerous religions, faiths, cultures, and races that
have coexisted and thrived for centuries. The Indian leadership has historically advocated the philosophy of
accommodation and tolerance to manage the diverse cultures, languages, religions, and customs that
converged in this subcontinent. The concept of "positive secularism," as described by the Supreme Court in
various cases16, defines India's approach to secularism. Positive secularism is not opposed to religious
devotion; rather, it emphasizes religious tolerance, coexistence, and the equal treatment of all religions. It
recognizes the importance of promoting harmony and common brotherhood among people transcending
religious, linguistic, regional, and sectional diversities.
The term religion has not been defined anywhere though it has been used in the Constitution. In the absence
of the same, the term "religion" has been interpreted broadly in Indian jurisprudence. In the case of Shirur
Mutt17, the Supreme Court defined religion extensively, recognizing that it includes moral values and ethics
that regulate life. Thus, if we look in that perspective secularism is not anti-religion or pro religion thus there
cannot be protection of the same with regard to Secularism.
In Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat, 18 the Supreme Court held that Secularism neither
means anti-god nor pro-god. It just ensures that no one is differentiated on the basis of religion eliminating
the concept of God in matters of the state. Also, while dealing with the concept of ‘secularism’ in detail, the
Supreme Court in S.R Bommai v. Union of India 19explained that under the Constitution, secularism does
not mean an atheist society but a heterogeneous society providing equal status to all religions without
16
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp SCC 1
17
Shirur Mutt v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, (1954) SCR 1005
18
Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat 1974 AIR 1389, 1975 SCR (1) 173
19
S.R Bommai v. Union of India 1994 AIR 1918, 1994 SCC (3) 1
favouring or discriminating against anyone. You can never separate social life from religious life 20 reflects
the deeply intertwined nature of religion and society in India.
The State is unequivocal in its commitment not to favour or endorse any specific religion at the expense of
others. Furthermore, no citizen within the State is to receive preferential treatment or face discrimination
based solely on their religious beliefs. Essentially, an individual's religious affiliation should hold no
significance in the affairs of the State. This embodies the fundamental essence of a secular state. To reinforce
this principle, it is established that no person should display visible signs, marks, or names that would enable
others to identify their religious beliefs even through Parliamentary debates 21. Similarly, individuals should
refrain from wearing clothing that could be used to recognize their religion. This underscores the State's
dedication to maintaining a secular and unbiased stance towards matters of faith and religion within its
jurisdiction.
Justice H.R. Khanna, citing K. Santhanam's words in Kesavananda Bharati, 22 stressed the necessity of a
social revolution in India, moving away from medievalism rooted in factors like birth, religion, custom, and
community. He underscored the idea that religion should not be narrowly interpreted; instead, it should
encompass the principle of treating everyone equally. In a secular state, differences in religious beliefs and
practices are transcended, and the welfare of all citizens is pursued. From the State's perspective, every
individual is equal and entitled to equitable treatment. To fulfil constitutional promises of social justice,
religious freedom, and equality, the State must wholly disregard a person's religion, faith, or belief in its
dealings with them. Secularism extends beyond mere tolerance of religions; it represents a proactive
approach of treating all religions with parity.
In conclusion, considering the arguments and legal principles discussed, the practice of wearing a hijab
should not be considered an essential religious practice within the Islamic faith, as it aligns with India's
commitment to secularism and equal treatment of all religions.
C. PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE 25 IS UNNECESSARY AS WEARING OF HIJAB IS NOT

