MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.
530 SCRA 341 delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and
(2007)
FACTS:
PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the
establishment of a Mass Transport System for Greater Manila.
Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila Council of the MMDA
cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Respondents, provincial bus
operators who had bus terminals that were threatened to be
removed, alleges that EO should be declared unconstitutional
and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners
and operators of public land transportation units over their
respective terminals
ISSUE: WON EO 179 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD: Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void.
RATIO:
MMDA has no police power, let alone legislative
power. Considering the administrative nature of its powers and
functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the
Project as envisioned by the EO; hence it could not have been
validly designated by the President to undertake the Project.
It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the
elimination of the respondents’ terminals. Police power rests
primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as
it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid
administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government under an express
delegation by the LGC of 1991 Measures calculated to promote
the safety and convenience of the people using the
thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a
proper subject for the exercise of police power.
On Constitutional Law, “The true role of
Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between
authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the
framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due
deference to rights.”
OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE,
EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, VICTORIA B. LOANZON, ELGIN MICHAEL C.
PEREZ, ARNOLD E. CACHO, AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON, ED VINCENT
S. ALBANO, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, ARIANNE C. ARTUGUE,
CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA, KRISTINE JANE R. LIU, ALYANNA
MARI C. BUENVIAJE, IANA PATRICIA DULA T. NICOLAS, IRENE A.
TOLENTINO and AUREA I. GRUYAL, petitioners, vs. LEGAL
EDUCATION BOARD, as represented by its Chairperson, HON.
EMERSON B. AQUENDE, and LEB Member HON. ZENAIDA N.
ELEPAÑO, respondents.
G.R. No. 230642 September 10, 2019
Facts:
Consolidated Petitions for Prohibition (GR 230642) and
Certiorari and Prohibition (GR 242954) were filed before the Court
to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7662, or the Legal
Education Reform Act of 1993, on the principal grounds of
encroachment upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning
the practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom and
violation of a law school aspirant’s right to education, these
petitions also seek to declare as unconstitutional the Legal
Education Board Issuances establishing and implementing the
Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhiLSAT.
RA 7662 created the Legal Education Board (LEB) for the
improvement of the system of legal education in the Philippines due
to diminishing performance of law students and law schools in the
bar examinations. It is an executive agency separate from the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports but attached solely for
budgetary and administrative purposes, consisting of presidential
appointees.
In July 2001, The Court’s Committee on Legal Education and
Bar Matters (CLEBM) through its Chairperson, Justice Jose Vitug,
noted that the following objectionable provisions of the law must
be removed: First, Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662], the State "shall xxx
require apprenticeship and continuing legal education." The
concept of continuing legal education encompasses education not
only of law students but also of members of the legal profession.
[This] implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the
education of persons who have finished the law course and are
already licensed to practice law, in violation of the Supreme Court's
power over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Next is Section 3 which provides that one of the objectives
of legal education is increasing "awareness among members of the
legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed
sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place in the
law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of law as
they perform the task of educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5,
paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution also provides that the
Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules on "legal
assistance to the “underprivileged" and hence, implementation of
[R.A. No. 7662] might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally
mandated power.
Lastly, Section 7(e) giving the LEB the power to prescribe
minimum standards for law admission and Section 7(h) giving the
LEB the power to adopt a system of continuing legal education and
for this purpose, the LEB may provide for the mandatory attendance
of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the
LEB may deem necessary encroach upon the Supreme Court's
powers under Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the
Constitution. Aside from its power over the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Supreme Court is constitutionally mandated to
promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law.
Moreover, in resolution dated September 4, 2001, the Court
approved the CLEBM’s explanatory note and draft amendments to
RA 7662, to which a copy was formally furnished to the Congress.
However, the said act remained unaltered.
In 2003, LEB members were appointed with the Retired
Court of Appeals Justice Hilarion Aquino was appointed as their first
chairperson. LEB became fully operational only in June 2010. Since
then, it has issued several orders, circulars, resolutions and other
issuances to prescribe the minimum standards for law schools
pursuant to Sec 7 of RA 7662. One of these orders includes
Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 which seeks to improve
the quality of legal education by requiring those seeking admission
to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law
school admission test, known as the PhilSAT.
 The PhilSAT is an aptitude test measuring the examinee’s
communication and language proficiency, critical thinking, verbal
and quantitative reasoning. It was designed to measure the
academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law.
Such examination was effective for the academic year 2017-2018,
wherein no applicant to law school was allowed admission without
having taken and passed the PhilSAT. The first PhilSAT was held on
April 16, 2017. However, under LEBMO No. 11-2017, a conditional
admission and enrollment was given to those who failed to take the
PhilSAT for justifiable and meritorious reasons, as part of the
transition adjustments in the initial year of the PhilSAT
implementation, as clarified by the issuance of LEBMO No. 11-2018.
Nevertheless, on July 25, 2018, the LEB issued LEBMC No. 19-2018
allowing limited conditional admission/enrollment in the first
semester of academic year 2018 to 2019 for those applicants who
have never previously taken the PhiLSAT. Those who have taken the
PhiLSAT and scored below the cut-off score (55%) were disqualified.
In addition, only those law schools with a passing rate of not less
than 25%, are updated in the reportorial requirement and signified
its intention to conditionally admit applicants were allowed to do
so.
The Petition
The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) to prevent the LEB from conducting the
PhiLSAT days before the first aptitude test was held. They argue that
R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive to the Court's power to
regulate and supervise the legal profession pursuant to Section 5
(5), Article VIII of the Constitution and that the Congress cannot
create an administrative office that exercises the Court's power over
the practice of law. They also argue that R.A. No. 7662 gives the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) additional functions to vet nominees
for the LEB in violation of Section 8 (5), Article VIII of the
Constitution. They also question the constitutionality of the LEB's
powers under Section 7 (c)and 7 (e)to prescribe the qualifications
and compensation of faculty members and Section 7 (h)on the LEB's
power to adopt a system of continuing legal education as being
repugnant to the Court's rule-making power concerning the practice
of law. They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic
freedom of law schools and the right to education.
The Court issued the TRO allowing conditional enrollment to
incoming freshmen law students for the academic year 2019
to2020.
The Office of the Solicitor General OSG in its comment
contends that the Court's power to regulate admission to the
practice of law does not include regulation of legal education. OSG
points out that the Court had actually authorized the JBC to process
the applications for membership to the LEB making this a non-issue.
In defending the validity of the PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the
argument that the PhiLSAT is the minimum standard for entrance to
law schools prescribed by the LEB pursuant to the State's power to
regulate education. The OSG urges that the PhiLSAT is no different
from the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which the Court
already upheld as a valid exercise of police power in the seminal
case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the case is subject to judicial review
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over legal education
3. Whether or not the reasonable supervision and regulation of
legal education is a valid exercise of police power
Ruling:
1. Whether or not the case is subject to judicial review-
YES
For a proper exercise of its power of review in
constitutional litigation, certain requisites must be
satisfied:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing"
to challenge;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.
ACTUAL CASE/CONTROVERSY
In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara,
this Court held that when an act of the legislative
department is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty
of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned
law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
Said the Court: In seeking to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The petitions therefore raise an actual controversy
insofar as they allege that R.A. No. 7662,specically
Section 2, paragraph 2, Section 3 (a) (2), Section 7 (c),
(e), (g), and (h) of R.A. No. 7662infringe upon the
Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the
practice of law and upon institutional academic
freedom and the right to quality education. Necessarily,
a review of the LEB issuances when pertinent to these
assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7662 shall also be
undertaken.
LEGAL STANDING
The rule on standing admits of recognized
exceptions: the over breadth doctrine, taxpayer suits,
third-party standing and the doctrine of transcendental
importance.
Petitioners who are law students possess the
requisite standing to challenge the constitutionality of
Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 and the implementing LEB
issuances, as they were, in fact, required to take the
PhiLSAT, or to comply with the terms of the conditional
enrollment and failing which, were denied admission as
regular students to law school.
Meanwhile, petitioners Pimentel, Comafay,
Gorospe, Sandoval, Loanzon, Perez, Cacho,Espaldon,
Albano, Siazon, Artugue, Lacsina, Liu, Buenviaje,
Nicolas, Tolentino, and Gruyal; and petitioners-in
 intervention Rapista, Rapista-Tan, Tan, Enterina and
Villarico commonly anchor their standing to challenge
R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as citizens. Standing as a
citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance or when paramount public interest is
involved.
Legal standing may be extended to petitioners for
having raised a "constitutional issue of critical
significance. "Without a doubt, the delineation of the
Court's rule-making power vis-à-vis the supervision and
regulation of legal education and the determination of
the reach of the State's supervisory and regulatory
power in the context of the guarantees of academic
freedom and the right to education are novel issues
with far-reaching implications that deserve the Court's
immediate attention. In taking cognizance of the
instant petitions, the Court is merely exercising its
power to promulgate rules towards the end that
constitutional rights are protected and enforced.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over legal
education - NO
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the
Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law necessarily includes the
power to do things related to the practice of law,
including the power to prescribe the requirements for
admission to the study of law. In support, they point to
Sections 6 and 16, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. They
contend that the Congress cannot create an
administrative body, like the LEB, that exercises this
rule-making power of the Court. They emphasize that
the LEB belongs to the Executive department, and, is
not linked to the Court nor placed under the Court's
regulation and supervision.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 maintain that the
Court exercises authority over the legal profession
which includes the admission to the practice of law, to
the continuing requirements for and discipline of
lawyers. They further contend that part of the rule-
making power of the Court which includes the power to
admit members to the practice of law extends to the
admission to the legal education since it is a
preparatory process to the admission to the legal
profession.
Contrary to petitioner's claims, the Court has no
primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education for
the following reasons:
First, it had been historically and consistently
exercised by the political departments. In fact, it was
recommended that legislation be enacted to prohibit
the opening of any school without the permission of the
Secretary of Public Instruction. Moreover, the
Constitution expressed in no uncertain terms that "all
educational institutions shall be under the supervision
and subject to regulation by the State." The
Administrative Code also states that it shall be the State
that shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels, and shall take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to
all; and that the DECS shall be primarily responsible for
the formulation, planning, implementation, and
coordination of the policies, plans, programs and
projects in the areas of formal and non-formal
education. The Administrative Code also empowered
the Board of Higher Education to create technical
panels of experts in the various disciplines including
law, to undertake curricula development.
Second, DECS Order No. 27-1989, the precursor of
R.A. No. 7662, defined legal education as an educational
program including a clinical program appropriate and
essential in the understanding and application of law
and the administration of justice. It is professional
education after completion of a required pre-legal
education at the college level. For state colleges and
universities, the operation of their law schools was to
depend on their respective charters, and for private
colleges and universities, by the rules and regulations
issued by the DECS. Nevertheless, it was made clear
under DECS Order No. 27-1989 that the administration
of a law school shall be governed primarily by the law
school's own policies and the provisions thereof apply
only suppletorily.
Third, legal education is a mere composite of the
entire Philippine education system. Being a specialized
area of study, however, is not reason in itself to
demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the
regulatory and supervisory powers of the political
branches.
Fourth, the Court's exclusive rule-making power
covers the practice of law and not the study of law.
Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to
the Bar has been interpreted as vesting upon the Court
the authority to define the practice of law, to determine
who will be admitted to the practice of law, to hold in
contempt any person found to be engaged in
unauthorized practice of law, and to exercise corollary
disciplinary authority over members of the Bar. The act
of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
lawyers in the practice of law is a judicial function
because it requires "(1) previously established rules and
principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present,
affecting determinate individuals; and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles.”
The definition of the practice of law cannot be
further enlarged as to cover the study of law.
Fifth, the Court exercises judicial power only and
should not assume any duty not connected to its judicial
functions, the basic postulate being the separation of
powers. Neither may the regulation and supervision of
legal education be justified as an exercise of the Court's
"residual" power. A power is residual if it does not
belong to either of the two co-equal branches and
which the remaining branch can, thus, exercise
consistent with its functions. Regulation and supervision
of legal education is primarily exercised by the
Legislative and implemented by the Executive, thus, it
cannot be claimed by the judiciary.
Sixth, while the power of the Court to promulgate
rules concerning admission to the practice of law exists
under the 1935 Constitution and reiterated under the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the Court has not
promulgated any rule that directly and actually
regulates legal education. In allowing the law student
and in governing the conduct of the law student
 practitioner under the Revised Law Student Practice
Rule, what the Court regulates and supervises is not
legal education, but the appearance and conduct of a
law student before any trial court, tribunal, board, or
officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic —
an activity rightfully falling under the definition of
practice of law. Inasmuch as the law student is
permitted to act for the legal clinic and thereby to
practice law, it is but proper that the Court exercise
regulation and supervision over the law student
practitioner. Necessarily, the Court has the power to
allow their appearance and plead their case, and
thereafter, to regulate their actions.
3. Whether or not the reasonable supervision and
regulation of legal education is a valid exercise of police
power - YES
REASONABLE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION
Police power is "the power vested in legislature by
the Constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes,
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth, and of
the subjects of the same."
