1 Protection of Women from

Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Introduction
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, seeks to cover those women who are in a
relationship or have been with the abuser where both parties have lived together in a shared household
and are related by consanguinity, marriage, or a relationship in the nature of marriage, or adoption; in
addition, relationship with family members living together as a joint family are also included. Domestic
violence includes actual abuse or the threat of abuse that is physical, sexual, verbal, emotional,
economic, and harassment by way of unlawful dowry demands to the woman.
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, contains 37 sections in five chapters.
The Act provides for the appointment, powers, functions, and duties of protection officers and service
providers. It also provides for the procedure for obtaining relief, and also describes powers and further
procedures.

History
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, was passed by both the houses of
Parliament and assented to by the President on 13 September 2005. This Act came into force on 26
October 2006 as Act number 43 of the year 2005.

Applicability of the Act

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, extends to the whole of India. According
to Section 36 of the Act, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the
provisions of any other law, for the time being in force.

Objectives of the Act

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was enacted to protect women from
domestic violence. This is the first act in India defining the term ‘domestic violence’. Section 3 provides
the definition of domestic violence,—
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or wellbeing, whether mental or physical,
of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse,
verbal and emotional abuse, and economic abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other
person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable
security; or
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct
mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.
Further, this section defines physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse, and economic
abuse.
Explanation I—For the purposes of this section,—
(i) “Physical abuse” means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm,
or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and
includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force;

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 1

 (ii) “Sexual abuse” includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or
otherwise violates the dignity of a woman;
(iii) “verbal and emotional abuse” includes—
(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name-calling, and insults or ridicule, especially with regard to
not having a child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is
interested.
(iv) “Economic abuse” includes—
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is
entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or
which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household
necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or
separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household
and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable,
valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved
person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which
may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any
other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved
person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to
the shared household.
Explanation II—For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of
the respondent constitutes “domestic violence” under this section, the overall facts and circumstances
of the case shall be taken into consideration.

Statement of Objects and Reasons

1. Domestic violence is a human rights issue and serious deterrent to development. The Vienna Accord
of 1994 and the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (1995) have also acknowledged this.
The United Nations Committee on the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) in its General Recommendation No. XII (1989) has recommended that
State parties should act to protect women against violence of any kind, especially that occurring
within the family.
2. The phenomenon of domestic violence is widely prevalent but has remained largely invisible in
public domain. Presently, where a woman is subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives,
it is an offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The civil law does not, however,
address this phenomenon in its entirety.
3. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a law keeping in view the rights guaranteed under Articles
14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution to provide for a remedy under the civil law which is intended
to protect women from being victims of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of
domestic violence in the society.
4. The Bill, inter alia, seeks to provide for the following.
(i) It covers those women who are or have been in a relationship with the abuser where both
parties have lived together in a shared household and are related by consanguinity, marriage

2 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

 or through a relationship in the nature of marriage or adoption. In addition, relationships
with family members living together as a joint family are also included. Even those women
who are sisters, widows, mothers, single women, or living with the abuser are entitled to
legal protection under the proposed legislation. However, whereas the Bill enables the wife
or the female living in a relationship in the nature of marriage to file a complaint under the
proposed enactment against any relative of the husband or the male partner, it does not
enable any female relative of the husband or the male partner to file a complaint against
the wife or the female partner.
(ii) It defines the expression “domestic violence” to include actual abuse or threat or abuse
that is physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or economic. Harassment by way of unlawful
dowry demands to the woman or her relatives would also be covered under this definition.
(iii) It provides for the rights of women to secure housing. It also provides for the right of a
woman to reside in her matrimonial home or shared household, whether or not she has any
title or rights in such home or household. This right is secured by a residence order, which
is passed by the Magistrate.
(iv) It empowers the Magistrate to pass protection orders in favour of the aggrieved person to
prevent the respondent from aiding or committing an act of domestic violence or any other
specified act, entering a workplace or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person,
attempting to communicate with her, isolating any assets used by both the parties and
causing violence to the aggrieved person, her relatives or others who provide her assistance
from the domestic violence.
(v) It provides for appointment of Protection Officers and registration of non-governmental
organisations as service providers for providing assistance to the aggrieved person with
respect to her medical examination, obtaining legal aid, safe shelter, etc.
5. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects. The notes on clauses explain the various provisions
contained in the Bill.

Amending Act
The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 (Act 34 of 2019)

Subjective Theory
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, came into force on 26 October 2010. The
statute is a benevolent piece of legislation aimed to provide for more effective protection of the rights
of women guaranteed under the Constitution, who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within
the family. The Act creates three basic rights for the victims of domestic violence: to be protected from
violence, to reside in a shared household, and to seek and secure monetary relief.

Ex Post Facto Law or Lex Retro Non Agit

In Savita Bhanot versus Lt Col VD Bhanot (Crl MC No. 3959/2009 and Crl. MA No. 13476/2009), the Delhi
High Court held that the Act will have a retrospective effect and based its ratio on the principle of
construing the Act, keeping in view the legislative intent behind it, but it failed to take into consideration
that if the legislature indeed desired or in fact intended the Act to have a retrospective effect, for that
matter, it would have provided so expressly.

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 3

 It can be concluded that the aggrieved person, who had been in domestic relationship with the
respondent ‘at any point of time’ even prior to the Act coming into force and was subjected to
domestic violence, is entitled to invoke the remedial measures as provided under the Act.

Gender Specific Enactment

One of the most significant features of the Domestic Violence Act is that it is a gender specific
enactment; hence, only women can avail the benefit of the provisions of this Act. According to Section
2(a) of the Act, an “aggrieved person as any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship
with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the
respondent”.
In Dennision Paulraj versus The Union of India (Madras High Court), [MANU/TN/0525/2008], the
petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of the Act on the basis that it is a discriminatory piece
of legislation because it does not permit the husband to file a complaint under the Act, and hence, is in
violation of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution and also affects the life and liberty of the husband and
his relatives. Rejecting these arguments, the High Court of Madras concluded that, “the Constitution
itself provides special provision for women and children. Thus, the contention that there could be no
special treatment for women is totally untenable. In tune with Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India,
the State has thought it fit to frame a special legislation for women, and thus, the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, came into force.”

Section 2(a): Aggrieved Person

It includes any woman, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who
alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. To come within the
purview of the aggrieved person, the following requisites need to be fulfilled.
1. The person needs to be a woman;
2. She must be in a domestic relationship with the respondent.
3. She must have alleged to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.
4. She must be subjected to domestic violence by the respondent while she is in a domestic
relationship with that respondent.
In Hiral P Harsora versus Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (AIR 2016 SC 4774), the Supreme Court while
setting aside the impugned judgement of the Bombay High Court, declared that “the words ‘adult male’
in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act will stand deleted since these words do not square with Article 14 of
the Constitution of India. Consequently, the proviso to Section 2(q), being rendered otiose, also stands
deleted.”
Thus, in view of the Supreme Court judgement, it can be concluded that a mother-in-law can file
a case under Domestic Violence Act, 2005, against her daughter-in-law, if the other ingredients are
fulfilled because now the respondent can also be a woman.
Domestic Relationship [Section 2(f)]
In Harbans Lal Malik versus Payal Malik [(2010) 171 DLT 67], the High Court of Delhi had the occasion to
interpret as to what is domestic relationship. It had interpreted that if the domestic relation continues
and the party have lived together at any point of time, a person can be made respondent, but if the
relationship does not continue and the relationship has been in past and not in the present, the person
cannot be made respondent on the ground of past relationship.

4 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Thus, in order to constitute a domestic relationship, it is necessary that the persons who constitute a
domestic relationship must be living together in the same house.
The High Court of Delhi in the case of Vijay Verma versus State (NCT) of Delhi, [2010 (118) (DRJ, 520)]
held that domestic relationship arises in respect of an aggrieved person, if the aggrieved person has
lived together with the petitioners in a shared household, but this living together can be either soon
before the filing of the petition or at any point of time. At any point of time indicates that the aggrieved
person has been continuously living in the shared household as a matter of right, but if for some reason
if the aggrieved person has to leave the house temporarily and when she returns, she is not allowed to
enjoy her right to live in the property. Where a family member leaves the shared household to establish
his or her own household, he or she cannot claim to have the right to move an application under
Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act on the basis of domestic relationship.

Live-in Relation and Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
In D Velusamy versus D Patchaiammal, (2011 Cri LJ 320), the Supreme Court laid down the following
requirements to be fulfilled for determining the term ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’.
1. The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.
2. They must be of legal age to marry.
3. They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried.
4. They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to
spouses for a significant period of time.
The Court held that a ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ under the Act of 2005 must fulfill the
above requirements, and in addition, the parties must have lived together in a ‘shared household’ as
defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. Merely spending weekends together or a one night stand would not
make it a ‘domestic relationship’. Thus, a relationship with a married person cannot be considered as
a relationship in the nature of marriage. The core ingredients of such a relationship, such as longevity,
co-dependency, emotional relationship, duration of the relationship, public impression, etc.; need to
be proved by the aggrieved person in order to discharge her burden of proving the alleged ‘relationship
in the nature of marriage’.

