No.

1268 April 7, 1999

CHINA INCREASES ITS MISSILE FORCES

WHILE OPPOSING U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE
RICHARD D. FISHER, JR.
MISSILES ARE A KEY FUTURE WEAPON
Revelations that China stole U.S. nuclear war-
head secrets highlight two strategic challenges to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) hopes
the United States. New, small nuclear warheads— that by developing a range
developed with the help of U.S. warhead informa- of nuclear and non-nuclear Produced by
tion—will allow China to put multiple warheads missiles, it can deter Amer- The Asian Studies Center
on new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) ican support for Taiwan
or equip short-range missiles with nuclear war- and project military power Published by
heads. In Asia, China already has increased to over in Asia. For China, mis- The Heritage Foundation
100 the number of missiles pointed at Taiwan, and siles are a weapon system 214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.
future theater ballistic and cruise missiles could that it can produce; it has Washington, D.C.
threaten U.S. forces in Asia and U.S. allies. much difficulty in produc- 20002–4999
(202) 546-4400
ing modern combat air- http://www.heritage.org
Second, China’s vigorous campaign to block craft and warships. Missiles
U.S.–Japan missile defense cooperation and future also address a military
U.S. sales of missile defense equipment to Taiwan weakness of the United
seeks to preserve a growing advantage in missile States and its allies: lack of
forces while putting great pressure on U.S. allies in effective missile defense
Asia in the hope that this will weaken their alli- systems. New, more accu-
ances with the United States. If the United States rate missiles also allow
and its allies were not to cooperate in missile China to seek greater polit-
defenses, this would undermine allied confidence ical leverage in Asia. China will likely use the
in U.S. defense commitments and force Asian threat of its new missile forces to coerce political
states to consider building their own missiles to concessions, especially from Taiwan.
deter China.
In the next several years, China can be expected
to field a new mobile intercontinental ballistic mis-
sile, more accurate medium- and short-range bal-
listic missiles, and a new land-attack cruise
No. 1268
missile. These will be supported by new recon-
naissance, intelligence, and navigation satellites.
China’s goal is to create a “reconnaissance-strike
complex” that marries space and airborne sensors
to provide precise targeting data to highly accurate
ballistic and cruise missiles. Besides making
greater use of outer space for military purposes,
China also seeks to develop the means to destroy
opposing satellites and may also be developing its
own missile defenses.
CHINA OPPOSES U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE
China hopes to create the impression that
American defensive missiles, not China’s new offen-
sive missiles, threaten peace in Asia. But it can be
expected that China will only increase its missile
forces in response to U.S. missile defense plans.
The Clinton Administration is not responding ade-
quately to China’s threats and is not sufficiently
affirming the need for U.S. missile defenses.
China’s attack against U.S. missile defense plans
must be seen as an attempt to limit the future
scope of U.S. alliances in Asia. This is unaccept-
able for the United States, as its alliances are a vital
element of its national security in Asia.
To prevent the U.S.–China relationship from
lapsing into a Cold War–like confrontation, Amer-
ica must demonstrate resolve and leadership in
responding to the challenge of China’s growing
missile forces and its anti-missile defense cam-
paign. The United States should:
• State
ate that China’s missil
ssile
iles threate
aten peace in
Asia. The Clinton Administration should offer
a full assessment of China’s future missile
development plans to Congress and the Ameri-
can people. The Administration should note
clearly that it is China’s missiles, not U.S. mis-
sile defenses, which threaten peace in Asia.
• Deploy national missi
ssile defenses. To defend
Americans from future Chinese missiles and to
strengthen allied confidence in U.S. missile
defense technology, the United States should
rapidly deploy a national missile defense sys-
tem based on the U.S. Navy’s Theater-Wide
missile defense system. A companion space-
April 7, 1999
based sensor system should follow in the
future.
• Use ththeat
eater missi
ssile defenses to st
strengthen U.S.
allia
lliances
ces in Asia. The United States should rap-
idly develop and deploy effective theater mis-
sile defenses in Asia. Missile defense
cooperation should be a major new mission for
U.S. forces in cooperation with Australia, the
Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. Such
cooperation is needed to protect U.S. forces in
Asia, as well as allied forces, from growing Chi-
nese and North Korean missile forces.
• Sell theater
ter missil
ssile
ile defenses to Taiwan. China’s
increased deployment of missiles near Taiwan
requires that the United States sell Taiwan mis-
sile defense systems. Such sales are consistent
with the goals of the 1979 Taiwan Relations
Act and with the U.S. goal that future Taiwan–
China relations be determined by peaceful
means.
• Suspend commercial space coo coop
ooperati ation with
China pending missil
ssilee c on tr o l n ego tiations.
il
The United States should suspend civil space
cooperation with China pending the comple-
tion of agreements with China that set limits
on future missile competition. China’s missile
forces have benefited from commercial space
cooperation with the United States. Such
cooperation is not in America’s interest as long
as China’s modernized missile forces can
threaten Americans.
China’s growing missile forces and its campaign
to block the development and deployment of U.S.
missile defenses pose a serious challenge to U.S.–
China relations and to stability in Asia. Prevention
of a future crisis with China requires that America
be firm and resolute in responding to future Chi-
nese threats. Missile defenses in Asia can help to
persuade China that missile competition with the
United States cannot succeed, and that China must
instead refrain from threatening the United States
and its Asian neighbors.
—Richard D. Fisher, Jr., is Director of The Asian
Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
No. 1268 April 7, 1999

CHINA INCREASES ITS MISSILE FORCES

WHILE OPPOSING U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE
RICHARD D. FISHER, JR.

Revelations that China stole U.S. nuclear war- tions. Along with plans to make greater use of
head secrets highlight two strategic challenges to outer space for military purposes, China is seeking
the United States. First, China is building a range to develop the means to
of new ballistic and cruise missiles. New, small destroy opposing satellites Produced by

nuclear warheads—developed with the help of the and may also be developing The Asian Studies Center

stolen information and other U.S. data—will allow its own missile defenses.
China to place multiple warheads on new inter- Published by
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or equip But China’s interest in The Heritage Foundation

short-range missiles with nuclear warheads. China missile defenses has not 214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.

has increased to over 100 the number of missiles stopped it from mounting a Washington, D.C.

pointed at Taiwan, and future theater ballistic and major diplomatic campaign 20002–4999

(202) 546-4400
cruise missiles could threaten U.S. forces and allies of threats this year to block http://www.heritage.org
in Asia. Second, China is seeking to weaken U.S. the U.S. deployment of
alliances by waging a loud and menacing cam- missile defenses in Asia.
paign to prevent the U.S. deployment of missile China hopes to create the
defenses in Asia that can guard against the growing impression that American
North Korean and Chinese missile forces. defensive missiles, not
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has long China’s new offensive mis-
viewed missile forces as a principal component of siles, threaten peace in
its future warfare plans. By developing a variety of Asia. The Clinton Adminis-
nuclear and non-nuclear missiles, the PLA hopes tration is not responding
to deter American support for Taiwan and project adequately to China’s
power in Asia. In the next several years, China can threats and is not sufficiently affirming the need
be expected to field a new mobile intercontinental for U.S. missile defenses. It is essential that the
ballistic missile, more accurate medium- and United States quickly develop and deploy ade-
short-range ballistic missiles, a new land-attack quate missile defense systems, lest uneasy U.S.
cruise missile, and new reconnaissance and intelli- friends and allies turn to their own missile—or
gence satellites that will support missile opera- even nuclear—options to deter China. The
No. 1268 April 7, 1999