The enactment of education laws, implementing
rules and regulations and issuances of government
agencies is an exercise of the State's police power. Such
exercise, however, is NOT ABSOLUTE. When the
Constitution gives the State supervisory power, it is
understood that what it enjoys is a supportive power,
that is, the power of oversight over all educational
institutions. It includes the authority to check, but not
to interfere. In addition to supervision, educational
institutions are likewise made subject to State
regulation. In this regard, the political departments are
vested with ample authority to set minimum standards
to be met by all educational institutions. To be valid, the
supervision and regulation of legal education as an
exercise of police power must be reasonable and not
repugnant to the Constitution, which means that when
the Constitution speaks of State supervision and
regulation, it does not in any way amount to control.
Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the
Bar has been interpreted as vesting upon the Court the authority to
define the practice of law, to determine who will be admitted to the
practice of law, to hold in contempt any person found to be
engaged in unauthorized practice of law, and to exercise corollary
disciplinary authority over members of the Bar.
The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
lawyers in the practice of law is a judicial function because it
requires "(1) previously established rules and principles; (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed
by the rules and principles
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Accordingly, the reasonable supervision and
regulation clause must be read in conjunction with the
other Constitutional provisions relating to education
 which include, in particular, the clause on academic
freedom. The internal conditions for institutional
academic freedom, means that the academic staff
should have de facto control over: (a) the admission
and examination of students; (b)the curricula for
courses of study; (c) the appointment and tenure of
office of academic staff; and(d) the allocation of income
among the different categories of expenditure.
The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy
ample discretion to decide for itself who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who to
admit, being part of their academic freedom. The State,
in the exercise of its reasonable supervision and
regulation over education, can only impose minimum
regulations.
RIGHT TO EDUCATION
The normative elements of the general right to
education under Section 1, Article XIV, are (1)to protect and
promote quality education; and (2) to take appropriate
steps towards making such quality education accessible.
"Quality" education is defined as the appropriateness,
relevance and excellence of the education given to meet the
needs and aspirations of the individual and society. In order
to protect and promote quality education, the political
departments are vested with the ample authority to set
minimum standards to be met by all educational
institutions. However, the right to education is subject to
fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.
The element of accessibility under the Constitution, thus,
pertains to both the elimination of discrimination especially
against disadvantaged groups and to the financial duty of
the State for, after all, the right to education is part and
parcel of social justice. The objective is to make quality
education accessible by appropriate means.
In conclusion, jurisdiction over legal education
belongs primarily and directly to the political departments,
and that the exercise of such police power must be in the
context of reasonable supervision and regulation, and must
be consistent with academic freedom and the right to
education.
LEB's Powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-à-vis the Court's
Jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the
Constitution
1. Sections 3(a)(2) and 7(2) on increasing awareness
among members of the legal profession of the needs of
the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society
goes beyond the scope of R.A. No.7662, which involves
the improvement of the quality of legal education, and,
instead delves into the training of those who are
already members of the bar. Likewise, this objective is a
direct encroachment on the power of the Court to
promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and
legal assistance to the underprivileged and should, thus,
be voided on this ground.
2. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No.7662 mandates the State to
legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
Pursuant to this policy, Section 7 (g) of R.A. No. 7662
 grants LEB the power to establish a law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the bar
examinations. The jurisdiction to determine whether an
applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations
belongs to the Court. This requirement unduly
interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to
promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and
admissions thereto.
3. By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal
education" under Section 2, par. 2, and Section 7 (h) of
R.A. No. 7662 unduly give the LEB the power to
supervise the legal education of those who are already
members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized
to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers
in such courses and for such duration as the LEB deems
necessary the same encroaches upon the Court's power
to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar
which includes the education of "lawyer-professors" as
teaching of law is practice of law.
4. The Court finds no constitutional conflict between its
rule-making power and the power of the LEB to
prescribe the minimum standards for law admission
under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662.Consequently, the
PhiLSAT, which intends to regulate admission to law
schools, cannot be voided on this ground. This provision
of the law embodies reasonable supervision and
regulation. Emphatically, the law allows the LEB to
prescribe only the minimum standards and it did not, in
any way, impose that the minimum standard for law
admission should be by way of an exclusionary and
qualifying exam nor did it prevent law schools from
imposing their respective admission requirements.
The issue on whether the exercise of such
power, through the PhiLSAT, was reasonable based on
grounds presented by the petitioners are not only
conclusions of fact which beg the presentation of
competent evidence, but also necessarily go into the
wisdom of the PhiLSAT which the Court cannot inquire
into. These grounds include the following: that it is not
a conclusive proof of the student's aptitude; it entails
unreasonable examination and travel expenses and
burdensome documentary requirements; applying for
PhiLSAT exemption is inconvenient; it is redundant to
existing law school entrance exams; and it is not
supported by scientific study.
The avowed purpose of the PhiLSAT is to
improve the quality of legal education by evaluating
and screening applicants to law school. As elucidated,
the State has an interest in improving the quality of
legal education for the protection of the community at-
large, and requiring an entrance test is reasonably
related to that interest. In other words, the State has
the power and the prerogative to impose a
standardized test prior to entering law school, in the
same manner and extent that the State can do so in
medical school when it prescribed the NMAT (as in the
case of Tablarin).In all, the Court finds no constitutional
conflict between the Court's rule-making power
concerning admissions to the practice of law and on
the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for
law admission under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No.
7662.Further, pursuant to its power under Section 7
(e), the Court arms the LEB's authority to initiate and
administer an aptitude test, such as the PhiLSAT, as a
 minimum standard for law admission. Thus, the
PhiLSAT, insofar as it functions as an aptitude exam
that measures the academic potential of the examinee
to pursue the study of law to the end that the quality of
legal education is improved is not per se
unconstitutional.
LEB's Powers vis-à-vis Institutional Academic Freedom and the
Right to Education
1. PhilSAT
In mandating the passing score of 55% in the
PhilSAT, it actually usurps the right of the school to
determine for itself the criteria for the admission of the
students. The law schools are left with absolutely no
discretion to choose its students at the first instance and
in accordance with its own policies, but are dictated to
surrender such discretion in favor of a State-determined
pool of applicants, under pain of administrative
sanctions and/or payment of fines. Mandating law
schools to reject applicants who failed to reach the
prescribed PhiLSAT passing score or those with expired
PhiLSAT eligibility transfers complete control over
admission policies from the law schools to the LEB.
With the conclusion that the PhiLSAT, when
administered as an aptitude test, passes the test of
reasonableness, there is no reason to strike down the
PhiLSAT in its entirety. Instead, the Court takes a
calibrated approach and partially nullifies LEBMO No.
7-2016 insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of
the PhiLSAT and the taking thereof within two years as
a prerequisite for admission to any law school which, on
its face, run directly counter to institutional academic
freedom. Unlike the PhiLSAT score, the NMAT score
is not the sole determining factor on whether or not an
examinee may be admitted to medical school. The
NMAT score is only meant to be one of the bases for
evaluating applicants for admission to the college of
medicine. In contrast, the PhiLSAT score itself
determines whether an applicant may be admitted to law
school or not, the PhiLSAT being strictly a pass or fail
exam. It excludes those who failed to reach the
prescribed cut-off score from being admitted to any law
school. It qualifies admission to law school not
otherwise imposed by the schools themselves. The
PhiLSAT, as presently crafted, employs a totalitarian
scheme in terms of student admissions. This leaves the
consequent actions of the applicant-student and the
school solely dependent upon the results of the
PhiLSAT.
The constitutionality of the PhiLSAT, moreover,
cannot be voided on the ground that it violates the right
to education as stated under Section 1, Article XIV of
the Constitution because the PhiLSAT is a minimum
admission standard that is rationally related to the
interest of the State to improve the quality of legal
education and, accordingly, to protect the general
community.
The rest of LEBMO No. 7-2016, being free from
any taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force
and effect, especially in view of the separability clause
therein contained.
2. Other LEB Issuances
LEB Issuances relating to pre-requisites to
admission to law school, Ll. B or JD Program and
Graduate Programs of Law similarly encroach upon the
law school's freedom to determine for itself its
admission policies. It affects a law school's admission
policies leaving the latter totally without the full
 discretion to admit applicants who do not comply with
these requirements.
3. Minimum qualification on faculty members
The masters degree required of law faculty members
and dean, and the doctoral degree
required of a dean of a graduate school of law are, in
fact, minimum reasonable requirements. However, it is
the manner by which the LEB had exercised this power
through its various issuances that prove to be
unreasonable. In this regard, the LEB is actually
assessing the teaching performance of faculty members
and when such is determined by the LEB as constituting
gross incompetence, the LEB may mete out penalties,
thus, usurping the law school's right to determine for
itself the competence of its faculty members.
4. Section 2, par. 2 and Section7 (g) on legal
apprenticeship and legal internship
The manner by which LEB exercised the power to
require apprenticeship through several of its
issuances undoubtedly show that the LEB controls
and dictates upon law schools on how such
apprenticeship and internship programs should be
undertaken.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The jurisdiction of
the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.
The Court further declared:
As CONSTITUTIONAL:
1. Section 7 (c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal
Education Board the power to set the standards of accreditation for
law schools taking into account, among others, the qualifications of
the members of the faculty without encroaching upon the academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning; and
2. Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal
Education Board the power to prescribe the minimum requirements
for admission to legal education and minimum qualifications of
faculty members without encroaching upon the academic freedom
of institutions of higher learning.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the
Court:
1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes
"continuing legal education" as an aspect of legal education which is
made subject to Executive supervision and control;
2. Section 3 (a) (2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7 (2) of LEBMO No.
1-2011 on the objective of legal education to increase awareness
among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
3. Section 7 (g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11 (g) of LEBMO No. 1-
2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to
establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the
Bar; and
4. Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11 (h) of LEBMO No. 1-
2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to
adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal education and to
provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:
1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding,
restricting, and qualifying admissions to law schools in violation of
the institutional academic freedom on who to admit, particularly:
a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college
graduates or graduating students applying for admission to the
basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a
requirement for admission to any law school in the Philippines and
that no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year
student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either
Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the
PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of studies for the
basic law course;
b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT
as a prerequisite for admission to law schools; Accordingly, the
temporary restraining order issued on March 12, 2019 enjoining the
Legal Education Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is
made PERMANENT. The regular admission of students who were
conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to the discretion of the
law schools in the exercise of their academic freedom; and
c. Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011.
2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the
qualifications and classification of faculty members, dean, and dean
of graduate schools of law in violation of institutional academic
freedom on who may teach, particularly:
a. Sections 41.2 (d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;
b. Resolution No. 2014-02;
c. Sections 31 (2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;
d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and
3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the
policies on the establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal
internship programs in violation of institutional academic freedom
on what to teach, particularly:
a. Resolution No. 2015-08;
b. Section 24 (c) of LEBMO No. 2; and
c. Section 59 (d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.
G.R. No. 133640 November 25, 2005
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style,
OUR LADY OF FATIMA BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing
business under the name and style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK;
PEOPLE’S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing
business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M.
GARCIA, M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY
REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing business
under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION
SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the
name and style, RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their individual capacities
and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD
BANKS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent.
G.R. No. 133661
DOCTORS’ BLOOD CENTER, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondent.
G.R. No. 139147
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style,
OUR LADY OF FATIMA BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing
business under the name and style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK;
PEOPLE’S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing
business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M.
GARCIA, M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY
REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing business
under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION
SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the
name and style, RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their Individual capacities
and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD
BANKS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent.
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was
enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate
supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by
regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President
Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the
Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by
respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).6
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 7 provides:
"Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial
blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the
effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by
the Secretary."
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:
"Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the
phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years,
extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A.
7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study
and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety."8
Pursuant to said Act, all commercial blood banks should have been phased
out by May 28, 1998. Hence, petitioners were granted by the Secretary of
Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May 27,
1998. On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration, they filed a petition
for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The case was entitled "Rodolfo S.
Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood
Bank."
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or status quo ante order.18
In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the constitutionality of the
questioned legal provisions, namely, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following
grounds: 19
1. The legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its
Implementing Rules violate the equal protection clause for irrationally
discriminating against free standing blood banks in a manner which is not
germane to the purpose of the law;
2. The said provisions represent undue delegation if not outright abdication
of the police power of the state; and,
3. The provisions are considered as deprivation of personal liberty.
Thereafter, Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition entitled "Doctors
Blood Center vs. Department of Health.” Both cases were consolidated.
Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7719
and its implementing rules and regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of
a license to operate commercial blood banks beyond May 27, 1998.
Then, Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) for respondent to
cease and desist from implementing and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 7719 and its implementing rules and regulations until further orders from
the Court.23
In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health submitted
that blood from commercial blood banks is unsafe and therefore the State, in
the exercise of its police power, can close down commercial blood banks to
protect the public. He cited the record of deliberations on Senate Bill No.
1101 which later became Republic Act No. 7719, and the sponsorship
speech of Senator Orlando Mercado.