Section 2(s): Shared Household

The Supreme court in SR Batra versus Smt Taruna Batra, [(2007) 3 SCC 169], while explaining the
term ‘shared household’ held that “the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared
household, and a ‘shared household’ would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the
husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member.”
However, The Bench, comprising Justices Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, and MR Shah, observed
that the definition of ‘shared household’ given in Section 2(s) of the Act cannot be read to mean that
it can only be that household which is household of the joint family of which the husband is a member
or in which the husband of the aggrieved person has a share. The Bench further observed that: “In the
event, shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship
the woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied and the said house will
become a shared household.” The Supreme Court in Satish Chander Ahuja versus Sneha Ahuja, [(2021)
1 SCC 414] while overruling the law laid down in SR Batra (Supra) held that a wife is also entitled to
claim a right to residence in a shared household belonging to relatives of the husband.
In Neetu Mittal versus Kanta Mittal, [(2008) DLT 691], while narrowing down the scope of shared
household, it was categorically held that self-acquired property of the husband’s parents does not

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 5

 fall within the purview of shared household. The parents or in-laws have a right to turn their son and
daughter-in-law out of their house, if the property belongs to them. Only if it is an ancestral house, the
son can enforce partition. The right of a woman to seek maintenance is only against the husband or
her children, but she cannot thrust herself against the parents of the husband.
In Umesh Sharma versus State, AIR 2010 (NOC) 515 (Del), wherein it is observed and held thus, “Shared
house/flat would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband or the house
which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The flat where the wife is residing
and which is owned by her father-in-law, cannot be said to be shared accommodation and she has no
legal right to continue to live in that house, except with the consent of her father-in-law who is not
agreeable to her continuing to live in the flat owned by him. Therefore, no restraint order against the
father-in-law can be passed in respect of the flat.”

Section 2(q): Respondent

In Varsha Kapoor versus Union of India, [2010 VI AD (Del) 472], while interpreting Section 2(q) of the
Act, the Division Bench of the Delhi High court came to the conclusion that on combined reading of
Section 2(q) of the Act with Section 19(1) of the Act, the contention raised when the ladies are arrayed
as respondents that the complaints under Domestic Violence Act are not maintainable against them.
The Court also suggested that the loophole in the Act should be plugged in for better and effective
application of the Act.

It is clear that the Legislature never intended to exclude female relatives of the husband or male
partner from the ambit of a complaint that can be made under the provisions of the Domestic
Violence Act, 2005.

Q. Can a mother-in-law, being an aggrieved person, file a complaint against the daughter-in-law?
In Kusum Lata Sharma versus State, [2011 SCC Online Del 3710], the Delhi High Court while interpreting
the inter-relation of the provisions embodied under Section 2(a), 2(f), 2(q), 2(s) held that the Act never
intended to exclude a female relative of a male or a respondent from the ambit of complaint made
under Section 12 of the Act, and hence, concluded that a mother-in-law being an aggrieved person can
file a complaint against the daughter-in-law as respondent.

Domestic Violence
Domestic violence, is, per se not a criminal offence but is defined extensively and comprehensively
to include various conditions. It has been defined under Section 3 of the Act, which not only talks
of mental and physical hurt, injury, or endangerment but also of physical, sexual, economic, verbal,
and emotional abuse. Therefore, the purview of the Domestic Violence Act is broader than “cruelty”
covered under Section 498A, IPC.
In Rajkishore Shukla versus Asha Shukla, [M. Cr C. No. 9246/2014 decided on 22.09.2015], the Madhya
Pradesh High Court held that:
“This meaning of domestic relationship has sense when we come to definition of domestic violence
and the purpose of the Act. The purpose of the Act gives remedy to the aggrieved person against
domestic violence. The domestic violence can take place only when one is living in shared household
with the respondents. The act of abuses emotional or economic, physical or sexual, verbal or non-
verbal, if committed, when one is living in the same shared household constitute domestic violence.
However, such acts of violence can be committed even otherwise also when one is living separate.
When such acts of violence take place when one is living separate, these may be punishable under

6 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

different provisions of IPC or other Penal Laws but, they cannot be covered under Domestic Violence
Act. Domestic violence is violence which is committed when parties are in a domestic relationship,
sharing the same household and sharing all the household goods with an opportunity to commit
violence.”

Domestic Incident Report

A domestic incident report or DIR is a report that is made on receiving a complaint of domestic
violence from a woman. This report can be made by either a protection officer or a service provider. The
DIR will contain details, such as name, age, details of the harasser, detail of the incident of violence
that happened, etc. A judicial magistrate may take cognizance of the domestic incident report filed by
the protection officer or service provider. It is not necessary for a magistrate to call for the domestic
incident report before passing an order for maintenance or any order as stated in the Act. However, it
is obligatory for the magistrate to consider the report, if any, filed before it by the service provider or
protection officer while passing of any order as mentioned in the Act.
In Ajay Kant versus Alka Sharma, [2008 Cr LJ 264 (MP HC)], the Madhya Pradesh High Court held
that, “On perusal of the aforementioned proviso appended to the provision, it appears that before
passing any order on the application, it is obligatory on a Magistrate to take into consideration any
report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider. Neither it is obligatory for
a Magistrate to call such report nor it is necessary that before issuance of notice to the petitioners it
was obligatory for a Magistrate to consider the report. The words before passing any order provide that
any final order on the application and not merely issuance of notice to the respondent/the petitioners
herein. The words ‘any report’ also mention that a report, if any, received by a Magistrate shall be
considered. Thus, at this stage, if the report has not been called or has not been considered, it cannot
be a ground for quashing the proceeding.”
In Abhiram Gogoi versus Rashmi Rekha Gogoi, [(2011) 4 Gau LR 276], the Gauhati High Court held that
it is not mandatory for a magistrate to obtain a domestic incident report before a magistrate passes a
maintenance order under Section 18, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
Even the Delhi High Court in Shambhu Prasad Singh versus Manjari [2012 (190) DLT 647 (DB)] pronounced
that the magistrate is not obliged to call for and consider the domestic incident report before issuing
notice to respondents.

Procedure for Seeking Relief under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Chapter IV of the Act is the heart and soul of the Domestic Violence Act, which provides various reliefs
to a woman who has or has been in domestic relationship with an adult male and seeks one or more
reliefs provided under the Act. The Magistrate, while entertaining an application from an aggrieved
person under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, can grant the following reliefs against the
respondents—right to reside in shared household, right to claim protection orders, residence orders,
monetary relief, custody order, and compensation order.
Application to Magistrate (Section 12).—(1) An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other
person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or
more reliefs under this Act: Provided that before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate
shall take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer
or the service provider.
(2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may include a relief for issuance of an order for payment
of compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit for

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 7

 compensation or damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the
respondent: Provided that where a decree for any amount as compensation or damages has been
passed by any court in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid or payable in pursuance
of the order made by the Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the amount payable under
such decree and the decree shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if
any, left after such set off.
(3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may
be prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto.
(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days
from the date of receipt of the application by the court.
(5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-section (1) within a
period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing.

Section 17: Right to Reside in Shared Household

Right to reside in a shared household (Section 17).—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to
reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the
same.
(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it
by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law.

Section 18: Right to Seek Protection from Violence Being Faced by the Aggrieved Person
Protection Order (Section 18).—The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent
an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken
place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit
the respondent from—
(a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence;
(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its
school or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved person, including personal,
oral or written or electronic or telephonic contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the
parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the respondent, including
her stridhan or any other property held either jointly by the parties or separately by them without
the leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependents, other relatives or any person who give the aggrieved person
assistance from domestic violence;
(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection order.
It can be transpired from the provision itself that the order which the magistrate may make under
Section 18 of the Act depends on the set of circumstances as the same cannot be issued in void. Only
if there is a previous satisfactory history or a genuine apprehension that the complainant/aggrieved

8 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

person has faced or is likely to face domestic violence the court would resort to issuance of protection
order. The import of the Section is to control the behaviour of the respondents and further restrain
him from being in situations where he/she can commit any acts of domestic violence. So far as the
reliefs provided under Section 18 of the Domestic Violence Act, for restriction orders, are concerned,
in absence of any complaint against the respondent that she/he had committed an act of domestic
violence no relief can be sought against the respondent under Section 18 of the Domestic Violence Act.
Q. Under what conditions a magistrate may pass an order of restraint under Section 18, Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
1. The respondent must be a person who is in a domestic relationship with an aggrieved person.
2. The respondent must be one who has allegedly committed acts of domestic violence.

