G.R. No.

L-23464 October 31, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GAVINO DORADO Y ARABACA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Rosalio A. de
Leon for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto R. Rondolo as counsel de officio for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Criminal Case No. 66095, finding the
defendant-appellant Gavino Dorado y Arabaca guilty of having committed the crime of arson with multiple homicide and
multiple frustrated homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law, and
to pay the costs.

The record shows that on September 2, 1962, a 5-door apartment owned by Mr. and Mrs. Ildefonso Tierra and an
adjacent residential house, both located on the densely populated street of Castillejos, Quiapo, Manila were burned,
resulting in the death of 21 persons and injuries to 5 others in varying degrees. On September 4, 1962, the appellant,
who had earlier surrendered to the Mayor of Malabon, Rizal and who was turned over by the latter to the Manila Police
Department, gave a confession in his own handwriting which was witnessed by several newspaper reporters1 in the
following tenor:

Noong Sabado ng gabi, ako'y nag good-time sa Baclaran at naparami ang aking nainom na alak. Ng mag-uumaga na,
siguro mga alas dos ng umaga, ako'y umuwi sa Castillejos, napansin ko na sarado ang pinto, kaya ang ginawa ko bumalik
ako sa Baclaran at naginum uli. Maalaala ko ang pagkaapi ko sa bahay kaya naisipan kong bumili ng gasolina at dinala ko
sa Castillejos na hindi ko nalalaman ang aking guinagawa dala ng labis kong pagkalasing. Dumating ako bukas na ang
pinto patungo sa second floor, seguro alas 5:00 o 6:00 ng umaga noon. Pagdating sa itaas tinumba ko yaong lata,
pagkatapos sinindihan ko. Tumakbo ako palabas hanggang makarating sa Arlegui; tumawag ako ng taxi at pumunta ako sa
Quezon City, Cubao. Tumuloy ako sa Marikina, at pagkatapos pumunta ako sa Malabon sa bahay ng Alkalde at
nagsurender ako sa kanya.

Sa katunayan ng lahat ng ito ay inilagda ko ang aking pangalan sa ibaba nito ngayon Sept. 4, 1962, dito sa Manila.

Soon after the appellant had written the aforequoted confession, he gave a more detailed statement to the police
investigator, in the form of questions and answers substantially reiterating the confession he made in his handwriting. On
September 5, 1962, the appellant reenacted the burning of the apartment, and on the same day, he subscribed, and
swore to, his statement before an assistant fiscal of the City of Manila.2

On September 6, 1962 an information was filed by an assistant fiscal of the City of Manila charging the appellant with
having committed the crime of arson with multiple homicide and multiple frustrated homicide, before the Court of First
Instance of Manila, as follows:

The undersigned accuses Gavino Dorado y Arabaca of the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide and Multiple Frustrated
Homicide, committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of September, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire to and burn an inhabited building and the contents therein valued at
P380,000.00, knowing the same to be occupied at the time by many persons, located at 1039 Castillejos Street, Quiapo,
in said City, which is a populated place or vicinity and where houses and buildings are closely adjacent to one another,
thereby causing the death of the following persons, to wit: Josephine Curato, Rosemarie Curato, Oliver Curato, Juliana
Ravelo Curato, Braulio Curato @ Joseph Lee, Marcelina Malaluan Vda. de Silva, Eufrocinia Silva, Rose Silva, Rufil Silva,
Erlinda Silva, Asterio Alcantara, Simeona Cuenca, Visitacion Cuenca, Rosalina Navasa, Marcelina Orillo, Eddie Ong Orillo,
Lydia Alim, Martin de la Peña, Sinforiana Wero, Baby Wero de la Peña and Orlando Ortanez and the said act of the said
accused could have caused the death of the following, to wit: Rogelio Villanueva, Helen J. Villanueva, Maria Luisa
Villanueva, Phil de Guzman and Leonardo Baaya, as a consequence, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of multiple Homicide, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or causes,
independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Rogelio Villanueva, Helen J.
Villanueva, Maria Luisa Villanueva, Phil de Guzman and Leonardo Baaya which have prevented their death.

There is no dispute over the fact of the burning of the five-door apartment located at 1039 Castillejos Street, Quiapo,
Manila, in the early morning of September 7, 1962, and of the death of 21 of the occupants, and of the injury of 5 of the
occupants, of the apartments, as a result of the burning.

