1.

Trust
and
understanding
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
Chapter
5
Reaching
a
New
Level
The
——
Sino-
Soviet
Alliance
in
All-
round
Cooperation
in
the
War
3.
Sino-
Soviet
relations
face
the
test
of
war
2.
Mao
Zedong
was
forced
to
make
up
his
mind
1.
Stalin
shifted
responsibility
to
Mao
Zedong
Chapter
Four
Across
the
Yalu
River
The
——
Sino-
Soviet
Alliance
and
China’s
Decision
to
Send
Troops
Korea
3.
Conditions
for
Decision-
Making:
Positioning
for
U.S.
and
Chinese
Responses
2.
Motivation
for
Decision-
Making:
Soviet
Goals
in
Korea
1.
Decision
premise:
the
escalation
of
conflict
on
the
Korean
peninsula
Chapter
Three
Crossing
the
38th
Parallel
Stalin's
——
Thoughts
on
the
International
Situation
in
Northeast
Asia
3.
The
dialogue
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
2.
Liu
Shaoqi's
secret
visit
to
Moscow
1.
Mikoyan
quietly
came
to
Xibaipo
Chapter
Two
Towards
Moscow
The
——
Foundation,
Goals,
and
Conditions
of
the
Sino-
Soviet
Alliance
3.
Basis
for
the
transition
of
Soviet
Union’s
China
policy
2.
Soviet
Union's
strategy
and
policy
on
the
Korean
Peninsula
1.
The
goals
and
evolution
of
Stalin's
foreign
policy
Chapter
One
Revisiting
the
Far
East
Dream
S
—
Far
East
Policy
and
the
Origin
of
Sino-
Soviet
Alliance
oviet
The
introduction
examines
the
history
of
the
Korean
War
from
the
perspective
of
Sino-
Soviet
relations
Author
Introduction
Table
of
contents
by
Shen
Zhihua
"Mao
Zedong,
Stalin
and
the
Korean
War"
Machine Translated by Google
 Comrade
Shen
Zhihua's
masterpiece
"Mao
Zedong,
Stalin
and
the
Korean
War"
will
be
published
soon,
and
Iwill
request
the
order.
Ihave
no
special
knowledge
on
the
issues
studied
in
this
book,
and
Icannot
comment
on
the
specific
arguments
in
the
book,
but
Iam
deeply
impressed
after
reading
it,
so
Iwould
like
to
make
some
comments
from
the
perspective
of
historical
methodology
for
readers'
reference.
Qi
Shirong
sequence
Shen
Zhihua
was
born
in
Beijing
in
April
1950.
He
enlisted
in
the
army
after
graduating
high
from
junior
school.
After
being
demobilized
from
the
army,
he
was
assigned
to
Beijing
Shijingshan
Power
Plant.
In
the
spring
of
1976,
he
was
arrested
by
the
Public
Security
Bureau
for
his
dissatisfaction
with
Jiang
Qing,
Zhang
Chunqiao
and
others.
He
was
rehabilitated
in
November
1977,
and
was
transferred
to
the
Propaganda
Department
of
the
Political
Department
of
the
Beijing
Electric
Power
Administration
Bureau
to
be
in
charge
of
publishing
"Beijing
Electric
Power
News"
"China
Electric
Power
News").
In
May
1979,
he
was
admitted
to
the
Graduate
School
of
Chinese
Academy
Social
Sciences,
majoring
in
modern
world
history.
In
1982,
he
graduated
from
the
World
History
Major
(Master)
of
the
Graduate
School
of
the
Chinese
Academy
of
Social
Sciences.
From
the
mid-1980s
to
early
1990s,
he
went
into
business.
In
1991,
he
(now
established
a
folk
history
research
institution
in
Beijing,
and
set
up
the
"Oriental
History
Research
and
Publishing
Fund"
under
the
Chinese
Historical
Society.
On
the
one
hand,
he
funded
the
publication
of
monographs
on
history
and
other
academic
activities
(more
than
70
monographs
on
history
have
been
funded),
and
on
the
other
hand,
he
continued
to
work
on
Research
on
the
history
of
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
history
of
Sino-
Soviet
relations.
In
1996,
he
was
hired
as
a
special
researcher
by
the
Institute
of
Contemporary
Chinese
History,
Chinese
Academy
of
Social
Sciences;
in
1997,
he
was
elected
as
a
director
of
the
Chinese
History
Society;
in
1998,
he
was
hired
as
a
part-
time
researcher
by
the
History
Department
of
Peking
University,
and
gave
lectures
to
graduate
students;
in
2000,
he
was
hired
as
a
part-
time
researcher
by
Renmin
University
of
China
Professor,
lectures
for
graduate
students;
In
2001,
he
was
hired
as
a
part-
time
research
by
the
Institute
of
Asia-
Pacific
Studies
of
the
Chinese
Academ
of
Social
Science
and
an
honorar
researc
by
the
Institut
of
Conte
Chines
Cultur
of
the
Chine
Univer
of
Hong
Kong.
About
the
Author
Simplified
Chinese
version
postscript
postscript
Remaining
Discussion
VII
The
Political
Considerations
of
Chinese
and
Soviet
Leaders
on
the
Korean
Armistice
Remaining
Discussion
6
The
State
of
Soviet
Economic
Aid
to
China
from
1950
to
1953
Archival
——
Materials
from
China
and
Russia
Remaining
Discussion
5:
A
Historical
Investigation
of
Soviet
Loans
to
China
in
the
1950s
Remaining
Discussion
4
The
Soviet
Military
Adviser
in
China
During
the
Korean
War
Remaining
Discussion
III
on
the
Pros
and
Cons
of
China’s
Decision
to
Send
Troops
North
Korea
Review
——
and
Reflection
on
the
History
of
the
Korean
War
50
Years
Later
On
the
Soviet
Air
Force
in
the
Second
War
to
Resist
US
Aggression
and
Aid
Korea
Remaining
Discussion
1:
The
Conflict
of
Interests
and
Their
Solutions
in
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
Negotiations
3.
Sino-
Soviet
coordination
and
unity
on
the
battlefield
2.
Soviet
aid
and
support
to
China
Machine Translated by Google
 During
this
period,
the
research
works
on
the
Korean
War
in
the
western
historian
circle
increased
rapidly.
However,
the
research
on
the
history
of
the
Korean
War
during
this
period
was
mainly
based
on
American
archives,
and
the
main
body
of
Korean
War
research
was
also
in
the
United
States.
Therefore,
a
research
group
centered
on
the
United
States
was
naturally
formed.
Among
Western
researchers,
no
matter
what
school
of
thought
they
are
concerned
with
and
the
starting
point
of
their
research
is
mostly
centered
on
U.S.
policy.
In
the
1950s
and
1960s
when
the
Cold
War
intensified,
the
traditional
school
emerged;
in
the
1970s,
when
the
anti-
war
upsurge
appeared
in
the
United
States,
the
revisionist
school
emerged;
and
in
the
1990s,
when
the
Cold
War
ended,
the
post-
revisionist
school
emerged.
This
situation
also
illustrates
the
central
position
of
the
United
States
in
the
field
of
cold
war
and
Korean
war
history
research
at
that
time.
Even
when
itcomes
to
issues
concerning
the
Korean
War
and
Sino-
Soviet
relations,
most
of
the
studies
focus
on
U.S.
policy
toward
the
Soviet
Union
and
toward
China.
In
the
late
1970s,
there
was
a
climax
of
research
on
the
Korean
War.
First,
the
International
Relations
Research
Center
of
the
Truman
Library
in
the
United
States
held
a
large-
scale
seminar
on
the
occasion
of
25th
anniversary
of
the
Korean
War.
In
addition
to
a
group
of
historians,
there
were
also
many
soldiers
and
politicians
who
participated
in
American
decision-
making
at
that
time,
such
as
the
United
Nations
Army.
Commander-
in-
Chief
Matthew
B.
Ridgway,
U.S.
Deputy
Ambassador
to
the
United
Nations
Ernest
A.
Gross,
Special
Advisor
to
President
Harry
S.
Truman
Avril
Harriman
(Averell
W.
Harriman),
U.S.
Army
Chief
of
Staff
Lawton
Collins
(J.
Lawton
Collins),
U.S.
Ambassador
to
South
Korea
John
Muccio
(John
J.
Muccio)
and
so
on.
After
the
meeting,
he
edited
and
published
the
book
"The
Korean
War:
Observations
25
Years
Later",
which
aroused
people's
renewed
attention
and
interest
in
the
study
of
Korean
War.
In
1976
the
U.S.
Department
of
State
edited
a
multivolume
collection
of
documents,
Foreign
Documents
of
the
United
States
(FRUS),
which
began
publishing
U.S.
archives
on
the
Korean
conflict,
and
in
1979
the
History
Department
of
the
U.S.
Joint
Chiefs
of
Staff
published
two
volumes
describing
U.S.
military
policy
on
North
Korea
book.
At
that
time,
the
British
archives
were
also
released
one
after
another.
By
1984,
all
the
Korean
War-
era
volumes
of
"American
Diplomatic
Papers"
had
been
published.
So,
is
there
any
direct
connection
between
these
two
successive
events,
that
is,
the
formation
of
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
and
the
origin
of
Korean
War?
What
is
the
relationship
between
the
two?
Since
outbreak
of
the
war
half
a
century
ago,
this
issue
has
always
been
the
focus
and
investigation
of
historians
in
the
study
of
Korean
War
and
the
history
of
the
Cold
War
in
Asia.
However,
due
to
the
lack
of
archival
documents
and
related
historical
materials,
before
the
1980s,
there
were
not
many
valuable
academic
works
on
this
topic.
In
1950,
two
events
occurred
in
the
course
of
world
history
that
had
a
major
impact
on
the
subsequent
development
of
the
international
situation
and
situation:
First,
after
Mao
Zedong
and
Zhou
Enlai
visited
Moscow
for
two
months,
the
New
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
made
a
statement
joint
on
February
14.
The
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship,
Alliance
and
Mutual
Assistance
was
signed
on
June
25;
second,
a
large-
scale
civil
war
broke
out
on
the
Korean
peninsula
on
June
25,
and
the
United
States
immediately
intervened
under
the
banner
of
the
United
Nations.
Formed
the
so-
called
Korean
War
in
later
history.
Examining
the
History
of
the
Korean
War
from
the
Angle
of
Sino-
Soviet
Relations
preface
Ihave
known
Comrade
Shen
Zhihua
more
than
20
years
ago.
At
that
time,
Ithought
he
was
a
young
man
who
was
eager
to
learn
and
think
deeply.
Now,
he
has
been
on
the
avenue
of
learning
for
a
long
time,
with
rich
writings
and
growing
maturity.
Gu
Tinglin,
a
great
Confucian
in
the
late
Ming
and
early
Qing
Dynasties,
said:
"What
you
achieved
in
the
past
is
not
enough
to
be
proud
of;
what
you
can
achieve
in
the
future
cannot
be
limited."
Ihope
Comrade
Shen
Zhihua
will
keep
Gu
Tinglin's
words
in
mind
and
continue
to
work
hard
climb
the
peak
of
historical
science.
Writing
historical
works
must
be
based
on
historical
materials,
collect
as
many
historical
materials
as
possible,
and
then
identify
them,
discard
the
false
and
preserve
the
true,
discard
dross
and
extract
the
essence,
and
on
this
basis
analyze
and
synthesize
the
historical
materials
to
form
the
author's
argument.
These
are
the
efforts
of
historians,
but
today
some
people
ignore
them
and
take
"shortcuts".
They
first
come
up
with
some
ideas
subjectively,
and
then
find
a
few
materials
to
"prove".
This
kind
of
article
seems
to
be
reasonable
and
well-
founded
at
first
glance,
but
ifyou
examine
itcarefully,
itwill
inevitably
be
full
of
flaws.
Comrade
Shen
Zhihua's
masterpiece
has
made
great
efforts
in
historical
materials.
He
consulted
the
archives
of
Soviet
Union,
the
United
States,
and
China,
interviewed
some
of
the
parties
involved,
and
read
a
large
number
of
memoirs,
diaries
and
other
first-
hand
historical
materials.
He
also
read
extensively
about
the
writings
of
his
contemporaries
and
absorbed
valuable
parts
of
them.
This
rigorous
academic
attitude
is
worthy
of
full
affirmation.
Machine Translated by Google
The
basis
for
further
pushing
the
study
of
Korean
War
in
the
international
academic
circle
to
a
climax
lies
in
the
emergence
of
a
large
number
of
the
latest
Russian
historical
materials.
In
the
early
1990s,
With
the
declassification
or
publication
of
these
important
documents,
anumber
of
research
results
using
the
latest
Chinese
materials
to
study
China’s
involvement
in
the
Korean
War
emerged
in
the
early
1990s.
Among
them,
the
main
works
in
China
include
Xu
Yan's
"The
First
Contest-
Historical
Review
and
Reflection
of
the
War
to
Resist
US
Aggression
and
Aid
Korea"
Radio
and
Television
Press,
1990),
and
Qi
Dexue's
"The
Inside
Story
of
the
Korean
War
Decision-
making"
University
Press,
1991)
Zhang
Xi's
"The
Sudden
Suspension
of
the
Chinese
People's
Volunteers
on
the
Eve
of
Entering
the
Court"
History
Research
Materials",
No.
1,
1993),
Li
Haiwen's
"When
did
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
decide
on
the
volunteer
army
(China
going
abroad
to
fight?"
"("Party
Documents"
No.
5,
1993),
Xiong
Huayuan's
"Zhou
Enlai's
Secret
,Visit
to
the
Soviet
Union
on
the
Eve
of
the
War
to
Resist
US
Aggression
and
Aid
Korea"
Documents"
(Liaoning
No.
3,
1994),
"Peng
("Party
Dehuai
and
Nie
Rongzhen
in
the
War
to
Resist
US
Aggression
and
Aid
Korea"
by
Wang
Yazhi
(History",
No.
1,
1994)
and
"Some
Situations
Before
"Military
and
After
Mao
Zedong's
Decision
to
Send
Troops
North
Korea"
Documents",
No.
6,
1995).
The
research
results
published
abroad
mainly
include
"China's
Decision
to
Participate
in
("Party
the
Korean
War:
Re-
examination
of
History"
by
Hao
Yufan
and
Zhai
Zhihai;
"Threat,
Confidence
and
Last
Chance
for
Peace"
by
Thomas
Christensen
(1992)
Michael
Hunt,
"Beijing
and
the
Korean
Crisis"
Goncharov,
Lewis,
Xue
Litai,
"Uncertain
Partners:
Stalin,
Mao
Zedong,
and
the
Korean
War"
The
Road
("Party
to
the
Korean
War:
The
Making
of
the
Sino-
American
Conflict"
Zhang
Shuguang's
"Mao
Zedong's
Military
Romanticism:
China
and
the
Korean
War,
1950-1953"
etc.
(1990)
; (1992);
(1993);
(1994),
(1995),
The
emergence
of
Chinese
literature
and
oral
historical
materials
has
not
only
promoted
the
research
of
domestic
scholars,
but
also
attracted
widespread
attention
in
the
international
historian
circle.
The
46
telegrams
in
"Mao
Zedong's
Manuscripts
Since
the
Founding
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China"
concerning
the
Chinese
leader's
decision
to
send
troops
North
Korea
were
translated
into
English
and
published
in
full
American
magazines.
The
International
History
Project
Bulletin
of
the
Cold
War
edited
and
published
by
the
American
Wilson
Center
for
International
Scholars
edited
and
published
more
Chinese
archival
documents
into
English
and
introduced
them
to
Western
scholars.
There
are
also
some
works
by
foreign
scholars
that
use
the
relevant
documents
published
by
China
as
appendices,
and
publish
the
full
text
or
excerpts
in
translation,
such
as
Thomas
Christensen's
paper
"Threats,
Guarantees,
and
Last
Chance
for
Peace:
Lessons
from
Mao
Zedong's
Telegrams
Regarding
the
Korean
War
",
especially
the
monograph
"Uncertain
Partners:
Stalin,
Mao
Zedong,
and
the
Korean
War"
by
Sergey
Goncharov,
John
Lewis,
and
Xue
Litai.
As
an
appendix,
the
book
includes
82
articles
on
Sino-
Soviet
relations
and
the
Korean
War
archives,
62
of
which
were
translated
from
"Mao
Zedong's
Manuscripts
Since
the
Founding
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China".
In
addition,
the
author
learned
that
Shi
Zhe's
memoir
"Beside
the
Giants
of
History",
which
has
important
historical
value,
has
been
translated
into
English
by
Chen
Jian,
a
Chinese
scholar
living
in
the
United
States,
and
will
be
published
in
the
United
States
soon.
At
the
same
time,
China
has
also
published
a
number
of
oral
history
materials.
Among
them,
Shi
Zhe's
memoir
"Beside
the
Giants
of
History",
Bo
Yibo's
"Review
of
Several
Major
Decisions
and
Events",
Wu
Xiuquan's
"Memories
and
Remembrance",
Du
Ping's
"At
the
Volunteer
Army
Headquarters",
Hong
Xuezhi's
"Memories
of
the
War
to
Resist
US
Aggression
and
Aid
Korea",
"Panmunjom
Negotiations"
by
Chai
Chengwen
and
Zhao
Yongtian,
"New
China's
Diplomatic
Situation--
Memoirs
of
Chinese
Diplomats"
edited
by
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs,
"Memories
of
Several
Major
Decisions
in
the
War
to
Resist
US
Aggression
and
Aid
Korea"
by
Lei
Yingfu,
Wu
Ruilin
"The
42nd
Army
in
the
War
to
Resist
US
Aggression
and
Aid
Korea"
and
so
on.
The
second
climax
of
research
on
the
Korean
War
appeared
in
the
late
1980s
and
early
1990s.
During
this
period,
China
successively
published
Volumes
1-4
of
"Mao
Zedong's
Manuscripts
Since
the
Founding
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China"
Volumes
15-18
of
"Selected
Documents
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China"
and
"Selected
Collection
of
Important
Documents
Since
the
Founding
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China".
Volumes
1-4
(1992-1993),
Volumes
5-6
of
Mao
Zedong's
Military
Works
(1993),
Mao
Zedong's
Diplomatic
Works
(1994),
and
Peng
Dehuai's
Military
Selected
Works
(1988)
"Selected
Works
of
Zhou
Enlai's
Diplomatic
Works"
"Selected
Collection
of
Economic
(1987-1990),
Archives
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China
from
1949
to
1952
(Comprehensive
Volume)"
(1992),
etc.
These,
and
subsequent
collections
of
literature,
published
a
large
number
of
Chinese
archives
on
the
Korean
War
and
Sino-
Soviet
relations
in
the
early
days
of
the
founding
People's
Republic
of
China.
In
addition,
alarge
number
of
original
archival
materials
,are
also
used
in
some
officially
published
research
works,
such
as
"The
History
(1990),
of
the
Chinese
People's
Volunteers'
War
to
Resist
US
Aggression
and
Aid
Korea"
compiled
by
the
Military
History
Research
Department
of
the
Academy
Military
Sciences
of
the
Chinese
People's
Liberation
Army
(1988),
"The
War
to
Resist
US
(1990),
Aggression
and
Aid
Korea"
edited
by
Tan
Jingqiao
"(1990),
"Biography
of
Peng
Dehuai"
edited
by
Wang
Yan
et
al.
(1993),
"Diplomatic
History
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China
(1949-1956)"
edited
by
Pei
Jianzhang
(1994),
especially
"Biography
of
Mao
Zedong"
edited
by
Jin
Chong
and
editor-
in-
chief
"(1996),
"Liu
Shaoqi's
Chronicle"
and
"Zhou
Enlai's
Chronicle
(1949-1976)"
compiled
by
the
Literature
Research
Office
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China,
etc. (1996)
(1997)
In
the
historical
research
of
the
Korean
War,
the
discussions
on
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
and
China’s
sending
troops
to
Korea
have
produced
many
academically
influential
and
valuable
research
results
only
in
recent
years.
The
reason
for
this
is
that
alarge
number
of
archival
documents
and
oral
history
materials
on
these
issues
as
the
basis
of
historical
research
began
to
be
published
in
the
world
late
1980s.
Machine Translated by Google
 This
research
boom
continued
until
2000,
which
coincided
with
the
50th
anniversary
of
the
outbreak
Korean
War.
Before
and
after,
archival
documents
and
research
results
related
to
the
Korean
War
emerged
in
an
endless
stream.
Important
historical
materials
on
China
include
official
publications
and
archival
documents,
as
well
reference
books
based
on
archival
materials.
As
for
Russian
archives,
apart
from
the
brief
introductions
made
by
Russian
scholars
in
professional
magazines,
they
are
mainly
106
military
archives
of
the
Soviet
Military
Advisory
Group
in
North
Korea
photocopied
and
published
by
the
Institute
of
Military
History
Compilation
of
the
Ministry
of
National
Defense
of
South
Korea.
In
addition,
in
the
process
of
collecting
and
organizing
Russian
archives
for
many
years,
the
author
has
aspecial
liking
for
the
documents
related
to
the
Korean
War.
In
order
to
allow
more
scholars
from
various
countries
who
can
use
Chinese
to
study
this
topic
About
the
Korean
War
The
memoirs
and
interviews
of
the
parties
published
in
Russia,
especially
the
declassification
and
dissemination
of
Russian
archives,
have
attracted
great
attention
from
scholars
in
Russia,
South
Korea,
the
United
States,
and
China,
there
have
been
anumber
of
discussions
on
the
history
of
the
Korean
War
using
Russian
archives
and
oral
history.
new
research
results.
Among
them
are
mainly
the
works
of
aforementioned
Russian
scholars
Volkognov,
Torkunov,
Mansholov,
Baganov,
etc.;
the
works
of
Korean
scholars
include
Park
Moon-
soo's
"Stalin's
Foreign
Policy
and
Korean
War:
Reexamination
of
History"
Park
Myung-
rim's
doctoral
dissertation
"The
Outbreak
and
Origins
of
the
Korean
War"
among
Western
scholars,
the
most
prominent
is
the
aforementioned
Wethersby
A
series
of
papers,
Jon
Halliday,
The
Soviet
Air
War
in
Korea
(1993),
William
Stecke,
The
Korean
War
in
International
History
(1995),
and
others.
Chinese
scholars
have
used
Russian
literature
to
study
the
Korean
War,
including
the
article
"Kim
IlSung
Stopped
Mao
Zedong's
Plan
(1994);
to
Attack
Taiwan"
published
by
Qing
Shi
(Yang
Kuisong)
in
the
July
1994
(1994),
issue
of
Hong
Kong's
"Ming
Pao
Monthly",
as
well
my
monographs
and
papers.
In
addition,
the
Center
for
North
Korean
Studies
of
Columbia
University
in
the
United
States
signed
an
academic
cooperation
agreement
with
the
Diplomatic
Academy
of
the
Russian
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
study
to
jointly
the
history
of
the
Korean
War,
thus
obtaining
a
batch
of
original
materials
declassified
by
Russia.
At
present,
the
center
is
cooperating
with
the
Woodrow
Wilson
International
Scholars
Research
Center
in
the
United
States
to
organize
and
translate
these
documents.
On
the
one
hand,
the
Wilson
Center
for
International
Scholars
provided
copies
of
these
documents
to
the
National
Security
Archives
of
the
United
States
and
stored
them
on
the
seventh
floor
of
Gelman
Library
at
George
Washington
University
for
the
use
of
researchers;
More
than
200
archives
were
translated
into
English
and
published
in
Issues
6-7
of
the
Cold
War
International
Relations
History
Project
Bulletin
in
1995/96.
At
the
same
time,
some
scholars
also
unearthed
a
lot
of
archival
materials
in
Russian
archives
through
their
own
efforts,
and
quoted
them
in
their
treatises
or
published
them
in
full.
Such
as
Catherine
Weathersby's
Soviet
Goals
in
Korea
and
the
Origins
of
Korean
War
(1945-1950):
New
Evidence
from
Russian
Archives
and
Soviet
Role
in
the
Early
Korean
War:
New
Documentary
Evidence
(1993
2010);
Dmitry
Volkognov's
Should
You
Be
Afraid
of
This?
(1993),
Vladimir
Petrov,
The
Role
of
the
USSR
in
the
Outbreak
of
Korean
War:
Secret
Documents
Declassified
(1994),
A.
V.
Torkunov
and
E.
P.
Ufimtsev,
New
Perspectives
on
the
Korean
Question
(1995);
Alexander
Mansholov,
Stalin,
Mao
Zedong,
Kim
Il-
sung
and
China's
Decision
to
Intervene
in
the
Korean
War,
September
16,
1950
to
October
15:
New
Evidence
from
Russian
Archives"
Yevgeny
Baganov:
"Policy
Analysis
of
the
Korean
War:
1949-1951"
etc. (1996);
(1996),
At
that
time,
Russian
archives
and
documents
that
had
been
closed
for
many
years
also
began
to
be
declassified
one
after
another.
Especially
on
the
eve
of
40th
anniversary
of
the
signing
Korean
War
Armistice
Agreement,
the
Russian
government
declassified
a
batch
of
archives
related
to
the
Korean
War
from
1949
to
1953,
including
Stalin’s
(JV
Stalin)
Correspondence
with
Kim
Ilsung,
between
Stalin
and
Mao
Zedong,
between
various
departments
of
the
Soviet
government,
and
with
their
representatives
in
Beijing
and
Pyongyang.
These
new
original
archival
materials
totaling
more
than
1,000
pages
come
from
the
Archives
of
President
of
the
Russian
Federation,
the
Archives
of
Foreign
Policy
of
the
Russian
Federation,
and
the
Military
Archives
of
the
Ministry
of
Defense
of
the
Russian
Federation.
In
June
1994,
President
Boris
Yeltsin
handed
over
215
Russian
files
related
to
the
Korean
War
to
the
visiting
South
Korean
President
Kim
Youngsam,
and
Baek
Juhyun
and
others
from
the
Eastern
European
Bureau
of
the
South
Korean
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
soon
reported
These
documents
were
compiled
into
the
"Summary
of
Korean
War
Documents"
in
Korean,
and
then
a
Chinese
version
of
this
summary
appeared
in
China.
Russia
began
to
publish
a
large
number
of
memoirs
and
interviews
about
the
truth
Korean
War,
including
former
senior
North
Korean
leaders
who
took
political
refuge
in
the
Soviet
Union,
such
as
Yoo
Songchol,
Minister
of
Operations
the
Korean
People's
Army,
Kang
Sangho,
Vice
Minister
of
the
Interior
Lee
Sangcho,
the
ambassador
to
Soviet
Union,
Im
Un,
secretary
of
the
Workers'
Party
of
Korea
Secretariat,
and
others,
as
well
Soviet
diplomats
and
military
personnel
who
participated
in
the
Korean
War,
such
as
the
ambassador
to
North
Korea
Shtykov
(TF
Shtykov),
MS
Kapitsa,
Deputy
Minister
of
Foreign
Affairs,
GALobov,
Commander
of
the
64th
Air
Defense
Group
Army,
G.
Il)
chief
consultant
Sozinov
(VDSozinov)
et
al.
,
Machine Translated by Google
Second,
the
concept
of
origin
the
Korean
War
should
be
defined
more
broadly.
In
the
past,
when
talking
about
the
origin
of
Korean
War,
most
people
only
analyzed
and
discussed
the
outbreak
of
a
large-
scale
military
conflict
between
North
and
South
Korea,
which
is
not
enough.
As
an
international
war,
the
Korean
War
was
essentially
a
war
between
China
(with
the
aid
and
support
of
the
Soviet
Union)
and
the
United
States
in
terms
of
its
development
process
and
final
outcome.
Although
the
U.S.
military
intervention
was
under
the
banner
of
the
United
Nations
Army,
and
China
formed
an
alliance
with
the
Soviet
Union
and
North
Korea,
from
the
judging
comprehensive
index
of
the
command
and
control
of
the
war
and
input
of
manpower
and
material
resources
by
the
two
combatants,
U.S.
and
the
China
both
dominated
the
war.
From
this
perspective,
the
entire
Korean
War
can
be
divided
into
five
stages:
the
first
stage
began
when
the
Korean
People’s
Army
crossed
the
38th
parallel
and
advanced
southward
on
a
large
scale;
the
second
stage
began
when
the
United
States
fully
intervened
in
the
Korean
conflict;
The
38th
Parallel
began
to
attack
North
Korea,
the
fourth
phase
began
when
China
sent
troops
into
North
Korea
and
fought
with
the
U.S.
Army,
and
the
fifth
phase
began
when
both
sides
ceased
fire
along
the
38th
Parallel
and
negotiated
an
armistice.
In
terms
of
time,
since
the
Korean
People's
Army
crossed
First,
in
discussions
of
the
origins
war,
concept
of
"first
shot"
is
often
used.
The
question
of
who
fired
the
"first
shot"
of
the
Korean
War
has
been
debated
for
decades,
with
no
resolution.
In
fact,
the
so-
called
"first
shot"
here
is
actually
not
important
to
historical
researchers,
because
in
fact,
itis
often
unclear
who
fired
the
first
shot
in
a
military
conflict.
The
attacker
often
induces
the
opponent
to
fire
first
shot,
and
such
cases
are
common
in
history.
Moreover,
before
the
outbreak
of
war
on
June
25,
military
conflicts
between
the
North
and
the
South
along
38th
parallel
had
occurred
for
more
than
ayear.
So,
among
these
thousands
of
firefights,
which
shot
is
the
"first
shot"?
Therefore,
there
is
absolutely
no
need
for
people
to
spend
alot
of
energy
trying
to
figure
out
who
fired
the
"first
shot".
The
crux
of
the
problem
lies
in
how
the
Korean
People's
Army's
overall
military
action
across
the
38th
parallel-
this
is
an
undoubted
historical
fact-
was
made,
no
matter
whether
this
military
action
was
an
active
offensive
or
a
The
result
of
being
forced
to
fight
back
has
made
this
war
one
of
the
most
important
events
in
contemporary
history,
and
ithas
also
become
the
starting
point
for
historians
to
study
this
event.
Otherwise,
even
ifthe
military
conflict
on
the
Korean
peninsula
continues
for
another
year,
itmay
not
become
the
center
of
world's
attention
and
the
focus
of
major
power
confrontation,
and
the
results
of
this
conflict
may
not
have
asignificant
impact
on
the
development
and
changes
of
the
world
pattern.
In
other
words,
what
are
the
conditions
and
preconditions
that
enabled
the
Korean
People’s
Army
to
cross
the
38th
parallel
in
a
large
scale
on
June
25,
1950,
and
what
is
the
international
background
of
Stalin’s
decision?
issues
that
should
be
given
special
attention
and
discussion
by
readers.
This
is
the
basis
of
the
analysis
and
discussion
in
this
book.
In
the
historical
study
of
Sino-
Soviet
relations
and
the
Korean
War,
there
are
always
various
opposing
and
divergent
views.
In
addition
to
the
influence
of
ideological
factors
and
the
limitation
of
original
materials,
there
is
also
aproblem
of
research
methods
and
concept
use.
Even
ifpeople
abandon
ideological
prejudices
and
master
a
large
number
of
historical
archives,
due
to
different
research
angles
and
starting
points,
or
the
concepts
used
and
their
meanings
are
different,
itis
often
easy
to
fall
into
unnecessary
disputes.
For
the
sake
of
discussion,
before
discussing
the
theme
of
this
book
torigin
—of
the
Korean
War
and
its
he
relationship
with
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance,
itis
necessary
to
make
some
explanations
on
the
research
methods
and
conceptual
definitions.
In
short,
as
a
large
number
of
Chinese
and
Russian
archival
materials
and
oral
historical
materials
have
been
released
to
the
world,
Beijing
and
Moscow
have
increasingly
attracted
the
attention
of
relevant
scholars
from
various
countries.
Now
that
an
international
academic
conference
on
the
history
of
the
Korean
War
is
being
held,
there
are
no
Chinese
and
Russian
scholars.
Participation
is
unthinkable.
The
multilateralization
of
archival
materials
has
also
led
to
the
internationalization
of
research
directions,
which
is
manifested
in
the
fact
that
interest
of
many
researchers
has
shifted
from
the
analysis
of
US
policy
in
the
Korean
War
to
the
study
of
China
and
the
Soviet
Union.
Many
American
scholars
have
broken
the
history
of
Western
diplomacy.
In
the
past,
boundaries
of
various
schools
thought
have
been
blurred.
More
importantly,
scholars
from
various
countries
have
studied
the
Korean
War
not
only
from
the
perspective
of
their
own
countries,
but
from
the
perspective
of
the
world
and
international
structures,
using
multilateral
archives
to
study
multilateral
issues.
This
is
undoubtedly
a
gratifying
phenomenon
in
the
study
of
Korean
War
history.
Against
this
background,
the
study
of
origin
the
Korean
War
from
the
perspective
of
Sino-
Soviet
relations
has
once
again
become
an
important
aspect
that
historians
pay
attention
to.
During
this
period,
there
were
many
relevant
monographs
published
in
China,
mainly
including
"The
Contest
of
Giants-
High-
Level
Decisions
and
Guidance
to
Resist
US
Aggression
and
Aid
Korea"
by
Qi
Dexue,
"Containing
China:
The
Korean
War
and
Sino-
US
Relations"
by
Lin
Limin,
and
"Mao
Zedong
and
China"
by
Pang
Zhizhi
and
Li
Jie.
Resisting
U.S.
Aggression
and
Aid
Korea,
and
History
of
the
War
to
Resist
U.S.
Aggression
and
Aid
Korea
compiled
by
the
Military
History
Research
Department
of
the
Academy
Military
Sciences,
and
many
more
academic
papers.
Foreign
scholars
have
also
published
many
new
academic
achievements,
and
have
shifted
their
research
focus
to
new
fields.
The
Chinese
translations
of
more
than
700
files
(including
attachments)
involved
in
the
war
were
edited
and
published
in
a
book
titled
"Korean
War:
Declassified
Documents
from
Russian
Archives"
volumes). (three
Machine Translated by Google
 Stalin's
foreign
policy
after
the
war
had
a
process
of
gradual
change
and
development
from
great
power
cooperation
to
bloc
confrontation.
For
the
Soviet
Union,
the
dividing
line
lay
in
its
response
to
the
Marshall
Plan.
However,
the
focus
of
confrontation
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
was
in
Europe.
When
the
Berlin
crisis
broke
out,
the
goal
of
Soviet
Union
in
Asia
was
still
to
maintain
the
sphere
of
influence
delineated
by
the
Yalta
system,
that
is,
to
be
satisfied
with
the
division
of
North
and
the
South
by
the
38th
parallel
on
the
Korean
peninsula.
In
China,
however,
the
focus
was
on
ensuring
the
rights
and
influence
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
Northeast.
The
research
ideas
and
narrative
structure
of
this
book
are
as
follows:
In
the
research,
this
book
makes
comprehensive
use
of
the
latest
archives
and
related
oral
historical
materials
released
by
China
and
Russia
so
far,
focusing
on
the
analysis
of
subjective
motives
and
objective
conditions
of
the
alliance
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union.
The
actual
results
and
objective
impact
of
the
alliance,
what
is
the
relationship
between
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
and
the
war
that
broke
out
in
North
Korea,
what
are
the
differences
in
the
policy
of
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
on
the
Korean
issue
after
the
alliance,
and
how
to
deal
with
the
danger
of
U.S.
military
crossing
the
38th
parallel.
The
considerations
and
countermeasures
adopted
by
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
as
the
allies,
when
and
how
Mao
Zedong
made
up
his
mind
to
send
Chinese
troops
to
fight
in
North
Korea,
and
how
China's
participation
in
the
Korean
War
had
an
impact
on
the
alliance
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union.
Thirdly,
ifthe
analysis
of
personal
psychology
and
thinking
of
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
occupies
a
very
important
position
in
the
study
of
Sino-
Soviet
relations
and
the
attitudes
policies
of
the
two
sides
toward
Korean
War,
then
neither
of
these
two
key
figures
left
their
personal
The
Memoirs
is
a
very
serious
shortcoming.
That
is
to
say,
in
addition
to
making
extensive
use
of
Chinese
and
Russian
archives
and
related
oral
historical
materials,
itis
also
necessary
to
rely
on
the
analysis
and
reasoning
of
researchers
on
many
issues.
When
this
book
analyzes
Stalin’s
motives
for
changing
his
policy
on
the
Korean
Peninsula
and
Mao
Zedong’s
considerations
on
sending
troops
to
North
Korea,
since
he
does
not
have
direct
archives
and
documents,
he
makes
subjective
inferences
on
the
basis
of
indirect
historical
materials
to
a
large
extent.
This
is
of
course
the
benevolent
see
benevolence,
and
the
wise
see
wisdom.
Secondly,
the
important
condition
for
decision-
making
on
international
relations
issues
is
the
grasp
of
external
information,
but
there
is
a
big
gap
between
the
relatively
complete
historical
environment
presented
to
historical
researchers
and
the
possibly
seriously
distorted
information
that
decision-
makers
had
at
that
time.
difference,
and
itis
very
important
to
recognize
this.
Because
the
decision-
maker
actually
thinks
and
makes
decisions
based
on
the
information
he
has,
so
ifthe
later
researchers
only
conduct
a
purely
rational
analysis
of
this
process,
they
lack
the
personality
and
environment
of
the
decision-
maker,
and
based
on
this
Ifwe
want
to
examine
the
way
of
thinking
formed
by
this
personality
and
environment,
this
kind
of
research
will
inevitably
encounter
major
obstacles.
First
of
all,
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin,
the
two
key
figures
who
are
the
subjects
of
this
study,
their
deepest
thoughts
and
strategic
planning
are
often
unknown.
In
the
early
days
of
the
founding
People's
Republic
of
China,
Mao
Zedong
directly
controlled
all
the
channels
and
details
of
contact
with
the
Soviet
Union.
Most
of
the
correspondence
and
telegrams
were
handled
by
Mao
Zedong
himself.
However,
due
to
the
imperfect
archives
system
in
the
early
days
of
the
founding
People's
Republic
of
China,
there
were
no
archives
left
in
the
relevant
departments.
In
addition,
some
important
meetings
are
not
recorded
at
all
for
reasons
of
confidentiality.
Likewise,
Stalin,
who
kept
himself
hidden
throughout
his
later
years
in
politics,
directly
controlled
all
contacts
with
Mao
and
often
forbade
the
keeping
of
records
of
more
sensitive
conversations
with
foreign
heads
of
state.
Third,
for
the
study
of
Sino-
Soviet
relations,
itis
necessary
to
examine
the
decision-
making
motivations
of
the
leaders
of
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
to
some
extent.
However,
research
in
this
area
is
not
without
difficulties.
From
the
38th
Parallel
to
the
Chinese
People’s
Volunteers
crossing
the
Yalu
River,
that
is,
from
the
outbreak
of
war
to
the
beginning
of
the
fourth
stage,
total
time
is
less
than
4
months,
and
ittakes
33
months
from
China’s
dispatch
of
troops
to
the
end
of
war.
The
first
four
months
were
actually
a
process
of
continuous
expansion
and
escalation
of
the
war.
In
terms
of
scale,
only
after
the
fourth
stage
began,
that
is,
after
China
intervened
in
the
Korean
War,
did
China
and
the
United
States
directly
confront
each
other,
and
this
war
became
acomplete
concept
of
the
Korean
War.
That
is
to
say,
the
development
of
war
before
the
beginning
of
the
fourth
stage
should
be
regarded
as
an
important
content
that
constitutes
the
origin
of
war.
Obviously,
ifthe
United
States
does
not
get
involved
in
this
military
conflict,
what
will
happen
on
the
Korean
peninsula
is
at
best
a
brief
civil
war;
The
result
of
the
year
ended;
ifChina
did
not
send
troops,
this
war
would
not
be
the
Korean
War
in
the
current
sense.
Therefore
for
the
analysis
of
origin
the
war,
in
addition
to
the
backgro
before
the
war,
itis
also
necessa
to
conduct
a
compre
inspecti
of
the
develo
proces
of
the
war
until
China
sent
troops.
This
book
studie
the
relatio
betwe
the
Sino-
Soviet
allian
and
the
origin
of
Kore
War
in
this
proc
Machine Translated by Google
 After
the
outbreak
of
civil
war
on
the
Korean
peninsula,
the
situation
deteriorated
sharply
due
to
the
blatant
intervention
of
the
United
States.
Stalin
urgently
needed
China
to
send
troops
aid
North
Korea.
When
the
flames
of
war
reached
the
Yalu
River,
as
the
leader
of
the
Asian
revolution,
Mao
Zedong
was
inspired
by
revolutionary
idealism,
and
out
of
consideration
for
national
security
interests,
he
also
determined
to
compete
with
the
world's
number
one
power,
the
United
States.
Negotiations
between
Zhou
Enlai
and
Stalin
at
the
Black
Sea
stalled
due
to
differences
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
over
the
issue
of
Soviet
air
aid.
Just
when
Stalin
informed
Kim
Il-
sung
to
withdraw
from
North
Korea,
and
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
treaty
was
almost
a
dead
letter,
Mao
Zedong
resolutely
decided
to
send
volunteers
fight
in
North
Korea
under
extremely
difficult
conditions,
thus
eliminating
the
conflict
to
alarge
extent.
Stalin's
suspicion
and
concern
about
China.
The
motivation
for
the
Soviet
Union
to
make
new
decisions
on
the
North
Korean
issue
was
mainly
to
safeguard
the
Soviet
Union’s
own
strategic
interests
in
Asia
and
to
worry
about
the
outcome
of
Sino-
Soviet
relations,
not
out
of
consideration
for
Soviet-
US
relations,
nor
out
of
concern
for
Sino-
US
relations.
relationship
considerations.
Stalin
did
not
envisage
that
the
Korean
War
was
directed
against
the
United
States
-the
premise
of
giving
Kim
IlSung
the
green
light
was
that
to
the
judge
United
States
would
not
intervene
in
the
Korean
peninsula.
The
basic
principle
of
the
Soviet
Union's
relationship
with
the
United
States
is:
ifthe
Soviet
Union
is
not
fully
prepared,
itwill
only
confront
in
the
form
of
a
cold
war,
but
itwill
never
have
a
direct
military
conflict
with
the
United
States.
So
Stalin
needed
Mao
to
take
responsibility
for
future
wars.
However,
itwas
not
Stalin's
motivation
to
make
the
decision
to
make
the
Korean
War
that
completely
broke
the
relationship
between
China
and
the
United
States,
but
the
result
of
the
actual
development
of
the
war
-ifthe
United
States
did
not
intervene
in
the
dispute
on
Korean
Peninsula,
there
would
be
no
need
for
China
to
participate
in
the
war
While
Moscow
hopes
Kim
IlSung's
move
will
not
lead
to
direct
conflict
with
the
United
States,
Washington
sees
itas
the
prelude
to
an
all-
out
war.
.
As
far
as
the
Korean
conflict
itself
was
concerned,
Stalin
could
not
bear
the
pressure
that
Soviet
Union
would
lose
its
basic
interests
in
Asia
due
to
the
signing
of
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty.
Therefore,
Moscow
needed
to
formulate
a
new
strategy
for
the
Far
East.
Under
the
background
that
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
were
already
in
a
state
of
cold
war
on
a
global
scale
and
the
Korean
Peninsula
was
on
the
verge
of
war,
Stalin
changed
his
previous
silent
and
defensive
position
in
Asia
out
of
the
need
to
safeguard
the
strategic
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
East.
Itwas
decided
to
take
military
action
on
the
Korean
peninsula,
far
away
from
Europe,
the
center
of
Cold
War,
to
complete
the
reunification
of
Korea,
thereby
expanding
the
power
and
influence
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
this
region.
At
the
same
time,
this
decision
was
also
to
cater
Kim
IlSung's
revolutionary
demands
for
the
unification
of
the
Korean
nation.
For
the
common
strategic
goal
tfight
—against
the
Western
capitalist
camp
headed
by
o
the
United
States,
and
to
survive
develop
in
the
Cold
War
world
structure,
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
finally
formed
a
strategic
alliance.
Stalin
was
forced
to
agree
the
"Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship,
Alliance
and
Mutual
Assistance"
signed
with
New
China,
which
made
the
Soviet
Union
lose
or
was
about
to
lose
the
rights
and
interests
in
the
Far
East
that
ithad
obtained
through
the
Yalta
system
and
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
in
1945.
Dalian
guarantees
the
Soviet
Union's
sea
outlets
and
ice-
free
ports
in
the
Pacific
Ocean.
Stalin
believed
that
the
Korean
Peninsula
could
replace
Northeast
China
and
maintain
the
political
and
economic
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
Asia.
This
was
the
main
reason
and
motivation
for
him
to
agree
with
Kim
IlSung's
plan
to
unify
Korea
by
,military
means.
Of
course,
in
order
to
prevent
the
CCP
from
launching
acampaign
to
liberate
Taiwan
(so
as
not
to
further
provoke
the
United
States),
itis
likely
that
Stalin
was
also
considering
it.
The
victorious
development
of
the
Chinese
revolution
forced
Stalin
to
consider
changing
the
Soviet
Union's
China
policy.
Mikoyan's
secret
visit
to
Xibaipo
enabled
Stalin
to
understand
the
development
strategy
of
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
and
its
position
on
the
Soviet
Union
and
Marxism.
The
foundation
of
real
cooperation
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
was
established.
After
Liu
Shaoqi's
visit
to
Moscow,
the
two
parties
in
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
unified
their
understanding
in
principle
and
preliminarily
determined
the
goals
for
development
of
future
bilateral
relations,
but
the
differences
involving
the
fundamental
interests
of
both
parties
were
not
resolved.
Despite
declaring
a
"one-
sided"
foreign
policy
toward
the
Soviet
Union,
as
the
founder
of
New
China,
Mao
Zedong
was
determined
to
sign
a
new
Sino-
Soviet
treaty
with
the
Union
to
reflect
China's
sovereignty
and
dignity
serve
as
the
basis
for
new
China's
foreign
relations
Stalin
believed
that
the
Northeast
issue
was
related
to
the
fundamental
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
Asia,
and
worried
that
the
signing
of
new
treaty
would
cause
a
chain
reaction
unfavorable
to
the
Soviet
Union
in
international
relations,
so
itwas
difficult
to
accept
China's
proposition.
The
dialogue
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
in
Moscow
was
once
deadlocked
due
to
the
gap
between
the
two
sides'
starting
points
and
alliance
conditions.
.
Starting
from
ensuring
national
security
interests,
Stalin
inherited
the
traditional
strategy
of
Tsarist
Russia
in
postwar
Asia,
and
formulated
a
diplomatic
policy
aimed
at
seizing
the
Pacific
Ocean
and
ice-
free
ports.
The
guarantee
for
the
Soviet
Union
to
achieve
this
goal
is
the
Yalta
Agreement
and
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance.
Therefore,
the
main
target
of
Stalin’s
China
policy
was
the
Kuomintang
government,
which
focused
on
protecting
and
realizing
the
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
Northeast
China,
while
the
Chinese
Communists
and
the
Chinese
revolution
were
borrowed
forces
in
the
Soviet
Union’s
diplomatic
struggle.
Although
the
relationship
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
Communist
Party
of
China
after
the
Second
World
War
had
a
side
of
friendship
and
mutual
assistance,
itgenerally
started
in
an
unhappy
and
disharmonious
state.
Machine Translated by Google
For
a
long
time,
scholars
from
various
countries
have
conducted
extensive
discussions
on
Stalin’s
foreign
policy
after
the
war.
Generally
speaking,
there
are
two
opposing
views:
either
believe
that
Stalin
had
an
ambitious
aggressive
plan,
seeking
to
control
and
expand
his
sphere
of
influence;
or
Itis
believed
that
Stalin
took
only
moderate,
cautious
and
defensive
political
countermeasures.
However,
prior
to
the
disintegration
of
Soviet
Union,
research
works
representing
both
perspectives
w
—
traditional
or
revisionist
hlittle
—access
to
Soviet
archives
ad
hether
With
the
end
of
World
War
II,
the
history
of
the
20th
century
entered
a
new
era.
Itcan
be
said
that
the
early
postwar
years
were
a
turning
point
in
history.
The
so-
called
historical
turning
point,
from
the
perspective
of
the
world,
is
reorganization
of
international
political
forces
and
the
reorientation
of
the
development
strategies
of
major
countries,
and
this
combination
positioning
also
determine
the
future
pattern
of
world
history
and
the
development
of
major
countries.
Development
path.
This
period
is
a
period
of
fundamental
changes
in
the
international
situation
and
the
world
pattern.
Therefore,
an
overall
analysis
of
Stalin’s
foreign
policy
and
its
strategic
goals
after
the
war
will
help
to
understand
the
basis
and
starting
point
of
the
Soviet
Union’s
policy
towards
China
and
North
Korea.
Itis
important
to
understand
the
objective
conditions
and
subjective
motivations
for
the
alliance
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union.