Section 19: Right to Seek Relief as to Right of Residence

Residence Order (Section 19).—(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of Section 12,
the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order—
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession
of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or
equitable interest in the shared household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household
in which the aggrieved person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing of the shared household or encumbering
the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the
leave of the Magistrate; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved
person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances
so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a
woman.
While interpreting the right to reside as prescribed under Section 19 of the Act, the Delhi High court
in Shumita Didi Sandhu versus Sanjay Singh Sandhu, [2007 (96) DRJ 697], suggested that the right of
residence which a wife undoubtedly has does not mean the right to reside in a particular property. It
may, of course, mean the right to reside in a commensurate property. It was concluded that it is only in
that property in which the husband has a right, title or interest that the wife can claim residence and
that, too, if no commensurate alternative is provided by the husband.
In a recent case of Roma Rajesh Tiwari versus Rajesh Dinanath Tiwari (Writ Petition No. 10696 of 2017),
the Bombay High Court elaborated on the right of a woman to residing in her matrimonial home or
shared household. The Court observed that the ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ of the Act makes
it clear that, this Domestic Violence Act is enacted to secure the right of a woman to reside in her
matrimonial home or shared household, irrespective of the question ‘whether she has any right, title
or interest in the said household or not’.
It is also irrelevant whether the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household.
The moment it is proved that it was a shared household, as both of them had, in their matrimonial
relationship, i.e., domestic relationship, resided together there, and in this case, up to the disputes

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 9

 arose, it follows that the petitioner wife gets the right to reside therein and, therefore, to get the order
of interim injunction, restraining the respondent husband from dispossessing her, or, in any other
manner, disturbing her possession from the said flat.
Section 19(1)(f) of the Domestic Violence Act states that the respondent can be directed to secure
the same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared
household. In the case of Ajay Kumar Jain versus Baljit Kaur Jain [160 (2009) DLT 401 (DB)], the court
observed that a wife cannot have the right to live in a particular property and the same cannot become
a clog on the property denying the right of the husband to deal with the property when he is willing
to provide an alternative matrimonial home to her. It was also held that she cannot insist on residing
in the suit property alone when the husband had offered a suitable alternative arrangement for her.

Section 20: Right to Seek Monetary Relief

Monetary reliefs (Section 20).—(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of Section
12, the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred
and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of the
domestic violence and such relief may include but is not limited to—
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the
aggrieved person; and
(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under
or in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force.
(2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent
with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed.
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an appropriate lump sum payment or monthly payments
of maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the case may require.
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for monetary relief made under sub-section (1) to the
parties to the application and to the in-charge of the police station within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction the respondent resides.
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted to the aggrieved person within the period
specified in the order under sub-section (1).
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make payment in terms of the order under sub-
section (1), the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to
the aggrieved person or to deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or debt due to or
accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary relief
payable by the respondent.

Maintenance under Section 20, Protection of women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, vis-a-vis
Section 125, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
The Delhi High Court in Karamchand versus State NCT of Delhi, (2011) 181 DLT, held that the
maintenance granted under Section 125, CrPC does not put an embargo on the court to pass an
order granting monetary relief under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

10 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

In Bhuwan Mohan Singh versus Meena [AIR 2014 SC 2875], the Supreme Court held that any delay in
the adjudication of maintenance cases by the Family Court is not only against human rights but also
against the basic embodiment of dignity of an individual. The object of the provisions for grant of
maintenance is to provide speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted
wife, and to prevent vagrancy and destitution.
In Shailja versus Khobbanna, [(2018) 12 SCC 199], the Supreme Court held that whether the wife is
capable of earning or whether she is actually earning are two different requirements. The qualification
of the wife and the capacity to earn cannot be a ground to deny interim maintenance to a wife, who is
dependent and does not have any source of income.
In Annurita Vohra versus Sandeep Vohra, [2004 (3) AD 232], it has been held that the family income
should be equally divided between all family members entitled to maintenance with one extra portion
or share being allotted to the earning spouse since extra expenses would necessarily occur.

Section 21: Right to Seek Custody of Children/Child

Custody orders (Section 21).—Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being
in force, the Magistrate may, at any stage of hearing of the application for protection order or for any
other relief under this Act grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person or
the person making an application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of
such child or children by the respondent: Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any visit
of the respondent may be harmful to the interests of the child or children, the Magistrate shall refuse
to allow such visit.
Section 21 of the Act of 2005 envisages with clarity and precision that in appropriate cases, the
Magistrate at any stage of hearing of the application for a protection order or any other relief under
this Act can grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person or to the person
making an application on her behalf. Merely because the petitioner is having her different place of
abode cannot be a significant factor for denying her right to visit her children.
In Vinay Gupta versus Saveri Nayak, [2017 (1) Crimes 53 (Ori HC)], the High Court, while considering the
power of the Court under Section 21 of the Act of 2005, duly recognised the power of Magistrate to
grant visitation right to a parent, except when it has reasons to believe that such visitation would be
harmful to the interests of child or children.
In Vikas Agarwal versus Geeti Mathur, [MAT APP (FC) 171/2016], a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court,
while considering the welfare of the child, emphasised that the child be allowed to spend quality time
with both the parents, and in appropriate cases, the Family Court may direct the parents to access a
child counsellor and seek a report from the counsellor.
In Shanti Devi versus Phuli Devi SB Civil, [Misc Appeal No. 645/2016], decided on 14 March 2016, duly
recognised the right of a mother for interim custody of a minor child under the Minority and Guardianship
Act, 1956. The Court also observed that paramount consideration, while granting interim custody of
a minor child, is to see the moral and ethical welfare of the child. It was also ruled by the Court that
the factum of re-marriage of the mother cannot disentitle her to claim interim custody of her minor
children.

Section 22: Right to Seek Compensation from Respondents

Compensation orders (Section 22).—In addition to other reliefs as may be granted under this Act, the
Magistrate may on an application being made by the aggrieved person, pass an order directing the
respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional
distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by that respondent.

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 11

 Section 27: Jurisdiction of Court Competent to Entertain Application under Section 12,
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Jurisdiction (Section 27).—(1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan
Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which—
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and other
orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made by this Act shall be enforceable throughout India.

There are three places, which are prescribed under the aforesaid provision, i.e., where a person
aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed, where the
respondent resides or carries on business or is employed, or where the cause of action has arisen.

Section 29: Appeal

Appeal (Section 29).—There shall lie an appeal to the Court of Session within thirty days from the date
on which the order made by the Magistrate is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent, as the
case may be, whichever is later.

Limitation to Invoke Proceedings under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
In Inderjit Singh Grewal versus State of Punjab, [(2011) 12 SCC 588], the Supreme Court held that a
complaint under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, could not be filed after one year from the date of
the incident. In view of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on a conjoint reading
of Section 28 and Section 32 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the
complaint under the Domestic Violence Act could be filed only within a period of one year from the
date of the incident.

Landmark Judgements

Live-in Relationship—Right of Maintenance

D Velusamy versus D Patchaiammal
AIR 2011 SC 479: 2011 Cri LJ 320: 2010 (13) SCR 706: 2010 (11) SCALE 112
Decided on: 21-10-2010
Bench: Justices Markandey Katju and TS Thakur, Supreme Court of India
Facts: The appellant alleged to have married according to Hindu Customary Rights with L, out of which
a male child was born. The petitioner appellant was working as a teacher in a school. Respondent D
filed a petition under Section 125, CrPC, before the Coimbatore Family Court, in which she alleged to
have married the appellant and lived together with him in her father’s house for two to three years.
That appellant left the house of the respondent but would visit the respondent occasionally. She
alleged that she did not have any kind of livelihood and was unable to maintain herself, whereas
the appellant was earning `10000 per month. The appellant was directed to pay `500 per month as
maintenance to the respondent.
Issue: Whether Live-in Relationship amount to claim to relationship in the nature of marriage to claim
the right of maintenance?

12 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Held: Not all live-in relationships will amount to relationships in the nature of marriage to get the
benefit of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, If a man has kept a woman whom he
maintains financially and uses mainly for sexual purpose and/or as a servant it would not, in the court’s
opinion, be a relationship in the nature of marriage. The High Court and the Family Court erred in law,
holding that the appellant was not married to L without even issuing a notice to L. This finding was set
aside. The matter was remanded to the High Court, which may issue notice to L and give fresh findings
in accordance with the law after hearing her.
—————

Domestic Violence—Mother-in-law Pressurising Daughter-in-law to

Consent for Divorcing Her Husband
Bhartiben Bipinbhai Tamboli versus State of Gujarat
2018 (1) RCR (Criminal) 693: 2018 (1) Crimes 522
Decided on: 08-01-2018
Bench: JB Pardiwala, Judge, High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad
Facts: The application filed to quash proceedings initiated against the applicants under provisions of
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act.
Issue: Whether the proceedings initiated by the wife under the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act against the husband and mother-in-law should be quashed?
Held: The husband allegedly developed intimacy for a teacher. The mother-in-law alleged to have
pressurised daughter in law to consent for giving divorce to her husband were also proved. Many other
allegations were there, which probably may constitute domestic violence, if ultimately found to be
true. No case made out for terminating proceedings initiated by wife.
—————

The Term ‘Adult Male‘ in Section 2(q) of 2005 Act

Hiral P Harsora versus Kusum Narottamdas Harsora
Decided on: 06-10-2016
Bench: Justices Kurian Joseph and RF Nariman
Issue: The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Bombay High Court. The Apex Court was dealing
with a question as to the constitutional validity of Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
Held: Court has deleted the words “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act as these words do not
square with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the proviso to Section 2(q), being
rendered otiose, also stands deleted which was provided only to carve out an exception to a situation
of the ‘respondent’ not being an adult male.
The court while dealing with such issue states that the microscopic difference between male and
female, adult and non adult, regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act, is
neither real or substantial nor does it have any rational relation to the object of the legislation.
Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, states that ‘respondent’
means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person
and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an aggrieved

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 13

 wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a
relative of the husband or the male partner.
—————