On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded
Temporary Restraining Order for the Court to order respondent Secretary of
Health to cease and desist from announcing the closure of commercial blood
banks, compelling the public to source the needed blood from voluntary
donors only, and committing similar acts "that will ultimately cause the
shutdown of petitioners’ blood banks."27
On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment and/or Opposition
to the above motion stating that he has not ordered the closure of
commercial blood banks on account of the Temporary Restraining Order. In
compliance with the TRO, DOH had likewise ceased to distribute the health
advisory leaflets, posters and flyers to the public which state that "blood
banks are closed or will be closed."
On July 15, 1999, petitioners filed a Petition to Show Cause Why Public
Respondent Should Not be Held in Contempt of Court, citing public
respondent’s willful disobedience of or resistance to the restraining order
issued by the Court in the said case. Petitioners added that respondent, in
his effort to strike down the existence of commercial blood banks,
disseminated misleading information under the guise of health advisories,
press releases, leaflets, brochures and flyers.
In respondent Secretary’s Comment to the Petition to Show Cause Why
Public Respondent Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court, dated January
3, 2000, it was explained that nothing was issued by the department
ordering the closure of commercial blood banks. The subject health advisory
leaflets pertaining to said closure pursuant to Republic Act No. 7719 were
printed and circulated prior to the Court’s issuance of a temporary restraining
order on June 21, 1998.32
Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose of the
information campaign was "to promote the importance and safety of
voluntary blood donation and to educate the public about the hazards of
patronizing blood supplies from commercial blood banks."33 In doing so, he
was merely performing his regular functions and duties as the Secretary of
Health to protect the health and welfare of the public. Hence, by authority of
the law, respondent Secretary contends that he has the duty to promote the
program of voluntary blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the
public to donate blood voluntarily and educating the people on the risks
associated with blood coming from a paid donor promotes general health
and welfare and which should be given more importance than the
commercial businesses of petitioners.
Also, a Petition-in-Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments and
issues as laid down by petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661, namely,
the unconstitutionality of the Acts, and, the issuance of a writ of prohibitory
injunction. The intervenors are the immediate relatives of individuals who
had died allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at a critical time. The
intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes undue
delegation of legislative powers and unwarranted deprivation of personal
liberty.36
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER;
2. WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE;
3. WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE NON-
IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;
4. WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE
DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY;
5. WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWER; and,
6. WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS TRULY SERVE PUBLIC
WELFARE.
RULING:
No. The Court dismissed the petitions. There is no undue
delegation of legislative power if the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to
the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate
of the Legislature. As a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it
does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated
to it.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is
complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the
Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has
mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the
phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently
provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in
carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing
a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its
provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of
Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law.
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies.40 The Secretary of Health has been given, under
Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.
This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the
administrative body’s authority and expertise in the matter, came out with
Administrative Order No.9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative Order. No. 9 effectively
filled in the details of the law for its proper implementation.
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the
phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall be extended for another
two years until May 28, 1998 "based on the result of a careful study and
review of the blood supply and demand and public safety." This power to
ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary
may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by
Congress. In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers
granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period was extended in
accordance with the Act.
As to the issue of violating the equal protection clause, class legislation or
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but
classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously
is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.43
Republic Act No. 7719 was enacted for the promotion of public health and
welfare. To do this, the Legislature decided to order the phase out of
commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine blood banking system, to
regulate the supply and proper collection of safe blood, and so as not to
derail the implementation of the voluntary blood donation program of the
government.
Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create
a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be
allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between
nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks. The
classification was valid and reasonable for the following reasons:
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates
for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the latter is
motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood
donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of
commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to
provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or
medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the
phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as
a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood
donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as
shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking
system.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the
law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of
the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.
Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks
without exception.
Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not
Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid exercise of police power.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The
health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the
National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police
power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. Police
power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the
interference of the State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of
the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood
banks. This action may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as
the employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way
to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of
the State’s police power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the
circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both necessary and
reasonable for the common good. Police power is the State authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare.
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues
raised by petitioners, namely, deprivation of personal liberty and property,
and violation of the non-impairment clause, to be unmeritorious.
Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void
because it infringes on the freedom of choice of an individual in connection
to what he wants to do with his blood. Additionally, under the Civil Code, the
human body and its organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver are
outside the commerce of man but this cannot be made to apply to human
blood because the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human
blood equally as the human organs would constitute invalid classification.
Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial blood banks
will be disadvantageous to them as it will affect their businesses and existing
contracts with hospitals and other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the
Act should be struck down because it violates the non-impairment clause
provided by the Constitution.
As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to this
fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be
subordinated.
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all
rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may
regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-
being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change,
or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground
for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.56 Those who petition
this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly
establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality
of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes
a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for
Congress to determine.
1. In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the National Blood
Services Act of 1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the
Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. The petitions
are DISMISSED. Consequently, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by
this Court on June 2, 1998, is LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in
contempt of court is DENIED for lack of merit.
JAMES MIRASOL, RICHARD SANTIAGO, and LUZON
MOTORCYCLISTS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and
TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, Respondents.

FACTS:
On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction docketed as
Civil Case No. 01-034. The petition sought the declaration of
nullity of the following administrative issuances for being
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled
"Limited Access Highway Act" enacted in 1957:
a. DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968;
b. DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993;
c. Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access
Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB).
Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH
issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215
declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway
as limited access facilities.
Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February
8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of
the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total
ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and
South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal
Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.
On June 28, 2001, the TRIAL COURT, thru then Presiding
Judge Teofilo Guadiz, after due hearing, issued an order
granting petitioners’ application for preliminary
injunction. On July 16, 2001, a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued by the trial court, conditioned upon petitioners’
filing of cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00, which
petitioners subsequently complied with.
On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued
Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine
displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access
facilities (toll ways).
Upon the assumption of Honorable Presiding Judge Ma.
Cristina Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were
required to file their respective Memoranda. Petitioners
likewise filed [their] Supplemental Memorandum. Thereafter,
the case was deemed submitted for decision.
Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the TRIAL COURT issued
the assailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring
invalid DO 123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
dismissal of their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in
its Order dated June 16, 2003.
ISSUE/S:
1. WHETHER THE RTC’S DECISION IS ALREADY BARRED
BY RES JUDICATA;
2. WHETHER DO 74, DO 215 AND THE TRB REGULATIONS
CONTRAVENE RA 2000; AND
3. WHETHER AO 1 AND DO 123 ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
HELD:
1. No. The RTC’s decision is not barred by res judicata.
Petitioners rely on the RTC’s Order dated 28 June
2001, which granted their prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. Since respondents did not
appeal from that Order, petitioners argue that the Order
became "a final judgment" on the issues. Petitioners
conclude that the RTC erred when it subsequently
dismissed their petition in its Decision dated 10 March
2003.
Petitioners are mistaken. As the RTC correctly stated,
the Order dated 28 June 2001 was not an
adjudication on the merits of the case that would
trigger res judicata. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
does not serve as a final determination of the issues. It
is a provisional remedy, which merely serves to
preserve the status quo until the court could hear the
merits of the case. A preliminary injunction is a mere
adjunct, an ancillary remedy which exists only as an
incident of the main proceeding.
2. Yes. DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH
has no authority to declare certain expressways as
limited access facilities. Under the EO No. 546, which
was issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, it
is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and
enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of
transportation and to regulate related activities.
Under Section 1 of EO 546, the Ministry of Public
Works (now DPWH) assumed the public works functions of the
Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications.
On the other hand, among the functions of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications (now Department of
Transportation and Communications [DOTC]) were to (1)
formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for
the preparation and implementation of an integrated and
comprehensive transportation and communications systems at
the national, regional, and local levels; and (2) regulate,
whenever necessary, activities relative to transportation and
communications and prescribe and collect fees in the exercise
of such power. Clearly, under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the
DPWH, which has authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit
access to limited access facilities.
Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities
relative to transportation, the TRB cannot derive its power from
the DPWH to issue regulations governing limited access
facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function
which it does not possess in the first place. Since DO 74 and
DO 215 are void, it follows that the rules implementing them
are likewise void.
3. DO 123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to
promulgate it.
DO 123 reads in part:
SUBJECT: Revised Rules and Regulations Governing
Limited Access Highways
By virtue of the authority granted the Secretary of
Public Works and Highways under Section 3 of R.A.
2000, otherwise known as the Limited Access Highway
Act, the following revised rules and regulations
governing limited access highways are hereby
promulgated for the guidance of all concerned:
1. Administrative Order No. 1 dated February 19, 1968,
issued by the Secretary of the then Department of
Public Works and Communications, is hereby
amended by deleting the word "motorcycles"
mentioned in Section 3(h) thereof. Therefore,
motorcycles are hereby allowed to operate inside the
toll roads and limited access highways, subject to the
following:
a. Motorcycles shall have an engine displacement of at
least 400 cubic centimeters (cc) provided that:
As previously discussed, the DPWH has no authority to
regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has
devolved this function to the DOTC.
Administrative Order No. 1 of Department of Public
Works and Communications is VALID
The assailed portion of AO 1 states:
Section 3. On limited access highways, it is unlawful for
any person or group of persons to:
xxxx
(h) Drive any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or
any vehicle (not motorized);
xxxx
The Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communications issued AO 1 on 19 February 1968.
Section 3 of RA 200029 authorized the issuance of the
guidelines. In contrast, DPWH issued DO 74, DO 215 and DO
123 after EO 546 devolved to the DOTC the authority to
regulate limited access highways.
The Court finds that AO 1 does not impose
unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines several
precautionary measures, to which toll way users must adhere.
These rules were designed to ensure public safety and the
uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities. They
cover several subjects, from what lanes should be used by a
certain vehicle, to maximum vehicle height. The prohibition of
certain types of vehicles is but one of these. None of these
rules violates reason. The purpose of these rules and the logic
behind them are quite evident. A toll way is not an ordinary
road. The special purpose for which a toll way is constructed
necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its
use and operation. Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain
rights. But the mere fact that certain rights are restricted does
not invalidate the rules.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS,
NAMELY, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, and VLADIMIR ALARIQUE
T. CABIGAO, petitioners,
 v. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as mayor of the City of
Manila, respondent.
G.R. No. 187836 & 187916, November 25, 2014, Perez, J.
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to
property--- alleging that they stand to lose billions of
pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to
life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The
reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes
with a few individuals’ right to property, the former
should prevail.
Facts:
Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is
situated along the banks of the Pasig river. In the 1920s, it was
classified as an industrial zone. Among its early industrial
settlers were the oil companies. Today, Pandacan has become
a densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000 people,
majority of whom are urban poor. The 36-hectare Pandacan
Terminals house the oil companies’ distribution terminals
and depot facilities. The terminals store fuel and other
petroleum products.
During the incumbency of former Mayor Lito Atienza,
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted against the continued stay
of the oil depots. Chevron Philippines, Inc., Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation (collectively
“oil companies”) were then ordered to stop the operation of
their business. Meanwhile, Mayor Atienza also approved
Ordinance No. 8119. Article V, Sec. 23 thereof designated the
Pandacan oil depot area as a “Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone” (O-PUD).
These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social
Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as
G.R. No. 156052), where the Court found: (1) that the
ordinance subject thereof – Ordinance No. 8027 – was
enacted "to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of
the inhabitants of Manila;" (2) that it had passed the tests of a
valid ordinance; and (3) that it is not superseded by Ordinance
No. 8119. Declaring that it is constitutional and valid, the
Court accordingly ordered its immediate enforcement with a
specific directive on the relocation and transfer of the
Pandacan oil terminals.
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former
Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim), who succeeded Mayor
Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No.
8187. The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or
otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of
Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions
inconsistent therewith thereby allowing, once again, the
operation of the oil depots in the Pandacan area.
The SJS now seek the nullification of Ordinance No.
8187, which contains provisions contrary to those embodied
in Ordinance No. 8027. Allegations of violation of the right to
health and the right to a healthful and balanced environment
are also included. Mayor Lim countered that the Ordinance
was in the valid exercise of police power of the Local
Government.
Issue: by Ordinance No. 8187, compels the affirmance of the Court’s
Decision in G.R. No. 156052.
Whether or not the enactment of Ordinance No. 8187
The objective adopted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
allowing the continued stay of the oil companies in the depots
to promote the constituents’ general welfare in terms of
is invalid and unconstitutional.
economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to
Ruling: life, security and safety of the people.

YES. Ordinance No. 8187, in relation to the continued

 Sangguniang Panlungsod's failure to uphold the
stay of the oil depots in the Pandacan Terminals, is invalid and
duty to promote the general welfare of the City
unconstitutional.
of Manila. (in relation to police power)
[In 2001, the Sanggunian found the relocation of the
 Ordinance No. 8027 remains a valid exercise of
Pandacan oil depots necessary, hence, the enactment of
police power,
Ordinance No. 8027. In 2009, when the composition of the
but Ordinance No. 8187 should be struck down.