1.
The
goals
and
evolution
of
Stalin's
foreign
policy
After
the
war,
Soviet
Union’s
policies
towards
China
and
North
Korea
were
based
on
the
basic
point
of
stabilizing
the
situation
in
the
East
and
maintaining
the
Yalta
system,
but
there
was
no
necessary
connection
between
the
two
policies.
However,
when
Stalin
believed
that
"the
international
situation
has
changed",
his
corresponding
policy
changes
created
an
intrinsic
link
between
the
two.
Therefore,
itis
necessary
to
examine
Stalin's
postwar
Far
East
policy
first.
The
formation
of
an
alliance
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
outbreak
of
war
in
Korea
were
two
major
historical
events
that
took
place,
and
the
key
leading
figure
was
Stalin.
This
is
unquestionable
due
to
the
long-
term
influence
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
international
communist
movement,
especially
the
post-
war
rise
in
the
international
status
of
the
Soviet
Union.
These
two
events
themselves
marked
that
Stalin
had
fundamentally
changed
the
Soviet
Union's
strategic
guidelines
and
policies
in
the
Far
East
since
1945.
Revisiting
the
Far
East
Dream
S
—
Far
East
Policy
and
the
Origin
of
Sino-
Soviet
Alliance
oviet
Chapter
One
This
is
the
complex
and
delicate
relationship
between
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
and
the
origin
of
Korean
War.
Unlike
some
scholars
believe,
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
was
the
direct
cause
of
the
outbreak
Korean
War.
In
the
past,
there
was
a
"conspiracy
theory"
theory
among
traditional
Western
scholars,
who
believed
that
the
Korean
War
planned
was
jointly
by
Stalin
and
Mao
Zedong,
and
was
directly
launched
by
Kim
IlSung.
Later,
after
the
emergence
of
revisionists,
this
kind
of
argument
is
no
longer
common.
However,
recently
Korean
scholars
seem
to
have
found
evidence
in
declassified
Russian
archives
and
put
forward
the
"collusion"
theory
again.
In
fact,
on
the
contrary,
itwas
when
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
were
negotiating
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty
and
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
that
Beijing
and
Moscow
began
to
diverge
in
their
understanding
and
policy
of
the
conflict
on
Korean
peninsula.
This
disagreement
even
cast
a
shadow
over
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
after
the
outbreak
of
Korean
War.
Itwas
not
until
China
decided
to
send
troops
North
Korea
that
itchanged
Stalin's
fundamental
views
on
Mao
Zedong
and
the
CCP.
Therefore,
itcan
be
said
that
the
signing
of
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
was
only
a
formal
manifestation
of
the
alliance
relationship.
After
China
participated
in
the
Korean
War,
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
formed
an
alliance
relationship
in
fact.
in
conclusion:
China's
involvement
in
the
Korean
War
was
an
important
turning
point
in
the
development
of
Sino-
Soviet
alliance.
Stalin
changed
his
attitude
towards
Mao
Zedong
and
adopted
a
policy
of
full
cooperation
with
China.
Due
to
the
similarity
of
interests
of
both
sides
in
the
war,
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
showed
its
significance
after
China
sent
troops
to
North
Korea.
The
coordination
and
unification
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
the
close
cooperation
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
are
one
of
the
important
conditions
to
ensure
that
China
can
persist
in
this
arduous
and
long
war
to
the
end.
As
a
result,
the
Korean
War
consolidated
and
developed
the
alliance
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union,
while
also
covering
up
hidden
differences
and
contradictions.
Machine Translated by Google
However,
for
world
revolution,
the
grand
strategic
goal
of
Soviet
development,
peaceful
coexistence
was
only
a
means,
or
a
temporary
and
short-
term
goal.
Stalin
believed
that
the
socialist
Soviet
Union
would
eventually
destroy
the
capitalist
world.
This
confession
of
Stalin
is
very
illustrative.
Except
for
the
border
issue
south
of
the
Caucasus,
which
Stalin
did
not
like
(this
will
be
mentioned
below),
in
general,
from
Finland
to
Eastern
Europe
through
the
three
Baltic
countries,
from
the
Near
East
through
Mongolia,
northeast
China
and
the
northern
part
of
the
Korean
Peninsula
to
the
northern
regions
of
Japan.
The
political
rights
and
interests
gained
by
the
Soviet
Union
through
the
war
and
Yalta
system
have
realized
the
strategic
goal
of
establishing
a
broad
security
buffer
zone
around
Russia
that
Russia
has
long
pursued,
and
the
realization
of
this
goal
is
the
result
of
cooperation
and
coordination
with
Western
allies
Therefore,
Stalin
first
needed
to
maintain
peaceful
coexistence
with
the
Western
capitalist
world.
Only
in
this
way
could
the
vested
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
be
guaranteed
at
the
least
cost.
.
Both
Mugraze,
first
secretary
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
Georgia,
and
Molotov,
the
foreign
minister,
recounted
the
fact
that
a
map
showing
the
new
borders
of
the
Soviet
Union
was
sent
to
Stalin's
dacha
after
the
war.
Stalin
pressed
itto
the
wall
with
thumbtacks
and
said
to
those
around
him:
"Let's
see
what
we
have
got.
everything
is
fine
and
normal
in
the
north.
Finland
has
committed
a
serious
crime
against
us,
so
we
Pushed
the
national
border
forward
from
Leningrad.
The
Baltic
coast,
which
has
been
Russian
land
since
ancient
times,
is
now
ours.
Our
Belarusians
.are
now
living
together,
Ukrainians
are
living
together,
and
Moldavians
are
also
.living
together.
They
live
together
together.
The
situation
in
the
west
is
normal.”
Then,
he
.turned
to
the
east
world:
“What’s
the
situation
here?
The
Thousand
Islands
are
now
ours,
and
Sakhalin
Island
is
completely
ours.
How
wonderful!
Lushun
Port
is
ours,
and
Dalian
is
also
ours."
Stalin
said
while
drawing
a
circle
on
the
map
of
China
with
a
pipe,
"Changchun
Railway
is
also
ours,
China,
Mongolia
iall
—right,...but
here
t's
Idon't
like
the
borders
of
the
country!"
Stalin
said,
pointing
to
the
south
of
Caucasus.
The
first
is
peaceful
coexistence.
Stalin
said
after
the
war:
"During
most
tense
time
of
war",
the
different
systems
did
not
prevent
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
from
uniting
and
defeating
the
common
enemy.
"In
peacetime,
itis
even
more
possible
to
maintain
this
relationship."
Stalin
also
stated
that
the
Soviet
Union
"has
a
desire
to
cooperate."
The
basis
of
Stalin's
thinking
lies
in
the
wartime
allied
cooperation,
especially
the
Yalta
system
built
jointly
by
the
United
States,
the
Soviet
Union
and
other
major
powers
at
the
end
of
war.
The
so-
called
Yalta
system
got
its
name
from
a
summit
meeting
of
the
United
States,
Britain,
and
the
Soviet
Union
held
in
Yusopov
Palace
in
Yalta,
Crimea
Peninsula,
Soviet
Union
in
February
1945.
The
main
result
of
the
meeting
was
to
determine
the
strategic
post-
world
pattern.
After
Germany
surrendered,
the
Potsdam
Conference
held
in
July
further
confirmed
and
supplemented
this.
As
a
result,
several
major
powers
divided
the
spheres
of
influence
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
East
and
the
United
States
and
Britain
in
the
West
after
war
according
to
their
political
and
military
power
at
that
time.
As
many
scholars
have
seen,
Stalin
was
satisfied
with
the
Yalta
system
established
in
the
later
period
of
the
war.
No
matter
in
terms
of
its
form
or
content,
the
construction
of
this
system
conforms
to
Russia’s
traditional
national
security
strategy
of
exchanging
space
for
time
The
——
wide
buffer
zone
around
the
perimeter
ensures
sufficient
time
to
maneuver
and
prepare
in
the
event
of
a
war
threat.
Through
the
intricate
fog
of
history,
itcan
beseen
that
the
strategic
goals
of
the
Soviet
Union’s
foreign
policy
after
the
war
actually
had
three
aspects,
or
levels,
namely
peaceful
coexistence-
world
revolution-
national
security
interests.
These
statements
do
not
seem
to
be
able
to
fully
or
accurately
reflect
the
strategic
goals
of
the
Soviet
Union’s
foreign
policy
in
the
early
post-
war
period.
In
particular,
they
did
not
outline
the
trajectory
of
Stalin’s
foreign
policy
changes
during
this
period,
making
itdifficult
to
correctly
understand
the
essence
of
Soviet
Union’s
foreign
policy.
The
real
reason
and
basis
for
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance.
With
the
gradual
opening
of
Russian
archives
to
the
outside
world,
researchers
began
to
re-
examine
this
issue
from
different
angles.
Some
people
think
that
Stalin's
diplomatic
behavior
during
this
period
was
eccentric
and
capricious,
that
the
Soviet
Union's
foreign
policy
had
no
clear
goal
and
was
inactive;
related".
Some
people
also
believed
that
the
political
goal
of
Stalin’s
foreign
policy
was
to
protect
his
vested
interests
and
sphere
of
influence.
He
did
not
want
to
instigate
world
revolution,
and
he
did
not
want
to
directly
confront
the
West.
West
coordinated.
Faced
with
the
increasingly
tense
relationship
with
the
West,
Stalin
was
even
at
a
loss.
The
victory
of
the
Chinese
revolution
had
a
major
impact
on
Stalin,
and
the
alliance
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
China
really
led
to
the
confrontation
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States.
The
conclusions
are
mainly
based
on
the
analysis
of
public
speeches
and
behaviors
of
the
Soviet
leaders
and
the
inferences
made
on
this
basis.
Machine Translated by Google
Second,
Stalin
believed
that
there
was
no
possibility
of
a
world
war
breaking
out
in
the
period
after
the
war,
which
was
premise
for
the
Soviet
Union
to
establish
a
policy
of
diplomatic
cooperation.
According
to
Stalin,
the
new
war
has
two
meanings,
namely,
a
war
between
capitalist
countries
and
a
war
between
capitalist
countries
and
the
Soviet
Union.
Stalin
believed
that
the
former
kind
of
war
is
more
likely
to
break
out
than
the
latter
kind
of
war,
because
capitalist
countries
are
relatively
First,
the
result
of
the
Second
World
War
made
the
Soviet
Union
a
politically
and
militarily
powerful
country
in
the
world.
However,
due
to
the
great
damage
and
losses
caused
by
the
war,
Soviet
Union
faced
extremely
difficult
tasks
in
its
economic
recovery
and
development.
This
naturally
requires
the
Soviet
Union
to
maintain
a
certain
cooperative
relationship
with
Western
countries
such
as
the
United
States
in
order
to
achieve
a
peaceful
external
environment
for
domestic
economic
construction.
As
far
as
the
economic
strength
of
the
Soviet
Union
was
concerned,
itwas
also
unable
to
compete
with
Western
countries
headed
by
the
United
States
at
that
time.
The
basis
for
Stalin
to
adhere
this
foreign
policy
lies
in
the
following
considerations:
In
the
early
post-
war
period,
Stalin’s
wish
was
to
maintain
the
wartime
partnership
with
Western
Allies,
and
to
consolidate
develop
the
political
rights
and
interests
that
the
Soviet
Union
had
gained
in
the
Yalta
and
Potsdam
systems
through
cooperation
with
Western
countries.
This
is
well
reflected
in
the
Soviet
Union's
passivity
in
1945
in
dealing
with
the
Greek
Revolution,
the
Chinese
Revolution,
and
Communist
Party
activity
in
Europe.
In
short,
in
the
three-
dimensional
structure
of
Stalin's
foreign
policy
goals
after
the
war,
Soviet
Union's
national
security
interests
were
always
at
the
top.
In
dealing
with
post-
war
international
relations
in
different
periods
and
in
different
regions,
Stalin
either
took
the
maintenance
of
peaceful
coexistence
as
the
yardstick
for
adjusting
foreign
policy,
or
took
the
agitation
of
world
revolution
as
the
goal
of
launching
diplomatic
offensives.
But
these
are
temporary
and
changeable,
their
fundamental
purpose
is
to
protect
the
national
security
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union,
and
everything
must
be
subject
to
the
ultimate
goal
of
the
Soviet
Union's
foreign
policy.
Starting
from
this
starting
point,
Stalin's
foreign
policy
after
the
war
underwent
a
process
of
development
and
change,
that
is,
from
apolicy
of
maintaining
cooperation
among
major
powers
while
carrying
out
limited
expansion,
itgradually
developed
into
a
policy
of
confrontation
between
the
two
major
groups.
However,
for
national
security
interests,
the
fundamental
goal
of
Soviet
foreign
policy,
the
world
revolution
became
a
means,
or
a
partial
and
temporary
goal
in
foreign
strategy.
Ifwe
say
that
during
the
Lenin
period,
the
Russian
Communist
Party
(Bolsheviks)
took
the
world
revolution
as
its
mission
and
hoped
to
liberate
all
mankind
in
the
torrent
of
world
revolution,
even
without
the
concept
of
national
borders,
then
by
the
time
of
Stalin,
Great
Russianism
was
already
deeply
rooted
in
the
Soviet
Party.
Itwas
Stalin's
consistent
policy
to
put
the
Soviet
Union's
national
security
interests
at
the
top
of
his
foreign
policy
strategy.
The
theoretical
basis
of
this
policy
is
Stalin's
"Theory
of
Socialism
in
One
Country".
Before
the
war,
Stalin
believed
that
when
the
Soviet
Union
was
surrounded
by
capitalist
countries,
safeguarding
the
national
security
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
was
not
only
the
fundamental
goal
of
the
Soviet
Union’s
foreign
policy,
but
also
the
goal
of
proletariat
and
its
political
parties
in
all
countries
in
the
world.
Proceeding
from
this
point,
Stalin
signed
the
Soviet-
German
non-
aggression
pact
with
Hitler
peace
of
mind,
mercilessly
divided
Poland
again,
signed
a
neutrality
treaty
with
Japan
and
established
the
"Oriental
Front",
and
launched
a
war
against
War
in
Finland,
and
by
a
single
order
disbanded
the
"Comintern".
Since
Stalin
believed
that
the
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
were
the
interests
of
socialism
and
represented
the
most
fundamental
interests
of
mankind,
the
interests
of
the
world
revolution
should
be
subordinated
to
the
national
security
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Whether
the
people
of
acountry
should
rise
up
for
revolution,
when
they
should
rise
up
for
revolution,
and
whether
they
will
support
and
assist
the
national
liberation
movement
depends
entirely
on
whether
such
revolutionary
actions
are
conducive
to
maintaining
the
national
security
of
the
Soviet
Union
tis
—what
Stalin
had
in
mind.
his
Another
logic.
The
historical
mission
of
the
human
proletariat,
and
the
way
to
accomplish
this
historical
mission
can
only
be
violent
revolution.
Stalin
said
before
the
war:
The
emergence
of
the
capitalist
economic
crisis
means
that
"the
stability
of
capitalism
is
coming
to
an
end",
"the
upsurge
of
the
revolutionary
movement
of
the
masses
will
grow
more
violently",
"the
bourgeoisie
will
start
from
the
new
imperialism
in
foreign
policy.
Find
a
way
out
in
war",
"The
proletariat
will
find
a
way
out
in
revolution
when
itopposes
capitalist
exploitation
and
stops
the
danger
of
war".
After
the
war,
Stalin
put
forward
the
theory
of
general
crisis
of
capitalism.
He
believed:
"The
capitalist
world
economic
system
contains
factors
of
general
crisis
and
military
conflict.
Therefore,
the
development
of
capitalism
in
the
modern
world
is
not
advancing
smoothly
and
in
a
balanced
manner.
but
through
crises
and
the
scourge
of
war”;
“The
most
important
economic
consequence
of
the
Second
World
War
and
its
economic
consequences
should
be
considered
the
disintegration
of
a
unified
all-
encompassing
world
market.
This
situation
determines
the
The
further
deepening
of
the
general
crisis
of
socialism";
this
"general
crisis
of
the
world
capitalist
system
is
a
comprehensive
crisis
that
includes
both
economics
and
politics."
Crises
lead
to
wars,
wars
lead
to
revolutions,
revolutions
overthrow
the
capitalist
world,
such
is
the
logic
of
Stalin's
general
crisis
theory.
Under
the
guidance
of
this
way
thinking,
the
formulation
of
Soviet
foreign
policy
should
be
incorporated
into
the
goal
,system
of
the
world
revolution,
and
itdoes
not
matter
whether
the
outside
world
is
in
a
state
of
war
or
peace.
Therefore,
in
Stalin's
view,
peaceful
coexistence
must
be
subordinate
to
the
world
revolution,
and
itis
only
apartial
and
temporary
goal
of
the
general
goal
of
the
world
revolution.
Machine Translated by Google
As
early
as
during
the
Yalta
Conference,
Stalin
clearly
expressed
his
unchallenged
determination
on
the
issue
of
power
in
Eastern
Europe.
when
the
United
States
proposed
The
dispute
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
Western
powers
first
appeared
on
the
issue
of
Eastern
Europe.
From
a
geographical
point
of
view,
Eastern
Europe
is
close
to
the
European
territory
of
the
Soviet
Union,
that
is,
the
central
area
of
the
Soviet
Union,
and
has
often
become
the
passage
and
entrance
for
foreign
enemies
to
invade
Russia
in
history.
Therefore,
Eastern
Europe
became
the
post-
war
Soviet
security
belt
and
power
established
by
Stalin
The
battleground
for
scope.
The
core
of
Stalin’s
policy
towards
Eastern
Europe
was
to
take
advantage
of
the
favorable
opportunity
for
Soviet
Red
Army
to
cross
the
border
and
fight
in
Eastern
Europe,
to
support
and
help
the
Communist
Party
of
Eastern
European
countries
to
establish
a
pro-
Soviet
government
or
a
Soviet-
style
political
organization,
and
to
complete
the
Soviet
Union’s
foreign
policy
in
one
fell
swoop
to
ensure
national
security
and
Realize
the
two
strategic
goals
of
the
world
revolution.
Only
in
this
way,
the
Soviet
Union
refused
to
give
in
to
the
United
States
and
Western
countries
on
the
Eastern
European
issue.
Theoretically
speaking,
ifthe
Soviet
Union
and
the
West
abide
by
the
principle
of
peaceful
coexistence,
although
the
two
sides
will
no
longer
have
the
same
alliance
as
they
did
during
the
war,
they
can
at
least
maintain
a
general
cooperative
relationship.
However,
due
to
the
reasons
mentioned
above,
the
positions
and
views
of
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
Western
powers
were
quite
different
in
terms
of
how
to
arrange
the
new
post-
war
world
order.
Try
to
enhance
their
status
and
influence
in
international
affairs,
and
transform
the
world
according
to
their
own
values
and
thinking
patterns.
As
a
result,
the
escalation
of
differences
and
conflicts
is
inevitable.
Thirdly,
unlike
the
connotation
of
Roosevelt’s
cooperation
policy,
the
major
power
cooperation
advocated
by
Stalin
is
essentially
following
the
traditional
practice
of
dividing
up
the
world’s
sphere
of
influence
by
the
main
victorious
powers
in
history,
trying
to
replace
the
Versailles
system
with
Yalta
and
rebuilding
with
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
as
the
dominant
countries.
new
world
order.
The
Soviet
Union
has
been
surrounded
by
the
capitalist
world
for
decades,
the
"isolated
island"
mentality
formed
by
oppression
and
discrimination
in
international
affairs,
and
Russia's
revenge
psychology
formed
due
to
the
failure
of
Russo-
Japanese
War,
which
made
Stalin
after
the
war.
A
sense
of
superiority:
As
one
of
the
main
victorious
countries,
the
Soviet
Union
can
now
participate
in
dictating
the
fate
of
world.
Therefore,
despite
its
policy
of
cooperation
among
the
major
powers,
the
Soviet
Union
has
shown
signs
of
eager
expansion
from
time
to
in
places
not
covered
by
the
Yalta
and
Potsdam
agreements.
Secondly,
although
Roosevelt
and
Stalin
also
advocated
the
post-
war
policy
of
major
power
cooperation
to
dominate
the
world,
Roosevelt
saw
the
disadvantages
of
Versailles
system
formed
after
the
First
World
War.
An
international
organization
that
arranges
international
affairs
on
the
basis
of
coordinating
relations
among
major
powers
in
order
to
achieve
world
peace
and
stability.
As
for
the
interests
of
the
United
States,
Roosevelt
believed
that
itcould
beguaranteed
by
virtue
of
the
economic
strength
of
the
United
States
and
the
open
door
policy.
But
other
heads
of
Western
powers,
such
as
Churchill,
did
not
have
Roosevelt's
political
strength
and
new
thinking.
Roosevelt
could
tolerate
and
ignore
Stalin's
things,
but
his
successors
and
other
Western
leaders
must
confront
them.
So
to
some
extent,
itcan
besaid
that
Roosevelt's
death
has
heralded
the
bleak
prospects
for
cooperation
among
major
powers.
First
of
all,
due
to
different
ideologies,
values
and
social
systems,
the
Soviet
Union
and
Western
powers
were
originally
hostile.
The
alliance
formed
during
the
war
was
established
under
the
specific
historical
conditions
of
opposing
jointly
fascist
aggression.
After
the
war
ended
and
the
common
enemy
disappeared,
this
alliance
would
have
fulfilled
its
historical
mission
and
lost
its
basis
for
existence.
However,
there
is
already
an
element
of
divisiveness
implicit
in
this
cooperation.
In
addition
to
the
fundamental
antagonism
and
conflict
of
national
interests,
there
are
the
following
reasons:
In
short,
only
by
adopting
a
cooperative
policy
can
the
existence
of
Yalta
system
be
maintained,
and
maintaining
the
Yalta
system
can
guarantee
the
vested
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Third,
the
establishment
of
Yalta
system
guaranteed
the
Soviet
Union's
postwar
international
status
and
national
security
interests.
At
least
in
Stalin's
view,
the
Soviet
Union's
sphere
of
influence
in
the
postwar
world
was
secured
through
international
agreements
with
the
Western
Allies.
For
the
sake
of
maintaining
the
Yalta
system,
Soviet
Union's
foreign
policy
also
had
to
be
based
on
cooperation
with
the
West.
The
purpose
of
the
war
with
each
other
is
to
gain
an
advantage
over
other
countries,
while
the
war
with
Soviet
Union
involves
the
survival
of
capitalism
itself.
However,
the
Soviet
Union
will
not
attack
capitalist
countries.
Therefore,
under
this
international
situation,
there
is
a
basis
for
the
Soviet
Union
to
maintain
cooperation
with
the
West.
Machine Translated by Google
The
setbacks
suffered
by
the
Soviet
Union
on
the
Turkey
and
Iran
issues
made
Stalin
feel
that
the
Soviet
Union
could
not
always
act
alone
in
international
affairs,
but
itwas
necessary
to
unite
the
strength
of
Soviet
Union
and
Eastern
European
countries
in
the
confrontation
with
United
States
and
its
Western
allies,
The
forces
of
the
Communist
Parties
of
the
world
unite.
Not
long
after
the
Soviet
Union
withdrew
its
troops
from
Iran,
at
the
end
of
May
and
beginning
of
June
1946,
Stalin
formally
proposed
the
idea
of
establishing
a
Communist
Intelligence
Bureau
in
talks
with
the
leaders
of
Yugoslavia
and
Bulgaria.
The
establishment
of
the
Communist
Intelligence
Bureau
was
also
recorded
in
the
manuscripts
written
by
Tito
after
his
visit
to
Moscow.
In
the
spring
of
1947,
Stalin
was
in
Tongbo
Third,
the
diplomatic
measures
of
the
Soviet
Union
accelerated
the
adjustment
of
Western
countries'
policies
towards
the
Soviet
Union.
These
two
incidents
in
the
Near
East
finally
led
to
the
breakdown
of
the
already
weak
cooperative
relationship
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
West,
deepened
the
suspicion,
hostility
and
confrontation
between
the
two
sides.
IfChurchill's
"Iron
Curtain
Speech"
was
more
ideological
than
ithad
aroused
strong
resonance
in
the
United
States
and
other
Western
countries,
then
Kennan's
"Containment
Theory"
and
the
Truman
Doctrine
showed
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
in
the
Near
East.
The
behavior
of
the
Western
powers
has
made
Western
powers
feel
that
their
own
interests
have
been
violated,
and
this
has
caused
the
adjustment
of
their
foreign
policies,
especially
the
policy
towards
Soviet
Union.
Therefore,
itcan
beconsidered
that
the
incidents
in
Turkey
and
Iran
opened
adoor
for
the
formation
of
bloc
confrontation
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
Western
powers.
Second,
the
diplomatic
measures
of
the
Soviet
Union
strengthened
the
coordination
and
recognition
among
Western
countries.
The
rise
of
the
status
United
States
after
the
war
and
decline
of
the
power
of
Britain
and
France
made
the
internal
contradictions
of
Western
countries
tend
to
expand.
This
is
illustrated
by
the
large
differences
between
the
United
States
and
Britain
on
the
issues
of
Turkey
and
Iran.
The
diplomatic
behavior
of
the
Soviet
Union
during
this
period
made
Western
countries
feel
threatened,
which
objectively
contributed
to
the
unity
of
Western
countries.
In
acertain
sense,
in
addition
to
the
inherent
anti-
communist
ideology
of
Western
countries,
itcan
also
be
said
that
itwas
the
diplomatic
behavior
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
its
extensive
pursuit
of
political
and
economic
interests
in
its
surrounding
areas
after
the
war
that
strengthened
group
consciousness
of
Western
countries
and
accelerated
Western
countries’
anti-
Soviet
ideology.
Alliance
formation.
First,
although
Stalin's
actions
in
the
Near
East
had
the
motive
of
expanding
the
Soviet
Union's
sphere
of
influence
in
the
Near
East,
he
did
not
intend
to
fundamentally
change
the
basic
policy
of
cooperation
with
the
West.
Therefore,
facing
tough
attitude
of
the
United
States
and
Britain,
the
Soviet
Union
adopted
The
policy
of
retreat
and
conciliation
was
adopted.
The
Soviet
Union's
withdrawal
from
Iran,
like
its
withdrawal
from
Northeast
China
and
North
Korea,
showed
that
Stalin's
expansionary
attempts
were
limited,
and
he
still
hoped
to
avoid
direct
confrontation
and
conflict
with
the
West,
especially
United
States.
Obviously,
the
consequences
for
West
of
the
Soviet
Union's
actions
beyond
the
Yalta
Agreement
in
the
Near
East
were
beyond
the
expectation
of
Stalin.
The
Turkish
issue
and
the
Iranian
crisis
had
a
major
impact
on
the
relationship
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
West
changes
in
the
international
situation
after
the
war.
The
following
conclusions
can
be
drawn
from
the
investigation
of
these
two
Near
East
incidents:
Historically,
the
Near
East
was
the
place
where
Tsarist
Russia
competed
with
European
powers.
Since
the
19th
century,
controlling
the
two
straits
of
Turkey
and
going
south
to
the
Persian
Gulf
to
obtain
an
important
ice-
free
port
has
been
the
established
policy
of
Tsarist
Russia's
foreign
policy.
After
the
Second
World
War,
Turkey
and
Iran
also
played
a
very
important
role
in
Stalin’s
foreign
policy,
because
once
the
Soviet
Union
gained
political
and
economic
rights
in
these
two
countries,
itwould
not
only
ensure
the
security
of
southern
part
of
the
Soviet
Union,
but
also
serve
as
a
guarantee
for
the
Soviet
Union.
Provide
a
base
for
development
in
the
Mediterranean
Sea
and
the
Indian
Ocean.
However,
neither
of
these
two
countries
was
included
in
the
Soviet
Union's
sphere
of
influence
in
the
Yalta
system.
Therefore,
Stalin's
actions
in
Turkey
and
Iran
also
aroused
strong
reactions
from
Western
powers.
Although
Western
powers
expressed
dissatisfaction
and
doubts
about
Stalin's
tough
attitude
on
the
Eastern
European
issue,
Central
and
Eastern
Europe
belonged
to
the
Soviet
Union's
sphere
of
influence
under
the
Yalta
system,
and
even
ifthe
West
responded
to
this,
itseemed
that
itlacked
confidence.
The
real
problems
that
caused
conflict
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
West
led
to
policy
shifts
on
both
sides
occurred
in
those
areas
where
the
Yalta
system
had
not
yet
been
defined
or
adjusted,
notably
in
Turkey
and
Iran.
Itwas
for
these
areas
that
Stalin
expressed
his
dissatisfaction
and
the
expansion
intention
of
the
Soviet
Union.
When
the
Lublin
Provisional
Government
of
Poland
was
dissolved
and
another
provisional
government
was
established
on
the
basis
of
the
Council
State,
Stalin
flatly
refused.
When
the
United
States
demanded
that
the
governments
of
Romania
and
Bulgaria
reshuffle
or
resign
in
September
1945,
the
Soviet
Union
also
expressed
firm
opposition.
At
the
same
time,
basic
consideration
of
the
Soviet
Union
on
the
German
issue
was
to
make
the
Soviet-
occupied
area
the
frontier
for
ensuring
security
of
the
western
part
of
the
Soviet
Union,
to
strengthen
the
position
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
whole
of
Germany
on
the
basis
of
consolidating
the
Soviet-
occupied
area,
and
to
prevent
the
western-
occupied
area
from
becoming
dependent
on
the
Soviet
Union.
independent
countries
of
the
West.
In
March
1946,
when
Stalin
commented
on
Churchill's
"Iron
Curtain
Speech",
he
even
ignored
Churchill's
view
that
Eastern
European
countries
were
the
sphere
of
influence
of
the
Soviet
Union,
and
only
emphasiz
the
establish
of
a
governm
in
Eastern
Europe
that
had
a
good
attitude
towards
the
Soviet
Union.
desire
for
peace",
not
"expan
tenden
Machine Translated by Google
The
basis
of
the
Cold
War
was
confrontation
between
the
two
superpowers
of
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union,
and
this
confrontation
was
manifested
as
a
combination
of
geopolitical
and
ideological
opposition.
After
World
War
II,
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
came
to
the
forefront
of
world
politically
and
economically.
The
United
States
got
rid
of
the
traditional
isolationism
and
rushed
out
of
the
Americas
in
one
fell
swoop.
Starting
from
the
mainland
of
the
United
States,
on
the
one
hand,
facing
east,
the
European
powers,
especially
Britain,
France,
and
Italy,
whose
economic
and
political
power
declined
after
the
war,
had
to
turn
the
economic
and
military
power
of
the
United
States;
China
and
the
Philippines
provide
an
excellent
opportunity
and
space
for
the
United
States
to
enter
Asia.
the
soviet
union
The
Soviet
Union
adjusted
its
foreign
strategy,
and
its
organizational
performance
was
the
establishment
of
a
new
European
Communist
Party
Coordinating
Center,
namely
the
Communist
and
Workers'
Party
Intelligence
Bureau.
Unlike
the
Comintern,
however,
the
Communist
Intelligence
Bureau
was
entirely
confined
to
European
geography,
so
its
formation
was
clearly
a
reaction
to
the
apparent
threat
posed
by
the
Marshall
Plan
rather
than
a
prelude
to
a
new
phase
of
world
revolution.
Stalin's
purpose
was
to
strengthen
his
control
over
Eastern
European
countries
and
European
parties
through
this
form
of
political
organization,
and
"establish
a
coordination
center
for
all
participating
parties
in
the
form
of
an
intelligence
bureau."
The
meeting
resulted
in
two
policy
outcomes,
namely:
the
abolition
of
democratic
coalition
governments
of
various
parties
in
Eastern
European
countries,
and
the
establishment
of
an
all-
Soviet
regime;
the
criticism
of
legal
struggle
tactics
still
adhered
to
by
the
parties
in
France
and
Italy,
and
the
advocacy
of
strikes
and
other
revolutionary
actions.
struggle
against
class
government.
In
particular,
the
theory
of
"two
camps"
put
forward
by
the
Soviet
Union
at
the
meeting
indicated
that
after
the
Marshall
Plan,
the
Soviet
Union's
foreign
policy
had
completely
deviated
from
the
track
of
cooperation
between
major
powers,
and
embarked
on
anew
path
of
bloc
confrontation
with
the
West.
In
order
to
resist
the
Marshall
Plan
and
strengthen
the
influence
and
control
of
the
Soviet
Union
on
Eastern
European
countries,
the
Soviet
government
signed
bilateral
trade
agreements
with
six
Eastern
European
countries
including
Bulgaria
from
July
10
to
August
26,
the
so-
called
"Molotov
Plan".
".
The
Molotov
plan
consolidated
the
economic
relations
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
Eastern
European
countries,
brought
the
economies
of
these
countries
into
the
orbit
of
Soviet
model,
and
thus
formed
the
Soviet-
Eastern
European
economic
circle
that
competed
with
the
Western
capitalist
world,
and
established
the
Soviet-
Eastern
European
bloc.
economic
basis.
The
Soviet
Union's
response
to
the
Marshall
Plan
was
a
sweeping
change
in
foreign
policy.
In
order
to
ensure
that
the
Eastern
European
countries
and
the
Soviet
Union
could
form
a
powerful
interest
group
against
the
West,
Stalin
first
needed
to
unify
and
regulate
the
actions
of
Eastern
European
parties
and
countries.
When
the
Soviet
Union
decided
to
boycott
the
Marshall
Plan,
itimmediately
sent
urgent
telegrams
to
the
leaders
of
Eastern
European
parties
on
July
8
and
9,
"suggesting"
that
they
refuse
to
participate
in
the
Paris
Conference
where
the
Marshall
Plan
was
discussed
and
"not
to
send
a
delegation
to
the
conference."
For
Czechoslovakia
and
Poland,
which
were
keen
to
participate
in
the
Marshall
Plan,
Stalin
summoned
the
leaders
of
the
two
national
parties
to
Moscow
severely
reprimand
and
force
them
to
submit
the
Soviet
Union's
proposition.
At
the
end
of
July
the
same
year,
when
leaders
of
Yugoslavia
and
Bulgaria
announced
that
they
would
study
and
negotiate
a
treaty
of
friendship
and
mutual
assistance
between
the
two
countries,
Stalin
severely
denounced
this
action
as
"hasty"
and
"wrong",
and
emphasized
that
it"did
not
agree
with
the
Soviet
government."
Negotiate".
However,
itwas
the
Marshall
Plan
issued
in
June
1947
that
really
brought
about
fundamental
changes
in
the
Soviet
Union's
postwar
foreign
policy.
Although
the
United
States
announced
the
Truman
Doctrine
not
long
ago,
in
Stalin's
view,
Truman's
speech
a
was
just
rhetorical
clamor
that
the
United
States
would
implement
a
"containment"
policy
against
the
Soviet
Union,
while
the
Marshall
Plan
was
to
establish
a
European
anti-
Soviet
policy
in
practice.
Among
the
Soviet
bloc,
what
Stalin
could
not
tolerate
the
most
was
that
the
United
States
tried
to
bring
Eastern
European
countries
under
the
influence
of
Western
forces
through
the
Marshall
Plan,
and
re-
armed
an
old
enemy
of
Russia
by
aiding
Germany's
western-
occupied
areas.
At
the
same
time,
foreign
policy
of
the
United
States
and
Western
powers
tended
to
be
tough,
which
also
attracted
the
attention
of
Soviet
Union.
Novikov,
the
Soviet
ambassador
to
the
United
States,
made
a
lengthy
report
on
the
analysis
of
U.S.
foreign
policy
in
September
1946,
which
fully
explained
the
Soviet
Union’s
concern
for
changes
in
U.S.
policy,
and
also
laid
the
foundation
for
Stalin’s
adjustment
of
U.S.
policy
to
a
certain
extent.
The
Novikov
report
clearly
stated
at
the
beginning:
"The
foreign
policy
of
the
United
States
reflects
the
imperialist
tendency
of
American
monopoly
capital,
which
is
characterized
by
seeking
world
hegemony
after
the
war.
"is
currently
the
main
obstacle
on
the
way
to
cooperation
of
major
powers.
This
obstacle
is
,mainly
because
the
United
States
no
longer
pursues
the
policy
of
strengthening
the
cooperation
of
three
major
powers
(or
the
four
major
powers)
after
the
war,
but
tries
its
best
to
destroy
the
unity
of
these
countries.
Its
purpose
is
to
impose
the
will
of
other
countries
on
the
Soviet
Union.”
IfKennan’s
famous
8,000-
character
telegram
became
the
theoretical
basis
for
the
U.S.
containment
policy
toward
the
Soviet
Union,
then
the
Novikov
Report,
which
appeared
almost
at
the
same
time,
also
pointed
to
the
Soviet
Union’s
policy
of
restraining
the
U.S.
The
tough
counterattack
policy
has
played
an
important
demonstration
and
guiding
role.
Gomulka,
the
leader
of
the
United
Workers'
Party
of
Poland,
also
proposed
to
create
a
common
publication
of
the
Communist
Parties
of
various
countries
during
his
talk,
and
proposed
that
a
conference
with
the
participation
of
the
Communist
Parties
of
various
countries
should
be
held
for
this
purpose.
This
shows
that
in
Stalin's
mind
at
this
time,
the
theoretical
embryonic
form
of
group
confrontation
as
the
guiding
principle
in
foreign
policy
had
already
appeared.
Machine Translated by Google
On
August
15,
1945,
Truman
sent
Stalin
a
coded
"General
Order
No.
1"
that
had
been
approved
by
him
to
Supreme
Allied
Commander
Douglas
MacArthur
regarding
the
details
of
surrender
the
Japanese
armed
forces.
One
of
the
contents
order
is
to
use
the
38th
parallel
as
the
dividing
line
to
determine
the
surrender
area
of
the
US
and
the
Soviet
Union
on
the
Korean
Peninsula.
On
August
16,
Stalin
replied
that
he
"basically
has
no
objection
to
the
content
of
order"
and
raised
no
objection
to
the
issue
of
the
Korean
demarcation
line.
September
2,
Due
to
the
military
and
geographical
conditions
at
that
time,
when
the
US
army
was
fighting
fiercely
with
the
Japanese
army
in
the
southern
islands
of
Japan,
the
Soviet
army
had
already
entered
the
Korean
peninsula
in
a
large
scale.
As
Japan
accepted
unconditional
surrender
soon
after
the
US
dropped
the
atomic
bomb
and
the
Soviet
Union
sent
troops,
a
vacuum
was
created
on
the
Korean
peninsula.
Itwas
in
this
urgent
situation
that
the
United
States
couldn't
wait
to
raise
the
issue
of
occupying
North
Korea
and
accepting
the
Japanese
surrender
with
38th
parallel
as
the
boundary.
The
goal
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
Japan
was
to
restore
the
Kuril
Islands,
South
Sakhalin
and
nearby
islands
occupied
by
Japan
after
the
Russo-
Japanese
War,
while
participating
in
occupation
the
joint
and
control
of
Japan.
Among
them,
the
former
was
recognized
by
the
Yalta
Agreement,
while
latter
completely
depends
on
the
progress
of
the
military
power
of
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
in
Northeast
Asia.
As
a
result
of
the
confrontation
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
on
the
issue
of
Northeast
Asia,
the
Soviet
Union
failed
to
achieve
its
goal
of
occupying
Japan
and
participating
in
the
control
of
Japan,
but
formed
a
situation
where
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
occupied
jointly
the
Korean
Peninsula
with
the
38th
parallel
as
the
boundary.
After
the
war,
Soviet
Union's
entry
into
Asia
began
with
the
war
against
Japan.
When
victory
of
the
Allies
in
European
War
was
a
foregone
conclusion,
the
United
States
was
eager
to
obtain
the
Soviet
Union’s
commitment
to
participate
in
the
war
against
Japan
and
clarify
its
political
conditions
for
the
dual
purposes
of
reducing
American
casualties
in
the
decisive
battle
of
the
Pacific
War
and
limiting
the
Soviet
Union’s
postwar
expansion
in
the
East.
However,
Stalin
did
not
immediately
express
his
position.
Itwas
not
until
the
Yalta
Conference
that
Soviet
Union
made
itclear
that
the
political
condition
for
participating
in
the
war
against
Japan
was
to
restore
the
sphere
of
influence
of
Tsarist
Russia
in
the
Far
East
before
the
Russo-
Japanese
War.
Later,
the
war
situation
changed
rapidly,
especially
after
the
successful
atomic
bomb
test,
the
United
States
no
longer
wanted
the
Soviet
Union
to
get
involved
in
Asian
affairs.
When
the
political
conditions
for
participating
in
the
war
have
not
been
clearly
guaranteed,
he
hastily
sent
troops
to
Northeast
China
and
launched
a
large-
scale
attack
on
the
Japanese
army,
thus
obtaining
afavorable
diplomatic
position
in
Asia
based
on
military
strength.
2.
Soviet
Union's
strategy
and
policy
on
the
Korean
Peninsula
Of
course,
the
general
tone
of
the
Soviet
Union's
Far
East
policy
was
gradually
becoming
tough
and
confrontational,
so
that
under
the
conditions
of
"changing
international
situations",
the
Far
East
finally
became
the
fuse
of
crisis
between
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union.
However,
until
the
outbreak
of
Korean
War,
unlike
the
direct
confrontation
shown
in
Europe,
both
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
had
adopted
a
certain
restraint
in
Asia,
which
was
particularly
reflected
in
their
policies
towards
North
Korea
and
China.
However,
the
formation
of
Cold
War
on
a
global
scale
was
not
synchronized.
There
was
adevelopment
process
from
Europe
to
Asia.
From
the
perspective
of
the
Soviet
Union,
Stalin
alternately
used
the
diplomatic
means
of
peaceful
coexistence
and
world
revolution
in
different
countries
and
regions
around
the
world.
With
recovery
and
development
of
the
domestic
economic
strength
and
the
changes
in
the
international
situation,
the
foreign
policy
of
the
Soviet
Union
gradually
changed
from
moderate
to
tough
during
this
period,
and
generally
developed
along
the
track
from
cooperation
between
major
powers
to
group
confrontation.
Of
course,
this
does
not
mean
that
Soviet
policy
as
a
whole
changed.
The
focus
of
the
foreign
policy
of
the
Soviet
Union
was
on
Europe,
and
the
policy
on
Asia
often
played
a
complementary
and
auxiliary
role
to
the
European
policy.
Therefore,
Stalin’s
policy
on
Asia
did
not
change
completely
or
simultaneously
with
the
changes
in
his
European
policy,
and
even
the
opposite
in
order
to
concentrate
its
forces
against
the
United
States
and
the
Western
bloc
in
Europe,
the
Soviet
Union
still
maintains
a
relatively
moderate
or
conservative
policy
in
Asia,
although
this
is
only
an
expedient
measure.
,
Getting
rid
of
the
"isolated
island"
state
before
the
war,
on
one
hand,
itmarched
westward
to
Europe
and
occupied
a
vast
security
zone
by
liberating
Eastern
European
countries;
on
the
other
hand,
itdeveloped
eastward,
instigated
Mongolia's
independence,
controlled
Northeast
China
and
North
Korea,
and
coveted
the
Near
East
at
the
same
time.
In
this
way,
a
geopolitical
confrontation
between
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
in
Eurasia
was
formed.
At
the
same
time,
under
the
banner
of
"freedom"
and
"democracy",
the
United
States
opened
the
way
with
US
dollar
and
the
US
occupation
forces,
and
became
the
leader
of
the
capitalist
world,
trying
to
bring
the
world
into
"free
world"
in
the
US
way.
Under
the
slogan
of
"proletarian
internationalism",
the
Soviet
Union
tried
to
bring
the
new
democratic
countries
liberated
from
Hitler's
iron
heel
and
the
independent
countries
that
had
got
just
rid
of
colonial
rule
into
the
orbit
of
Soviet
system,
leading
all
mankind
towards
a
Stalin-
style
society.
doctrine
and
communism.
As
a
result,
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
also
formed
a
situation
of
fundamental
opposition
in
ideology.
Machine Translated by Google
However,
the
arrangement
of
Yalta
Agreement
regarding
post-
war
Korea
was
not
occupied
by
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
separately,
but
by
the
United
States,
the
Soviet
Union,
China,
and
the
United
Kingdom.
On
the
one
hand,
Stalin
expressed
regret
that
the
United
States
had
rejected
the
Soviet
Union’s
request
in
his
telegram
on
August
22.
On
the
other
hand,
before
the
telegram,
on
August
20,
he
issued
an
order
to
the
Soviet
Army,
requiring
the
Soviet
Army
and
Navy
to
station
all
their
strength
in
Hokkaido,
Japan.
The
reason
is
that
Hokkaido
is
located
north
of
the
38th
parallel.
At
the
same
time
that
Stalin
gave
the
order,
Lieutenant
General
Derevyanko,
the
Soviet
representative
in
Japan,
visited
MacArthur
and
declared
that
regardless
of
whether
the
United
States
agreed,
the
Soviet
army
would
be
stationed
in
Hokkaido.
MacArthur
retorted
in
astrong
tone
on
the
spot:
Without
my
permission,
even
ifone
soldier
lands
on
Hokkaido,
Iwill
immediately
arrest
all
members
of
the
Soviet
delegation
to
Japan,
including
you.
The
U.S.'s
strong
reaction
stranded
the
Soviet
Union's
plan
to
station
in
Hokkaido,
and
Stalin
had
previously
agreed
to
draw
the
border
on
the
Korean
peninsula
with
the
38th
parallel,
and
itwas
hard
to
recover.
Therefore,
Stalin
had
no
choice
but
to
accept
the
fait
accompli,
ceded
southern
Korea
to
the
United
States,
and
left
the
problem
to
be
solved
later.
As
will
be
seen
below,
this
opportunity
did
not
arise
until
1950.
However,
for
the
United
States,
in
view
of
the
lessons
of
the
division
Germany,
only
by
occupying
Japan
alone
can
itlimit
the
further
expansion
of
Soviet
power
in
Asia.
The
United
States
can
give
up
North
Korea,
but
itis
determined
to
win
Japan,
and
the
Soviet
Union
will
never
be
allowed
to
intervene.
Therefore,
in
the
telegram
to
Stalin
on
August
18,
Truman
agreed
with
Stalin's
first
amendment,
that
is,
to
include
the
Kuril
Islands
in
the
surrender
area
of
the
Soviet
army.
The
second
point
of
revision
is
to
allow
the
Soviet
army
to
enter
the
Japanese
mainland,
but
itis
subtly
rejected.
Truman
said
that
the
United
States
had
decided
that
the
Japanese
mainland
ministries
would
surrender
to
General
MacArthur,
and
that
arrangements
had
been
made,
and
that
MacArthur
"would
use
token
forces
of
the
Allies,
including
of
course
the
Soviets,
to
come
and
temporarily
occupy
the
Japanese
mainland."
So,
why
did
Stalin
accept
the
38th
Parallel?
In
fact,
as
a
politician,
Stalin
had
far-
reaching
considerations,
and
he
accepted
the
proposal
of
the
38th
Parallel
in
exchange.
The
author
noticed
that
when
Stalin
telegraphed
back
to
Truman
on
August
16
expressing
agreement
with
the
U.S.
surrender
plan,
he
also
proposed
two
important
amendments:
(1)
hand
over
the
entire
Kuril
Islands
belonging
to
Japan
the
Soviet
Army;
The
northern
part
of
Hokkaido,
which
belongs
to
the
Japanese
mainland,
was
handed
over
to
the
Soviet
army.
Stalin
also
emphasized
the
importance
of
the
second
point
for
the
Soviet
Union.
He
pointed
out:
"People
know
that
in
1919-1921,
Japan
occupied
the
entire
Far
East
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Ifthe
Russian
army
did
not
occupy
any
part
of
the
Japanese
mainland,
Russian
public
opinion
There
will
be
a
big
uproar."
Finally,
Stalin
said
to
Truman
in
an
indisputable
tone:
"I
urgently
hope
that
the
above-
mentioned
moderate
opinion
will
not
meet
any
opposition."
Obviously,
Stalin
was
trying
to
use
the
Soviet
Union's
position
north
of
the
38th
parallel
to
the
Japanese
mainland.
The
occupation
of
part
the
territory
was
exchanged
by
the
United
States
for
the
occupation
of
part
the
territory
south
of
38th
parallel
on
the
Korean
peninsula.
Just
as
the
American
Colonel
Rusk
who
proposed
the
38th
Parallel
estimated,
according
to
the
military
situation
at
that
time,
the
Soviet
Union
could
completely
reject
the
38th
Parallel
and
propose
to
use
the
37th
Parallel
or
even
a
line
further
south
as
the
demarcation
line
for
military
surrender.
Departure
also
had
to
accept
this
amendment.
But
Stalin
did
not
do
this,
but
agreed
to
the
38th
Parallel
proposal
without
hesitation.
This
not
only
surprised
Rusk
and
the
U.S.