Administration should state clearly that China’s Asymmetric Warfare

new missiles threaten peace in Asia, accelerate the
development of effective missile defense systems
to protect U.S. forces in Asia from both increasing
Chinese and North Korean missile forces, and
develop and share theater missile defense systems
with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia.
The Administration also should suspend civilian
space cooperation with China until it enters into
agreements with the United States that limit future
missile competition.
FOR CHINA, MISSILES ARE
A KEY FUTURE WEAPON
The importance of missiles to China’s future
military posture is emphasized dramatically by
recent revelations that China obtained critical
information on the U.S. W–88 nuclear warhead
that allowed it to develop a similar small nuclear
warhead. In China’s developing strategy and doc-
trine, missiles hold a place of priority that is per-
haps above that of air or naval forces. PLA missile-
related doctrine is evolving from one that stresses
the use of nuclear missiles to deter other nuclear
powers to one that envisions a range of uses for
nuclear and non-nuclear armed missiles at the
regional level.1 Most ballistic missiles are now con-
trolled by a special service within the PLA called
the Second Artillery. As China builds new short-
range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, its
Army, Navy, and Air Force likely will be given
more missile-based strike missions as well. China’s
emphasis on missiles is due also to a practical real-
ity: China by itself cannot build a modern air force
and navy, but it can build a variety of modern mis-
siles.2
In addition to compensating for PLA weak-
nesses, missiles allow the PLA to exploit deficien-
cies in the military forces of the United States and
other possible Asian adversaries which have no
effective defenses against theater or tactical mis-
siles or against supersonic anti-ship missiles. Mis-
siles also are essential to a high-priority PLA goal:
to build the forces needed to wage modern infor-
mation warfare. Like the United States, China rec-
ognizes the vital importance to future warfare of
gaining information dominance. China intends to
use missiles to launch reconnaissance and commu-
nication satellites. China may also use missiles to
attack satellites or terrestrial-based command,
communication, computer, control and intelli-
gence (C4I) systems.3
Importance of Foreign Technology
The high priority that the PLA and the political
leadership in China place on missile force mod-
ernization is reflected in China’s determination to
obtain foreign missile technology, whether by
cooperation, sale, or subterfuge. Indeed, China’s
aerospace sector and its missile and space pro-
grams receive greater political support and
resources than aircraft programs. But despite the
progress China has made on its own to develop
modern missiles, it still requires foreign technol-
ogy inputs to keep pace with the United States.
Some of China’s sources for missile technology
include:
• The United States. Stolen W–88 small nuclear
warhead data; stolen neutron bomb data; pos-
sible Tomahawk cruise missiles obtained via

1. For a discussion of China’s evolving missile doctrine, see Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “China’s Missiles Over the Taiwan Strait: A
Political and Military Assessment,” in James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1997), pp. 183–187. For an excellent review of relatively recent Chinese literature on
evolving missile doctrine, see Alistair I. Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking,’” International Security, Winter 1995–1996.
2. While investing heavily in modernizing its Air Force and Navy, China has been forced to obtain technology from such
countries as Russia and Israel to aid its efforts. See Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “How America’s Friends Are Building China’s Mil-
itary,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1146, November 5, 1997.
3. PLA emphasis on developing information warfare capabilities is emphasized in a 1998 Department of Defense report to
Congress, Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant to Section
1226 of the Fiscal Year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act, pp. 5–9.
No. 1268 April 7, 1999

Afghanistan;4 use of U.S. Global Positioning
Satellite (GPS) navigation signals;5 information
derived from commercial cooperation that is
critical to improving the reliability of space
launch vehicles;6 and subsidy for future mis-
sile programs from U.S. purchase of Chinese
satellite launch services. The father of China’s
missile program, Dr. Tsien Hsue-shen, was an
important early U.S. rocket expert; he returned
to China in 1955 following alleged McCarthy-
period persecution. Since the 1980s, many
younger Chinese aerospace engineers have
studied at U.S. universities.
• Israel. Possible co-development with China of
a land-attack cruise missile;8 sale to China of
its Phalcon airborne radar that could help
guide Chinese anti-ship missiles; alleged sale
of U.S. Patriot missile to China which may be
assisting future Chinese anti-missile pro-
grams.9
• Germany, Britain. Germany’s DASA aerospace
company has helped China develop communi-
cation satellites; Britain’s University of Surrey is
helping China develop small satellites, which
are more difficult to detect and less expensive
to produce and launch.

• Russia. Has marketed the Raduga Kh–65SE
and Novator Alpha cruise missiles to China;
has sold China the Raduga SS–N–22 Sunburn
supersonic anti-ship missile, co-production
rights for the Zvezda Kh–31 supersonic anti-
radiation missile, and data on large military
lasers; very likely has sold China data from the
VEGA–M bureau on radar satellites; and sold
the S-300PMU surface-to-air missile that is
helping China develop future anti-missile sys-
tems. From Belarus, China has obtained a MAZ
missile transporter used for a Soviet missile
that can help China make mobile its new
ICBMs.7
• Kiribati, France, Brazil. Kiribati has allowed
China to establish a satellite tracking station on
its island of Tarawa;10 France and Brazil may
soon begin space-tracking cooperation with
China.11
CHINA’S MISSILE FORCE
MODERNIZATION
A 1997 U.S. Department of Defense report to
Congress notes that China has the potential to
build “as many as a thousand” new ballistic mis-
siles over the next decade.12 China is developing
new ballistic, cruise, and anti-missile systems, and
is investing heavily in advanced guidance systems

4. John Barry and Gregory L. Vistica, “‘The Penetration Is Total,’” Newsweek, March 29, 1999, p. 30.
5. Walter Pincus, “U.S. Navigation Satellites Help China, Pentagon Says,” The Washington Post, June 20, 1998, p. A2.
6. For a review of the ways in which U.S. commercial space cooperation has helped to improve China’s missiles and the ways
in which the PLA may have access to commercial communication satellites sold to China, see Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “Com-
mercial Space Cooperation Should Not Harm National Security,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1198, June 26,
1998.
7. Bill Gertz, “Missile-Related Technology Sold to Beijing by Belarus,” The Washington Times, June 12, 1997, p. A9.
8. Trevor Nash, “Stand-off and Deliver,” Armada International, August/September 1996, p. 56. The Delilah was built originally
as an anti-radar cruise missile and was derived from the U.S. Chukar target drone.
9. David A. Fulghum, “China Exploiting U.S. Patriot Secrets,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 18, 1993, p. 20,
and “Defense Department Confirms Patriot Technology Diverted,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 1, 1993, p.
26. Israel strongly denied the charge in the wake of these reports.
10. Liu Cheng, “China: Tarawa Station Added to China Aerospace’s Tracking/Control Network,” Keiji Ribao (Science and Tech-
nology Daily), October 7, 1997, p. 1, in FBIS–CHI-98–068.
11. “China and France to Pool Satellite Control Network,” Agence France-Presse, February 10, 1999.
12. U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Military Capabilities of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant to
Section 1305 of the Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authorization Act, p. 4.