The decision of the trial court finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged in the information is based mainly on the
two extrajudicial confessions of the appellant, Exhibits A and C. In the present appeal, counsel for the appellant contends
that the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty on the basis of those confessions.

We have examined the record very carefully, and We find that the lower court has not committed the error pointed to by
appellant.

Testifying in his own behalf in the court below the appellant admitted that he had a grievance against the owner of the
apartment, but denied having set fire to the apartment. He claimed in the court below, and he insists in this appeal, that
he had to make and sign the statements presented against him, and he had to reenact the crime, because of the force
and violence applied to him by the police. According to the appellant, when he was turned over to the arson division of
the Manila Police Department, the investigators slapped and kicked him; that due to his sickness, and afraid that he
might vomit blood if subjected to further torture, he wrote his confession, Exhibit C, as dictated to him by Captain Giron
that with regard to his statement, Exhibit A, all that are stated therein, except his name and personal circumstances,
were supplied by the police investigators; that when he subscribed and swore to said statement before Assistant Fiscal
Lino Barbosa, he affirmed the truth of its contents because he was accompanied by one of the policemen; and that he
did not reveal the fact of his having been maltreated to the newspaper reporters, nor to the fiscal, or to any one,
because his idea was to expose the matter when he would testify in court, as he would then be free from harm.

On the other hand, the police investigators who testified for the prosecution denied having obtained the confessions of
the appellant through violence or intimidation. These witnesses testified that the statements of the appellant were given
by him freely and voluntarily. The testimonies of the police investigators were bolstered by the testimony of Rodolfo T.
Reyes, a reporter of the "Manila Times", who was also presented by the appellant as his own witness. Rodolfo T. Reyes
testified that he and other newspapermen saw the appellant write his confession (Exhibit C), without dictation from
Captain Giron that he did not see any sign of injury on the face, nor on any part of the body, of the appellant; 3 that the
appellant did not complain to him, or to any of the reporters present, at the time when he was writing his confession and
during the reenactment of the crime, regarding any maltreatment received by him from the police investigators; and that
the appellant reenacted the crime voluntarily and without hesitation.4

We hold that the lower court did not err when it did not give credence to the claim of appellant that his extra-judicial
confession were extracted from him through force or intimidation. We find no reason to alter the finding of the lower
court that the confessions of the appellant were given by him voluntarily. It is a settled rule that the findings of fact by
the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts of
weight and importance, it being acknowledged that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the
trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies.5 It is also a settled rule that a confession is admissible as
evidence, and it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is shown. 6 Before a confession can be set aside, both the
confession and the reasons or motives given for its repudiation should be carefully scrutinized. It would be an unsound
practice for the court to disregard the confession of an accused simply because the accused repudiates it during the
trial.7
In the case now before Us, except for appellant's testimony repudiating his confessions, no other evidence was adduced
to show that the statements in the confessions were obtained through force or intimidation. On the contrary, appellant's
claim of torture is belied by an abundance of evidence showing that his confession, Exhibit C, was written by him under
circumstances which preclude any doubt as to the voluntariness of his act. More so, because he wrote and signed the
confession in the presence of reporters of the metropolitan newspapers. The other confession, Exhibit A, was subscribed
and sworn to by the appellant before an assistant city fiscal of Manila, and it was not shown at all that appellant ever
hesitated or refused to sign and swear to the same, much less did he protest to the fiscal regarding the way he was
investigated.8 We have noted that the statements of the appellant in answer to the questions in Exhibit A are responsive
and informative. The statements mention details which only the declarant could have furnished, and could not have
been concocted by the investigators. For instance, the appellant stated details regarding his educational attainments;
regarding the demolition of his improvised room in the apartment as a result of which he lost P70.00 in cash and P10.00
worth of medicine, regarding his having filed a complaint against Mrs. Tierra, the owner of the apartment, in the fiscal's
office; regarding the fact that due to his illness he had not been drinking wine for almost 6 months because his doctor
prohibited him from doing so; and regarding the fact that after burning the apartment he went to Quezon City, thence to
Marikina, and thereafter to Malabon, where he surrendered to the Municipal Mayor. We cannot believe that the
investigators could fabricate those particulars, and that they are so perverted and depraved as to conspire together to
falsely impute to an innocent man the commission of a very grave offense.9