War
Department,
but
also
puzzled
some
later
researchers.
Indeed,
by
the
end
of
Second
World
War,
the
military
strength
of
the
Soviet
Union
had
increased
unprecedentedly,
so
that
Stalin
could
confidently
declare:
"This
war
is
no
better
than
before.
Now,
whoever
reaches
the
place
with
army
occupies
the
land,
that
is,
Whose
social
system
is
in
place
there?"
Ifthe
U.S.
hastily
proposed
the
38th
Parallel
delimitation
was
out
of
political
considerations
to
limit
the
expansion
of
Soviet
Union’s
sphere
of
influence
on
the
Korean
Peninsula,
then
the
Soviet
Union’s
willingness
to
accept
the
38th
Parallel
proposal
was
also
out
of
deeper
political
considerations.
However,
Washington
is
thinking
about
North
Korea,
while
Moscow's
eyes
are
fixed
on
the
Japanese
mainland.
When
the
order
to
accept
surrender
was
transmitted
to
the
battlefield,
Soviet
troops
attacking
in
divisions
had
already
crossed
the
38th
parallel
and
were
moving
towards
Seoul
along
the
highway.
But
as
soon
they
received
the
order
about
demarcation
line,
they
quickly
withdrew
to
the
north
of
the
38th
parallel.
The
U.S.
military
successfully
entered
Seoul
on
September
6.
MacArthur
issued
"General
Order
No.
1"
after
the
signing
ceremony
of
Japan's
surrender
aboard
the
USS
Missouri
in
Tokyo
Bay,
its
content
slightly
modified
according
to
Stalin's
proposal.
The
order
mentioned:
"The
senior
commanders
of
the
Japanese
army
stationed
in
South
Korea,
Manchuria,
Sakhalin
Island,
the
Kuril
Islands
and
other
places
north
of
the
38th
parallel
north
latitude,
as
well
the
land,
sea,
air
force
and
auxiliary
forces,
should
surrender
to
the
Supreme
Commander
of
the
Soviet
Far
East
Army.
The
headquarters
of
the
Imperial
Government
of
Japan
and
the
senior
commanders
of
the
Japanese
army
stationed
in
the
mainland
of
Japan
and
its
surrounding
islands,
as
well
in
South
Korea
and
the
Ryukyu
Islands
south
of
the
38th
parallel,
as
well
the
land,
sea,
air
and
auxiliary
forces,
should
report
to
the
Pacific
region
of
the
United
States.
The
Supreme
Commander
of
the
Army
surrenders."
In
this
way,
the
38th
parallel
was
clearly
defined
as
the
dividing
line
between
the
surrender
and
military
occupation
of
Korea
by
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union.
Machine Translated by Google
At
least
until
the
end
of
1945,
the
policy
of
the
Soviet
Union
was
still
hoping
to
establish
a
unified
government
on
the
Korean
Peninsula
that
was
friendly
or
at
least
not
hostile
to
the
Soviet
Union
through
external
forces
and
through
cooperation
with
the
United
States.
A
Foreign
Ministry
background
report
entitled
"Problems
Concerning
a
Unified
Korean
Government"
drafted
by
the
Soviet
ambassador
to
Japan
Malik
indicated
that
in
December
1945
the
Soviet
Union
intended
to
take
special
measures
to
organize
elections
for
the
establishment
of
a
Korean
provisional
government.
The
report
believes
that
"the
Soviet
Union's
opposition
to
the
establishment
of
a
unified
Korean
government
is
politically
unwise",
and
recommends
(1)
support
and
declare
the
restoration
of
North
Korea's
independence
and
sovereignty;
Korean
Provisional
Government;
(3)
All
of
these
organizations
must
elect
an
interim
committee
to
prepare
for
the
Constituent
Assembly
Documents
from
the
archives
of
Soviet
Foreign
Ministry
indicate
that
until
September
1945,
the
Soviet
government
had
no
clear
plans
for
a
political
solution
to
the
Korean
problem,
but
considered
the
proposed
trusteeship
to
be
an
attempt
to
neutralize
U.S.
interests
in
the
Pacific
and
strengthen
the
Soviet
Union's
An
effective
instrument
for
the
status
of
Northeast
Asia.
A
report
by
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
listed
a
series
of
places
where
trusteeship
should
be
implemented
in
the
Far
East
and
Pacific
region,
and
another
report
clearly
stated:
"In
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
Cairo
Declaration
and
the
Charter
of
United
Nations,
in
view
of
the
desire
to
eliminate
Japan's
long-
term
influence
on
North
Korea
as
soon
possible
harmful
consequences,
and
promote
the
formation
of
conditions
that
allow
the
Korean
people
to
realize
complete
sovereignty
and
national
independence
rights",
the
Soviet
government
should
propose
that
"after
the
end
of
military
occupation
period
of
the
Korean
territory
by
the
Allied
Forces,
North
Korea
must
be
placed
in
the
Soviet
Union,
the
United
States
Under
trusteeship
the
of
joint
four
major
powers
of
China,
the
United
Kingdom
and
the
Republic
of
China",
"the
purpose
of
the
trusteeship
North
Korea
must
be
to
help
the
Korean
people
to
restore
their
independence
in
political,
economic
and
social
aspects,
and
to
help
promote
North
Korea's
independence
in
accordance
with
Article
2,
76
of
the
Charter
United
Nations
money
gradually
develops
in
the
direction
of
independence".
These
archival
documents
show
that
in
September
1945,
Moscow's
goal
was
simply
to
protect
Soviet
strategic
interests
in
Northeast
Asia
through
some
form
of
administration
joint
Korea.
Stalin's
aim
was
not
to
gain
control
of
the
entire
Korean
peninsula,
as
he
had
control
of
Poland
in
Europe,
and
even
at
the
beginning
there
was
no
intention
of
splitting
the
Korean
peninsula
and
occupying
North
Korea
separately.
On
the
contrary,
what
he
implemented
was
a
more
.complex
strategy,
which
was
to
balance
the
interests
and
influence
of
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
on
the
Korean
Peninsula
on
the
premise
of
mastering
some
strategic
military
locations.
Generally
speaking,
until
the
end
of
1949,
the
Soviet
Union’s
policy
towards
North
Korea
can
be
divided
into
three
stages:
the
first
stage,
through
trusteeship
or
other
means,
to
cooperate
with
the
United
States
to
establish
a
unified
Korean
government
in
North
Korea
that
maintains
friendly
relations
with
the
Soviet
Union;
the
second
stage
In
the
first
stage,
political
and
economic
power
in
North
Korea
was
strengthened,
and
on
this
basis,
the
unification
of
the
Korean
nation
was
promoted,
so
as
to
ensure
that
the
unified
government
established
through
general
elections
in
Korea
would
implement
a
policy
friendly
to
the
Soviet
Union;
in
the
third
stage,
after
separate
elections
were
carried
out
in
the
south
of
Korea,
Support
and
help
North
Korea
establish
an
independent
government,
be
satisfied
with
the
Soviet
Union's
control
of
North
Korea,
and
use
itto
confront
the
United
States.
Itis
not
that
the
Soviet
Union
did
not
pay
attention
to
the
status
of
Korean
Peninsula,
but
there
was
no
specific
policy
at
that
time.
A
June
1945
reference
report
on
North
Korea
written
by
two
officials
of
the
Second
Far
East
Department
of
the
Soviet
Foreign
Ministry
clearly
illustrates
Soviet
considerations
on
North
Korea
in
the
months
following
Yalta
Conference.
The
report,
which
provided
background
for
Soviet
negotiators
at
the
forthcoming
Potsdam
Conference,
offered
five
conclusions
on
a
solution
to
the
Korean
problem,
stating
that
"Japan
must
be
driven
out
of
Korea
forever
because
Korea
under
Japanese
rule
would
be
aconstant
threat
to
the
Soviet
Union's
Far
East",
"North
Korea's
independence
must
be
sufficient
to
effectively
prevent
North
Korea
from
becoming
a
base
for
future
aggression
against
the
Soviet
Union,
whether
by
Japan
or
by
any
other
country
attempting
to
exert
pressure
on
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
Far
East.
North
Korea's
Independence
The
most
effective
guarantee
for
the
security
of
Far
East
of
the
Soviet
Union
is
the
establishment
of
friendly
and
close
relations
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
North
Korea.
This
must
be
reflected
in
the
establishment
of
North
Korean
government
in
the
future.”
This
report
clearly
stated
that,
first,
the
Soviet
government
attached
great
importance
to
the
competition
among
major
powers
in
Northeast
Asia,
but
at
the
time
itstill
considered
Japan
as
the
main
threat,
so
itwas
necessary
to
prevent
Japan
from
using
North
Korea
as
a
springboard
for
expansion
into
the
Asian
continent;
second,
The
Soviet
Union
did
not
ask
for
occupation
or
sole
control
of
the
Korean
peninsula,
but
only
hoped
that
a
government
would
be
established
there
that
would
maintain
"friendly
and
close
relations"
with
the
Soviet
Union.
The
four
major
countries
share
the
trusteeship.
When
US-
Soviet
leaders
met
during
the
Yalta
Conference,
Roosevelt
raised
the
issue
of
discussing
the
territorial
trusteeship
and
suggested
to
Stalin
that
before
the
Korean
people
were
ready
for
self-
government,
"Korea
would
be
implemented
by
a
Soviet
representative,
an
American
representative,
and
a
Chinese
representative."
trusteeship",
"the
shorter
the
trusteeship
period,
better".
Probably
because
British
Foreign
Secretary
Eden
had
rejected
the
U.S.
postwar
trusteeship
plan
for
Korea
and
Indochina
proposed
by
the
United
States
in
March
1944,
Roosevelt
believed
that
"it
is
not
necessary
to
invite
Britain
to
participate
in
the
Korean
trusteeship".
Stalin
agreed
to
the
scheme
of
trusteeship,
but
he
suggested
that
Britain
should
still
be
invited
to
participate
in
the
trusteeship.
Therefore,
plan
for
China,
the
United
States,
the
Soviet
Union,
and
Britain
to
implement
temporary
trusteeship
over
North
Korea
after
the
war
was
finalized
at
Yalta
Conference.
However,
the
meeting
document
did
not
specifically
mention
the
issue
of
trusteeship
North
Korea,
but
only
mentioned
which
territories
will
be
under
trusteeship,
saying
that
"this
will
be
a
matter
to
be
reached
in
the
future."
After
Truman
succeeded
US
president,
he
sent
special
envoy
Hopkins
to
meet
Stalin
at
the
end
of
May
1945,
and
Stalin
expressed
his
"agreement
that
China,
Britain,
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
manage
jointly
Korea."
Machine Translated by Google
However,
the
Soviet
Union
also
estimated
that
itwould
be
very
difficult
to
establish
a
unified
Korean
government
friendly
to
the
Soviet
Union
through
cooperation
with
the
United
States.
Zabulokin,
deputy
director
of
the
Second
Far
East
Department
of
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs,
wrote
in
a
report:
"The
problem
is
extremely
complex,
because
there
are
numerous
political
parties
and
groups,
the
lack
of
unity
among
them,
and
the
temptation
of
United
States.
"At
the
same
time,
nature
of
the
future
North
Korean
government
must
involve
the
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union,
because
the
nature
of
this
government
will
be
one
of
the
important
factors
that
determine
how
the
North
Korean
Provisional
Government
will
act
in
the
future
domestic
and
foreign
policies
of
North
Korea.
Therefore,
North
Korea
is
Will
itbecome
the
breeding
ground
for
our
new
worries
in
the
future,
or
will
itbecome
the
Although
the
Soviet
occupation
authorities
publicly
assured
the
North
Koreans
from
the
very
beginning
that
"the
property
of
all
North
Korean
enterprises
will
be
protected,
and
they
will
do
everything
possible
to
support
you
and
maintain
the
normal
operation
of
your
enterprises",
by
September
20,
Stalin
gave
the
Soviet
Far
East
Army
General
Commander
Vasilevskii
and
the
Military
Committee
of
the
Primorsky
District
and
the
Military
Committee
of
the
25th
Army
also
ordered
to
protect
"private
and
public
property
of
North
Korean
citizens",
"encourage
local
residents
to
continue
their
peaceful
work,
protect
industry,
trade,
the
normal
functioning
of
municipal
and
other
undertakings”
and
that
troops
stationed
in
North
Korea
were
expected
to
“observe
strict
discipline,
conduct
themselves
well
and
not
bully
the
inhabitants,”
but
in
fact,
from
October
to
mid-
December
1945,
the
Soviets
seemed
to
have
lost
all
respect
for
their
troops.
Out
of
control,
the
Soviet
troops
who
entered
North
Korea
plundered
Japanese
and
Koreans
wantonly.
The
Soviets
dismantled
many
factories
in
northern
Korea
as
just
they
had
done
with
the
industrial
facilities
developed
during
the
colonial
period
in
Northeast
China.
Itis
based
on
this
fact
that
U.S.
intelligence
agencies
believe
that
the
Russians
do
not
intend
to
stay
in
North
Korea.
Obviously,
ifthe
Soviet
Union
had
intended
to
use
North
Korea
as
its
satellite
country
from
the
very
beginning,
Iam
afraid
that
itwould
not
have
adopted
such
a
predatory
economic
policy.
In
addition,
the
Soviet
Union's
economic
policy
in
North
Korea
in
1945
also
showed
that
Stalin
had
no
intention
of
occupying
the
Korean
Peninsula
or
North
Korea
for
a
long
time
at
that
time.
The
"Report
on
Japan's
Military
Industry
and
Heavy
Industry
in
Korea"
prepared
by
Suzdalev,
advisor
to
the
Second
Far
East
Department
of
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs,
for
the
Moscow
Foreign
Ministers'
Meeting
in
December
listed
a
detailed
list
of
Japan's
assets
in
Korea
and
made
a
Three
conclusions:
(1)
Japan's
military
industrial
and
heavy
industrial
enterprises
in
Korea
were
established
to
serve
the
purpose
of
Japan's
aggressive
policy
and
have
always
played
such
a
role.
There
is
no
doubt
that
these
enterprises
must
be
completely
deprived
from
the
hands
of
the
Japanese;
(2)
The
Japanese
military
and
heavy
industries
in
North
Korea
must
be
regarded
as
trophies
of
the
Red
Army,
since
all
these
enterprises
are
to
some
extent
in
the
service
of
Japanese
troops
fighting
the
Red
Army,
and
in
order
to
seize
these
enterprises
from
the
Japanese,
The
Red
Army
paid
a
lot
of
sacrifices;
(3)
Finally,
the
Japanese
military
industry
and
heavy
industry
in
North
Korea
must
be
transferred
to
the
Soviet
Union
as
part
of
the
reparations
to
compensate
for
the
huge
losses
Japan
caused
to
the
Soviet
Union
from
the
founding
of
Soviet
Union,
including
Japan’s
arrival
in
1918
Losses
caused
by
the
intervention
in
the
Far
East
in
1923.
Itwas
precisely
for
the
purpose
of
forming
a
cooperative
situation
with
the
United
States
as
soon
possible
that
the
Soviet
Union
did
not
let
the
Communists
serve
as
the
heads
of
this
institution
when
itorganized
atemporary
regime
in
North
Korea.
Although
on
October
10,
1945,
the
Soviet
cargo
ship
"Pugachev"
had
sent
66
officers
of
the
Korean
Battalion
of
the
88th
Brigade
headed
by
Kim
Il-
sang,
who
had
been
trained
in
the
Soviet
Far
East,
to
Wonsan
Port
on
November
19.
When
Japan
and
North
Korea
established
the
administrative
bureaus
of
the
five
northern
provinces,
itwas
not
Kim
IlSung
who
was
elected
chairman,
but
Cho
Mansik,
the
nationalist
leader
and
chairman
of
the
People's
Committee
of
South
Pyongan
Province
spontaneously
established
by
the
North
Koreans.
At
the
same
time,
Soviet
occupation
authorities
were
unwilling
to
support
the
activities
of
South
Korean
Communist
Party,
and
were
unwilling
to
carry
out
any
propaganda
and
agitation
work
in
the
U.S.-
occupied
areas.
The
documents
of
the
International
Department
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
on
the
North
Korean
issue
indicate
that
although
the
Soviet
military
occupation
authorities
actively
reorganized
the
Communist
Party
and
guided
its
activities
in
northern
North
Korea
in
the
autumn
of
1945,
these
practices
did
not
go
beyond
the
scope
of
38th
parallel.
At
the
time,
North
Korean
Communist
Party,
headquartered
in
Seoul,
was
headed
by
Park
Henyong,
who
later
moved
to
North
Korea
as
deputy
prime
minister
and
foreign
minister.
Under
the
sabotage
and
pressure
of
anti-
communist
organizations
in
South
Korea,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
Korea
repeatedly
requested
support
from
the
Soviet
occupation
authorities,
especially
to
help
persuade
the
US
occupation
authorities
to
allow
the
Korean
Communist
Party
to
carry
out
activities
legally.
Intervention
of
the
South
Korean
Communist
Party.
On
the
contrary,
Soviet
Union
demanded
that
the
communists
in
South
Korea
cooperate
with
the
U.S.
occupation
authorities,
explaining
that
"the
correct
strategic
line
can
be
produced
only
through
an
appropriate
understanding
of
Korea's
international
status,"
and
that
the
U.S.
and
the
Soviet
Union
"have
no
contradictory
views
on
the
Korean
issue."
of".
Although
the
U.S.
occupation
policy
faced
strong
resistance
in
South
Korea
at
that
time,
and
the
activities
of
Communist
Party
were
extremely
beneficial
to
their
own
political
development,
the
1945
report
from
North
Korea
did
not
mention
any
Soviet
propaganda
and
agitation
work
in
South
Korea
at
all .
(4)
Before
the
Constituent
Assembly
is
convened,
various
democratic
conferences
must
be
held
among
workers,
peasants,
intellectuals,
teachers,
employees,
and
other
groups
in
various
places
to
extensively
discuss
and
propose
representatives
to
the
Constituent
Assembly
and
a
unified
Korean
government
(5
establish
a
special
committee
joint
composed
of
representatives
of
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
to
take
charge
of
this
preparatory
work
(possibly
including
representatives
of
China
)and
Britain);
For
all
pressing
issues
that
arise,
a
special
Soviet-
American
committee
is
established
consisting
of
representatives
of
the
Soviet
Army
Command
and
the
US
Army
Command.
Machine Translated by Google
On
February
8,
1946,
the
North
Korean
Provisional
People's
Committee
was
established,
and
the
chairman
of
committee
at
this
time
had
been
changed
to
Kim
IlSung.
Cao
Wanzhi
was
a
highly
respected
leader
of
the
Korean
nation
in
the
anti-
Japanese
struggle,
but
he
regarded
the
Soviet
troops
in
North
Korea
as
occupiers
like
the
Japanese,
which
of
course
the
Soviets
could
not
tolerate.
Shtykov
reported
to
Stalin
that
Cao
Wanzhi
was
disloyal
to
Soviet
policy
and
had
"nationalist
tendencies,"
so
Stalin
decided
to
replace
him.
Shtykov
recommended
Kim
IlSung,
who
was
only
in
his
early
30s
when
he
returned
from
the
Soviet
Union,
and
Stalin
agreed,
saying
that
"North
Korea
is
a
young
country
and
needs
young
leaders."
Provisional
People's
Commissar
of
North
Korea
The
political
situation
at
the
beginning
of
1946
when
the
Joint
Commission
was
negotiating
very
complicated
and
the
contradictions
intensified.
On
the
one
hand,
the
U.S.
military
government
attempted
to
change
the
distribution
of
power
among
the
various
political
forces
in
southern
Korea,
declared
the
Korean
Communist
Party
illegal,
and
strengthened
the
state’s
repressive
machinery.
Create
an
adequate
political
basis
for
general
elections
under
Southern
control.
On
the
other
hand,
the
Soviet
occupation
authorities
also
actively
supported
the
political
forces
in
North
Korea
and
made
preparations
for
the
establishment
of
a
unified
Central
Provisional
Government.
In
early
October
1945,
with
the
approval
of
Marshal
Meretskov,
commander
of
the
1st
Far
Eastern
Front,
the
Soviet
25th
Army
Command
in
North
Korea
established
a
civilian
government
to
help
establish
a
regular
social
life
order
in
North
Korea.
The
civilian
government
was
a
department
under
Lieutenant-
General
Chistiakov,
commander
of
the
25th
Army,
but
itwas
also
directly
subordinate
to
the
Primorsky
Military
Council
headed
by
General
Shtykov.
Major
General
Romanenko
was
appointed
head
of
the
civil
government.
The
Soviet
civilian
government
in
North
Korea
was
indeed
much
smaller
than
the
U.S.
military
government
in
South
Korea.
However,
through
cooperation
with
the
Communists,
Soviet
Union
firmly
controlled
the
economic
and
political
life
in
North
Korea.
With
the
liberation
of
Korea
on
August
15,
various
self-
governing
management
agencies
were
quickly
established
in
various
parts
of
North
Korea,
mainly
the
people's
committees,
which
gradually
assumed
the
responsibility
of
managing
local
areas.
This
kind
of
local
administrative
organization
established
spontaneously
by
the
Koreans
filled
the
power
vacuum
that
emerged
after
the
collapse
of
Japanese
rule,
and
played
a
role
in
stabilizing
society,
protecting
and
controlling
public
facilities,
industries,
and
transportation
facilities.
After
the
U.S.
military
entered
South
Korea,
itbanned
the
People's
Committee
there
and
established
a
military
government
directly
managed
by
the
U.S.
authorities.
The
Soviet
military
occupation
authorities
established
contact
with
the
People's
Committees
in
the
North
and
reorganized
them.
The
reorganized
institutions
were
called
People's
Political
Committees.
By
the
end
of
August
1945,
in
the
northern
occupation
zone,
the
reorganization
of
the
people's
committees
was
basically
complete,
all
members
of
the
people's
political
committees
were
nationalists
or
communists,
and
the
Soviet
occupation
authorities
controlled
the
committees
directly
or
indirectly
through
the
garrison
command.
Afterwards,
the
responsibilities
of
the
Garrison
Command
expanded
dramatically,
taking
on
the
responsibility
of
supporting
the
local
People's
Political
Committee
from
all
aspects,
and
implementing,
enforcing
and
maintaining
local
laws
similar
to
military
control.
The
Soviet
occupation
authorities
first
strengthened
the
political
and
administrative
power
in
North
Korea.
Immediately
after
the
Soviet
Red
Army
entered
Korea
to
fight,
itestablished
a
military
control
agency
there,
called
the
Garrison
Command.
During
this
period,
the
Soviet
occupation
forces
generally
established
a
total
of
113
garrison
headquarters
in
North
Korea
and
its
administrative
agencies
at
all
levels.
In
the
initial
stage,
the
Garrison
Command
was
only
responsible
for
keeping
property
and
weapons
seized
from
the
Japanese,
but
later,
its
role
was
expanded
to
support
the
work
of
People's
Committee
in
all
aspects.
Sure
enough,
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
were
in
sharp
conflict
on
how
to
establish
and
what
kind
of
a
unified
interim
Korean
government
to
establish.
As
the
United
States
gradually
pursued
a
tough
policy
in
South
Korea,
especially
after
the
work
of
U.S.-
Soviet
Joint
Commission
came
to
an
impasse
in
early
1946,
the
Soviet
Union
began
to
change
its
policy
of
cooperating
with
the
United
States
to
establish
a
unified
Korean
government,
and
instead
actively
helped
North
Korea
in
the
political
And
economically
mature,
in
order
to
establish
a
unified
government
friendly
to
the
Soviet
Union
through
the
strength
of
Korean
nation
itself.
The
second
way
Zabrodin
said
was
adopted
by
the
Soviet
government.
One
of
the
strong
footholds
for
security
of
the
Far
East
depends
on
the
nature
of
the
future
North
Korean
government.”
Zablokin
concluded
that
the
establishment
of
North
Korean
government
can
be
achieved
through
the
following
possible
methods:
(1)
in
the
three
countries
of
the
Soviet
Union,
the
United
States
and
China
The
establishment
of
the
Korean
government
on
the
basis
of
the
agreement
government.In
this
form
of
government,
the
participation
of
communists
and
true
democrats
in
the
government
will
be
strongly
opposed
by
the
Korean
reactionaries,
because
such
a
government
will
undoubtedly
favor
close
relations
with
the
Soviet
Union.
Contact.
Undoubtedly,
these
reactionaries
will
seek
the
support
of
U.S.
and
Chinese
governments.
(2)
Convene
a
meeting
of
people’s
representatives,
which
must
pass
universal,
secret,
and
equal
votes
to
elect
the
members
of
the
entire
Korean
people
(except
traitors)
Delegates
to
the
Representative
Conference.
The
People's
Assembly
must
declare
the
establishment
of
Korean
Republic
and
the
establishment
of
Korean
People's
Government.
This
is
a
more
acceptable
form
of
solving
the
problem
of
establishing
a
Korean
government.
Machine Translated by Google
With
the
establishment
of
Republic
of
Korea
in
the
south,
fully
prepared
Democratic
People's
Republic
of
Korea
was
also
established
in
the
north,
and
was
immediately
recognized
and
supported
by
the
Soviet
government.
Stalin's
telegram
to
Kim
IlSung
on
October
12,
1948
stated:
"The
Soviet
government
In
short,
from
1946
to
1947,
although
both
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
realized
that
they
could
not
continue
to
cooperate,
they
did
not
immediately
think
of
establishing
independent
governments
in
the
north
and
the
south.
North
Korea
conducts
general
elections,
and
then
establishes
a
provisional
government
of
North
Korea
that
is
beneficial
to
its
own
unification.
Scholars
have
different
views
on
whether
the
United
States
or
the
Soviet
Union
first
decided
to
establish
a
separate
government
in
the
areas
they
occupied.
However,
itcan
be
concluded
that
when
things
have
developed
to
this
point,
when
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
have
formed
a
confrontational
situation
in
Europe,
the
split
of
Korean
peninsula
and
the
Korean
nation
is
already
doomed.
This
document
of
the
Soviet
military
occupation
authority
fully
demonstrated
the
starting
point
of
the
Soviet
Union’s
North
Korea
policy
at
that
time.
Regarding
this,
Molotov
commented:
“Comrade
Stalin,
Ithink
this
proposal
must
be
supported.”
Although
in
the
copies
of
files
collected
by
the
author,
Stalin's
own
written
instructions
have
become
somewhat
vague,
but
itcan
still
be
seen
that
he
agreed
with
them.
Ifthe
Soviet
experts
have
not
arrived
in
North
Korea
before
the
reunification
of
North
and
South
Korea
and
the
establishment
of
Korean
Provisional
Government,
then
the
North
Korean
Provisional
Government
will
inevitably
hire
American
experts
to
work
for
North
Korea
because
itcannot
do
without
foreign
technical
assistance.
This
will
strengthen
the
American
presence
in
North
Korea.
to
the
detriment
of
our
country's
interests.
So
we
ask
you
to
give
instructions
to
send
Soviet
experts
to
North
Korea
as
soon
possible.
North
Korea's
industry
and
rail
transport
would
not
be
able
to
function
without
the
help
of
Soviet
or
other
foreign
experts.
We
must
send
Soviet
engineers
and
technicians
to
North
Korea
without
delay,
not
only
to
help
the
People's
Committee
adjust
the
management
of
industry
and
transportation,
but
also
to
strengthen
our
country's
position
and
influence
in
North
Korea
in
the
future.
In
order
to
strengthen
the
economic
power
of
North
Korea,
the
Soviet
Union
also
changed
its
predatory
economic
policy
towards
North
Korea
and
began
to
provide
economic
aid
to
North
Korea.
On
May
12,
1947,
Meretskov
and
Shtykov
sent
a
telegram
to
joint
Stalin
stating:
Russian
archival
materials
prove
that
compared
with
the
political
difficulties
encountered
by
the
United
States
in
South
Korea,
the
Soviet
Union’s
control
over
North
Korea
was
much
more
effective,
and
Soviet
policies
and
guidelines
could
also
be
conscientiously
implemented.
On
February
20,
1947,
the
newly
established
Korean
People's
Committee
stated
in
a
letter
to
Stalin:
"The
Korean
people
are
eagerly
looking
forward
to
the
unification
of
North
and
South
Korea
and
the
rapid
establishment
of
a
unified
and
democratic
Korean
provisional
government."
On
March
1,
the
Korean
people
The
committee's
bureau
replied
to
Molotov's
letter
stating:
"Considering
that
Korea
has
not
been
reunified
so
far,
the
North
Korean
people
are
making
various
efforts
to
achieve
national
reunification
and
establish
ademocratic
government
in
accordance
with
the
Moscow
resolution."
Korea,
August
15,
1947
On
Liberation
Day,
Kim
IlSung
said
in
another
reply
to
Molotov:
"We
firmly
believe
that
aunified
democratic
Korean
government
will
be
established
in
a
short
period
of
time,
and
North
Korea
will
become
a
completely
independent
country.
Ibelieve
that,
as
a
result
of
the
efforts
Soviet
Union
as
well
yours
personally,
the
question
of
establishing
a
provisional
democratic
government
in
Korea
will
be
resolved
in
the
spirit
of
Moscow
agreement
of
the
three
foreign
ministers
in
the
interests
of
the
entire
Korean
people."
At
the
same
time,
number
of
Soviet
troops
stationed
in
North
Korea
also
declined
sharply.
In
December
1946,
the
Soviet
army
began
to
voluntarily
withdraw
from
North
Korea,
and
the
local
security
police
took
over
the
security
work
of
Soviet
army.
The
total
number
of
Soviet
occupying
forces
fell
from
40,000
in
1946
to
10,000
in
1947
as
the
North
Koreans
took
over
their
own
police
and
army.
On
April
3,
1947,
General
Kestyakov,
commander
of
the
Soviet
occupation
forces,
was
also
replaced
by
an
officer
with
the
rank
of
lieutenant
general,
Korotkov.
Under
such
a
premise,
the
Soviet
occupation
authorities
gradually
reduced
their
direct
rule
and
management
over
North
Korea.
Since
February
1946,
when
the
Soviet
Civilian
Government
handed
over
power
to
the
Korean
Provisional
People's
Committee,
the
staff
of
Civilian
Government
Headquarters
has
been
greatly
reduced.
According
to
US
intelligence
reports,
in
September
1946,
there
were
200
officials
in
various
parts
of
the
civil
government,
but
by
December
1946,
the
number
of
officials
had
dropped
to
60.
After
the
establishment
of
Korean
People's
Committee
in
February
1947,
the
personnel
of
the
Soviet
Democratic
Government
made
further
reductions
and
replacements.
Itis
said
that
by
July
1947,
the
number
of
Soviet
advisors
in
the
Korean
People's
Committee
had
dropped
to
30.
The
meeting
was
established
by
the
Soviet
occupation
authorities.
In
the
archives
of
Central
Committee
of
the
former
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
Moscow,
there
are
a
large
number
of
documents
on
the
Korean
Constitution
and
regulations
drafted
by
Soviet
officials.
There
are
also
many
reports
in
the
Central
Committee
archives
that
the
Soviet
Union
helped
North
Korea
train
cadres
and
skilled
workers,
as
well
establish
propaganda
agencies
and
social
organizations
on
the
Soviet
model.
Machine Translated by Google
Until
early
1949,
the
Soviet
Union
initially
supported
the
trusteeship
system,
later
supported
the
establishment
of
a
unified
Korean
government,
and
finally
supported
helped
There
are
different
opinions
as
to
whether
Kim
Il-
sung's
talks
with
Stalin
in
March
1949
involved
a
military
solution
to
the
Korean
national
unification
issue.
Some
scholars
pointed
out
that
when
Kim
Il-
sung
held
talks
with
Stalin
in
Moscow,
he
proposed
that
the
current
situation
required
and
possible
to
liberate
the
entire
country
by
military
means,
but
Stalin
disagreed,
on
the
grounds
that
North
was
at
a
military
disadvantage
and
that
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
had
conflicts
over
the
38th
Parallel.
agreement,
and
the
possibility
of
U.S.
intervention.
Stalin
also
said
that
ifthe
enemy
attacked
Pyongyang,
they
could
try
to
achieve
reunification
by
military
means
by
launching
a
counterattack.
However,
Kapitsa,
who
served
as
Stalin's
interpreter
during
the
talks,
testified
in
two
interviews
in
November
1993
and
December
1994
that
the
question
of
taking
military
action
was
never
mentioned
at
all.
As
for
the
U.S.
"News
and
World
Weekly"
8,
1993),
itsaid
that
Stalin
forced
Kim
Il-
sung
to
prepare
a
plan
to
attack
the
south
in
Moscow.
The
assistant
held
talks
with
Kim
Il-
sung
again
and
formulated
specific
combat
deployments,
etc.,
which
are
completely
unreliable,
and
the
author
did
not
provide
any
evidence
that
can
explain
the
problem.
Itcan
beargued
that
in
early
1949
Stalin
did
not
seriously
discuss
with
Kim
IlSung
the
issue
of
taking
military
action
on
the
Korean
peninsula,
or
at
least
did
not
agree
with
North
Korea
to
(No.
do
so.
As
a
result,
when
Kim
IlSung
visited
Moscow
in
March
1949,
only
an
economic
and
cultural
agreement
was
signed
with
the
Soviet
Union.
After
my
supplementary
explanation,
Kim
Il-
sung
and
Park
Hyun-
yong
agreed
that
itwas
not
the
right
time
to
propose
a
treaty
of
friendship
and
mutual
assistance.
My
briefing
made
Kim
Il-
sung
and
Park
Hyun-
young
alittle
uneasy.
Kim
IlSung
hesitantly
tried
to
explain
the
reasons
for
signing
the
treaty.
In
order
to
emphasize
his
own
ideas,
he
said
that
Kim
Doobong,
chairman
of
the
Presidium
of
the
Supreme
People's
Assembly,
had
repeatedly
proposed
to
him
that
a
treaty
of
friendship
and
mutual
assistance
should
be
signed
with
the
Soviet
Union.
Ifthis
treaty
cannot
be
signed
for
some
reason,
then
aSoviet
Union
must
be
signed
Secret
agreement
to
aid
North
Korea.
As
for
Kim
IlSung's
expressed
desire
to
sign
a
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Mutual
Assistance
with
the
Soviet
Union,
Iexplained
to
Kim
IlSung
and
Park
Hyun-
yong
that
itis
inappropriate
to
sign
such
a
treaty
when
the
country
is
currently
divided
into
two
parts.
The
reactionaries
use
itagainst
the
Government
of
Democratic
People's
Republic
of
Korea
in
order
to
maintain
the
divided
state
of
the
country.
The
first
thing
Kim
IlSung
thought
of
after
the
founding
country
was
to
establish
an
alliance
with
the
Soviet
Union,
so
as
to
strengthen
the
status
and
influence
of
the
Democratic
People's
Republic
of
Korea
in
the
unification
of
Korea.
Kim
IlSung
was
prepared
to
make
this
request
during
an
official
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union,
but
Stalin
was
not
interested.
On
January
19,
1949,
Shtykov,
the
Soviet
ambassador
to
Pyongyang,
reported
to
Moscow
on
the
North
Korean
delegation’s
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union,
stating
the
position
of
the
Soviet
Union:
Of
course,
the
Soviet
Union
hoped
that
North
Korea
would
develop
rapidly
and
become
stronger,
so
as
to
limit
the
influence
of
the
United
States
on
the
Korean
Peninsula
and
use
itas
asecurity
barrier
for
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
Far
East.
However,
Stalin's
basic
policy
in
North
Korea
did
not
change.
Even
ifcooperation
isno
longer
possible,
the
Soviet
Union
is
absolutely
unwilling
to
form
an
open
confrontation
with
the
United
States
like
the
Berlin
crisis.
Moscow's
goal
was
simply
to
establish
a
government
there
friendly
to
the
Soviet
Union,
except
that
this
neighbor,
originally
envisioned
to
be
the
entire
Korean
peninsula,
is
now
North
Korea.
The
reason
is
simple.
When
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
were
in
sharp
confrontation
in
Europe
in
1948,
itwas
impossible
for
Stalin
to
put
the
North
Korean
issue
first.
Due
to
the
implementation
of
the
policy
of
putting
Europe
first
in
foreign
policy,
the
Soviets
must
also
first
solve
the
huge
human
and
material
losses
caused
by
the
war
to
their
country,
so
they
had
to
put
Northeast
Asia
in
a
secondary
position.
Stalin
never
and
did
not
intend
to
establish
a
satellite
state
like
Eastern
Europe
in
North
Korea
or
North
Korea.
Therefore,
the
Soviet
Union
first
called
on
the
US
and
Soviet
troops
to
withdraw
from
the
Korean
peninsula
at
the
same
time,
and
then
announced
that
the
Soviet
occupying
forces
would
withdraw
from
North
Korea
on
their
own
initiative,
and
promised
to
give
the
Koreans
full
autonomy,
which
far
exceeded
the
autonomy
they
had
promised
to
some
Eastern
European
countries
Stalin
was
unwilling
even
to
establish
diplomatic
relations
of
an
alliance
nature
with
the
Democratic
People's
Republic
of
Korea,
or
to
take
responsibility
for
their
cause
of
unifying
the
country,
lest
itprovoke
the
United
States
and
lead
to
a
conflict
at
atime
and
place
beyond
the
reach
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Greater
disputes
and
conflicts
between
Western
blocs.
.
Unswervingly
safeguard
the
right
of
the
Korean
people
to
establish
their
own
unified
and
independent
state,
welcome
the
establishment
of
Korean
government,
and
wish
itsuccess
inits
activities
for
the
rejuvenation
of
the
Korean
nation
and
the
development
of
democracy.
The
Soviet
government
expressed
its
agreement
to
establish
diplomatic
relations
and
exchange
ambassadors
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
Democratic
People's
Republic
of
Korea,
and
at
the
same
time
establish
corresponding
economic
relations.
"
Machine Translated by Google
Under
such
circumstances,
one
of
the
main
goals
of
Chiang
Kai-
shek's
policy
toward
the
Soviet
Union
was
to
limit
Soviet
support
and
assistance
to
the
CCP.
After
Sino-
Soviet
negotiations
started
in
early
July,
as
a
reply
to
Stalin's
question
of
the
independence
of
Outer
Mongolia,
Chiang
Kai-
shek
instructed
that
"the
Soviet
Union
will
no
longer
When
the
War
of
Resistance
Against
Japan
drew
to
a
close,
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
and
its
army
had
grown
stronger
than
ever
before,
and
became
a
thorn
in
the
side
of
Kuomintang's
rule
of
China.
According
to
Zhang
Baijia’s
analysis,
when
considering
post-
war
issues,
Mao
Zedong
had
two
different
trains
of
thought:
one
was
the
long-
term
cooperation
between
the
KMT
and
the
Communist
Party
to
achieve
the
peaceful
establishment
of
the
country;
other
was
to
prepare
for
the
breakdown
of
the
KMT-
CPC
relationship
and
the
outbreak
of
civil
war.
At
that
time,
striving
for
the
first
kind
of
future
was
the
dominant
aspect
of
the
CCP's
policy.
At
the
opening
of
Seventh
National
Congress
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
in
late
April
1945,
Mao
Zedong
proposed
that
the
unity
of
the
three
major
powers
of
the
United
Kingdom,
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
is
the
most
important
in
the
international
arena,
ruling
and
deciding
everything;
Concession
and
compromise
with
the
CCP;
after
war,
China
may
embark
on
the
road
of
peaceful
reunification,
abolish
the
rule
of
one
party,
implement
democratic
reforms,
and
establish
a
coalition
government
including
all
parties,
so
as
to
gradually
achieve
the
political
realization
of
new
democracy
in
the
whole
country
Target.
However,
when
the
Communist
Party
is
preparing
to
strive
for
peace,
the
Kuomintang
tends
to
use
force
first.
This
is
because,
although
the
Kuomintang
is
relatively
strong
and
the
Communist
Party
is
relatively
weak
in
terms
of
pure
balance
of
power,
from
the
perspective
of
development
trends,
the
decline
of
Kuomintang
is
quite
obvious.
The
Communist
Party
has
an
unstoppable
upward
momentum.
In
order
to
maintain
its
monopoly
on
state
power,
the
Kuomintang
is
eager
to
use
its
remaining
military
superiority
to
interrupt
the
rising
momentum
of
the
Communist
Party
as
soon
possible,
at
least
to
weaken
the
Communist
Party's
power
enough
to
pose
a
threat
to
its
own
position.
The
Communist
Party
hopes
to
postpone
the
showdown
as
long
as
possible,
so
as
to
avoid
setbacks,
achieve
further
development,
and
win
the
final
victory
with
confidence.
Until
the
signing
of
new
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty,
the
basic
goal
of
the
Soviet
Union's
China
policy
was
to
ensure
the
realization
of
the
above-
mentioned
rights
and
interests.
For
this
reason,
Stalin
also
made
some
concessions
and
guarantees
to
Chiang
Kai-
shek,
that
is,
recognizing
Chiang
Kai-
shek's
leadership
in
China
and
persuading
the
Communist
Party
to
submit
the
unified
leadership
of
the
Kuomintang
government.
The
"Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance"
is
valid
for
30
years,
and
on
this
basis,
the
"Agreement
on
China's
Changchun
Railway",
"Agreement
on
Dalian",
"Agreement
on
Lushunkou"
and
accompanying
documents
were
signed.
These
agreements
fully
guaranteed
that
the
Soviet
Union
could
recover
all
the
rights
and
interests
in
Northeast
China
lost
by
Tsarist
Russia
during
the
Russo-
Japanese
War:
the
Changchun
Railway
owned
was
jointly
and
operated
by
China
and
the
Soviet
Union;
the
director
of
Changchun
Railway
Bureau
was
appointed
by
the
Soviet
side;
Dalian
is
a
free
port,
and
the
director
of
port
is
appointed
by
the
Soviet
side;
import
and
export
goods
transported
to
the
Soviet
Union
through
Dalian
Port
and
Changchun
Railway
are
exempt
from
customs
duties,
while
import
and
export
goods
transported
to
other
parts
of
China
through
this
port
are
subject
to
import
and
export
taxes;
Lushun
As
anaval
base
used
only
by
China
and
the
Soviet
Union;
the
chairman
of
military
committee
of
the
base
was
appointed
by
the
Soviet
side;
appointment
and
removal
of
the
main
civil
administrative
personnel
in
Lushun
City
should
be
subject
to
the
consent
of
Soviet
military
command
authority.
In
order
to
force
the
Chinese
government
to
accept
the
conditions
of
Soviet
Union,
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
attacked
from
both
sides,
using
both
soft
and
hard
tactics.
After
the
Soviet
army
had
entered
Northeast
China
in
a
large
scale,
Chiang
Kai-
shek
was
finally
forced
to
agree
sign
an
alliance
under
the
city:
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance.
On
the
China
issue,
Stalin's
Far
East
strategy
after
the
war
mainly
had
two
points,
namely:
to
separate
Mongolia
from
China's
territory
and
form
abroad
security
zone;
Outlets
and
ice-
free
ports.
The
request
of
the
Soviet
Union
was
notified
to
the
United
States
through
the
meeting
between
Stalin
and
Roosevelt
on
December
14,
1944,
and
was
guaranteed
by
the
United
States
through
the
meeting
between
Stalin
and
Roosevelt
on
February
8,
1945
and
the
Yalta
agreement.
At
same
time,
Stalin
also
made
a
return
to
the
United
States'
assurance
that
the
basic
point
of
the
Soviet
Union's
postwar
China
policy
was
to
support
Chiang
Kai-
shek's
Kuomintang
government
and
discourage
the
revolutionary
activities
of
the
Chinese
Communist
Party.
3.
Basis
for
the
transition
of
Soviet
Union’s
China
policy
North
Korea
established
a
separate
government,
and
the
content
of
its
policy
toward
North
Korea
has
changed,
but
the
basic
goal
remains
the
same,
that
is,
to
avoid
direct
conflict
with
the
United
States
and
to
avoid
stimulating
The
United
States
adopts
an
overly
tough
policy.
This
is
similar
to
the
U.S.
policy
toward
North
Korea.
That
is
to
say,
when
the
Soviet
Union’s
foreign
policy
generally
shifted
from
great-
power
cooperation
to
group
confrontation,
its
Asian
policy
still
aimed
at
maintaining
the
Yalta
system,
and
kept
confrontation
and
conflicts
within
a
limited
range
so
as
not
to
affect
the
Soviet
Union’s
confrontation
policy
in
Europe
implementation.
This
point
is
also
fully
reflected
in
Stalin's
China
policy.
Machine Translated by Google
On
August
11,
1945,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
issued
a
notice
to
the
party
committees
of
the
districts
stating:
"After
the
Soviet
Union
entered
the
war,
Japan
had
already
announced
its
surrender.
Extremely
violent."
"In
this
case,
our
party's
tasks
are
divided
into
two
stages:
A.
At
the
current
stage,
main
force
should
be
concentrated
to
force
the
enemy
and
puppets
to
surrender
us.
When
the
CCP
determined
its
strategic
policy
in
the
final
stage
of
War
Resistance
Against
Japan,
itdid
not
know
that
Stalin
had
already
made
a
decision
to
support
the
Kuomintang
government
in
China.
Mao
Zedong
once
believed
that
after
the
end
of
Anti-
Japanese
War,
the
Soviet
Union
would
come
to
help
the
Chinese
Communist
Party.
In
the
summary
report
of
the
Seventh
National
Congress
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China,
he
stated
that
he
"very
hoped
that
the
international
proletariat
and
the
great
Soviet
Union
will
help
us",
and
believed
that
"the
assistance
of
the
international
proletariat
must
come,
otherwise
Marxism
will
not
work".
Because
of
the
great
hope
that
the
Soviet
Union
would
send
troops
to
the
Northeast
and
provide
help
to
the
CCP,
Chinese
Communist
Party
decided
to
take
an
active
approach,
expand
the
liberated
areas,
and
prepare
to
fight
the
Kuomintang.
The
relationship
between
the
CCP
and
Soviet
leaders
became
more
complicated
after
the
Soviet
Red
Army
sent
troops
to
the
Northeast
in
1945.
The
Chinese
Communist
Party's
tendency
to
be
independent
from
Moscow's
command
aroused
Stalin's
great
dissatisfaction
and
suspicion,
the
Yan'an
rectification
movement
deepened
the
Soviet
leaders'
dissatisfaction
and
prejudice
against
the
CCP.
Itwas
on
the
premise
of
this
understanding
that
Stalin
said
in
a
conversation
with
US
Representative
Harriman
on
June
22,
1944:
The
CCP
is
a
"margarine"
type
of
Communist
Party,
and
they
will
abandon
communism
once
the
economic
situation
improves.
Ever
since
Mao
Zedong
led
the
Red
Army
to
northern
Shaanxi
via
the
Long
March
and
restored
contact
with
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
Communist
International,
the
relationship
between
the
CCP
and
Soviet
Union
has
been
in
a
state
of
mutual
distrust
and
disharmony.
First,
the
strategy
of
"all
through
the
united
front"
put
forward
by
Wang
Ming
on
behalf
of
the
Communist
International
opposed
Mao
Zedong's
policy
of
maintaining
independence
in
the
anti-
Japanese
national
united
front;
after
Mao
Zedong's
position
in
the
party
was
recognized
by
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
Communist
International,
the
CCP
and
Soviet
Union
The
contradictions
between
them
are
mainly
manifested
in
the
strategy
and
tactics
of
the
war.
Hu
Qiaomu
recalled:
“When
the
Soviet
Union
representatives
arrived
in
Yan’an,
as
soon
they
met,
asked
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
why
they
didn’t
concentrate
their
forces
to
fight
Japan.
A
large-
scale
war
may
be
fought.
The
Soviet
Union
is
very
dissatisfied
with
this,
thinking
that
the
CCP
is
unwilling
to
support
the
Soviet
Union.”
To
some
extent,
itcan
besaid
that
Mao
Zedong’s
independent
development
line
based
on
China’s
actual
situation
is
not
only
aimed
at
the
Kuomintan
governmen
but
also
Against
the
Comintern
and
Soviet
leaders.
From
February
1942
when
the
Yan’an
rectificati
moveme
opposed
party
stereotyp
and
bookishi
to
April
1945
when
the
Seventh
National
Congres
of
the
Commu
Party
of
China
put
forward
Mao
Zedon
Thoug
one
of
its
goals
was
to
elimin
the
influen
of
Soviet
forces
in
the
party
and
indep
devel
the
party’
stren
From
the
"Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance"
signed
by
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
Kuomintang
government
to
the
"Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship,
Alliance
and
Mutual
Assistance"
signed
with
New
China,
itmarks
the
completion
of
transition
the
Soviet
Union's
policy
towards
China,
and
the
basis
for
realizing
this
transition
lies
in
the
Soviet
Union's
cooperation
with
the
People's
Republic
of
China.