3
No. 1268 April 7, 1999

and satellites to improve missile accuracy. Where
possible, foreign technology is being sought to
improve China’s future missile development.
Increasingly, Chinese missile forces will be
equipped with highly destructive non-nuclear
warheads.
New Long-Range Ballistic Missiles
The PLA has two ICBM development programs
and one submarine-launched ballistic missile pro-
gram that may result in new deployed missiles by
2010. The most
advanced, the Chart 1
China is expected to field the 8,000-mile-range
DF–41 solid-fueled ICBM. Both it and the DF–31
will be mobile. China’s new transporter-erector-
launcher (TEL), based on a new WS–2400 heavy
transport vehicle revealed at the 1998 Zhuhai Air
Show,14 shows influences from the Russian MAZ
TEL sold to China.15 A better TEL, likely operat-
ing from a network of mountainside caves, would
enhance the survivability of these mobile ICBMs.
Both the DF–31 and DF–41 ICBMs are expected
to incorporate multiple independently targeted re-
B1268

solid-fueled
5,000-mile-
range DF–31
F u tu r e P L A M o b ile IC B M s
ICBM, which Both the DF–31 and DF–41 will be more survivable
has enough because they will be mobile. A new Chinese
range to hit the transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) that incorporates
western United technology from the Russian MAZ TEL may be
developed from the Chinese WS–2400 heavy
States, may transporter. This TEL may be similar to the recently
enter service in revealed TEL for Pakistan’s Shaheen short-range
the next few ballistic missile, which closely resembles the Russian
years. In late MAZ 543 TEL and is similar to the WS–2400.
1998, the DF–
31 was reported
to be ready for W S – 2 4 0 0

an ejection test
from its launch
tube.13 This D F – 3 1 * D F – 4 1 *
P a k is t a n S h a h e e n T E L S im ila r t o W S – 2 4 0 0
missile will 8,000 km 12,000 km
Range
form the basis 4,800 miles 8,000 miles
for China’s next Payload MIRV MIRV
submarine-
M A Z T E L
launched mis- Year
2000–2003 2005–2010
sile, the JL–2. Operational
By the end of
the next decade, Note: * Notional configuration. MIRV= Multiple Independently
Targeted Re-entry Vehicles. D F – 3 1 o n W S – 2 4 0 0 -b a s e d T E L *

13. Bill Gertz, “China Prepared to Test ICBM with Enough Range to Hit U.S.,” The Washington Times, November 12, 1998, p.
A1.
14. The second Zhuhai Air Show was held from November 15 to 22, 1998, at the Zhuhai International Airport near Macao.
These shows in 1996 and 1998 were China’s most extensive exposition of its aerospace sector.
15. A picture of the WS–2400 can be seen on The Heritage Foundation Asian Studies Center Web page report, in a on the
Zhuhai Air Show. See http://www.heritage.org/exclusive/zhuhai/.

4
No. 1268 April 7, 1999

Chart 2 B1268

Im p a c t o f P R C N u c le a r E s p io n a g e : O p tio n fo r D F – 5 M IR V B r e a k o u t

Thrusters can adjust

trajectory of
satellites/warheads

Current 2 Iridium
Nuclear Satellites
Warhead

LM–2C/SD Smart Dispenser used to launch

10 Motorola Iridium communication
satellites in 5 launches, 1996–98. 1

MIRVed
Nuclear
Warheads

D F – 5 A L M – 2 C /S D
Function ICBM SLV
Notional image of LM–2C/SD reconfigured
Diameter 3.35 m 3.35 m to deploy 8 nuclear re-entry vehicles

Length 36 m (est.) 35.14 m Assuming the Smart Dispenser can

carry up to 8 new small nuclear warheads,
Payload 3,200 kg/7,000 lb ? China has the potential to arm its estimated
26 DF–5s with up to 208 warheads.2
Range 13,000 km —
Year 1986 1986
Operational (DF–5, 1981)

Notes: ICBM= Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, SLV = Space Launch Vehicle.

1. Diagram based on illustration in brochure from China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, a part of the China
Aerospace Corporation.
2. Warhead shapes derived from re-entry vehicle shapes in a brochure from the Beijing Institute of Aerodynamics.

entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. For many years,
China has been suspected of trying to develop
MIRV warheads; in early 1998, U.S. Air Force
General Eugene Habinger stated publicly that
China was developing MIRVs for its ICBMs.16 As a
result of an investigation conducted by a congres-
sional panel led by Representative Christopher
Cox (R–CA), it was revealed in early 1999 that in
the mid-1980s, China had obtained secret data
from the Los Alamos National Laboratory concern-

16. Bill Gertz, “China’s Nukes Could Reach Most of U.S.; Russians Also Beefing Up Missiles, Top General Says,” The Washington
Times, April 1, 1998, p. A1.

5
No. 1268 April 7, 1999

ing the U.S. W–88 nuclear warhead.17 The W–88
is the smallest and most modern U.S. nuclear war-
head and is mounted on the U.S. Navy Trident D–
5 submarine-launched ballistic missile.18
On March 14, National Security Advisor Samuel
Berger stated “there’s no question” that China ben-
efited from nuclear warhead secrets leaked from
the Los Alamos labs.19 One source notes that U.S.
W–88 information could have saved China “two to
ten years” of effort.20 Possible evidence that China
is developing new smaller re-entry vehicles to
carry its new smaller nuclear weapon was gathered
by the author at the 1998 Zhuhai Air Show.21
The Multiple-Warhead Option. China has sug-
gested that it may respond to a U.S. National Mis-
sile Defense (NMD) by increasing the number of
missiles or warheads that it could aim at the
United States. The addition of smaller nuclear war-
heads to its arsenal also gives China the option to
modify its existing 8,000-mile-range DF–5 ICBMs
with multiple warheads as another means of
responding to NMD. The DF–5 currently has only
one large warhead that is not very accurate. A
“bus” that China developed to launch multiple
U.S. Motorola “Iridium” communication satellites
could quickly be converted to carry up to eight
small nuclear warheads.22 The Chinese Long
March CZ–2C/SC space-launcher used to loft ten
Iridium satellites to date is a slightly modified ver-
sion of the DF–5 ICBM. According to press
reports, U.S. intelligence services estimate China
may have 18 to 26 DF–5 ICBMs.23 Modifying
these DF–5s with an eight-warhead MIRV bus
increases the number of nuclear weapons carried
by its DF–5s from 26 to 208.
Better Medium- and
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
To achieve its regional objectives, China puts
great emphasis on its medium- and short-range
missile forces. China is improving the 1,125-mile-
range DF–21 ballistic missile that entered service
in the late 1980s. China’s armed forces may have
more than 80 of these solid-fueled missiles, which
are both road- and rail-mobile.24 Jane’s Defence

17. The Cox Commission, formally called the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns
with the People’s Republic of China, was created in June 1998 to investigate the leakage of U.S. missile technology to
China and focused on this incident. The espionage was first reported in Carla Ann Robins, “China Got Secret Data on U.S.
Warhead,” The Wall Street Journal, January 7, 1999, p. A3.
18. For a full report of the struggle of Department of Energy officials to convince the Clinton Administration to take corrective
action to find who betrayed the technology and to increase security measures, see James Risen and Jeff Gerth, “China Stole
Nuclear Secrets from Los Alamos, U.S. Officials Say,” The New York Times, March 6, 1999, p. A1.
19. David E. Sanger, “‘No Question’ U.S. Says, Leak Helped China,” The New York Times, March 15, 1999, p. A8.
20. Robins, “China Got Secret Data on U.S. Warhead.”
21. A brochure from the Beijing Institute of Aerodynamics obtained by the author shows wind tunnel test models and infrared
thermodynamic pictures of shapes that are very likely to be nuclear re-entry vehicles. Assuming China’s new nuclear re-
entry vehicle weighs about the same as a W–88 (about 800 lbs.), this would allow a DF–5 to carry up to eight warheads.
Photos can be seen on The Heritage Foundation Asian Studies Center Web page report on the Zhuhai Air Show, op. cit.
22. Both U.S. government and defense industry sources have told The Heritage Foundation that the Iridium launch bus could
be reconfigured to launch nuclear warheads.
23. China has made no official statement on the size of its ICBM force. The estimate of 18 DF–5s comes from a leaked assess-
ment by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. See Bill Gertz, “China Targets Nukes at U.S.,” The Washington Times, June 3,
1998, p. A1. In 1998, China reportedly added eight new DF–5s. Bill Gertz, “China Adds 6 ICBMs to Arsenal,” The Wash-
ington Times, July 21, 1999, p. A1. This small number is viewed as confirming the “retaliatory” role of the Second Artillery
Corps. Based on estimated production rates, others estimate China has produced 120 to 150 DF–5s. See Yang Zheng,
“China’s Nuclear Arsenal,” National University of Singapore, March 16, 1996, at http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/ch-war.htm.
Although this analysis is highly speculative and far exceeds “conventional” wisdom, a U.S. source told this author that the
latter estimate is plausible. See also “New Information on the Size of China’s Missile Force,” Center for Defense and Inter-
national Security Studies Web site, at http://www.cdiss.org.