Sanggunian had already changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was
As to the argument of the oil companies that the
passed in favor of the retention of the oil depots. In 2012,
threat of a terrorist attack is merely conjectural, the Court
again when some of the previous members were no longer re-
rules that the issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal
elected, but with the Vice-Mayor still holding the same seat,
is not a likely target of terrorist attacks has already been
Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give the oil depots until
passed upon in G.R. No. 156052. The very nature of the
the end of January 2016 within which to transfer to another
depots where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly
site.]
volatile products, regardless of whether or not the
It appears that, notwithstanding that the conditions
composition may cause explosions, has no place in a densely
with respect to the operations of the oil depots existing prior
populated area. Surely, any untoward incident in the oil
to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially
depots, be it related to terrorism of whatever origin or
differ to this day, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
otherwise, would definitely cause not only destruction to
on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the
properties within and among the neighboring communities
new composition of the council and/or political affiliations.
but certainly mass deaths and injuries.
The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the
It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere
“general welfare” of the city does not after all gear towards
subdual of risk of catastrophe that the Court saw in and made
the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning,
the Court favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected
but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal
preference of the members who sit in the council as to which
particular sector among its constituents it wishes to favor.
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., doing business under the name
and style "Carlos Superdrug", ELSIE M. CANO, doing business
under the name and style "Advance Drug", Dr. SIMPLICIO L.
YAP, JR., doing business under the name and style "City
Pharmacy", MELVIN S. DELA SERNA, doing business under the
name and style "Botica dela Serna", and LEYTE SERV-WELL
CORP., doing business under the name and style "Leyte Serv-
Well Drugstore", petitioners
vs . DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT
(DSWD), DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (DOH), DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE (DOF), DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR and LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(DILG), respondents
Ponente: Justice Azcuna
FACTS: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors
operating drugstores in the Philippines. Public respondents, on the
other hand, are specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores'
compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and
prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore
establishments.
On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257 (EXPANDED SENIOR CITIZENS
ACT), amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21
which granted privileges for Senior Citizens a discount from all
establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers,
and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive
use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial
services for the death of senior citizens; The establishment may
claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax
deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services
rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed
as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be
included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be
subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
On May 28, 2004, the DSWD approved and adopted the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9257. The Drug
Stores Association of the Philippines (DSAP) submitted a query
concerning the meaning of a tax deduction under the Expanded
Senior Citizens Act. The DOF, through Director IV Ma. Lourdes B.
Recente differentiated Tax Credit and Tax Reduction. She explained
that Tax credit is a peso-for-peso deduction from a taxpayer's tax
liability due to the government of the amount of discounts such
establishment has granted to a senior citizen. The establishment
recovers the full amount of discount given to a senior citizen and
hence, the government shoulders 100% of the discounts granted. It
is necessary however that that prior payments of taxes have been
made and the taxpayer is attempting to recover this tax payment
from his/her income tax due. The tax credit scheme under R.A. No.
7432 is, therefore, inapplicable if no tax payments have previously
occurred. Tax deduction as defined by R.A. No. 9257 on the other
hand is a discount from gross income, based on net cost of goods
sold or services rendered. Under this scheme, the establishment
concerned is allowed to deduct from gross income, in computing for
its tax liability, the amount of discounts granted to senior citizens.
Effectively, the government loses in terms of foregone revenues an
amount equivalent to the marginal tax rate the said establishment is
liable to pay the government. This will be an amount equivalent to
32% of the twenty percent (20%) discounts so granted. The
establishment shoulders the remaining portion of the granted
discounts. To sum up, under a tax deduction scheme, the tax
deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together
with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses
before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable
Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the
amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted
directly from the tax due amount.
Aside from the establishments that may claim tax credits under the
old law, more establishments were added under the new law such
as: establishments providing medical and dental services, diagnostic
and laboratory services, including professional fees of attending
doctors in all private hospitals and medical facilities, operators of
domestic air and sea transport services, public railways and skyways
and bus transport services.
On October 1, 2004 the DOH released the “Expanded Senior Citizens
Act of 2013” providing the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount
in the purchase of prescription and non-prescription medicines
whether branded or generic from all establishments dispensing
medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens. It stated that
"[t]he grant of twenty percent (20%) discount shall be provided in
the purchase of medicines from all establishments dispensing
medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens".
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) of the
Expanded Senior Citizens Act based on the following grounds:
1) The law is confiscatory because it infringes Art. III, Sec. 9
of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation;
2) It violates the equal protection clause (Art. III, Sec. 1)
enshrined in our Constitution which states that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied of the equal protection of the laws;" and
3) The 20% discount on medicines violates the
constitutional guarantee in Article XIII, Section 11 that makes
"essential goods, health and other social services available to all
people at affordable cost."
Petitioners assert that Section 4 (a) of the law is unconstitutional
because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling
drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will
result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a
mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law
failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly
compensated for the discount.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the State, in promoting the health and
welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private
establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government
program? (YES)
HELD: PETITION DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent
of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word just is
used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property
to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. A tax deduction
does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As
such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation.
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize
the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant
benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-
being as the State considers them an integral part of our society.
The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution
as set forth in the law itself [R.A. No. 9257, Section 2 (f)]. The law
grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and
dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees
charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other
similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic
land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar
lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and
purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior
citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior
citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for
its object. Police power is described as "the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to
all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of
the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." For this
reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police
power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare. Police power as an attribute to
promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the
mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and
capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the
absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect
of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in
view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of
the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business,
because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and
come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to
show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really
works greatly to their disadvantage.
Petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which
should not be the case as the law states that the cost of the
discount shall be deducted from gross income, the amount of
income derived from all sources before deducting allowable
expenses, which will result in net income (See the Norvasc exhibit
by Carlos Super Drug). Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to
criticize the law because they cannot raise the prices of their
medicines given the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry.
It is a business decision on the part of petitioners to peg the mark-
up at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition cost, as alleged by
petitioners, is merely a result of this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is
a property right, petitioners cannot reproach the law for being
oppressive, simply because they cannot afford to raise their prices
for fear of losing their customers to competition. The Court is not
oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the
competitive pricing component of the business. While the
Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the
realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power,
can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an
impairment of property rights in the process.
DRUGSTORES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioners v.
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY AFFAIRS (NCDA),
respondents
FACTS: This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with a
prayer of Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with regards to the decision made
regarding the implementation of the 20% discount on the
purchasing of medicine by Persons with Disability (PWD).
On March 24, 1992, Republic Act 7277 also known as the
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was passed and was then
amended by Republic Act 9442 which was known as the
Magna Carta for Persons with Disability. The said law defined
what covers Persons with Disability and the discount to be
provided on medicinal purpose for the said people. Section 32
of RA 9442 granted the PWD with a 20% discount on
purchases of medicine whether branded or unbranded upon
the presentation of the following:
(i) An identification card issued by the city or municipal
mayor or the barangay captain of the place where the
person with disability resides;
(ii) The passport of the person with disability
concerned; or
(iii) Transportation discount fare Identification Card
(ID) issued by the National Council for the Welfare of
Disabled Persons (NCWDP).
In relation to this the National Council on Disability Affairs
presented the following guidelines on how PWDs would get
the following identification to benefit from the discount.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Prohibition with
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction to annul the following laws:
1) Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by
R.A. No. 9442;
2) Section 6, Rule IV of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of R.A. No. 9442;
Issues:
 Whether or not it is a valid exercise of Police Power –
YES
 Whether or not it violates the Due Process Clause – NO
 Whether or not it violates the Equal Protection Clause
because of singling out drugstores to bear the burden
– NO

Held:
3) NCDA A.O. No. 1;
POLICE POWER
4) DOF Revenue Regulation No. 1-2009;
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar
5) DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011. to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but
The Court of Appeals then rendered a decision which upheld
has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
the constitutionality of R.A. 7277 as amended by R.A. 9442,
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
however, suspended the effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
because of pending proof with filing of the said administrative
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
order with the Office of the National Administrative Registrar
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential,
(ONAR) and its publication in a newspaper of general
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it
circulation. The respondent then filed a motion for
does to all the great public needs. It is the power vested in the
reconsideration regarding the suspension of NCDA A.O. No. 1
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish
where the suspension was lifted by attaching a proof of
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
publication in the Philippine Star and the Daily Tribune with
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
certification from the ONAR. After the lifting of the
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
suspension, the petitioners then filed for a motion for
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
reconsideration which was then turned down by the Court of
same.
Appeals.
Police power is the power of the state to promote public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. On the other hand, the power of eminent domain is
the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which
the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private
property to public use upon payment of just compensation. In
the exercise of police power, property rights of private
individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state. A legislative act based on the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In more
familiar words, (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify
the interference of the state; and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
DUE PROCESS
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277, as amended by R.A. No. 9442,
must be read with its IRR which stated that upon its effectivity,
NCWDP (which is the government agency tasked to ensure the
implementation of RA 7277), would adopt the IDC issued by
the local government units for purposes of uniformity in the
implementation. Thus, NCDA A.O. No. 1 provides the
reasonable guidelines in the issuance of IDCs to PWDs as proof
of their entitlement to the privileges and incentives under the
law and fills the details in the implementation of the law.
As stated in NCDA A.O. No. 1, before an IDC is issued by the
city or municipal mayor or the barangay captain, or the
Chairman of the NCDA, the applicant must first secure a
medical certificate issued by a licensed private or government
physician that will confirm his medical or disability condition.
If an applicant is an employee with apparent disability, a
"certificate of disability" issued by the head of the business
establishment or the head of the non-governmental
organization is needed for him to be issued a PWD-IDC. For a
student with apparent disability, the "school assessment"
issued by the teacher and signed by the school principal
should be presented to avail of a PWD-ID. In line with this, the
petitioners then argued that non-competent people such as
teachers, head of establishments and non-governmental
organization heads to confirm the medical condition is
misplaced. It must be stressed that only for apparent
disabilities can the teacher or head of a business
establishment validly issue the mentioned required document
because, obviously, the disability is easily seen or clearly
visible. It is, therefore, not an unqualified grant of authority
for the said non-medical persons as it is simply limited to
apparent disabilities. For a non-apparent disability or a
disability condition that is not easily seen or clearly visible, the
disability can only be validated by a licensed private or
government physician, and a medical certificate has to be
presented in the procurement of an IDC.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Under the equal protection clause, all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike, both in the privileges
conferred and the obligations imposed. Conversely, all
persons or things differently situated should be treated
differently.
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is
equality under the same conditions and among persons
similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of
treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial
differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When
things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they
may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union, this Court declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of
the State. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid
the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every
man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Subject to the determination of the courts as to what is a
proper exercise of police power using the due process clause
and the equal protection clause as yardsticks, the State may
interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this
particular, a large discretion is necessarily vested in the
legislature to determine, not only what interests of the public
require, but what measures are necessary for the protection
of such interests. Thus, we are mindful of the fundamental
criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute. The burden of proof is on him who claims that a
statute is unconstitutional. Petitioners failed to discharge such
burden of proof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 26, 2010, and the Resolution
dated November 19, 2010, in CA-G.R. SP No. 109903 are
AFFIRMED.
MARK ANTHONY V. ZABAL, THITING ESTOSO
JACOSALEM, AND ODON S. BANDIOLA, petitioners, vs.
RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the
Philippines; SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, Executive
Secretary; and EDUARDO M. AÑO, [Secretary] of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government, respondents.
G.R. No. 238467. February 12, 2019. DEL CASTILLO, J:
Facts:
In February 2018, during a business forum in Davao, President
Duterte stated that Boracay has become a cesspool and that he would
later place the said island under a state of calamity. Not long after, on
April 4, 2018, President Duterte ordered the shutting down of the
island and the said total closure of the island was to officially begin
on April 26, 2018. The maximum duration of the said closure was
for only a total of six (6) months. According to the petitioners, the
closure was then followed by the deployment of around 630 police
and military personnel including crowd dispersal management
personnel.
Concerning the closure of the island, on April 25, 2018, petitioners
Mark Anthony Zabal (Zabal), Thiting Estoso Jacosalem (Jacosalem),
and Odon Bandiola (Bandiola) filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary Injunction, and/or Status Quo Ante Order against
herein respondents President Rodrigo Duterte (President Duterte),
Executive Secretary Salvador Medialea, and Secretary Eduardo Año
of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
Zabal and Jacosalem claim that the shutting down of the islands
would result in the grave and irreparable damage especially towards
them as residents of the islands. Both Zabal and Jacosalem depend
on tourist activities as their source of income. Zabal builds
sandcastles for tourist while Jacosalem drives locals and non-locals
around the island. Among the petitioners, Bandiola was the only one
who is not a resident of the island but would occasionally visit the
island for business and pleasure. The three base their locus standi on
direct injury and also from the transcendental importance doctrine.
On May 18, 2018, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition praying
for the court to declare Proclamation No. 475 (issued on April 26,
2018, the day after they filed the original petition) unconstitutional
for the said closure of the island and the banning of tourist and non-
residence of the area.
The island was then reopened on October 26, 2018.