Changes
in
CCP
relations.
Therefore,
here
we
focus
on
discussing
the
changes
in
the
Soviet
Union’s
postwar
China
policy
from
the
perspective
of
the
relationship
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
CCP.
These
measures
taken
by
Stalin
to
achieve
the
goals
of
China
policy
cast
a
darker
shadow
on
the
already
unstable
and
disharmonious
relationship
between
the
CCP
and
Soviet
Union.
Since
Stalin
had
already
made
a
promise
to
the
United
States,
he
readily
agreed
to
Chiang
Kai-
shek's
terms.
Regarding
the
relationship
between
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party,
Stalin
expressed
three
opinions:
first,
"China
can
only
have
one
government,
led
by
the
Kuomintang",
but
the
Communist
Party
and
other
people
should
be
allowed
to
participate;
second,
"the
Chinese
government
requires
the
unity
of
military
orders
and
government
orders,
which
is
extremely
The
Kuomintang’s
reluctance
to
establish
acoalition
government
is
a
“legitimate
desire”;
third,
all
weapons
and
other
materials
that
the
Soviet
Union
aided
China
“are
for
the
central
government
only,
and
do
not
supply
weapons
to
the
Communist
Party.”
Stalin
also
said
meaningfully:
"In
China
there
is
the
Kuomintang,
and
the
other
force
is
the
Communist
Party.
Can
the
Communist
Party
overthrow
the
government?...
IfChina
is
allied
with
the
Soviet
Union,
no
one
will
be
able
to
overthrow
the
Chinese
government."
Supporting
the
CCP
and
bandit
rebellion
in
Xinjiang”
and
guaranteeing
the
“territorial
sovereignty
and
administrative
integrity
of
the
three
eastern
provinces”
were
the
“conditions
of
exchange”
for
the
Nationalist
government
to
recognize
the
independence
of
Outer
Mongolia.
Chiang
Kai-
shek
also
asked
Song
Ziwen,
head
of
the
Chinese
delegation,
to
clearly
tell
the
Soviets
that
on
the
issue
of
the
CCP
The
KMT's
request
is:
"The
CCP's
military
orders
and
government
orders
must
be
completely
unified
by
the
central
government,
that
is,
according
to
the
fact
that
political
parties
in
various
countries
strictly
abide
by
national
laws
and
regulations,
the
government
will
treat
them
equally.
within,
but
by
no
means
called
a
coalition
government.
"
Machine Translated by Google
 Based
on
past
experience,
the
leaders
of
the
CCP
have
already
thought
that
the
Soviet
Union's
help
to
the
CCP
is
limited.
Before
the
Soviet
Union
sent
troops,
when
the
representatives
of
the
Kuomintang
government
were
negotiating
with
Stalin
in
Moscow,
Wang
Ruofei,
the
CCP
representative
in
charge
of
foreign
affairs,
reminded
that
the
Soviet
Union
would
sign
a
contract
with
the
Kuomintang
government
and
would
never
Itwas
"The
Treaty
of
Freedom
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
Support
of
the
Communist
Party
against
the
Nationalist
Party".
But
the
Soviet
Union’s
compromise
would
not
exceed
two
limits.
One
was
that
the
Soviet
Union
would
not
allow
a
pro-
American
fascist
government
to
emerge
in
China;
Wang
Ruofei's
estimate
was
very
accurate.
On
August
23,
Mao
Zedong
made
a
long
speech
at
the
enlarged
meeting
of
the
Political
Bureau
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China.
One
is
that
we
can
get
some
big
cities,
and
the
other
is
that
we
can't
get
it,
and
we
can't
get
itnow.
We
have
tried
to
enter
several
large
cities,
but
have
not
been
successful.
There
are
two
reasons:
one
is
that
the
Soviet
Union
is
restricted
by
the
"Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance",
itis
impossible
and
not
suitable
to
help
us;
the
other
is
that
Chiang
Kai-
shek
used
his
legal
status
recognized
by
the
allies
to
make
the
Japanese
army
completely
surrender
to
him.
We
can
only
go
to
the
peace
phase
without
getting
the
big
cities.
Regarding
the
negotiations
in
Chongqing,
he
suggested:
"Comrade
Enlai
will
go
to
the
negotiations
immediately,
and
come
back
after
two
days
of
talks,
and
Hurley
and
Iwill
go.
This
time
we
can't
delay,
should
go,
and
there
is
probably
no
danger."
On
the
Northeast
issue
Mao
Zedong
pointed
out:
limited
to
the
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty,
the
Union
cannot
directly
assist
us.
Itis
certain
that
we
will
send
cadres
first,
and
there
is
alot
to
do.
Whether
the
army
will
go
or
not
is
still
uncertain.
Itdepends.
Inhis
speech
on
August
26,
Mao
Zedong
also
imagined
the
limits
of
concessions:
the
first
step
is
,from
Guangdong
to
Henan,
the
second
step
is
Jiangnan,
and
the
third
step
is
Jiangbei.
On
August
21,
Mao
Zedong
called
the
Central
China
Bureau
to
change
the
policy
of
the
Shanghai
Uprising,
on
the
grounds
that
such
an
uprising
would
turn
into
an
action
against
Chiang
Kai-
shek.
On
August
22,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
and
the
Central
Military
Commission
issued
instructions
to
cancel
the
plan
to
occupy
large
cities.
Although
Mao
Zedong
was
very
angry
about
this,
under
the
dual
diplomatic
pressure
of
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union,
he
had
to
reconsider
the
entire
strategic
policy
of
the
CCP.
As
far
as
the
strength
of
CCP
was
concerned
at
that
time,
the
offensive
strategy
could
not
be
completed
without
the
support
and
assistance
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Therefore,
on
the
one
hand,
Mao
Zedong
decided
to
go
Chongqing
to
negotiate
with
Chiang
Kai-
shek,
and
on
the
other
hand,
he
changed
his
strategy
of
attacking
big
cities.
The
Soviet
Union
sent
troops
to
Northeast
China
not
to
support
the
revolutionary
struggle
led
by
the
Communist
Party
of
China.
Therefore,
the
strategic
policy
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
to
launch
offensives
on
all
fronts
obviously
contradicted
the
policies
adopted
by
the
Soviet
Union
in
China.
Stalin
sent
two
consecutive
telegrams
on
August
20
and
22,
resolutely
opposing
the
CCP's
proposition,
and
asking
Mao
Zedong
to
agree
go
to
Chongqing
negotiate
with
Chiang
Kai-
shek.
Stalin
said
that
China
can
no
longer
fight
civil
wars,
and
ifthere
isanother
civil
war,
itmay
lead
to
the
destruction
of
nation.
However,
at
this
time,
the
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance
had
been
signed,
and
the
US
ambassador
to
China
Hurley
and
Chiang
Kai-
shek
seized
the
opportunity
to
request
peaceful
negotiations
with
the
CCP
and
invited
Mao
Zedong
to
go
Chongqing
in
person.
At
the
same
time,
CCP
has
also
adopted
an
offensive
strategy
in
North
China
and
South
China.
On
August
20,
Mao
Zedong
replied
to
the
Huazhong
Bureau:
"Your
policy
of
launching
the
Shanghai
Uprising
is
completely
correct.
Ihope
that
you
will
resolutely
and
thoroughly
implement
this
policy,
and
send
powerful
troops
from
our
army
to
the
city
provide
assistance.
Ifother
cities
have
the
conditions
for
an
uprising,
do
so."
On
the
same
day,
he
also
sent
a
telegram
to
the
Shanxi-
Chahar-
Hebei
Sub-
bureau:
"For
Beiping,
Tianjin,
Tangshan,
Baoding,
and
Shijiazhuang,
we
should
quickly
arrange
armed
uprisings
for
the
people
in
the
cities
so
that
we
can
seize
the
opportunity
to
cooperate
with
the
siege
army
to
carry
out
uprisings
and
seize
these
cities,
mainly
Pingjin. .”
The
Northeast
issue
has
received
special
attention
from
the
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China.
On
August
11,
Zhu
De
issued
the
No.
2
order
of
the
Yan'an
headquarters:
Lu
Zhengcao's
headquarters
moved
from
Shanxi
and
Suiyuan
to
Chahar
and
Rehe,
and
Zhang
Xueshi's
headquarters
moved
from
Hebei
and
Chahar
to
Rehe
and
Liaoning
Wan
Yi's
troops
marched
from
Shandong
and
Hebei
to
Liaoning,
and
Li
Yunchang's
troops,
currently
stationed
at
the
borders
of
Hebei,
Rehe,
and
Liaoning,
marched
to
Liaoning
and
Jilin
today. ,
There
should
be
no
hesitation
in
launching
an
attack
according
to
the
specific
situation,
eliminating
them
one
by
one,
vigorously
expanding
the
liberated
areas,
occupying
all
possible
and
necessary
cities
and
traffic
arteries,
seizing
weapons
and
resources,
and
arming
the
basic
masses.
""B,
in
the
future
stage,
Kuomintang
may
attack
us
on
a
large
scale.
Our
party
should
prepare
to
mobilize
troops
deal
with
civil
war.
The
number
and
scale
will
be
determined
according
to
the
situation.
"
Machine Translated by Google
 (Malinovskii)
Lieutenant
Colonel
Berulosov,
accompanied
by
Shenyang
Garrison
Commander
Zeng
Kelin,
flew
to
Yan'an
and
conveyed
Malinovskii's
verbal
notice
to
the
CCP
leaders,
namely:
Before,
neither
the
Jiang
Army
nor
the
Eighth
Route
Army
could
enter
the
Northeast;
Eighth
Route
Army
that
had
already
reached
Shenyang,
Dalian,
Changchun,
Hiraizumi
and
other
places
asked
Commander-
in-
Chief
Zhu
to
order
all
troops
withdraw
from
the
areas
occupied
by
the
Soviet
army;
Red
Army
will
soon
retreat,
how
will
the
Chinese
army
enter
the
Northeast
Itshould
be
resolved
by
China
itself,
and
the
Soviet
Union
will
not
interfere
in
China's
internal
affairs.
In
order
to
express
the
attitude
of
Soviet
Union
and
coordinate
relations
with
the
CCP,
on
September
14,
Malinovsky,
commander
of
the
Soviet
Red
Army
stationed
in
Northeast
China,
Regarding
the
conflict
between
the
CCP
army
and
the
Soviet
army
in
the
early
days
of
entering
the
Northeast,
there
are
already
many
oral
materials
from
the
Chinese
side,
and
written
materials
in
this
regard
have
also
been
found
in
Russian
archives
recently.
In
early
September
1945,
the
Northeast
Regional
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
and
the
Manchurian
Committee
of
the
Third
Branch
of
the
Shandong
Bureau
sent
letters
to
relevant
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks),
complaining
about
the
lack
of
discipline
and
misbehavior
of
the
Soviet
army
in
the
Northeast,
and
asking
the
Soviet
army
not
to
dismiss
the
Chinese
Communist
troops
entering
the
Northeast.
armed
and
demanded
that
they
be
provided
with
arms
as
well
printing
presses,
paper,
etc.
These
requests
obviously
did
not
receive
a
positive
response.
A
document
that
was
able
to
be
seen
confirmed
that
the
Soviet
garrison
officially
refused
to
provide
the
CCP
with
printing
presses
and
paper,
also
prohibited
the
CCP
from
operating
in
the
Soviet-
occupied
areas,
and
reminded
that
this
issue
would
be
handled
by
the
central
government,
namely
the
Chiang
Kai-
shek
government.
to
decide.
But
at
this
time,
the
units
of
the
Soviet
Red
Army
occupying
the
Northeast
did
not
have
the
same
understanding
and
grasp
of
Moscow's
policy.
Some
units
expressed
their
support
for
the
CCP
army,
such
as
in
Shanhaiguan,
Dalian,
Shenyang
and
other
places.
Conflicts
and
even
frictions
occur
from
time
to
time.
By
the
beginning
of
September
1945,
the
CCP
troops
in
the
pass
had
quickly
approached
or
entered
the
Northeast
by
taking
advantage
of
their
geographical
advantages.
On
September
11
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
sent
a
telegram
to
the
Shandong
Branch
Bureau:
"According
to
the
reconnaissance
report
of
the
party
members
in
Jiaodong
District
in
,Dalian,
our
party
and
our
army
are
currently
developing
very
well
in
the
Northeast.
In
order
to
rapidly
develop
our
strength
and
strive
for
a
solid
position
in
the
Northeast,
central
government
decided
to
transfer
four
divisions
and
twelve
regiments
from
Shandong,
with
a
total
of
25,000
to
30,000
people,
and
disperse
them
into
the
Northeast
via
sea
routes.
And
send
Xiao
Hua
to
unify
the
command."
What
Stalin
pursued
was
to
ensure
the
full
realization
of
the
Yalta
Agreement
in
the
Far
East,
and
to
restore
all
the
rights
and
interests
in
China
that
Russia
lost
during
the
Russo-
Japanese
War
in
1904.
As
for
the
ideological
considerations,
at
best,
itone
was
just
of
Stalin’s
dealings
with
the
KMT
government.
political
weight.
Therefore,
whether
the
Red
Army
of
the
Soviet
Union
"let
go"
and
"sympathize"
with
the
CCP
army
in
the
Northeast
is
completely
determined
by
the
needs
of
the
Soviet
Union
when
dealing
with
the
Kuomintang
government
in
China
and
with
the
United
States
in
the
international
arena,
and
the
CCP's
policy
towards
the
Northeast
cannot
be
determined.
Itdoes
not
change
with
changes
in
the
attitude
of
Soviet
Union.
However,
at
that
time,
the
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
still
lacked
a
comprehensive
understanding
of
the
goals
Soviet
Union's
policy
in
China.
In
order
to
fulfill
the
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
and
the
Soviet
Union's
promises
to
the
United
States
and
Chiang
Kai-
shek,
the
Soviet
Union
was
asking
the
Nationalist
Army
to
enter
the
Northeast
at
this
time.
According
to
Harriman,
the
U.S.
ambassador
to
the
Soviet
Union,
reported
to
Secretary
of
State
Byrnes
that
on
August
27,
Stalin
expressed
in
a
meeting
that
he
hoped
that
the
Chinese
Nationalist
Government
would
send
Chinese
troops
to
Manchuria
in
the
near
future
to
take
over
the
law
and
order
control
of
Japanese
saboteurs
from
the
Soviets.
Take
precautions.
Harriman
believed
that
this
indicated
the
Soviet
Union
would
comply
with
the
agreement
and
withdraw
from
Manchuria
within
three
months,
and
therefore
suggested
that
this
matter
should
be
considered
immediately
in
connection
with
the
plan
to
deploy
Chinese
troops
in
the
Northeast.
Obviously,
the
CCP’s
starting
point
for
this
understanding
is
that
although
there
were
contradictions
between
the
leaders
of
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
CCP,
Soviet
Union’s
China
policy
was
constrained
by
the
international
situation
in
the
Far
East,
the
consistency
of
ideology
and
the
dependence
of
Chiang
Kai-
shek’s
government
on
the
United
States
made
them
Itis
believed
that
the
CCP
will
not
be
restricted
by
the
Soviet
Union
when
developing
its
own
power.
Therefore,
the
CCP’s
consideration
when
adjusting
and
changing
its
policies
was
still
based
on
cooperating
with
the
Soviet
Union’s
actions
in
China
and
receiving
the
help
and
support
of
the
Soviet
Union.
In
order
to
cooperate
with
the
actions
of
Soviet
Red
Army
and
coordinate
with
the
situation
of
Chongqing
negotiations,
the
CCP
decided
to
quickly
enter
the
Northeast
to
control
the
vast
villages
and
small
medium-
sized
cities.
After
the
three
provinces,
Red
Army
will
definitely
not
make
formal
contact
with
us
or
give
us
help”,
but
still
believes
that
as
long
as
the
actions
of
Chinese
Communist
Army
in
the
Northeast
“do
not
directly
affect
the
Soviet
Union’s
obligations
in
diplomatic
treaties,
the
Soviet
Union
will
adopt
a
laissez-
faire
attitude
and
entrust
itto
us.”
great
sympathy".
There
are
also
specific
instructions
that
"you
can
enter
informally
in
the
name
of
the
Northeast
Volunteer
Army,
keep
quiet,
don't
publish
newspapers,
take
small
roads,
control
cities
and
villages
where
the
Soviet
army
is
not
stationed,
and
send
cadres
to
make
informal
contacts
with
the
Red
Army
in
cities
that
cannot
be
visited."
The
CCP’s
consideration
at
the
time
like
was
just
Liu
Shaoqi,
acting
chairman
of
the
Central
Committee,
said:
“The
Soviets
are
the
Red
Army,
and
we
are
also
the
Red
Army;
they
are
the
Communist
Party,
and
we
are
also
the
Communist
Party.”
Machine Translated by Google
 However,
Soviet
policy
in
the
Northeast
soon
changed
again.
The
Soviet
Union
adopted
a
policy
of
supporting
the
CCP,
on
one
hand
to
prevent
American
forces
from
entering
the
Northeast,
and
on
the
other
hand
to
put
pressure
on
the
Kuomintang.
At
that
time,
Soviet
representatives
were
negotiating
with
the
Kuomintang
government
on
Northeast
takeover
and
economic
cooperation
issues.
The
Chinese
side
demanded
that
the
Northeast
takeover
be
completed
before
signing
an
economic
cooperation
agreement.
In
this
regard,
Zhang
Jiaao,
the
economic
representative
of
the
Kuomintang
government
in
the
Northeast,
had
clearly
felt
during
the
negotiations
with
Malinovsky
that
as
long
as
the
Kuomintang
could
meet
the
demands
of
Soviet
Union,
the
Soviet
Union
would
immediately
change
its
attitude.
At
this
time,
Chiang
Kai-
shek's
countermeasures
were
both
soft
and
hard.
On
the
one
hand,
he
ordered
the
Kuomintang
government
to
retreat
the
northeast
to
put
pressure
on
the
Soviet
Union
This
hand
really
worked.
On
November
17,
the
Soviet
Union
notified
the
Kuomintang
government:
"The
troops
of
the
Chinese
government
can
enter
Changchun
and
Shenyang
without
hindrance,
and
the
Soviet
army
will
provide
assistance";
"The
Soviet
army
strictly
abides
by
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty."
will
help
the
Communist
Party
in
Manchuria”;
“If
the
Chinese
government
wishes
to
delay
the
withdrawal
of
Soviet
troops,
the
withdrawal
of
Soviet
troops
can
be
.postponed
for
a
month
or
two.”
On
Nov
19th,
Chungking
stated
that
ifthe
Soviet
Union
was
willing
to
help
the
KMT
airlift
troops
to
Shenyang
and
Changchun,
as
well
transportation
in
Shanghai
and
land,
and
disarm
the
CCP
troops
in
Manchuria,
the
withdrawal
of
Red
Army
could
be
postponed
for
a
month
or
two.
On
Nov
20th,
Moscow
notified
Chongqing
that
the
Red
Army
would
guarantee
the
safe
arrival
of
KMT
troops
to
Shenyang
and
Changchun.
In
order
to
realize
this
strategy,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
will
inevitably
need
further
help
from
the
Soviet
Union,
so
itasked
the
Soviet
Union
to
delay
the
withdrawal
of
Soviet
army
from
the
Northeast
and
prevent
the
Kuomintang
troops
from
landing
in
the
Northeast
port
and
taking
over
the
regime.
The
Soviet
side
stated
that
itwould
be
difficult
to
postpone
the
withdrawal,
but
agreed
not
to
allow
the
Kuomintang
troops
to
be
airlifted
to
Changchun
until
the
withdrawal.
In
addition,
the
Soviet
army
was
also
preparing
to
provide
weapons,
equipment,
communication
and
means
of
transportation
to
the
CCP
army,
allowing
the
CCP
army
to
move
freely
in
the
areas
where
Kuomintang
troops
landed.
In
Changchun,
except
for
the
mayor,
leaders
of
government
departments
could
be
replaced
by
the
CCP.
As
a
result,
the
Kuomintang
troops
who
took
over
the
Northeast
failed
to
land
in
Dalian,
Yingkou
and
Huludao.
This
is
of
course
the
result
of
the
cooperation
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
CCP.
Affected
by
this
policy
of
the
Soviet
Union,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
successively
issued
instructions
to
the
relevant
units
on
October
16,
October
19,
and
November
1to
"change
the
policy
of
dispersion
in
the
past"
and
"resolutely
eliminate
all"
troops
entering
from
any
direction.
The
Jiang
army
in
the
Northeast
concentrated
its
main
forces
on
the
front
lines
of
Jinzhou,
Yingkou,
and
Shenyang,
"first
defending
Liaoning
and
Andong,
then
controlling
the
entire
Northeast".
The
overall
task
was
"to
seize
the
Northeast
and
consolidate
North
and
Central
China.
"
In
order
to
resist
the
pressure
of
the
United
States
and
play
a
role
in
containing
the
Kuomintang,
Soviet
Union
not
only
stopped
the
landing
of
the
Kuomintang
troops
in
various
ports
in
the
Northeast,
but
also
expressed
its
full
support
for
the
CCP
to
seize
the
Northeast.
In
early
October,
the
Soviet
Army
suggested
to
the
Northeast
Bureau
of
the
CPC
and
Central
Committee
of
the
CPC
that
CCP
deploy
200,000
to
300,000
troops
into
the
Northeast
to
guard
the
Northeast
Gate,
and
the
Soviet
Army
would
provide
the
CCP
with
a
large
amount
of
military
equipment.
In
late
October,
the
representatives
of
the
Soviet
Army
further
encouraged
the
Northeast
Bureau
to
"respect
itself
as
the
master
and
let
go
of
doing
things"
in
the
Northeast,
"send
people
quickly
to
take
over
the
cities
and
industries
in
the
industrial
centers",
and
stated
that
the
CCP
"can
gradually
take
over
the
government"
and
Soviet
Army
could
Cooperate
with
the
CCP
army
to
fight
against
the
Kuomintang
army.
Representatives
of
the
Soviet
Army
even
suggested
that
itwould
be
best
to
move
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
to
the
Northeast.
Soon,
the
five
foreign
ministers
meeting
in
London
failed,
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
failed
to
achieve
coordination
on
the
Far
East
issue,
and
the
Soviet
Union
refused
to
participate
in
the
Far
East
Advisory
Committee.
As
Stalin
was
disturbed
by
the
actions
of
United
States
in
the
Northeast,
Soviet
Union
began
to
adjust
its
policy
in
the
Northeast.
The
United
States
was
worried
that
the
Soviet
Union
would
use
the
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
to
completely
control
Northeast
China,
so
itrepeatedly
asked
the
Soviet
Union
to
publicly
promise
to
abide
by
the
principle
of
"open
door".
At
the
same
time,
American
troops
began
to
land
in
various
ports
in
North
China
and
transported
Kuomintang
troops
to
North
China
and
Northeast
China
on
alarge
scale.
The
Soviet
Union
expressed
serious
concern
and
dissatisfaction
with
the
march
of
the
Kuomintang
troops
to
the
northeast
with
help
of
the
United
States.
In
October,
aU.S.
warship
forced
its
way
into
Dalian
Port,
and
its
captain
went
ashore
to
inspect
the
surrounding
situation.
This
incident
angered
the
commanders
of
Soviet
army
in
the
Northeast.
Marshal
Malinovsky
repeatedly
mentioned
this
incident
when
he
met
with
the
representatives
of
the
Northeast
Xingyuan
of
the
Nationalist
Government.
Recognizing
that
"the
Soviet
Union
was
unwilling
to
allow
us
to
rely
on
the
United
States
to
transport
our
troops,
in
other
words,
they
were
unwilling
to
allow
the
United
States
to
gain
a
presence
in
the
Northeast,"
which
indicated
that
Malinovsky
"was
concerned
about
our
dependence
on
American
strength
to
transport
our
troops
The
level
of
dissatisfaction
transported
to
the
Northeast
and
how
unwilling
the
Soviet
Union
was
to
see
American
power
penetrate
the
Northeast".
Faced
with
this
situation,
the
strategic
policy
of
fighting
for
the
Northeast
proposed
by
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
had
to
be
conceived
as
"a
long-
term
struggle
with
the
Kuomintang."
Relying
on
the
key
cities
and
villages,
establish
a
basis
for
protracted
struggle,
and
then
go
on
to
win
and
control
the
major
cities
along
the
South
Manchurian
route.”
Machine Translated by Google
Mao
Zedong
was
very
dissatisfied
with
the
Soviet
Union's
approach,
and
even
expressed
his
desire
to
strengthen
ties
with
the
United
States.
After
Marshall
came
to
China,
Mao
Zedong
asked
Zhou
Enlai
to
bring
him
a
message
saying:
"I
want
to
go
abroad
first
to
the
United
States."
Hu
Qiaomu
later
explained
that
this
was
a
political
gesture
to
the
United
States
out
of
strategic
needs,
but
on
the
other
hand
On
the
one
hand,
itis
also
because
of
dissatisfaction
with
the
Soviet
Union
that
itdoes
intend
to
seek
aid
from
the
United
States.
All
this
shows
that
the
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
Far
East
can
hopefully
be
realized
by
reaching
a
compromise
with
the
United
States
and
the
Chiang
Kai-
shek
government.
Therefore,
when
Marshall
came
to
China
mediate
relations
between
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party
at
this
time,
the
Soviet
Union
not
only
rejected
the
CCP’s
proposal
to
ask
the
Soviet
Union
to
also
participate
in
the
mediation,
but
also
used
its
influence
to
push
the
CCP
to
decide
cease
the
war
and
cooperate
with
the
Kuomintang
to
carry
out
democratic
reforms.
Moscow
also
warned
the
CCP
that
itmust
not
go
to
war
in
the
Northeast,
otherwise
there
would
be
"the
great
danger
of
annihilation
the
entire
army
and
causing
the
full
deployment
of
US
military."
Meanwhile,
Stalin
met
with
Chiang
Kai-
shek's
son,
Chiang
Ching-
kuo,
in
Moscow.
Stalin
expressed
the
following
attitude
of
Soviet
government
during
talks
with
Chiang
Ching-
kuo
on
December
30:
The
Soviet
Union
had
only
three
representatives
in
Yan’an,
and
the
Soviet
Union
had
recalled
all
representatives
from
Yan’an
because
they
disagreed
with
the
CCP’s
interruption
of
the
Chongqing
negotiations;
the
Soviet
Union
reiterated
that
Moscow’s
foreign
minister
The
spirit
of
the
meeting
was
to
recognize
Chiang
Kai-
shek’s
government
as
China’s
legitimate
government.
China
cannot
have
two
governments
and
armies;
Suggestions,
and
since
the
Chongqing
negotiations,
the
CCP
no
longer
asks
the
Soviet
Union
for
advice;
the
Soviet
Union
is
not
satisfied
with
the
behavior
of
the
CCP,
ifthey
ask
the
Soviet
Union
for
advice,
the
Soviet
Union
will
make
suggestions
to
them
in
accordance
with
the
spirit
described
to
Chiang
Ching-
kuo;
the
CCP
wants
to
enter
Manchuria,
but
the
Soviet
Union
did
not
let
itgo;
the
Soviet
Union
was
willing
to
act
as
a
mediator
in
resolving
the
Xinjiang
uprising,
the
Soviet
Union
was
able
to
play
a
role
in
the
Xinjiang
uprising,
and
so
on.
By
December
1945,
relations
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
Nationalist
government
had
improved.
The
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
reached
a
consensus
on
the
China
issue
again
at
the
Moscow
Foreign
Ministers'
Meeting,
and
both
sides
expressed
their
support
for
aunified
Chinese
government
led
by
the
Kuomintang.
Molotov
also
repeatedly
stated
that
"supporting
Chiang
Kai-
shek
is
the
policy
of
the
Soviet
Union"
and
stated
that
"the
goals
of
the
Soviet
Union
are
no
different
from
those
of
the
United
States"
on
the
issue
of
supporting
the
Chinese
central
government.
At
this
time,
Chen
Yun,
Gao
Gang,
Zhang
Wentian
and
others
who
were
on
the
Northeast
front
had
seen
that
the
fundamental
policy
of
the
Soviet
Union's
China
policy
was
to
safeguard
the
Soviet
Union's
own
interests.
They
pointed
out
in
their
report
to
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
on
November
30:
The
purpose
is
to
"maintain
peace
in
the
Far
East
and
the
world."
The
Soviet
Union's
policy
toward
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party
in
the
Northeast
serves
this
purpose.
Therefore,
the
CCP
must
prepare
for
a
long-
term
struggle
in
the
Northeast
and
"do
its
utmost
to
avoid
pinning
all
hopes
on
Soviet
aid."
The
so-
called
"maintaining
peace"
is
nothing
more
than
a
statement
by
the
CCP
leaders
to
protect
the
face
of
Soviet
Union,
while
abandoning
the
illusion
of
aid
to
the
Soviet
Union
shows
that
the
CCP
leaders
understand
the
essence
of
Stalin's
Far
East
policy.
Facing
the
sudden
change
in
the
situation,
CCP
also
had
to
adjust
its
policy
again.
On
November
20
and
28,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
issued
instructions
to
the
Northeast
Bureau
twice
in
a
row,
proposing
that
"a
solid
foundation
should
be
quickly
established
in
East
Manchuria,
North
Manchuria,
and
West
Manchuria,
and
the
work
in
Rehe
and
East
Hebei
should
be
strengthened."
The
actions
of
the
Soviet
occupation
authorities
made
the
CCP
realize
that
itwas
impossible
to
"occupy
the
Northeast",
and
the
CCP's
main
force
could
only
be
dispersed
again,
"to
control
various
small
and
medium-
sized
cities,
minor
railways,
and
vast
villages,
to
establish
base
areas
with
a
focus,
and
to
make
long-
term
plans." .
At
the
same
time,
in
early
and
mid-
November
1945,
the
United
States
used
31
transport
ships
to
the
two
armies
of
Kuomintang
from
Kowloon
in
Hong
Kong
and
Haiphong
in
Vietnam
to
Qinhuangdao,
and
successively
captured
Shanhaiguan,
which
had
been
liberated
by
the
Eighth
Route
Army
from
the
Japanese
and
puppet
troops.
And
Suizhong,
Jinzhou
and
other
points
on
Beining
Road.
After
reaching
a
compromise
with
Chiang
Kai-
shek,
the
Soviet
Union
began
to
restrict
the
CCP's
actions
in
the
Northeast.
On
November
20,
the
representative
of
the
Soviet
Army
notified
the
Northeast
Bureau
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
that
the
higher
authorities
had
decided
that
all
the
cities
along
Changchun
Road
would
be
handed
over
to
the
Kuomintang
government,
and
that
the
Chinese
Communist
Army
must
retreat
50
kilometers
away
from
the
railway
line
and
not
enter
the
areas
where
Soviet
troops
were
stationed.
Before
the
Northeast,
they
were
not
allowed
to
fight
with
the
Kuomintang
army.
The
representatives
of
the
Soviet
Army
also
claimed
that
in
order
to
safeguard
the
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union,
they
would
"do
not
hesitate
to
use
force
when
necessary"
to
expel
the
Chinese
Communist
Army.
Shortly
thereafter,
the
Soviet
army
further
demanded
that
the
CCP
hand
over
the
power
ithad
already
grasped,
and
prohibited
the
CCP
from
taking
actions
in
major
cities
that
would
hinder
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty.
In
early
December,
Molotov
also
ordered
the
Soviet
commander
at
the
Lushun
naval
base
to
carry
out
his
instruction:
Do
not
allow
Chinese
troops
w
—
Kuomintang
or
Communist
tenter
—the
Soviet
base.
Molotov
especially
o
emphasized
that
"we
must
absolutely
oppose
all
hether
attempts
by
the
Communists
to
re-
establish
political
and
economic
life
in
naval
bases,
as
they
are
doing
in
their
own
bases."
Machine Translated by Google
In
this
situation,
the
withdrawal
of
Soviet
troops
from
Northeast
China
is
imperative.
However,
Stalin
was
absolutely
unwilling
to
give
up
the
economic
benefits
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
about
to
gain
in
the
Northeast,
especially
not
allowing
the
United
States
to
take
advantage
of
the
situation
after
withdrawal
of
the
Soviet
Union
to
gain
a
foothold
in
the
Northeast.
Although
Stalin
expressed
his
understanding
of
the
"open
door"
of
the
United
States
in
public,
he
deeply
doubted
that
this
policy
was
expansionary.
He
once
warned
the
Chinese
government
that
the
"open
door"
policy
was
a
tool
of
imperialist
aggression,
so
the
Nationalist
government
was
opening
the
door.
At
same
time,
itshould
be
prepared
to
close
the
door.
In
early
1946,
when
the
U.S.
special
envoy
Wedemeyer
announced
that
he
would
help
Du
Yuming
transport
large
troops
to
the
Northeast,
Malinowski
made
itclear
to
Zhang
Jiaao
that
the
Soviet
Union
had
always
been
unwilling
to
see
U.S.
political
power
penetrate
into
the
Northeast
through
the
dollar.
Zhang
Jiaao
believes
that
"after
the
Americans
have
further
expressed
their
intention
to
support
China's
military
power
in
the
Northeast
today,
the
suspicion
and
of
jealousy
the
Soviets
must
have
increased."
The
Soviet
Union
was
even
more
worried
about
the
presence
of
American
troops
in
the
Northeast.
When
he
met
with
Chiang
Ching-
kuo
on
December
30,
1999,
he
made
itclear
that
the
Soviet
government
was
unwilling
to
let
American
troops
enter
Manchuria
because
this
was
within
the
scope
of
Soviet
Union.
Thirdly,
the
anti-
Soviet
sentiment
in
China
at
that
time
also
forced
the
Soviet
Union
to
make
a
decision
to
withdraw
its
troops
from
the
Northeast.
On
February
11,
1946,
in
order
to
force
the
Soviet
Union
to
withdraw
its
troops
as
soon
possible,
the
United
States
and
Britain
published
the
full
text
of
Yalta
Secret
Agreement
on
the
Far
East.
Soon,
the
newspaper
published
the
Soviet
Union's
economic
requirements
for
the
Northeast
and
the
suspension
of
withdrawal
the
Soviet
troops.
The
disclosure
of
these
news
aroused
great
indignation
in
Chinese
public
opinion.
Large-
scale
anti-
Soviet
demonstrations
took
place
successively
in
major
cities
such
as
Chongqing,
Changchun,
and
Nanjing,
demanding
the
immediate
withdrawal
of
Soviet
troops
from
the
Northeast.
Chiang
Kai-
shek
took
advantage
of
this
situation
to
issue
a
stronger
statement,
reiterating
that
the
Chinese
government
enjoyed
complete
sovereignty
over
Manchuria.
At
the
same
time,
on
January
16,
1946,
the
murder
of
Zhang
Xinfu,
a
technician
responsible
for
Northeast
reception
by
the
Kuomintang,
was
also
used
by
Kuomintang
newspapers,
which
aroused
strong
anti-
Soviet
sentiment
among
the
people.
Second,
the
Northeast
issue
has
drawn
great
attention
from
the
international
community,
especially
the
United
States.
When
the
U.S.
government
learned
of
the
Sino-
Soviet
negotiations
on
economic
cooperation,
itformally
sent
anote
to
the
Chinese
and
Soviet
governments
on
February
9,
claiming
that
the
Sino-
Soviet
discussion
on
management
the
joint
of
Northeast
China’s
industrial
and
mining
industries
violated
the
“open
door”
policy
Britain
also
expressed
its
support
for
the
US
position.
Marshall,
who
came
to
China
mediate
the
relationship
between
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party,
encouraged
the
Chinese
government
to
resist
the
pressure
of
the
Soviet
Union
and
not
make
any
promises
on
the
"spoils
of
war"
and
economic
cooperation
issues.
He
told
Foreign
Minister
Wang
Shijie:
"Time
is
not
good
for
the
Soviet
.Union,
because
the
longer
its
troops
stay
in
Manchuria,
the
more
clearly
itwill
become
awillful
saboteur
of
the
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
in
the
eyes
of
people
all
over
the
world."
On
February
13,
the
United
States
Secretary
of
State
Bernas
sent
a
power
call
to
Wang
Shijie
again,
proposing
that
ifthe
Soviet
Union's
economic
demands
on
Northeast
China
involved
compensation,
itshould
beresolved
by
the
Far
East
Committee.
In
this
way,
the
issue
of
economic
cooperation
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
will
be
raised
on
the
stage
of
international
diplomacy,
and
the
Soviet
Union
will
be
involved
in
a
direct
contest
with
the
United
States
and
Britain.
At
the
same
time,
closely
related
issue
of
Soviet
withdrawal
has
also
developed
into
an
international
issue,
which
forced
the
Soviet
Union
to
make
a
final
decision.
First
of
all,
the
Sino-
Soviet
negotiations
on
Northeast
economic
cooperation
reached
astalemate.
The
main
differences
are:
First,
the
scope
of
economic
cooperation
is
different.
Although
the
Soviet
Union
has
greatly
reduced
ventures,
a
joint
considerable
number
of
heavy
industry
enterprises
and
aviation
inland
waterway
shipping
enterprises
cannot
be
agreed
to
by
China.
The
second
is
whether
the
chairman
and
general
manager
of
venture
the
should
joint
be
held
by
the
Chinese
side
or
the
Soviet
side.
The
two
sides
hold
opposing
positions.
Third,
the
two
sides
decided
to
sign
the
economic
cooperation
agreement
at
different
times.
The
Soviet
Union
requested
that
itbe
completed
before
the
withdrawal
of
troops,
while
China
insisted
on
signing
after
the
withdrawal
of
Soviet
troops.
Thus,
when
the
date
of
third
troop
withdrawal
(February
1,
1946)
approached,
the
Sino-
Soviet
negotiations
on
economic
cooperation
did
not
make
any
substantive
progress.
In
order
to
seek
the
economic
interests
of
the
Northeast,
Soviet
Union
threatened
China
many
times
that
"it
will
not
withdraw
its
troops
until
the
economic
cooperation
issue
is
resolved".
The
Kuomintang
government
also
felt
bitter
about
the
transfer
of
too
many
rights
and
interests
in
the
Northeast.
Therefore,
sometimes
itwas
soft,
and
sometimes
itresisted.
Chiang
Kai-
shek
simply
said:
"As
long
as
the
Soviet
Union
does
not
withdraw
its
troops,
we
will
not
discuss
and
carry
out
economic
cooperation.
We
will
still
put
this
issue
aside.
Wait
for
the
development
of
situation."
This
is
actually
a"cold
treatment"
strategy,
allowing
the
Soviet
Union
to
fully
expose
its
diplomatic
intentions
in
order
to
seek
international
solidarity.
Since
the
Soviet
army
continued
to
occupy
the
Northeast
after
February
1,
the
Chinese
negotiators
left
Changchun,
and
the
Sino-
Soviet
economic
negotiations
were
interrupted.
Afterwards,
the
Soviet
Union
requested
to
continue
negotiations
in
Changchun,
but
the
Chinese
government
refused,
but
stated
that
itcould
consider
moving
the
negotiations
to
Chongqing.
Economic
negotiations
were
nowhere
in
sight,
but
the
date
agreed
by
both
parties
for
the
withdrawal
of
Soviet
troops
from
the
Northeast
had
already
passed.
In
this
way,
the
Soviet
Union
was
in
a
very
passive
position
diplomatically.
But
by
the
spring
of
1946,
the
situation
in
the
Northeast
had
changed
dramatically
again,
forcing
the
Soviet
Union
into
an
embarrassing
situation
where
itfailed
to
obtain
the
economic
rights
and
interests
in
the
Northeast
as
ithad
expected
and
had
to
withdraw
its
troops
from
the
Northeast.
Faced
with
this
situation,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
finally
determined
its
strategic
policy
in
the
Northeast,
that
is,
to
shift
the
focus
of
work
in
the
Northeast
to
areas
far
away
from
big
cities
and
traffic
arteries,
to
establish
a
solid
base.
In
other
words,
the
CCP
can
only
rely
on
its
own
strength
and
prepare
for
a
long-
term
war.
Machine Translated by Google
Under
this
favorable
strategic
situation
with
his
back
to
North
Manchuria
and
relying
on
the
inside
line,
Mao
Zedong
even
determined
to
fight
against
the
Kuomintang
army
in
strategically
important
places.
In
this
way,
when
the
Soviet
army
withdrew
from
the
Northeast,
CCP
army
took
advantage
of
the
favorable
opportunity
that
Soviet
army
had
withdrawn
from
the
Changchun
Railway
and
the
Kuomintang
army
was
still
stranded
in
West
Manchuria,
and
promptly
entered
or
captured
many
cities
with
solid
industrial
foundations
in
South
Manchuria,
such
as
Andong,
Benxi,
Liaoyang,
Haicheng,
Fushun
and
Tonghua,
captured
Siping
in
mid-
March,
and
captured
Changchun,
Harbin,
Qiqihar
and
other
important
cities
in
mid-
to-
late
April,
annihilating
the
puppet
Manchukuo
and
The
bandits
armed
more
than
30,000
people.
So
far,
the
section
north
of
Kaiyuan
of
the
Changchun
Railway
has
been
completely
under
the
control
of
CCP.
While
emphasizing
that
itwill
not
make
any
concessions
for
the
Chongqing
negotiations,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
ordered
its
troops
in
the
Northeast
to
quickly
take
active
military
actions.
On
March
24,
Mao
Zedong
instructed
the
Northeast
Bureau
that
"our
party's
policy
is
to
use
all
our
strength
to
control
the
two
cities
of
Changha
and
the
entire
Middle
East,
at
any
cost,
and
oppose
the
Jiang
army's
occupation
of
Changha
and
the
Middle
East
Road."
He
asked
the
Northeast
Bureau
to
contact
the
Soviet
occupation
authorities
immediately
"We
are
allowed
to
send
troops
occupy
the
two
cities
of
Changsha
and
the
entire
Middle
East",
"mobilize
all
efforts
to
resolutely
control
the
Siping
Street
area,
and
ifthe
recalcitrant
army
is
completely
wiped
out
when
itadvances
northward,
itwill
never
be
allowed
to
advance
Changchun",
"Our
main
force
in
southern
Manchuria
will
be
Resolutely
annihilate
the
enemy
attacking
Liaoyang,
Fushun
and
other
places
on
the
spot."
On
March
25,
itwas
also
telegraphed
that
before
the
actual
truce
in
Northeast
China,
"all
possible
efforts
should
be
made
to
defend
strategic
locations,
especially
northern
Manchuria,
at
the
expense
of
major
sacrifices."
For
Changchun,
Harbin,
Qiqihar
and
other
places,
"it
must
be
controlled
within
one
or
two
days
after
the
Soviet
army
retreats",
lest
the
armistice
team
arrive
and
be
handed
over
to
the
Kuomintang
for
occupation.
Of
course,
taking
advantage
of
the
withdrawal
Soviet
Union
to
occupy
strategically
important
locations
was
indeed
a
rare
opportunity
for
the
CCP's
development
in
Northeast
China.
Mao
Zedong
decided
to
take
advantage
of
this
favorable
opportunity,
and
even
considered
that
ifthe
Soviet
Union
did
not
support
it,
he
would
seize
the
favorable
opportunity
and
make
military
preparations
to
occupy
the
Northeast.
On
March
15,
Mao
Zedong
called
Zhou
Enlai,
who
was
negotiating
with
the
Kuomintang,
and
pointed
out:
"Harbin
must
not
allow
the
Kuomintang
to
garrison
troops,
and
Fushun
and
Yingkou
must
strive
to
prevent
both
sides
from
stationing
troops."
He
also
emphasized
that
the
Soviet
friends
in
Chongqing
were
too
weak.
Their
words
Don't
listen
to
itall.
The
telegram
on
March
16
also
stated:
"If
there
is
no
political,
military,
and
territorial
exchange
conditions,
and
they
are
resolved
at
the
same
time,
Iwill
never
give
up
the
place."
Under
such
circumstances,
the
CCP
has
also
made
major
adjustments
to
its
Northeast
strategy.
But
at
this
time,
the
CCP
was
no
longer
making
strategic
adjustments
based
entirely
on
the
changes
in
Soviet
policy.
The
leaders
of
the
CCP
were
fully
aware
of
the
complexity
international
background
of
the
Northeast
issue
in
early
1946.
After
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party
achieved
a
truce
in
the
pass,
Chiang
Kai-
shek
asked
the
Soviet
army
to
suspend
the
withdrawal
of
troops
from
Northeast,
and
on
the
other
hand
asked
the
United
States
to
increase
its
shipping
capacity
and
speed
up
the
transport
of
about
250,000
regular
troops
into
the
Northeast.
They
occupied
Shenyang,
Anshan,
Yingkou
and
other
cities,
and
made
full
use
of
the
truce
in
pass.
Ifthere
is
an
opportunity
to
launch
a
large-
scale
attack
outside
the
customs,
try
to
eliminate
the
CCP
army,
or
compress
them
to
remote
mountainous
areas,
in
a
disadvantageous
position,
and
then
resolve
the
Northeast
issue
through
negotiations.
Liu
Shaoqi
stated
in
an
order
to
the
Northeast
Bureau
on
March
5
that
the
Soviet
Union
wanted
to
conduct
economic
cooperation
in
Manchuria,
but
so
far
the
United
States
and
Chiang
Kai-
shek
have
refused,
and
even
instigated
a
nationwide
anti-
Soviet
movement.
The
response
to
this
is
The
Red
Army
postponed
its
evacuation
plan.
Liu
Shaoqi
said
that
itwas
impossible
for
the
CCP
and
Kuomintang
to
reach
a
compromise
when
the
Soviet
Union
was
fighting
the
United
States
and
Chiang
Kai-
shek
in
Manchuria.
Because
of
the
KMT's
anti-
Soviet
campaign,
the
Soviet
Red
Army
in
Manchuria
might
be
more
willing
to
help
the
CCP.
Therefore,
Northeast
Bureau
should
take
advantage
of
this
situation,
contact
the
Soviet
army
immediately,
and
report
the
results
of
the
discussion
to
Central
Committee.
In
view
of
past
lessons,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
warned
the
Northeast
Bureau
to
negotiate
clearly,
because
"in
the
future,
when
issue
of
economic
cooperation
is
resolved,
the
Soviet
Union
may
express
its
favor
towards
Jiang
again."
Now,
the
Soviet
Union
can
neither
restrict
the
penetration
of
American
forces
into
the
Northeast
through
military
occupation
nor
use
cooperation
with
the
Kuomintang
government,
so
itcan
only
revise
its
policy
again
and
rely
on
aid
and
support
for
the
development
of
CCP
in
Northeast
China
to
achieve
its
goals.
In
some
areas,
such
as
Shenyang
and
Siping,
the
Soviet
Union
retreated
suddenly
so
that
the
CCP
troops
could
take
advantage
of
it.
On
March
8,
1946,
representatives
of
the
Soviet
Army
formally
notified
the
Northeast
Bureau
of
the
CCP
that
Red
Army
would
withdraw
from
areas
such
as
Fushun,
Jilin,
and
Shenyang.
The
Red
Army
would
not
hand
over
these
areas
to
the
Kuomintang,
and
the
CCP
was
free
to
act.
Sure
enough,
on
March
9,
the
Soviet
military
occupation
authorities
in
Shenyang
unexpectedly
received
an
order
to
evacuate
Shenyang
within
two
days,
a
decision
that
even
Stankovich,
commander
of
the
Shenyang
Guards,
was
baffled
by.
In
other
areas,
such
as
the
areas
other
than
Dongdong
Road
and
Nanman
Road,
the
Soviet
occupation
authorities
were
directly
handed
over
to
the
Chinese
Communist
Army
to
take
over.
When
the
Soviet
army
was
about
to
withdraw,
italso
suggested
that
the
CCP
could
"fight
freely"
on
Changchun
Road,
and
expressed
support
for
the
CCP
to
seize
Changchun,
Harbin
and
Qiqihar
after
the
Soviet
Union
withdrew.
At
the
same
time,
at
request
of
Xiao
Jinguang,
Commander
of
the
Northeast
Democratic
Alliance
Army’s
South
Manchuria
Military
Region,
and
Han
Guang,
Secretary
of
the
Dalian
Municipal
Party
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China,
the
Soviet
military
authorities
handed
over
nearly
50
compartments
of
Japanese
weapons
seized
to
the
Chinese
Communist
Army,
and
delivered
them
through
North
Korea’s
Chongjin
Port.
The
Tsushima
Strait
provided
20
freight
locomotives
to
the
Chinese
Communist
Army
in
the
northeast.
Neither
American,
British
nor
other
foreign
troops
should
enter
Manchuria.
Machine Translated by Google
In
the
summer
of
1947,
the
Chinese
People's
War
of
Liberation
entered
a
new
stage
of
strategic
offensive.
This
result
is
obviously
not
conducive
to
the
stability
determined
by
the
Soviet
Union.