BEING A MATTER OF FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE
It is humbly submitted that there is no necessity for granting protection under Article 25 of the Constitution
for the wearing of a hijab or headscarf, as it is not considered an essential religious practice within the
Islamic faith. Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution establishes the fundamental right to freedom of
conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion 23. However, this right is subject to
20
Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar's statement debates on Fundamental Rights in the Advisory Committee in April 1947
21
MR. Kamat on December 3rd, 1948
22
Kesavananda Bharati Sripadgalvaru and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and Anr. (1973) 4 SCC 225: AIR 1973 SC 1461
23
Under art 25 of the constitution
certain limitations, including considerations of public order, morality, health, and other provisions of Part III
of the Constitution. Notably, the inclusion of the term "conscience" in Article 25(1) was advocated by Dr.
B.R. Ambedkar, who recognized the importance of accommodating individuals who may not adhere to any
religious faith, such as atheists, agnostics, or followers of philosophies like Charvaka.
Article 25 of the Constitution should be interpreted conjunctively. In Article 25(1), the term 'conscience'
should be broadly understood, including the use of the hijab as an expression of conscience. 'Conscience,'
'profess,' and 'practice' in Article 25(1) are interconnected, with 'practice' inherently including 'conscience.'
The article primarily aims to protect essential religious practices rather than encompassing every religious
belief or practice. The critical distinction lies in recognizing that not all religious beliefs and practices hold
equal significance within a religion's framework. The determination of what constitutes an essential part of a
religion should primarily be based on reference to the doctrine and core tenets of that particular religion.
Article 25(2)(a) of the Constitution does not grant the state the authority to regulate or interfere with every
religious practice. Instead, it specifically addresses the regulation of essential religious practices, even if
these practices may have economic, commercial, or political associations. The rationale behind this
distinction is rooted in the understanding that essential religious practices are the foundation of a religion,
forming the core beliefs upon which the entire faith is built. They are integral to the very essence of the
religion and hold a unique and profound significance. In essence, Article 25(2)(a) recognizes that religious
freedom encompasses the protection of those practices and beliefs without which a religion would lose its
fundamental character. It does not provide the state with unlimited power to intervene in all aspects of
religious practice but seeks to preserve the core identity and character of a religion from unwarranted
interference. Therefore, when assessing whether a specific religious practice merits constitutional protection
under Article 25, it is imperative to consider whether that practice is genuinely essential and fundamental to
the religion in question. This determination should be guided by the religion's doctrine and core teachings,
ensuring that the protection granted under the Constitution is extended to practices integral to the faith's
identity and character. In the case of Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors. 24, the
distinction between Article 25 and Article 26 of the Indian Constitution was clarified. Article 25 primarily
protects the rights of individuals concerning freedom of religion, while Article 26 safeguards the rights of
religious denominations. Additionally, it was emphasized that Article 26(b) should be interpreted in
conjunction with Article 25(2)(b), which addresses concerns related to public order, morality, and health.
The protection granted under Article 25 is not absolute. In cases involving religious practices, a thorough
examination may be necessary to determine whether a particular practice is genuinely of a religious
character and constitutes an integral part of the religion in question.25
24
Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors (1958 AIR 255)
25
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan (1963 AIR 1638, 1964 SCR (1) 561)
Furthermore, for protection under A25 the essential religious practice should revolve around: (i) the right to
manage places of worship, (ii) individual rights concerning places of worship, and (iii) the restriction of
fundamental rights through religious practices. The appellants' claim does not involve performing a religious
activity within a religious institution but pertains to the wearing of headscarves in public places as a social
conduct expected from believers of the faith. However, in this instance, students aim to prioritize religious
regulation over their freedom of dress choice, even though they attend a state school. Moreover, it is
essential to uphold the principle of equality before the law, which mandates the equal treatment of all
citizens, regardless of caste, creed, gender, or place of birth. In this regard, the State should not violate the
principle of equality based on religious faith. In the context of a state school, where the primary purpose is
to provide education and promote a secular and inclusive environment, prioritizing religious regulation over
students' freedom of dress choice could potentially lead to discrimination and undermine the principles of
equality and secularism that the Indian Constitution upholds.
It is humbly submitted that conscience is by its very nature subjective. Merely stating that wearing hijab is
an overt act of conscience and therefore, asking them to remove hijab would offend conscience, would not
be sufficient for treating it as a ground for granting relief. The definition of an essential religious practice
should rely on the intrinsic doctrines and beliefs of the religion itself. It should encompass practices that are
fundamental to the religion's core beliefs and integral to its character. In the case of wearing a hijab, while it
may be a religious practice, it does not meet the criteria of being essential to the very essence of the Islamic
faith. In conclusion, the practice of wearing a hijab, while significant for some individuals, does not qualify
as an essential religious practice under the Constitution of India. Therefore, it should not be granted
protection under Article 25(1).
2.2 WHETHER IT IS THE RIGHT OF STUDENTS TO SEEK PERMISSION TO WEAR A

HEADSCARF TO A SECULAR SCHOOL IF WEARING A HIJAB IS CONSIDERED AN
ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE?
It is humbly submitted that seeking permission to wear a headscarf in a secular school, even when wearing a
hijab is regarded as an essential religious practice, generally falls outside the constitutional rights of students
as such schools typically enforce their own uniform and dress code policies, regardless of religious
convictions.
A. DURING INSTITUTION OR COLLEGE HOURS, THEIR RIGHT TO MANAGE THEIR

RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS CANNOT BE ASSERTED.
It is humbly submitted Muslim individuals cannot assert their right to manage their religious affairs during
institution or college hours because educational institutions have established norms, codes of discipline,
rules, and regulations that must be adhered to by all students. In an educational setting, students of diverse
religious backgrounds come together to learn and educate, and the institution's uniform policy promotes a
sense of unity.
Wearing the hijab is not a matter of essential religious practice for Islam. Firstly, the hijab, being a matter of
attire, cannot be justifiably treated as an essential religious practice. Secondly, it is a custom or practice that
can change with time. The term "Hijab" or "Burqa" does not occur in the Quran, and the practice of wearing
the hijab is advisory rather than obligatory. With the advancement of time, such practices can be modified,
and temporarily suspending the hijab for some hours should not impact the religion. Comparing the
suspension of the hijab to other cultural practices suggests that customs can change with time and are not
immutable. Allowing the hijab, even if it matches the uniform colour, would lead to division among
students, creating a sense of "social separateness," which is undesirable for both students and educational
institutions. It is asserted that the preambular goals of "justice, equality, liberty, and fraternity" would be
better served by eliminating religious differences and treating all students alike before they reach adulthood.
Allowing religious symbols and attire in educational institutions would undermine the primary purpose of
uniforms, which is to promote secularism, equality, togetherness, uniformity, and unity among students,
regardless of their religion, caste, race, creed, etc. Even though Section 26(b) of India's constitution grants
every religious denomination or organization the right to manage its own religious affairs. However, this
right is subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, morality, and health. In cases where
certain religious practices run counter to these considerations, the state has the authority to intervene 26.
However, if such a uniform requirement does not exist, students are expected to wear clothing that promotes
unity, equality, and public order. In essence, the circular aimed to ensure that uniform norms are followed in
a non-discriminatory manner, regardless of students' religious beliefs.
Discipline is very important in educational institutions, considering them as temples of learning. The
relationship between teachers and students should be harmonious, with teachers imparting knowledge and
students receiving it in a dedicated manner. When both parties are committed to the pursuit of knowledge
and maintain discipline, the educational institution operates smoothly without discord. The right to
administer educational institutions should be balanced with regulatory measures to ensure efficient
administration. The minority institutions should strive for exemplary eclecticism in their administration, and
the best compliment for such institutions is when they do not overly emphasize their minority character. 27
26
Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police Calcutta 1983 4 SCC 522; Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State
of Bihar 1958 AIR 731, 1959 SCR 6
27
Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat Bihar State Madarasa Education Board v. Madarasa Hanfia Arabic
College
The students have been given a uniform platform to grow and take quantum leap in their further pursuits.
The homogeneity amongst the students in the matter of uniform would prepare them to grow without any
distinction on the basis of religious symbols, if not worn during the classroom studies in a Pre-University
College.
The uniform prescribed would lose its meaning if the student is permitted to add or subtract any part of
uniform28. The schools are nurseries for training the citizen for future endeavours. If, the norms of the
uniform in the school are permitted to be breached, then what kind of discipline is sought to imparted to the
students. The freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) does not extend to the wearing of
headscarf. Once the uniform is prescribed, all students are bound to follow the uniform so prescribed. The
uniform is to assimilate the students without any distinction of rich or poor, irrespective of caste, creed or
faith and for the harmonious development of the mental and physical faculties of the students and to
cultivate a secular outlook. The wearing of hijab is not permitted only during the school time; therefore, the
students can wear it everywhere else except in schools. The wearing of anything other than the uniform is
not expected in schools run by the State as a secular institution. In a secular school maintained at the cost of
the State, the State is competent to not permit anything other than the uniform.
The argument that the wearing of a headscarf provides dignity to the girl students is also not tenable. The
students are attending an all-girls’ college. The students are at liberty to carry their religious symbols outside
the schools but in pre-university college, the students should look alike, feel alike, think alike and study
together in a cohesive cordial atmosphere. That is the objective behind a uniform, so as to bring about
uniformity in appearances. The wearing of the hijab, although perceived by some as a 'religious practice' can
be regarded as a form of social conduct for women within the Islamic faith. It's crucial to recognize that
interpretations of wearing the headscarf are deeply rooted in individual beliefs and faith. However, it is
essential to underscore that religious practices should not extend into the realm of secular schools that
receive funding from the State. Students are, of course, entitled to express their faith freely in educational
institutions that permit the wearing of the hijab or other religious symbols, like a tilak, which may signify an
individual's religious beliefs. Nonetheless, the State retains the rightful authority to regulate and restrict the
display of apparent religious symbols within State-funded schools. In this context, the practice of wearing
the hijab can be justifiably restricted by the State, especially in adherence to the Government Order. This