We agree with the observation of the trial court that appellant's grievance against Mrs. Tierra must have driven him to
burn the apartment, but when overcome by remorse of conscience because those who perished in the fire were his
friends and acquaintances, he voluntarily confessed his criminal act; and realizing later the grave implications of his
confessions, it must have occurred to him, as an afterthought, to repudiate the same and assert his innocence. 10

The defense contends that the appellant could not have committed the crime because of the alleged impossibility for the
appellant to enter the building and set it afire, and that there was no eyewitness who pointed to him as the one who set
the building on fire. This pretension of the defense deserves no consideration in the face of clear evidence that the
appellant had confessed voluntarily his commission of the crime, and his confession is supported by the corpus
delicti.11 Well established is the rule that it is not necessary that an eyewitness should testify on having seen the accused
committing the crime, or had seen him under circumstances indicating his having committed the crime, before the
accused may be held liable under his own confession."12

We find the decision of the lower court to be in accordance with law and the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant. No payment of indemnity
is here ordered because the offended parties, and/or the heirs of the offended parties, reserved their right to institute
separate civil actions to recover indemnities. It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
JERWIN DORADO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 216671, 2016-10-03

Facts:

Dorado, Julius Ramos (Ramos), Jeffrey Confessor (Confessor) and Jayson Cabiaso (Cabiaso) were charged with the crime
of frustrated murder, defined under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) committed against
Ronald Bonion (Ronald) before the RTC. They were also charged with violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, committed against Raniel
Parino (Raniel).

That on or about the 15th day of March 2004, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with one another and with Jerwin Dorado y
Felipe @ Ewing who is a 16 year old minor, and with two (2) unidentified companions whose true identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown, with intent to kill by means of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, aggravated by the circumstances of nighttime and with the use of an improvised shotgun (sumpak), a
deadly weapon and unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
with said deadly weapon, one Ronald Bonion y Bozar, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the accused, that is due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said victim which prevented
his death.

On November 9, 2004, Dorado and his co-accused were arraigned and they all pleaded "not guilty" to the charges.
Thereafter, the trial ensued.

onald was operated on his forehead and was confined for a month at the Rizal Medical Center. As a result of the shooting
incident, Ronald lost his left eye while his right eye could only see some light. Dr. Artes, the operating surgeon, testified
that without medical intervention, Ronald could have died.

he RTC rendered its decision. In Criminal Case No. 127784, the trial court found Dorado guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of frustrated murder; while in Criminal Case No. 127785, accused Dorado, Ramos, Confessor and Cabiaso
were all acquitted as the crime was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It noted that their participation in the crime
was limited to the throwing of stones and bottles and there was no indication that they Singled out Ronald as their
target. The RTC also acquitted all the accused for the charge of violation of R.A. No. 7610 because the prosecution failed
to establish Ronald's minority.

In finding Dorado guilty of frustrated murder, as defined under Article 248, in relation to Article 6, paragraph 2, of the
RPC, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that it was Dorado who shot Ronald with a
sumpak. The trial court considered the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation because of the following:
Dorado's group had an ongoing feud with Ronald's group; when the assault began, Dorado was already holding a
sumpak; after Ronald fled, Dorado waited intently for an opportunity to shoot him; and when Ronald came out, Dorado
shot him on the face. The RTC, nevertheless, appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in Dorado's
favor as he was still a minor at the time of the incident. It, however, stated that Dorado was not entitled to a suspension
of sentence because he was above twenty-one (21) years old at the time of the pronouncement of guilt. Thus, it
disposed the case in this wise:

Aggrieved, Dorado elevated an appeal before the CA.

the CA affirmed the RTC decision, finding that Dorado committed the crime of frustrated murder because he had the
intent to kill Ronald when he fired his sumpak hitting the portion between the two eyes of the victim. It noted that
Ronald would have died were it not for the timely medical attention. The appellate court also agreed with the RTC that
Dorado's act of waiting for Ronald to come out of the talipapa, where the latter was hiding, indicated evident
premeditation.The CA did not give credence to Dorado's defense of alibi because his house was merely one block away
from the talipapa. It opined that it was not physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time in
question.Dorado moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the CA in its assailed resolution, dated January
29, 2015.Hence, this petition.