After
the
civil
war
broke
out
in
China,
the
Soviet
Union’s
policy
toward
China
was
consistent
with
that
of
the
United
States,
that
is,
to
mediate
between
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party,
and
especially
emphasized
that
the
Soviet
Union
should
participate
in
the
peace
talks,
thereby
strengthening
Moscow’s
position
in
resolving
the
Chinese
issue,
and
thereby
restricting
the
U.S.
Therefore,
while
criticizing
the
United
States
for
interfering
in
China's
internal
affairs,
Moscow
also
expressed
to
the
United
States
that
the
Soviet
Union
still
intended
to
coordinate
its
China
policy
with
the
United
States.
In
December
1946,
Stalin
told
Roosevelt's
son
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
"willing
to
pursue
acommon
policy
with
the
United
States
on
the
question
of
Far
East."
A
letter
from
Molotov
to
Marshall
in
early
April
1947
indicated
that
Stalin’s
so-
called
“common
policy”
referred
to
the
resolution
on
the
China
issue
at
the
meeting
of
the
three
foreign
ministers
in
December
1945.
Ithas
always
adhered
to
the
policy
of
non-
interference
in
China's
internal
affairs
in
the
past
and
present."
In
the
Northeast,
on
the
one
hand,
the
Soviet
government
supported
and
aided
the
CCP
regime
in
North
Manchuria,
and
secretly
supported
the
Communists
in
the
Soviet-
occupied
areas
of
Dalian
and
Lushun;
Negotiated
more
than
once
with
the
Kuomintang
in
April
1947
on
the
northern
"boundary"
of
the
naval
base,
and
received
a
high-
level
Kuomintang
delegation
from
Nanking
in
June
1947.
During
this
period,
the
CCP’s
policy
towards
the
Soviet
Union
also
had
a
dual
nature.
Mao
Zedong
was
determined
to
stick
the
road
of
independently
developing
the
cause
of
China's
revolution,
and
the
withdrawal
of
Soviet
troops
from
Northeast
China
strengthened
the
CCP's
belief
in
relying
on
its
own
strength
to
win
the
revolution.
This
is
very
clear.
At
the
same
time,
although
Mao
Zedong's
decision-
making
did
not
depend
on
Stalin's
will,
he
realized
that
only
the
Soviet
Union
could
support
China's
revolutionary
cause,
so
the
leadership
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
international
communist
movement
must
be
recognized.
After
the
Soviet
army
retreated,
the
CCP
not
only
continued
to
maintain
contact
with
Moscow,
but
even
asked
Stalin
for
instructions
and
reports
more
and
more
frequently,
in
order
to
win
the
understanding,
support
and
help
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Therefore,
ifthe
development
strategy
of
the
CCP
in
the
early
postwar
period
was
generally
changed
according
to
the
changes
in
the
Soviet
Union’s
policy
in
Asia,
then
from
the
second
half
of
1946
to
the
end
of
1948,
the
relationship
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
CCP
showed
a
more
subtle
and
complicate
relationship
Phenomen
However,
this
does
not
indicate
that
the
Soviet
Union's
China
policy
after
its
troops
withdrew
from
Chinese
territory
was
to
fully
support
the
Chinese
Communist
Party.
On
the
one
hand,
Stalin
wanted
to
maintain
ties
with
the
CCP
and
strengthen
the
power
of
the
CCP
through
aid
so
as
to
contain
the
United
States
and
Chiang
Kai-
shek
China's
political
and
economic
interests.
This
of
course
requires
normalizing
relations
with
the
KMT
government
while
keeping
a
certain
distance
from
the
CCP.
Especially
after
the
Soviet
Union
rejected
the
Marshall
Plan
and
provoked
the
Berlin
Crisis,
the
tense
situation
in
Europe
forced
Stalin
to
focus
on
the
confrontation
between
the
West
and
United
States
.while
maintaining
a
relatively
relaxed
situation
in
the
East.
Iwould
rather
not
fully
support
and
assist
the
CCP's
strategic
policy
of
seizing
power
by
force.
After
the
Soviet
troops
withdrew
from
China,
a
major
change
took
place
in
the
conditions
of
interaction
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
CCP.
Before
the
retreat
of
the
Soviet
army,
Union
directly
relied
on
its
military
superiority
of
millions
troops
to
occupy
the
Northeast
to
compete
for
strategic
interests
in
the
Far
East.
The
existence
of
the
CCP
and
its
military
power
an
was
just
insignificant
bargaining
chip
between
Stalin
and
the
Kuomintang
government;
After
the
army
retreated,
the
only
factor
in
the
Soviet
Union’s
China
policy
that
could
restrain
the
Kuomintang
government’s
policy
towards
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
development
of
American
power
in
China
was
the
CCP.
Moreover,
as
the
CCP’s
military
power
became
stronger
and
stronger,
this
factor
also
held
a
higher
position
in
Stalin’s
mind.
more
and
more
important.
At
the
end
of
1946,
the
Soviet
trade
organization
openly
established
economic
relations
with
the
Northeast
People’s
Democratic
Administrative
Committee
and
provided
economic
assistance
to
the
Northeast
Liberated
Areas,
which
reflected
the
beginning
of
a
“transition”
in
the
Soviet
Union’s
China
policy.
Although
the
CCP’s
strategy
on
the
Northeast
issue
in
this
period
was
not
entirely
based
on
Stalin’s
policies,
itwas
obviously
closely
related
to
the
support
and
encouragement
of
the
Soviet
Union.
This
objective
policy
coincidence
made
Mao
Zedong
overestimate
the
military
strength
of
the
CCP
at
that
time,
and
made
an
untimely
decision
to
fight
a
decisive
battle
with
the
Kuomintang
army
in
strategic
areas.
In
the
middle
of
1946,
the
actual
result
of
the
decisive
battle
with
the
Kuomintang
army
on
Siping
Street
was
that
Lin
Biao’s
troops
suffered
heavy
losses
and
retreated.
Urban
work
is
still
the
first",
"It
is
necessary
to
delay
the
outbreak
of
national
civil
war
as
much
as
possible",
our
army
"the
main
force
should
not
be
afraid
of
losing
ground,
separate
and
stay
away
from
the
enemy,
and
buy
time
to
rest
and
replenish,
and
restore
vitality",
"Our
party
We
must
prepare
for
a
long
struggle."
In
his
telegram
to
the
Chongqing
CCP
delegation
on
April
19,
he
put
forward
the
slogan
of
"fight
for
every
inch
of
land
and
never
give
in",
and
in
his
telegram
to
the
Northeast
Bureau
and
Lin
Biao
on
April
20,
he
proposed
to
prepare
Changchun
becomes
Madrid".
Machine Translated by Google
In
August
of
the
same
year,
in
aconversation
with
Anna
American
Louise
journalist
Strong,
Mao
Zedong
put
forward
the
theory
of
"middle
ground".
He
believes
that
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
are
separated
by
a
vast
area
including
many
capitalist
countries,
colonial
and
semi-
colonial
countries
in
Europe,
Asia,
and
Africa.
Therefore,
the
center
of
post-
war
international
politics
is
not
the
US-
Soviet
dispute,
but
the
American
reactionaries
against
the
people
of
the
world,
Facing
the
international
situation
of
compromise
and
cooperation
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States,
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
had
to
fight
for
its
own
ideals.
Itwas
precisely
because
of
this
consideration
that
Mao
Zedong
emphasized
at
this
time
that
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
should
advocate
self-
reliance
in
the
Northeast
and
prepare
for
a
protracted
war.
He
told
Luo
Ronghuan,
deputy
political
commissar
of
the
Northeast
Democratic
Alliance
Army
who
was
about
to
go
the
Soviet
Union
for
medical
treatment:
"The
struggle
in
the
Northeast
is
mainly
based
on
self-
reliance",
and
do
not
make
"excessive
and
excessive
demands"
on
the
Soviet
side;
"Make
any
request".
Ifitis
said
that
Stalin's
goal
at
this
time
was
consistent
with
the
US's
policy
towards
China,
itobviously
ran
counter
to
the
wishes
of
CCP.
By
the
beginning
of
1946,
Mao
Zedong
had
realized
that
the
fundamental
policy
of
Yan'an
and
Moscow
was
different:
what
the
Soviet
Union
needed
in
Asia
was
compromise,
while
the
CCP
could
only
survive
and
develop
through
struggle.
Therefore,
Mao
Zedong
put
forward
a
very
important
idea
in
April
1946,
that
is,
seeking
compromise
between
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
does
not
require
the
people
of
various
countries
to
follow
suit
in
their
own
domestic
struggles.
On
the
contrary,
people
of
various
countries
can
and
must
fight
with
their
own
reactionaries
resolute
struggle,
and
the
realization
of
the
compromise
between
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
can
only
be
the
result
of
the
struggle
people
of
all
countries.
This
actually
raises
the
question
of
road
to
the
independent
development
of
the
Chinese
revolution..
After
Luo
Shen
returned
to
China
on
February
22,
1948,
until
the
beginning
of
1949,
he
kept
in
touch
with
senior
KMT
officials
for
mediation.
In
June
1948,
Luo
Shen
proposed
to
officials
of
the
National
Defense
Ministry
of
the
Kuomintang
to
hold
talks
prevent
a
"cold
war"
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union.
He
proposed
to
work
together
find
a
common
position
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
peace
treaty
with
Japan;
he
promised
not
to
interfere
in
China's
internal
affairs,
increase
commercial
loans
to
the
Kuomintang,
and
establish
a
economic
joint
development
agreement
on
the
Sino-
Soviet
border
that
would
benefit
both
sides.
sproject.
Roshin
said
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
willing
to
invest
extensively
in
China
to
resist
the
influence
of
British
and
American
imperialism,
so
that
China
could
achieve
industrialization
like
Japan
during
the
Meiji
Restoration.
Luo
Shen
said
that
as
long
as
the
Chinese
adopted
his
proposal,
the
acute
problems
in
Sino-
Soviet
relations
would
be
easily
resolved,
but
ifthe
Chinese
did
not
agree
to
accept
his
proposal,
the
Soviet
Union
might
be
forced
to
establish
a
"buffer
zone"
along
the
Sino-
Soviet
border,
To
defend
the
security
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union.
In
August
of
that
year,
when
Luo
Shen
met
with
Wang
Shijie,
he
reiterated
that
the
Soviet
Union
hoped
to
mediate
the
conflict
between
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party
and
provide
material
assistance
to
the
Kuomintang.
The
meeting
record
also
confirmed
that
Chiang
Kai-
shek
had
agreed
to
accept
Stalin's
invitation
to
visit
Moscow
in
September
of
that
year.
Luo
Shen
admitted
that
he
was
the
middlema
and
arranged
the
visit
with
Chiang
Ching-
kuo.
When
contactin
KMT
officials,
Luo
Shen
also
pointed
out
that
the
reason
why
the
Soviets
were
interest
in
mediati
the
Chines
civil
war
was
becaus
they
were
afraid
that
Mao
Zedon
would
becom
the
"Tito
of
Asia."
The
Soviet
amba
even
appea
directl
to
the
Ameri
emba
gain
supp
for
his
medi
effort
Acco
to
sourc
Rosh
medi
effor
had
som
succ
amo
Kuo
offic
(Roshchin)
raised
the
issue
of
Soviet
mediation
in
China
before
returning
home
in
January.
A
telegram
from
Moscow
to
the
Soviet
embassy
in
Nanjing
intercepted
by
Kuomintang
intelligence
personnel
stated
that
itwas
necessary
to
"try
make
some
kind
of
arrangement
between
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party"
and
indicated
that
the
Soviet
Union
might
come
forward
to
mediate.
Therefore,
when
Luo
Shen
bid
farewell
to
Zhang
Zhizhong,
he
expressed
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
willing
to
arrange
peace
negotiations
with
the
Communist
Party.
Soon,
Luo
Shen
returned
to
China
and
was
promoted
to
ambassador
China.
Leighton
Stuart
believed
that
this
"may
mean
that
the
Soviet
Union
is
preparing
to
mediate",
although
"the
Chinese
agreed
to
the
appointment
of
Luo
Shen,
which
does
not
necessarily
mean
that
the
Chinese
government
intends
to
immediately
seek
the
mediation
of
the
Soviet
Union.
But
we
felt
that
this
might
be
advisable
ifthe
Chinese
government
was
convinced
that
its
military
position
in
Manchuria
was
hopeless",
on
the
grounds
that
"we
agree
with
Moscow
that
such
mediation
is
contrary
to
the
basic
objectives
of
the
Soviet
Union.
consistent".
,The
American
ambassador
also
tended
to
think:
"From
the
standpoint
of
Chinese
government,
the
Soviet
Union's
mediation
was
necessary
and
even
desirable
a
long
time
ago;
from
the
standpoint
of
United
States,
any
Soviet
intervention
in
the
situation
in
China
has
a
purpose.
This
is
self-
evident.
Of
course,
we
can
foresee
that
the
situation
Soviet
mediation
may
create
may
be
in
our
favor."
According
to
a
telegram
from
Stuart,
the
U.S.
ambassador
to
China,
the
Secretary
of
State
between
February
and
March
1948,
Roshchen,
the
Soviet
military
attache
to
China,
Therefore,
the
focus
of
Soviet
Union's
China
policy
was
changed
to
promoting
peace
negotiations
between
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party.
In
October
1947,
Soviet
ambassador
to
Iran
Sachikov
proposed
to
Chinese
ambassador
Zheng
Yitong
in
Tehran
that
the
Soviet
Union
intervene
to
end
the
Chinese
civil
war.
The
Soviet
ambassador
tried
his
best
to
convince
the
Chinese
government
that
the
deterioration
of
Soviet-
American
relations
did
not
necessarily
lead
to
the
deterioration
of
Sino-
Soviet
relations.
Ambassador
Sachkov
said
that
the
Soviet
Union
understood
the
ideology
of
the
Kuomintang
based
on
Sun
Yat-
sen's
thought,
and
pointed
out
that
the
common
enemies
of
the
Soviet
Union
and
China
were
Japanese
imperialism
and
American
imperialism.
The
Soviet
Union
believed
that
the
U.S.
policy
on
the
peace
treaty
with
Japan
was
contrary
to
the
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
and
China.
Sachkov
suggested
that
the
Soviet
Union
and
China
hold
talks
on
Xinjiang,
Manchuria
and
the
conflict
between
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party.
Machine Translated by Google
 As
for
the
treatment
of
Communist
Party,
in
May
of
that
year
Stalin
showed
Kovalev
a
telegram
requesting
aid
from
Mao
Zedong,
and
said:
"Of
course
we
will
give
all
possible
assistance
to
New
China.
Ifsocialism
wins
in
China,
some
of
our
countries
will
also
Ifwe
take
this
path,
we
can
consider
that
the
victory
of
socialism
in
the
world
is
guaranteed,
and
we
will
not
be
threatened
by
any
accident.
Therefore,
in
order
to
help
the
Chinese
Communists,
we
must
not
begrudge
our
strength
and
money.”
A
few
days
Later,
when
talking
to
Kovalev
on
the
eve
of
his
trip
to
China,
Stalin
reiterated
this
position.
The
development
of
the
Chinese
revolutionary
situation
forced
Stalin
to
reevaluate
the
position
of
the
CCP
in
the
Soviet
Union's
China
policy.
In
April
1948,
the
Soviet
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
drafted
political
instructions
to
ambassadors
in
China,
the
main
points
of
which
were:
1.
“The
policies
of
the
Chinese
government
should
be
restrained”
and
“do
not
show
special
enthusiasm”
for
government
personnel
Emphasizes
a
policy
of
non-
interference
in
China's
internal
affairs.
2.
Seriously
study
and
report
the
various
measures
and
changes
taken
by
the
Chinese
government
in
the
fields
of
diplomacy,
military
affairs
and
internal
affairs.
Third,
pay
close
attention
to
the
factional
struggles
within
government
agencies
and
the
Kuomintang
and
their
political
goals.
Fourth,
study
the
US
policy
toward
China
very
seriously,
especially
the
actions
of
aiding
Chiang
Kai-
shek
against
the
Soviet
Union
and
expose
them.
5.
"Attach
importance
to
exchanges
and
meetings
with
democratic
and
progressive
people,
and
at
the
same
time
maintain
a
cautious
attitude."
Sixth,
to
ensure
the
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
China.
7.
Use
various
channels
and
methods
.to
strengthen
the
propaganda
of
friendship
with
the
Soviet
Union.
By
the
summer
of
1948,
the
Chinese
People's
Liberation
Army
had
achieved
major
victories
in
counter-
offensives
across
the
country,
and
situation
in
China
had
fundamentally
changed.
Also
during
the
Central
Committee
meeting
in
December
1947,
Mao
Zedong
sent
a
telegram
to
Stalin,
mainly
emphasizing
that
the
progress
of
China’s
revolutionary
war
had
reached
a
turning
point,
that
is,
the
Chinese
People’s
Liberation
Army
had
repelled
the
general
offensive
of
the
Kuomintang
reactionary
army
and
made
the
He
entered
the
counterattack
phase.
This
is
a
fundamental
change
and
a
historic
turning
point
in
the
present
revolutionary
war
in
China.
At
the
Central
Committee's
plenary
meeting
in
December,
Mao
Zedong
once
again
reminded
the
entire
party
to
"rely
on
itself,
not
foreign
aid."
Mao
Zedong
also
printed
and
distributed
the
document
he
drafted
in
April
1946
at
this
meeting,
and
again
proposed
the
policy
that
people
of
all
countries
should
carry
out
independent
struggles.
He
said:
Regarding
the
relationship
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
Britain
and
the
United
States,
there
are
two
formulations.
One
is
to
compromise
or
break
up;
the
other
is
to
compromise
earlier
or
later
on
certain
issues,
including
some
major
issues.
Ithink
itshould
bethe
second
formulation,
not
the
first.
Compromise
does
not
mean
compromise
on
all
international
issues,
which
is
impossible.
Such
a
compromise
would
affect
the
handling
of
domestic
issues
in
some
countries.
"The
policy
of
the
people
of
various
countries
is
to
carry
out
different
struggles
according
to
different
situations."
In
addition,
Mao
Zedong
also
made
a
speech
at
the
preparatory
meeting
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
on
December
8,
1947,
criticizing
the
French
Communist
Party
and
the
Italian
Communist
Party
for
"right
deviation",
and
believed
that
the
French
Communist
Party
and
the
Italian
Communist
Party
were
keen
to
take
the
parliamentary
road
as
the
root
cause
of
the
setbacks
revolutionary
forces
there.
He
expressed
his
special
appreciation
for
the
policies
of
the
Communist
Party
of
Yugoslavia,
and
believed
that
the
Communist
Party
of
Western
European
countries
had
been
fooled
by
the
Potsdam
and
Yalta
agreements,
only
the
Communist
Party
of
Yugoslavia
won
victory
ifitinsisted
on
armed
struggle.
.
Starting
from
this
idea,
Mao
Zedong
began
to
explore
an
independent
foreign
policy.
Kovalev,
Stalin's
technical
expert
and
liaison
to
the
CCP,
had
reported
to
Moscow
that
in
1947
Mao
Zedong
sent
two
senior
aides,
Lu
Dingyi
and
Liu
Ningyi,
to
Yugoslavia,
and
Mao
wanted
to
know
"had
declared
himself
to
be
How
did
Yugoslavia,
a
socialist
country,
find
a
way
to
establish
friendly
relations
with
the
imperialist
United
States
and
Great
Britain
under
conditions
of
serious
confrontation
between
the
socialist
and
imperialist
camps".
Zhang
Baijia
noted
in
his
research
that
Strong
only
published
Mao
Zedong's
speech
in
April
1947.
In
fact,
this
point
of
view
was
already
disclosed
in
Lu
Dingyi's
signed
article
"Explanation
of
Several
Basic
Issues
in
the
Post-
War
International
Situation"
published
on
January
2,
1947.
Zhang
Wen
believes
that
from
the
perspective
of
the
Chinese
revolution,
the
proposal
of
the
"middle
zone"
has
three
important
meanings:
first,
ithas
made
a
unique
division
of
various
international
political
forces
and
pointed
out
China's
actual
situation
in
international
struggles.
status.
Second,
itclarified
the
relationship
between
friends
and
enemies
in
the
international
arena
of
the
Chinese
revolution
at
this
stage,
and
laid
the
foundation
for
CCP’s
international
united
front
policy
in
the
postwar
period.
Third,
an
important
theoretical
issue
is
implied
in
the
concept
of
"middle
ground",
that
is,
the
international
struggle
between
the
CCP
and
Soviet
Union
has
a
closely
related
aspect,
which
inevitably
requires
the
cooperation
of
two
sides.
The
nature
and
content
of
these
struggles
are
different
from
each
other,
which
means
that
the
two
sides
must
adopt
different
struggle
forms
and
strategies
according
to
their
respective
conditions.
From
this
perspective,
the
proposal
of
the
"middle
ground"
signifies
that
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
has
a
clearer
awareness
of
its
subject
in
international
struggles.
The
United
States
cannot
talk
about
attacking
the
Soviet
Union
until
ithas
conquered
the
"middle
ground".
Its
conclusion
is
that
the
peoples
of
all
countries
can
defeat
the
American
reactionaries,
avoid
World
War
III,
and
defend
the
Soviet
Union
only
through
struggle,
not
compromise.
Machine Translated by Google
The
economic
aid
provided
by
the
Soviet
Union
to
the
Northeast
Liberated
Areas
also
increased
significantly
by
1948.
In
1947
the
USSR
Foreign
Trade
Organization
and
the
East
In
fact,
itwas
only
after
the
summer
of
1948
that
the
Soviet
Union
began
to
provide
military
assistance
to
the
CCP.
In
the
Russian
archives
disclosed
so
far,
there
is
no
evidence
that
the
Soviet
Union
provided
military
assistance
to
the
CCP
before
that.
There
are
materials
to
prove
that
on
June
12,
1948,
the
Soviet
representative
reported
to
Moscow
that
Gao
Gang
requested
the
Soviet
Union
to
provide
weapons,
especially
shells
for
75mm
Japanese
artillery,
in
order
to
launch
an
attack
on
Siping.
But
the
Soviet
Union
did
not
provide
this
batch
of
munitions.
Although
acknowledging
that
the
authenticity
of
these
documents
is
not
yet
fully
certain,
Murray
tends
to
believe
that
these
documents
are
authentic,
and
explained
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
only
using
the
CCP's
victory
to
restrain
the
Kuomintang
government
and
the
United
States
at
that
time,
rather
than
hoping
that
the
CCP
really
won
the
whole
country.
The
ultimate
triumph
of
sex.
Murray
also
analyzed
that
ifthese
documents
false
were
information
just
deliberately
provided
by
the
Soviet
Union
to
the
Kuomintang,
then
their
purpose
was
to
intimidate
the
Kuomintang
into
agreeing
to
the
Soviet
Union's
mediation
proposal.
This
was
completely
consistent
with
Luo
Shen's
threat
to
establish
a
"buffer
zone"
in
Manchuria
along
the
Sino-
Soviet
border.
Behind
the
mediation
efforts,
Soviet
diplomatic
activities
in
Tehran,
Brussels,
and
Nanjing
all
emphasized
that
the
Kuomintang
should
not
the
United
join
States
in
participating
in
the
"Cold
War"
against
the
Soviet
Union.
Ifthe
Soviet
Union's
mediation
is
successful,
itcan
avoid
anew
confrontation
with
the
United
States
in
Asia
due
to
the
overall
victory
of
CCP
and
its
entry
into
the
Soviet
bloc
while
the
Cold
War
in
Europe
is
raging.
This
analysis
is
undoubtedly
persuasive.
On
May
22
and
July
6,
1948,
the
Soviet
Army’s
Foreign
Operations
Department
sent
a
more
specific
instruction
to
Lt.
Ministry
of
Defense,
and
as
quickly
possible
to
understand
their
specific
needs.
From
June
1st
to
the
end
of
September,
we
will
build
up
a
large
amount
of
arms,
clothing
and
gasoline
along
the
border
line
from
Irkutsk
to
Manchuria
provide
to
the
Chinese
People’s
Liberation
Army.
Light
and
heavy
tanks,
machine
guns
of
various
calibers,
and
aircraft
will
also
be
provided.
Chinese
personnel
using
these
weapons
and
equipment
have
been
sent
to
us
for
training.”
The
telegram
even
stated:
“The
chief
of
the
Soviet
Army’s
general
staff
has
already
draw
up
a
detailed
military
plan
of
operations"
"by
the
end
of
this
summer,
to
deliver
successive
strikes
against
the
enemy
in
order
to
compel
them
surrender
or
at
least
to
weaken
them
so
much
that
they
can
no
longer
continue
to
fight
effectively
even
with
American
assistance.
resistance."
"From
now
on,
all
your
actions
will
have
only
one
purpose:
to
help
destroy
the
enemy
at
any
cost.
This
is
absolutely
necessary
to
establish
our
position
in
the
Far
East.
The
severe
political
situation
in
Europe
has
caused
us
to
suffer
from
conflicts
with
the
United
States
and
its
allies.
The
threat
of
war,
so
we
should
be
ready
everywhere.
The
KMT,
blinded
by
their
hatred
of
the
Communists,
cannot
see
that
they
are
on
the
verge
of
disaster.
Since
the
security
of
our
Siberian
border
is
at
stake,
we
have
no
choice.
We
hope
China
is
a
country
that
is
friendly
to
the
Soviet
Union,
not
a
country
that
is
politically
and
economically
enslaved
by
international
capitalists
and
hostile
to
us."
However,
the
order
is
also
careful
to
state:
"Only
when
our
liberated
lands
are
consolidated
and
regions
to
make
further
progress.”
According
to
these
documents,
Stalin
stated
at
a
special
meeting
of
the
Politburo
on
March
14,
1948
that
"it
is
futile
to
find
a
way
reconcile
the
two
camps"
and
that
"the
inevitable
period
of
conflict
is
coming."
In
addition
to
preparing
military
and
economic
strength
to
deal
with
any
eventuality,
at
the
same
time
"should
vigorously
support
the
struggle
of
people
who
have
embarked
on
the
road
of
national
liberation
movement",
because
"national
liberation
movement
will
cause
a
world
crisis
of
capitalism".
Stalin
specifically
mentioned
that
"the
example
of
the
Chinese
liberation
movement
is
encouraging",
"Although
the
United
States
has
provided
a
large
amount
of
aid
to
the
Kuomintang,
whole
of
China
is
being
shaken
under
the
powerful
blow
of
the
victorious
Communist
army.
The
Chinese
reactionaries
have
been
attacked
repeatedly.
Failed,
the
Chinese
people
inspired
by
a
new
life
are
dealing
merciless
blows
to
those
oppressors
who
have
turned
to
foreign
capital.
The
People's
Liberation
Army
has
successfully
liberated
new
towns
and
new
areas.
After
suffering
and
struggle,
the
Chinese
people
are
building
a
new
An
anti-
imperialist,
democratic
China.
Our
is
job
to
use
all
possible
means
to
help
our
Chinese
comrades
until
they
can
completely
defeat
all
enemies,
live
in
friendship
with
the
Soviet
Union,
and
start
a
new
happy
life.”
At
the
same
time,
Stalin
Also
warns
that
"some
of
our
comrade
are
deluded
by
success"
into
thinking
"we
can
do
whateve
we
want".
Not
long
ago,
American
scholar
Brian
Murray
published
four
archival
documents
found
in
Taiwan,
which
seemed
to
prove
this
position
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
spring
and
summer
of
1948.
These
internal
Soviet
documents,
allegedly
obtained
by
personnel
of
the
Nationalist
government
embassy
in
Brussels
from
a
Soviet
courier,
include
a
copy
of
Stalin's
speech
at
a
Politburo
meeting
on
March
14,
1948,
two
copies
dated
May
22,
1948
military
orders
dated
11
and
6
June
an
undated
message.
Machine Translated by Google
By
the
spring
of
1948,
the
situation
of
China’s
civil
war
had
changed
a
lot.
Mao
Zedong’s
strategy
proved
to
be
successful,
and
the
CCP’s
power
was
strong
enough
to
talk
the
Soviet
Union.
Consider
the
issue
of
strengthening
ties
with
the
Soviet
Union
and
seeking
assistance.
Mao
Zedong's
telegram
to
Stalin
on
April
26,
1948
stated:
"I
have
decided
to
leave
for
the
Soviet
Union
early."
"I
will
discuss
and
consult
with
the
comrades
of
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
on
political,
military,
economic
and
other
important
issues...
In
addition
Ifpossible,
Iwould
also
like
to
go
Eastern
European
countries
to
inspect
the
work
of
People's
Front
and
other
forms
of
work."
On
April
29,
Stalin
responded
by
calling
back
to
express
his
agreement.
On
May
10,
Stalin
sent
another
telegram
to
Mao
Zedong,
advising
him
to
postpone
his
departure.
The
telegram
stated:
"In
view
of
the
developments
in
your
area,
especially
Fu
Zuoyi
has
already
attacked
Yu
County,
that
is
to
say,
the
road
you
plan
to
pass
through
on
your
way
to
the
Soviet
Union
The
three
areas
are
on
the
line
of
fire.
Iam
worried
that
your
trip
will
affect
the
course
of
situation,
and
your
road
is
not
peaceful.
In
view
of
this,
Iwonder
ifyou
should
postpone
your
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union."
Mao
Zedong
called
back
that
day
and
said:
"Comrade
Stalin,
today
Your
letter
has
been
received.
Thank
you
very
much.
In
view
of
the
current
situation,
itis
advisable
to
postpone
my
visit
to
your
country
a
little...I
need
to
rest
a
little
before
Ican
take
the
plane."
As
mentioned
earlier,
in
early
1947
Mao
Zedong
was
considering
a
development
path
independent
of
Soviet
policy,
so
itseems
impossible
that
Mao
Zedong
offered
to
visit
Moscow
in
person
at
this
time.
In
terms
of
Mao
Zedong's
character
and
thinking
logic,
there
were
differences
of
opinion
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
at
that
time,
and
the
CCP
was
not
strong
enough
to
support
itself.
Itwas
meaningless
for
him
to
go
see
Stalin
in
person
except
to
incur
a
reprimand.
Tito's
refusal
to
go
Moscow
in
February
1948
was
probably
based
on
this
mentality.
The
clearest
manifestation
of
Mao
Zedong's
strengthening
of
relations
with
the
Soviet
Union
was
his
repeated
request
to
visit
Moscow
in
person
since
the
spring
of
1948.
Regarding
Mao
Zedong’s
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union,
Soviet
scholars
believe
that
itwas
first
proposed
in
early
1947,
and
itwas
first
proposed
by
the
CCP.
The
documentary
evidence
is
Stalin’s
letter
to
Orlov,
a
Soviet
doctor
and
liaison
officer
in
Yan’an,
on
June
15,
1947.
Orlov
(Jerepin)
telegram:
"Report
to
Mao
Zedong
that
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
alias
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
believes
that
itis
not
appropriate
for
him
to
reveal
any
information
about
the
trip
to
Moscow.
IfMao
Zedong
also
thinks
that
itshould
bedone,
then
we
think
itis
better
to
pass
through
Harbin.
Ifnecessary,
we
can
send
a
plane
to
meet
him.
Iwill
report
the
results
of
the
conversation
with
Mao
Zedong
and
his
wishes
by
telegram.”
According
to
Shi
Zhe,
Mao
Zedong’s
translator
and
secretary,
the
actual
situation
is
that
Stalin
believed
the
news
from
Western
agencies
and
thought
that
“the
Eighth
Route
Army
is
in
Shaanxi.
Peking
University
suffered
setbacks,
lost
its
troops,
lost
its
army,
senior
generals,
such
as
He
Long,
and
even
Mao's
wife
Jiang
Qing
were
captured
and
sent
to
Xi'an..."
He
offered
to
send
a
special
plane
to
pick
up
Mao
Zedong
and
other
major
leaders
of
the
CCP
to
Soviet
Union.
When
Stalin
learned
that
things
were
not
as
rumored
in
the
West,
he
immediately
sent
atelegram
to
Orlov
on
July
1with
the
exact
opposite
content.
Stalin
said:
"In
view
of
the
upcoming
campaign,
and
in
view
of
the
adverse
effects
that
Mao
Zedong's
departure
would
have
on
the
war,
we
consider
itexpedient
to
temporarily
postpone
Mao
Zedong's
trip."
With
the
victories
of
Chinese
revolution,
Mao
Zedong
also
paid
more
and
more
attention
to
the
relationship
with
the
Soviet
Union,
and
paid
special
attention
to
considering
this
issue
from
the
perspective
of
the
new
China's
foreign
policy
in
the
future.
The
change
in
the
CCP's
attitude
towards
the
Communist
Party
of
Yugoslavia
is
a
signal.
After
the
relationship
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
Yugoslavia
deteriorated
at
the
end
of
June
1948,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
quickly
passed
a
resolution
stating
that
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
stood
by
the
Soviet
Union.
On
November
1,
Xinhua
News
Agency
broadcast
the
article
"On
Internationalism
and
Nationalism"
by
Liu
Shaoqi,
secretary
of
the
Secretariat
CPC
Central
Committee.
On
November
7,
"People's
Daily"
and
"Northeast
Daily"
published
the
full
text
of
this
article
An
important
article
expressing
the
position
of
the
CCP,
and
later
a
booklet
was
published.
In
this
article,
Liu
Shaoqi
pointed
out
that
the
world
has
been
divided
into
two
camps,
and
during
the
period
of
fierce
struggle
between
the
two
camps,
"neutrality"
is
impossible.
Itis
the
limit
of
progress
or
retrogression",
which
more
clearly
stated
that
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
supported
the
Soviet
Union's
position
on
the
Yugoslavia
issue.
The
trade
volume
of
the
People's
Democratic
Government
of
the
North
was
93
million
rubles,
which
in
1948
increased
rapidly
to
151
million
rubles.
Another
document
said
that
in
September
1948,
Lin
Biao
sent
a
letter
directly
to
Stalin,
requesting
to
send
100
Soviet
technical
advisers
and
engineers.
In
October,
Gao
Gang
also
directly
requested
Stalin
to
provide
railway
equipment
and
20,000
tons
of
cotton.
At
the
end
of
December,
Gao
Gang
also
made
a
direct
request
to
Soviet
officials
in
Northeast
China
for
aid
in
railway
vehicles,
equipment,
and
electricity.
In
June
1948,
at
the
request
of
the
organs
people's
democratic
regime
in
the
Liberated
Areas,
the
Soviet
government
sent
a
Soviet
railway
expert
group
led
by
Kovalev.
This
team
includes
50
engineers,
52
technicians,
and
220
technicians
skilled
workers.
The
team
is
equipped
with
the
necessary
technical
equipment,
including
repair
trains,
diving
stations,
cranes
and
other
machinery.
All
the
materials
necessary
for
the
repair
of
the
railway
were
also
brought
from
the
Soviet
Union,
including
metal
components,
rails,
bridge
piles,
steel
girders,
etc.
The
railway
restoration
work
in
the
Northeast
Liberated
Area
has
made
great
progress
with
the
help
of
the
Soviet
Union.
As
of
December
15,
1948,
15,000
kilometers
of
the
most
important
railway
lines
in
Manchuria
and
120
large
and
medium-
sized
bridges
with
a
total
length
of
more
than
9,000
meters
have
been
repaired,
including
the
long
The
987-
meter
Songhua
River
No.
2
Bridge,
the
320-
meter-
long
Yinma
River
Bridge
between
Harbin
and
Changchun,
the
440-
meter-
long
Songhua
River
Bridge
between
Jilin
and
Changchun,
12
large
and
medium-
sized
bridges
on
other
lines.
Machine Translated by Google
At
this
time,
Stalin's
views
on
the
position
of
the
CCP
in
the
Far
East
also
changed
a
lot.
Although
Stalin
repeatedly
refused
Mao
Zedong's
personal
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union
out
of
strategic
considerations
for
the
international
struggle
in
Asia,
this
did
not
mean
that
the
Soviet
Union
refused
to
directly
contact
the
CCP.
Therefore,
when
Mao
Zedong
sent
another
telegram
on
November
28,
1948,
requesting
to
change
the
date
of
his
trip
to
Moscow
the
end
of
December
1948,
Itcan
beseen
from
the
text
of
above-
mentioned
telegram
that
Mao
Zedong
was
eager
to
meet
Stalin
directly,
and
his
words
were
sincere
and
respectful.
The
purpose
was
to
show
that
the
CCP
would
consult
Moscow
on
all
major
issues
and
maintain
consistency
with
the
Soviet
Union.
This
shows
that
although
Mao
Zedong
did
not
take
orders
from
Moscow
in
actual
actions,
at
this
time
he
had
fully
realized
the
importance
of
dealing
with
domestic
construction
issues
after
the
victory
of
Chinese
revolution
and
strengthening
relations
with
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
arena
of
international
struggle.
There
is
no
material
on
the
Soviet
side's
response
to
this.
Mao
Zedong
called
Moscow
again
on
September
28
and
said:
“Be
sure
to
report
a
series
of
issues
to
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
and
the
boss
personally.
(In
order
to)
get
instructions,
Iintend
to
go
Moscow
at
the
time
indicated
in
the
last
telegram.
Now,
for
the
time
being,
Iwill
make
a
general
report
on
the
above
content,
and
please
convey
itto
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
(Bolsheviks)
and
the
boss.
Isincerely
hope
that
they
will
give
us
instructions."
Summing
up
the
content
of
conversation,
Mao
Zedong
emphasized
that
"an
agreement
should
be
reached
so
that
our
political
approach
is
completely
consistent
with
that
of
the
Soviet
Union."
7.
A
host
of
other
issues.
6.
Policies
(route)
on
establishing
diplomatic
relations
with
Britain
and
France;
5.
Questions
about
the
$30
million
silver
loan;
4.
Regarding
the
restoration
and
establishment
of
Chinese
industry,
including
(especially)
military,
mining,
and
transportation
(road
and
rail)
issues.
Explain
our
(Chinese
Communist
Party)
needs
to
Moscow;
3.
A
strategic
plan
for
the
struggle
against
United
States
and
against
Chiang
Kai-
shek;
2.
On
the
question
of
uniting
the
revolutionary
forces
in
the
East,
on
the
relationship
between
the
Eastern
(and
other)
Communist
parties;
1.
On
the
relationship
with
small
democratic
parties
and
groups
(and
democrats);
on
the
issue
of
holding
a
political
consultative
conference;
Mao
Zedong
said
that
ifhe
was
not
in
a
hurry
to
go
Moscow
in
1947,
then
now,
in
1948,
the
situation
has
changed
and
he
wants
to
go
Moscow
as
soon
possible.
There
are
many
things
to
discuss
there,
some
questions
to
ask,
others
involve
getting
as
much
help
as
possible.
The
main
points
of
the
issues
that
Mao
Zedong
intends
to
discuss
in
Moscow
are:
The
closer
the
Chinese
revolution
was
to
victory,
the
more
CCP
felt
the
need
to
strengthen
its
relationship
with
the
Soviet
Union
in
consideration
of
the
international
situation
facing
the
new
China
in
the
future.
Therefore,
Mao
Zedong
quickly
raised
the
question
of
visiting
Moscow.
On
August
28,
1948,
Orlov’s
telegram
to
Moscow
described
the
content
of
a
conversation
he
had
with
Mao
Zedong:
Soon,
Mao
Zedong
raised
the
issue
of
visiting
the
Soviet
Union
again.
In
his
July
4th
telegram,
he
said:
"Compared
to
the
previous
two
months,
my
health
has
improved
greatly.
Iintend
to
leave
for
your
country
in
the
near
future.
There
are
three
routes
to
go:
land,
sea,
and
air.
But
regardless
How
about
it,
we
have
to
pass
through
Harbin,
because
Iwant
to
discuss
with
some
responsible
comrades
in
the
Northeast.
Ihope
to
send
a
plane
to
Weixian
around
the
25th
of
this
month.”
Mao
Zedong
also
said
that
there
will
be
20
people
with
him.
Ifyou
go
there
by
plane,
Please
send
two
planes.
On
July
14,
Stalin
replied
to
Mao
Zedong:
"Since
the
food
collection
work
has
already
started,
the
leading
comrades
will
go
to
various
places
from
August
and
will
not
return
until
November.
Therefore,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
asked
Comrade
Mao
Zedong
to
send
his
Schedule
until
the
end
of
November
so
that
you
can
meet
with
all
the
leading
comrades.”
Orlov
wrote
in
a
telegram
to
Moscow
on
July
14,
1948
that
although
Mao
Zedong
agreed
with
Stalin
to
postpone
his
visit
again,
he
clearly
Show
dissatisfactio
Mao
Zedong
had
made
all
the
preparation
for
departure,
but
he
did
not
expect
to
be
rejected.
Machine Translated by Google
 Obviously,
Stalin
was
eager
to
understand
the
basic
position
and
attitude
of
the
CCP.
Therefore,
despite
fearing
that
direct
contact
with
the
CCP
would
cause
a
strong
reaction
from
the
United
States,
Stalin
decided
to
send
Mikoyan,
amember
of
the
Politburo
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks),
to
secretly
visit
the
headquarters
of
the
CCP
Central
Committee
Xibaipo.
2.
When
the
relevant
person
in
charge
of
the
democratic
regime
or
someone
specially
authorized
by
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
visits
you,
you
can
only
maintain
unofficial
relations
with
the
local
democratic
regime
through
the
consul
or
vice-
consul.
1.
Stop
all
official
activities
of
the
consulate
before
issuing
a
special
order,
and
treat
all
staff
of
the
consulate
as
unofficial
personnel.
In
view
of
the
fact
that
we
have
not
yet
established
diplomatic
and
consular
relations
with
the
organs
of
democratic
regime
in
the
Liberated
Areas
of
China,
and
that
the
organs
of
democratic
regimes
in
the
Liberated
Areas
of
China
require
all
foreign
consulates
to
cease
their
activities
before
establishing
normal
diplomatic
and
consular
relations,
we
order
you
to:
But
at
this
time,
Stalin
had
no
idea
what
position
the
CCP
would
take
after
ittook
power
and
what
path
itwould
take.
Ina
telegram
to
Mao
Zedong
on
February
16,
1949,
Stalin
very
clearly
showed
a
complaining
attitude
and
atentative
mentality.
Stalin
informed
Mao
Zedong
that
the
Soviet
government
had
issued
the
following
instructions
to
the
Soviet
consuls
in
Beiping,
Tianjin,
Harbin,
Shenyang
and
Manzhouli:
In
the
winter
of
1948-1949,
the
situation
in
Asia
changed
fundamentally,
and
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
had
already
captured
half
of
China.
At
this
time,
the
CCP
had
already
played
a
pivotal
role
in
the
development
of
entire
Asian
situation,
and
itaroused
Stalin's
great
attention,
so
that
Molotov
and
Vyshinskii
(Vyshinskii)
instructed
Kovalev
in
a
telegram
in
early
1949
"From
now
on,
any
matter
concerning
China
must
be
directed
to
Comrade
Filippov,"
he
said.
1.
Mikoyan
quietly
came
to
Xibaipo
An
examination
of
the
process
of
forming
an
alliance
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
China
from
1949
to
1950
shows
that
for
both
sides,
the
basis,
objectives
and
conditions
for
forming
this
alliance
are
intricately
intertwined.
This
is
mainly
reflected
in
two
aspects:
how
to
deal
with
the
policy
towards
United
States
and
how
to
solve
their
respective
actual
interests.
Dealing
with
the
United
States,
the
common
enemy
of
the
Soviet
Union
and
China,
is
the
basic
condition
for
the
conclusion
of
alliance,
and
itis
also
the
common
goal
of
both
sides.
However,
Mao
Zedong
needed
the
assistance
and
support
of
the
Soviet
Union
to
complete
the
great
cause
of
liberating
the
whole
of
China
(including
Taiwan).
On
the
one
hand,
the
Soviet
Union
wanted
to
use
China’s
power
to
contain
the
expansion
of
American
power
in
Asia,
and
on
the
other
hand,
ithad
to
avoid
making
the
Soviet
Union
directly
into
a
possible
Sino-
US
military
conflict.
In
addition,
the
birth
of
new
China
and
the
requirement
to
restore
national
sovereignty
will
inevitably
affect
the
fundamental
rights
and
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
Far
East
obtained
through
the
Yalta
Agreement.
In
these
two
aspects,
there
are
not
only
the
basis
and
goals
for
the
establishment
of
Sino-
Soviet
alliance,
but
also
the
implicit
conditions
for
the
contradictions
and
differences
in
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance.
During
the
three
meetings
of
the
senior
leaders
of
the
two
parties
in
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
at
the
beginning,
middle
and
end
of
1949,
this
kind
of
unity
and
contradiction
was
fully
reflected,
and
the
form
of
its
expression
changed
subtly.
However,
the
general
trend
is
obvious,
that
is,
Mao
Zedong
is
determined
to
"leave
one
side"
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Towards
Moscow:
The
Foundation,
Objectives
and
Conditions
of
the
Sino-
Soviet
Alliance
Chapter
two
In
conclusion,
despite
their
differences
and
contradictions,
by
the
end
of
1948
Mao
and
Stalin
had
realized
that
they
had
to
stand
together.
The
Political
Bureau
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
decided
to
send
Mikoyan
to
China
meet
Mao
Zedong
and
other
members
of
the
Political
Bureau
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
to
understand
the
requirements
and
wishes
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
and
explain
the
views
of
Soviet
leaders
on
the
issues
raised
by
the
latter
to
Moscow.
Machine Translated by Google
Mao
Zedong
obviously
saw
what
Stalin
meant.
In
his
telegram
on
January
12,
he
directly
expressed
his
resolute
opposition
to
foreign
investigations.
Perhaps
itwas
inconsideration
of
the
need
to
adopt
amore
appropriate
and
strategic
statement,
or
in
consideration
that
the
CCP
might
reject
the
Soviet
Union’s
proposal
and
leave
a
way
out
for
itself.
Before
Mao
Zedong’s
reply,
Stalin
called
again
on
January
11
to
explain
that
“the
Your
answer
to
the
Kuomintang’s
proposal
is
intended
to
prevent
peace
negotiations,”
because
ifthe
CCP’s
conditions
proposed
by
the
Kuomintang
do
not
agree,
“then,
the
Kuomintang
will
become
a
sinner
for
sabotaging
the
peace
talks.
In
this
way,
the
Kuomintang’s
peace
talks
with
the
United
States
will
be
tricked.”
Ifyou
are
exposed,
can
continue
the
war
of
liberation
that
must
be
won."
Itcan
beseen
that
Stalin’s
propositions
were
actually:
first,
in
order
to
avoid
taking
responsibility,
the
CCP
should
not
refuse
peace
talks;
second,
the
United
States
must
not
be
allowed
to
participate
in
mediation;
third,
the
Soviet
Union
is
willing
to
act
as
a
mediator
alone.
Stalin
went
on
to
point
out
that
the
CCP's
"reply
should
generally
be
like
this."
The
Communist
Party
of
China
has
always
advocated
peace
in
China.
Itwas
not
the
Communist
Party
of
China
that
first
provoked
the
civil
war
in
China,
but
the
Nanjing
government,
so
the
Nanjing
government
should
bear
the
responsibility
for
the
consequences
of
war.
The
Chinese
Communist
Party
agreed
to
negotiate
with
the
Kuomintang,
but
the
war
criminals
who
started
the
Chinese
civil
war
cannot
be
allowed
to
participate
in
the
negotiations.
The
Chinese
Communist
Party
favored
direct
negotiations
with
the
KMT
without
the
participation
of
any
foreign
mediators.
In
particular,
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
believes
that
an
external
power
that
sends
troops
and
ships
directly
involved
in
the
civil
war
against
the
Chinese
People's
Liberation
Army
cannot
act
as
a
mediator,
because
itis
impossible
for
such
a
power
to
adopt
a
neutral
and
objective
attitude
to
end
China's
war.
At
the
same
time,
Stalin
also
prepared
Mao
Zedong’s
reply
to
the
Kuomintang’s
consultation:
The
Soviet
government
was
and
still
is
in
favor
of
ending
the
war
and
achieving
peace
in
China.
But
before
agreeing
to
act
as
a
mediator,
the
Soviet
government
wanted
to
know
whether
the
other
party,
the
Chinese
Communist
Party,
would
agree
to
accept
Soviet
mediation.
Therefore,
the
Soviet
Union
hoped
that
the
other
party,
the
Chinese
Communist
Party,
would
also
be
informed
of
this
peaceful
move
by
the
Chinese
government,
and
hoped
to
obtain
the
consent
of
other
party
for
the
Soviet
Union
to
act
as
a
mediator.
After
Stalin
received
the
Nanjing
government's
note
on
January
9,
1949,
he
immediately
called
Mao
Zedong
the
next
day.
The
lines
in
his
telegram
revealed
that
Moscow
did
not
want
to
refuse
mediate.