restriction aligns with the principle that secular schools should not endorse or facilitate practices that are not
integral to their educational mission and the secular ethos.
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the wearing of hijabs during college hours should not be
allowed as it contradicts the established norms, uniformity, and principles of secularism in educational
28
Fatima Hussain Syed v Bharath Education Society and ors AIR 2003 Bom 75
institutions. Religious practices, when in conflict with public order, morality, or health, can be subject to
reasonable restrictions in the interest of the larger public.
B. RIGHT TO EDUCATION OF THE STUDENTS ARE NOT DENIED
It is humbly submitted that the State has not denied admission to the students from attending classes. If they
choose not to attend classes due to the uniform that has been prescribed, it is a voluntary act of such students
and cannot be said to be in violation of Article 29 by the State. It is not a denial of rights by the State but
instead a voluntary act of the students. It would thus not amount to denial of right to education if a student,
by choice, does not attend the school. A student cannot claim the right to wear a headscarf to a secular
school as a matter of right.
The argument put forth by the student’s centres on their right to wear the hijab, contending that it does not
harm anyone and is protected under various constitutional provisions such as Article 25 (Conscience &
Religion), Articles 29 and 51-A(f) (Culture), and Articles 19 and 21 (Autonomy, Dignity, Choice), which
encompass identity and secularism. They assert that being denied admission to an educational institution
based on their religious attire is a violation of their constitutional rights, including Article 29(2), which
ensures admission without discrimination. However, this argument is not found to be meritorious. State-run
schools are open for admission regardless of religion, race, caste, or language, as mandated by the law. Still,
students are expected to adhere to the school's uniform policy, and violating this uniform mandate is not a
right guaranteed by the Constitution.
The seed of education should germinate equally amongst all students. The students in question are aged 15
to 18, and the goal of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity, as outlined in the Preamble, would be better
served by removing religious differences and treating all students alike before they reach adulthood. If we
consider the case of M. Ajmal Khan v. The Election Commission of India 29, the challenge revolved around
the inclusion of photographs, particularly of Muslim Gosha women, in the eligible voters' list. The argument
put forth was that wearing purdah (veil) by Muslim women is a religious practice mandated by the Holy
Quran, and any interference with this practice would infringe upon the fundamental rights of Muslim
women, as guaranteed under Article 25 of the Indian Constitution. The Madras High Court, however,
dismissed the writ petition, asserting that the Election Commission's decision to include photographs in the
electoral roll aimed at improving the accuracy of the electoral rolls, preventing impersonation, and
eliminating fraudulent voting. Therefore, it was held that this decision did not violate the right to privacy.
Although this judgment was related to election matters, its underlying principle, which emphasized non-
discrimination and the importance of constitutional mandates, can be applied to the present cases.
29
M. Ajmal Khan v. The Election Commission of India, rep. by its Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi-I & Ors 2006 SCC
OnLine Mad 794: (2006) 5 CTC 121
Similarly in Leading Aircraftsman Ansari Aaftab Ahmed v. Union of India & Ors 30., dealt with the issue of
whether a person professing Islam could maintain a beard while serving in the Indian Air Force. The Punjab
and Haryana High Court's Single Bench referred to Islamic principles articulated by Maulana Wahiduddin
Khan, as well as the uniform norms applicable to airmen, to conclude that growing a beard was not in line
with uniform regulations. Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed. An intra-court appeal met a
similar fate. This matter was subsequently brought before the Supreme Court in Mohammed Zubair
Corporal No. 781467-G v. Union of India & Ors 31., where the Court upheld the High Court's decision. The
Supreme Court noted that there were varying interpretations within Islam regarding the desirability of
maintaining a beard. In the context of an airman employed by the Indian Air Force, it was determined that
wearing a beard was not permissible according to the established rules and regulations. These cases
highlight the balance between religious practices and state regulations, with the courts considering
constitutional mandates, uniform norms, and varying interpretations of religious practices to arrive at their
decisions.
It is hereby contented that the students have already agreed to the rules and regulations of the college, and it
was only in the middle of the academic year these issues have. The educational institutions of the kind being
'qualified public places', the students have to adhere to the campus discipline and dress code as lawfully
prescribed since years i.e., as early as 2004. The parents have in the admission forms of their wards (minor
students) have signified their consent to such adherence. All the students had been accordingly adhering to
the same all through. It is argued that the directives in question were addressed to the colleges and
institutions rather than individual students, in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Act's preamble
outlines its objectives, which include the planned development of educational institutions, the promotion of
healthy educational practices, the enhancement of education standards, and the cultivation of a scientific and
secular perspective through education. Thus, it is humbly submitted that right to education is not denied for
the same.
It is thus humbly submitted that, wearing a hijab or headscarf is considered not an essential religious practice
in the Islamic faith and protected under Article 25 of the Constitution and seeking permission to wear a
headscarf in a secular school, even when wearing a hijab is regarded as an essential religious practice,
generally falls outside the constitutional rights of students as such schools typically enforce their own
uniform and dress code policies, regardless of religious convictions.

30
No. 786505-N Leading Aircraftsman Ansari Aaftab Ahmed v. Union of India & Ors.
31
Mohammed Zubair Corporal No. 781467-G v. Union of India & Ors..
It is humbly submitted that the concept of freedom of expression, especially in the context of wearing
uniforms in educational institutions. It recognizes that freedom of expression must be balanced with
reasonable restrictions, particularly in school settings. The Karnataka Education Act of 1983, which stresses
the importance of maintaining discipline and uniformity in educational institutions to foster holistic
development and national integration. It argues that the wearing of a uniform is a regulatory provision that
does not infringe upon freedom of expression but reinforces the right to equality. The significance of
fraternity and dignity within a secular school environment, asserting that promoting a uniform appearance
among students contributes to a sense of equality. Hence, the government's order aligns with constitutional
rights and upholds the principles of the Karnataka Education Act and secularism.
3.1 WHETHER A STUDENT CITIZEN IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME IS EXPECTED TO

SURRENDER HER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER A19/21 AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR
ACCESSING EDUCATION IN A STATE INSTITUTION?
It is humbly submitted that there is no violation of the fundamental rights of the appellants.

It is humbly submitted that freedom of expression has been humanity’s yearning in times ancient and
modern. Similarly, the founders of Indian constitutions are aware about co-existence of conflicting Right and
Restrictions and enacted Article 19 with clear mention of Reasonable restrictions. The freedom of
expression cannot be absolute in an orderly society, and this raises crucial issues of the permissible limits of
restrictions on freedom of expression. Such issues involve consideration of the nature of the restriction, its
scope and extent, its duration and the presence or absence of an efficacious corrective machinery to
challenge the restriction. Generally, it is the legislature which performs the task of reconciling freedom of
expression with certain imperatives of public interest such as national security, public order, public health or
morals, and individual rights such as the right to reputation and the right of privacy. In India legislature has
taken enormous effort to ensure delicate balance between Freedom of Speech and Expression and
Reasonable restriction.
Karnataka Education Act 1983, enacted by the Karnataka govt to maintain discipline and control over the
educational institutions in the State with a view to foster the harmonious development of the mental and
physical faculties of the students. Therefore, discipline and control are with regard to educational
institutions, and not with regard to students. In terms of Section 5 of the Act, the State Government’s
endeavours is to promote the education of the handicap, backward classes and the weaker sections of the
society including the economically weaker sections, whereas curricula under Section 7 includes promotion
of national integration and inculcation of the sense of the duties of the citizens, enshrined under Art. 51 of
the Constitution. It is also pointed out that the State provides uniform to all the students from Class I to
Class X as a part of its social obligations and to maintain parity with all students studying in the Government
Schools without any distinction of caste, creed, sex, or religion. The Government order is in exercise of the
executive powers of the State. The reasons for an enactment of a Statute, Rules and statutory order are not
call for any clarification unless the question of constitutional validity would arise. It is when the issue of
constitutionality is raised, the executive is required to satisfy the Court about the legality of action taken.
The right under Article 19(1)(a) as a right of expression to dress as per one’s own will, however, is also
subject to reasonable restrictions under sub-clause (2) of Article 19. The State has not put a restriction on the
exercise of right conferred under Article 19(1) (a) but has regulated the same in a manner that during the
school hours on working days and in the class, the students shall wear the uniform as prescribed. Since it is a
regulatory provision for wearing of uniform, hence, the decision of the State Government mandating the
College Development Committee to ensure the students wear the uniform as prescribed does not violate the
freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a), rather reinforces the right to equality under Article 14. The
College Development Committee is constituted in terms of the statutory provisions and, therefore, the
direction of the State that the College Development Committee shall ensure that the students wear the dress
as prescribed cannot be said to be volatile of Part III of the Constitution. The test of invasion of Article 19(1)
(a) is required to be examined by the test of doctrine of Pith and Substance in view of the judgment of this
Court reported as Buchan Singh v. State of Punjab 32 wherein this Court held that the mere fact that the
impugned law incidentally, remotely or collaterally has the effect of abridging or abrogating those rights,
will not satisfy the test. If the answer to the above queries be in the affirmative, the impugned law in order to
be valid, must pass the test of reasonableness under Article 19. But if the impact of the law on any of the
rights under clause (1) of Article 19 is merely incidental, indirect, remote or collateral and is dependent upon
factors which may or may not come into play, the anvil of Article 19 will not be available for judging its
validity.
It is to be observed that the Act, Rules, and the orders issued under the said Act were enacted to provide for
better organization, development, discipline, and control of the educational institutions in the State. The
primary object was encouraging holistic development through education and its various facets. The
prescribing of uniform is only an incidental Action in furtherance of the core object of the Act. Therefore,
keeping in view Buchan Singh, some incidental effect on the right under Article 19(1) (a) cannot be said to
be an unreasonable restriction, also being mindful of the fact that it is not an absolute right.
The freedom of expression under Article 19(1) (a) 33 of the Constitution means right to express one’s
opinions by word of mouth, printing, picture, or in any other manner. It includes the freedom of
communication and the right to propagate or publish one’s opinion. The communication of ideas could be
32
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684
33
Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution
made through any medium, newspaper, magazine, or movie. Such right is though subject to reasonable
restrictions on grounds set out under Article 19(2) of the Constitution3435.
The right to privacy as crystallized in the Constitution Bench judgment of K.S. Puttuswamy has to be read in
the context of other provisions of the Constitution in the present appeals. It was laid down as under that it
goes without saying that no legal right can be absolute. Every right has limitations.
It is to be noted that none of the fundamental rights is absolute. The curtailment of the right is permissible
by following due procedure which can withstand the test of reasonableness. The intent and object of the
Government Order is only to maintain uniformity amongst the students by adherence to the prescribed
uniform. It is reasonable as the same has the effect of regulation of the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)
(a). Thus, the right of freedom of expression under Article 19(1) (a) and of privacy under Article 21 are
complementary to each other and not mutually exclusive and does meet the injunction of reasonableness for
the purposes of Article 21 and Article 14. 36
The concept of fraternity and dignity do not stand alone but have to be inferred from the context,
circumstances and the purpose sought to be achieved. There is no dispute, as asserted in the written
submissions, that the purpose of introducing fraternity as a constitutional value is to invoke horizontal or
social sensitivity towards inequalities, in addition to the vertical, or top-down political prescriptions towards
inequalities. Fraternity is in fact social sensitivity. The students herein are in the age group of 15 to 18 years.