Interpretation and Working of the Protection of Women

from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Satish Chander Ahuja versus Sneha Ahuja
Decided on: 15-10-2020
Bench: Justices Ashok Bhushan, R Subhash Reddy and MR Shah
Issue: Whether proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act and proceedings before a civil court, family
court or a criminal court, as mentioned in Section 26 of the Domestic Violence Act are independent
proceedings?
Held: According to the court, from a conjoint reading of Sections 12(2), 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26 and 28
of the Domestic Violence Act, it can be said that the proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act
and proceedings before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, as mentioned in Section 26 of
the Domestic Violence Act are independent proceedings, like the proceedings under Section 125 of the
CrPC for maintenance before the Magistrate and/or family court and the proceedings for maintenance
before a civil court/family court for the reliefs under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.
Issue: Pendency of proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, or order passed under Section
19 regarding the right of residence. Whether the right of residence is an indefeasible right?
Held: (i) The pendency of proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, or any order interim or
final passed under the Domestic Violence Act under Section 19 regarding the right of residence is not
an embargo for initiating or continuing any civil proceedings, which relate to the subject matter of order
interim or final passed in proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
(ii) The judgement or order of the criminal court granting an interim or final relief under Section 19 of
the Domestic Violence. Act, 2005 is relevant within the meaning of Section 43 of the Evidence Act and
can be referred to and looked into by the civil court.
(iii) A civil court is to determine the issues in civil proceedings on the basis of evidence, which has been
led by the parties before the civil court.
(iv) In the facts of the present case, the suit filed in civil court for mandatory and permanent injunction
was fully maintainable and the issues raised by the appellant as well as by the defendant claiming a
right under Section 19 were to be addressed and decided on the basis of evidence, which is led by the
parties in the suit.
Right to residence under Section 19 is not an indefeasible right of residence in a shared household,
especially when the daughter-in-law is pitted against the aged father-in-law and mother-in-law. The
senior citizens in the evening of their life are also entitled to live peacefully and not be haunted by
marital discord between their son and daughter-in-law.
Issue: The definition of shared household can be divided into two parts, expressions “means and
includes” in Section 2(s) of Act, 2005.
Held: Shared household—The definition can be divided into two parts—first, which follows the word
‘means’ and second which follows the word ‘includes’. The second part which follows ‘includes’ can be

14 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

further sub-divided into two parts. The first part reads: “shared household means a household where
the person aggrieved has lived or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or
along with the respondent”. Thus, the first condition to be fulfilled for a shared household is that the
aggrieved person lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship. The second part sub-divided
into two parts—

(a) includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and
the respondent and owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved
person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity, and

(b) includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a
member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or
interest in the shared household. In the above definition, two expressions, namely, ‘aggrieved
person’ and ‘respondent’ have occurred. From the above definition, the following is clear—

(i) it is not a requirement of law that the aggrieved person may either own the premises jointly or
singly or by tenanting it jointly or singly;

(ii) the household may belong to a joint family of which the respondent is a member irrespective
of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared
household; and

(iii) the shared household may either be owned or tenanted by the respondent singly or jointly.

—————

Legal Position on Simultaneous Remedy under the Domestic

Violence Act, 2005, and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
Sachin Sharma versus Palvi Sharma

Decided on: 26-10-2020

Bench: Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, Himachal Pradesh High Court

Facts: A petition was filed to set aside the order passed by the lower court, wherein the court had
awarded a sum of `3,000 per month as maintenance in favour of the respondents. In this case, a
petition filed by the respondent herein, under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005, stood allowed by the Court, titled Palvi Sharma versus Sachin Sharma, directing
the present petitioner to pay monthly maintenance to the tune of `3,000 per month to the present
respondent/wife from the date of the order. The court also ordered `20,000 by way of compensation.

Issue: Whether the petition filed is maintainable? Whether the proceedings envisaged under Section
125 of the Criminal Procedure Code are different from proceedings under the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?

Held: The court rejected the criminal revision sought against the compensation and maintenance
allowed by the lower court. The court was of the view that provisions of Section 125 of the Criminal
Procedure Code and Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, are
distinct and different. The law does not prohibit a wife to proceed under both of the said statutory
provisions simultaneously or otherwise.

Reasonable amount awarded by the learned court: The court said that the petitioner was awarded
to pay `3,500 under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code and `3,000 under Section 12 of the

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 15

 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The court also said that an amount of `6,500
per month to maintain an adult person and a minor child, by no stretch of the imagination, can be said
to be on the higher side and the amount awarded by the learned courts below is reasonable, just and
fair.
—————

Supreme Court Guidelines

Live-in or Marriage Like Relationship

Indra Sarma versus VKV Sarma
(2013) 15 SCC 755
Criminal Appeal No. 2009 of 2013: @ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 4895 of 2012
Decided on: 26-11-2013
Bench: Justices KS Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose
A live-in relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under
Section 2(f) of the Domestic Violence Act. The guidelines, of course, are not exhaustive, but will
definitely give some insight to such relationships.
(1) Duration of the period of relationship: Section 2(f) of the Domestic Violence Act has used the
expression “at any point of time”, which means a reasonable period of time to maintain and
continue a relationship which may vary from case to case, depending upon the fact situation.
(2) Shared household the expression has been defined under Section 2(s) of the Domestic Violence
Act, and hence, needs no further elaboration.
(3) Pooling of resources and financial arrangements: Supporting each other, or any one of them,
financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties in joint names or in the name
of the woman, long-term investments in business, shares in separate and joint names, so as to
have a long-standing relationship, maybe a guiding factor.
(4) Domestic arrangements: Entrusting the responsibility, especially on the woman to run the home,
do household activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or upkeeping the house, etc., is an
indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage.
(5) Sexual relationship: Marriage-like relationship refers to sexual relationship, not just for pleasure,
but for emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation of children, so as to give emotional
support, companionship and also material affection, caring, etc.
(6) Children: Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. Parties,
therefore, intend to have a long-standing relationship. Sharing the responsibility for bringing up
and supporting them is also a strong indication.
(7) Socialisation in Public: Holding out to the public and socialising with friends, relations and others,
as if they are husband and wife is a strong circumstance to hold the relationship is in the nature
of marriage.
(8) Intention and conduct of the parties: Common intention of parties as to what their relationship is
to be and to involve, and as to their respective roles and responsibilities, primarily determines the
nature of that relationship.
—————

16 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

 Objective Type Questions
1. The National Commission for Women is a:
(A) constitutional body
(B) statutory body
(C) independent body
(D) None of the above
Ans: (B)
The National Commission for Women was set
up as statutory body in January 1992 under
the National Commission for Women Act, 1990
(Act No. 20 of 1990 of Government of India), to
review the Constitutional and legal safeguards
for women, recommend remedial legislative
measures, facilitate redressal of grievances and
advise the Government on all policy matters
affecting women.
2. Dowry death is an offence punishable under
Section _____ of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
(A) 304
(B) 304B
(C) 307
(D) 109
Ans: (B)
Section 304B of IPC defines dowry death as:
“Where the death of a woman is caused by
any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven
years of her marriage and it is shown that soon
before her death she was subjected to cruelty
or harassment by her husband or any relative
of her husband for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called
‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall
be deemed to have caused her death.
3. Any person who has reason to believe that
an act of domestic violence has been, or is
being, or is likely to be committed, may give
information about it to the concerned:
(A) protection officer
(B) police station
(C) magistrate
(D) None of the above
Ans: (A)
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Section 4: Information to Protection Officer and
exclusion of liability of informant.—(1) Any person
who has reason to believe that an act of domestic
violence has been, or is being, or is likely to be
committed, may give information about it to the
concerned Protection Officer.
(2) No liability, civil or criminal, shall be incurred by
any person for giving in good faith of information
for the purpose of sub-section (1).
4. Every woman in a domestic relationship
shall have the right to reside in the shared
household:
(A) if she has any right, title in the same
(B) if she has any beneficiary interest in the
same
(C) whether or not she has any right, title or
beneficial interest in the same
(D) None of the above
Ans: (C)
Section 17:Right to reside in a shared household.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, every woman
in a domestic relationship shall have the right to
reside in the shared household, whether or not
she has any right, title or beneficial interest in
the same.
(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or
excluded from the shared household or any part
of it by the respondent save in accordance with
the procedure established by law.
5. Every person appointed as Protection Officer
under the Domestic Violence Act shall have
at least ___________ years of experience in
the social sector.
(A) 3
(B) 5
(C) 7
(D) 10
Ans: (A)
Rule 3, the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Rules, 2006: Qualifications and experience
of Protection Officers.—(1) The Protection Officers
appointed by the State Government may be of the
Government or members of non-governmental
17
 organisations: Provided that preference shall be
given to women.
(2) Every person appointed as Protection Officer
under the Act shall have at least three years’
experience in the social sector.
(3) The tenure of a Protection Officer shall be a
minimum period of three years.
(4) The State Government shall provide necessary
office assistance to the Protection Officer for the
efficient discharge of his or her functions under
the Act and these rules.
6. While passing a monetary relief under the
Domestic Violence Act, the magistrate shall
have the power to order an appropriate:
(A) lump sum payment
(B) monthly payments of maintenance
(C) Either (A) or (B)
(D) None of the above
Ans: (C)
Section 31: Monetary reliefs.—(1) While disposing
of an application under sub-section (1) of Section
12, the Magistrate may direct the respondent to
pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred
and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and
any child of the aggrieved person as a result of
domestic violence and such relief may include
but is not limited to—
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction,
damage or removal of any property from
the control of the aggrieved person; and
(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person
as well as her children, if any, including
an order under or in addition to an order
of maintenance under Section 125 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974), or any other law for the time being
in force.
(2) The monetary relief granted under this section
shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and
consistent with the standard of living to which
the aggrieved person is accustomed.
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order
an appropriate lump sum payment or monthly
18 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
payments of maintenance, as the nature and
circumstances of the case may require.
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order
for monetary relief made under sub-section (1)
to the parties to the application and to the in-
charge of the police station within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction the respondent resides.
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief
granted to the aggrieved person within the period
specified in the order under sub-section (1).
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent
to make payment in terms of the order under sub-
section (1), the Magistrate may direct the employer
or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to
the aggrieved person or to deposit with the court
a portion of the wages or salaries or debt due to
or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which
amount may be adjusted towards the monetary
relief payable by the respondent.
7. While passing the monetary relief under the
Domestic Violence Act, the magistrate can
order maintenance for the aggrieved person
as well as her children:
(A) including an order of maintenance under
Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973
(B) including an order under or in addition to
an order of maintenance under Section
125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973
(C) if no order is passed under Section 125 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(D) None of the above
Ans: (B)
Section 31: Monetary reliefs.—(1) While disposing
of an application under sub-section (1) of Section
12, the Magistrate may direct the respondent
to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses
incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved
person and any child of the aggrieved person as
a result of the domestic violence and such relief
may include but is not limited to—
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
 (c) the loss caused due to the destruction,
damage or removal of any property from
the control of the aggrieved person; and
(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person
as well as her children, if any, including
an order under or in addition to an order
of maintenance under Section 125 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974), or any other law for the time being
in force.
(2) The monetary relief granted under this section
shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and
consistent with the standard of living to which
the aggrieved person is accustomed.
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order
an appropriate lump sum payment or monthly
payments of maintenance, as the nature and
circumstances of the case may require.
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order
for monetary relief made under sub-section (1)
to the parties to the application and to the in-
charge of the police station within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction the respondent resides.
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief
granted to the aggrieved person within the period
specified in the order under sub-section (1).
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent
to make payment in terms of the order under sub-
section (1), the Magistrate may direct the employer
or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to
the aggrieved person or to deposit with the court
a portion of the wages or salaries or debt due to
or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which
amount may be adjusted towards the monetary
relief payable by the respondent.
8. Which among the following category of abuse
has not been included in the definition of
domestic violence?
(A) Economic abuse
(B) Verbal abuse
(C) Sexual abuse
(D) None of the above
Ans: (D)
Section 3: Definition of domestic violence.—For
the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
commission or conduct of the respondent shall
constitute domestic violence in case it—
(a) harms or injures or endangers the
health, safety, life, limb or wellbeing,
whether mental or physical, of the
aggrieved person or tends to do so and
includes causing physical abuse, sexual
abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and
economic abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers
the aggrieved person with a view to
coerce her or any other person related
to her to meet any unlawful demand for
any dowry or other property or valuable
security; or
(c) has the effect of threatening the
aggrieved person or any person related to
her by any conduct mentioned in Clause
(a) or Clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm,
whether physical or mental, to the
aggrieved person.
Explanation I.—For the purposes of this
section,—
(i) “physical abuse” means any act or
conduct which is of such a nature as to
cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life,
limb, or health or impair the health or
development of the aggrieved person and
includes assault, criminal intimidation
and criminal force;
(ii) “sexual abuse” includes any conduct of
a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates,
degrades or otherwise violates the dignity
of a woman;
(iii) “verbal and emotional abuse” includes—
(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name-
calling, and insults or ridicule
especially with regard to not having a
child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical
pain to any person in whom the
aggrieved person is interested.
(iv) “economic abuse” includes—
19
 (a) deprivation of all or any economic
or financial resources to which the
aggrieved person is entitled under any
law or custom whether payable under
an order of a court or otherwise or
which the aggrieved person requires
out of necessity including, but not
limited to, household necessities
for the aggrieved person and her
children, if any, stridhan, property,
jointly or separately owned by the
aggrieved person, payment of rental
related to the shared household and
maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects,
any alienation of assets whether
movable or immovable, valuables,
shares, securities, bonds and the
like or other property in which the
aggrieved person has an interest
or is entitled to use by virtue of
the domestic relationship or which
may be reasonably required by the
aggrieved person or her children or
her stridhan or any other property
jointly or separately held by the
aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued
access to resources or facilities which
the aggrieved person is entitled to
use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic
relationship including access to the
shared household.
Explanation II.—For the purpose of determining
whether any act, omission, commission or
conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic
violence” under this section, the overall facts and
circumstances of the case shall be taken into
consideration.
9. A breach of protection order, or of an interim
protection order, by the respondent shall be
an offence under the Domestic Violence Act
and shall be punishable with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may
extend to:
20 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
(A) one year, or with fine which may extend
to twenty thousand rupees or both
(B) two years, or with fine which may extend
to twenty thousand rupees or both
(C) three years, or with fine which may
extend to twenty thousand rupees or
both
(D) None of the above
Ans: (A)
Section 31: Penalty for breach of protection
order by respondent.—(1) A breach of protection
order, or of an interim protection order, by the
respondent shall be an offence under this Act
and shall be punishable with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to
one year, or with fine which may extend to twenty
thousand rupees, or with both.
(2) The offence under sub-section (1) shall as far
as practicable be tried by the Magistrate who had
passed the order, the breach of which has been
alleged to have been caused by the accused.
(3) While framing charges under sub-section (1),
the Magistrates may also frame charges under
Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860) or any other provision of that Code or the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), as the
case may be, if the facts disclose the commission
of an offence under those provisions.
10. Which Section of the Domestic Violence Act,
2005, deals with proceedings to be held in
camera?
(A) Section 16 of the Domestic Violence Act,
2005
(B) Section 17 of the Domestic Violence Act,
2005
(C) Section 18 of the Domestic Violence Act,
2005
(D) Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act,
2005
Ans: (A)
Section 16: Proceedings to be held in camera.—If
the Magistrate considers that the circumstances
of the case so warrant, and if either party to
the proceedings so desires, he may conduct the
proceedings under this Act in camera.
11. While disposing of an application under the
Domestic Violence Act, the Magistrate may,
on being satisfied that domestic violence has
taken place, pass a residence order:
(A) restraining the respondents from
dispossessing or in any other manner
disturbing the possession of the aggrieved
person from the shared household,
whether or not the respondent has a
legal or equitable interest in the shared
household
(B) directing the respondent to remove
himself from the shared household
(C) restraining the respondent or any of his
relative from entering any portion of the
shared household in which the aggrieved
person resides.
(D) All of the above
Ans: (D)
Section 19: Residence orders.—(1) While disposing
of an application under sub-section (1) of Section
12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that
domestic violence has taken place, pass a
residence order—
(a) restraining the respondent from
dispossessing or in any other manner
disturbing the possession of the aggrieved
person from the shared household,
whether or not the respondent has a
legal or equitable interest in the shared
household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove
himself from the shared household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his
relatives from entering any portion of the
shared household in which the aggrieved
person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from
alienating or disposing of the shared
household or encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from
renouncing his rights in the shared
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
household except with the leave of the
Magistrate; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same
level of alternate accommodation for the
aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the
shared household or to pay rent for the
same, if the circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under Clause (b)
shall be passed against any person who
is a woman.
12. The Protection of women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005, points out the expression
‘domestic relationship’ includes not only
the relationship of marriage but also a
relationship ‘in the nature of marriage’. The
statement is:
(A) true
(B) false
(C) partly correct
(D) None of the above
Ans: (A)
In Veluswamy versus D Patchaiammal, [AIR 2011
SC 479], it was held that—
34. In our opinion, not all live-in relationships
will amount to a relationship in the nature of
marriage to get the benefit of the Act of 2005.
To get such benefit the conditions mentioned by
as above must be satisfied, and this has to be
proved by evidence. If a man has a ‘keep’ whom
he maintains financially and uses mainly for
sexual purpose and/or as a servant it would not,
in our opinion, be a relationship in the nature of
marriage’
35. No doubt the view we are taking would
exclude many women who have had a live-in
relationship from the benefit of the 2005 Act, but
then it is not for this Court to legislate or amend
the law. The Parliament has used the expression
‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ and not
‘live in relationship’. The Court in the grab of
interpretation cannot change the language of the
statute.
21
 Previous Years’ Questions
13. An application for residential order shall be
made by a victim of domestic violence before
a:
(A) Civil Judge (Senior Division)
(B) Magistrate of the First Class
(C) Family Court
(D) Mediation Centre established by the High
Court
Ans. (B) [Rajasthan Judicial Service, 2011]
Section 12 of the Protection of Woman from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Application to
Magistrate.—(1) An aggrieved person or a Protection
Officer or any other person on behalf of the
aggrieved person may present an application to
the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under
this Act:Provided that before passing any order
on such application, the Magistrate shall take
into consideration any domestic incident report
received by him from the Protection Officer or
the service provider.
(2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1)
may include a relief for issuance of an order for
payment of compensation or damages without
prejudice to the right of such person to institute
a suit for compensation or damages for the
injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence
committed by the respondent: Provided that
where a decree for any amount as compensation
or damages has been passed by any court in
favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any,
paid or payable in pursuance of the order made
by the Magistrate under this Act shall be set off
against the amount payable under such decree
and the decree shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5
of 1908), or any other law for the time being in
force, be executable for the balance amount, if
any, left after such set off.
(3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall
be in such form and contain such particulars
as may be prescribed or as nearly as possible
thereto.
(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing,
which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days
22
from the date of receipt of the application by the
court.
(5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose
of every application made under sub-section (1)
within a period of sixty days from the date of its
first hearing.
Section 19 of the Protection of Woman from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Residence orders.—
(1) While disposing of an application under sub-
section (1) of Section 12, the Magistrate may, on
being satisfied that domestic violence has taken
place, pass a residence order—
(a) restraining the respondent from
dispossessing or in any other manner
disturbing the possession of the aggrieved
person from the shared household,
whether or not the respondent has a
legal or equitable interest in the shared
household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove
himself from the shared household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his
relatives from entering any portion of the
shared household in which the aggrieved
person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from
alienating or disposing-of the shared
household or encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from
renouncing his rights in the shared
household except with the leave of the
Magistrate; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same
level of alternate accommodation for the
aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the
shared household or to pay rent for the
same, if the circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b)
shall be passed against any person who
is a woman.
(2) The Magistrate may impose any additional
conditions or pass any other direction which he
may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or
any child of such aggrieved person.
(3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent
to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for
preventing the commission of domestic violence.
(4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be
deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and
shall be dealt with accordingly.
(5) While passing an order under sub-section (1),
sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), the court may
also pass an order directing the officer in charge
of the nearest police station to give protection