6
No. 1268 April 7, 1999

Weekly, citing Japanese military sources, reports
that China recently fielded an advanced version of
the DF–21, known as the DF–21X.25 This new
DF–21 may have a new highly accurate warhead
that uses navigation satellite data like the U.S. GPS
network or radar guidance technology.26 If this
new warhead used radar guidance in a manner
similar to the U.S. Pershing II, which correlates
images from the missile’s radar with digital map
pictures in the warhead’s computer, it could
achieve an accuracy within a radius of 50
meters.27 This level of accuracy would mean the
difference in capability between hitting an airfield
or hitting a particular hangar on the airfield. The
new DF–21 variant is expected also to have a
longer range, perhaps up to 1,800 miles.28
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs). Espe-
cially for missions near Taiwan, China intends to
rely heavily on short-range ballistic missiles to
overcome the technical superiority of Taiwan’s air
force. U.S. intelligence estimates that China could
deploy up to 650 of the 360-mile-range DF–15
and 180-mile-range M–11 short-range ballistic
missiles to areas near Taiwan. The DF–15 is a
sophisticated missile that uses warhead shaping to
make radar detection more difficult and a second
stage to confuse anti-missile radar. But it may soon
get better. At the 1996 Zhuhai show, the author
was told that satellite navigation technology was
being used to improve the accuracy of the short-
range DF–15 missile. This solid-fueled missile is
both road- and rail-mobile. One Chinese article
says that an enhanced guidance system under
investigation “can raise impact accuracy by an
order of magnitude.”29 For the DF–15, this could
mean improved accuracy from a 300-meter radius
to a 30-meter radius. Similar guidance upgrades
could also be used to improve the M–11, which
sources in Taiwan believe will go to Army units,
whereas the DF–15 is controlled by the Second
Artillery.
New Cruise Missiles
As seen in the case of short-range ballistic mis-
siles, the Second Artillery and other PLA services
are likely to have their own land-attack cruise mis-
siles now in development. The Pentagon has noted
that land-attack cruise missiles for theater and
strategic missions are a “relatively high develop-
ment priority” for China and that initial versions
“should be ready early in the next century.”30
China has been investigating combined GPS/Iner-

24. “Army General Comments on PRC Simulated Missile Exercise,” Tzu-Li Wan-Pao, January 27, 1999, p. 2, in FBIS–CHI–99–
027.
25. Paul Beaver, “China Prepares to Field New Missile,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 24, 1999, p. 3. GPS and its Russian
counterpart, GLONASS, each use about 24 satellites to provide signals correlated from several satellites to produce an
accurate determination of location. Although the GPS signal is downgraded for civil users, by using differential processing
technology from a larger number of satellites, civil GPS signals can produce location information sufficient for precision
missile strike missions. There is some indication that China is interested in utilizing Differential GPS for military purposes.
26. That China was working on a new, possibly terminally guided, warhead for the DF–21 was first revealed to this author at
the 1996 Zhuhai Air Show by an engineer from the Beijing Research Institute for Telemetry, which develops advanced
guidance systems. See Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “China’s Missile Threat,” The Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1996, p. A8.
Sources in Taiwan interviewed in November 1996 speculated that the new DF–21 warhead would be radar-guided in a
manner similar to the Radar Digital Area Guidance (RADAG) system used on the U.S. Pershing II, which had been
destroyed as a consequence of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the former Soviet Union.
China’s interest in a missile with a Pershing II capability can be inferred as well from Chinese literature; see Zhu Bao,
“Developmental Prospects for Surface to Surface Missiles,” in Xu Daxhe, ed., Review on Ballistic Missile Technology, China
Aero Space Corporation, Science and Technology Bureau, 1998, pp. 9–19.
27. “MGM–31 Pershing II,” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems—Issue 15 (date not available).
28. Range estimates from Beaver, “China Prepares to Field New Missile.”
29. Wang Yonggang and Yuan Jianping of Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xian, and Wang Minghai of the Second Artil-
lery Engineering College, “Preliminary Investigation of GPS/INS Integrated Scheme for Ballistic Missiles,” Hangtian Kongzhi
(Aerospace Control), June 1996, pp. 25–28.

7
No. 1268 April 7, 1999

tial and Terrain-Contour Matching (TERCOM)
guidance systems to give high accuracy to its
cruise missiles.31 China could gain insights for this
guidance technology by studying U.S. Tomahawk
cruise missiles reportedly obtained from Afghani-
stan. Russian and Israeli cruise missile companies
are another likely source of advanced cruise mis-
sile guidance technology.
China’s first new land-attack cruise missile is
reported by one source to be the 240-mile-range
YJ–22,32 an advanced development of the C–802
anti-ship cruise missile but with a straight wing
and a probably better engine. A long-range strate-
gic version of this cruise missile, similar in capabil-
ity to early U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles, likely
will enter service after 2005. Both new cruise mis-
siles probably will be carried by multiple plat-
forms, such as trucks, aircraft, ships, and
submarines.
New Supersonic Tactical Missiles
China is developing ramjet engine technologies
to confer supersonic speeds on its missiles that
complicate interception. In addition, ramjets offer
the potential to increase the range of a smaller mis-
sile. China’s existing ramjet-powered missiles are
large and cannot travel great distances, but the
purchase of the Russian Raduga SS–N–22 ramjet-
powered anti-ship missile could give China a new
source of cruise missile ramjet technology.33 China
is reported to have purchased co-production rights
to the ramjet-powered, Mach-2 speed, 125-mile-
range Zvezda Kh-31P missile,34 which was
designed by the Russians to counter the radar of
U.S. Patriot surface-to-air missiles and the U.S.
Navy Aegis ship-defense radar. Attacking radar
systems is essential to destroying an opponent’s
anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems.
New Conventional Missile Warheads
Although many new Chinese ballistic and cruise
missiles have the option of carrying a small
nuclear warhead, China is placing great emphasis
on developing powerful non-nuclear warheads.
Mounted on new, much more accurate ballistic
and cruise missiles, such warheads make possible
long-range precision strike missions without
recourse to nuclear weapons, thus reducing the
prospect of nuclear retaliation. China is develop-
ing Radio Frequency (RF) weapons35 that simulate
the electromagnetic pulse created by nuclear
explosion, which has the effect of wiping out com-
puter and electronic systems. An RF-armed missile
might be able to disable a communication grid on
a warship without causing great casualties. China
is also interested in building cluster munitions for
ballistic or cruise missiles that could disable air-
base runways. Such cluster warheads eventually
could arm the new version of the DF–21 medium-
range ballistic missile.