The seed of education should germinate equally amongst all students. Therefore, the Preamble goal of
justice, liberty, equality or fraternity would be better served by removing any religious differences,
inequalities and treating students alike before they attain the age of adulthood.
The students have been given a uniform platform to grow and take quantum leap in their further pursuits.
The homogeneity amongst the students in the matter of uniform would prepare them to grow without any
distinction on the basis of religious symbols, if not worn during the classroom studies in a Pre-University
College do not find any merit in the argument raised. Fraternity is a noble goal but cannot be seen from the
prism of one community alone. It is a goal for all citizens of the country irrespective of caste, creed, sex and
religion. The abstract idea of fraternity, as discussed in Subramainan Swamy V. Union Of India, Ministry of
Law and ors.37 has to be applied to the ground realities wherein some students wearing headscarf in a secular
school run by the State Government would stand out and overtly appear differently. The concept of
fraternity will stand fragmented as the apparent distinction of some of the students wearing headscarf would
not form a homogenous group of students in a school where education is to be imparted homogeneously and
34
Article 19(2) of the Constitution
35
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram & Ors., (1989) 2 SCC 547
36
Article 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution
37
Subramainan Swamy V. Union of India, Ministry of Law and ors (2016) 7 SCC 221
equally, irrespective of any religious identification mark. The Constitutional goal of fraternity would be
defeated if the students are permitted to carry their apparent religious symbols with them to the classroom.
The Constitutional goal as emanating from the Preamble would not be achieved if fraternity is given a
narrow meaning in respect of the students identifying themselves with the religious symbols in the
classroom.
There is no merit in the argument raised that the use of the phrase “behave in a fraternal manner by
transcending their group identity as the young students” in the impugned Order can be said to be volatile of
any law. Before a student goes for higher studies in colleges, she should not grow with a specific identity,
but under the umbrella of equality guaranteed under Article 14 transcending the group identity. Religion,
which is a private affair, has no meaning in a secular school run by the State. The students are free to profess
their religion and carry out their religious activities other than when they are attending a classroom where
religious identities should be left behind.
The Government Order does not impinge on the Constitutional promise of fraternity and dignity. Instead, it
promotes an equal environment where such fraternal values can be imbibed and nurtured without any
hindrance of any kind. The issue as to whether a person professing Islam can support a beard as a member of
the Indian Air Force came up for consideration before the Single Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court in No. 786505-N Leading Aircraftsman Ansari Aintab Ahmed v. Union of India & Ors. 38. The Single
Bench referred to the principles of Islam by Mauling Wahid Uddin Khan from his book “Islam the Voice of
Human Nature” and the rules applicable to the airmen to hold that growing of beard violates the norms of
uniform. Accordingly, the writ petitions were dismissed. An intra-court appeal was also dismissed 39. The
matter came up for hearing before this Court in a judgment reported as Mohammed Dubai Corporal No.
781467-G v. Union of India & Ors40. This Court dismissed the appeal finding no reason to take a view of
the matter at variance with the view taken by the High Court. It was noticed that there are varying
interpretations, one of which is that it is desirable to maintain a beard. Therefore, in respect of an airman
employed by the Indian Air Force, beard was not found permissible in terms of the Rules framed.
In the world of organizations, the concept of "Uniform" holds significant importance. According to Black’s
Law Dictionary, a uniform is something that conforms to one unvarying standard, ensuring consistency and
equality across different places or divisions of a country. This uniformity promotes a sense of fairness and
equality in the application of rules and regulations. In everyday life, when we think of the word "Uniform,"
we often picture a particular set of clothing worn by members of a specific group or organization. The
38
No. 786505-N Leading Aircraftsman Ansari Aintab Ahmed v. Union of India & Ors 2008 L.I.C. 4004 (CWP No. 14927 of 2005
decided on 14.7.2008)
39
LPA No. 196 of 2008 decided on 31.7.2008.
40
Mohammed Dubai Corporal No. 781467-G v. Union of India & Ors (2017) 2 SCC 115
Cambridge English Dictionary defines it as such. This type of uniform serves multiple purposes - it fosters a
sense of belonging among group members and also acts as a means of identification, making it easy to
recognize and distinguish individuals associated with that organization. Moreover, the Merriam Webster
Dictionary emphasizes the distinctive design or fashion aspect of uniforms. These uniforms are not just
about clothing; they represent a unique identity. For instance, military uniforms are not only functional but
also symbolize discipline, honour, and service. Similarly, the uniforms of sports teams not only provide a
consistent appearance but also signify team spirit and unity. As an adjective, "Uniform" signifies consistency
and conformity. When something is described as uniform, it means that it maintains the same form, manner,
or degree without variation. This concept applies in various contexts, from uniform procedures in a company
ensuring standardized processes to uniform red brick houses creating a visually consistent neighbourhood
aesthetic. In conclusion, the word "Uniform" encompasses a wide range of meanings, from the legal and
regulatory realm's consistency and conformity to the everyday sense of clothing that unites and identifies a
group. It is a word that underscores the value of standardization, consistency, and unity in various aspects of
our lives.
The uniform prescribed would lose its meaning if the student is permitted to add or subtract any part of
uniform. The schools are nurseries for training the citizen for future endeavours. If, the norms of the uniform
in the school are permitted to be breached, then what kind of discipline is sought to impart to the students.
The freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) does not extend to the wearing of headscarf.
Once the uniform is prescribed, all students are bound to follow the uniform so prescribed. The uniform is to
assimilate the students without any distinction of rich or poor, irrespective of caste, creed or faith and for the
harmonious development of the mental and physical faculties of the students and to cultivate a secular
outlook. The wearing of hijab is not permitted only during the school time; therefore, the students can wear
it everywhere else except in schools. The wearing of anything other than the uniform is not expected in
schools run by the State as a secular institution. In a secular school maintained at the cost of the State, the
State is competent to not permit anything other than the uniform.
The students are attending an all-girls’ college. The students are at liberty to carry their religious symbols
outside the schools but in pre-university college, the students should look alike, feel alike, think alike and
Study together in a cohesive cordial atmosphere. That is the objective behind a uniform, so as to bring about
uniformity in appearances. Hence order issued by the Karnataka govt. is not a violative of art.19(1)(a).
It is humbly submitted that the Government Order does not take away any right of a student available to her
under Article 2141 of the Constitution, or that it contemplates any barter of fundamental rights. The right to
41
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution
education under Art. 21 continues to be available but it is the choice of the student to avail such right or not.
The student is not expected to put a condition, that unless she is permitted to come to a secular school
wearing a headscarf, she would not attend the school. The decision is of the student and not of school when
the student opts not to adhere to the uniform rules.
The pre-university college is open to all students of all castes and religions. The doors of such institutions
are not closed to any student of any community. The object of the State is to provide an opportunity for the
students to study in the secular schools. It is for the students to avail such a facility. If a particular student
feels that she cannot compromise with the wearing of headscarf or of any other student to wear any
outwardly religious symbol, the school would be justified not to allow such student, in the larger interest of
treating all the students alike as a part of mandate of Article 14, which is central to the theme of Part III of
the Constitution. The headscarf is not permitted in the school for the students who are.
studying in Class 10+1 or 10+2. The students have many years ahead of them where they can carry on their
religious faith but the Government Order mandating wearing of uniform cannot be faulted with since the
object is in tune with the principles of the Constitution.
The judgment of this Court reported as Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India
& Anr.42 held that the right of education has been read into right to life in Article 21. The argument is that a
child who is denied right to access education is not only deprived of his right to live with dignity, but he is
also deprived of his right to freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Article 19(1) (a) of the
Constitution. The right to education is thus a part of Article 21. The State has not put any restriction to avail
such right of education. The right of education is available to every student. The State has only regulated the
right in a manner that students come to the school to attend classes only in the prescribed uniform, and the
same has been done to achieve the statutory and constitutional goals.
The students cannot assert that they have a right to education, but they would avail such right as per their
own wish and in the manner which they consider appropriate. Schools are to prepare the students for their
future endeavours in life. Discipline is one of the attributes which the students learn in schools. Defiance to
rules of the school would in fact be antithesis of discipline which cannot be accepted from the students who
are yet to attain adulthood. Therefore, they should grow in an atmosphere of brotherhood and fraternity and
not in the environment of rebel or defiance. The argument that the school is insisting on surrendering or
curtailing the right to wear a headscarf as a pre-condition to access the education is not tenable as the right
to education is available but only condition is that the students should attend the classes in prescribed
uniform.
42
Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India & Anr (2012) 6 SCC 1
The Government Order cannot be said to be contrary to the legitimate State goal of promoting literacy and
education. Article 21A is not applicable as all the students are over 14 years of age. The students have a right
to education under Article 21, but not of insisting on wearing something additional to the uniform, in a
secular school, as a part of their religion.
In fact, the Act itself contemplates providing of opportunities and facilities in a healthy manner and
maintaining the dignity of childhood and youth so that there is no moral or material abandonment. The
uniform for the students has been prescribed so that there is no distinction between the students coming
from diverse background and that each student grows in an environment of equality, fairness and equal
opportunities. The uniform is an equalizer of inequalities. Therefore, prescribing uniform for children at an
impressionable age is not only important but has a salutary effect on the mental development of the child to
grow in the environment of oneness. The said object is in tune with Article 39(f) of the Constitution of
India. Children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of
freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and
material abandonment.
Hence, the Government Order cannot be said to be contrary to the State goal of promoting literacy and
education as mandated under the Constitution. The Government Order only ensures that the uniform
prescribed is adhered to by the students and it cannot be said that State is restricting the access to education
to the girl students through such an Order.
The State is under a positive obligation to create an environment conducive for the exercise of fundamental
rights. Conversely, it means that the subjects have no responsibility to create a conducive environment in a
non-discriminatory manner. If the students of one faith insist on a particular dress, there is no stopping for
the others to carry their faiths and beliefs to the schools. It would not be conducive to the pious atmosphere
of the school where the students seek admission for education. In fact, uniform fosters a sense of ‘equality’
amongst students- instils a sense of oneness, diminishes individual differences, helps focus on learning as
students would not be bothered about their social status, improves discipline, fewer conflicts in school,
promotes school spirit- generates a sense of belonging, pride, loyalty towards the school, relieves economic
pressure on the parents, ensures equality before the educational institution, serves the need of a diverse
community and promotes a positive sense of communal identity and does not lead to the growth of
disparities of wealth and style. School is the time to learn and lay foundation for the future pursuits in life.
The students are expected to maintain discipline and the school is responsible to lay a strong foundation so
as to nurture the students as responsible citizens of the country.
In Inedible Creative Private Ltd. & OR’s. V. Government of West Bengal & Ors., 43 the release of a movie in
43
Inedible Creative Private Ltd. & OR’s. V. Government of West Bengal & Ors (2020) 12 SCC 436
the State of West Bengal was not permitted on account of threatened breach of peace. It was in these
circumstances, this Court held that the State is duty-bound to ensure the prevalence of conditions in which
the constitutional freedoms can be exercised. The Court held that the freedoms which are guaranteed by
Article 19 are universal. Article 19(1) stipulates that all citizens shall have the freedoms which it recognizes.
Political freedoms impose a restraining influence on the State by carving out an area in which the State shall
not interfere. Hence, these freedoms are perceived to impose obligations of restraint on the State. But, apart
from imposing “negative” restraints on the State these freedoms impose a positive mandate as well. In its
capacity as a public authority enforcing the rule of law, the State must ensure that conditions in which these
freedoms flourish are maintained. In the space reserved for the free exercise of speech and expression, the
State cannot look askance when organized interests threaten the existence of freedom. The State is duty-
bound to ensure the prevalence of conditions in which of those freedoms can be exercised. The instruments
of the State must be utilized to effectuate the exercise of freedom. When organized interests threaten the
properties of theatre owners or the viewing audience with reprisals, it is the plain duty of the State to ensure
that speech is not silenced by the fear of the mob. Unless we were to read a positive obligation on the State
to create and maintain conditions in which the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution can be exercised,
there is a real danger that art and literature would become victims of intolerance. In the present case, we are
of the view that there has been an unconstitutional attempt to invade the fundamental rights of the producers,
the actors and the audience. Worse still, by making an example out of them, there has been an attempt to
silence criticism and critique. Others who embark upon a similar venture would be subject to the chilling
effect of “similar misadventures”. This cannot be countenanced in a free society. Freedom is not a
supplicant to power.
As discussed above, secularism is applicable to all citizens, therefore, permitting one religious community
to wear their religious symbols would be antithesis to secularism. Thus, the Government Order cannot be
said to be against the ethic of secularism or to the objective of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983. It is
hence humbly submitted that the order issued by the Karnataka govt. Is not a violative of Article 21.

PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities citied, this
Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:
Pass appropriate orders declaring that:
1. The Special Leave Petition filed by the appellant should be quashed.

2. Upheld the Government Order as it does not violate any constitutional provision for the women and
the community as a whole.
3. Declare that Hijab is not an Essential Religious Practice, and the University norms should be
followed.
AND / OR
Pass any other order, direction or relief that it may deem fit in the best interest of Justice, Equity and Good
Conscience. For this act of kindness, the counsels on the behalf of the Respondent shall duty bound forever
pray.
Respectfully Submitted by
Counsel for Respondents

Moot Respondent 1

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TEAM: GROUP 6

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SLP(C) NO: 5236 /2022

UNDER ART 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BY THE PETITIONER IS MAINTAINABLE?

A. THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER IS NOT MAINTAINABLE

2. WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN

A. WEARING OF HIJAB IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTISE.

B. SECULARISM AND RELIGION

C. PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE 25 IS UNNECESSARY AS WEARING OF HIJAB IS NOT BEING A MATTER OF

3. WHETHER THE DIRECTION ISSUED IS VIOLATIVE OF PROVISIONS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION

A. GOVT. ORDER IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19(1)(A)

B. GOVT. ORDER IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

 AIR - ALL INDIA REPORTER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

 Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police Calcutta 1983 4 SCC 522.

ARTICLES, BOOKS, COMMENTARIES, DICTIONARIES & JOURNALS

1) The Constitution of India,1950

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

THE COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS, THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,

THE RESPONDENT WOULD LIKE TO HUMBLY SUBMIT THAT THIS SPECIAL

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BY THE PETITIONER IS MAINTAINABLE?

A. THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER IS NOT MAINTAINABLE

2. WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL

2.1 WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN

A. WEARING OF HIJAB IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTISE.

B. SECULARISM AND RELIGION

C. PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE 25 IS UNNECESSARY AS WEARING OF HIJAB IS NOT BEING A MATTER OF

3. WHETHER THE DIRECTION ISSUED IS VIOLATIVE OF PROVISIONS ENSHRINED IN THE

A. GOVT. ORDER IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19(1)(A)

B. GOVT. ORDER IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BY THE PETITIONER IS MAINTAINABLE?

2. WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL

3. WHETHER THE DIRECTION ISSUED IS VIOLATIVE OF PROVISIONS ENSHRINED IN THE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER IS

A. THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER IS NOT MAINTAINABLE

B. THE GOVERNMENT ORDER IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF

2.WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL

2.1 WHETHER WEARING A HIJAB OR HEADSCARF IS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL

A. WEARING OF HIJAB IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTISE.

B. SECULARISM AND RELIGION

C. PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE 25 IS UNNECESSARY AS WEARING OF HIJAB IS NOT

2.2 WHETHER IT IS THE RIGHT OF STUDENTS TO SEEK PERMISSION TO WEAR A

A. DURING INSTITUTION OR COLLEGE HOURS, THEIR RIGHT TO MANAGE THEIR

B. RIGHT TO EDUCATION OF THE STUDENTS ARE NOT DENIED

3. WHETHER THE DIRECTION ISSUED IS VIOLATIVE OF PROVISIONS ENSHRINED IN THE

3.1 WHETHER A STUDENT CITIZEN IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME IS EXPECTED TO

A. GOVT. ORDER IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19(1)(A)

B. GOVT. ORDER IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Pass appropriate orders declaring that:

1. The Special Leave Petition filed by the appellant should be quashed.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

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