Argument of the Petitioners: The petitioners claim that a petition
for prohibition and action for mandamus are the proper remedy to be
used in the present case. Stating that prohibition be applied to
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials while an action for
mandamus lies against the respondent’s unlawful exclusion of
another from the enjoyment of an entitled right or office. The
petitioners assert that (1) whether or not President Duterte acted
within the scope of powers granted to him by the Constitution and
whether or not the measures implemented violates the right to travel
and due process; and, (2) President Duterte exercised a power
legislative in nature, thus unlawfully excluding the legislative
department from the assertion of such power.
In its substantive aspects, petitioners argue that Proclamation No.
475 is a product of an invalid exercise of legislative power that must
be struck down for it partakes of a law the issuance of which is not
vested in the President. Furthermore, it is unconstitutional for the
reason that it is a violation of one’s constitutional right to travel and
due process.
According to Section 6, Article III of the Constitution, it can be
indeed impair the right to travel however only based on two (2)
conditions which are: (1) that there be a law restricting said travel,
and (2) that the restriction is based on national security, public safety
or public health. Petitioners argue that these requisites are not present
for there is no law mentioned in Proclamation No. 475 and that the
presence of tourists on the island does not pose any threat to national
security, public safety or public health.
With regard to due process, they argue that the same cover property
rights including their right to work and earn a living.
Petitioners also argue that the closure of Boracay could not be
anchored on police power for it must not be exercised by the
executive but rather, by the legislative through the creation of
statutes and ordinances.
With regards to the Supplemental Petition, petitioners argue that
Proclamation No. 475 is invalid for ordering the local autonomy of
affected Local Government Units (LGU’s) for the President can only
supervise over LGU’s and does not have the power to control over
them.
To the petitioners, this is not a simple case of the need to rehabilitate
the island but rather on the extent of the executive power and the
manner it was implemented. Such a situation does not justify the
President’s abuse of power.
Argument of the Respondents: Respondents first assert that
President Duterte be excluded from party-respondent for the reason
that the President is immune from suit. They also argue that the said
petition be dismissed for lack of basis. According to respondents,
prohibition is a preventive measure that cannot be made to apply in
the present case for the reason that Proclamation No. 475 was
already issued by the President and was currently ongoing and, as a
rule, a writ of prohibition cannot be made to apply on an act that is
already fait accompli. With regard to the action of mandamus, the
respondents claim that it is neither proper. According to Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it provides that a mandamus petition
may be resorted to when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station. Thus, in the present case, respondents argue that mandamus
cannot lie for they were not neglectful of their duty to protect the
environment and, therefore, mandamus is obviously inappropriate.
The respondents also add that there is no real justiciable controversy.
In the said case, there exists no clear discord between the right of the
State to preserve and protect its natural resources from the right of
the petitioners to earn a living. Proclamation No. 475 does not
prohibit anyone from being gainfully employed.
In its substantive aspect, respondents argue that Proclamation No.
475 is indeed a valid exercise of delegated legislative power as stated
on Section 16 of Republic Act (RA) No. 10121 (Philippine Disaster
Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010) in where it is the
authority given to the President to declare a state of calamity.
Respondents emphasize that the issuance of Proclamation No. 475 is
within the ambit of the powers of the President, not contrary to the
doctrine of separation of powers, and in accordance with the
mechanism laid out by the Constitution.
With regards to petitioners claims that Proclamation 475 is violative
of the right to travel and to due process, respondents emphasize that
the right to travel is not absolute. In connection to due process, being
that said petitioners belong to the informal economy sector, their
source of livelihood is never guaranteed and is susceptible to
changes in regulations and the overall business climate. In any case,
petitioners’ contentions must yield to the State’s sexercise of police
power for private interests should yield to the reasonable
prerogatives of the State for the public good and welfare.
In the Supplementary Petition, respondents insist that Proclamation
No. 475 does not unduly transgress upon the local autonomy of the
LGU’s concerned. Under RA 10121, the Local Disaster Risk
Reduction Management Council is the one tasked to take the lead in
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from the effects of any
disaster when a state of calamity is declared. Taking into account the
magnitude and gravity of the problem requires the intervention and
assistance of different national government agencies in coordination
with the concerned LGU’s.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Prohibition and Mandamus are proper
remedies in the said case?
2. Whether or not Proclamation 475 poses an actual
impairment on the right to travel?
3. Whether or not Proclamation 475 be upheld for being in the
nature of valid police power?
4. Whether or not petitioners have vested rights on their
sources of income as to be entitled to due process?
5. Whether or not there exists an intrusion into the autonomy of
the concerned LGU’s?
Held:
1.) Yes, under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it can
be averred that prohibition is a preventive remedy and that,
as a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to
prevent the performance of an act which is about to be done.
It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished. With Section 3 of the same Rule 65,
mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station.
According to respondents, both prohibition and mandamus
cannot lie in the current case in connection to the above-
mentioned paragraph. They contend that prohibition cannot
lie on issues that are already a fait accompli. Neither is
mandamus for their only doing their duty to protect the
environment from further deterioration.
However, according to the court, the use of prohibition and
mandamus is not merely confined to Rule 65. As stated by
the court, these are extraordinary remedies that may be
invoked when there exists a constitutional violation or
issues that are raised. Citing the case of Spouses Imbong v.
 Hon. Ochoa, Jr, ...prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials, as there is no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
These remedies are, still, not without limitations. For it to
apply, the four (4) requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review must be present and these are: (1) there must
be an actual case or controversy, (2) the petitioner must
posses a locus standi, (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
2.) No, this case does not actually involve the right to travel in
its essential sense contrary to what petitioners want to
portray. Any bearing that Proclamation No. 475 may have on
the right to travel is merely corollary to the closure of
Boracay and the ban of tourists and non-residents therefrom
which were necessary incidents of the island's rehabilitation.
There is certainly no showing that Proclamation No. 475
deliberately meant to impair the right to travel. The
questioned proclamation is clearly focused on its purpose
of rehabilitating Boracay and any intention to directly
restrict the right cannot, in any manner, be deduced
from its import.
Citing the case of Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. v. Hon. Drilon, the Court held that the
consequence on the right to travel of the deployment ban
implemented by virtue of Department Order No. 1, Series of
1998 of the Department of Labor and Employment does not
impair the right.
In addition to this, the closure of Boracay was only limited
for a period of six (6) months and will no longer extend after
the prescription of the said months. Hence, if at all, the
impact of Proclamation No. 475 on the right to travel is not
direct but merely consequential; and, the same is only for a
reasonably short period of time or merely temporary.
With regards to the discussion on whether President Duterte
exercised a power legislative in nature loses its significance.
Since Proclamation No. 475 does not actually impose a
restriction on the right to travel, its issuance did not result to
any substantial alteration of the relationship between the
State and the people. The proclamation is therefore not a
law and conversely, the President did not usurp the law-
making power of the legislature.
3.) Yes, being that police power, amongst the three fundamental
and inherent powers of the state, is the most pervasive and
comprehensive. "It has been defined as the 'state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote general welfare."
"Expansive and extensive as its reach may be, police power
is not a force without limits. It has to be exercised within
bounds — lawful ends through lawful means, i.e., that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from that
of a particular class, require its exercise, and that the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose while not being unduly oppressive upon
individuals."
That the assailed governmental measure, in this case, is
within the scope of police power cannot be disputed. The
motivating factor in the issuance of Proclamation No. 475 is
without a doubt the interest of the public in general. Being
 that, one of the root causes of the problems that beset
Boracay was tourist influx and, as early as 2007, DENR had
already determined this as the major cause of the
catastrophic depletion of the island's biodiversity. Certainly,
the closure of Boracay, albeit temporarily, gave the island its
much-needed breather, and likewise afforded the
government the necessary leeway in its rehabilitation
program.
In any case, the closure, to emphasize, was only for a
definite period of six months. To the mind of the Court, this
period constitutes a reasonable time frame, if not to
complete, but to at least put in place the necessary
rehabilitation works to be done on the island. Indeed, the
temporary closure of Boracay, although unprecedented and
radical as it may seem, was reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive under the circumstances.
Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 475 is a valid police
power measure. Police power constitutes an implied
limitation to the Bill of Rights, and that even liberty
itself, the greatest of all rights, is subject to the far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater
number.
4.) No, with the petitioner’s argument that the issuance of
Proclamation No. 475 has violated their constitutional right
to due process cannot lie. They claim that this right was
taken away when they were deprived of their right to work
and their right to make a living. According to the petitioners,
“profession, trade or calling is a property right within the
meaning of our constitutional guarantees”. They claim that
this was violated when Proclamation No. 475 was issued.
The court, however, stressed that "when the conditions so
demand as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
yield to general welfare."
Petitioners Zabal and Jacosalem cannot be said to have
vested rights to their sources of income in Boracay for they
are included in the informal sector of the economy where
earnings are not guaranteed. As stated in the case of
Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. Department of Social
Welfare and Development, “vested rights are fixed,
unalterable, or irrevocable”. It was also mentioned there
that, ...A right is not vested unless it is more than a mere
expectancy based on the anticipated continuance of
present laws; it must be established interest in property,
not open to doubt. x x x To be vested in its accurate legal
sense, a right must be complete and consummated, and
one of which the person to whom it belongs cannot be
divested without his consent.
In the present case, Zabal and Jacosalem only possessed a
mere inchoate right or one that has not fully developed and
therefore cannot be claimed as one’s own. As stated by the
court, an inchoate right is a mere expectation, which may or
may not come into fruition. With this, even without the said
banning of tourists from entering the island, there can be no
guarantee that they will gain any profit unless these people
avail of them. Thus, said vested rights on their income
cannot apply to petitioners which leads to their claim of lack
of due process being untenable. As mentioned in the present
case, only rights which have completely and definitely
accrued and settled are entitled protection under the due
process clause.
5.) No, there were no intrusions into the autonomy of the
concerned LGU’s. With RA 10121, it gave LGU’s premium
roles in the disaster risk reduction and management and can WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
be seen with the amount of legislative policies that were is DISMISSED.
aimed towards the strengthening of the powers of the
SO ORDERED.
LGU’s. The mere involvement of other governmental
agencies with regards to the rehabilitation of the island does
not constitute to the encroachment of the powers and
functions of the LGU’s. All have their own designated roles
as defined and enumerated in Executive Order No. 53.
Boracay, being a prime tourist destination for both local and
CITY OF BATANGAS, petitioner v. PHIL. SHELL.
foreign tourist signifies that any threat or issues that exist are PET. CO, respondent
not only of local concern but at the national level. Even if the
LGU’s have been fully aware of the island’s situation, it still GR NO. 195003 || June 7, 2017
shows that it has failed to address it. Thus, Proclamation No.
475 directed "[a]ll departments, agencies, and offices, Police Power delegated to local government units must be
including government-owned or controlled corporations exercised according to the will of their principal.
and affected local government units x x x to implement
and execute x x x the closure [of Boracay] and the Facts: To promote the discovery of indigenous petroleum
appropriate rehabilitation works, in accordance with
pursuant to P.D. 87, DOE (Department of Energy) executed a
pertinent operational plans and directives, including the
service contract with SPEX (Shell Philippines Exploration, B. V.)
Boracay Action Plan."
to authorize the latter to explore North Western Palawan for
In the case of Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. possible petroleum sources. When SPEX found an abundance
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, with the failure of of natural gas in Malampaya field, the Malampaya project was
government agencies to address the existing environmental
issues despite hard evidence, the court took it upon itself to
created, requiring the construction of an offshore pipeline to
put the heads of concerned department-agencies and the transport natural gas from the field to Batangas so that the
bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice and to gas may be treated in PSPC’s (Philippine Shell Petroleum
enjoin them to perform their mandates and duties towards Corporation) refinery.
the clean-up and/or restoration of Manila Bay, through a
"continuing mandamus". In 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Batangas
enacted City Ordinance No. 3 s. 2001, which required heavy
industries operating along the portions of Batangas Bay to
All told, the Court sustains the constitutionality and
validity of Proclamation No. 475. construct desalination plants to facilitate the use of seawater
as coolant for their industrial facilities. Heavy industries
subject of the ordinance had until 2006 to comply with its
provisions. Among the facilities affected by the ordinance is
PSPC's Tabangao Refinery.
In 2006, PSPC then filed a petition against Batangas and the SP
to the RTC, praying that the ordinance be made null and void.
Among PSPC’s contentions were that the enactment of the
ordinance constituted an invalid exercise of police power as it
failed to meet the substantive requirements for validity. The
ordinance allegedly had no legal basis and encroached upon
the power of the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) to
regulate and control the Philippines' water resources.
In response, Batangas City and the SP maintained that they
have the power to enact the ordinance pursuant to the
general welfare clause under the LGC (Local Government
Code). According to them, the rationale of the ordinance is to
promote the use of seawater as coolants for machineries,
considering that fresh ground water is a "perishable
commodity." Furthermore, Batangas City and the SP
countered that the regulation on the use of ground water is
merely incidental to the main purpose of the ordinance,
hence, regulatory and prohibitive provisions may be taken out
without entirely impairing the validity of the ordinance.
In 2007, the RTC declared the ordinance invalid. On appeal,
the CA reaffirmed the decision of the RTC, hence the
certiorari.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision
which declared the City Ordinance No. 3 s. 2001 invalid.