30. U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Military Capabilities, p. 4.

31. China may be considering combining inertial, GPS, and Terrain-Contour Matching (TERCOM) guidance systems. The lat-
ter refers to a new system that matches radar pictures of terrain with a computer database of terrain images to guide a mis-
sile to its target. See Zhong Long yi, “Application of Combined Navigation Systems on Cruise Missiles,” China Aerospace
Abstracts, March 1993. The author of this article is employed by an institute of the China Aero Space Corporation’s 3rd
Academy, which is known to be working on cruise missile guidance.
32. “China: Ying Ji–2 (C–802),” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 9, 1998, p. 75.
33. China is reported to have purchased 30 to 50 SS–N–22 missiles for its Russian-built Soveremennyi-class destroyers. See
Nikolai Novichkov, “Russian Firm Starts to Produce Antiship Missiles for China,” ITAR–TASS, April 7, 1998, and Anatoliy
Illykhov, “Far East Plant Making ‘Mosquito’ Rockets for Chinese Navy,” Moscow RIA, April 14, 1998, in FBIS–UMA–98–
104.
34. The sale of Kh–31P co-production is said to be confirmed by sources in the Zvezda Bureau. See “Russia Boosts Asian Naval
Links,” Jane’s International Defence Review, December 1997, p. 6; see also “China and India Are Expected to Become...” Avi-
ation Week and Space Technology, August 25, 1997, p. 17.
35. U.S. Department of Defense, Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s Republic of China, p. 6. There also is a
report that China may have stolen U.S. technology in this area. See Barry and Vistica, “‘The Penetration Is Total.’”

8
No. 1268 April 7, 1999

Chart 3 B1268

T a r g e t T a iw a n : P o s s ib le D e p lo y m e n t
A r e a s o f N e w C h in e s e M is s ile s
Japan

D F – 1 5 600 km/360 mi
360 mi

People’s Republic
of China
Y J– 2 2 240 mi

M – 1 1 180 mi

Republic of China
(Taiwan)

D F – 1 5 /M – 9 M – 1 1 Y J– 2 2 * D F – 2 1 X *

Function SRBM SRBM LACM MRBM

Year Operational 1990 2000+ 2000+ 2000+
Range 600 km/360 miles 300 km/180 miles 400 km/240 miles Up to 3,000 km/
1,800 miles (est.)
Payload 500 kg/1,100 lb 800 kg/1,760 lb ? ?
Future Warhead high explosive/ high explosive/ high explosive/ high explosive/
Options radio frequency/ radio frequency/ radio frequency/ radio frequency/
nuclear submunitions/ nuclear nuclear submunitions/ nuclear
Guidance Inertial + future Inertial + future Inertial/GPS/ possible radar or
GPS/GLONASS GPS/GLONASS GLONASS GPS/GLONASS
Current Accuracy 300m CEP 600m CEP ? ?
Accuracy with < 50m CEP (est.) ? < 50m CEP (est.) < 50m CEP (est.)
Satellite Guidance
Note: *Notional configuration. SRBM=Short-Range Ballistic Missile, LACM = Land-Attack Cruise Missile, MRBM = Medium Range Ballistic
Missile, GPS = U.S. Global Positioning Satellite, GLONASS = Russian equivalent of GPS, Circular Error Probability = radius of potential
circular target area.

9
No. 1268 April 7, 1999

Anti-Missile, Anti-Satellite, and Space
Warfare
China’s government loudly protests U.S. anti-
missile plans but says almost nothing about its
own anti-missile or anti-satellite programs, or its
space warfare plans. The PLA is aware of the need
to defend against opposing missiles and the need
to exploit the U.S. military’s high dependence on
reconnaissance and communication satellites.36
PLA literature on future warfare acknowledges the
need for a range of systems to deny the enemy’s
use of space.37 Engineering reports thought to be
co-authored by the head of the China Aerospace
Corporation’s 2nd Academy, which manufactures
surface-to-air missiles, indicate that China may be
developing anti-missile or anti-satellite systems.38
According to Chinese officials interviewed at the
1998 Zhuhai Air Show, China will complete in two
years a new version of the FT–2000 surface-to-air
missile that could have an anti-tactical ballistic
missile (ATBM) capability. The FT–2000 is
designed to home in on the emissions of electronic
warfare aircraft like the U.S. EA-6B Prowler. The
next version of the FT–2000 will be radar-guided
and similar in performance to the Russian Fakel S–
300PMU, which China purchased in 1991. These
missiles may be related to China’s HQ–9 surface-
to-air missile program, which sought to marry
guidance and command technology from the Rus-
sian S–300 and missile-seeker radar from the U.S.
Patriot missile. A U.S. source has told the author
that China does indeed have an example of the
Patriot; at the 1997 Moscow Air Show, an official
with a Russian missile design bureau told the
author that the HQ–9 will use the same guidance
frequency as the Patriot.
Laser ASAT
Last year, the Pentagon reported to Congress
that “China already may possess the capability to
damage, under specific conditions, optical sensors
on satellites that are very vulnerable to damage by
lasers” and that, “given China’s current level of
interest in laser technology, it is reasonable to
assume that Beijing would develop a weapon that
could destroy satellites in the future.”39 China has
invested heavily in its own laser programs but may
also benefit from foreign technology. China is
recruiting Russian laser technicians, and Chinese
engineers appear to be familiar with current U.S.
military laser developments and with the potential
for lasers to destroy or disable targets.40
To support civilian space activities, such as its
manned space program, and also for military pur-
poses, China is trying to develop a global space-
tracking capability. The Pentagon notes that China
already has a good space tracking capability; in
1987, it began to operate a space tracking station

36. A U.S. Army war game was said to demonstrate the high vulnerability of U.S. forces in the event of any loss of satellite
capabilities. See Sean D. Naylor, “U.S. Army War Game Reveals Satellite Vulnerability,” Defense News, March 10–16, 1997,
p. 50.
37. See Ch’en Huan, “The Third Military Revolution,” Contemporary Military Affairs, March 11, 1996, in Michael Pillsbury, ed.,
Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), p. 394, and Major General
Zheng Shenxia and Senior Colonel Zhang Changzhi, “The Military Revolution in Air Power, China Military Science, Spring
1996, as reprinted in Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare, p. 299.
38. Yin Xingliang and Chen Dingchang, “Guidance and Control in Terminal Homing Phase of a Space Interceptor,” Systems
Engineering and Electronics, Vol. 17, No. 6 (1995), and Yin Xingliang, Chen Dingchang, and Kong Wei, “Tesoc Method
Based on Estimated Value Theory for a Space Interceptor in Terminal Homing,” Systems Engineering and Electronics, Vol. 17,
No. 8 (1995), abstracted in Chinese Aerospace Abstracts, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1996), p. 49. Chen is thought to be the head of the
China Aerospace Corporation’s 2nd Academy.
39. U.S. Department of Defense, Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s Republic of China, p. 9.
40. See article by Guo Jin of the China Aerospace Chanchun Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics in Guangxue Jingmi
Gongcheng (Optics and Precision Engineering), February 1996, pp. 7–14, in FBIS–CST–96–015, February 1, 1996; see
also Ding Bo, Xi Xue, and Yan Ren, “Beam Energy Weaponry, Powerful Like Thunderbolts and Lightning,” Jeifangjun Bao,
December 25, 1995, p. 7, in FBIS–CHI–96–039, February 27, 1996, pp. 22–23.