Issues:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED.[8]

Ruling:

The Court finds merit in the petition.Dorado was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime

A perusal of the records will readily show that Dorado was a sixteen (16) year old minor at the time of the commission of
the crime on March 15, 2004. The Informations filed against him consistently stated his minority.[11] For said reason, he
must benefit from the provisions of R.A. No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, as amended. Even
though the said law was enacted on April 28, 2006, the same must still be retroactively applied for the benefit of Dorado
pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law — favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws
which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect).[12

Curiously, neither the RTC nor the CA paid much attention to Dorado's minority and how it affected his criminal
responsibility. Thus, the Court deems it proper to lay down the salient provisions of R.A. No. 9344 regarding the
prosecution of a Child In Conflict with the Law (CICL).[13]One of the significant features of R.A. No. 9344 is the increase
of the minimum age of criminal responsibility, to wjt:SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However,
the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.A child is deemed to be fifteen
(15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.A child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.[14]

In sum, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the following minors shall be exempt from criminal liability:Those below
fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime; and ,Those above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age who acted without discernment.Thus, if a child falls under the above-cited ages, he or she
shall be released and shall be subjected to an intervention program as may be determined by a local social welfare and
development officer, pursuant to Section 20 of the said law.

Consequently, under R.A. No. 9344, only a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age who acted
with discernment shall not be exempted from criminal responsibility.[15] Nevertheless, the said child does not
immediately proceed to trial. Instead, he or she may undergo a diversion, which refers to an alternative, child-
appropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment of the CICL without resorting to formal court
proceedings. If the diversion is unsuccessful or if the other grounds provided by law[16] are present, then the CICL shall
undergo the appropriate preliminary investigation of his or her criminal case, and trial before the courts may proceed.

Once the CICL is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall not immediately execute its judgment; rather, it shall
place the CICL under suspended sentence. Notably, the suspension shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his or her guilt. During the suspension, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law. If the disposition measures are successful, then the court shall discharge the CICL. Conversely, if unsuccessful,
then the court has the following options: (1) to discharge the child, (2) to order execution of sentence, or (3) to extend
the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years

The Prosecution did not determine the discernment of Dorado at the time of the commission of the crime

Based on the above-cited discussion, when a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is charged with a
crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During the trial, the prosecution must specifically
prove as a separate circumstance that the CICL committed the alleged crime with discernment.

Notably, R.A. Np. 9344 was enacted while Dorado's trial was pending before the RTC. Consequently, Resolution No. 03-
2006, dated July 11, 2006, of the Juvenile Justice Welfare Council (JJWC)[20] must apply in the present case. It
established the guidelines for the implementation of the transitory provisions of R.A. No. 9344 and it stated that one of
the duties of the prosecution during the trial regarding the CICL was as follows:For above 15 but below 18 years old at
the time of the commission of the alleged offense, with pending case but released on bail or on recognizance or under
detention• Trial may proceed for the prosecution to prove discernment.

After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution did not make an effort to prove that Dorado,
then a sixteen (16)-year old minor, acted with discernment at the time of the commission of the crime. The RTC decision
simply stated that a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado must be appreciated as it was
proven that he was a minor at the time of the incident. Glaringly, there was no discussion at all on whether Dorado acted
with discernment when he committed the crime imputed against him.

Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away with Ronald. Discernment is different from intent.
The distinction was elaborated in Guevarra v. Almodovar.[25] Thus:

From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are
products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desire of one's act while the latter relate to
the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence, a person may not intend to shoot another but may be
aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in .negligently handling an air
rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen
acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus, did not intend
to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.

Considering that there was no determination of discernment by the trial court, the Court cannot rule with certainty that
Dorado was criminally responsible. As earlier stated, there can be no presumption of discernment on the part of the
CICL. In the absence of such determination, it should be presumed that the CICL acted without discernment. This is in
accordance with Section 3 of R.A. No. 9344, to wit:Section 3. Liberal Construction of this Act. — In case of doubt, the
interpretation of any of the provisions of this Act, including its implementing rules and regulations (IRRs), shall be
construed liberally in favor of the child in conflict with the law.

Accordingly, Dorado is deemed exempted from criminal liability. Nevertheless, he is not excused from the civil liability
that arose from the act.[27] Thus, the Court is tasked to determine the crime committed and the civil liability that results
from it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The judgment of conviction of Jerwin Dorado is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
by reason of the exempting circumstance of minority. He is hereby referred to the local social welfare and development
officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program.He is also ordered to pay the private complainant, Ronald
B onion, civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00.,The amounts of
damages awarded shall have an interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully
paid.

Principles: