A Strategy of Denial for the Western Pacific Proceedings - March 2023 Vol. 14931,441.

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A Strategy of Denial for the Western

Pacific
China aspires to dominate the Indo-Pacific region—the impact of
which would dramatically undermine Americans’ security,
freedom, and prosperity. The only workable strategy is to deny
China this goal. The naval services will play a central role.

By Elbridge Colby
March 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/3/1,441

THE AMERICAN SEA POWER PROJECT VIEW ISSUE

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The primary threat to core U.S. interests is that China could dominate
Asia, and from that position atop more than half the global economy,
undermine Americans’ prosperity, freedom, and even security. This is not
a merely speculative fear. Beijing is pursuing regional hegemony over
Asia, and if successful, it will very likely pursue the kind of global
preeminence that would enable it to directly intervene in and exercise a
domineering influence over Americans’ lives.

As a result, nothing else in the

international system is as
fundamentally dangerous to U.S.
interests as Chinese hegemony
over Asia. Accordingly, U.S. policy
must prioritize avoiding that
outcome, but must do so in ways
that correlate the risks and costs
the American people incur in
doing so with the stakes, which are vital but not genuinely existential. In
practice, this requires working together with Asian states in an
antihegemonic coalition focused on denying Beijing dominance over
the region.

Contrary to some commentary that suggests the military dimension in

this dynamic is not that important, the U.S. military’s role in this strategy
is central. This is because Beijing will likely not be able to dominate Asia
without resorting to military force. While China has enormous and
growing economic and other nonmilitary forms of influence, it is finding
it difficult to use its leverage to get neighboring countries to accept
what would essentially be a tributary relationship. Its efforts to do so
have largely backfired—as demonstrated in places such as Australia,
India, Japan, and Taiwan—and an increasingly aggressive China’s
standing (as reflected in global polling) has declined precipitously.1

The bad news is China has another option: military force. Unlike
economic sanctions, decisive and direct military force can compel other
countries to do things they really do not want to do.
Coalition: The Center of Gravity
If China can gain sufficient military advantage over its neighbors, it may
convince them to accept its hegemony given the plausible alternatives
they will face. And the best way for Beijing to operationalize such
advantage is not to fight all its potential opponents at once, but to
pursue a focused and sequential strategy against the antihegemonic
coalition arraying against it, seeking to pick it apart or short-circuit it.

The USS Annapolis (SSN-760) loads a Mk 67 sub-launched mobile mine in Apra Harbor, Guam, in
May 2022. Naval mines would contribute directly to a defense of Taiwan by denying the PLA Navy
sea control and the ability to project power across the Taiwan Strait. U.S. Navy

The key for Beijing is to strike at the coalition’s center of gravity:

perceptions of Washington’s willingness to come to the stout defense of
those to which it has committed. Only if they believe Washington can
and will stand with them will Asian countries judge it prudent to take
the risks necessary to check Beijing’s ambitions. If they do not have this
confidence, they will fear being isolated and punished by China and
thus will likely cut a deal with Beijing. If Beijing can pick off enough
countries in this fashion, it could achieve regional hegemony without
having to fight World War III. Indeed, given how sensitive Asian
countries are to China’s strength and how lucrative it is to be in its good
graces, Beijing may not have to fight many—or even any—wars to attain
regional dominance.

A Denial Defense
To prevent this, Washington needs to ensure an effective denial defense
along the first island chain, one that includes Taiwan within its
perimeter. Denial defense is a military strategy derived from the nation’s
geopolitical goal, which is to provide sufficient defense for our allies that
they believe it prudent to stand up to China together with us—and thus
prevent Chinese domination of Asia. If the United States can succeed in
this military strategy, the coalition should stand strong and resist
attempts by Beijing to crack it apart. Even better, Beijing might see this
strength and never try to break it apart in the first place.

Taiwan plays an especially salient role in this strategy. Washington’s

credibility in Asia is, practically speaking, linked to Taiwan’s defense. If
Beijing could take Taiwan, it would break out of the first island chain
that currently constrains its military power projection. As the recent
Congressional Research Service report to Congress on the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) points out, China’s “military strategy focuses
primarily on preparing for a conflict involving the United States over
Taiwan.” The report also highlights the PLA Navy’s 340-ship fleet, its air
forces with several hundred fourth-generation fighters, and a large,
advanced conventional missile force.2 Thus, if the United States and its
allies can prevent China from subordinating Taiwan, they can protect
other U.S. allies in Asia, enabling the coalition to stand strong, checking
Beijing’s ambition to regional hegemony.

In practical terms, a denial defense strategy generates a minimum

military standard of being able to prevent China from seizing and
holding the key territory of our allies—essentially, the core political and
economic areas of a country. If China cannot seize and hold these areas,
it will not be able to bring enough coercive pressure on a resolute ally to
abandon the coalition. History and logic indicate that most countries are
prepared to hold on even in the face of bombardment, blockade, and
harassment if it is a matter of their independence and autonomy,
especially if they believe relief will arrive. Crucially, this creates a need for
a forward defense for U.S. allies against China.

Alternative Strategies Will Not Work

Alternative U.S. and allied
strategies will not work or will, if
attempted, result in costs grossly
out of proportion to the stakes for
the American people. For example,
relying on the threat of large-scale
first use of nuclear weapons to
defeat a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan or other allies is simply not
credible; Beijing is unlikely to A U.S. Marine sights his weapon in deep jungle
believe Washington would follow vegetation during an exercise in Japan. The
Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 efforts are
through. And if the United States rightly focused on capabilities that will be
brought to bear in a denial strategy. U.S. Marine
did, China could respond with a
Corps
nuclear attack that would leave
the United States devastated, without having reversed China’s gains—
hardly a good strategy.
Neither would a strategy relying primarily on cost imposition or
horizontal escalation be likely to work. Such strategies would emphasize
inflicting costs on China, for instance through measures such as
blockades and attacks on Chinese interests beyond the first island chain,
with the goal of persuading Beijing to relent. To be clear, such measures
could be essential or useful elements alongside a denial defense, but
not as the primary line of effort for the U.S. and allied militaries.

Horizontal escalation is unlikely to work because Beijing almost certainly

would prize victory over Taiwan and in the first island chain over its
interests in places such as South Asia, the Middle East, or Latin America.
A blockade-reliant strategy is also unlikely to work for several reasons.
Militarily, if the United States and its allies do not contest China forward,
the PLA could adapt to challenge a distant blockade, negating the
strategy over time. Moreover, a strategy relying on blockade would
essentially allow China to assault U.S. allies in the western Pacific at will,
increasing the chances they would fold and that the coalition—the
center of gravity for Washington’s overall strategy—would fail.

Even if effectively implemented, a blockade is unlikely to work as a

primary victory mechanism. China has enormous economic capacity
and could weather much of the effects of an embargo; indeed, it
appears to be strengthening its ability to do so through measures such
as dual circulation.3 At the same time, Beijing could reduce the efficacy
of such an effort by exploiting sympathetic or profiteering third parties,
ranging from Russia through the Middle East and even to parts of
Europe. Further, China’s famously strong nationalism will make it willing
to put up with a lot of pain to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan.

Finally, full-scale economic warfare against China is a poor strategy for

the United States because it does not credibly match the demands of
the military strategy with the stakes for the American people. Such an
action would be met with a comparable response from Beijing, with
devastating consequences for Americans’ livelihoods. Moreover, rather
than providing a clear end point and set of escalation boundaries, such
a strategy would turn the war into a contest in pain tolerance, and it is
highly unlikely that the United States would be more prepared to prevail
in such a contest with China over Taiwan and the western Pacific.
 A Chinese J-15 fighter prepares to land on board the aircraft carrier Liaoning during flight
operations in December 2021. A denial defense strategy would require containing or sinking PLAN
units inside the first island chain. Xinhua/Alamy

Many navalists, however, find horizontal or cost-infliction strategies

appealing. To advocates of these strategies, navies and their associated
forces offer attributes such as global scale, mobility, and the ability to
threaten maritime commerce, so why not shape national strategies
based on those attributes? But this is the wrong way to approach the
problem. The military must conform to the strategy the nation needs,
not the other way around. And the strategy the nation needs is a
forward denial defense that can prevent China from subordinating U.S.
allies along the first island chain in ways that keep the costs and risks to
American citizens at a level proportionate to the stakes at issue. If the
U.S. military is not so shaped, then it needs to adapt, even if that
requires dramatic change.

It is important to emphasize, though, that a forward denial defense is

not a static, unimaginative, or fixed defense. It is about meeting a
standard—denying China’s ability to subordinate a U.S. ally—not
prescribing how to do it. Indeed, forward denial defense is consistent
with unorthodox, imaginative, and nonlinear forms of military action
and force structure, so long as they materially and efficiently contribute
to the goal. It is consistent with any number of different approaches to
military operations: high-tech and low-tech; at sea, in the air, space, and
cyberspace, and on the ground; at long-range and short. If a naval mine
meets the standard better than a long-range hypersonic missile, so be it.
But the reverse is true, too: If a new approach is required to make a
denial defense work, even at the expense of treasured old platforms and
ways of operating, so must it be.

Implications for the Navy and Marine Corps

A denial defense strategy will have far-reaching implications for the U.S.
Navy and Marine Corps.
First, it necessitates prioritizing
China not in some generic sense,
but by revamping the U.S. Sea
Services to be able to shoulder
much of a forward denial defense
along the first island chain. This is
especially important because the
western Pacific and the strategic
depth to its rear (from the U.S.
perspective) are maritime Responsibility for a denial defense of Taiwan will
be shouldered in large part by the U.S. Navy and
environments. Naval forces are Marine Corps. Here, Chief of Naval Operations
thus critical—at the front lines, in Admiral Michael Gilday and Marine Corps
Commandant General David Berger testify before
depth, and in supporting the fight. the House Armed Services Committee in May
2022. U.S. Navy (Sean Castellano)
The Marine Corps is laudably
adapting to this reality with Force
Design 2030, which specifically seeks to reshape the force to meet the
looming threat from China and is consistent with a denial defense
strategy. In particular, Force Design 2030, if realized, would provide a
strong and resilient forward-deployed blunt layer—one that would
present military and political challenges to Beijing while also reinforcing
allied confidence in U.S. strength and staying power. That said, given the
scale of the China challenge, the Sea Services must work to integrate
their forces, posture, plans, and vision with the Air Force, Army, Space
Force, and key allies, especially Australia, Japan, and Taiwan. Given
China’s enormous size and power, there is simply not enough material
advantage for unnecessary duplication or unlinked efforts.

Moreover, this thoroughgoing prioritization must be carried through

immediately in every part of the Navy and Marine Corps. People often
say China is a long-term problem. But this is misleading. China is a long-
term problem only if we can deter or defeat it in the short term. It is like
acute heart disease: A patient is lucky if he can make it a long-term
problem. And achieving that often requires urgent, drastic steps, such as
having a stent put in, before concentrating on longer-term measures
such as changing one’s diet or exercise habits. Similarly, the United
States must ensure the security of its position in Asia in the near-term,
not simply prepare for long-term strategic competition. To qualify for
the marathon, we must first sprint.

And there are multiple reasons Beijing might strike in this decade.4 The
most pressing is the “Shugart Window”—the assessment that China
may judge the 2020s to be its best opportunity to retake Taiwan in
terms of relative military advantage over time.5 Others point to Xi
Jinping’s own personal calculus and his apparent desire to solve the
Taiwan problem during his leadership tenure. Still others suggest
China’s economy may decline, increasing Beijing’s incentive to act
before it weakens. In any case, Beijing can now clearly see that a
coalition is coalescing against it and may judge that its future economic
growth and security are in question if it does not act. This fear is not
mere speculation. Rather, an increasing chorus of senior Biden
administration officials and military officers have stated that Beijing has
moved up its timeline to address the Taiwan issue, that overwhelming
force is Beijing’s best strategy, and that an invasion is a distinct threat.6

These ominous warnings rule out the Sea Services taking a knee to
focus exclusively on modernization. This might have been a reasonable
position ten years ago, when Beijing could not hope to take Taiwan. It no
longer is now that Taiwan’s defensibility is increasingly in question. The
United States needs an all-hands-on-deck effort to ensure its military is
ready now.

But the Sea Services also must modernize for the future. The United
States cannot succeed in the near term merely to set itself up for failure
in the longer term. Accordingly, the U.S. military must ensure the
readiness to take on China now and modernize for the future fight at
the same time. This modernization effort will require urgency on the
part of the defense establishment, given the long lead times needed to
bring about changes in force structure and posture.

Priorities
It is important to be clear about what prioritizing a denial defense
against China means. It means not taking chances nor cutting it close.
To the contrary, it will require extra effort and, as necessary, resources, to
ensure a workable denial defense. To continue the earlier metaphor, just
as someone at risk of acute heart disease should take multiple
precautions to avoid heart failure, the Sea Services must build
appropriate redundancy into their plans, posture, and concepts to guard
against failure in the nation’s most important strategic priority.
 A denial defense strategy also means helping Taiwan defend itself. Here, Taiwan military forces
conduct live-fire training during Exercise Han Kuang in 2019.

In part, this challenge is a function of time. Because the threat is already

upon us, the Sea Services must ensure they can employ a forward denial
defense of Taiwan both in the short and long term. It is also a function of
uncertainty around concepts of operations, technology, and allied
decision-making. In simple terms, the United States cannot afford to bet
its future on one approach to deterring or defeating China. It cannot
have single points of failure. It requires strategic redundancy—more
than one way to contribute materially to a denial defense.

This means the Department of Defense should not bet solely on either
exquisite new technologies or only the tried and true. The former, as in
the examples of the DDG-1000–class destroyers, the littoral combat
ships, and the Army’s Future Combat System, risks programmatic
failure. But failing to exploit new technologies and concepts of operation
risks the Sea Services being outpaced by an advancing PLA that is
building not just a large force but also a cutting-edge one.

Similarly, the Sea Services should not bet entirely on either a long-range
force operating largely from outside PLA striking range or solely on
stand-in forces. The former may not live up to expectations in the event
of war and may risk allied defection if it undermines confidence in U.S.
resolve, while the latter may be too vulnerable to attack within the
densest parts of Beijing’s strike envelope. Accordingly, the Navy and
Marine Corps must pursue them together, both to guard against
programmatic and operational failure and to present greater military
difficulties and strategic dilemmas for Beijing and the PLA.

What should be deprioritized, then, is almost everything else (save the

nuclear deterrent). This includes naval operations and posture in
theaters other than Asia, including Europe and the Middle East, as well
as capacity and presence for its own sake rather than warfighting
efficacy. The basic point is that U.S. naval forces should prepare to
mount an effective and politically credible denial defense of Taiwan,
along with the nuclear deterrent needed to back it up. Everything else
should be scaled down, pushed to the back, and, if need be, eliminated.
This includes symbolic or assurance-oriented presence operations not
connected to a robust blunt layer, as former Deputy Secretary of
Defense Bob Work has compellingly argued.7

The reason for all this stems from a simple proposition: The main
purpose of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps is to fight and win the
nation’s most important wars at a reasonable cost to the American
people—not policing the sea lanes, showing the flag, or “facilitating—or
deranging international trade.”8 By far the most significant threat to
Americans’ prosperity, freedom, and security is China dominating Asia
and from that position, the global economy. The Navy and the Marine
Corps ought to be clear that their overriding responsibility lies in
preventing this baleful outcome through a denial defense along the first
island chain, and all other missions unconnected to this goal must take
a back seat to that.

The Sea Services must now be laser focused on this core task to make
the best use of the enormous resources the American people allocate to
defense, as the Marine Corps is so commendably doing. Americans
already spend a far greater proportion of their wealth on defense than
almost any of their allies. It is therefore incumbent on the defense
establishment to make the best use of that money as possible.

At the end of the day, this agenda will require more money. Our allies do
need to spend more, but they will not be able to match China alone. The
simple fact is the United States will need to spend more just to match
China’s buildup. But the American people are most likely to support
such an increase if they see the Navy and Marine Corps hyperfocused on
implementing a strategy of denial.

1. Laura Silver, Christine Huang, and Laura Clancy, “Negative Views of China Tied
to Critical Views of Its Policies on Human Rights,” Pew Research Center, 29 June
2022.

2. Caitlin Campbell, “China Primer: The People’s Liberation Army,” Congressional

Research Service, 21 December 2022.

3. “China’s ‘Dual-Circulation’ Strategy Means Relying Less on Foreigners,” The

Economist, 5 November 2020.

4. Mallory Shelbourne, “Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan in

‘Next Six Years,’” USNI News, 9 March 2021.

5. Thomas H. Shugart III, “Trends, Timelines, and Uncertainty: An Assessment of

the Military Balance in the Indo-Pacific,” testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, 17 March 2021.

6. Julia Mueller, “Blinken: China’s Plans to Annex Taiwan Moving ‘On a Much
Faster Timeline,’” The Hill, 18 October 2022.

7. The Honorable Robert O. Work, “A Slavish Devotion to Forward Presence Has

Nearly Broken the U.S. Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 147, no. 12
(December 2021).

8. Nicholas Lambert, “What Is a Navy For?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 147,
no. 4 (April 2021).
 Elbridge Colby
Mr. Colby is a principal at the Marathon Initiative. As Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force
Development, he served as the lead official in the development of
the 2018 National Defense Strategy. He is the author of The
Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power
Conflict (Yale University Press, 2021).

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