to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the
person making an application on her behalf in the
implementation of the order.
(6) While making an order under sub-section (1),
the Magistrate may impose on the respondent
obligations relating to the discharge of rent and
other payments, having regard to the financial
needs and resources of the parties.
(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-
charge of the police station in whose jurisdiction
the Magistrate has been approached to assist in
the implementation of the protection order.
(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to
return to the possession of the aggrieved person
her stridhan or any other property or valuable
security to which she is entitled to.
14. Under the Protection of Woman from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, besides
passing orders for protection and residence,
a Magistrate can pass:
(A) custody orders
(B) compensation orders
(C) ex-parteorders
(D) All of the above
Ans. (D) [Rajasthan Judicial Service, 2013]
Section 18 of the Protection of Woman from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Protection orders.—
The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved
person and the respondent an opportunity of
being heard and on being prima facie satisfied
that domestic violence has taken place or is likely
to take place, pass a protection order in favour of
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent
from—
(a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of
acts of domestic violence;
(c) entering the place of employment of
the aggrieved person or, if the person
aggrieved is a child, its school or any
other place frequented by the aggrieved
person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form,
whatsoever, with the aggrieved person,
including personal, oral or written or
electronic or telephonic contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank
lockers or bank accounts used or held
or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by
the aggrieved person and the respondent
or singly by the respondent, including her
stridhan or any other property held either
jointly by the parties or separately by
them without the leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependents,
other relatives or any person who give
the aggrieved person assistance from
domestic violence;
(g) committing any other act as specified in
the protection order.
Section 19 of the Protection of Woman from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Residence orders.—
(1) While disposing of an application under sub-
section (1) of Section 12, the Magistrate may, on
being satisfied that domestic violence has taken
place, pass a residence order:
(a) restraining the respondent from
dispossessing or in any other manner
disturbing the possession of the aggrieved
person from the shared household,
whether or not the respondent has a
legal or equitable interest in the shared
household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove
himself from the shared household;
23
 (c) restraining the respondent or any of his
relatives from entering any portion of the
shared household in which the aggrieved
person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from
alienating or disposing of the shared
household or encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from
renouncing his rights in the shared
household except with the leave of the
Magistrate; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same
level of alternate accommodation for the
aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the
shared household or to pay rent for the
same, if the circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b)
shall be passed against any person who
is a woman.
(2) The Magistrate may impose any additional
conditions or pass any other direction which he
may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to
provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or
any child of such aggrieved person.
(3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent
to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for
preventing the commission of domestic violence.
(4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be
deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and
shall be dealt with accordingly.
(5) While passing an order under sub-section (1),
sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), the court may
also pass an order directing the officer in-charge
of the nearest police station to give protection
to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the
person making an application on her behalf in the
implementation of the order.
(6) While making an order under sub-section (1),
the Magistrate may impose on the respondent
obligations relating to the discharge of rent and
other payments, having regard to the financial
needs and resources of the parties.
(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-
charge of the police station in whose jurisdiction
24 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
the Magistrate has been approached to assist in
the implementation of the protection order.
(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to
return to the possession of the aggrieved person
her stridhan or any other property or valuable
security to which she is entitled to.
Section 21 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Custody orders.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, the Magistrate
may, at any stage of hearing of the application
for protection order or for any other relief under
this Act grant temporary custody of any child or
children to the aggrieved person or the person
making an application on her behalf and specify,
if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such
child or children by the respondent:
Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion
that any visit of the respondent may be harmful
to the interests of the child or children, the
Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit.
Section 22 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Compensation
orders.—In addition to other reliefs as may be
granted under this Act, the Magistrate may on
an application being made by the aggrieved
person, pass an order directing the respondent
to pay compensation and damages for the
injuries, including mental torture and emotional
distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence
committed by that respondent.
Section 23 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Power to grant
interim and ex-parte orders.—(1) In any proceeding
before him under this Act, the Magistrate may
pass such interim order as he deems just and
proper.
(2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application
prima facie discloses that the respondent is
committing, or has committed an act of domestic
violence or that there is a likelihood that the
respondent may commit an act of domestic
violence, he may grant an ex-parte order on the
basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be
prescribed, of the aggrieved person under Section
18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 21 or, as the
case may be, Section 22 against the respondent.
15. As per Section 2(q) of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005,
“respondent” means and includes:
(A) any person, who is in a domestic
relationship with the aggrieved person
and against whom the aggrieved person
has sought relief under the Act
(B) male partner when the aggrieved female
is living in a relationship with him in the
nature of a marriage
(C) the female relatives of the husband of
the aggrieved wife, seeking their removal
from the shared household
(D) None of the above
Ans. (A) [Rajasthan Judicial Service, 2015]
Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, “respondent”
means any adult male person who is or has been
in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved
person and against whom the aggrieved person
has sought any relief under this Act: Provided
that an aggrieved wife or female living in a
relationship in the nature of a marriage may also
file a complaint against a relative of the husband
or the male partner.
16. The Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005, extends to the whole of
India, except the:
(A) State of Jammu and Kashmir
(B) State of Nagaland
(C) tribal areas of Assam as referred to in
paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to
the Constitution
(D) All of the above
Ans. (A) [Rajasthan Judicial Service, 2016]
Section 1 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Short title, extent
and commencement.—(1) This Act may be called
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the
State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
(3) It shall come into force on such date as the
Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, appoint.
17. A Magistrate directing the matter to be
referred for counselling under Section 14
of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005, will fix the next date for
hearing:
(A) After a period of two months
(B) Within a period not exceeding two
months
(C) After a period of three months
(D) After a period of four months
Ans. (B) [Rajasthan Judicial Service, 2016]
Section 14 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Counselling—
(1) The Magistrate may, at any stage of the
proceedings under this Act, direct the respondent
or the aggrieved person, either singly or jointly, to
undergo counselling with any member of a service
provider who possesses such qualifications and
experience in counselling as may be prescribed.
(2) Where the Magistrate has issued any direction
under sub-section (1), he shall fix the next date of
hearing of the case within a period not exceeding
two months.
18. Non-compliance of which of the following
orders passed under the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is
an offence?
(A) Maintenance order
(B) Custody order
(C) Residence order
(D) Protection order
Ans. (D) [Rajasthan Judicial Service, 2017–18]
Section 18 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Protection orders.—
The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved
person and the respondent an opportunity of
being heard and on being prima facie satisfied
that domestic violence has taken place or is likely
to take place, pass a protection order in favour of
the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent
from—
25
 (a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of
acts of domestic violence;
(c) entering the place of employment of
the aggrieved person or, if the person
aggrieved is a child, its school or any
other place frequented by the aggrieved
person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form,
whatsoever, with the aggrieved person,
including personal, oral or written or
electronic or telephonic contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank
lockers or bank accounts used or held or
enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the
aggrieved person and the respondent or
singly by the respondent, including her
stridhan or any other property held either
jointly by the parties or separately by
them without the leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependents,
other relatives or any person who give
the aggrieved person assistance from
domestic violence;
(g) committing any other act as specified in
the protection order.
Section 31 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Penalty for breach
of protection order by respondent.—(1) A breach
of protection order, or of an interim protection
order, by the respondent shall be an offence
under this Act and shall be punishable with
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to one year, or with fine which
may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or with
both.
(2) The offence under sub-section (1) shall as far
as practicable be tried by the Magistrate who had
passed the order, the breach of which has been
alleged to have been caused by the accused.
(3) While framing charges under sub-section (1),
the Magistrate may also frame charges under
Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860) or any other provision of that Code or the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), as the
26 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
case may be, if the facts disclose the commission
of an offence under those provisions.
19. In which of the following judgements, the
Supreme Court held that where an act of
domestic violence commenced prior to
the enactment of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act and continued
even thereafter also, in such a situation, the
aggrieved person is entitled to protection of
the Act?
(A) (2014) 3 SCC 712, Sarswath versus Babu
(B) (2015) 2 SCC 145, Meena Chaudhary
versus Commissioner of Delhi Police
(C) (2013) 15 SCC 755, Indra Sarma versus
KKV Sarma
(D) None of the above
Ans. (A) [Rajasthan Judicial Service 2018–19]
Case law: Sarswath versus Babu, (2014) 3 SCC 712
The question was raised whether acts committed
prior to the coming into force of the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005,
and which fall within the definition of the term
‘Domestic Violence’ as informed in the Act could
form the basis of an action.
This court would first concern itself with whether
acts that now constitute domestic violence but
committed prior to the coming into force of the
Act would form a basis of an action thereunder.
With due respect to the authorities above cited,
this court would inform that the fundamental
issue stands unaddressed. The Act came into
force in 2005. It cannot be disputed that several
wrongful actions which might have amounted to
offences, such as cruelty and demand for dowry
cannot have taken the description of ‘Domestic
violence’ till such time the Act came into force. In
other words, the offending acts could have been
construed as offences under other enactments
but could not have been construed as acts of
‘Domestic Violence’ until the Act came into force.
Therefore, what was not ‘Domestic violence’ as
defined in the Act till the Act came into force
could not have formed the basis of an action.
Ignorance of the law is no excuse but the
application of this maxim on any date prior to
the coming into force of the Act could only have
imputed knowledge of offence as subsisted prior
to coming into force of the Act. It is true that
it is only violation of orders passed under the
Act which are made punishable. But those very
orders could be passed only in the face of acts
of domestic violence. What constituted domestic
violence was not known until the passage of the
Act and could not have formed the basis of a
complaint of commission of ‘Domestic violence’.”
20. Under the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which of the
following statement regarding the Protection
Officer, is correct?
(A) Protection Officer is not a public servant.
(B) Penalty is prescribed for not discharging
duty by Protection Officer.
(C) A first information report can be lodged
for the offence committed by Protection
Officer.
(D) None of the above options.
Ans. (B) [Rajasthan Judicial Service, 2022]
Penalty for not discharging duty by Protection
Officer.—If any Protection Officer fails or refuses to
discharge his duties as directed by the Magistrate
in the protection order without any sufficient
cause, he shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend
to one year, or with fine which may extend to
twenty thousand rupees, or with both (Section
33 of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005).
21. Under the provisions of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005,
which of the following statement regarding
protection order, is wrong?
(A) A breach of the protection of the
aggrieved under the said Act of 2005.
(B) Upon the sole testimony of the aggrieved
person, the Court may conclude that an
offence under sub-section (1) of Section
31 has been committed by the accused.
(C) Breach of a protection order is a non-
cognizable offence.
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
(D) Breach of a protection order is a non-
bailable offence.
Ans. (C) [Rajasthan Judicial Service, 2022]
Protection orders.—The Magistrate may, after
giving the aggrieved person and the respondent
an opportunity of being heard and on being prima
facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken
place or is likely to take place, pass a protection
order in favour of the aggrieved person and
prohibit the respondent from—
(a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of
acts of domestic violence;
(c) entering the place of employment of
the aggrieved person or, if the person
aggrieved is a child, its school or any
other place frequented by the aggrieved
person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form,
whatsoever, with the aggrieved person,
including personal, oral or written or
electronic or telephonic contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank
lockers or bank accounts used or held or
enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the
aggrieved person and the respondent or
singly by the respondent, including her
stridhan or any other property held either
jointly by the parties or separately by
them without the leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependents,
other relatives or any person who give
the aggrieved person assistance from
domestic violence;
(g) committing any other act as specified in
the protection order. (Section 18 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005)
Penalty for breach of protection order by
respondent.—
(1) A breach of protection order, or of
an interim protection order, by the
respondent shall be an offence under
this Act and shall be punishable with
imprisonment of either description for
27
 a term which may extend to one year, (3) While framing charges under sub-section
or with fine which may extend to twenty (1), the Magistrate may also frame charges
thousand rupees, or with both. under Section 498A of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860) or any other provision
(2) The offence under sub-section (1) shall
of that Code or the Dowry Prohibition
as far as practicable be tried by the
Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), as the case may
Magistrate who had passed the order, be, if the facts disclose the commission
the breach of which has been alleged to of an offence under those provisions.
have been caused by the accused. (Section 31 of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005)
Recent and Relevant Cases
Kamatchi versus Lakshmi Narayanan [2022 SCC Online SC 466]
Point(s) to note: Section 12; Section 31; Section 468, CrPC; application; offence
Filing of an Application under Section 12
Section 12 of the Act speaks of filing of an application seeking one or more reliefs under the Act,
whereafter the relevant material is considered by the Magistrate including any Domestic Incident
Report.
The scope of notice under Section 12 of the Act is to call for a response from the respondent in terms
of the Statute so that after considering rival submissions, appropriate order can be issued.
The provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act contemplate the filing of an
application under Section 12 to initiate the proceedings before the concerned Magistrate. After hearing
both sides and after taking into account the material on record, the Magistrate may pass an appropriate
order under Section 12 of the Act. It is only the breach of such order which constitutes an offence as is
clear from Section 31 of the Act. Thus, if there be any offence committed in terms of the provisions of
the Act, the limitation prescribed under Section 468 of CrPC will apply from the date of commission of
such an offence. By the time an application is preferred under Section 12 of the Act, there is no offence
committed in terms of the provisions of the Act and as such there would never be a starting point for
limitation from the date of application under Section 12 of the Act. Such a starting point for limitation
would arise only after there is a breach of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act.
—————
Mathew Daniel versus Leena Mathew [2022 LiveLaw (Ker) 441]
Point(s) to note: Objective; Purpose; Enactment; Section 18–22; Reliefs sought in legal proceeding
Civil Remedies for a Woman Who Is Subjected to Domestic Violence
The very objective of the Domestic Violence Act is to protect women against the violence that occurs
within family and for matters connected therewith. The Domestic Violence Act, therefore, conceives a
scheme of protective measures with the object to protect women.
The statement of objects and reasons of the Act record that the civil law does not address the
phenomenon of domestic violence, and therefore, a law be enacted to provide a remedy in civil law for
the protection of women from being victims of domestic violence. Thus, the purpose of enacting the
law was to provide civil remedies to a woman, who is subjected to domestic violence. Apart from the
statement of objects and reasons, various provisions contained in the Domestic Violence Act make it
clear that predominantly the rights and remedies created under the Act are of civil nature.

