Professional Documents
Culture Documents
IoS - (Divya Sharma)
IoS - (Divya Sharma)
Certain scenarios: -
Corporate social responsibility- Under Company’s act when we read CSR, India is one of the
countries that have made CSR compulsory (section 135)- So if a company had annual
turnover of Rs. 1000 crore, and out of that 2% they have to spend on any CSR activity.
Schedule 7 of the act tells what all CSR activities you can put money in.
Intent was corporate should be more accountable- we will force them to spend so that some
money goes in CSR activities- But when Ambani spends 2% in building schools as CSR
activity and Bollywood kids are going to that school, is it actually adding to welfare of
society? We are just spending where already enough exists. Does this fulfil the intent with
which CSR was made mandatory? The idea was to give back to society for welfare- for
people who need it. Intent and purpose are not being satisfied by the acts.
Now technically what Ambani did is okay under law because schedule 7 did not tell the, that
they have to make it only for needy. So, technically they have ticked all boxes. The problem
is the ambiguity of understanding. No matter how clearly draftsmen draft the provision, if the
act is not matching the intent, it defeats the purpose. Now in such case if for every such
ambiguity amendments are done; it will render the legislation unstable. We can’t go for
amending, the hassle it creates, every time.
In such situations we allow judges to go ahead and correctly interpret the statutes and
provisions. Judge, while making such interpretation, has some boundaries. Judicial overreach
is not permitted. When there is no ambiguity, but the judges force one and interpret
something- this is not allowed. Judges have to stay within the bounds of interpretation rules.
Misuse of interpretation- In schedule 7 preservation of national heritage is also a CSR
activity- we have statue of unity- the Top 5 oil companies which were PSUs, their 2% CSR
was given in creation of this statue in name of CSR and they said it is in concurrence with
national heritage point- it was questioned that they misinterpreted the provision- law talked
about preservation of national heritage and not creation of new monuments- So, such twisting
of words also happens.
These scenarios show why we need interpretation. It helps us resolve ambiguity and
vagueness.
Also, it helps us solve issues arising from change in environment. With time, things change
and thus there comes the need of interpretation to make things congruous with present need.
We can’t amend laws every time things don’t match, so interpretation bridges this gap.
Thirdly, interpretation can be used to address some complexity like some technical word. E.g.
Taxation statute- tax on transportation of vegetables.
When a legislation does not cover a specific area- interpretation can be used. For e.g. mental
some mental health issues are not even seen as a disease and thus insurance is not given- but
things have changed now and insurance companies are coming up and providing such
insurance.
Main Content
What is a statute? – When we are talking about statutes in IoS- we talk about a collection of a
particular kind of acts- like we talk about welfare statute, we talk about different acts related
to the same- So, statute is usually the bigger set. Statute is a collection of acts belonging to a
particular legal area.
What is an act? – When we talk about act- we talk about the act, we talk about one unit like
company act. So, a particular unit in statute is an act.
What is enactment? – Provision of a particular act in statute- say we are talking about section
XYZ of company’s act.
Why is it important to understand the difference between act and statute? – Commercial
statute is genus in which we have Company act, IBC, competition etc. Let us say we have to
figure out a definition of word enterprise from section 4 of competition act. I look at the
definition clause- if I find the meaning well and good, but if I don’t what do I do? I have to
figure out the meaning of an ambiguous word- I will have to look into pari materia of laws
i.e., the acts that were there before this particular act came. E.g., MRTP act was repealed by
comp. act, so I can go to MRTP act and see to relate to history, and since IBC and company
act belong to same area, I will also go to these to see the definition. So, the judge has to look
into statutes because they belong to same area. This is why we differentiate- if act does not
define ab ambiguous term, we have to look at pari materia of laws, i.e., its history or statute it
belongs to, to understand the intent of legislature. Intention of legislature is formally
expressed in statute.
Statute v. Case law- Case laws are developed via judicial opinion given on these statutes-
Laws created through judicial opinions stand in contra distinction to law created in statute.
Case laws have same legal binding effect as statutory laws. If there is no statute addressing a
particular matter, Court in such situations can provide decision on such matters: e.g.,
Vishakha Guidelines.
Two questions-
1. When do we require to interpret?
2. Difference between interpretation and construction
Interpretation-
⁃ Courts interpret only when the case comes before it.
⁃ Will of the legislature is expressed clearly in the statute and the prime concern
of the court is to find out the intention of the legislature in the given legal text. Everything the
judges do, needs to align with the intention of the legislature.