Stalin
first
pointed
out:
"The
intention
of
this
proposal
is
to
declare
that
the
Nanjing
government
supports
the
armistice
and
advocates
the
realization
of
peace.
Ifthe
Chinese
Communist
Party
categorically
refuses
to
negotiate
peace
with
the
Nanjing
government,
itwill
advocate
continuing
the
war."
In
view
of
this,
Stalin
The
following
reply
prepared
by
the
Soviet
Union
was
presented:
As
mentioned
above,
Soviet
Ambassador
Roshin
had
already
started
mediation
work
as
early
1948,
and
even
the
US
ambassador
to
China
had
this
estimate.
On
December
1,
1948,
Leighton
Stuart
called
the
Secretary
of
State
the
United
States,
saying:
"The
development
of
the
current
situation
is
very
likely
to
lead
an
armistice
and
the
resumption
of
peace
talks.
According
to
unconfirmed
information,
the
Soviet
ambassador
will
be
at
that
time
when
the
Kuomintang
controls
South
China,
the
Communist
Party
controls
North
China,
and
the
United
States
recognizes
Russia.
Mediation
under
the
conditions
of
Manchuria's
rights."
Regarding
this
issue,
Mao
Zedong
had
already
expressed
the
CCP's
attitude
to
the
Soviet
Union
in
advance.
In
his
telegram
to
Stalin
on
December
30,
1948,
he
said:
We
must
conduct
peace
negotiatio
but
we
do
not
negotiate
with
the
Kuomint
governm
We
only
negotiat
with
represe
of
powerfu
local
govern
and
troops,
negotia
with
them
or
negotia
an
armisti
or
to
negoti
the
conditi
of
uprisin
we
are
negoti
with
Fu
Zuoyi
in
Pekin
who
has
stron
milita
stren
and
there
is
hope
for
a
pea
settl
On
January
8,
1949,
facing
the
critical
situation
of
the
Chinese
People's
Liberation
Army's
one-
million-
strong
army
Chen
Bing
on
the
Yangtze
River,
Chiang
Kai-
shek
asked
the
United
States,
Britain,
France,
and
the
Soviet
Union
to
mediate
the
relationship
between
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party
and
achieve
peace
talks
in
order
to
buy
time
and
make
a
comeback.
Mao
Zedong's
established
policy
was
"the
revolution
must
be
carried
through
to
the
end"
and
"prepare
to
hold
a
Political
Consultative
Conference
and
establish
a
central
government."
Stalin
thought
differently.
He
worried
about
open
interference
by
the
United
States
in
the
rapidly
changing
situation
in
Asia.
Before
Mikoyan’s
trip,
another
unpleasant
incident
occurred
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin,
that
is,
they
had
different
views
on
the
important
issue
of
how
to
deal
with
the
Nanjing
government’s
proposal
for
peace
talks.
Machine Translated by Google
Itshould
be
said
that
itwas
the
issue
of
the
peace
talks
in
early
1949
that
represented
a
fundamental
change
in
the
Soviet
Union's
policy
toward
China.
Stalin,
January
10th
However,
Mao
Zedong's
worries
were
superfluous,
because
Stalin
was
also
very
cautious
in
dealing
with
affairs
at
this
time.
Now
that
he
knew
the
CCP's
firm
attitude,
he
would
not
raise
the
issue
of
mediation
again.
On
January
21,
Chiang
Kai-
shek
had
no
choice
but
to
announce
his
voluntary
retirement
in
the
face
of
conditions
for
peace
talks
proposed
by
the
CCP,
pushing
Li
Zongren
to
the
fore.
Immediately
after
Li
Zongren
became
the
acting
president,
he
summoned
Luo
Shen
and
asked
the
Soviet
government
to
help
China
stop
the
civil
war.
But
after
asking
Stalin
for
instructions,
Luo
Shen
replied
sharply:
"Mr.
President,
itis
too
late
now.
The
Chinese
government
will
not
get
rid
of
the
United
States.
Under
such
circumstances,
what
can
the
Soviet
Union
do?"
They
sent
someone
to
see
Luo
Shen,
and
the
answer
they
got
was
that
in
order
to
show
the
sincerity
of
Chinese
government,
they
should
first
do
everything
they
can
to
drive
the
American
forces
out
of
China.
Obviously,
this
is
a
rejection
of
Li
Zongren's
request.
Thus,
when
Mikoyan
arrived
in
Xibaipo
on
January
31,
the
issue
he
was
prepared
to
discuss
with
the
CCP
leaders
seemed
to
have
disappeared.
Some
scholars
believe
that
according
to
these
archives
recently
released
by
Russia,
Stalin
had
no
attempt
at
all
to
prevent
the
in-
depth
development
of
the
Chinese
revolution
at
the
beginning
of
1949,
nor
did
he
intend
to
promote
the
peace
talks
between
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party.
This
understanding
may
not
be
accurate
enough.
Mao
Zedong's
understanding
of
Stalin's
telegram
on
January
10
was
not
wrong.
Stalin
did
intend
to
use
the
Soviet
Union
alone
as
a
mediator
to
facilitate
the
peace
talks
between
the
Kuomintang
and
the
Communist
Party,
which
was
clearly
shown
in
the
telegram.
Itwas
only
after
taking
into
account
the
CCP’s
resolute
opposition
to
the
peace
talks
that
Stalin
stopped
raising
the
issue
of
amediator,
but
proposed
that
the
CCP
should
not
categorically
reject
the
peace
talks
from
a
strategic
point
of
view.
Itwas
precisely
out
of
fear
that
someone
would
bring
up
the
issue
of
peace
talks
again,
after
Mao
Zedong
had
a
telegram
with
Stalin,
on
January
19,
when
reviewing
the
draft
instructions
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
on
diplomatic
issues,
he
added
a
sentence:
"Finally,
and
most
importantly,
do
not
Any
foreign
country
and
the
United
Nations
are
allowed
to
interfere
in
China's
internal
affairs.
Because
China
is
an
independent
country,
matters
within
China
should
be
resolved
by
the
Chinese
people
and
the
people's
government
themselves.
Ifany
foreigner
mentions
that
foreign
governments
mediate
China's
civil
war,
they
should
be
completely
rejected.
"
So
far,
Stalin
believes
that
"we
have
reached
a
consensus
on
the
proposal
for
peace
talks
in
Nanjing"
and
"it
should
be
considered
that
the
problem
has
been
resolved."
However,
the
United
States,
Britain
and
other
countries
had
clearly
expressed
to
the
Kuomintang
government
that
they
refused
to
act
as
mediators
before
the
Soviet
Union,
and
the
peace
talks
had
to
be
abandoned.
On
the
same
day,
Stalin
received
Mao
Zedong's
reply
to
his
11th
telegram.
Mao
Zedong
agreed
and
accepted
the
revised
proposal
of
the
Soviet
Union,
announcing
the
eight
conditions
for
holding
peace
talks
with
the
Kuomintang,
but
Mao
Zedong
still
emphasized
that
the
"basic
policy"
for
the
two
sides
to
reach
an
agreement
was
to
"prevent
extensive
negotiations
with
the
Kuomintang
and
carry
out
the
revolutionary
war
in
the
end".
On
January
14,
Stalin
sent
a
long
telegram
back
to
Mao
Zedong,
again
explaining
in
detail
the
intention
of
the
Soviet
proposal.
Obviously
touched
by
Mao
Zedong's
firm
attitude,
in
this
telegram,
Stalin
no
longer
mentioned
the
Soviet
Union
as
a
mediator,
but
proceeded
in
full
accordance
with
the
ideas
of
the
11th
telegram.
The
telegram
suggested
that
the
CCP
agreed
to
peace
talks
from
a
strategic
point
of
view,
but
itcould
propose
conditions
that
the
Kuomintang
could
not
accept.
Stop
peace
talks.
He
believes
that
the
Soviet
government
should
give
the
following
answer
to
Nanjing:
"The
Soviet
government
has
always
hoped
to
see
a
peaceful,
democratic
and
unified
China.
The
people's
own
business.
The
Soviet
government,
based
on
the
principle
of
non-
interference
in
the
internal
affairs
of
other
countries,
considers
itunacceptable
to
mediate
between
the
two
sides
of
Chinese
civil
war."
Mao
Zedong
believed
that
although
the
United
States
was
"extremely
interested
in
participating
in
the
mediation
work
to
end
the
Chinese
civil
war",
however,
"The
victory
of
the
People's
Liberation
Army
across
the
country
is
not
far
away,
and
the
fall
of
Kuomintang
regime
has
become
a
foregone
conclusion.
Under
such
circumstances,
whether
the
big
powers
are
willing
to
continue
support
the
Nanjing
government
and
continue
to
oppose
the
People's
Liberation
Army
seems
to
have
become
aproblem."
On
the
contrary,
"If
the
Soviet
Union
adopts
the
position
stated
in
your
letter
of
January
10
in
its
reply
to
the
Nanking
government,
then
the
United
States,
Britain
and
France
will
inevitably
think
that
they
should
also
participate
in
the
mediation,
and
the
Kuomintang
will
find
itbeneficial
to
slander
us
The
pretext
of
the
fighters".
"If
Soviet
Union
can
adopt
the
position
we
proposed
in
the
reply
from
the
perspective
of
the
overall
interests
of
international
relations,
we
sincerely
hope
that
you
can
accept
our
proposal.
Ifyou
can
do
this,
itwill
be
agreat
support
to
us."
Mao
Zedong
further
clearly
stated
the
position
of
.the
CCP:
"In
order
to
enable
the
Chinese
people
to
obtain
real
peace
as
soon
possible",
the
CCP
"demanded
the
unconditional
surrender
of
the
Nanjing
government",
"because
now,
due
to
the
fundamental
changes
in
the
balance
of
class
power
in
China,
International
public
opinion
is
also
unfavorable
to
the
Nanjing
government,
so
this
summer
the
People's
Liberation
Army
should
cross
the
Yangtze
River
and
attack
Nanjing."
"We
don't
seem
to
need
resort
to
political
detours
anymore.
In
the
current
situation,
using
such
detours
will
do
more
harm
than
good."
Machine Translated by Google
 On
the
issue
of
Xinjiang,
the
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
carefully
mentioned
the
influence
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
this
region,
while
Mikoyan
made
itvery
clear
that
the
Soviet
Union
did
not
have
any
territorial
claims
on
Xinjiang.
According
to
Mikoyan’s
recollection:
“Mao
Zedong
said
that
the
independence
movement
was
going
on
in
the
Ili
region
of
Xinjiang,
and
that
this
movement
was
not
under
the
control
of
Urumqi
government.
There
was
also
a
Communist
Party
in
Ili.
He
said
that
when
he
met
with
Bai
Chongxi
in
Chongqing
in
1945,
Bai
told
him
that
the
Ili
region
The
insurgents
had
Soviet-
made
cannons,
tanks,
and
planes."
"I
told
Mao
Zedong
clearly
that
we
do
not
advocate
the
independence
movement
of
the
people
of
all
ethnic
groups
in
Xinjiang,
and
we
have
no
territorial
claims
on
Xinjiang.
We
believe
that
Xinjiang
should
also
be
part
of
China's
within
the
map."
Obviously,
Stalin
was
as
uncompromising
on
the
Mongolian
issue
as
he
was
in
the
1945
negotiations
on
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty,
and
he
adopted
a
preemptive
stance.
Mao
Zedong
could
only
give
up
on
this.
Mao
Zedong
took
the
initiative
to
ask
us
how
we
view
the
unification
of
Inner
and
Inner
Mongolia.
Ireplied
that
we
do
not
support
the
unification
of
Inner
and
Inner
Mongolia,
because
itwould
cause
China
to
lose
a
large
part
of
its
territory.
Mao
Zedong
said
that
he
believed
that
Outer
Mongolia
and
Inner
Mongolia
could
be
unified
and
included
in
the
territory
of
China.
To
this,
Ireplied
that
this
is
impossible
because
the
Mongolian
People's
Republic
has
long
enjoyed
independence.
After
the
victory
of
Anti-
Japanese
War,
even
the
Chinese
government
recognized
the
independence
of
Outer
Mongolia.
The
Mongolian
People's
Republic
has
its
own
army,
its
own
culture,
and
its
culture
and
economy
are
developing
rapidly.
Ithas
long
experienced
the
benefits
of
independence,
and
Iam
afraid
that
itwill
never
voluntarily
give
up
independence.
Ifone
day
Outer
Mongolia
and
Inner
Mongolia
unite,
the
result
will
probably
be
an
independent
and
unified
Mongolian
state.
Ren
Bishi,
who
was
present
during
the
conversation,
interjected
at
this
time,
saying
that
Inner
Mongolia
has
3
million
people,
while
Outer
Mongolia
has
only
1million
people.
In
response
to
my
report
on
this
matter,
Stalin
sent
me
a
telegram
for
Mao
Zedong’s
reference,
which
said:
“The
leader
of
Outer
Mongolia
advocates
that
Mongolians
from
all
over
China
should
link
up
with
Outer
Mongolia
and
establish
a
unified
Mongolian
state
under
an
independent
banner.
The
Soviet
government
opposed
this
plan
because
although
itdid
not
threaten
the
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union,
itwould
mean
ceding
a
large
piece
of
territory
from
China.
We
believe
that
even
ifall
Mongols
were
united
into
one
autonomous
unit,
Outer
Mongolia
would
not
Self-
government
within
the
territory
of
Chinese
government
and
renunciation
of
independence.
Itgoes
without
saying
that
the
decision
on
this
matter
belongs
to
Outer
Mongolia.”
Mao
Zedong
learned
of
the
telegram
and
said
he
would
consider
it,
adding
that
they
“of
course
will
not
defend
a
Itdoes
not
intend
to
raise
the
issue
of
the
unification
of
Mongolia.”
On
the
Mongolian
issue,
Mao
Zedong
first
euphemistically
used
the
issue
of
the
unification
of
the
Mongolian
nation
to
express
that
New
China
intended
to
take
back
Outer
Mongolia.
However,
due
to
the
firm
attitude
of
Soviet
Union,
itwas
the
first
to
raise
the
issue
of
Outer
Mongolia
annexing
Inner
Mongolia.
Facing
the
reality,
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
did
not
insist
on
taking
back
Outer
Mongolia.
Mikoyan
recalled
this
matter
in
his
report
to
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
1960s
and
said:
The
conflicts
that
may
arise
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
New
China
in
terms
of
state
relations
are
mainly
reflected
in
the
Northeast
issue
(the
lease
of
the
Lushun
base
and
the
ownership
of
Changchun
Railway
in
China),
the
Mongolian
issue
(the
independence
of
Outer
Mongolia)
and
the
Xinjiang
issue
(the
Soviet
Union’s
local
power
and
Influence),
the
Northeast
issue
is
the
focus.
On
Northeast
issue,
the
main
rights
and
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
China
were
realized
through
the
"Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance"
signed
with
the
Chiang
Kai-
shek
government
in
1945.
Therefore,
how
to
deal
with
this
treaty
became
a
concentrated
expression
of
resolving
these
contradiction
Regarding
the
position
and
policies
of
the
CCP,
itwas
mainly
introduced
by
Mao
Zedong.
According
to
Shi
Zhe's
recollection,
from
February
1st
to
3rd,
Mao
Zedong
talked
alone
for
three
days,
and
described
in
great
detail
the
current
situation
in
China
and
various
policies
of
the
CCP.
Although
Mikoyan
was
not
used
to
Mao
Zedong's
wide-
ranging
and
quotable
way
of
talking,
he
finally
had
a
general
understanding
of
the
basic
situation
of
China
and
the
CCP.
Mikoyan
had
many
talks
with
the
leaders
of
the
CCP
in
Xibaipo,
mainly
to
understand
the
CCP’s
position
and
policies
on
some
major
issues,
and
to
discuss
the
problems
in
the
relationship
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
future.
The
Soviet
Union
provided
the
CCP
with
economic
and
military
Aid
issues,
as
well
new
China's
domestic
policies
and
development
path
and
other
issues.
The
report
was
obviously
drafted
in
accordance
with
the
Soviet
Union’s
idea
of
peace
talks
in
1948,
and
itprobably
had
the
idea
of
testing
the
CCP’s
intentions.
However,
in
view
of
the
changes
in
the
situation
in
China
and
the
past
policies
of
the
CCP,
Stalin
was
actually
considering
changing
the
Soviet
Union’s
policy,
so
he
Soon,
he
became
silent
about
the
mediation
of
the
Soviet
Union.
In
any
case,
the
victory
of
Chinese
Communist
Party
in
China
is
a
sign
of
the
development
international
communist
movement,
and
itis
something
that
Stalin
should
be
happy
about.
The
key
issue
lies
in
New
China's
position
and
policy
towards
the
Soviet
Union,
which
is
exactly
the
main
purpose
of
Stalin's
sending
Mikoyan
to
Xibaipo.
Machine Translated by Google
 Itseems
that
although
Stalin
was
already
worried
about
the
fate
of
Sino-
Soviet
treaty,
the
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
did
not
seem
to
have
a
clear
opinion
on
this,
and
perhaps
there
was
no
time
to
seriously
consider
this
issue
at
that
time.
Judging
from
the
talks,
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
talked
more
about
asking
the
Soviet
Union
to
provide
economic
and
military
assistance.
Stalin
was
particularly
concerned
about
the
Changchun
Railway
in
China.
According
to
the
recollection
of
Kovalev
who
accompanied
Mikoyan
to
Xibaipo,
during
the
talks,
"he
asked
me
more
than
once
by
wireless
telegram,
what
is
the
real
attitude
of
the
Chinese
comrades
towards
the
Changchun
Railway
Treaty,
and
whether
they
think
the
Changchun
Railway
Treaty
is
a
truly
equal
treaty
".
During
the
talks,
Mikoyan
also
frankly
told
the
leaders
of
the
CCP
that
Soviet
Union
did
not
believe
that
the
agreement
on
Changchun
Railway
was
unequal,
"because
this
railway
was
mainly
funded
and
built
by
Russia",
"maybe
in
this
treaty,
the
principle
of
equality
Ithas
not
been
fully
represented,
but
we
are
ready
to
discuss
and
resolve
this
issue
amicably
with
our
Chinese
comrades."
Mao
Zedong
replied
somewhat
vaguely:
"There
are
some
frictions
on
the
ownership
of
Changchun
Railway,
which
can
be
resolved
on
the
spot.
For
example,
the
Kuomintang
army
plundered
Changchun
Railway
and
some
enterprises,
but
with
the
advance
of
People's
Liberation
Army,
these
The
enterprises
were
eventually
returned
to
the
Changchun
Railway.
The
folklore
was
that
the
Kuomintang
occupied
these
enterprises
under
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty,
and
that
the
People's
Liberation
Army
seemed
to
be
violating
these
treaties
and
handing
over
the
enterprises
to
Changchun
Railway."
Mao
Zedong
finally
agreed
to
let
Gao
Gang
and
Kova
Lev
studied
jointly
this
issue
and
reported
to
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
and
the
Union
Communist
Party
(Bolsheviks).
Sure
enough,
after
hearing
the
attitude
of
Soviet
Union,
Mao
Zedong
and
other
leaders
of
the
CCP
expressed
almost
at
the
same
time
that
they
could
not
immediately
withdraw
the
Soviet
troops
from
Liaodong
and
withdraw
the
Lushun
base,
because
doing
so
would
only
benefit
the
United
States.
Mao
Zedong
said
that
we
will
keep
the
issue
of
withdrawing
troops
from
Liaodong
asecret,
and
we
will
reconsider
the
treaty
issue
in
the
future
when
China
smashes
the
political
reactionary
forces,
mobilizes
the
people
to
confiscate
foreign
capital,
and
governs
the
country
in
order
with
the
help
of
the
Soviet
Union
Mao
Zedong
said
that
the
Chinese
people
are
grateful
to
the
Soviet
Union
for
this
treaty,
and
you
will
leave
China
when
we
become
stronger,
and
then
we
will
sign
aSino-
Soviet
mutual
assistance
treaty
like
the
Soviet-
Polish
Treaty.
The
attitude
of
the
CCP
seems
to
be
very
sincere,
but
Mikoyan
feels
that
"he
has
his
own
strategic
considerations,
but
he
didn't
explain
them
clearly."
Later
developments
showed
that
Mikoyan's
feeling
was
correct.
.
After
receiving
Mikoyan's
report
on
China's
position
on
this
issue,
Stalin
wrote
in
a
telegram
to
Mao
Zedong
on
February
5,
1949:
"After
the
Chinese
Communists
took
power,
the
situation
has
fundamentally
changed.
The
Soviet
government
has
decided
that
once
the
same
Japan
signed
a
peace
treaty
and
the
United
States
withdrew
its
troops
from
Japan.
The
Soviet
Union
canceled
this
unequal
treaty
and
withdrew
its
troops
from
Lushun.
However,
ifthe
Chinese
Communist
Party
thinks
itis
appropriate
for
the
Soviet
troops
to
immediately
withdraw
from
the
Lushun
area,
then
the
Soviet
Union
is
ready
to
meet
the
wishes
of
Chinese
Communist
Party.”
After
Stalin
clearly
pointed
out
to
the
CCP
conditions
for
the
Soviet
Union
to
withdraw
its
troops
from
Lushun,
he
said
that
itcould
also
withdraw
its
troops
immediately
according
to
the
CCP's
request.
Obviously,
Stalin's
statement
is
not
sincere.
In
fact,
he
also
understands
that
China
will
not
ask
for
troop
withdrawal
right
now.
Of
course,
the
Northeast
issue
was
the
focus
of
concern
both
China
and
the
Soviet
Union.
However,
both
sides
have
adopted
a
very
cautious
and
tentative
approach
on
this
very
sensitive
issue.
According
to
Russian
archives,
regarding
the
issue
of
the
Lushun
naval
base,
Mao
Zedong
proposed
to
Mikoyan
through
the
mouths
of
Chinese
democrats
that
some
people
believed
that
"after
the
revolutionary
government
came
to
power
in
China,
itwould
be
meaningless
for
the
Soviet
Union
to
keep
a
military
base
at
Lushunkou,
and
itwould
be
useless
to
withdraw
the
military
base
at
Lushunkou."
Lushunkou
is
abig
event
for
China.”
But
Mao
Zedong
said
that
he
thought
itwas
wrong
to
raise
the
question
in
this
way,
"There
are
communists
in
China,
and
there
are
communists
in
the
Soviet
Union,
but
this
does
not
rule
out
and
completely
allows
the
Soviet
military
base
in
Lushun
to
be
preserved."
The
Chinese
communists
"advocate
the
retention
of
this
military
base"
and
"when
China
is
strong
and
capable
of
resisting
Japanese
aggression,
then
the
Soviet
Union
itself
will
no
longer
need
the
base
in
Lushun."
Mao
Zedong
used
this
euphemistic
statement
to
express
his
position
that
China
should
take
back
Lushunkou
but
will
not
take
itback
for
the
time
being.
Although
Xinjiang
was
also
one
of
the
areas
concern
to
the
Soviet
Union,
the
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
in
1945
did
not
involve
the
issue
of
Xinjiang.
At
that
time,
Stalin
used
the
Soviet
government
to
give
up
support
for
the
armed
struggle
and
independence
tendency
of
Xinjiang
minorities
as
one
of
the
conditions
in
exchange
for
Chiang
Kai-
shek
agreeing
to
the
independence
of
Outer
Mongolia.
Later,
the
Soviet
government
tried
to
guarantee
Soviet
interests
in
the
region
by
signing
a
treaty
with
the
Xinjiang
local
government,
but
was
opposed
by
the
Chinese
central
government.
Nevertheless,
due
to
the
presence
of
alarge
number
of
Soviet
expatriates,
Moscow's
control
and
influence
over
Xinjiang
cannot
actually
be
ignored.
In
other
words,
the
Soviet
Union’s
influence
and
control
over
Xinjiang
(especially
northern
Xinjiang)
was
mainly
through
the
ubiquitous
Soviet
Overseas
Chinese
Association
known
as
the
“state
within
a
state”,
rather
than
through
occupying
territory
or
signing
treaties.
Therefore,
Stalin
had
prepared
in
advance
to
make
concessions
on
the
Xinjiang
issue,
but
the
CCP
at
that
time
could
not
bring
this
issue
to
the
agenda.
Machine Translated by Google
Fifth,
Mao
Zedong
repeatedly
emphasized
the
need
to
accept
the
leadership
and
command
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks),
saying
that
he
was
a
student
of
Stalin
and
insisted
on
a
pro-
Soviet
policy.
Fourth,
regarding
foreign
recognition
of
the
future
revolutionary
government,
Mao
Zedong
had
two
proposals:
one
proposal
was
that
the
new
government
be
recognized
immediately
after
its
establishment,
and
he
hoped
that
the
Soviet
Union
would
recognize
itfirst;
The
foreign
government
declares
that
itrecognizes
and
does
not
refuse,
but
does
not
agree
to
itfor
the
time
being.
The
CCP
prefers
the
second
option,
because
itcan
be
free
to
solve
the
problem
of
foreign
interests
in
China.
Mikoyan
did
not
comment
on
this.
Third,
Mao
believed
that
there
should
be
no
rush
to
form
a
government,
which
would
complicate
matters
ifa
government
were
to
be
formed
now
that
would
necessarily
be
a
coalition
government,
and
insisted
that
agovernment
could
not
be
formed
immediately
after
the
capture
of
Nanjing.
Mikoyan
persuaded
Mao
Zedong
to
quickly
establish
anew
revolutionary
government
on
acoalition
basis
after
capturing
Nanjing
or
Shanghai,
believing
that
this
would
be
beneficial
to
both
domestic
and
international
struggles.
Second,
Mao
Zedong
did
not
pay
enough
attention
to
the
issue
of
the
composition
proletariat.
He
was
satisfied
with
the
"great
influence
of
the
Communist
Party
in
the
countryside"
and
said
that
"the
consciousness
of
Chinese
peasants
is
higher
than
that
of
all
American
workers
and
many
British
workers".
Mikoyan
believes
that
this
has
something
to
do
with
the
fact
that
CCP
and
its
military
have
been
operating
in
the
mountains
for
a
long
time
and
are
far
away
from
the
working
class
and
big
cities.
First,
the
CCP
decided
not
to
rush
capture
big
cities
like
Nanjing
and
Shanghai
due
to
the
lack
of
management
cadres
and
the
difficulty
in
solving
the
urban
supply
problem.
Mikoyan
refuted
this
based
on
the
opinions
of
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks),
pointing
out
that
large
cities
should
be
occupied
as
soon
possible
in
order
to
strengthen
the
proletarian
foundation
among
the
members
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China.
As
for
the
political
policy
adopted
by
the
CCP,
itcan
be
seen
from
the
comprehensive
materials
of
Russian
archives
that
Mikoyan
considered
the
following
points
worthy
of
attention
in
his
report:
From
the
above
situation,
itcan
be
seen
that
the
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
urgently
requested
the
Soviet
Union
to
provide
assistance.
Although
Mao
Zedong
stated
several
times
in
the
talks
that
even
ifthe
Soviet
Union
could
not
provide
loans
or
other
assistance,
he
would
not
complain,
but
in
the
end
he
still
asked
the
Soviet
Union
to
provide
military
supplies
as
soon
possible.
goods,
and
decided
that
a
special
delegation
would
be
sent
to
Moscow
in
order
to
sign
the
loan
agreement
and
discuss
other
important
issues.
On
February
3,
Liu
Shaoqi
also
touched
on
the
issue
of
China's
industrial
development
in
the
future
his
conversation
with
Mikoyan.
He
suggested
that
the
Soviet
Union
could
take
the
following
forms
in
helping
China’s
industrial
development:
(1)
teach
the
experience
of
socialist
economic
reform;
(2)
provide
corresponding
books,
and
send
experts
and
technical
personnel
from
various
economic
departments;
(3)
Funding.
He
also
stated
that
the
Chinese
side
is
eager
to
know
how
much
help
the
Soviet
Union
can
give.
Regarding
the
demands
made
by
the
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China,
Mikoyan
agreed
in
principle
to
help
organize
arms
production
and
dispatch
experts,
and
declared
that
he
would
ask
Moscow
for
advice
on
the
rest.
Regarding
Zhou
Enlai's
request
for
a
loan
of
400
million
US
dollars
from
the
Soviet
Union,
Mikoyan
said
that
he
could
only
give
300
million
US
dollars,
and
suggested
that
the
CCP
determine
alist
of
materials
that
need
Soviet
assistance.
During
their
meeting
on
February
2,
Zhu
De
and
Ren
Bishi
"focused
on
China's
industrial
development
and
Sino-
Soviet
cooperation
in
this
field."
In
this
regard,
they
attach
particular
importance
to
the
important
role
of
the
Northeast.
Regarding
this
conversation,
Mikoyan
specifically
wrote
in
the
telegram:
"Ren
Bishi
emphasized
that
in
formulating
the
national
economic
plan,
they
pay
special
attention
to
the
important
role
of
the
Northeast,
and
strive
to
turn
itinto
China's
national
defense
base.
The
Northeast
should
be
able
to
produce
aircraft,
tanks
and
Other
weapons.
At
the
same
time,
he
pointed
out
that
they
hoped
the
Soviet
Union
would
help
the
industrial
development
of
Northeast
China,
and
listed
the
following
ways
to
provide
assistance:
(1)
Soviet-
Chinese
economic
union;
(2)
Soviet
loans;
(3)
Soviet
concessions
Ren
Bishi
said
that
mining
the
rare
mineral
deposits
in
Shenyang,
Jinzhou
and
Rehe
provinces,
such
as
uranium,
magnesium,
molybdenum
and
aluminum,
requires
the
help
of
the
Soviet
Union.
In
the
past,
Japan
looted
1ton
of
uranium
ore
from
China.
Ifthe
Soviet
Union
is
interested
in
these
deposits,
Considering
development
joint
or
asking
the
Soviet
Union
to
set
up
aspecial
concession
enterprise.
Ren
Bishi
pointed
out
that
industrial
development
in
Northeast
China
requires
high-
level
experts.
In
Anshan
Iron
and
Steel
Company,
they
had
to
hire
Japanese
experts.
Therefore,
Ren
Bishi
asked
the
Soviet
Union
to
send
no
less
than
500
experts
in
various
fields
of
the
national
economy."
During
the
talks
on
February
1,
Zhou
Enlai
and
Zhu
De
raised
the
issues
that
Chinese
Communist
Party
and
the
Chinese
People's
Liberation
Army
urgently
requested
to
solve.
They
hoped
that
the
Soviet
Union
would
provide
anti-
tank
guns,
tanks,
explosives
and
weapons
production
equipment,
and
send
some
consultants
to
help
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
train
and
establish
Military
schools
and
organization
of
logistics
including
weapons
production.
Zhou
Enlai
also
hoped
that
the
Soviet
Union
would
provide
steel,
gasoline,
automobiles
and
other
machinery
and
supplies.
Machine Translated by Google
 Apparently
because
they
did
not
understand
Stalin's
true
intentions,
or
out
of
consideration
avoiding
the
suspicion
of
Soviet
Union,
the
CCP
never
accepted
loans
and
economic
aid
from
the
United
States.
In
response
to
the
above-
mentioned
telegram,
Stalin
sent
a
telegram
to
Kovalev
on
April
19:
"When
talking
with
Mao
Zedong,
please
tell
him
the
following
points:
First,
we
believe
that
the
Chinese
democratic
government
should
not
refuse
to
cooperate
with
certain
capitals,
including
the
United
States.
The
establishment
of
official
relations
with
capitalist
countries
should
these
formally
renounce
support
for
Chiang
Kai-
shek
and
the
Kuomintang
government
in
the
military,
economic
and
political
fields....Secondly,
we
believe
that
foreign
loans
and
business
dealings
with
capitalist
countries
should
not
be
refused
under
certain
conditions.
All
The
problem
is
that
the
terms
of
loans
and
doing
business
cannot
become
a
burden
on
China's
economic
and
financial
development,
so
that
US
imperialism
can
use
these
conditions
to
limit
the
national
sovereignty
of
democratic
China
and
stifle
China's
national
industry."
On
April
13,
Kovalev,
who
had
become
the
representative
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
to
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China,
reported
to
Stalin
the
situation
of
his
three-
hour
meeting
with
Mao
Zedong
on
April
9.
During
the
meeting,
Zhu
De,
Zhou
Enlai
and
Liu
Shaoqi
were
present.
Mao
Zedong
specifically
pointed
out
in
his
talk:
The
US
government,
through
its
agent
(Citibank),
expressed
its
willingness
to
provide
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
with
a
loan
of
US$100-300
million.
Mao
Zedong
also
offered
to
say:
"We
regard
this
proposal
as
an
attempt
to
make
a
deal
with
us,
which
is
not
to
aid
the
Chinese
people,
but
(according
to
Marshall's
plan)
to
get
American
capitalism
out
of
crisis
and
make
the
Chinese
people
obey
them.
As
itdid
during
the
reign
of
Chiang
Kai-
shek."
However,
Mao
Zedong
later
stated
that
out
of
consideration
economic
interests,
the
CCP
decided
to
"establish
de
facto
ties
with
capitalist
countries
under
certain
circumstances,
but
not
de
diplomatic
jure
relations." .
At
the
time
when
economic
recovery
was
in
urgent
need
of
loan
assistance,
the
issue
of
using
funds
from
capitalist
countries
aroused
the
attention
of
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
because
the
loans
requested
from
the
Soviet
Union
could
not
be
obtained
for
a
while.
At
that
time,
consortiums
from
Western
countries
also
had
the
intention
to
invest
in
China.
But
Mao
Zedong
was
well
aware
of
the
sensitivity
this
issue,
and
he
had
to
inform
the
Soviet
Union
and
obtain
Stalin's
consent.
In
order
to
express
this
wish
of
the
CCP
to
Moscow,
Mao
Zedong
stepped
up
his
ties
with
Stalin.
Especially
on
the
issue
of
relations
with
the
United
States
and
Western
countries,
although
the
CCP
is
unwilling
to
close
the
door,
in
order
to
gain
Stalin's
trust,
itstill
asks
and
reports
to
Moscow
from
time
to
time.
After
Mikoyan
visited
Xibaipo,
Mao
Zedong
became
more
convinced
that
for
the
development
and
construction
of
New
China,
an
alliance
with
the
Soviet
Union
must
be
formed.
In
the
summary
report
of
the
Second
Plenary
Session
of
the
Seventh
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
on
March
13,
1949,
Mao
Zedong
made
along
speech
on
the
relationship
between
the
October
Revolution
and
the
Chinese
Revolution.
He
said:
"We
cannot
imagine
that
there
would
be
no
Soviet
Union...we
should
stand
on
the
same
front
as
Soviet
Union
and
be
allies.
As
long
as
we
have
the
opportunity,
we
will
publish
astatement
to
explain
this
point.
Now
non-
Party
people
should
also
explain
this
point.
We
must
also
do
this
kind
of
propaganda.”
On
April
3,
the
CCP
and
various
democratic
parties
issued
jointly
the
“Joint
Statement
Against
the
North
Atlantic
Treaty”
drafted
by
Mao
Zedong
himself,
which
publicly
stated
for
the
first
time
that
Soviet
Union
was
an
ally
of
New
China.
2.
Liu
Shaoqi's
secret
visit
to
Moscow
Judging
from
the
existing
Russian
archives,
during
Mikoyan’s
visit
to
China,
although
no
practical
issues
were
resolved,
Mikoyan
had
in-
depth
conversations
with
Mao
Zedong
and
had
extensive
contacts
with
the
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China,
especially
during
this
period.
The
frequent
exchanges
of
telegrams
between
Mikoyan,
after
all,
enabled
the
leaders
of
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
to
initially
understand
each
other's
positions,
views,
intentions
and
requirements,
as
well
existing
differences.
The
exchange
of
visits
and
further
communication
between
the
leaders
laid
the
foundation,
and
at
same
time
took
the
first
step
towards
Sino-
Soviet
alliance.
Sixth,
the
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
stated
that
the
"goal
of
the
new
China
is
to
gradually
transition
socialism
by
strengthening
the
planning
principle",
but
in
terms
of
time,
itis
long-
term,
and
itwill
take
10-10
years
to
launch
a
full-
scale
attack
on
the
capitalist
elements
in
the
economy.
15
years".
Hope
the
USSR
advises
on
this.
And
thank
Stalin
for
his
concern
for
the
Chinese
revolution.
Machine Translated by Google
On
June
21,
1949,
the
delegation
of
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China,
headed
by
Liu
Shaoqi
and
including
Gao
Gang
and
Wang
Jiaxiang,
left
for
the
Soviet
Union
and
arrived
in
Moscow
on
the
26th.
Liu
Shaoqi's
visit
to
Moscow
was
the
most
significant
diplomatic
move
taken
by
the
CCP
on
eve
of
the
founding
New
China.
The
purpose
of
the
CCP
delegation’s
visit
is
very
clear,
which
is
to
directly
express
Stalin
the
CCP’s
position
on
major
domestic
and
foreign
issues
through
the
meeting
of
the
senior
leaders
of
the
two
sides,
to
strengthen
relations
with
the
Soviet
Union,
to
lay
the
foundation
for
formation
of
an
alliance
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union,
Meeting
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
Itwas
precisely
because
of
the
fear
provoking
the
United
States
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
reluctant
to
even
disclose
its
close
contacts
with
the
CCP.
Stalin
specifically
pointed
out
in
his
telegram
to
Kovalev
on
May
26,
1949:
"We
believe
that
itis
inappropriate
to
show
the
friendship
between
Soviet
Union
and
democratic
China
extensively
at
present."
The
delegation
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
should
visit
Moscow
in
secret,
and
the
foreign
report
should
be
in
the
name
of
the
Northeast
trade
delegation
headed
by
Gao
Gang.
As
for
whether
Stalin
prevented
the
CCP
from
attacking
the
Yangtze
River,
which
has
been
debated
for
a
long
time
in
the
historical
circles,
according
to
the
historical
materials
that
the
author
has
seen
so
far,
no
direct
documentary
evidence
has
been
found
in
this
regard.
However,
from
Luo
Shen's
activities
and
Stalin's
above-
mentioned
telegram
about
the
mediation
of
the
Soviet
Union,
itcan
beseen
that
the
Soviet
Communist
Party
really
intended
to
allow
the
KMT
and
the
Communist
Party
to
rule
across
the
river,
although
this
was
not
explicitly
stated.
Therefore,
there
was
a
reason
why
Mao
Zedong
repeatedly
expressed
his
grievances
against
Stalin
on
this
issue.
Hu
Qiaomu's
statement
is
still
credible,
that
is,
Stalin
did
not
officially
propose
to
prevent
the
CCP
from
crossing
the
river,
but
there
was
such
an
intention.
The
Soviet
ambassador
to
China
Roshin
expressed
similar
concerns.
On
April
1,
1949,
before
the
CCP
troops
crossed
the
river,
Clark,
the
U.S.
Minister
Counselor
to
China,
called
Marshall
and
said
that
Roshen
told
him
that
ifthe
CCP
finally
seized
the
country,
itwould
feel
"ridden
on
a
tiger"
and
could
not
cope
with
it.
situation.
In
fact,
itwas
Stalin
who
really
felt
"riding
the
tiger".
For
example,
after
the
Chinese
Communist
Army
shelled
the
British
frigate
"Amethyst"
and
the
cruiser
"London"
in
the
battle
of
crossing
the
river,
British
cabinet
held
an
emergency
meeting.
The
Conservative
Party
demanded
to
declare
war
on
Red
China,
which
was
supported
by
the
United
States.
According
to
Moscow’s
reaction
to
his
report,
Kovalev,
who
was
in
Peking
at
this
time,
“feeled
that
the
moment
of
crisis
has
arrived”
and
that
“the
Soviet
army
on
the
Liaodong
Peninsula
and
the
Soviet
fleet
at
Lushunkou
and
other
bases
in
the
Pacific
Ocean
are
in
a
state
of
complete
combat
readiness.”
But
"thankfully
for
all,
conflict
was
avoided". .
However,
the
Soviet
Union’s
consideration
of
the
development
relationship
between
the
CCP
and
United
States
at
that
time
was
more
complicated
and
subtle
than
Mao
Zedong
estimated.
On
the
one
hand,
Stalin
was
unwilling
to
have
close
contact
between
the
CCP
and
United
States.
On
the
other
hand,
he
was
worried
that
the
United
States
would
send
troops
to
interfere
with
the
CCP’s
cause
of
liberation.
From
a
certain
perspective,
itcan
be
said
that
Stalin’s
main
concern
about
the
development
of
situation
in
China
at
that
time
was
not
the
relationship
between
the
CCP
and
United
States.
but
because
the
CCP’s
excessively
drastic
military
action
will
create
an
excuse
for
the
United
States
to
send
troops
intervene
in
China’s
civil
war.
Because
once
the
United
States
sends
troops,
the
Soviet
Union
will
face
very
difficult
choices:
ifthe
Soviet
Union
intervenes
in
this
conflict,
itwill
inevitably
be
involved
in
a
war
with
the
United
States
in
Asia;
Vested
interests
in
northern
China.
,
On
May
26,
in
a
telegram
to
Kovalev,
Stalin
asked
him
to
tell
Mao
Zedong
that
he
agreed
with
"Comrade
Mao
Zedong's
comments
on
American
Ambassador
Stuart"
and
said,
"The
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
thanks
Comrade
Mao
Zedong
for
the
information
".
On
May
23,
Kovalev
reported
to
Stalin
again:
Mao
Zedong
briefly
informed
the
situation
of
talks
between
the
representatives
of
the
CCP
and
US
Ambassador
Stuart
in
early
May.
Mao
Zedong
said
that
during
the
talks,
Leighton
Stuart
had
expressed
his
personal
opinion
that
the
Americans
had
now
stopped
supporting
the
Kuomintang
regime,
and
the
presence
of
the
American
embassy
headed
by
him
in
Nanjing
was
proof.
He
also
said
that
as
soon
the
People's
Liberation
Army
entered
the
city
(Qingdao,
Shanghai),
the
Americans
withdrew
army
and
navy.
Leighton
Stuart
expressed
the
hope
that
democrats
would
be
as
broad
possible
in
a
future
coalition
government.
After
the
establishment
of
coalition
government,
as
long
as
ithas
the
support
of
people
of
the
whole
country,
United
States
will
recognize
itand
establish
diplomatic
relations
with
the
government.
Regarding
the
talks
with
Leighton
Stuart,
Mao
Zedong
said:
Leighton
Stuart's
statement
contradicted
MacArthur's
actions.
MacArthur
not
long
ago
sent
two
regiments
of
American
soldiers
to
land
in
Qingdao
and
strengthened
the
fleet
stationed
in
Shanghai.
Either
Leighton
Stuart
lied,
or
the
soldiers
(MacArthur)
didn't
respect
the
opinion
of
US
State
Department.
Mao
Zedong
also
said:
"Leighton
Stuart
lied
that
the
Americans
seemed
to
have
stopped
supporting
the
Kuomintang
regime.
What
we
know
is
the
opposite:
this
support
has
been
actively
going
on.
As
for
Leighton
Stuart's
statement
that
the
embassies
of
United
States
and
other
countries
remained
in
Nanjing,
itwas
not
for
the
sake
of
Our
interests.
We
would
be
happy
ifall
embassies
of
capitalist
countries
were
withdrawn
from
China.”
On
the
sensitive
issue
of
Sino-
US
relations,
Mao
Zedong
also
paid
special
attention
to
listening
Moscow's
opinions.
Kovalev
recalled
that
before
and
after
the
battle
of
crossing
the
river,
Mao
Zedong
and
Zhou
Enlai
repeatedly
briefed
him
on
the
relationship
between
the
CCP
and
United
States
and
other
Western
countries
and
sought
the
opinions
of
Soviet
Union.
Machine Translated by Google
In
his
report,
Liu
Shaoqi
expounded
several
principles
of
the
new
China’s
foreign
policy:
“First,
struggle
with
the
imperialist
countries
in
order
to
realize
the
complete
independence
of
the
Chinese
nation;
second,
stand
with
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
new
democratic
countries
in
international
affairs
to
oppose
new
dangers
of
war,
and
to
defend
world
peace
and
democracy;
third,
to
take
advantage
of
the
contradictions
among
capitalist
countries
and
within
these
countries.
(Yes.)
Fourth,
to
develop
trade
and
commerce
between
China
and
foreign
countries
under
conditions
of
equality
and
mutual
benefit,
especially
Itis
to
develop
trade
with
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
new
democracies."
,
The
report
distinguishes
between
China's
internal
struggles
and
external
struggles:
"The
so-
called
internal
contradictions
and
internal
struggles
refer
to
the
contradictions
and
struggles
among
various
classes
and
parties
within
the
people's
democratic
dictatorship,
which
will
gradually
intensify
in
the
future,
but
compared
with
external
contradictions,
For
quite
a
long
time,
itwill
remain
in
a
secondary
and
subordinate
position."
"Some
people
say:
'After
the
overthrow
of
Kuomintang
regime
or
the
implementation
of
land
reform,
the
contradiction
between
the
Chinese
proletariat
and
the
bourgeoisie
will
immediately
become
the
main
contradiction,
and
the
workers
The
struggle
against
the
capitalists
immediately
becomes
the
main
struggle.'
We
do
not
think
this
statement
is
correct,
because
ifa
regime
turns
its
main
forces
against
the
bourgeoisie,
itbecomes
or
begins
to
become
a
dictatorship
of
the
proletariat,
which
will
put
the
The
national
bourgeoisie
who
can
cooperate
with
us
rush
to
the
side
of
imperialism.
This
will
be
a
dangerous
adventurist
policy
ifitis
implemented
in
China
today.
(Yes!)”
The
report
particularly
emphasizes:
“In
China,
from
now
on
Itwill
take
many
steps
to
realize
the
complete
nationalization
of
national
capital,
and
itwill
take
quite
along
time.
How
long
this
period
will
take
depends
on
various
international
and
domestic
conditions.
We
estimate
that
itmay
take
10
to
15
years.
Year."
Regarding
the
issue
of
future
state
management,
the
report
said:
"We
have
decided
to
hold
a
new
Political
Consultative
Conference
in
August
this
year
and
form
a
coalition
government.
We
are
now
actively
making
various
preparations.
The
new
Political
Consultative
Conference
will
not
be
organized
by
the
Communist
Party
or
a
few
parties.
Itwas
initiated
and
convened
by
a
single
party,
but
itprepared
was
jointly
and
convened
by
23
organizations
including
all
democratic
parties,
people's
organizations,
ethnic
minorities
and
overseas
Chinese.
This
method
made
people
outside
the
party
very
satisfied."
The
report
pointed
out:
"About
China
The
nature
of
the
state
and
nature
of
the
regime
of
New
Democracy",
"it
is
a
country
led
by
the
proletariat
and
based
on
the
alliance
of
workers
and
peasants,
itis
adictatorship
over
imperialism,
feudal
forces
and
bureaucratic
capital.
(is
'bureaucratic
capital'?)"
The
report
emphasized:
"The
people's
democratic
dictatorship
is
What
neither
the
dictatorship
of
bourgeoisie
nor
the
dictatorship
of
proletariat.
This
needs
no
explanation.
(Yes!)"
"The
form
of
the
Chinese
people's
democratic
dictatorship
is
the
This
not
a
bourgeois
parliamentary
system,
but
is
close
to
the
Soviet
system,
but
itis
also
different
from
the
Soviet
system
of
the
dictatorship
proletariat,
because
representatives
of
the
national
bourgeoisie
participate
in
the
People's
Deputies
Conference.
(Yes!)”
Liu
Shaoqi
first
pointed
out
in
his
report:
"The
Chinese
people's
revolutionary
war
has
basically
won
victory
now,
and
will
soon
achieve
complete
victory."
"The
victory
of
the
Chinese
people's
revolutionary
war
occurred
after
World
War
II.
The
world
proletariat
assistance
given
to
the
Chinese
people
by
the
people's
democratic
forces,
especially
the
Soviet
Union,
was
one
of
the
decisive
conditions
for
the
victory
of
Chinese
people.
The
Chinese
Communist
Party
took
advantage
of
these
conditions.
In
the
Chinese
revolution,
having
successfully
organized
the
anti-
imperialist
national
united
front,
The
experience
of
land
reform,
the
experience
of
long-
term
armed
struggle
in
the
countryside,
siege
of
the
cities,
and
then
the
capture
of
cities,
the
experience
of
secret
work
and
legal
struggle
in
the
cities
to
accompany
the
armed
struggle,
and
the
experience
of
establishing
Marxism-
Leninism
in
a
country
like
China
The
experience
of
the
Communist
Party.
These
experiences
may
be
very
useful
to
other
colonial
and
semi-
colonial
countries."
Referring
to
future
tasks,
the
report
believes
that
we
should
"strive
to
end
the
war
in
shortest
possible
time,
eliminate
the
remnants
of
Chiang
Kai-
shek's
Kuomintang,
and
expedite
restore
and
develop
the
national
economy,
manage
and
build
the
country".
First,
Liu
Shaoqi
briefed
on
the
basic
domestic
situation
in
China
and
the
CCP’s
principles
and
policies
on
nation-
building,
and
solicited
instructions
and
opinions
from
the
Soviet
Union.
On
July
4,
Liu
Shaoqi
submitted
a
report
to
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
and
Stalin
in
the
name
of
the
head
of
the
delegation
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China.
When
Stalin
read
the
Russian
version
of
the
report,
he
made
many
annotations
on
the
document
and
drew
many
emphatic
lines.
These
annotations
and
emphatic
lines
indicated
Stalin's
attitude
and
tendentious
opinions
on
the
issues
raised
by
the
CCP
delegation.
Judging
from
the
archives
disclosed
so
far,
the
main
issues
discussed
by
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
are
as
follows:
During
the
one-
and-
a-
half-
month
visit,
Liu
Shaoqi
basically
achieved
the
purpose
of
this
visit
through
many
talks
and
exchanges
of
various
documents
with
Stalin
and
other
Soviet
leaders,
but
some
issues
were
left
for
Mao
Zedong
to
go
Moscow
to
solve
in
person.
Pave
the
way.
At
same
time,
learn
from
the
experience
of
Soviet
Union
in
building
and
managing
the
country,
and
strive
for
more
economic
and
military
assistance
from
the
Soviet
Union.
Machine Translated by Google
The
report
also
pointed
out:
"The
strong
national
friendship
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
China
is
of
great
significance
to
both
countries
and
the
world,
especially
to
In
order
to
show
Stalin
China's
firm
attitude
towards
the
alliance
with
Soviet
Union,
Mao
Zedong
published
"On
the
People's
Democratic
Dictatorship"
on
June
30
after
Liu
Shaoqi
arrived
in
Moscow,
publicly
declaring
that
New
China
would
implement
a
"one-
sided"
foreign
policy.
This
position
of
the
CCP
was
valued
and
appreciated
by
Stalin.
On
July
6,
Pravda
published
this
article
by
Mao
Zedong,
and
even
published
a
separate
version.
In
his
report
on
July
4,
Liu
Shaoqi
also
specifically
explained
Mao
Zedong’s
“one-
sided”
policy:
“We
must
agree
with
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
policy
of
international
activities.
Some
explanations.
people
outside
the
party
criticized
our
policy
as
leaning
towards
the
Soviet
Union.
Mao
Zedong
replied
to
them:
Our
policy
is
to
lean
towards
the
Soviet
Union.
Itis
wrong."
Stalin
expressed
his
great
appreciation
for
this.
Second,
Liu
Shaoqi
clarified
the
principles
and
positions
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
on
the
relationship
between
the
two
parties
and
the
two
countries,
that
is,
New
China
will
resolutely
implement
the
policy
of
"leaning
to
one
side"
towards
the
Soviet
Union
and
oppose
taking
the
"middle
line."
Stalin
said
that
the
principles
and
policies
of
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
are
correct,
and
that
the
Chinese
and
Soviet
parties
should
establish
close
relations
and
help
each
other.
In
this
way,
the
basis
for
establishing
an
alliance
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
was
established.
According
to
Stalin's
comments
on
this
report
and
the
subsequent
talks,
itcan
beconsidered
that
Stalin
was
satisfied
with
the
basic
situation
in
China
and
basically
agreed
with
the
CPC
Central
Committee's
principles
and
policies
for
the
founding
of
new
China.
That
is
to
say,
although
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
are
at
different
stages
of
development,
their
directions
and
goals
are
the
same.
Regarding
the
establishment
of
formal
diplomatic
relations
with
other
countries
after
the
establishment
of
new
government,
as
well
the
participation
in
the
United
Nations
and
other
international
organizations
and
international
conferences,
Liu
Shaoqi
pointed
out:
"The
imperialist
countries
may
not
recognize
us
for
aperiod
of
time,
or
put
forward
certain
conditions
that
tie
our
hands
and
feet.
Recognize
our
price,
at
this
time,
what
kind
of
policy
should
we
adopt?
(Treat
differently.
Whoever
does
not
recognize
China,
China
will
not
give
itany
preferential
treatment
in
trade
-the
economic
crisis
in
the
United
States
forces
itto
pay
attention
to
trade
with
China
use
Chinese
businessmen
for
this
purpose.)
Of
course,
we
cannot
agree
to
the
conditions
that
bind
our
hands
and
feet,
but
should
we
take
positive
measures
to
ensure
the
recognition
of
these
countries
so
that
we
can
occupy
the
legitimate
rights
and
interests
in
handling
international
affairs?
On
the
other
hand,
should
we
wait
a
little
longer
and
not
be
in
a
hurry
to
get
recognition
from
these
countries,
(Yes!
It
,is
better
not
to
rush.)
In
order
to
avoid
unpleasantn
we
should
first
concentrate
on
domestic
affairs?
(Yes!
After
the
establishm
of
new
Chinese
governmen
whether
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
new
democraci
in
Eastern
Europe
will
recognize
us
as
soon
possible,
even
ifthe
imperiali
countrie
adopt
a
policy
of
ignoring
us.
(Yes.)”
The
report
also
stated:
“If
the
imperia
countri
recogni
the
new
Chines
govern
we
are
ready
to
establi
diplo
relatio
)with
these
count
At
that
time,
we
hope
that
the
Sovie
Unio
will
be
the
first
to
reco
us."
Regarding
the
diplomatic
officials
in
China,
the
report
said:
"We
do
not
recognize
the
diplomatic
personnel
of
various
countries
in
China,
and
only
treat
them
as
overseas
Chinese.
The
result
of
this
makes
the
people
feel
that
China
has
stood
up,
and
the
CCP
is
not
afraid
of
the
imperial
and
saved
us
from
a
lot
of
troubles,
so
that
the
democratic
parties
dare
not
contact
the
imperialist
diplomats,
and
even
ordinary
people
dare
not
contact
foreigners
from
the
imperialist
countries.
The
imperialist
diplomats
in
China
use
their
names
On
such
occasions,
they
request
and
try
to
keep
in
touch
with
us
in
an
attempt
to
obtain
our
official
recognition.
The
policy
we
are
implementing
towards
foreigners
has
never
been
dared
to
implement
in
Chinese
history.
But
doing
so
will
cause
alot
of
inconvenience
to
the
nationals
of
various
countries,
and
many
People
request
to
leave
the
country,
and
at
the
same
time,
we
ourselves
have
some
inconvenienc
in
this
regard.”
Regarding
how
to
deal
with
the
economic
interests
of
Western
countries
in
China,
the
report
said:
"At
present,
we
generally
allow
imperialist
economic
enterprises
in
China
to
continue
operate,
except
for
certain
necessary
restrictions.
(What
kind
of
restrictions?
As
for
"For
foreign
original
newspapers,
magazines,
news
agencies
and
the
Central
journalists,
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
has
decided
to
stop
their
activities
and
publications,
all
localities
have
implemented
it.
But
in
Shanghai,
because
imperialism
has
mastered
some
of
Shanghai's
economic
lifelines,
the
Central
Committee
Approved
Comrade
Shanghai's
proposal
to
suspend
the
implementation
of
this
decision,
but
itis
still
ready
to
be
implemented
in
the
future."
"As
for
the
schools
and
hospitals
run
by
imperialist
countries
in
China,
temporarily
let
them
continue
to
operate
under
the
condition
of
complying
with
our
laws,
but
No
new
ones
are
allowed.
When
the
country
has
the
strength
to
accept
these
schools
and
hospitals
in
the
future,
they
will
accept
them.
For
religious
institutions,
on
the
one
hand,
they
are
allowed
to
continue
their
activities
under
?)"
the
condition
of
abiding
by
our
laws,
and
on
the
other
hand,
they
carry
out
some
anti-
religious
propaganda.
The
land
of
churches
and
shall
be
confiscated
and
distributed
with
the
consent
of
church
members.
(Yes.)
The
land
of
other
foreign
organizations
shall
also
be
confiscated
and
distributed.”
Machine Translated by Google
Stalin
understood
that
what
China
needed
most
was
economic
aid.
According
to
the
Russian
meeting
minutes,
Stalin
talked
about
how
to
provide
aid
to
China
during
the
late-
night
talks
on
June
26-27,
the
first
day
after
arrival
of
the
CCP
delegation.
question.
Stalin
first
said
that
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
decided
to
provide
a
loan
of
300
million
U.S.
dollars
to
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China,
and
this
loan
was
provided
to
China
at
a
low
interest
rate
of
1%
in
the
form
of
equipment,
machinery
and
various
types
of
materials
for
aperiod
of
time.
5
years.
China
will
repay
within
10
years
after
the
loan
becomes
fully
effective.
Regarding
the
signing
of
loan
agreement,
Stalin
said
that
there
are
two
options:
first,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
and
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
should
sign
the
agreement;
After
establishing
the
democratic
coalition
government
of
the
whole
China,
the
agreement
was
signed
through
negotiations
between
the
Soviet
and
Chinese
governments.
Stalin
also
said
that
the
Soviet
Union
is
ready
to
send
a
group
of
experts
to
China,
and
the
treatment
only
needs
to
be
the
same
as
that
of
excellent
Chinese
experts,
and
the
rest
will
be
subsidized
by
the
Soviet
government.
Third,
one
of
the
important
purposes
of
Liu
Shaoqi's
trip
was
to
hope
that
the
Soviet
Union
would
provide
more
assistance
to
China's
revolution
and
construction.
On
this
point,
Stalin
basically
met
the
demands
of
Chinese
side.
Itshould
be
said
that
this
was
the
first
time
in
the
history
of
the
relationship
between
the
two
parties
in
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
that
such
a
harmonious
phenomenon
appeared.
Stalin
also
expressed
the
intention
of
the
Soviet
Union
to
form
an
alliance
with
China
through
the
proposal
of
an
international
division
of
labor
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union.
Stalin
proposed
on
his
own
initiative:
In
the
international
revolutionary
movement,
both
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
should
undertake
more
responsibilities,
and
there
should
be
some
kind
of
division
labor,
that
is
to
say,
division
of
labor
and
cooperation.
Itis
hoped
that
China
will
undertake
more
assistance
to
the
national
democratic
revolutionary
movements
of
colonial
and
semi-
colonial
dependent
countries
in
the
future,
because
Chinese
revolution
itself
and
its
revolutionary
experience
will
have
a
greater
impact
on
them
and
will
be
referred
to
and
absorbed
by
them.
for
the
benefit
of
the
international
revolution,
we
two
will
divide
the
labor:
you
should
do
more
work
in
the
East
and
colonial
semi-
colonial
countries,
and
give
more
play
to
your
role
and
influence
in
this
regard.
We
assume
more
obligations
to
the
West
and
do
more
work.
Stalin
also
said:
After
the
death
of
Marx
and
Engels,
the
social
democratic
movement
in
the
West
stagnated,
and
center
of
revolution
...Therefore,
shifted
from
the
West
to
East,
and
now
ithas
shifted
to
China
and
East
Asia.
should
fulfill
your
responsibilities
for
the
revolutions
of
the
East
Asian
countries.
Perhaps
we
Soviet
people
are
better
than
you
in
general
theoretical
questions
of
Marxism.
But
when
itcomes
to
applying
the
principles
of
Marxism
to
practice,
you
have
a
lot
of
experience
that
we
can
learn
from.
We
have
learned
many
things
from
you
in
the
past.
...You
Although
Stalin
disagreed
with
the
idea
that
CCP
obeyed
the
leadership
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks),
Stalin
was
obviously
touched
by
the
CCP's
sincere
attitude.
During
the
talks,
Stalin
took
initiative
to
talk
about
the
problems
that
existed
in
the
relationship
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
in
the
past,
main
one
being
his
mistake
in
asking
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
to
compromise
with
the
Kuomintang
in
1945.
He
said:
"Due
to
ignorance
of
the
situation,
we
have
given
some
bad
ideas
to
the
Chinese
revolution
in
the
past,
which
brought
difficulties
to
your
work
and
interfered
with
you."
Liu
Shaoqi
said
"no
hindrance",
but
Stalin
repeatedly
apologized
and
said
that
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
is
a
mature
party
that
has
achieved
rapid
development
in
all
aspects
of
politics,
theory
and
national
construction,
and
wished
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
to
stand
at
the
forefront
of
international
communist
movement.
Liu
Shaoqi
said:
"We
are
still
your
students."
Stalin
said
without
hesitation
that
students
can
surpass
Mr.,
and
the
center
of
revolution
will
shift
from
Europe
to
the
East,
and
your
historical
responsibility
will
be
increased
at
that
time.
We
will
lag
behind,
and
you
will
make
rapid
progress,
and
you
will
definitely
surpass
Mr.
Wang.
Ihope
that
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
will
talk
about
unity
at
any
time.
Stalin
also
said:
"Victors
are
not
and
judged,
those
who
win
are
correct."
"Chinese
comrades
are
always
,polite
and
polite.
We
feel
that
we
have
hindered
you.
You
also
have
opinions,
but
Just
refuse
to
say
it.
Of
course
you
should
pay
attention
to
whether
what
we
say
is
correct
or
not,
because
we
often
don’t
understand
the
essence
of
your
matter
enough
and
may
say
something
wrong.
However,
ifwe
make
a
mistake,
you’d
better
say
it,
and
we
will
Inoticed."
Shi
Zhe,
who
was
the
translator,
felt
that
Stalin
said
this
in
a
tone
of
deep
guilt
and
apology.
When
Liu
Shaoqi
talked
about
the
relationship
between
the
two
parties
in
China
and
the
Soviet
Union,
he
stated:
"Comrade
Mao
Zedong
and
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
believe
that
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
is
the
headquarters
of
the
world
communist
movement,
while
the
Communist
Party
of
China
is
only
the
headquarters
of
a
front
army.
Partial
interests
We
should
obey
the
interests
of
the
world.
Therefore,
our
CCP
obeys
the
decision
of
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolshevik),
although
the
Communist
International
no
longer
exists,
and
the
CCP
has
not
participated
in
the
European
Communist
Intelligence
Bureau.
On
some
issues,
ifthe
CCP
and
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolshevik)
disagree
the
CCP
is
ready
to
obey
and
resolutely
implement
the
decision
of
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
after
explaining
its
opinions.
We
believe
that
the
mutual
relations
between
the
two
parties
should
be
as
close
possible,
and
appropriate
politically
responsible
representatives
should
be
sent
to
each
other
deal
with
the
relevant
issues
between
the
two
parties.
issues
and
enhance
mutual
understanding
between
the
two
parties.”
,
Itis
of
decisive
significance
to
China's
independence
and
construction,
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
fully
understands
this
importance.
The
Communist
Party
of
China
must
make
unremitting
efforts
to
enhance
and
consolidate
this
kind
of
national
friendship.
"
Machine Translated by Google
 Soon
after
Liu
Shaoqi
returned
from
his
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union,
the
Soviet
Union
accelerated
the
pace
of
aid
to
the
CCP.
On
September
19,
1949,
the
Council
of
Ministers
of
the
Soviet
Union
decided
to
provide
China
with
334
aircraft
and
artillery,
including
360
anti-
aircraft
guns,
with
a
total
value
of
26.5
million
US
dollars.
Weapons
and
other
technical
equipment
worth
$31.5
million
have
since
been
provided.
In
addition,
rails
and
fixings
worth
$6.3
million
were
provided
pursuant
to
a
resolution
of
the
Council
Ministers
of
the
USSR
on
November
5,
1949 .
When
Liu
Shaoqi
left
Moscow
on
August
14
to
return
home,
220
senior
Soviet
economic
cadres
and
engineers
had
already
traveled
with
him.
According
to
Mao
Zedong's
suggestion,
Liu
Shaoqi
sent
a
letter
to
Stalin
on
August
2,
saying
that
he
hoped
that
Kovalev
and
the
identified
Soviet
experts
would
go
back
to
China
with
him,
and
that
the
rest
of
the
experts
could
accompany
Wang
Jiaxiang
when
he
returned
to
China
in
the
middle
and
late
August,
and
asked
Stalin
to
come
back
to
China.
Instructions
to
speed
up
the
preparations
for
Soviet
experts
going
to
China.
When
Stalin
read
the
letter,
he
deliberately
underlined
this
passage.
On
July
4,
Mao
Zedong
called
Liu
Shaoqi
and
Gao
Gang,
agreeing
that
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
should
organize
a
committee
joint
to
specify
issues
such
as
loans
to
the
Soviet
Union
and
orders.
However,
in
view
of
the
fact
that
China’s
economic
organization
has
been
just
established,
there
is
a
lack
of
experts
and
necessary
information,
and
itis
impossible
to
propose
a
list
of
required
equipment
and
goods.
In
China,
Kovalev
"first
brought
major
experts
to
China
discuss
with
us
all
or
a
major
part
of
the
manifest."
Mao
Zedong
further
proposed
that
ifStalin
agreed
to
send
experts
China
to
organize
a
committee
joint
first,
then
itis
best
to
ask
Kovalev
to
bring
experts
from
railways,
electric
power,
steel,
coal
mines,
kerosene
mines,
and
military
affairs
first.
On
July
26,
the
Secretariat
of
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
called
Liu
Shaoqi:
In
order
to
prepare
for
the
establishment
of
Chinese
Air
Force
Combat
Force
in
about
a
year,
they
planned
to
order
aircraft
and
hire
experts
from
the
Soviet
Union.
They
hoped
that
the
delegation
would
have
preliminary
discussions
with
Stalin.
Ifthe
Soviet
side
agreed
in
principle,
Then
send
Liu
Yalou
to
lead
asmall
delegation
to
the
Soviet
Union
for
specific
discussions.
In
his
report
to
Stalin,
Liu
Shaoqi
also
proposed
to
learn
management
experience
from
the
Soviet
Union,
visit
the
Soviet
Union,
send
people
to
study
in
the
Soviet
Union,
and
invite
Soviet
experts
to
China
help
with
economic
construction.
Liu
Shaoqi
said:
"We
have
been
in
the
environment
of
rural
guerrilla
warfare
for
along
time,
and
we
know
very
little
about
the
outside
world.
Now
we
are
going
to
manage
such
a
large
country
and
carry
out
economic
construction
and
diplomatic
activities.
We
still
need
to
learn
alot
In
this
regard,
the
instructions
and
assistance
given
to
us
by
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
are
very
important,
and
we
urgently
need
such
instructions
.and
assistance.
In
addition
to
sending
experts
from
the
Soviet
Union
to
China
help
us,
we
also
hope
to
send
some
Soviet
professors
to
China
give
lectures
and
China
will
send
some
visiting
groups
to
visit
and
study
in
the
Soviet
Union,
and
in
addition,
send
some
college
students
to
study
in
the
Soviet
Union."
In
his
letter
to
Stalin
on
July
6,
Liu
Shaoqi
raised
a
series
of
questions
that
the
Soviet
Union
needed
to
answer
or
provide.
Questions
of
guidance,
which
include
understanding
the
state
structure,
economic
policy,
cultural
and
educational
institutions,
party
and
mass
organization
structures
of
the
USSR.
The
Soviet
Union
tried
its
best
to
meet
these
demands
of
Liu
Shaoqi
and
the
CCP
,delegation.
In
subsequent
talks,
the
two
sides
also
agreed
that
the
Soviet
Union
would
help
China
run
anaval
school
in
Lushun.
The
Soviet
Union
expressed
its
willingness
to
help
China
build
coastal
defense,
and
also
promised
to
help
build
arailway
from
Ulaanbaatar,
Mongolia
to
Zhangjiakou,
China.
Liu
Shaoqi
proposed
to
Stalin,
Vasilevsky,
Bulganin,
etc.
based
on
the
request
of
the
domestic
call
that
in
order
to
prepare
for
the
formation
of
Chinese
People's
Air
Force
combat
unit
in
about
ayear,
he
asked
the
Soviet
Union
to
provide
assistance:
First,
he
planned
to
order
the
Jacques
from
Soviet
Union.
100-200
Japanese-
style
fighters
and
40-80
bombers,
with
various
spare
parts
and
Japanese
or
German
heavy
bombs;
second,
Iplan
to
ask
the
Soviet
aviation
school
to
train
air
force
personnel
on
my
behalf.
The
Soviet
Union
immediately
agreed
with
this
plan,
but
only
proposed
that
the
aviation
school
need
not
be
located
in
the
Soviet
Union,
but
could
be
located
in
China.
Stalin
also
dispatched
the
Soviet
Air
Force
to
deploy
defenses
between
Lushun
and
Dalian
according
to
China's
request
to
deal
with
the
Kuomintang's
air
strikes.
In
addition,
the
two
sides
also
agreed
to
cooperate
in
intelligence
and
counterintelligence.
Gao
Gang
and
Liu
Shaoqi
said
that
most
of
the
intelligence
networks
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
China
in
the
past
were
unreliable,
and
they
were
even
working
for
the
United
States
and
Chiang
Kai-
shek.
They
demanded
to
stop
the
activities
of
these
uncontrollable
spies.
Stalin
replied:
"The
situation
requires
us
to
unite
our
intelligence
agencies
on
both
sides,
and
we
are
ready
to
do
so
immediately...
us
act
on
the
united
front!"
stick.
The
Soviet
Union
is
also
preparing
to
send
experts
and
provide
minesweepers
to
help
China
clear
the
mines
around
Shanghai.
Stalin
said:
"China
should
have
its
own
fleet,
and
we
are
ready
to
help
you
build
one.
For
example,
now
we
can
salvage
those
sunken
military
and
commercial
ships
and
help
them
repair
them.
As
for
your
request
to
help
consolidate
Qingdao's
coastal
defense,
we
Itis
possible
to
send
a
squadron
to
the
port
of
Tsingtao,
but
only
after
the
establishment
of
government
the
whole
of
China,
in
the
form
of
a
visit."
In
response
to
China's
request
for
the
establishment
of
an
air
route
between
Moscow
and
Peiping,
Stalin
said,
"We
have
already
made
Get
ready,
you
can
start
to
build
this
route
now",
and
promised
to
help
China
build
an
aircraft
assembly
and
repair
factory.
Machine Translated by Google
After
Mikoyan
left
China,
by
April
1949
at
the
latest,
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
were
already
considering
how
to
deal
with
previous
foreign
treaty
issues.
Zhou
Enlai
mentioned
to
Chinese
democrats
in
a
report:
"Some
foreign
treaties
in
the
past
are
abolished,
some
must
be
revised,
and
some
can
be
maintained."
The
treaties
that
are
"to
be
modified"
or
"can
be
maintained"
are
mentioned
here,
obviously
taking
into
account
the
1945
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty.
This
statement
by
Zhou
Enlai
shows
that
the
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
are
still
unclear
about
Stalin's
original
intentions,
or
they
are
skeptical
of
the
Soviet
Union's
position
on
the
original
Sino-
Soviet
treaty
expressed
by
Mikoyan.
And
Stalin
couldn't
figure
out
the
real
position
of
the
CCP
on
this
issue.
As
the
founder
of
New
China,
Mao
Zedong
naturally
demanded
the
abolition
of
all
unequal
treaties
including
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty
for
the
purpose
of
safeguarding
national
sovereignty.
In
order
to
ensure
the
actual
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
Far
East,
Stalin
tried
his
best
to
maintain
the
original
Sino-
Soviet
treaty.
This
was
where
the
interests
of
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
conflicted
at
that
time.
Ifthe
Soviet
Union
raised
this
issue
during
Mikoyan's
visit,
itwas
somewhat
unexpected
to
the
Chinese
leaders,
then
when
the
new
China
was
about
to
be
born,
Mao
Zedong
had
to
seriously
consider
this
issue.
However,
both
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
were
very
cautious
on
this
apparently
very
sensitive
issue.
When
they
talked
about
this
issue,
they
were
often
testing
each
other's
intentions
and
bottom
line.
Fifth,
on
the
issue
of
whether
to
sign
a
new
Sino-
Soviet
treaty,
the
talks
between
Liu
Shaoqi
and
Stalin
did
not
yield
any
results.
Itshould
be
noted
that
Stalin’s
suggestions
and
concerns
about
the
Xinjiang
issue
were
not
mainly
based
on
China’s
interests,
but
out
of
concerns
about
the
penetration
of
Western
forces
into
the
region
on
the
premise
that
Soviet
Union
had
already
decided
that
the
Soviet
Union
would
no
longer
intervene
in
the
Xinjiang
issue.
Even
so,
the
early
realization
of
Xinjiang's
peaceful
liberation
was
directly
related
to
Stalin's
advice
and
help.
However,
from
another
perspective,
Stalin's
decision
to
give
up
making
demands
on
China
the
Xinjiang
issue
is
hard
to
say
that
itwas
not
an
initiative
to
make
concessions
for
the
purpose
of
bargaining
with
Chinese
leaders
when
discussing
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty,
because
Stalin
knew
very
well
that
the
Sino-
Soviet
The
real
conflict
of
interests
between
Liu
Shaoqi
and
Stalin
lies
in
the
northeast
issue,
which
is
also
the
core
content
of
the
uncertain
1945
Sino-
Soviet
treaty,
and
itis
precisel
on
this
issue
that
Liu
Shaoqi'
negotiat
with
Stalin
encoun
obstacl
With
the
help
of
the
Soviet
Union,
Deng
Liqun
established
a
telecommunications
connection
with
Mao
Zedong
and
the
embassy
in
Xinjiang
Xinjiang,
and
met
and
visited
reliable
local
leaders.
Later
that
year,
the
CCP
resolved
the
Xinjiang
issue
peacefully.
Chinese
leaders
attached
great
importance
to
Stalin's
proposal.
In
his
report
on
July
4,
Liu
Shaoqi
said:
"We
are
fully
in
favor
of
occupying
Xinjiang
as
soon
possible,
but
the
biggest
difficulty
in
occupying
Xinjiang
is
clearing
and
ensuring
the
road
to
Xinjiang,
and
the
lack
of
necessary
means
of
transportation
(from
Gansu
to
Xinjiang)
Ifyou
can
overcome
these
difficulties,
the
time
to
occupy
Xinjiang
will
be
greatly
advanced.”
After
consulting
Mao
Zedong,
Liu
Shaoqi
told
Stalin
on
July
6that
Mao
Zedong
agreed
with
the
Soviet
Union
to
help
liberate
Xinjiang,
And
suggested
"concreteizing
the
issue
of
the
Soviet
Air
Force's
assistance
and
airdrops
of
troops".
Mao
Zedong
originally
planned
to
resolve
the
Xinjiang
issue
in
1950
or
1951.
After
receiving
Liu
Shaoqi's
report,
he
decided
to
advance
the
date
of
capturing
Xinjiang.
On
July
25,
Mao
Zedong
notified
Liu
Shaoqi
that
after
occupying
Lanzhou,
Xining
and
other
places
in
autumn,
he
could
prepare
to
enter
Xinjiang,
and
instructed
the
political
secretary
of
the
delegation,
Deng
Liqun,
to
rush
Yining
in
Xinjiang
as
soon
possible.
radio
link".
Mao
Zedong
also
instructed
Peng
Dehuai
to
investigate
the
feasibility
of
occupying
Xinjiang
by
the
end
of
year.
In
terms
of
the
conflict
interests
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union,
ifStalin
was
more
sensitive
to
the
Northeast
issue,
he
was
particularly
generous
on
the
Xinjiang
issue.
In
the
first
meeting
with
Liu
Shaoqi,
Stalin
offered
to
propose:
"The
occupation
of
Xinjiang
should
not
be
delayed,
because
the
delay
will
cause
the
British
to
interfere
in
Xinjiang
affairs,
and
they
can
activate
Muslims,
including
Muslims
in
India,
to
continue
Civil
war
against
the
Communist
Party.
This
cannot
be
tolerated.
Because
Xinjiang
has
rich
oil
reserves
and
cotton,
these
are
exactly
what
China
needs."
Stalin
also
suggested:
"The
proportion
of
the
population
of
the
Han
nationality
in
Xinjiang
has
not
exceeded
5%.
After
the
occupation
of
Xinjiang,
this
ratio
should
be
increased
to
30%.
By
relocating
the
Han
people,
this
vast
and
fertile
area
will
be
fully
developed,
and
the
guards
on
China’s
borders
will
be
strengthened.”
In
order
to
help
Xinjiang
be
liberated
as
soon
possible,
Stalin
expressed
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
willing
to
provide
40
fighter
planes
to
quickly
disperse
and
defeat
Ma
Bufang's
cavalry
unit.
Fourth,
during
Liu
Shaoqi's
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union,
the
successful
cooperation
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
on
the
Xinjiang
issue
was
one
of
the
important
factors
for
strengthening
the
understanding
and
trust
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union.
Machine Translated by Google
As
for
the
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty,
Stalin
said
that
he
had
previously
stated
in
the
telegrams
exchanged
with
Mao
Zedong
that
the
treaty
was
unequal,
because
at
that
time
he
was
dealing
with
the
Kuomintang,
so
ithad
to
be
so.
As
for
China's
proposal,
Stalin
clearly
told
Liu
Shaoqi
that
none
of
the
three
solutions
proposed
by
the
CCP
were
needed,
and
that
this
issue
would
be
resolved
when
Mao
Zedong
came
to
Moscow.
In
general,
although
Liu
Shaoqi
stated
that
the
old
treaty
could
be
inherited,
he
proposed
three
alternatives.
Obviously,
the
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
hoped
to
abolish
the
old
treaty,
but
left
they
just
a
lot
of
room
for
choice.
Stalin
could
not
fail
to
see
this.
Of
course,
the
Soviet
Union
wanted
to
keep
the
old
treaties.
This
can
also
be
clearly
seen
from
the
way
Stalin
raised
the
question
and
his
words.
Some
scholars
believe
that
Moscow’s
option
of
“immediately
withdrawing
troops
from
Lushun”
is
not
so
much
a
real
suggestion
to
the
Chinese
as
athreat.
Ifthey
make
such
achoice,
Stalin
will
think
that
they
cannot
be
regarded
as
reliable
partners
and
will
take
measures
against
them
accordingly".
This
kind
of
statement
is
too
harsh,
but
Stalin's
intention
to
test
the
CCP
with
this
kind
of
statement
is
not
clear.
Regarding
the
issue
of
the
Lushun
base,
Stalin
already
knew
that
China
did
not
require
the
Soviet
Union
to
withdraw
its
troops
immediately,
so
he
repeated
Mikoyan’s
statement,
that
is,
he
proposed
two
options
for
China
to
choose:
one
is
that
the
Soviet
Union
will
not
withdraw
its
troops
temporarily,
because
the
Soviet
Union
stationed
troops
in
Lushun
for
the
purpose
of
boycotting
The
free
movement
of
the
armed
forces
United
States
and
Chiang
Kai-
shek
protects
the
Soviet
Union
and
at
the
same
time
protects
the
interests
of
the
Chinese
revolution.
First,
the
Soviet
Union
immediately
withdraws
its
troops.
Ifthe
CCP
needs
the
Soviet
Union
to
withdraw
its
troops
from
Lushun
immediately,
the
CCP
will
have
more
room
for
maneuver
in
politics.
Regarding
the
Dalian
issue,
Stalin
said
that
since
Dalian
was
a
free
port,
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
could
use
jointly
itbefore
establishing
diplomatic
relations
with
the
relevant
governments.
In
the
July
11
meeting
with
Liu
Shaoqi,
Stalin
avoided
talking
about
the
Changchun
Railway
issue.
On
this
issue,
Mikoyan
had
expressed
the
opinion
of
Soviet
Union
in
Xibaipo,
that
is,
the
Soviet
Union
believed
that
the
treaty
was
equal
and
should
therefore
be
preserved.
Although
the
Chinese
side
made
no
statement
on
the
issue
of
the
Changchun
Railway,
Stalin
had
learned
from
Kovalev
long
before
Liu
Shaoqi
came
to
Moscow
that
when
talking
about
the
issue
of
the
Changchun
Railway,
although
both
Gao
Gang
and
Chen
Yun
apparently
insisted
that
the
treaty
are
equal
and
satisfactory,
but
"the
Chinese
secretly
want
total
control
of
the
railway,
and
in
fact
they
are
doing
their
best
to
wrest
management
of
this
railway
from
the
Soviets".
Stalin
obviously
considered
that
this
issue
would
cause
conflict,
so
itmay
be
better
to
shelve
the
issue.
Among
the
democratic
parties,
students
and
workers,
some
people
raised
the
issue
of
the
Soviet
Union's
garrison
in
Lushun,
Mongolia's
independence,
and
the
removal
of
the
Northeast
machinery
by
the
Soviet
Union.
(The
Japanese
assets
we
transported
from
the
Northeast
are
only
a
part,
far
from
all.)
We
explained
to
these
people
that
ifwe
did
not
approve
of
the
Soviet
Union
stationing
troops
in
Lushun
when
we
were
unable
to
defend
our
own
coast,
itwould
be
adisservice
to
imperialism.
help.
Regarding
the
issue
of
the
Mongolian
People's
Republic,
we
said:
the
Mongolian
people
demand
independence.
According
to
the
principle
of
national
self-
determination,
we
should
recognize
Mongolia's
independence,
but
ifthe
Mongolian
People's
Republic
is
willing
to
unite
with
China,
we
naturally
welcome
it.
Only
the
Mongolian
people
have
the
right
to
decide
this
issue.
(right.)
The
Soviet-
Chinese
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance
has
helped
the
Chinese
people
agreat
deal
in
the
past.
In
the
future,
new
Chinese
government
will
inherit
this
treaty
and
will
make
even
greater
contributions
to
the
peoples
of
the
Soviet
Union
and
China,
especially
the
Chinese
people.
We
are
fully
willing
to
inherit
this
treaty.
When
the
Soviet
Union
establishes
diplomatic
relations
with
New
China,
this
treaty
needs
to
be
dealt
with.
There
are
roughly
three
ways
to
deal
with
it:
(1)
The
new
Chinese
government
declares
that
the
treaty
will
continue
to
be
valid
without
adding
any
Revise.
(2)
According
to
the
spirit
of
original
treaty,
a
new
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance
shall
be
re-
signed
by
the
representatives
of
the
two
governments,
so
that
the
text
and
content
may
be
changed
according
to
the
new
situation.
(3)
The
representatives
of
the
two
governments
will
exchange
notes,
temporarily
maintaining
the
original
status
of
the
treaty,
but
preparing
to
re-
sign
itat
an
appropriate
time.
Which
of
these
three
methods
should
be
adopted?
(Wait
until
Mao
Zedong
arrives
in
Moscow
to
decide
on
this
issue.)
Regarding
the
treaties
and
agreements
signed
by
the
Kuomintang
and
foreign
countries,
we
are
prepared
to
deal
with
them
separately.
The
principle
is
that
we
are
prepared
to
recognize
and
inherit
whatever
is
beneficial
to
the
Chinese
people
and
the
peace
and
democracy
of
the
world.
For
example,
the
Charter
of
United
Nations,
the
Cairo
Declaration,
and
the
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance.
We
are
ready
to
abolish
anything
that
is
detrimental
to
the
Chinese
people
and
the
peace
and
democracy
of
the
world.
For
example,
the
Sino-
US
Treaty
of
Commerce
and
Navigation.
Others
are
intended
to
be
recognized
with
amendments.
(right.)
The
mentality
of
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
to
find
out
and
test
each
other
on
the
treaty
issue
can
be
clearly
reflected
in
Liu
Shaoqi's
report
to
Stalin
and
Stalin's
comments
on
the
report:
What
is
the
requirement.
Before
the
departure
of
CCP
delegation,
Mao
Zedong
had
a
long
conversation
with
Liu
Shaoqi
and
Wang
Jiaxiang
at
the
Yi
Nian
Hall
in
Zhongnanhai.
When
talking
about
how
to
deal
with
the
original
Sino-
Soviet
treaty
after
the
founding
of
New
China,
Mao
Zedong
only
said
that
"we
can
talk
about
it."
Machine Translated by Google
According
to
Kovalev's
private
archives,
Chinese
leaders
also
directly
asked
Stalin
for
Soviet
assistance
in
liberating
Taiwan.
In
the
telegram
to
Moscow
before
the
Chinese
delegation
left
Peiping,
Mao
Zedong
asked
Stalin
to
provide
air
and
sea
support
for
the
Taiwan
landing
campaign,
but
he
did
not
receive
a
clear
answer.
Kovalev
recalled
that
when
Liu
Shaoqi
reintroduced
this
However,
Liu
Shaoqi
failed
to
solve
this
problem.
Please
report
all
this
to
Comrade
Stalin
so
that
he
can
consider
our
plans
and
whether
they
can
be
carried
out?
Ifthese
plans
are
generally
acceptable,
we
intend
to
send
cadets
the
Soviet
Union
now.
Concrete
plans
for
training
pilots
are
being
formulated
and
will
be
announced
later.
After
solving
these
problems,
you
can
go
back
to
your
country.
The
anti-
imperialist
movement
in
Europe
and
other
parts
of
the
world
is
likely
to
hit
its
stride,
and
there
is
also
the
possibility
of
an
economic
crisis
in
the
US
and
UK,
in
which
case,
ifwe
use
Soviet
aid
(i.e.
in
addition
to
our
request
to
the
USSR
to
help
us
train
pilots
and
sell
to
In
addition
to
our
aircraft,
we
may
have
to
ask
the
Soviet
Union
to
send
us
experts
from
the
Soviet
Air
Force
and
Navy,
as
well
pilots
to
participate
in
military
operations)
to
capture
Taiwan.
Will
this
cause
damage
to
US-
Soviet
relations?
Mao
Zedong
specifically
proposed
the
idea
of
requesting
the
Soviet
Air
Force
to
participate
in
the
liberation
of
Taiwan,
and
course
he
proposed
itvery
tactfully.
Telegram
says:
In
Shanghai,
serious
difficulties
have
intensified
since
the
day
of
blockade,
so
that
in
order
to
break
this
blockade,
itis
necessary
to
occupy
Taiwan.
But
itis
impossible
to
occupy
Taiwan
without
the
Air
Force.
We
would
like
you
to
exchange
views
with
Comrade
Stalin
on
the
question
of
whether
Soviet
Union
can
help
us
in
this
regard
by
training
us
1,000
pilots
and
300
airport
staff
in
Moscow
within
a
period
of
six
months
to
one
year.
Also,
can
the
Soviet
Union
sell
us
100-200
fighters,
40-80
bombers,
which
will
be
used
in
the
military
operation
to
capture
Taiwan.
We
also
asked
the
Soviet
Union
to
help
us
in
building
our
naval
fleet.
We
envisage
that
in
the
second
half
of
next
year,
that
is,
during
our
army's
attack
on
Taiwan,
all
the
territory
of
mainland
China
will
be
occupied
by
us
except
Tibet.
The
telegram
also
recounts
the
necessity
and
urgency
of
capturing
Taiwan:
The
Third
Field
Army
will
conduct
military
operations
in
only
two
places,
namely
in
Fujian
Province
and
Taiwan.
The
military
operation
in
Fujian
Province
will
end
in
October
this
year,
and
the
military
operation
to
capture
Taiwan
cannot
be
carried
out
until
we
have
established
an
air
force,
which
may
not
be
possible
until
the
second
half
of
next
year.
In
the
telegram
to
Liu
Shaoqi
and
forwarded
to
Stalin
on
July
25,
Mao
Zedong
stated
more
clearly
that
he
hoped
that
the
Soviet
Union
would
provide
direct
military
assistance
on
the
issue
of
liberating
Taiwan.
The
telegram
begins
by
stating
China's
plan
for
the
Liberation
of
Taiwan
campaign:
In
Liu
Shaoqi’s
report
to
Stalin
on
July
4,
he
already
revealed
the
CCP’s
tendency
to
attack
Taiwan:
“Taiwan
may
be
occupied
early
because
of
the
internal
support
of
some
Kuomintang
troops.”
On
July
10,
Mao
Zedong
wrote
to
Zhou
Enlai,
The
issue
of
liberating
Taiwan
was
mentioned
again.
According
to
Zhu
De's
suggestion,
the
letter
suggested
that
three
or
four
hundred
people
could
be
sent
to
the
Soviet
Union
to
study
the
air
force,
and
at
the
same
time
purchase
about
100
aircraft,
together
with
the
existing
air
force,
form
an
attack
team
to
cover
crossing
the
sea
and
prepare
to
capture
Taiwan
next
summer.
Therefore,
on
July
26,
the
Central
Military
Commission
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
decided
to
form
the
leading
body
of
the
Air
Force
with
the
headquarters
of
the
14th
Corps,
the
troops
directly
under
it,
and
the
Aviation
Bureau
of
the
Military
Commission.
etc.
During
the
talks,
Stalin
repeatedly
emphasized
the
basic
idea:
We
are
not
afraid
of
war,
oppose
and
do
everything
possible
to
stop
war;
peace
is
the
most
important
thing,
and
we
must
strive
for
peace
a
few
more
years.
But
for
China,
the
liberation
of
Taiwan
is
the
established
policy
of
the
CCP
to
completely
eliminate
the
Chiang
Kai-
shek
clique
and
complete
the
great
cause
of
national
reunification.
Moreover,
Mao
Zedong
hoped
to
get
help
from
the
Soviet
Union
on
this
issue.
Sixth,
another
disagreement
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
during
the
Moscow
talks
was
the
issue
of
the
liberation
of
Taiwan.
Stalin
was
not
prepared,
nor
was
he
willing,
to
offer
help
to
the
CCP
in
resolving
the
Taiwan
issue.
Itis
also
very
obvious.
Itseems
that
Stalin
wanted
to
delay
the
issue,
or
wait
for
Mao
Zedong
to
clarify
his
demands
or
make
concessions
first.
Machine Translated by Google
On
October
28,
1949,
Chen
Yun,
vice
premier
of
the
State
Council
and
director
of
the
Finance
and
Economics
Committee,
pointed
out
to
him
when
meeting
Soviet
ambassador
Luo
Shen
that
the
characteristics
of
China's
economic
situation
were
"complex
and
difficult",
foreign
trade
had
been
paralyzed
by
the
Kuomintang's
blockade
of
the
coast.
Of
all
the
ports
under
control,
only
Tianjin
has
import
and
export
business,
and
its
trade
volume
does
not
exceed
US$3
million.
The
lack
of
professional
and
technical
cadres
is
also
one
of
the
most
serious
problems
in
economic
recovery.
Chen
Yun
pointed
out
in
the
talk:
"The
lack
of
technical
cadres
loyal
to
the
people's
government
seriously
restricts
the
recovery
of
the
country's
economy.
The
engineers
and
professional
technical
personnel
we
received
from
the
Kuomintang
There
are
only
20,000
people
in
total,
and
according
to
their
political
beliefs,
most
of
them
are
reactionaries
and
pro-
Americans.
In
the
largest
Anshan
Iron
and
Steel
Complex,
62
of
the
70
engineers
are
Japanese,
and
they
generally
hold
Chinese
people,
especially
the
Communists.
There
is
hostility."
And
the
general
education
and
literacy
level
of
most
CCP
members
is
very
low.
According
to
the
material
reported
by
Lu
Dingyi,
head
of
the
Organization
Department
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China,
when
he
met
Shebayev,
the
Chargé
d’affaires
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
China
in
March
1950,
there
were
1.5
million
party
members
in
North
China
at
that
time,
of
which
1.3
million
were
illiterate
or
semi-
illiterate.
Among
the
leaders
(district
committee
and
above),
nearly
However,
there
was
another
economic
reason
why
the
CCP
wanted
to
form
an
alliance
with
the
Soviet
Union,
that
is,
itneeded
alot
of
assistance
from
the
Soviet
Union
in
terms
of
economic
recovery,
production
development,
construction
and
management
in
a
newborn
country.
This
requirement
is
particularly
urgent
after
the
founding
of
New
China.
Although
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
won
the
final
military
victory
in
the
civil
war,
leaders
of
the
new
China
were
really
anxious
in
the
face
of
devastated
and
ruined
economic
situation.
At
that
time,
China
was
in
astate
of
confrontation
with
Western
countries,
and
the
only
hope
was
to
get
assistance
from
the
Soviet
Union.
Chinese
leaders
kept
reporting
this
situation
to
the
Soviet
side.
An
important
basis
for
the
alliance
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
was
to
deal
with
the
threat
of
United
States
politically
and
militarily.
The
Communist
Party
of
China
needs
the
support
and
assistance
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
its
struggle
to
seize
power
and
consolidate
power,
and
to
curb
the
United
States'
attempts
to
interfere
in
the
Chinese
civil
war
and
subvert
the
new
China.
In
the
international
context
of
the
Cold
War
with
United
States,
the
Soviet
Union
also
needs
the
help
of
China
to
contain
itin
Asia
and
against
American
power.
As
Professor
Westa
thinks,
the
content
of
Sino-
Soviet
friendship
is
firstly
an
anti-
American
alliance,
or
an
anti-
capitalist
system
alliance
on
a
global
scale,
which
directly
targets
the
post-
war
US
in
Asia.
The
emergence
of
the
United
States
and
the
world
capitalist
system
headed
by
the
United
States.
On
this
point,
the
needs
of
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
are
common
and
mutual.
3.
The
dialogue
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
However,
as
far
bilateral
relations
are
concerned,
Liu
Shaoqi's
visit
to
Moscow
did
not
resolve
the
fundamental
issue
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
in
relation
to
conflicts
of
national
and
ethnic
interests.
The
resolution
of
these
problems
can
only
wait
for
the
direct
dialogue
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin.
The
above
situation
shows
that
the
extent
to
which
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
can
meet
each
other's
demands
depends
on
their
consistency
in
observation
of
global
issues
and
their
understanding
of
whether
such
cooperation
is
in
line
with
their
long-
term
goals.
Since
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
shared
a
common
understanding
of
ideology
and
shared
strategic
considerations
in
actual
international
struggles,
forming
an
alliance
was
in
the
long-
term
interests
of
both
sides.
Itwas
from
this
starting
point
that
both
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
sought
to
reach
an
understanding
on
major
issues
and
possible
cooperation
on
controversial
issues.
This
was
the
basis
for
success
of
the
Moscow
talks
between
Liu
Shaoqi
and
Stalin.
From
this
point
of
view,
American
professor
Chen
Jian’s
conclusion
is
after
justified:
Liu
Shaoqi’s
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union,
the
framework
of
Sino-
Soviet
strategic
cooperation
has
been
formed,
and
Mao
Zedong’s
“one-
sided”
foreign
policy
has
changed
from
rhetoric
to
reality.
Itestablished
its
foreign
policy
and
foreign
strategy
on
the
basis
of
forming
astrategic
alliance
with
the
Soviet
Union.
When
the
question
was
asked,
Stalin
immediately
refused.
He
told
the
Chinese
that
Soviet
Union
had
suffered
immeasurable
losses
due
to
the
war,
and
that
country
from
its
western
border
to
the
Volga
was
in
ruins.
Soviet
military
support
for
an
attack
on
Taiwan
would
mean
a
conflict
with
the
U.S.
Air
Force
and
Navy,
and
create
a
pretext
for
a
new
world
war.
The
Soviet
Union
saw
no
reason
to
take
that
risk
again.
Stalin
revealed
his
true
feelings
about
the
war,
and
said:
"If
our
leaders
do
this,
the
Russian
people
will
not
understand
us.
Not
only
that,
because
we
underestimated
the
difficulties
and
disasters
during
and
after
the
war,
and
acted
rashly
and
they
might
drive
us
away.”
Stalin
suggested
that
the
matter
be
brought
to
an
enlarged
meeting
of
the
Politburo
of
the
CPSU
(Bolsheviks),
possibly
involving
senior
military
leaders
and
some
ministers.
On
July
27th,
he
invited
the
Chinese
delegation
to
the
Central
Committee
headquarters,
where
Liu
Shaoqi,
Gao
Gang,
and
Wang
Jiaxiang
attended
the
meeting.
In
addition
to
all
members
of
the
Political
Bureau
of
the
Soviet
,Union,
Marshal
Bulganin
and
Vasilevsky
also
participated.
At
the
meeting
Stalin
repeated
his
earlier
advice
and
demand
that
the
Chinese
not
launch
a
Taiwan
campaign.
At
the
end
of
his
speech,
Liu
Shaoqi
announced
that
he
was
withdrawing
his
request
for
assistance,
saying
that
the
issue
had
passed.
Machine Translated by Google
The
preparations
for
Mao
Zedong’s
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union
started
in
October.
He
initially
planned
to
visit
the
Soviet
Union
for
three
months,
the
first
month
in
the
Soviet
Union,
and
to
sign
In
addition
to
seeking
economic
assistance,
another
main
purpose
of
Mao
Zedong's
trip
to
Moscow
was
to
sign
a
new
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
treaty.
Shi
Zhe,
a
translator
who
accompanied
Mao
Zedong
on
his
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union,
had
a
widely
circulated
memory.