10
No. 1268
on the islands of Tarawa in the South Pacific state
of Kiribati. China is also reported to be entering
into space tracking ventures with Brazil and
France.
Space Information Systems
As it seeks the means to deny space to future
adversaries, China is seeking also to exploit outer
space more effectively for military missions.41
China is developing new military satellites for
high-resolution imaging, radar imaging, signal
intelligence (SIGINT) collection, navigation, and
communication. At the 1998 Zhuhai Air Show,
China announced it would launch six reconnais-
sance satellites: four imaging satellites and two
radar satellites. When in orbit, this network will
give China coverage of Asia twice daily for regular
imaging and once daily for radar images. Radar
satellites can penetrate cloud cover and are very
useful for finding naval formations at sea. As does
the U.S. military, China probably also will seek to
integrate access to commercial satellite imaging
into its military operations. China has long been a
customer for images from French commercial sat-
ellites and is developing signal and electronic
intelligence satellites which can also also be used,
in conjunction with information from imaging sat-
ellites, to provide targeting data for missiles, air-
craft, and submarine missions. Not content to rely
on foreign navigation satellites, such as GPS or its
Russian counterpart (called GLONASS), China is
developing its own navigation satellite network. At
the Zhuhai Air Show, China announced that a
future navigation satellite network will be based
on small satellites—which are less expensive, eas-
ier to launch, and can be replaced quickly.
HOW CHINA’S MISSILES THREATEN
AMERICA AND ASIA
China’s growing missile forces pose a future
threat to the United States and to U.S. forces and
allies in Asia. It is not certain how fast China’s
intercontinental missile forces will grow, nor is it
certain that they will grow to rival the U.S. missile
41. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “China Rockets Into Military Space,” The Asian Wall Street Journal, December 28, 1998, p. 6.
11
April 7, 1999
arsenal. But in the next decade, they will increase
in sophistication and survivability. In the next
decade, the potential of scores to several hundred
new, well-concealed Chinese mobile ICBMs will
make more difficult the task of defending America
from nuclear missile attack. China can be expected
also to use its larger ICBM force as a political
weapon to constrain American actions, especially
support for U.S. friends and allies.
Combining Missile and Sensor Technology
China’s most profound challenge to the balance
of power in Asia is the PLA’s developing “recon-
naissance-strike complex” of highly accurate bal-
listic and cruise missiles, combined with multiple
layers of long-range sensors. Over the next ten
years, China will build more capable imaging and
radar satellites, and perhaps electronic intelligence
satellites. Reconnaissance data from satellites will
be added to data from future AWACS, electronic
intelligence aircraft, long-range radar, and signal
intelligence-gathering systems to provide precise
targeting data for ballistic and cruise missiles, as
well as air and naval platforms. Weapons systems
will be guided to their targets with a high degree of
accuracy with the help of either Chinese or foreign
navigation satellites. The challenge for China will
be to fuse these sensors to provide useful recon-
naissance and targeting data for its developing
cruise and ballistic missiles. China also will have
to develop new doctrine, tactics, and inter-service
cooperation to enable such long-range missile
strike missions. China clearly has some way to go
before it can boast of such a capability, but it is
working to achieve this goal.
By 2005, China’s developing missile forces will
pose a grave threat to Taiwan. Chinese satellites
and AWACS aircraft likely will be able to provide
constant targeting data for missile strikes by satel-
lite-guided DF–15s, M–11s, and new cruise mis-
siles to attack airfields, secondary airfields, ports,
military command posts, and major government
buildings. Missiles and cruise missiles armed with
Radio Frequency warheads could attack commu-
nication and power grids to sow chaos among the
No. 1268
Chart 4
F u tu r e C h in e s e M is s ile -B a s e d R e c o n n a is s a n c e -S tr ik e C o m p le x
Imaging Satellite
U.S. RUSSIA
DF–21X
By the middle of the next decade, the PLA may be able to combine data from multiple satellite and aircraft
sensors to produce targeting data that will allow precision ballistic missile and cruise missile strikes against land
or naval targets.
population. The same range of targets in Japan
could be attacked by future long-range cruise mis-
siles and DF–21 missiles armed with terminally
guided high explosive or Radio Frequency war-
heads. American military facilities in Japan and
Okinawa also would be vulnerable to new DF–21
missiles and future long-range cruise missiles.
POLITICAL WARFARE
China also views missiles as a tool for political
intimidation. China fired ten DF–15 missiles near
Taiwan in July 1995 and March 1996, and could
have fired 20 to 30 missiles in March.42 The 1995
42. Fisher, “China’s Missile Threat.”
April 7, 1999
B1268
GPS Radarsat
Phalcon/A-50 AWACS
Tu–154 ELINT
U.S. Aircraft
JAPAN Carrier
ROC
PRC
Long-Range
Cruise Missile
missile firing affected Taiwan’s stock market and
caused some panic. In 1996, the missiles were sent
just outside Taiwan’s two major ports, Keelung and
Kaohsiung. Both demonstrations were intended to
illustrate Beijing’s anger over its perception that
President Lee Teng-hui was seeking an “indepen-
dent” Taiwan that would never unite with the
mainland. This attempt to intimidate Taiwan back-
fired by increasing the re-election margin of Presi-
dent Lee in the March 1996 elections, but China’s
use of missiles and the U.S.–China military con-
frontation of 1996, in which the United States
deployed two aircraft carrier groups to deter
China, may have unnerved the Clinton Adminis-
12
No. 1268 April 7, 1999

tration. By October 1997, the Administration
announced a new policy that set new limits on
American support for Taiwan: the “three no’s.”43
From this concession, China’s political and mili-
tary leaders very likely drew the lesson that missile
intimidation can work. Late last year, China
reportedly held missile exercises that targeted Tai-
wan and U.S. forces in Asia.44 And in early March,
it was reported that China might now have 100 to
150 short-range missiles in areas near Taiwan,
with possible plans to increase that number to 650
by 2005.45 In 1994, the United States sold Taiwan
the Patriot PAC–2 system, which has a limited
anti-missile capability to defend only a small area.
To meet the threat of increased numbers of Chi-
nese ballistic missiles and new cruise missiles, Tai-
wan will require much more capable missile
defense systems.
CHINA’S VERBAL VOLLEYS
AGAINST U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE
Despite clear evidence that it intends to make
missile forces a major component of its future mil-
itary power and is increasing its missiles deployed
near Taiwan, China is campaigning vigorously
against American missile defense plans for Asia.
China has opposed U.S. missile defense plans
since the Reagan Administration’s Strategic
Defense Initiative and has continued its criticism
in recent years.46 But in late 1998, as it became
clearer that Japan would join the United States in
developing Theater Missile Defense (TMD) sys-
tems, that the United States would embark seri-
ously on a National Missile Defense (NMD)
program, and that the United States might con-
sider selling advanced TMD systems to Taiwan, or
might even include Taiwan in multilateral TMD
schemes, China decided to begin its most vigorous
campaign against U.S. missile defense plans to
date.
Since the beginning of this year, China has tried
to portray American missile defense plans as a
threat to the balance of power in Asia, a threat to
arms control, and a grave affront to China’s sover-
eignty if Taiwan were included in U.S. missile
defense plans. China has issued escalating bluster
and threats. China’s chief arms control negotiator,
Sha Zukang, suggested in a February 12 speech in
Washington that China would develop more
advanced ballistic missiles in response to NMD
and TMD, and declared in a press interview that
TMD for Taiwan would “bring severe conse-
quences.”47 Sha also suggested that China may

43. President Clinton stated the “three no’s” again on June 30, 1998, during a visit to China: “[We] don’t support indepen-
dence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member of any
organization for which statehood is a requirement.” No U.S. President ever has so constrained U.S. support of Taiwan.
44. Bill Gertz, “Chinese Exercise Targets Taiwan,” The Washington Times, January 26, 1999, p. A1.
45. These numbers reportedly were leaked from a Department of Defense report requested by Congress on Asian missile
defense requirements. Despite a February 1 deadline for this report, it was not issued as of the publication date of this
Backgrounder, reportedly because of efforts by the Clinton Administration to tone down its findings so as not to anger
China. See Tony Walker and Stephen Fidler, “US Fears on China Missile Build-up,” Financial Times (London), February 10,
1999, p. 1, and Bill Gertz, “China Moves Missiles in Direction of Taiwan,” The Washington Times, February 11, 1999, p.
A12.
46. For a history of China’s opposition to missile defense, see Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives
on the Strategic Defense Initiative,” Problems of Communism, March–April 1986, and “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear
Arms Control,” International Security, Winter 1995–1996; Patrick E. Tyler, “China Warns Against ‘Star Wars’ Shield for U.S.
Forces in Asia,” The New York Times, February 18, 1995, p. A4; Amelia A. Newcomb, “China Vexed by US Push for a
‘Shield’ Against Nukes,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1995, p. 1; and Zhang Liang, “U.S. Star Wars Program—
Repeated Adjustments Carried Out to Ensure Nuclear Supremacy,” Remin Rabao, July 15, 1996, in FBIS–CHI–96–150.
47. Ambassador Sha Zukang, Director-General, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
China, “Some Thoughts on Non-Proliferation,” speech before the Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Con-
ference, January 11–12, 1999, Washington, D.C., at http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/sha.htm; “One on One, Ambassador
Sha Zukang,” Defense News, February 1, 1999, p. 22.