28 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Various kind of reliefs which can be obtained by the aggrieved person under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act
are of civil nature. At the same time, when there is a breach of such orders passed by the Magistrate,
Section 31 terms such a breach to be a punishable offence. The reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 can
be sought in any legal proceedings pending before a civil court, family court, or criminal court as well
(Section 26). All these reliefs that can be granted by the Magistrate/Court are meant for the welfare
and well-being of the women. When the welfare statute is made with the single focus of the protection
of women, such an Act must be treated as remedial to protect the women.
—————
Prabha Tyagi versus Kamlesh Devi [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 474]
Point(s) to note: Right to reside; Section 17; Section 19; Shared household; Domestic violence
Right to Reside in the Shared Household
The object and purpose of the Domestic Violence Act is to protect a woman from domestic violence,
the salutary object of sub-section (1) of Section 17 is to confer a right on every woman in a domestic
relationship to have the right to reside in a shared household.
Section 17 speaks of the right to reside in a shared household, while Section 19 deals with residence
orders which could be passed by a Magistrate while disposing of an application under sub-section (1)
of Section 12, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place in a shared household. Thus,
while Section 19 deals with residence orders, the right to reside in a shared household is dealt with
in Section 17 of the Domestic Violence Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 17, which begins with a non-
obstante clause, states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household,
whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Sub-section (2) states that an
aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the
respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law.
While Section 19 deals with a multitude of directions or orders, which may be passed against the
respondent vis-à-vis the shared household in favour of an aggrieved person, Section 17 confers a right
on every woman in a domestic relationship to reside in the shared household irrespective of whether
she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. This right to reside in a shared household,
which is conferred on every woman in a domestic relationship, is a vital and significant right. It is an
affirmation of the right of every woman in a domestic relationship to reside in a shared household. Sub-
section (2) of Section 17 protects an aggrieved person from being evicted or excluded from the shared
household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by
law. The distinction between sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 17 is also to be noted.
While sub-section (2) deals with an aggrieved person, which is defined in Section 2(a) of the Domestic
Violence Act in the context of domestic violence, sub-section (1) of Section 17 is a right conferred on
every woman in a domestic relationship irrespective of whether she is an aggrieved person or not. In
other words, every woman in a domestic relationship has the right to reside in the shared household
even in the absence of any act of domestic violence by the respondent.
It is not mandatory for the aggrieved person, when she is related by consanguinity, marriage, or through
a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family,
to actually reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled at the time of
the commission of domestic violence. If a woman has the right to reside in the shared household under
Section 17 of the Domestic Violence Act and such a woman becomes an aggrieved person or victim of