Held: The SC affirmed the decision of the CA.
The Assailed Ordinance is void for being ultra vires, for being
contrary to existing law, and for lack of evidence showing the
existence of factual basis for its enactment.
In order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the concerned LGU to enact,
but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. The ordinance (i) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must
not prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (vi) must not be
unreasonable.
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the general welfare of the people. As an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, police power primarily rests with the State. In
furtherance of the State's policy to foster local autonomy, the
national legislature delegated the exercise of police power to
local government units (LGUs) as agents of the State. Since
LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the State, it
is incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the will of
their principal, the State.
The Water Code governs the ownership, appropriation,
utilization, exploitation, development, conservation and
protection of water resources. Under Article 3 thereof, water
resources are placed under the control and regulation of the
government through the National Water Resources Council,
now the NWRB. The ordinance effectively contravened the
provisions of the Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas
City the power to control and regulate the use of ground
water which, by virtue of the Water Code, pertains solely to
the NWRB. By enacting City Ordinance No. 3, Batangas City
acted in excess of the powers granted to it as a LGU, rendering
the Assailed Ordinance ultra vires.
Batangas City also failed to prove the existence of factual basis
to justify the enactment of City Ordinance No. 3. As held in
Ermita-Ma/ate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v.
City Mayor of Manila, the presumption of validity ascribed to
an ordinance prevails only in the absence of some factual
foundation of record sufficient to overthrow the assailed
issuance. In this case, the presumption of validity had been
overturned by PSPC’s documentary and testimonial evidence
showing that no substantial diminution in the ground water of
Tabangao-Malitam watershed had occurred in the last three
(3) decades, and that no threat of depletion of ground water
resources in said watershed existed (Engr. Caranto’s
hydrogeology study).
Batangas City is not precluded from exercising its right to
protect its inhabitants from injurious effects provided that
such exercise is done within the framework of applicable
national law, particularly, the Water Code.
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES
MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR),
respondent.
G.R. No. 91649; May 14, 1991
FACTS:
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and
was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1,
1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land
or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its
operation was originally conducted in the well known floating
casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success
for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund
infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was
passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D.
1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by
law. PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the
Philippines.
Petitioners filed the petition because it is allegedly contrary to
morals, public policy and order, and because of the following issues:
ISSUES:
(1) WON it waived the Manila City gov't's right to impose taxes and
license fees, which is recognized by law.
(2) WON it has intruded into the LGUs' right to impose local taxes
and license fees, and thus contrary to the principle of local
autonomy enshrined in the Constitution.
(3) WON it violates the equal protection clause as it allows some
gambling acts but also prohibits other gaming acts.
(4) WON it violates the government’s policy of being away from
monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and
privatization.
HELD:
(1) No. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has
no inherent right to impose taxes. Thus, "the Charter or statute
must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality
cannot assume it". Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield
to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by
the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax".
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress.
It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere
creatures of Congress" which has the power to "create and abolish
municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers".
Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or
even take back the power.
(2) No. The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on
gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of
local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise,
licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was
vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only
the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or
permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to
demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the
issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of
Manila.
(3) No. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals
who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as
the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not
have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature
from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require
situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law
as though they were the same.
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is
violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the
petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like
cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA
983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P.
42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are
prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one,
unconstitutional.
(4) No. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can
only declare what the law is and not what the law should be.
Under our system of government, policy issues are within the
domain of the political branches of government and of the people
themselves as the repository of all state power.
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies
are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must
still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be
regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the
Legislature to decide.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY
COUNCIL OF Q.C., plaintiff v. HON. JUDGE ERICTA as
Judge of the CFI of Rizal, Q.C.; HIMLAYANG
PILIPINO,INC., respondent
GR NO. L-34915, JUNE 24, 1983
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting
the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely
regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he
is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public
use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general
welfare.
Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL
GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial
of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their
death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The
area so designated shall immediately be developed and
should be open for operation not later than six months from
the date of approval of the application.
7 years after the enactment of the aforequoted Ordinance, Quezon
City Council passed a Resolution to request the city engineer to stop
further selling of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the
owners failed to donate 6% space intended for the paupers. City
Engineer then notified Himlayang Pilipino about the said Resolution.
Himlayang Pilipino in response filed a petition for declaratory relief,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to
annul sec 9 of the said Ordinance saying that the said ordinance is
contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, and the Local
Autonomy Act. Respondent court then rendered a decision
declaring sec. 9 of Ordinace no. 6118, S-64 as null and void. Motion
for Reconsideration was denied hence the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a
valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is
taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is
authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, "
to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to
law as may be necessary.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or
confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned
ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner
of all beneficial use of his property.
Issue/s: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question a
valid exercise of the police power?
Held: NO. Sec 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to
Quezon City to regulate other business, trades, and occupations as
may be practiced in the city. The power to regulate does not include
the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs.
Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70,
Mich. 396). The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also
prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because
under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision
thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that
upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a
private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory
clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a
memorial park cemetery.
There is no reasonable relation between setting aside at least 6%
of the total area of a private property or cemetery for charity and
the promotion of the general welfare of the people. Instead of
building a public cemetery, the City passed the burden to private
cemeteries.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general
welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation,
not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their
exercise of power.
Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. had received necessary licenses and permits and
commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the
cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly
acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the
permits to commence operations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The
decision of the respondent court is affirmed.
 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
VICENTE ABECINA and MARIA CLEOFE ABECINA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 206484
June 29, 2016
The exercise of eminent domain requires a genuine necessity to take
the property for public use and the consequent payment of just
compensation.
FACTS: Respondent spouses Vicente and Maria Cleofe Abecina
(respondents/spouses Abecina) are the registered owners of five
parcels of land in Sitio Paltik, Barrio Sta. Rosa, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte. The DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a contract for the management, operation,
maintenance, and development of a Regional Telecommunications
Development Project (RTDP) under the National Telephone
Program, Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1). Later on, the municipality of
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, donated a one thousand two
hundred (1,200) square-meter parcel of land to the DOTC for the
implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. However, the
municipality erroneously included portions of the respondents’
property in the donation. Pursuant to the FLAs, Digitel constructed a
telephone exchange on the property which encroached on the
properties of the respondent spouses. The spouses discovered the
occupation and they required Digitel to vacate the properties and pay
damages, but the latter refused. Later on, the spuses sent a final
demand letter to both the DOTC and Digitel to vacate the premises
and to pay unpaid rent/damages in the amount of one million two
hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00). Neither the DOTC nor
Digitel complied with the demand.
The RTC held that as the lawful owners of the properties, the
respondent spouses enjoyed the right to use and to possess them -
rights that were violated by the DOTC's unauthorized entry,
construction, and refusal to vacate. , the CA affirmed the RTC's
decision but deleted the award of exemplary damages. It also
adopted the RTC's position that state immunity cannot be used to
defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from an unlawful
taking without the proper expropriation proceedings. 17 The CA
affirmed the award of actual and moral damages due to the DOTC's
neglect to verify the perimeter of the telephone exchange
construction but found no valid justification for the award of
exemplary damages
ARGUMENT OF THE PETITIONER: It argues that while the
DOTC, in good faith and in the performance of its mandate, took
private property without formal expropriation proceedings, the
taking was nevertheless an exercise of eminent domain
ARGUMENT OF THE RESPONDENTS: On the other hand, the
respondents counter that the state immunity cannot be invoked to
perpetrate an injustice against its citizens. They also maintain that
because the subject properties are titled, the DOTC is a builder in
bad faith who is deemed to have lost the improvements it introduced
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not DOTC is immune from suit? - NO
2. Whether or not there exists a genuine necessity for the DOTC to
actually take the property? - NO
RULING:
State Immunity
The State may not be sued without its consent. This fundamental
doctrine stems from the principle that there can be no legal right
against the authority which makes the law on which the right
depends. But as the principle itself implies, the doctrine of state
immunity is not absolute. The State may waive its cloak of immunity
and the waiver may be made expressly or by implication. Thus, it
became necessary to distinguish between the State's sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and its private, commercial, and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Presently, state immunity
restrictively extends only to acts jure imperii while acts jure
gestionis are considered as a waiver of immunity. The DOTC
encroached on the respondents' properties when it constructed the
local telephone exchange in Daet, Camarines Norte. The exchange
was part of the RTDP pursuant to the National Telephone Program.
We have no doubt that when the DOTC constructed the encroaching
structures and subsequently entered into the FLA with Digitel for
their maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign function.
Therefore, we agree with the DOTC's contention that these are
acts jure imperii that fall within the cloak of state immunity.
However, as the respondents repeatedly pointed out, this Court has
long established that the doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. If the DOTC
had correctly followed the regular procedure upon discovering that it
had encroached on the respondents' property, it would have initiated
expropriation proceedings instead of insisting on its immunity from
suit. The Department's entry into and taking of possession of the
respondents' property amounted to an implied waiver of its
governmental immunity from suit.
Eminent Domain
The court also found no merit in the DOTC's contention that the
RTC should not have ordered the reconveyance of the respondent
spouses' property because the property is being used for a vital
governmental function, that is, the operation and maintenance of a
safe and efficient communication system. The exercise of eminent
domain requires a genuine necessity to take the property for
public use and the consequent payment of just compensation.
The property is evidently being used for a public purpose.
However, we also note that the respondent spouses willingly
entered into a lease agreement with Digitel for the use of the
subject properties. If in the future the factual circumstances should
change and the respondents refuse to continue the lease, then the
DOTC may initiate expropriation proceedings. But as matters now
stand, the respondents are clearly willing to lease the property.
Therefore, we find no genuine necessity for the DOTC to actually
take the property at this point.
Moreover, contrary to the RTC's findings, the DOTC was not a
builder in bad faith when the improvements were constructed. The
CA itself found that the Department's encroachment over the
respondents' properties was a result of a mistaken implementation of
the donation from the municipality of Jose Panganiban. While the
DOTC later realized its error and admitted its encroachment over the
respondents' property, there is no evidence that it acted maliciously
or in bad faith when the construction was done. Without proof that
the Department's mistake was made in bad faith, its construction is
presumed to have been made in good faith. Therefore, the forfeiture
of the improvements in favor of the respondent spouses is
unwarranted.
PETITION DENIED.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA
PAZ-SUCAT, INC., petitioners v. SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents
G.R. No. 175356 December 3, 2013
 The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power
and not eminent domain.
Facts: RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257),
granting senior citizens 20% discount on certain
establishments. To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257,
the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD issued its own Rules
and Regulations. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to
senior citizens but are only assailing the constitutionality of
the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the
implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and
the DOF. Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme
contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which
provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation." Under the tax deduction
scheme, the private sector shoulders 65% of the discount
because only 35% of it is actually returned by the government.
Petitioners posit that the resolution of this case lies in the
determination of whether the legally mandated 20% senior
citizen discount is an exercise of police power or eminent
domain. If it is police power, no just compensation is
warranted. But if it is eminent domain, the tax deduction
scheme is unconstitutional because it is not a peso for peso
reimbursement of the 20% discount given to senior citizens.
Thus, it constitutes taking of private property without
payment of just compensation.
Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a
legitimate exercise of the State’s police power. As to the
constitutionality of RA 9257 and its implementing rules and
regulations, respondents contend that petitioners failed to
overturn its presumption of constitutionality.
Issues: Whether the tax deduction scheme prescribed under
RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations are
invalid and unconstitutional.
Held: No. The validity of the 20% senior citizen discount and
tax deduction scheme under RA 9257, as an exercise of police
power of the State, has already been settled in Carlos
Superdrug Corporation. The permanent reduction in their
total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking
of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes
compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily
become entitled to a just compensation. A tax deduction does
not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As
such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation.
Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State,
in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of
citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden
of partly subsidizing a government program. The Court
believes so.
As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to
senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The
law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to
the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to
the primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. Police
power as an attribute to promote the common good would be
diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that
they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the
grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to
their business, because petitioners have not taken time to
calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that
they have not been able to show properly whether or not the
tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their
disadvantage.
We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax
deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of the
State. The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of
senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully
employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and,
thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. The
20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private
establishments to price their products and services relative to
a special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the
Constitution affords preferential concern. It does not purport
to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the
operation or conduct of the business of private
establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior
citizens for that matter
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with
substantial distinctions from, price control or rate of return on
investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as
police power measures. These laws generally regulate public
utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with public interest
in order to protect consumers from exorbitant or
unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed by
controlling the rate of return on investment of these
corporations considering that they have a monopoly over the
goods or services that they provide to the general public. On
its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power
measure.
Police power versus eminent domain.
Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or
to restrain the use of liberty and property for public welfare.
The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be
reasonable, not oppressive. Under the police power of the
State, "property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government." The State "may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare [as long as] the interference [is] reasonable
and not arbitrary."
Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of
the State to take or appropriate private property for public
use. The Constitution, however, requires that private property
shall not be taken without due process of law and the
payment of just compensation.
Traditional distinctions exist between police power and
eminent domain.
In the exercise of police power, a property right is
impaired by regulation, or the use of property is
merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote
public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable
taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not
required. It has, thus, been observed that, in the
exercise of police power (as distinguished from
eminent domain), although the regulation affects the
right of ownership, none of the bundle of rights which
constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for
the benefit of the public.
On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, property interests are appropriated
and applied to some public purpose which
necessitates the payment of just compensation
therefor. Normally, the title to and possession of the
property are transferred to the expropriating
authority. In some cases, although the private
property owner is not divested of ownership or
possession, payment of just compensation is
warranted because of the burden placed on the
property for the use or benefit of the public.
JOSE B.L. REYES and EDMUNDO A. REYES, petitioners
vs.
PEDRO ALMANZOR, VICENTE ABAD SANTOS, in their capacities as
appointed and Acting Members of the CENTRAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS; TERESITA H. NOBLEJAS, ROMULO M. DEL
ROSARIO, RAUL C. FLORES, in their capacities as appointed and
Acting Members of the BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS of
Manila; and NICOLAS CATIIL, in his capacity as City Assessor
Manila, respondents
G.R. Nos. L-49839-46 April 26, 1991 Paras, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Jose B.L. Reyes and Milagros Reyes are owners of parcels
of land situated in Tondo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, which are leased
and occupied as dwelling units by tenants. The tenants were paying
monthly rentals not exceeding Php 300. In 1971, RA 6359 was
enacted prohibiting for one year from its effectivity, an increase in
monthly rentals of dwelling units or of lands on which another’s
dwelling is located, where such rentals do not exceed Php 300 a
month but allowing an increase in rent by not more than 10%
thereafter. In 1973, the respondent City Assessor of Manila re-
classified and reassessed the value of the subject properties based
on the schedule of market values. The revision entailed an increase
in the corresponding tax rates. The petitioners filed a Memorandum
of Disagreement with the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals. They
averred that the reassessments made were “excessive,
unwarranted, inequitable, confiscatory, and unconstitutional”
considering that the taxes imposed upon them greatly exceeded the
annual income derived from their properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the comparable sales approach method used by
respondents in fixing the assessed value of appellants’ properties is
reasonable.
HELD:
No. Under Article VII, Section 7 of the Constitution, then enforced,
the rule of taxation must not only be uniform, but must also be
equitable and progressive. Uniformity has been defined as that
principle by which all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Taxation is said to be
equitable when its burden falls on those better able to pay. It is
progressive when its rate goes up depending on the resources of
the person affected.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classification for purposes of taxation but the government’s act
must not be prompted by a spirit of hostility, or at the very least
discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices that law
operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed.
In the case at bar, not even the factors determinant of the assessed
value of subject properties under the “comparable sales approach”
were presented by the public respondents, namely:
1) That the sale must represent a bonafide arm’s length
transaction between a willing seller and a willing buyer and;
2) The property must be comparable property
Nothing can justify or support their view as it is of judicial notice
that for properties covered by P.D. 20 especially during the time in
question, there were hardly any willing buyers. As a general rule,
there were no takers so that there can be no reasonable basis for
the conclusion that their properties were comparable with the
other residential properties not burdened by P.D. 20.
Taxes are the lifeblood of government and so should be collected
without unnecessary hindrance. However, such collection should be
made in accordance with the law and therefore, necessary to
reconcile conflicting interests of the authorities so that the real
purpose of taxation, promotion of the welfare of common good can
be achieved. Consequently, It stands to reason that petitioners who
are burdened by the government by its Rental Freezing Laws under
the principle of justice should not now be penalized by the same
government by the imposition of excessive taxes petitioners can ill
afford and eventually result in the forfeiture of their properties.
Philippine Health Care Provider vs.
Commission on Internal Revenue
GR 167330: September 18, 2009
 ARTICLE II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged
sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
Facts: Philippine Health Care Provider is a health-care
organization that caters benefits to its members through a
prepaid system. The CIR found that the petitioner had a
deficiency in the payment of Documentary Stamp Tax under
Section of 185 of 1887 Tax Code:
“On all policies of insurance or bonds or obligations of the
nature of indemnity for loss, damage, or liability made or
renewed by any person, association or company or
corporation transacting the business of accident, fidelity,
employer's liability, plate, glass, steam boiler, burglar,
elevator, automatic sprinkler, or other branch of insurance
(except life, marine, inland, and fire insurance)”
The CIR sent a demand for the payment of the said deficiency
taxes including surcharges and interest for the years 1996-
1997 with the total amount of P224,702,641.18. The
petitioner protested to the CIR, however, did not act on the
appeal. Hence, they proceeded to the Court of Tax Appeals
which declared a judgement against them. CTA ordered them
to pay 22 Million Pesos for the 1997 and 31 Million Pesos for
the 1996. The petitioner appealed to the CA which also denied
the appeal and even increased the taxes to 55 and 68 Million
pesos respectively.
Issue: WON a health care agreement in the nature of an
insurance contract and therefore subject to the documentary
stamp tax (DST) imposed under Section 185 of Republic Act
8424 (Tax Code of 1997)
Held: Yes. The DST is levied on the exercise by persons of
certain privileges conferred by law for the creation, revision,
or termination of specific legal relationships through the
execution of specific instruments. It is an excise on the
facilities used in the transaction of the business, separate and
apart from the business itself.
The DST is an excise upon the privilege, opportunity, or facility
offered at exchanges for the transaction of the business. In
particular, the DST under Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code is
imposed on the privilege of making or renewing any policy of
insurance (except life, marine, inland and fire insurance), bond
or obligation in the nature of indemnity for loss, damage, or
liability.
Petitioner's health care agreement is primarily a contract of
indemnity. And in the recent case of Blue Cross Healthcare,
Inc. v. Olivares, this Court ruled that a health care agreement
is in the nature of a non-life insurance policy. Its health
care agreement is not a contract for the provision of medical
services. Petitioner does not actually provide medical or
hospital services but merely arranges for the same. It is also
incorrect to say that the health care agreement is not based
on loss or damage because, under the said agreement,
petitioner assumes the liability and indemnifies its member for
hospital, medical and related expenses (such as professional
fees of physicians). The term "loss or damage" is broad
enough to cover the monetary expense or liability a member
will incur in case of illness or injury.
Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. v. CA.- The health
care agreement was in the nature of non-life insurance, which
is primarily a contract of indemnity. Similarly, the insurable
interest of every member of petitioner's health care program
in obtaining the health care agreement is his own health.
Under the agreement, petitioner is bound to indemnify any
member who incurs hospital, medical or any other expense
arising from sickness, injury or other stipulated contingency to
the extent agreed upon under the contract.
Decision of the CA is affirmed.
CONSTI law
CIR v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION,
GR Nos. 205045 & 205723,
2017-01-25
FACTS:
These consolidated cases consider whether "San Mig Light"
is a new brand or a variant of one of San Miguel Corporation's
existing beer brands, and whether the Bureau of Internal Revenue
may issue notices of discrepancy that effectively changes "San Mig
Light"'s classification from new brand to variant. The issues involve
an application of Section 143 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue
Code (Tax Code), as amended, on the definition of a variant, which
is subject to a higher excise tax rate than a new brand. This case
also applies the requirement in Rep. Act No. 9334 that
reclassification of certain fermented liquor products introduced
between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2003 can only be done
by an act of Congress.
Virgilio S. De Guzman (De Guzman), San Miguel
Corporation's Former Assistant Vice President for Finance, wrote
the Bureau of Internal Revenue Excise Tax Services Assistant
Commissioner Leonardo B. Albar (Assistant Commissioner Albar) to
request the registration of and authority to manufacture "San Mig
Light," to be taxed at ₱12.15 per liter.9 The letter dated October 27,
1999 granted this request.
February 7, 2002, LTAD II Acting Chief Conrado P. Item
replied to Villacorte's letter. He confirmed that based on the
submitted documents, San Miguel Corporation was allowed to
register, manufacture, and sell "San Mig Light" as a new brand, had
been paying its excise tax for a considerable length of time, and that
the tax classification and rate of "San Mig Light" as a new brand
were in order.
 The CIR argues that "San Mig Light," launched in November
1999, is not a new brand but merely a low-calorie variant of "San
Miguel Pale Pilsen." Thus, the application of the higher excise tax
rate for variant products is appropriate (₱19.91 per liter instead of
₱9.15 per liter) and SMC should not be entitled to a refund or
issuance of a tax credit certificate. The CTA sided with SMC; hence,
this petition by the CIR with the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the BIR can validly reclassify brands
Whether or not “San Mig Light” is a new brand and not a
variant of “San Miguel Pale Pilsen”
Whether or not SMC entitled to a refund of excess
payment of excise taxes on “San Mig light”
HELD:
1.) No, any reclassification of fermented liquor products should be
by act of Congress. (Section 143 of the Tax Code)
The CIR's letters and Notices of Discrepancy, which effectively
changed San Mig Light's brand's classification from "new brand to
variant of existing brand," necessarily changes San Mig Light's tax
bracket. Based on the legislative intent behind the classification
freeze provision, petitioner has no power to do this. A
reclassification of a fermented liquor brand introduced between
January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2003, such as "San Mig Light,"
must be by act of Congress. There was none in this case.
2.) A new brand still because the BIR has no power to reclassify.
Also, a 'variant of a brand' shall refer to a brand on which a modifier
is prefixed and/or suffixed to the root name of the brand. The word
"Light" cannot he considered as a mere suffix to the word "San
Miguel," hut it is part and parcel of an entirely new brand name,
"San Mig Light."
3.) Yes, SMC is entitled to tax refund or tax credit certification. The
Tax Code includes remedies for erroneous collection and
overpayment of taxes. Under Sections 229 and 204(C) of the Tax
Code, a taxpayer may seek recovery of erroneously paid taxes
within two (2) years from date of payment.
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967 FERNANDO, J.:
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE
HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches
to a challenged statute or ordinance, the presumption for validity prevails.
There being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it
is unavoidable.
Facts: Petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators, Hotel Del
Mar, Inc. and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of Hotel Del
Mar, assail the constitutionality of an ordinance passed by the City Mayor
of Manila.
Ordinance 4760 was approved by then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (VM
Astorga), who was the acting Mayor of the City of Manila at the time.
The petitioners allege that the said ordinance was beyond power of the
Muncipal Board of the City of Manila insofar as it would regulate motels
when there is no reference made to motels in the revised charter of the
City of Manila; that it was unconstitutional and violative of due process
insofar as it imposes license fees per annum to motels, by requiring the
owners or managers of such establishment to refrain from entertaining
customers who would refuse to provide their personal information, such as
name, address, occupation, address, etc., in a document which would be
open to public view at all times; that it is arbitrary and unreasonable
insofar as it requires motels to maintain certain minimum facilities; that it
is violative of due process insofar as the penalty provided which causes the
automatic cancellation of the license of the owners of such establishments.
Instead of presenting evidence, a stipulation of facts was submitted. The
lower court held the assailed ordinance to be unconstitutional, and,
therefore, null and void.
Issue: W/N Ordinance 4760 is unconstitutional.
Ruling: NO. The SC held that Ordinance 4760 is valid and in accordance
with the constitution.
The SC’s primary reason for the reversal is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or
ordinance. There being a presumption of validity of statutes and
ordinances, the necessity for evidence to rebut is unavoidable.
The Court cited the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. which stated the following:
“The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within
the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on
the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption
of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute."
No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the
ordinance set aside.
With regards to the alleged violation of due process, the SC held that
there was no violation since the ordinance, being a manifestation of police
power, was specifically aimed to safeguard public morals by minimizing
certain practices. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action
must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due
process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness.
In the explanatory note of Councilor Astorga, there was an alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery, and fornication in Manila,
traceable in great part to the existence of motels. Again, such a limitation
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process.
It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb
the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises
could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
injunction issued lifted forthwith.
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Petitioners, v. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 159647 April 15, 2005
Facts: Respondent is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in
retailing of medicines and other pharmaceutical products. In 1996, it
operated six (6) drugstores under the business name and style
'Mercury Drug.' From January to December 1996, respondent
granted twenty (20%) percent sales discount to qualified senior
citizens on their purchases of medicines pursuant to Republic Act
No. [R.A.] 7432 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. For
the said period, the amount allegedly representing the 20% sales
discount granted by respondent to qualified senior citizens
totaled P904,769.00. Respondent then filed its Annual Income Tax
Return for taxable year 1996 declaring therein that it incurred net
losses from its operations. Furthermore, respondent filed with
petitioner a claim for tax refund/credit in the amount of P904,769.00
allegedly arising from the 20% sales discount granted by respondent
to qualified senior citizens in compliance with R.A. 7432. Unable to
obtain affirmative response from petitioner, respondent elevated its
claim to the Court of Tax Appeals via a Petition for Review.
The Tax Court rendered a Decision dismissing respondent's Petition
for lack of merit. In said decision, the CTA justified its ruling with
the following ratiocination:
'x x x, if no tax has been paid to the government, erroneously or
illegally, or if no amount is due and collectible from the taxpayer, tax
refund or tax credit is unavailing. x x x.
'Prescinding from the above, it could logically be deduced that tax
credit is premised on the existence of tax liability on the part of
taxpayer. In other words, if there is no tax liability, tax credit is not
available.'
Respondent lodged a Motion for Reconsideration. The CTA, in its
assailed resolution, granted respondent's motion for reconsideration
and ordered herein petitioner to issue a Tax Credit Certificate in
favor of respondent citing the decision, to wit:
Take note* 'However, Sec. 229 clearly does not apply in the instant case
because the tax sought to be refunded or credited by petitioner was not
erroneously paid or illegally collected. We take exception to the CTA's
sweeping but unfounded statement that 'both tax refund and tax credit are
modes of recovering taxes which are either erroneously or illegally paid to
the government. 'Tax refunds or credits do not exclusively pertain to
illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes as they may be other
circumstances where a refund is warranted. The tax refund provided under
Section 229 deals exclusively with illegally collected or erroneously paid
taxes but there are other possible situations, such as the refund of excess
estimated corporate quarterly income tax paid, or that of excess input tax
paid by a VAT-registered person, or that of excise tax paid on goods locally
produced or manufactured but actually exported. The standards and
mechanics for the grant of a refund or credit under these situations are
different from that under Sec. 229. Sec. 4a of R.A. 7432, is yet another
instance of a tax credit and it does not in any way refer to illegally collected
or erroneously paid taxes, x x x.
CA: Affirmed in toto the Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
ordering petitioner to issue a tax credit certificate in favor of respondent in
the reduced amount of P903,038.39. It reasoned that Republic Act No. 7432
required neither a tax liability nor a payment of taxes by private
establishments prior to the availment of a tax credit. Moreover, such credit
is not tantamount to an unintended benefit from the law, but rather a just
compensation for the taking of private property for public use.
Issues: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, DESPITE
INCURRING A NET LOSS, MAY STILL CLAIM THE 20%
SALES DISCOUNT AS A TAX CREDIT.
Held: Yes, Section 4a of RA 7432 grants to senior citizens the
privilege of obtaining a 20 percent discount on their purchase of
medicine from any private establishment in the country. The latter
may then claim the cost of the discount as a tax credit. Such credit be
claimed, even though an establishment operates at a loss
Tax credit generally refers to an amount that is "subtracted directly
from one's total tax liability." It is an "allowance against the tax
itself" or "a deduction from what is owed" by a taxpayer to the
government. Tax credit should be understood in relation to other tax
concepts. One of these is tax deduction - - defined as a subtraction
"from income for tax purposes," or an amount that is "allowed by
law to reduce income prior to the application of the tax rate to
compute the amount of tax which is due." An example of a tax
deduction is any of the allowable deductions enumerated in Section
34 of the Tax Code. A tax credit differs from a tax deduction. On the
one hand, a tax credit reduces the tax due, including - - whenever
applicable - - the income tax that is determined after applying the
corresponding tax rates to taxable income. A tax deduction, on the
other, reduces the income that is subject to tax in order to arrive
at taxable income. To think of the former as the latter is to avoid, if
not entirely confuse, the issue. A tax credit is used only after the tax
has been computed; a tax deduction, before.
RA 7432 specifically allows private establishments to claim as tax
credit the amount of discounts they grant. In turn, the Implementing
Rules and Regulations, issued pursuant thereto, provide the
procedures for its availment. To deny such credit, despite the plain
mandate of the law and the regulations carrying out that mandate, is
indefensible.
First, the definition given by petitioner is erroneous. It refers to tax
credit as the amount representing the 20 percent discount that "shall
be deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for
income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax
or other percentage tax purposes." In ordinary business language,
the tax credit represents the amount of such discount. However, the
manner by which the discount shall be credited against taxes has not
been clarified by the revenue regulations. By ordinary acceptation, a
discount is an "abatement or reduction made from the gross amount
or value of anything." To be more precise, it is in business parlance
"a deduction or lowering of an amount of money;" or "a reduction
from the full amount or value of something, especially a price." In
business, there are many kinds of discount, the most common of
which is that affecting the income statement or financial report upon
which the income tax is based.
G.R. No. 187417
CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ, Petitioner, vs. BRENT HOSPITAL
AND COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.
Facts:
Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent Hospital
and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her indefinite suspension
from employment in 2006. The cause of suspension was Cadiz's
Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed
Pregnancy. It appears that Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock,
and Brent imposed the suspension until such time that she marries
her boyfriend in accordance with law.
Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for Unfair
Labor Practice, Constructive Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages and
Damages with prayer for Reinstatement
The Labor Arbitrator found that Cadiz's indefinite suspension
amounted to a constructive dismissal; nevertheless, the LA ruled
that Cadiz was not illegally dismissed as there was just cause for her
dismissal, that is, she engaged in premarital sexual relations with
her boyfriend resulting in a pregnancy out of wedlock.
Cadiz elevated her case to the CA but was dismissed due to
technical defects. Namely; (1) incomplete statement of material
dates; (2) failure to attach registry receipts; and (3) failure to
indicate the place of issue of counsel's PTR and IBP official receipts.
Issue/s:
1. W/N technical defects were grounds to dismiss her case
2. W/N NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
upholding her dismissal from employment.
Held:
1. NO. The technical failures were not enough to dismiss the
petition.
The Court finds that the ends of substantial justice would be
better served by relaxing the application of technical rules
of procedure. Time and again, the Court has emphasized
that rules of procedure are designed to secure substantial
justice. These are mere tools to expedite the decision or
resolution of cases and if their strict and rigid application
would frustrate rather than promote substantial justice,
then it must be avoided.
2. NO, Immorality in this case was not a just cause for
termination.
Brent’s policy manual states immorality as grounds for
dismissal thus the question tha must be resolved is whether
Cadiz's premarital relations with her boyfriend and the resulting
pregnancy out of wedlock constitute immorality.
The Court makes reference to the case of Cheryll Santos Leus v. St.
Scholastica’s College Westgrove and/or Sr. Edna Quiambao, OSB.
The Court ruled in Leus that the determination of whether
a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process:
first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said
circumstances vis-a-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what
the society generally considers moral and respectable.
Brent erroneously relied on the standard dictionary
definition of fornication as a form of illicit relation and proceeded to
conclude that Cadiz's acts fell under such classification, thus
constituting immorality. Jurisprudence has already set the standard
of morality with which an act should be gauged - it is public and
secular, not religious. Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful
or immoral should be made in accordance with the prevailing norms
of conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those conducts which
are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society. More
importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish that
premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is
considered disgraceful or immoral.
There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother by
reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual
activity between two unmarried persons; that neither does such
situation contravene[s] any fundamental state policy enshrined in
the Constitution. “The fact that Brent is a sectarian institution does
not automatically subject Cadiz to its religious standard of morality
absent an express statement in its manual of personnel policy and
regulations, prescribing such religious standard as gauge as these
regulations create the obligation on both the employee and the
employer to abide by the same.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA’s Concurring Opinion
The Constitution protects personal autonomy as part of the
Due Process Clause in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, the Bill of Rights
cannot be invoked against private employers. However, the values
expressed in the Constitution cannot be completely ignored in the
just adjudication of labor cases.
In this case, Brent's reliance on laws and governmental
issuances justifies the view that the Constitution should permeate a
proper adjudication of the issue. Brent invokes the MRPS to support
Christine Joy's dismissal. The MRPS is a department order issued by
DepEd in the exercise of its power to regulate private schools. It is
thus a ,government issuance which the DepEd is authorized to issue
in accordance with law. Further, the labor tribunals also invoke the
Labor Code which provides for the just causes for termination.
The Labor Code is a presidential decree and has the status
of law. The Constitution is deemed written into every law and
government issuance. Hence, in the application of laws and
governmental regulations, their provisions should not be
interpreted in a manner that will violate the fundamental law of the
land.
The bill of rights is an embodiment of the most important
values of the people enacting a Constitution. Values that find
expression in a society's Constitution are not only accepted as
moral, they are also fundamental. In ascertaining whether an act is
moral or immoral, a due consideration of constitutional values must
be made. In Christine Joy's case, her decision to continue her
pregnancy outside of wedlock is a constitutionally protected right. It
is therefore not only moral, it is also a constitutional value that this
Court is duty bound to uphold.
Liberty, as a constitutional right, involves not just freedom
from unjustified imprisonment. It also pertains to the freedom to
make choices that are intimately related to a person's own
definition of her humanity. The constitutional protection extended
to this right mandates that beyond a certain point, personal choices
must not be interfered with or unduly burdened as such
interference with or burdening of the right to choose is a breach of
the right to be free.
In the United States, whose Constitution has heavily
influenced ours, jurisprudence on the meaning of personal liberty is
much more detailed and expansive. Their protection of the
constitutional right to privacy has covered marital privacy, the right
of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy and sexual
conduct between unmarried persons.
In Roe v. Wade, the US Supreme Court affirmed that while
the US Constitution does not expressly mention a right to privacy,
its provisions create such zones of privacy which warrant
constitutional protection. They make it clear that the right has some
extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and [child rearing] and
education." In Roe, Court held that the constitutional right to
privacy also encompasses a woman's choice whether to terminate
her pregnancy.
in Lawrence v. Texas, the US Supreme Court invalidated a
law criminalizing sodomy. Lawrence held that "[t]he petitioners are
entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the govemment.
Brent's act of dismissing Christine Joy because of her
pregnancy out of wedlock, with the condition that she will be
reinstated if she marries her then boyfriend, unduly burdens first,
her right to choose whether to marry, and second, her right to
decide whether she will bear and rear her child without marriage.
These are personal decisions that go into the core of how Christine
Joy chooses to live her life. This Court cannot countenance any
undue burden that prejudices her right to be free.
The Constitution and the laws merely express an ideal.
While marriage is the ideal starting point of a family, there is no
constitutional or statutory provision limiting the definition of a
family or preventing any attempt to deviate from our traditional
template of what a family should be. The Constitution allows
women in this country to design the course of their own lives. They
are free to chart their own destinies.
The Constitution should be considered as a gauge of what
the public deems as moral. In this case, there is a constitutionally
declared value to protecting the right to choose to marry and the
right to be a single mother by choice. This is our people's
determination of what is moral.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff v. ANDRE
MARTI, respondent
193 SCRA 57 , January 18, 1991
An act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights, may not be invoked against
the State.
Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-
law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export
Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was
received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the
packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to
seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before being
sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of
the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon
opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which
made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He
reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to
inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job
Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-
marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti
in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a
quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that
his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the
evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as
evidence against him.
Issues:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against
private individuals?
Held:
YES. The Supreme Court held based on the speech of
Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes
was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI
agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI
agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr.
Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the
constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in
plain sight is not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was
AFFIRMED.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003
Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003
Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003
Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003
Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003
Republic of the Philippines
vs.
Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano,
G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003
FACTS: Immediately upon her assumption to office following the
EDSA Revolution, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its
Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP
Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired. Investigations include the alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas),
Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Evidence showed that
respondent is the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City as well in
Cebu City. Moreover, equipment and communication facilities were
found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the military
equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano. Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit
disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent
Ramas, that he stays and sleeps at the house of Dimaano who kisses
him whenever he arrives, and that a person who rode in a car went
to her residence with 4 attache cases filled with money owned by
Ramas. Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported
by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary, making her
claim that she owns the money improbable. With these, a prima
facie case exists against respondent Ramas for ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth. The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under
Republic Act No. 1379, known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property (RA No. 1379), against Ramas and
impleaded Dimaano as co-defendant, in favor of the State.
However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently DISMISSED the
complaint because there was an illegal search and seizure of the
items confiscated. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners
Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated
items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second
Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence,
this appeal to SC. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in
declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as
illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the PCGG has the authority to investigate
Ramas and Dimaano
2. Whether or not the property that were confiscated were
illegally seized
RULING:
1. NO. The SC held that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction because
Ramas was not a “subordinate” of former President Marcos as
contemplated under EO no. 1. Mere position held by a military
officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this
term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he
enjoyed close association with former President Marcos.
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily
show what is contemplated within the term “subordinate”. The
Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the
ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and
abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes `ll assets and properties in the Philippines in which
former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their
close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents,
or nominees have any interest or participation.'
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem
generis, the term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to
one who enjoys a close association with former President Marcos
and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative,
and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business
associate,... dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2. There must be
a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated
wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. This, the PCGG failed to provide.
Ramas' position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine
Army with the rank of Major General does not suffice to make him a
"subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1
and its amendments.
2. YES. While it is true that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution was not operative during an interregnum (any period
during which a state has no ruler or only a temporary executive).
However, the protection accorded to individuals in International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum. When
no constitution or Bill of Rights exists, directives and orders issued
by government officers are valid so long as these officers did not
exceed the authority granted on them. The raiding team seized the
items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not
included in the search warrant. Dimaano was also not present
during the raid (only Dimaano's cousins witnessed the raid).Under
Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the
duty to ensure that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence. The Declaration provides in its Article 17(2) that no
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Thus, the
revolutionary government is obligated under international law to
observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.
Petition DISMISSED.