13
No. 1268
want to join the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
to emphasize its opposition to missile defenses. In
late February, an unnamed Chinese official made a
veiled threat to “undertake cooperation on missiles
and missile technology with third countries” in
response to a U.S. TMD system for Asia.48 On
March 5, a “senior Chinese official” told The Wash-
ington Post that U.S. sale of missile defense equip-
ment to Taiwan would be the “last straw” in U.S.–
China relations and would lead to “serious conse-
quences.”49 In late March, a Hong Kong press
report noted that Chinese Leader Jiang Zemin had
told an internal government meeting that China
would use force against Taiwan if it sought foreign
help to prevent unification with China and sug-
gested further that Taiwan’s joining U.S. TMD
would lead to a military confrontation.50 Though
this report cannot be confirmed, it is consistent
with China’s escalating threats against U.S. missile
defense plans in Asia.
A Strategic Ploy
China’s campaign against U.S. missile defense
plans serves military and long-range strategic
goals. First, China dearly wants to preserve the
ability of its missile forces to have a military and
political impact on its neighbors, which can be
negated by missile defenses. Second, China is
opposing U.S. missile defense plans as a means of
stopping a new area of military cooperation
between the United States and its Asian allies.
U.S–Asian missile defense cooperation, with U.S.
technology as its centerpiece, would preserve an
American leadership role in Asia well into the
future. China knows that without the protection of
U.S. TMD systems, U.S. allies will come to doubt
the strength of U.S. defense commitments and
become more willing to accommodate China in
the future.
48. James Kynge, “China Raises Stakes on US Plan for Asian Missile Shield,” Financial Times (London), February 26, 1999,
p. 1.
49. John Pomfret, “China Warns U.S. Not to Arm Taiwan,” The Washington Post, March 6, 1999, p. A1.
50. “Beijing Will Not Hesitate to Go to War If Taiwan Joins TMD,” Tai Yang Pao (Hong Kong), March 18, 1999, p. A28.
14
April 7, 1999
CHINA’S EMERGING MISSILE THREAT
REQUIRES A FIRM U.S. RESPONSE
China’s growing missile forces, its willingness to
threaten Taiwan, and its barrage of threats against
American missile defense plans all require a firm
response from Washington. At stake is nothing less
than America’s leadership position in Asia—
obtained at the cost of many American lives in
three major wars this century to defend the secu-
rity and freedom of Asia. The Clinton Administra-
tion must give Congress and the American people
a clear and frank assessment of China’s developing
missile capability. In addition, the Administration
needs to offer Americans and Asian allies a firm
rationale for missile defense development and
cooperation.
Cost of Weakness
By refusing for most of his Administration to
support aggressive development of missile
defense, and by his long-standing support of the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that would limit
the effectiveness of missile defenses, President Bill
Clinton has helped to undermine Asian confidence
in missile defense. This plays into China’s clear
attempt to divide Asians from their American ally.
In South Korea, and to a lesser degree in Taiwan,
there is growing interest in building offensive
long-range missiles to deter threats rather than
building missile defenses. In the absence of effec-
tive non-nuclear anti-missile defenses, countries
that succeeded in building long-range missiles
would be tempted over time to arm them with
nuclear warheads. This would trigger U.S. sanc-
tions and cause the collapse of an alliance relation-
ship.
Such fears are not far-fetched. South Korea’s
Minister of Defense declared recently that Seoul
would not participate in U.S. TMD plans because
it was “not an effective countermeasure” against
No. 1268
North Korean missiles and would “also arouse
concern from neighboring countries.”51 South
Korea is reported to prefer building offensive bal-
listic missiles to deter missile threats from North
Korea.52 Seoul’s apparent lack of concern about
China’s missiles is unfortunate. Effective missile
defense in Northeast Asia requires the cooperation
of Japan, South Korea, and the United States.
American early warning satellites, and even even-
tual space-based anti-missile systems, will be nec-
essary for the effective missile defense of both
countries. For example, to prevent Chinese mis-
siles fired at Japan from being shot down over
Korea will require the cooperation of Japan, the
U.S., and South Korea. It is necessary to secure
Seoul’s future cooperation in missile defense.
Centrality of Taiwan
As it used missiles to help force a limitation of
U.S. political support for Taiwan, China is now
using its opposition to U.S. missile defense to fur-
ther weaken American support for Taiwan. While
not a treaty ally, the United States maintains
defense guarantees under the 1979 Taiwan Rela-
tions Act, which stipulates that the United States
will sell Taiwan arms of a “defensive character.” If
the U.S. bowed to China’s demands and did not
sell missile defense equipment to Taiwan, that vio-
lation of the TRA’s arms sales provision would call
into question Washington’s broader commitment
to the TRA. China probably would then apply
even greater political and even military pressure
on Taiwan to force unification on terms that might
limit Taiwan’s newly developed democracy. Other
U.S. allies and friends in Asia understandably
would regard such an abandonment of Taiwan as
the end of the period of American leadership in
Asia and begin to seek a strategic accommodation
with China.
The Clinton Administration has been correct to
urge Japan to enter into theater missile defense
cooperation with the United States and to sell Tai-
wan advanced Patriot missiles with a point-
51. “S Korea Refuses Participation in TMD,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 17, 1999, p. 16.
52. Barbara Opall-Rome, “Seoul Seeks Medium-Range Missile Force,” Defense News, March 8, 1999, p. 1.
15
April 7, 1999
defense anti-missile capability. However, China’s
emerging missile threat and its vigorous campaign
against U.S. missile defense plans require an active
Administration strategy to sustain U.S. security
and leadership in Asia. The Clinton Administra-
tion should:
• State clearly that China’s emerging missile
forces threaten Asian stability. The Clinton
Administration needs to regain the rhetorical
offensive that has been ceded to China this
year. The Administration must mount its own
diplomatic campaign that clearly describes
China’s developing missile forces and how they
threaten U.S. allies and friends in Asia. The
Administration also needs, regularly and
firmly, to challenge China’s opposition to mis-
sile defense. Administration officials should
use every opportunity to stress that U.S.
National Missile Defense and Theater Missile
Defense programs are non-nuclear and defen-
sive. U.S. officials should stress publicly that
China’s and North Korea’s missile threats more
than justify American development of missile
defenses. They should declare that China’s
attempt to deny other Asian states their sover-
eign right of defense is an attempt to conceal
the challenge to peace in Asia posed by China’s
growing missile forces.
• Accelerate development of an effective U.S.
National Missile Defense. Building an effective
NMD capability is essential, not just to defend
Americans from China’s modernizing ICBM
force, but also to demonstrate that missile
defense works. This is necessary to strengthen
Asian confidence in U.S. missile defense tech-
nology over ballistic missile or nuclear weapon
alternatives. The Clinton Administration can
begin an NMD system by upgrading U.S Navy
Aegis cruisers with the Navy Theater Wide
Upper Tier anti-missile system and deploying
associated Space Based Infra Red Satellite in
low orbit (SBIRS-Low) early warning satellites.
Such a system could be deployed as early as
No. 1268
2003 for about $8 billion.53 Furthermore, the
U.S. should end restrictions on the develop-
ment and deployment of missile defenses pur-
suant to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
• Use TMD cooperation to strengthen Asian alli-
ances. Washington should emphasize to Japan,
South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia
that Theater Missile Defense will be a key mis-