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 29

 domestic violence, she can seek relief under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, including
enforcement of her right to live in a shared household.
It is held that there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and
the person against whom the relief is claimed vis-à-vis the allegation of domestic violence. However,
it is not necessary that at the time of filing of an application by an aggrieved person, the domestic
relationship should be subsisting. In other words, even if an aggrieved person is not in a domestic
relationship with the respondent in a shared household at the time of filing of an application under
Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act but has at any point of time lived so, or had the right to live
and has been subjected to domestic violence, or is later subjected to domestic violence on account of
the domestic relationship, is entitled to file an application under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence
Act.
—————
Suneesh versus State of Kerala [2022 LiveLaw (Ker) 635]
Point(s) to note: Section 31; Section 19 and 20; Section 18; Section 125 CrPC; Breach of protection
order; Interim protection
Breach of Protection Order or Interim Protection
Section 31 does not provide that an order passed under Sections 19 or 20, if violated, would enable
the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. Sub-section (1) of Section 31 restricts the power
in respect of breach of a protection order or an interim protection order alone. A protection Order is
defined under sub-section (o) of Section 2 as an order made in terms of Section 18. Therefore, only
if an order, which is allegedly broken by the petitioner, is a protection order as defined under Section
2(o), cognizance could be taken under Section 31 of the Act. Such an order should be made in terms of
Section 18. An order under Section 19 or 20 is an order made in terms of Section 18 and hence, cannot
be a protection order.
A plain reading of Section 31 would go to show that a breach of the protection order or interim
protection order by the respondent shall be an offence under this Act and is punishable. Section 18
deals with protection orders categorised as (a) to (g) referred to in Section 18 herein above extracted.
Section 19 deals with residence orders and Section 20 deals with monetary reliefs and Section 20(d)
authorises a Magistrate to grant maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any,
including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or any other law for the time being in force. Thus, it could be noticed
that while incorporating provisions under Section 31 to impose a penalty on violation or breach of
‘protection order’, the legislature never intended to impose a penalty for violation of ‘residence orders’
or ‘monetary reliefs’.
The Legislature vigilantly included ‘protection orders’ alone under Section 31 of the Domestic Violence
Act after specifically categorising the orders which would be given under the head ‘protection orders’
under Section18 of the Domestic Violence Act.
The Domestic Violence Act and the said situation cannot said to have been intended by the Legislature.
Therefore, the Court cannot overturn the legislative wisdom to hold that a ‘monetary relief’, such as
payment of maintenance, if disobeyed, the same also would attract a significant penalty under Section
31 of the Domestic Violence Act, treating the same as breach of ‘protection order’ or ‘interim protection
order’. Therefore, it is held that the penalty provided under Section 31 of the Domestic Violence Act
would attract only for breach of protection orders passed under Section 18 of the Domestic Violence
Act and the same would not apply to maintenance orders under Section 20 of the Act.
—————
30 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Surendra Kumar versus The State of Jharkhand [2022 LiveLaw (Jha) 24]
Point(s) to note: Section 31; Penalty for breach of protection order
Taking Cognizance and Sentencing Accused the Same Day Is Unknown Procedure of Law
Section 31 of the Act provides for penalty for breach of protection order by the respondent. Section 31
of the Act is clear that this verse can be invoked whenever an order of protection is breached.
Sub-clause (3) provides the Magistrate to frame charge under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code or
any other provision of that the Indian Penal Code or the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, in case the facts
disclose the commission of an offence under those provisions.
Cognizance taken and the petitioner was found guilty under Section 31 of the Act and also sentenced
on the same day is unknown to the judicial procedure.
—————
Ravneet Kaur versus Prithpal Singh Dhingra [2022 LiveLaw (Del) 151]
Point(s) to note: Section 19; Right of residence; Civil proceedings
Right of Residence under Section 19
Where the parties are residing is a flat, having only three bedrooms and a drawing room, and the
appellant is in possession of a room in the said flat, then considering that there are various complaints
filed by them against each other; their relations being not cordial, would it in such circumstances, be
appropriate for them to stay together and fight every minute of their existence.
The right of residence under Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act is not an indefeasible right of
residence in a shared household, especially, when the daughter-in-law is pitted against the aged
father-in-law and mother-in-law. In this case, both being senior citizens aged about 74 and 69 years
and being in the evening of their life, are entitled to live peacefully and not to be haunted by the
marital discord between their son and daughter-in-law.
The pendency of proceedings under the Act of 2005 or any order interim or final passed under the
Domestic Violence Act under Section 19 regarding the right of residence is not an embargo for initiating
or continuing any civil proceedings, which relate to the subject matter of order interim or final passed
in proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The judgement or order of the criminal court
granting an interim or final relief under Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, are relevant
within the meaning of Section 43 of the Evidence Act and can be referred to and looked into by the
civil court. A civil court is to determine the issues in civil proceedings on the basis of evidence, which
has been led by the parties before the civil court.
—————

Practice Questions
1. What is the meaning of ‘Economic Abuse’ 3. A woman, during her live-in relationship
under the Protection of Women from with a man, was subjected to domestic
violence. Can such women get remedy under
Domestic Violence Act, 2005? [Rajasthan
the Protection of Women from Domestic
Judicial Services Mains Examination, 2018] Violence Act, of 2005? [Rajasthan Judicial
2. Explain in short the definition of ‘Domestic Services Mains Examination, 2017]

Violence’ under the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. [Rajasthan
Judicial Services Mains Examination, 2017]
4. What does ‘monetary relief’ mean under
the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005? [Rajasthan Judicial
Services Mains Examination, 2016]

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 31

 5. When a magistrate may conduct proceedings
in camera under the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005? [Rajasthan
Judicial Services Mains Examination, 2016]
6. Which of the ‘abuses’ are included within
‘domestic violence’ under the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005? [Rajasthan Judicial Services Mains
Examination, 2013-2014]
7. What are the provisions related
compensation and monetary reliefs to the
aggrieved person under the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005? [Rajasthan Judicial Services Mains
Examination, 2013-2014]
8. Which court is competent to entertain a
complaint of domestic violence? [Rajasthan
Judicial Services Mains Examination, 2011]
9. What will be the consequences if the
protection order issued by the court against
domestic violence is beached by the
to respondent? [Rajasthan Judicial Services
Mains Examination, 2011]

Solved Questions

Q. What is the meaning of ‘Economic Abuse’ under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005?
Ans. Economic Abuse
Sub-section (iv) of Section 3 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 deals with
the term ‘Economic Abuse’. It includes—(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to
which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a
court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited
to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly
or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and
maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables,
shares, securities, bonds, and the like, or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest
or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the
aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by the
aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is
entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household.
The expression ‘economic abuse’ as it has been defined in Section 3(iv) of the said Act has a large
canvas. The apex court in the case of Aishwarya Atul Pusalkar (2020), alienating an immovable asset to
defeat the right of a victim lady under the said Act can constitute domestic violence, coming, inter-alia,
within the ambit of the expression ‘economic abuse’ under Section 3(iv) of 2005 Act.
As per the definition of the term ‘domestic violence’, economic abuse shall also constitute domestic
violence. For example, ‘for the wife’, maintenance paid by way of the maintenance amount payable
by the husband is a financial resource for her. Similarly, the denial of household necessities to the
wife is also an economic abuse. The husband is bound to maintain the wife. If he neglects or fails to
maintain, the wife is deprived of her financial resources to maintain herself and to meet her household
necessities. Denial of either of these would amount to economic abuse. Hence, such economic abuse
will amount to domestic violence.

32 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Q. What does ‘monetary relief’ mean under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
Ans. Monetary Relief
The term ‘monetary relief’ is defined in Section 2(k) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005. Monetary relief means the compensation that the Magistrate may order the respondent to
pay to the aggrieved person, at any stage during the hearing of an application seeking any relief under
this Act, to meet the expenses incurred and the losses suffered by the aggrieved person as a result of
the domestic violence.
Aggrieved Person
The term ‘aggrieved’ is defined in Section 2(a) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005. Aggrieved person means any woman, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the
respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.
Who Is Entitled to Monetary Relief?
Under Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to get an order for
monetary relief, the claimant should be an aggrieved person as a result of domestic violence. The term
‘domestic violence’ is defined in Section 2(g) of the Act, which states that domestic violence has the
same meaning as assigned to it in Section 3 of the Act.
Section 20 of the Act deals with the grant of monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and the
losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of domestic
violence.
The wife, who is the victim of domestic violence, is entitled to monetary relief under Section 20 of the
Act. Monetary relief should be to meet the expenses incurred and the loss suffered by the aggrieved
as a result of the domestic violence. The loss suffered is nothing but the loss of financial resources to
be paid by the husband towards her maintenance. Thus, if the husband neglects the wife or refuses
to maintain her, the said act of the husband surely amounts to domestic violence, and therefore, the
aggrieved wife is entitled to monetary relief and such monetary relief may include but is not limited to
the maintenance for the wife as well as to her children. The monetary relief paid by way of maintenance
can be an order under Section 125 of the Code, which is evident from a plain reading of Section 20(1)(d)
of the Act. Thus, it is clear that a wife, who has suffered domestic violence by the act of the husband
in neglecting or refusing to maintain her is entitled to approach the Judicial Magistrate seeking an
order under Section 125 of CrPC, which itself is a monetary relief under Section 20 of the Act. Any such
maintenance order made under Section 20 of the Act is appealable to the Court of Sessions under
Section 29 of the Act.

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 33