⁃ For e.g.- let’s say we have a CSR act specifically. Let’s say CSR is not
defined. In this act, we have to figure out the intent of the act in India. CSR as a concept is
very ambiguous- in some places it is mandatory and some it is not. Does it mean giving back
to environment or employees or what? To determine, in India., the meaning of the word CSR,
the courts will look into the intention of the legislature.
What is ambiguity?
⁃ Before considering what canons of interpretation to apply, the court must
determine whether the statute or enactment in question is ambiguous or not.
⁃ Defining ambiguity is a problem in itself. The interpretation of a word is a
very subjective criterion.
⁃ In these situations where it is very subjective, we always look into what a
reasonable man would do.
How do we know if there is ambiguity?
⁃ Courts have said that if a reasonable and well-informed person could
understand the language in either two or more senses, then it is ambiguous.
What is vagueness?
⁃ This means that there is something missing. Some omission which doesn’t
make sense in that particular provision or enactment. So, if your reading an enactment and
cannot come to a conclusion regarding a particular legal situation, then it is vague. Therefore,
if it is incomplete then it’s vague.
NOTE- “Prima facie and follow it irrespective of the consequences”- even if there is
absurd result. (The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw a trend towards a more
literal approach. Courts took an increasingly strict view of the words of a statute: if
the case before them was not precisely covered they were not prepared to countenance
any alteration of the statutory language. So, this “irrespective of consequences”
characteristic was restricted to 18th and 19th century. Now this is not used.
Intent of legislature is very important in literal rule of interpretation. What you are
interpreting must match with the intent of legislature, if it doesn’t, we go to other
three. Also, it shouldn’t create absurd result after matching with intent of legislature.
One of the leading statements of the literal rule was made by Tindal CJ in the Sussex
Peerage Case (1844) 11 Cl& 85: “… the only rule for the construction of Acts of
Parliament is, that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament
which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and
unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their
natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare
the intention of the lawgiver.” - (has gone to extend sometimes where courts have said
that even if giving plain meaning leads to absurdity or an injustice, still we have to
take literal meaning because they have an erroneous belief that would have been the
intention of the legislature. But in practicality we never used the above principle in
such circumstances.)
Why is ambiguity important in this rule? Ambiguity means when a word or phrase has
two or more meanings and one has to be selected by judge. It can also be defined in
terms of vagueness and absurdity (absurd results after reading enactment and applying
to facts). Absurd results will be at a stage where judge has applied rule of
interpretation and that hasn’t matched either with intent of legislature or spirit of laws
or etc, and thus it leads to absurd results. Ambiguity in English means something that
has two meaning; in its legal sense it means something with latent and patent meaning
ambiguity. Patent ambiguity arises because of extrinsic circumstances. E.g., there is a
contract talking about a ship named peerless carrying cotton. Now if two peerless
ships are moving, both carrying cotton, it creates ambiguity. Ambiguity could have
been prevented by telling the time of the ship (as time was different).
Iota of doubt in mind of a judge while hearing facts can lead to absurd results and
those in turn leads to ambiguity. This ambiguity is solved by rules of interpretation.
Textualism: Plain text of the statute is used to determine the meaning. (Legal text-
plain meaning-result is presumed to be the intention of the legislature). Whatever you
interpret has to be as it is and not what ought to be. This also gives hint of what is
strict interpretation. Do not go in what ought to be law just stick to what it is.
There was a fear that if judges are given power to interpretation and construction it
will create whimsical ambiguities. Because right now judges interpret to determine
legislature’s intent. If they tend to construct on their wishes their biases may affect the
things. We cannot be sure that judges will always be unbiased, which is why strict
interpretation. This was in 18th-19th century.
Validity of creating such presumptions was well founded in relation to that time but
the point is that as soon as we start moving ahead where we have recognised rights of
more and more people, we are starting recognising rights of animals, artificial
intelligence bots, machines. With growing time, more and more emphasis on human
rights. If you are not left with any option but to amend a law it will be a tiring
exercise. This tool of interpretation was used to fill the gap. As we progressed, we felt
the need that until and unless there is an amendment by parliament, we needed some
tools to preserve these newly realised rights and for that we move from strict
interpretation of presuming and giving an interpretation. Thus, shift from strict/plain.
Two rules:
1. Litera legis: Go by words of the law. Go in an order, section 1, then 2, then 3. talks
about sequence.
2. Ita Sriptum: as the words are-don’t change the order of the words, whatever written
just go with the plain and grammatical meaning, meaning used in common parlance.
Advantages:
1. Certainty; predictability
2. Eliminates element of bias of judges
3. Separation of powers/Eliminates judicial overreach
Disadvantages:
1. Intent of parliament may not always be correct with respect to grammatical
meaning.
Cases:
3. Fischer v. Bell
restriction of offensive weapons act which made it an offense to offer to sell certain
offensive weapons, such as flick knives- in a shop, shopkeeper had displayed the
knife, and that was brought it question whether sale or offer to sell.
Display: Invitation to offer; When customer takes, it's offer-Thus, only keeping the
knife was only an invitation to offer. Hence, shopkeeper was acquitted.
4. R v. Harris
Stabbing, cutting or wounding someone was deemed to be an offence. A person bit
another’s nose. The Court held that biting did not fall under the terms ‘stabbing’,
‘cutting’ or ‘wounding’ as these words implied that an instrument had to be used.
Under the literal rule, biting was not seen to be stabbing, cutting or wounding.
Question- Interpreting “any person”- since they have only said ‘any person’ or ‘any
person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central
Government or any local authority’, so saying that it will only include govt employee
will be a wrong interpretation- plain and literal meaning shows that intent is clear, any
person can be given the premises by relevant authority.
In this case a govt servant was staying in govt allotted property and had his ow house
also there which he rented- a govt notice came which stated all govt employees who
have been allotted property and have own property in vicinity have to vacate this and
stay in their own property and whatever compensation is there will be given to them-
a week before this notice the appellant had retired so he was no more a govt.
employee when this notice came- when this notice came, under 14A (1), he asked his
tenants to leave as he had to vacate the govt property- this is also allowed in 14A(1)
but in general cases notice rule has to be followed- tenant argued that since this
person has retired and is not a govt employee he does not have power under the
section to ask me to immediately vacate. The court said 14A (1) is not talking about
govt employee but about someone who has been allotted property by mentioned
authorities. If you narrow the meaning down and say it only refers to govt employee it
will go against the plain and literal meaning and also intention of legislature.
Held meaning of words should be interpreted in the light of their popular meaning or
common parlance meaning as understood by the common man and the persons
dealing with such articles in their day to day life. The context here is that words when
are determined are that what is their common parlance meaning, we are taking it out
from people who are using that particular word and we see how they use it- In this
case it was held that the word vegetables used in taxing statute is to be understood as
in common parlance i.e. denoting a class of vegetables which are grown in the kitchen
garden or in farm. (While answering the question do mention the context) Context
defers from statute to statute- like tax statute is only fiscal in nature but when you talk
about IPR, there you identify the very identity of the plant for giving any right. So, in
IPR vegetable will be construed in botanical sense.
(a) Motipur Zamindary Co. v. State of Bihar (1962) (read from doc)
4. Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay
carried certain amount of gold, on airport- did not tell about it- confiscated under
167(8) of Sea Customs act- was later charged under section 8 of the foreign exchange
regulation act 1947- appellant challenged this as double jeopardy- question came
whether confiscating gold means that other punishment should not have been there-
the court deciding just by confiscating the person does not come under double
jeopardy principle- in confiscating trial is missing, he was not prosecuted, so he can
be prosecuted in the latter charge.
A constitution Bench of the supreme court was called upon to decide whether Part I of
the arbitration act 1996 applies to arbitral proceedings taking place outside India.
Decision in Bhatia case which was the case before Balco-Section 2(2) of Part I of the
act provides that this part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India and not
that the part shall only apply where the place of arbitration in India.- In the Balco case
it was held that the absence of the word ‘only’ from Section 2(2) could not be
construed so as to make Part I of the Act applicable to arbitrations taking place
outside India. As a plain reading of Section 2(2) makes it clear, Part I is limited in its
application to arbitrations which take place in India. There is no ambiguity and
therefore no need of construction.
The interpretation in Bhatia is foolish because the very idea of amending act in 1996
from 1947 was to ensure two different part for India and outside- by such
interpretation we are neglecting the intent of different procedures. When you are
looking at the phrase, the parliamentary history and the legislative intent and find the
three to be matching i.e. difference in procedure for in and outside India, then such
interpretation is unnecessarily creating ambiguity and then solving it.
The principle laid down herein was that a departure from the rule of literal
construction outside the recognised limits in the guise of liberal or strict construction
leads to unwarranted expansion or restriction of the meaning of words and gives rise
to serious errors. Clause 2(g) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights
Act, 1950, defines ‘home farm’ as meaning land recorded as ‘sir’ and ‘khudkast’ in
the name of the proprietor. The Nagpur High Court held that this definition should be
construed liberally and that land, though not recorded as khudkast of the proprietor,
but ought to have been recorded as such (since the land was used for cultivation),
should be brought within the definition. This decision was overruled as it was held
that the basis of treating a particular land as ‘khudkast’ was a recording to that effect
and not the fact of actual cultivation. There was no ambiguity in the definition of
‘home farm’ and the question of strict and liberal construction does not arise.
Judges are not supposed to create unnecessary ambiguities under the garb of literal
interpretation when law has clearly mentioned things. What high court did was
unwarranted. It is disrespect of separation of power.
7. Kotak Mahindra Bank v. Hindustan National Goa and Industries
The principle laid down herein was that it is only when the meaning leads to some
result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the
legislature, that it is proper to look for some other possible meaning of the word or
phrase.
The Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the term ‘wilful default’ in the RBI
Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters. Though the definition of the term in the Master
Circular used the term ‘lender’, the Court held that the words in a statute or document
are to be interpreted in the context or subject-matter in which they are used, and not
according to their literal meaning. The term ‘lender’ was held to mean ‘bank’ after
looking into the RBI Act, the Banking Regulations Act as well as the purpose for
which the Circular was issued and the mischief it sought to curtail.
It was noted that in the construction of a statute, you have to look at:
When we are looking into golden or mischief rule, the difference lies in procedure- in
golden rule we have to find intention but the pre requisite is that literal rule has failed.
The golden rule looks into purpose of the act, in mischief you look into intention by
looking to prior acts because there is some mischief that needs to be solved, and in
purpose rule you look into intention because purpose of law is important to
understand. We are gradually moving to a liberal interpretation than a strict one.
So, literal rule did not entirely work for this case, so they had to move to mischief
rule.
In construing the word ‘coal’ in the Sales Tax Act, the Supreme Court ruled in favour
of the popular meaning by asking the question “what would be the meaning which
persons dealing with coal and consumers purchasing it as fuel would give to that
word”. On this test, coal was held to include charcoal and not restricted to coal
obtained as a mineral. (In interpreting items in statutes like the Sales Tax resort
should be had not to the scientific or technical meaning of the terms used but to their
popular meaning or the meaning attached them by those dealing in them, that is to
say, in their commercial sense. Viewed from this angle both a merchant dealing in
coal and a consumer wanting to purchase it would regard coal not in its geological
sense but in the sense as ordinarily understood and would include ‘charcoal in the
term ‘coal’)
Respondent argued that charcoal was coal and should be taxed at 2% rate according to
the said provision whereas tax authorities were arguing that charcoal was not coal and
should be taxed at 4% Under the Entries, ‘coal’ as well as ‘firewood’; were taxed at
2%. It could not have been intended to tax charcoal alone at 4%.
In contrast, it was said that in the Colliery Control Order (law for prohibiting or
limiting the production of coal as per government order), the word ‘coal’ will be
understood in its technical or scientific sense and will be interpreted as a mineral
product, therefore not including charcoal. The Court held that the natural and ordinary
meaning of the word ‘coal’ would be coal used as fuel in the context of the Sales Tax
Act and coal as a mineral product in the context of the Colliery Control Order.
Ejusdem Generis
Casus omissus
MV Joshi v. MU Shimpi
The application of literal rule has to be in alignment with purpose and object of the act- there
was one law regarding adulteration of butter- section 7(i) of food adulteration act 1954- under
the definition clause (section 2 (1)) word adulterated has been defined- word butter was also
defined somewhere- butter will be product made exclusive from milk or cream of cow or
buffalo or both ….- see from main doc of case
There was inspection in the shop, butter was found adulterated- the defence the shopkeeper
took was that since he made butter from curd and not from milk or cream, under literal rule
he will not come under that section which defined butter under the appendix and he will not
be liable. This idea that just because it is made of curd, it can be sold in market does not
match the purpose and object of the act. You have to understand curd is coming from milk
only, just one step is added- so the idea is so use milk or cream only, you can’t just go ahead
and make something from milk and make butter and claim it to be outside the realm of act.
2) Golden rule of interpretation- start of getting away from what is stated in the text and
conclusion was made of paramount importance-I t is called an extension of literal rule
and the result results in irregularities, we arrive at the golden rule- this rule tries to
avoid absurd consequences and aims at giving spirit of the law rather than just the
grammatical meaning. what the law ought to be/have been is looked at.
GR tells that when we are applying this principle, literal rule had failed and by apply
the GR we are trying to save the absurd result by giving meaning to law or phrase so
that absurd result is not created- it aims at giving effect to spirit of the law. only when
grammatical construction cannot be given without a doubt, GR applies. for purpose of
legislature, you look at the history, remedies, etc., for intent you look at object and
preamble. when you are talking about spirit of laws, it is a very big subset. for ex:
maternity benefit act. its intention is that mother should be given protective labour
rights. purpose of the act is providing some sort of security to the mother during that
process of childbirth and after that for some time. when you come to spirit, this act
will come under welfare legislation. if you are talking under such terms, it gives an
idea that in spirit we look beyond purpose and intent and when we go beyond that, it
helps you in relation to understanding the nature of the legislation. for ex: fiscal
statute. giving penalty. connotation of such levying is that there has to be strict
construction. nature and spirit are stricter. duty bound legislation. Thus, strict
interpretation. if you have to look at spirit, the judges will look into stricter
interpretation or have a narrower approach. but for a welfare legislation, we are
talking about legislation which gives rights and benefits to be given to a particular
class. spirit of laws is v different. these classes of people should be protected due to
this this reason, they are in need of protection.
Characteristics:
Absurdity in relation to application of the GR, that we define as: absurdity when
meaning culled out using the literal rule is such that it can in no circumstances be the
intention of the legislature to produce that particular result.
Q. what is the role of the judiciary? - extent to which the normal can be departed from
is important. this is to prevent judicial overreach. You can depart from the meaning or
modify the meaning till the time the result aligns with the intent, spirit and purpose of
the law. but this extent is v important. there should not be unnecessary breach of
extent. always a cautionary note attached. allows judge to depart from normal
meaning to avoid absurd result created through literal rule. court can only divert only
to the extent so that the effect of the absurdity is no more. even if the absurdity is
arising due to lacuna in law, you have to give it a meaning so that the consequence of
that meaning is that absurdity of the meaning is erased.
CASES:
1) Lee v. Knapp
The law was that the driver causing an accident shall stop after the accident.
Herein, a driver stopped for a moment after the accident and then moved away.
The result of the application of the literal rule would be that the driver had
complied with the law. However, that could not have been the intention of the
legislature. It was thus held, applying the golden rule, that requirement of the law
had not been followed by the driver as he had not stopped for a reasonable period,
requiring interested persons to make necessary inquiries from him about the cause
of the accident.
So, absurdity was that the stopping for such a small time did not match with the
intention of the legislature. The intention was to stop for reasonable time so that
officials can conduct inquiry and other necessary steps could be taken.
2) Grey v. Pearson
The Lord Wensleydale rule was expounded in this case. It posited that the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless such
adherence would lead to some absurdity or repugnance or inconsistency with the
rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and the inconsistency, but no
farther.
3) Adler v. George
This case dealt with section 3 of the Official Secrets Act, 1920. Under it, it was an
offence to obstruct forces in the vicinity of a prohibited place. Adler was arrested
for obstructing forces whilst in a prohibited area. Under the literal rule, Adler was
not technically ‘in the vicinity of the area’, he was in the area itself (larger set) and
so was not infringing the terms of the Act. The golden rule was applied to extend
the meaning of ‘vicinity’ and avoid the possible absurd outcome. Thus, Adler was
held liable. Golden rule in such cases help in modifying definition to deplete
absurdity or prevent possible absurd outcome.
4) Re Sigsworth
A son murdered his mother. The mother had not made a will. Under the
Administration of Justice Act, 1925, if someone dies without a will, the estate
would to the next of kin, who in this case was the son. There was no ambiguity in
the words of the Act, but the Code was not prepared with the intention to let the
son who had murdered his mother benefit from his crime. It was held that the
literal rule should not apply here and the golden rule should be used to prevent the
repugnant situation.
5) R. v. Allen
The defendant was charged with bigamy under Section 57 of the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861, which stated ‘whosoever being married shall marry any
other person during the lifetime of the former husband or wife is guilty of an
offence’. Under the literal rule, bigamy would be impossible because civil courts
do not recognise second marriages. Thus, no person already married could
technically be ‘married’ to a second person during the lifetime of the first spouse.
The golden rule was applied to determine that the word ‘marry’ should be seen as
‘to go through ceremony’ and the conviction was upheld.