sion for U.S. military forces in the future.
Japan is on the verge of agreeing to coopera-
tion in TMD development, while Australia is
quietly expanding cooperation with the United
States in some TMD-related areas. The United
States should strongly encourage all of its allies
to cooperate in expanding regional missile
defenses. Washington should continue to urge
Tokyo to commit to TMD development
projects and should strongly urge Seoul to
reconsider its recent opposition to TMD coop-
eration. Washington should offer Seoul a less
expensive means of participation that allows
South Korean access to early warning data and
command activities. The U.S. should also urge
Japan and South Korea to consider missile
defense cooperation in conjunction with the
United States. The U.S. Pacific Command
should also include missile defense activities in
its future regional military exercises with allies.
• Sell Taiwan missile defense systems. By selling
missile defense equipment to Taiwan, the U.S.
will fulfill its obligations under the Taiwan
Relations Act and advance the American inter-
est in preserving Taiwan’s democratic system.
The Clinton Administration should clearly
identify China’s increased missile deployments
as a threat to stability in the Taiwan Strait and
call on China to remove its missiles from
regions near Taiwan. China’s increased missile
threat to Taiwan makes it necessary for the
United States to offer Taiwan a range of missile
defense systems. When Taiwan is ready to for-
mally request additional missile defense sys-
53. For more on this recommendation, see Defending America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat, Report by The Heritage
Foundation’s Commission on Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1999), pp. 2–3, 47–56.
54. Umer Farooq and Duncan Lennox, “Pakistan Parades Missiles,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 31, 1999, p. 15.
16
April 7, 1999
tems, the U.S. should be ready to sell Taiwan
equipment such as Patriot PAC–3 missiles and
the Aegis naval missile defense system, in addi-
tion to long-range radar and high-altitude
unmanned aircraft like the Global Hawk to
help detect and intercept incoming missiles.
To counter a Chinese strategy that would
include deploying more missiles against Tai-
wan in response to a U.S. sale of missile
defense equipment to Taiwan, the United
States in the future should sell laser-based mis-
sile defense systems to Taiwan. Because lasers
use chemical fuel or an electrical energy
source, they offer the prospect of an unlimited
number of defensive “rounds.” Washington
should tell Beijing that its sale of missile
defenses to Taiwan is consistent with the long-
standing American goal that Taipei and Beijing
settle the issue of their future relationship by
peaceful means.
• Pursue strategic agreements instead of increas-
ing technical cooperation in missiles and
space. It is time for the United States to chal-
lenge China to enter into broad understand-
ings concerning missiles and nuclear weapons
that increase transparency and confidence. The
strategic missile de-targeting agreement that
Presidents Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton
announced last June does not serve U.S. inter-
ests. It is a simple declared agreement that can-
not be verified; the missiles can be re-targeted
with a few computer keystrokes. Such agree-
ments also create a false sense of progress in
arms control. Pakistan’s newly revealed Sha-
heen missile bears a close resemblance to
China’s DF–15/M–9 missile.54 China consis-
tently refuses to sign minimal missile control
agreements like the Missile Technology Con-
trol Regime and in the past has sold significant
missile technology to Iran, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, and perhaps North Korea. China has
intimate knowledge of U.S. nuclear secrets but
No. 1268
Chart 5
P a k is t a n ’s S h a h e e n S R B M
S h a h e e n
Function SRBM
Range 750 km/450 miles
(est.)
Payload 320 kg (est.)
Note: SRBM=Short-Range Ballistic Missile, TEL=Transporter-Erector-Launcher.
Source: Shaheen information from “Pakistan Parades Missiles,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 31, 1999.
has never disclosed the contents of its own
nuclear and missile forces.
Washington should make clear to Beijing
that America desires to avoid future missile
competition. Washington also should reject
China’s suggestion that it join the now-defunct
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; this is
merely an attempt to constrain U.S. missile
defenses. To demonstrate U.S. resolve, Wash-
ington should suspend commercial missile and
space cooperation with China until both sides
can reach agreements that truly advance trans-
parency and the confidence that neither side
will pose a threat to the other’s security with
nuclear missiles.
• Prevent China from obtaining advanced mis-
sile technologies. Until China enters into
agreements that increase transparency and
April 7, 1999
B1268
C o m p a r e d t o C h in a ’s M – 9
D F – 1 5 /M – 9 S h a h e e n o n a T E L S im ila r t o
t h e R u s s ia n M A Z 5 4 3 T E L a n d
SRBM t h e C h in e s e W S – 2 4 0 0
600 km/360 miles
500 kg/1,100 lb
confidence in the areas of missile and nuclear
forces, the United States should seek to pre-
vent leakage of sensitive U.S. nuclear and mis-
sile technology to China and should urge allies
and friends not to sell missile technology to
China. Both Congress and the Clinton Admin-
istration should investigate the extent and the
impact on U.S. national security of Chinese
nuclear and missile espionage. During this
review, the U.S. should suspend commercial
satellite launches on Chinese missiles to dem-
onstrate U.S. anger over China’s spying. New
security measures at U.S. nuclear laboratories
should focus on strict monitoring of all con-
tacts with Chinese nationals. In addition,
Washington must make clear to allies and
friends like Russia, Israel, Britain, and France
that they must not sell China technology that
could help China to build better military mis-
siles and space systems.
17
No. 1268
When China enters into broad strategic
agreements with the U.S. that avoid future
missile competition, is committed to a peaceful
course to settle the issue of its future relations
with Taiwan, and does not challenge U.S. alli-
ances in Asia, then the U.S. should resume
civil missile and space cooperation with China.
In such an environment, the U.S. could even
consider strategic military cooperation such as
sharing missile defense technologies that allow
China to defend itself from nuclear missiles.
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of a new century, the United
States faces the prospect of a new strategic compe-
tition, this time with China. China is stealing
American nuclear secrets to build better missiles
that could be used to attack Americans more effec-
tively. China is using its growing missile forces and
a campaign of threats against American missile
defense plans to advance its goals in Asia. China is
using its missile forces to create political pressures
that, over time, will divide the United States from
its key allies. If America does not develop missile
defense systems that defend the United States from
55. The author would like to thank Heritage Manager of Graphic Design Services Thomas J. Timmons for the graphic
illustrations.
18
April 7, 1999
missile attack, and theater-level defenses that can
be shared with Asian allies, these same allies will
lose confidence in American leadership. Further-
more, President Clinton’s lackluster commitment
to missile defense and blind adherence to the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that limits U.S. missile
defenses are undermining allied confidence in
non-nuclear missile defense.
To prevent the U.S.–China relationship from
lapsing into a Cold War–like confrontation, it is
essential that America demonstrate resolve and
leadership by rapidly developing a National Mis-
sile Defense system and theater missile defense
systems that could be sold to Asian allies and to
Taiwan. Finally, the U.S. should suspend commer-
cial space cooperation with China—which has
proven to benefit China’s missiles—until China
reaches agreements with the United States that
advance transparency and increase confidence that
neither will pose a nuclear missile threat to the
other.
—Richard D. Fisher, Jr., is Director of The Asian
Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.55