He
believed
that
the
reason
why
the
leaders
of
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
encountered
difficulties
or
gaps
in
the
early
stage
of
the
talks
was
that
"neither
Stalin
nor
Mao
Zedong
could
guess
the
other
party's
psychology
and
intentions.
So
some
kind
of
misunderstanding
happened,"
especially
when
Stalin
didn't
understand
what
Mao
Zedong
wanted
to
be
"both
good-
looking
and
delicious."
However,
some
Russian
scholars
held
different
views.
They
(such
as
Ledovsky,
Kulik,
etc.)
said
in
interviews
or
academic
exchanges
with
the
author
that
main
purpose
of
Mao
Zedong’s
coming
to
Moscow
was
to
recover
from
his
illness,
so
Mao
Zedong
later
complained
that
he
was
treated
coldly
in
Moscow
Itdoesn't
make
sense.
These
views
are
all
wrong,
because
the
archives
that
have
been
disclosed
so
far
fully
show
that
Mao
Zedong
had
made
very
clear
the
main
purpose
of
his
trip
to
the
Soviet
Union
long
before
he
left
Beijing,
that
is,
he
hoped
to
sign
a
new
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
treaty
with
the
Soviet
Union.
Whether
the
United
States
has
a
"plan
for
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
to
respond
the
Tito
clique"
and
how
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
learned
about
this
situation
is
still
unknown,
but
Li
Kenong's
delivery
of
such
a
message
is
undoubtedly
a
reminder
to
Moscow
that
in
the
confrontation
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States,
China
status
cannot
be
ignored.
Because
Stalin
was
always
worried
that
Mao
Zedong
would
take
the
Tito-
style
road,
especially
he
was
worried
about
the
development
of
relationship
between
New
China
and
the
United
States.
Mao
Zedong
felt
about
this.
He
once
said
to
Chinese
democrat
Luo
Longji
that
China
"cannot
accept
American
aid."
",
as
this
would
arouse
suspicion
in
the
Soviet
Union.
Of
course,
Mao
Zedong
needed
to
express
China's
position
on
this
issue,
so
the
Chinese
leaders
also
revealed
to
the
Soviet
Union
that
the
United
States
was
still
trying
to
overthrow
China's
nascent
revolutionary
regime.
They
not
only
provided
assistance
to
the
remnants
of
the
Kuomintang
in
Taiwan,
but
more
importantly
they
Organize
and
establish
counter-
revolution
organizati
on
the
mainland.
In
short,
on
the
one
hand,
Mao
Zedong
wanted
to
express
China's
different
positions
on
the
relations
between
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union,
and
on
the
other
hand,
he
also
empha
the
necess
of
closer
Sino-
Soviet
relatio
At
the
same
time,
from
Li
Keno
mess
one
can
also
unde
the
impli
that
lead
of
New
Chin
are
diss
with
the
194
Sin
Sov
Tre
As
the
head
of
the
Chinese
Communist
Party's
intelligence
department
and
then
Mao
Zedong's
liaison
with
the
Soviet
ambassador,
Li
Kenong
pointed
out
in
a
talk
at
the
Soviet
embassy
on
November
17,
1949
that
the
United
States
had
a
"plan
for
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
to
respond
the
Tito
clique,"
and
Expand
their
"influence
in
China
to
destroy
the
friendship
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union".
According
to
Li
Kenong,
the
imperialists'
propaganda
focused
on
accusing
the
Soviet
Union
of
"stealing
China's
food
and
resources,
and
attacking
the
1945
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
as
an
unequal
imperialist
treaty
that
resulted
in
China's
loss
of
Manchuria
and
Manchuria."
All
industrial
equipment".
However,
Mao
Zedong
understood
that
the
alliance
with
Soviet
Union
must
not
be
achieved
by
begging
for
aid.
He
had
to
explain
Stalin
that
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
was
not
only
beneficial
to
China,
but
fundamentally
speaking,
itwas
also
beneficial
to
the
Soviet
Union.
Mao
Zedong
did
send
such
a
message.
His
starting
point
was
to
let
Moscow
know
that
in
order
deal
to
jointly
with
the
United
States
politically,
the
Soviet
Union
also
needed
China
to
become
stronger
economically.
Itwas
precisely
because
of
concerns
about
domestic
economic
conditions
and
development
trends
that
Chinese
leaders
strengthened
their
belief
in
forming
an
alliance
with
the
Soviet
Union.
In
Liu
Shaoqi's
words,
after
the
founding
of
People's
Republic
of
China,
"uniting
with
the
Soviet
Union"
was
the
"basic
policy
of
founding
the
country."
In
addition,
the
"Instructions
of
the
Government
Council
on
Production
and
Disaster
Relief"
issued
by
Zhou
Enlai
on
December
19,
1949
stated:
This
year,
the
disasters
in
various
places
were
extremely
serious.
About
100
million
mu
of
cultivated
land
was
flooded
nationwide,
about
12
billion
catties
of
grain
production
was
reduced,
and
about
40
million
victims
were
affected.
In
his
report
entitled
"The
Victory
of
People's
Democracy
in
China
and
the
National
Economy
in
1949,"
Tikhvickii,
Counselor
of
the
Soviet
Embassy
in
China,
pointed
out
the
following
facts:
When
such
important
industrial
centers
were
liberated,
more
than
75%
of
the
industrial
enterprises
there
had
been
paralyzed.
When
the
Kuomintang
troops
retreated,
they
left
a
ruin
-blew
up
dikes,
trampled
tens
of
thousands
hectares
of
farmland,
took
away
or
blew
up
train
locomotives
and
carriages,
destroyed
power
stations
and
warehouses,
destroyed
transportation,
telegraph
and
radio
communication
facilities
scuttled
the
ship.
When
Kuomintang
retreated
from
Shanghai,
itdestroyed
the
international
radio
station,
blew
up
the
main
workshop
of
Jiangnan
Shipyard
and
the
oil
depot
of
Jiangwan
Airport,
and
scuttled
4
oil
tankers
and
10
steamships.
Burned
more
than
1,000
trucks
full
of
industrial
equipment
sent
from
Shanghai
while
fleeing
Wuxi.
More
than
90
of
the
more
than
100
railway
bridges
from
Wuhan
to
Guangzhou
were
blown
up.
Destroyed
more
than
30
ships
in
Hankou
and
blew
up
all
the
railway
bridges
connecting
the
three
towns
of
Wuhan.
,
50%
have
no
or
little
culture.
Machine Translated by Google
 Now
that
Stalin
had
already
expressed
the
intention
of
the
Soviet
Union
not
to
change
any
clauses
of
the
treaty,
Mao
Zedong
had
no
choice
but
to
say
that
"the
current
situation
of
the
Changchun
Railway
and
Lushun"
could
be
retained,
and
"there
is
no
need
to
revise
the
treaty
at
moment."
At
that
time,
we
did
not
take
into
account
the
positions
of
the
United
States
and
Britain
in
the
Yalta
agreement.
We
should
act
according
to
how
itis
beneficial
to
the
common
cause,
and
this
issue
must
be
thoughtful.”
Mao
Zedong
then
asked
“whether
itis
necessary
for
Zhou
Enlai
to
come
Moscow
to
resolve
the
treaty
issue”
because
Mao
Zedong
stated
in
his
previous
telegram
to
Moscow
that
Zhou
En’s
mission
in
Moscow
was
to
sign
a
treaty,
so
raising
this
issue
actually
insisted
on
signing
a
new
Sino-
Soviet
treaty.
To
this,
Stalin
replied,
apparently
displeased:
"You
have
to
decide
this
question
yourself.
Itmay
take
weeks
to
solve
some
other
problems."
,
When
Mao
Zedong
mentioned
just
that
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
studied
the
issue
of
the
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance
after
Liu
Shaoqi’s
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union,
Stalin
immediately
took
over
and
said:
“This
issue
can
be
discussed
and
resolved.”
But
he
emphasized:
"The
treaty
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
China
was
concluded
in
accordance
with
the
Yalta
agreement,
which
stipulated
the
most
important
provisions
of
the
treaty
(about
Kuril
Islands,
South
Sakhalin
Island,
Lushun
issue,
etc.).
This
means
that
the
conclusion
of
above-
mentioned
treaty
should
be
said
to
have
been
agreed
by
the
United
States
and
the
United
Kingdom.
In
view
of
this
situation,
we
have
decided
not
to
change
any
clauses
of
this
treaty
in
a
small
range
for
the
time
being,
because
even
if,a
change
is
made,
the
United
States
and
the
United
Kingdom
may
propose
amendments
Therefore,
itis
necessary
to
find
a
feasible
way
retain
the
treaty
in
form
and
actually
modify
the
existing
treaty,
that
is,
to
retain
the
Soviet
Union
in
Lushun
in
form.
The
right
to
garrison
troops,
but
withdraw
the
Soviet
troops
there
according
to
the
suggestion
of
Chinese
government."
"As
for
the
Changchun
Railway,
in
this
case,
considering
the
wishes
of
Chinese
side,
itcan
beretained
in
form,
but
in
fact
the
relevant
clauses
of
the
agreement
can
be
modified."
Mao
arrived
in
Moscow
on
December
16,
1949,
and
held
formal
talks
with
Stalin
six
hours
later.
According
to
meeting
minutes
in
Russian
archives,
the
first
conversation
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
resulted
in
differences
on
two
important
issues
tSino-
—Soviet
treaty
and
the
liberation
of
Taiwan.
he
On
the
issue
of
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty,
although
both
sides
expressed
that
they
could
make
concessions,
they
did
not
actually
reach
a
consensus.
On
the
issue
of
liberating
Taiwan,
the
Soviet
Union
refused
to
provide
assistance
directly
to
China.
However,
Mao
Zedong
was
completely
unsure
about
the
outcome
of
his
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union,
because
Stalin
did
not
give
aclear
answer,
so
he
had
to
go
alone.
On
the
one
hand,
he
wished
Stalin's
birthday,
and
on
the
other
hand,
he
understood
Moscow's
cards.
In
order
to
emphasize
the
importance
of
this
visit
and
attract
Stalin's
attention,
Mao
Zedong
summoned
Kovalev
on
December
3
and
specifically
told
him
that
the
CCP
was
under
pressure
from
Mao
Zedong's
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union.
Mao
Zedong
said
that
China's
democratic
parties
opposed
the
trip
at
a
meeting
because,
according
to
tradition,
ithas
always
been
"foreign
barbarians"
who
come
to
worship
the
Chinese
emperor,
not
the
other
way
around.
They
also
believed
that
Mao
Zedong's
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union
would
complicate
China's
relations
with
Western
countries
and
deprive
them
of
economic
assistance
from
these
countries.
Mao
Zedong's
worries
and
were
justified,
his
visit
was
indeed
not
smooth.
Some
Russian
scholars
believe
that
Stalin
and
Mao
Zedong
"understood
each
other"
from
the
very
beginning,
and
the
negotiations
on
the
treaty
"reached
a
peaceful
agreement
without
any
differences."
In
fact,
on
the
contrary,
dialogue
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
encountered
obstacles
from
the
very
beginning.
In
short,
the
purpose
of
Mao
Zedong’s
trip
to
Moscow
was
to
try
his
best
to
obtain
economic
aid
from
the
Soviet
Union,
and
to
form
an
alliance
with
the
Soviet
Union
and
express
this
alliance
in
the
form
of
a
new
treaty.
Signed
the
Sino-
Soviet
friendship
treaty,
visited
Eastern
European
countries
in
the
second
month,
and
recuperated
in
Sochi
in
the
third
month.
On
Kovalev's
suggestion,
the
visit
will
be
conducted
in
secret.
In
the
conversation
on
November
5,
Kovalev
conveyed
Stalin's
opinion
and
welcomed
Mao
Zedong's
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union.
Mao
Zedong
proposed
that
he
wanted
to
meet
Stalin
in
Moscow
in
December
and
personally
congratulate
Stalin
on
his
birthday.
Mao
Zedong's
trip
to
Moscow
was
also
of
a
completely
public
nature,
as
many
countries
would
send
delegations
to
Stalin's
birthday
celebrations.
Subsequently,
on
November
8,
Mao
Zedong
sent
a
telegram
to
Moscow
specifically
for
this
matter.
On
November
10,
Mao
Zedong
entrusted
Zhou
Enlai
to
express
Mao
Zedong's
desire
to
visit
the
Soviet
Union
again
to
Ambassador
Luo
Shen,
and
explained
that
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty
issue
would
be
raised
during
the
visit.
Zhou
Enlai
added
during
the
talks
that
ifa
treaty
was
to
be
signed,
he
would
personally
go
to
Moscow
negotiate.
The
telegram
from
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
to
Wang
Jiaxiang,
the
Chinese
ambassador
to
the
Soviet
Union,
on
November
9
proved
the
above
statement.
Go
to
Moscow,
or
decide
whether
and
when
Enlai
will
go
after
Chairman
Mao
arrives
in
Moscow,
this
point
is
also
at
Stalin's
discretion."
Wang
Jiaxiang
immediately
conveyed
this
meaning
to
the
Central
Committee
of
the
CPSU.
In
this
regard,
Gromyko
suggested
to
Stalin
that
since
the
Chinese
talked
about
fears
that
Mao
Zedong
and
Zhou
Enlai’s
visits
at
the
same
time
might
affect
their
work,
the
Soviet
Union
could
show
respect
for
the
CCP’s
own
choice.
This
actually
implies
that
only
Mao
Zedong
will
visit.
The
above
situation
shows
that
the
main
content
of
the
dialogue
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
has
been
clearly
stated
by
both
parties
in
advance,
and
there
is
no
misunderstanding
at
all.
Machine Translated by Google
Stalin
clearly
believed
that
the
Soviet
Union
had
made
great
concessions,
but
he
did
not
know
that
Mao
was
somehow
paying
more
attention
to
the
formal
aspect
of
problem.
Mao
Zedong
insisted
on
abolishing
the
original
Sino-
Soviet
treaty.
On
the
one
hand,
he
took
into
account
the
prestige
of
the
new
Chinese
leaders
in
the
country,
and
on
the
other
hand,
he
also
wanted
to
put
pressure
on
Western
countries
to
eliminate
all
unequal
treaties.
As
he
himself
said:
Stalin’s
reluctance
to
sign
a
new
Sino-
Soviet
treaty
was
fundamentally
due
to
the
fear
of
losing
the
economic
interests
in
Northeast
China
that
the
Soviet
Union
had
obtained
from
Chiang
Kai-
shek
in
1945
and,
on
the
other
hand,
the
fear
that
ifthis
led
to
Western
criticism
of
the
entire
Yalta
system.
Ifitraises
objections,
the
Soviet
Union
will
fall
into
an
extremely
passive
position
internationally.
Ifthere
is
any
change
in
Stalin’s
position
on
this
issue
compared
with
Mikoyan’s
visit
to
China
and
Liu
Shaoqi’s
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union,
itis
that
the
Soviet
Union
has
now
more
clearly
proposed
to
revise
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty
in
practice,
while
still
retaining
itin
form.
Doing
so
will
at
least
not
cause
more
troubles
for
the
Soviet
Union
in
terms
of
internatio
relations
due
to
changes
in
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty.
.
However,
in
the
second
meeting
held
on
December
24,
Stalin
did
not
mention
the
issue
of
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty
at
all,
and
Mao
Zedong
was
very
disappointed.
Mao
Zedong
himself
later
talked
about
this
situation
with
the
Soviet
ambassador
Yudin.
Mao
Zedong
believed
that
this
was
amanifestation
of
Stalin’s
distrust
of
the
CCP:
“One
of
the
main
purposes
of
our
visit
to
Moscow
was
to
sign
the
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship,
Cooperation
and
Mutual
Assistance.
The
Chinese
people
asked
Whether
the
Soviet
Union
will
sign
a
treaty
with
New
China,
why
the
treaty
signed
with
Kuomintang
is
still
legally
valid,
etc.
The
issue
of
signing
the
treaty
was
of
great
importance
to
us
at
that
time,
and
itwould
determine
the
future
development
prospects
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China.
"I
proposed
to
sign
atreaty
during
the
first
meeting
with
Stalin,
but
Stalin
avoided
answering
it.
Iraised
this
issue
again
during
the
second
meeting
and
sent
him
the
telegram
of
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
regarding
the
request
for
signing
the
treaty."
Look.
Isuggested
that
Zhou
Enlai
be
summoned
to
Moscow
sign
the
treaty,
since
he
was
the
foreign
minister.
Stalin
used
this
suggestion
as
an
excuse
for
refusal,
saying
'it
would
be
inappropriate
because
the
bourgeois
press
would
say
that
the
entire
Chinese
government
was
in
Moscow'
Later,
Stalin
avoided
seeing
me.
Icalled
his
residence,
but
the
reply
was
that
Stalin
not
at
home,
and
suggested
that
Igo
to
see
Mikoyan.”
Mao
Zedong
said,
“This
practice
made
me
very
angry,
and
Idecided
to
stay
in
In
the
villa,
do
nothing."
Mao
also
rejected
Kovalev
and
Fedorenko's
proposal
to
tour
the
entire
Soviet
Union,
preferring
instead
to
"sleep
in
the
dacha".
Mao
Zedong
was
very
dissatisfied
with
the
results
of
the
first
meeting.
According
to
Kovalev's
observations,
Mao
Zedong
"stayed
in
the
villa
sullenly"
in
those
few
days,
"in
a
bad
mood
and
restless."
In
order
to
further
express
China's
attitude,
after
participating
in
the
celebration
of
Stalin's
70th
birthday,
he
invited
Kovalev
to
have
a
talk
on
December
22
and
requested
that
the
transcript
of
talk
be
transferred
to
Stalin.
According
the
transcript
of
conversation,
Mao
Zedong
said
that
he
had
reported
the
contents
of
meeting
on
December
16
to
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China,
and
was
waiting
for
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China's
opinions
on
the
issues
involved
in
the
talks.
Mao
Zedong
proposed
that
the
next
meeting
be
arranged
on
December
23
or
24,
and
submitted
to
Stalin
two
plans
for
the
next
negotiation.
The
first
solution
is
to
solve
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty,
loan
agreement,
trade
treaty,
aviation
agreement
and
other
issues,
including
the
issue
of
Burma's
recognition
of
China.
According
to
this
plan,
Zhou
Enlai
was
required
to
come
Moscow
to
perform
the
signing
procedures
of
the
agreement.
The
second
option
is
to
conduct
consultations
on
various
issues
in
the
first
option,
but
the
corresponding
signing
procedures
will
not
be
performed
for
the
time
being.
In
this
way,
Zhou
Enlai
does
not
have
to
come
Moscow
immediately.
Mao
Zedong
emphasized
more
than
once
in
the
conversation
that
all
these
issues
were
decided
by
Stalin.
When
talking
about
the
establishment
of
navy,
Mao
Zedong
not
inadvertently
mentioned
in
passing:
"The
Kuomintang
has
established
a
naval
base
and
an
air
base
on
the
island
of
Taiwan.
We
do
not
have
a
navy
or
an
air
force,
which
makes
itdifficult
for
the
People's
Liberation
Army
to
occupy
Taiwan.
In
view
of
this,
we
Some
of
the
generals
advocated
appealing
to
the
Soviet
Union
for
assistance,
and
the
Soviet
Union
could
send
volunteer
pilots
or
secret
troops
to
take
Taiwan
as
soon
possible.”
Mao
Zedong’s
words
were
carefully
considered.
In
view
of
Stalin’s
meeting
with
Liu
Shaoqi,
which
showed
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
unwilling
to
openly
conflict
with
the
United
States
because
of
aiding
China’s
liberation
of
Taiwan,
Mao
Zedong
mentioned
“volunteer
pilots
or
secret
troops”
which
can
avoid
the
Soviet
Union’s
public
appearance
and
can
be
used
in
practice
The
way
to
get
aid
from
the
Soviet
Union.
In
this
regard,
itwas
inconvenient
for
Stalin
to
directly
reject
it,
so
he
proposed
that
"the
form
of
aid
needs
to
be
thoughtful"
and
"the
main
problem
is
not
to
provide
an
excuse
for
the
Americans
to
intervene."
But
Stalin
then
went
on
to
say
that
the
Soviet
Union
could
provide
“staff
officers
and
instructors”
and
“we
have
to
carefully
consider
other
issues.”
This
was
actually
tantamount
to
sealing
Mao
Zedong’s
mouth
on
the
issue
of
providing
military
aid
to
help
the
CCP
liberate
.Taiwan.
The
meeting
records
show
that
although
both
sides
expressed
that
they
could
make
concessions
on
the
issue
of
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty,
the
Union
wanted
to
maintain
the
old
treaty
while
China
insisted
on
signing
a
new
treaty.
There
is
only
room
for
maneuver
in
diplomacy.
Machine Translated by Google
At
this
time,
Mao
Zedong
told
the
Soviet
Union
that
Burma,
India,
the
United
Kingdom
and
the
Commonwealth
of
Nations
would
establish
diplomatic
relations
with
China.
The
actual
situation
is
that
as
early
December
16,
1949,
when
Zhou
Enlai
presided
over
the
State
Council
meeting,
he
revealed
that
"the
British
government
tends
to
recognize
my
country".
On
December
18,
Zhou
Enlai
replied
to
the
Foreign
Minister
of
Myanmar,
agreeing
to
establish
Sino-
Myanmar
diplomatic
relations
on
the
basis
of
the
severance
relations
between
the
Myanmar
government
and
the
remnants
of
the
Kuomintang.
On
December
30,
Indian
Prime
Minister
Nehru
(Nehru)
called
Zhou
Enlai,
stating
that
the
Indian
government
had
decided
to
recognize
the
People's
Republic
of
China,
and
at
the
same
time
announced
withdrawal
of
recognition
of
the
Kuomintang
government.
At
the
same
time,
another
event
occurred
that
affected
Stalin's
decision-
making.
During
his
meeting
with
Luo
Shen
on
January
1,
Mao
Zedong
told
him
that
in
recent
days
"received
reports
from
Beijing
that
the
Burmese
and
Indian
governments
expressed
their
willingness
to
recognize
the
People's
Republic
of
China.
The
position
of
the
Chinese
government
on
this
issue
is:
inform
Burma
and
the
Indian
government,
ifthey
really
wish
to
improve
relations
with
the
People's
Republic
of
China,
then
they
must
first
completely
sever
ties
with
Chiang
Kai-
shek
and
issue
an
official
statement
unconditionally
refusing
to
provide
any
support
and
assistance
to
the
Chiang
Kai-
shek
regime.
Accepted
by
the
Indian
and
Burmese
governments
Under
the
conditions
of
Chinese
government’s
above
proposal,
they
can
send
representatives
to
Beijing
for
negotiations.”
Mao
Zedong
also
told
Luo
Shen
that
“Soon
Britain
and
other
Commonwealth
countries
will
also
take
obvious
steps
on
the
issue
of
recognizing
the
People’s
Republic
of
China.”
Itwas
the
Western
newspapers
that
first
provoked
Stalin.
Since
Mao
Zedong
had
not
appeared
in
the
Soviet
media
since
Stalin’s
birthday
celebration,
the
embassies
of
various
countries
in
Moscow
were
discussing
and
inquiring
about
Mao
Zedong’s
whereabouts
everywhere,
which
also
aroused
various
speculations
in
the
Western
media.
There
was
even
news
that
Mao
Zedong
was
under
house
arrest.
Both
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
felt
uncomfortable
about
this.
Ambassador
Wang
Jiaxiang
proposed
to
solve
the
predicament
by
Mao
Zedong
answering
reporters'
questions,
and
publicly
stated
the
purpose
of
Mao
Zedong's
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union.
The
next
day,
January
2,
"Pravda"
published
the
news
that
Mao
Zedong
answered
the
questions
of
TASS
reporter.
Mao
Zedong
stated
to
the
outside
world
that
purpose
of
his
visit
to
Moscow
was
first
to
resolve
issues
such
as
the
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance,
that
the
duration
of
his
stay
in
the
Soviet
Union
"partially
depends
on
the
time
required
to
resolve
various
issues
of
the
interests
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China."
Mao
Zedong
also
said
that
he
"plans
to
visit
several
places
and
cities
in
the
Soviet
Union."
These
two
completely
different
attitudes
expressed
by
Mao
Zedong
in
private
and
in
public
were
nothing
more
than
trying
to
put
pressure
on
Stalin
to
force
him
discuss
the
issue
of
the
new
treaty.
In
fact,
Stalin's
agreement
with
Mao
Zedong
to
publicly
publish
such
a
talk
in
the
newspaper
has
already
shown
the
Soviet
Union's
tendency
to
make
concessions.
Mao
Zedong
later
admitted
that
speaking
in
Pravda
"was
a
great
step
forward".
Facing
Mao
Zedong,
who
never
backed
down,
Stalin
had
to
make
a
choice.
On
New
Year's
Day
in
1950,
Luo
Shen
was
ordered
by
Foreign
Minister
Vyshinsky
to
visit
Mao
Zedong.
Zedong
declared
to
him
that
due
to
his
physical
discomfort,
he
"prepared
to
completely
rest
for
a
week
and
completely
return
to
normal
sleep."
Mao
also
suggested
that
during
the
next
week's
break
he
would
like
to
meet
Shvernik,
Molotov,
Voroshilov,
Beria,
Malenkov,
Vasilev
Vyshinski
and
Vyshinsky,
"These
meetings
should
be
of
a
simple
discussion
nature
only.
He
does
not
want
to
raise
any
special
topics
for
these
meetings,
or
to
discuss
substantive
issues.
The
meetings
should
be
arranged
once
a
day
and
should
not
be
too
long,
He
thought
itwould
be
best
after
5-6
o'clock
in
the
evening."
"During
this
time,
he
wanted
to
discuss
substantive
issues
with
Stalin
himself."
Mao
Zedong
also
emphasized
that
he
"did
not
want
to
visit
factories,
give
reports,
or
make
public
statements.
Lectures.
From
his
health
considerations,
these
things
are
tiring
and
will
again
disrupt
his
sleeping
habits
and
cause
dizziness
to
recur.
Previously
he
had
planned
to
visit
various
parts
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Now,
due
to
his
health
and
when
he
returns
home
There
was
a
long
trek
to
go,
so
he
didn't
want
to
travel
all
over
the
Soviet
Union."
In
the
end,
Mao
Zedong
proposed
that
he
originally
planned
to
stay
in
the
Soviet
Union
for
three
months,
but
now
he
wanted
to
leave
Moscow
and
return
home
one
month
earlier,
that
is,
at
the
end
of
January.
Itseemed
that
Mao
Zedong
didn't
want
to
do
anything
other
than
"discuss
substantive
issues."
At
this
time,
Stalin
was
waiting
for
Mao
Zedong
to
make
corresponding
concessions,
and
Mao
Zedong
proposed
to
prepare
rest
in
peace
and
return
home
in
advance
to
express
his
dissatisfaction
and
protest
against
the
cold
reception
he
received
in
Moscow.
"Sino-
Soviet
relations
are
fixed
on
the
new
treaty,
and
Chinese
workers,
peasants,
intellectuals,
and
the
left
wing
of
the
national
bourgeoisie
will
all
feel
excited,
and
can
isolate
the
right
wing
of
the
national
bourgeoisie;
internationally,
we
can
have
greater
political
capital
to
deal
with
imperialism.
The
capitalist
countries
should
review
the
treaties
concluded
between
China
and
the
imperialist
countries
in
the
past."
Signing
the
new
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance"
will
put
the
People's
Republic
in
a
more
favorable
position,
and
will
make
the
capitalist
countries
have
to
stay
within
their
limits,
which
is
conducive
to
forcing
All
countries
recognized
China
unconditionally,
abolished
the
old
covenant,
and
re-
established
the
new
covenant,
so
that
the
capitalist
countries
did
not
dare
to
act
rashly."
Machine Translated by Google
Later,
Mao
Zedong
further
explained
China's
position,
and
said
that
the
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
should
be
considered
when
signing
acontract.
Mao
Zedong
said,
"A
new
treaty
between
us
reflects
a
completely
new
type
of
relationship
between
the
People's
Republic
of
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
after
the
victory
of
people's
revolution.
Itis
absolutely
necessary
to
re-
examine
the
existing
treaty,
because
the
two
treaties
of
this
treaty
Important
components
-Japan
and
the
Kuomintang
have
undergone
major
changes:
Japan
is
no
longer
an
armed
force,
and
the
Kuomintang
has
collapsed.
In
addition,
itis
well
known
that
a
considerable
number
of
Chinese
people
are
dissatisfied
with
the
existing
Sino-
Soviet
treaty,
so,
sign
a
new
The
Soviet
Union
also
put
forward
a
suggestion
that
Mao
Zedong
was
very
interested
in,
that
is,
China
should
issue
a
statement
on
the
seat
of
People's
Republic
of
China
in
the
United
Nations,
which
stated
that
itwas
illegal
for
the
representatives
of
the
Kuomintang
to
remain
on
the
UN
Security
Council
and
they
must
be
expelled.
The
Soviet
Union
will
support
this
statement,
and
at
the
same
time
demand
that
the
Security
Council
expel
the
Kuomintang
delegation
from
the
Security
Council,
and
"while
the
Kuomintang
representatives
remain
in
the
Security
Council,
the
Soviet
representatives
will
announce
that
as
long
as
there
are
Kuomintang
representatives,
the
Soviet
representatives
will
not
participate
in
the
work
of
Security
Council."
Mao
Zedong
immediately
stated
that
he
"agreed
100%
to
this
proposal."
.
Vyshinsky
also
told
Mao
Zedong
that
in
view
of
Liu
Shaoqi's
call
and
the
request
for
the
Soviet
Union
to
supply
fuel
for
aviation
training,
the
Soviet
side
decided
to
provide
China
with
the
required
amount
of
fuel
starting
from
January
according
to
the
Soviet
Air
Force's
standards
based
on
expert
calculations.
As
for
the
method
and
terms
of
China's
payment
for
this
batch
of
fuel,
itcan
be
resolved
in
the
1950
trade
negotiations.
Mao
Zedong
once
again
expressed
his
gratitude
for
Soviet
aid.
In
the
following
period
of
time,
both
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
tried
their
best
to
show
afriendly
and
cooperative
attitude,
and
tried
their
best
to
close
the
possible
cracks
in
Sino-
Soviet
relations.
On
January
6,
Vyshinsky
visited
Mao
Zedong
and
had
formal
talks
with
Kovalev,
Federline,
Wang
Jiaxiang
and
Shi
Zhe.
Vyshinsky
told
Mao
Zedong
that
in
view
of
the
request
from
the
Central
People's
Government
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China
to
help
restore
the
Jilin
Hydropower
Station,
the
Soviet
government
had
decided
to
send
four
Soviet
experts
to
China
within
five
days.
Within
amonth,
they
will
write
a
report
on
the
condition
of
water
conservancy
complex's
equipment
and
draw
up
the
measures
that
must
be
taken
to
restore
the
Jilin
Hydropower
Station.
Mao
Zedong
"expressed
his
gratitude
for
the
necessary
help
provided
by
the
Soviet
government,
and
said
that
the
help
provided
by
the
Soviet
government
for
this
purpose
is
of
great
significance
to
the
entire
national
economy
of
China".
The
dark
clouds
hanging
over
Moscow
have
finally
lifted.
In
short,
by
January
2
the
stalemate
began
to
break,
and
itwas
Stalin
who
made
concessions.
At
8:00
p.m.
on
January
2,
1950
Molotov
and
Mikoyan
came
to
the
villa
where
Mao
Zedong
stayed
and
asked
him
for
his
opinion
on
signing
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty
and
other
matters.
Mao
Zedong
made
three
comments:
(1)
Signing
a
new
Sino-
Soviet
treaty;
(2)
The
news
agencies
of
the
two
countries
issued
asimple
communiqué,
indicating
that
the
two
countries
had
exchanged
views
on
the
old
Sino-
Soviet
,treaty
of
friendship
and
alliance.
Drag
itdown;
(3)
sign
a
statement,
the
content
is
to
talk
about
the
main
points
of
the
relationship
between
the
two
countries.
Molotov
immediately
agreed
with
the
first
option.
Mao
Zedong
asked
again:
"Will
the
new
treaty
replace
the
old
treaty?"
Molotov
replied
clearly:
"Yes."
Mao
Zedong
immediately
stated
his
arrangement:
"My
telegram
will
arrive
in
Beijing
on
January
3,
and
Enlai
will
prepare
for
itin
5days
Departed
from
Beijing
on
January
9,
took
the
train
for
11
days,
arrived
in
Moscow
on
January
19,
negotiated
and
signed
various
treaties
in
about
10
days
from
January
20
to
the
end
of
month,
and
returned
to
China
with
Zhou
Yi
in
early
February.”
.,
In
addition,
Professor
Westa
proposed
another
interesting
reason
for
Stalin's
change
of
mind
based
on
Russian
archives.
When
the
Chinese
leaders
stayed
in
Moscow
during
the
new
year,
Mao
was
constantly
doing
work
to
Molotov,
Mikoyan
and
Roshin,
etc.,
and
as
a
result,
most
of
the
Soviet
leaders
believed
that
Mao
would
leave
without
signing
a
new
treaty
Moscow,
will
damage
the
status
of
himself
and
his
party
in
China.
They
felt
itwas
the
Soviet
Union's
responsibility
to
keep
its
new
communist
neighbor
safe.
Therefore,
among
these
leaders,
Mikoyan
proposed
to
Stalin
that
some
measures
could
be
taken
to
sign
a
new
treaty
without
adversely
affecting
the
Soviet
Union .
Itis
meaningless.
When
Mao
Zedong
himself
talked
about
this
issue
later,
he
said:
"Stalin's
position
has
changed,
maybe
the
Indians
and
the
British
helped
us.
They
recognized
the
People's
Republic
of
China
in
January
1950."
Goncharov
and
others
He
believed
that
Britain's
recognition
of
China
had
greatly
shocked
Stalin,
and
he
felt
that
this
was
aharbinger
of
easing
Sino-
US
relations.
In
any
case,
when
the
Sino-
Soviet
negotiations
were
at
an
impasse,
China's
relations
with
other
countries,
especially
Western
turned
around,
which
undoubtedly
stimulated
the
Soviet
Union.
Itseems
that
Stalin
needs
to
consider
making
concessions
again.
Machine Translated by Google
 Generally
speaking,
the
Sino-
Soviet
negotiations
on
the
new
treaty
started
in
a
friendly
and
harmonious
atmosphere.
After
Zhou
Enlai
arrived
in
Moscow
on
January
20,
the
third
meeting
between
Stalin
and
Mao
Zedong
on
January
22
began
to
discuss
how
to
revise
the
Sino-
Soviet
treaty.
Before
the
talks
started,
Soviet
Union
had
already
drafted
12
documents
related
to
the
new
treaty
and
handed
them
over
to
Stalin
on
the
day
of
talks.
Therefore,
Stalin
had
already
made
full
preparations,
while
Mao
Zedong
and
Zhou
Enlai
seemed
a
little
passive
during
the
talks.
In
Shi
Zhe's
view,
this
is
another
"misunderstanding",
but
from
the
judging
existing
written
materials,
this
statement
cannot
be
established.
According
to
Russian
archives,
during
the
talks
between
Molotov
and
Mao
Zedong
on
January
17,
the
Soviet
Union
clearly
proposed
to
issue
a
statement
in
the
name
of
the
Chinese
government
Wouldn’t
the
statement
be
better?”
Molotov
immediately
replied:
“Since
the
matter
concerns
such
an
important
issue
as
the
speech
of
Secretary
State
of
the
United
States,
the
statement
should
not
be
published
by
the
news
agency,
but
by
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
of
the
People’s
Republic
of
China.
Mao
Zedong
agreed
to
this
at
the
time,
and
specifically
said
that
"the
draft
statement
of
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China
will
be
drafted
tomorrow."
After
the
Soviet
Union
studied
and
revised
it,
"it
will
be
sent
to
Beijing
by
telegram,
and
the
deputy
minister
acting
as
foreign
minister
will
issue
this
statement."
Obviously,
cannot
be
explained
by
"misunderstanding".
Why
Mao
Zedong
insisted
on
issuing
a
statement
in
the
name
of
the
General
Information
.Administration
is
still
unknown,
but
itis
true
that
Mao
Zedong
insisted
on
his
own
views
and
was
quite
dissatisfied
with
Stalin's
accusations.
This
at
least
shows
that
there
was
still
a
lack
of
understanding
and
understanding
between
the
leaders
of
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
at
that
time. .
According
to
Shi
Zhe,
Mao
Zedong’s
translator,
Stalin
asked
China,
the
Soviet
Union,
and
Mongolia
to
issue
official
statements
to
refute
Acheson’s
remarks
in
his
speech
to
sow
discord
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union,
but
Mao
Zedong
“did
not
further
clarify
what
is
meant
by’
Official'
statements",
as
a
result,
the
Soviet
Union
and
Mongolia
issued
statements
in
the
name
of
foreign
ministers,
while
China
issued
a
statement
in
the
name
of
the
head
of
the
General
Information
Administration.
Stalin
was
very
dissatisfied
with
this,
and
accused
Mao
Zedong
of
"not
following
the
original
plan,
messing
up
his
pace,
and
leaving
loopholes
for
the
enemy
to
exploit",
and
said,
"We
should
all
keep
our
promises,
cooperate
closely,
and
keep
pace,
so
that
we
can
achieve
success."
more
powerful."
Mao
Zedong
suffocated
for
this,
and
never
said
a
word.
However,
an
unpleasant
incident
also
occurred
during
this
period,
that
is,
a
contradiction
arose
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
in
the
matter
of
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
agreeing
issue
to
jointly
a
statement
refuting
Acheson's
January
12
speech .
In
addition,
the
Communist
Party
and
Workers'
Party
Intelligence
Bureau
published
an
article
on
January
6,
strongly
criticizing
Nosaka
Sanzo,
a
member
of
the
Political
Bureau
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Japanese
Communist
Party,
for
advocating
the
path
of
peaceful
seizure
of
power,
as
well
the
view
that
US
military
stationed
in
Japan
is
beneficial
to
Japan's
democratization.
Regarding
this
issue,
Stalin
raised
itwith
the
CCP
delegation
when
Liu
Shaoqi
visited
the
Soviet
Union,
but
the
CCP
did
not
respond
to
itat
that
time.
During
the
war,
Nosaka
Sanzo
had
been
participating
in
China’s
anti-
Japanese
struggle
in
Yan’an,
and
maintained
a
close
relationship
with
the
CCP
after
returning
home.
Nevertheless,
in
order
to
maintain
consistency
with
the
Soviet
Union’s
views,
Mao
Zedong
instructed
Hu
Qiaomu
on
January
14
to
The
People's
Daily
published
an
editorial
supporting
the
position
of
the
Communist
Intelligence
Bureau.
Later,
Mao
Zedong
also
specifically
instructed
that
this
article
be
translated
into
Russian
and
handed
over
to
Stalin.
In
order
to
show
that
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
were
consistent,
on
January
13,
Mao
Zedong
notified
Liu
Shaoqi,
who
was
in
charge
of
the
work
in
country,
that
he
agreed
to
requisition
foreign
military
camps,
including
the
United
States,
and
prepared
to
let
the
United
States
withdraw
all
its
old
consulates
in
China.
Agree
that
the
Shanghai
Military
Control
Commission
will
directly
receive
or
requisition
the
materials
left
in
Shanghai
by
the
U.S.
Economic
Cooperation
Administration.
On
January
17,
Mao
Zedong
notified
the
Soviet
side
of
the
matter,
and
stated
that
his
purpose
was
to
"expel
the
consular
representatives
of
the
United
States
from
China."
Mao
Zedong
also
stated
to
Molotov
and
others
that
China
"will
work
hard
to
delay
the
time
for
United
States
to
recognize
China"
;because
"the
longer
the
United
States
obtains
its
legal
rights
in
China,
the
better
itwill
be
for
the
People's
Republic
of
China."
When
talking
with
Kovalev
on
January
9,
Mao
Zedong
also
stated
that
China
would
abide
by
the
agreements
signed
by
the
Soviet
Union
at
the
Tehran,
Yalta,
and
Potsdam
conferences.
When
talking
about
specific
signing
negotiations,
Mao
Zedong
once
again
emphasized
that
the
Chinese
democratic
government
will
start
from
all
existing
treaties,
including
those
signed
between
Chiang
Kai-
shek
and
capitalist
countries,
and
renegotiate.
The
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance
with
the
Soviet
Union
is
beneficial
to
both
parties.
Vyshinsky
also
explained
Stalin's
initial
position.
He
said:
"The
issue
of
anew
treaty
is
very
complicated,
because
signing
a
new
treaty
or
revising
an
existing
treaty
may
be
used
by
the
Americans
and
British
as
their
request
for
anew
trial
and
A
pretext
for
modifying
other
parts
of
the
treaty
that
might
harm
Soviet
and
Chinese
interests.
This
is
something
we
are
not
happy
to
see
and
cannot
allow.
Mao
Zedong
immediately
replied:
"This
situation
should
undoubtedly
be
taken
seriously
when
determining
the
way
to
solve
this
problem."
"
Machine Translated by Google
After
the
Soviet
side
agreed
to
return
the
Changchun
Railway
in
advance,
itsuggested
that
Soviet
troops
should
be
able
to
move
along
the
route
from
Manzhouli
to
Vladivostok.
During
the
talks
from
January
31
to
February
2,
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
expounded
different
positions
on
this
issue.
In
response
to
the
Soviet
Union's
proposal,
Zhou
Enlai
proposed
that
the
Soviet
army's
use
of
the
Changchun
Railway
should
be
subject
to
the
threat
of
war,
and
requested
that
the
agreement
be
added:
Chinese
troops
and
military
supplies
can
also
pass
through
Chita-
Novosibirsk-
Almaty
along
the
Manzhouli
Station.
Transport
and
mobilize
to
the
front
line
of
Yining
in
Xinjiang
Province,
and
the
freight
rate
is
based
on
the
current
Soviet
army
transportation
standards.
On
February
1,
Mikoyan
replied
that
the
question
should
be
modified
as
follows
according
to
the
wishes
of
Chinese
side:
"It
is
stipulated
that
the
movement
of
troops
along
the
Changchun
Railway
in
China
can
only
be
done
in
the
event
that
Soviet
Far
East
is
threatened
by
war.
One
is
about
the
use
of
the
Changchun
Railway
by
the
Soviet
Army.
Ihaven't
seen
any
literature
on
continuing
discussions
on
this
issue,
but
the
final
result
is
that
there
are
indeed
some
agreements
that
have
not
been
announced.
Among
these
unpublished
agreements,
according
to
the
currently
declassified
archives
of
Russia,
there
are
two
issues
that
deserve
the
attention
of
researchers:
There
are
still
some
texts
in
the
agreements
and
reached
in
Moscow
that
have
not
been
published,
and
there
are
also
differences
and
contradictions
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
on
these
issues.
During
the
meeting
with
Vyshinsky
on
February
13,
Zhou
Enlai
said
that
according
to
his
opinion
discussed
with
Mao
Zedong,
all
the
agreements
between
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
to
be
signed
in
Moscow
should
be
made
public.
Zhou
Enlai
explained
that
the
Chinese
version
of
these
agreements
had
been
sent
to
Beijing
and
would
report
to
the
Government
Affairs
Council
of
the
People's
Republic
of
China,
"If
there
is
anything
in
the
signed
agreement
that
cannot
be
published,
a
special
explanation
must
be
made
to
the
members
of
the
Government
Affairs
Council."
Zhou
Enlai
also
emphasized:
"According
to
our
opinion,
the
announcement
of
all
signed
agreements
is
beneficial
to
both
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
as
well
to
other
democratic
countries,
because
this
can
further
enhance
their
prestige
in
the
world."
Ji
said
that
although
Zhou
Enlai's
statement
was
very
clear,
there
no
agreement
between
the
two
parties
to
publish
all
agreements
and
other
documents.
Therefore,
the
issue
of
publishing
these
documents
must
be
discussed,
and
this
issue
will
be
reported
to
Stalin.
The
talks
determined
the
basic
principles
of
treaty
negotiations,
and
after
some
haggling,
the
two
sides
finally
reached
an
agreement.
From
the
relevant
treaties
and
agreements
announced
later,
compared
with
the
1945
treaty,
the
main
changes
are:
shortening
the
time
for
return
of
Lushun
Port
and
Changchun
Railway,
that
is,
from
the
past
30
years
to
after
the
signing
of
peace
treaty
with
Japan
but
not
later
than
Before
the
end
of
1952;
Dalian’s
administrative
power
used
to
be
restricted
by
the
Soviet
side,
but
now
itis
completely
under
of
the
jurisdiction
China;
positions
of
the
director
Changchun
Railway
Bureau
and
the
chairman
of
council,
and
the
chairman
of
Lushun
Base
Joint
Military
Committee
used
to
be
held
by
the
Soviet
side,
but
now
they
adopt
a
rotation
system.
In
terms
of
specific
issues,
especially
the
ownership
and
management
of
China's
Changchun
Railway,
generally
speaking,
the
Soviet
side
tended
to
retain
more
of
the
content
1945
agreement,
while
the
Chinese
draft
basically
had
to
overthrow
and
start
over.
The
result
of
the
dispute
was
that
Stalin
made
another
concession,
that
is,
he
generally
accepted
the
revised
draft
proposed
by
Zhou
Enlai
on
January
26.
Regarding
the
content
of
new
treaty,
Mao
Zedong
only
emphasized
that
"the
new
treaty
should
cover
various
issues
of
political,
economic,
cultural
and
military
cooperation,
and
the
most
important
issue
is
economic
cooperation",
but
did
not
express
any
specific
opinions.
Regarding
the
Lushun
issue,
according
to
the
Soviet
side's
opinion,
itwas
announced
that
the
Port
Arthur
Agreement
would
still
be
valid
until
the
peace
treaty
with
Japan
was
signed,
and
the
Soviet
troops
withdrew
from
Lushun
after
that.
Regarding
the
Dalian
issue,
Stalin
stated
that
the
Soviet
Union
"does
not
intend
to
retain
any
rights
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
Dalian",
but
pointed
out
that
ifDalian
continues
to
be
a
free
port,
itis
inline
with
the
"open
door"
policy
of
the
United
States
and
Britain.
Mao
Zedong
agreed,
and
proposed
that
Lushunkou
could
be
used
as
a
base
for
our
military
cooperation,
and
Dalian
could
be
used
as
a
base
for
Sino-
Soviet
economic
cooperation.
Regarding
the
Changchun
Railway,
Mao
Zedong's
basic
idea
was
that
the
new
agreement
should
state
that
operation
the
joint
and
management
would
continue
in
the
future,
but
that
China
should
play
a
major
role
in
the
management.
At
same
time,
itwas
necessary
to
study
the
issue
of
shortening
the
validity
period
of
the
agreement
and
stipulating
the
investment
of
both
parties.
scale.
In
this
regard,
Molotov
pointed
out:
"In
the
case
of
cooperation
and
management
joint
of
acertain
enterprise
between
the
two
countries,
itis
usually
stipulated
that
both
parties
should
participate
equally
and
take
turns
to
act
as
leaders.
In
the
old
agreement,
railway
management
belonged
to
the
Soviet
side,
but
In
the
future,
we
believe
that
itis
necessary
to
stipulate
that
management
functions
must
be
performed
in
rotation.
For
example,
itcan
berotated
every
2-3
years."
Zhou
Enlai
took
over
and
said:
"Our
comrades
believe
that
the
existing
positions
of
Changchun
Railway
Bureau
and
the
director
must
be
abolished,
and
management
must
be
established.
The
commission
should
replace
it,
and
itshould
bestipulated
that
the
positions
of
the
chairman
commission
and
the
director
of
bureau
should
be
represented
by
the
Chinese
side.
However,
in
view
of
Comrade
Molotov's
suggestion,
this
issue
must
be
reconsidered."
Stalin
supported
Molotov's
opinion,
saying:
"If
Ifitmeans
management,
joint
then
the
agent
of
leadership
position
must
be
replaced.
This
is
more
reasonable.
As
for
the
validity
period
of
the
agreement,
we
have
no
objection
to
shortening.”
Molotov
also
believed
that
Zhou
Enlai
proposed
to
increase
the
proportion
of
Chinese
investment
to
51%
The
%
requirement
"contradicts
the
prevailing
principle
of
parity
between
the
parties".
Stalin
also
said:
"Since
itis
amanagement,
joint
then
we
must
participate
equally."
Mao
Zedong
came
out
to
mediate
and
said:
"This
issue
must
be
studied
from
the
perspective
of
protecting
the
interests
of
both
parties."
In
the
subsequent
negotiations,
the
main
obstacle
lies
in
On
the
issue
of
the
Changchun
Railway
in
China.
Machine Translated by Google
Itis
worth
noting
here
that
the
existing
materials
on
this
issue
in
China
are
not
records
in
archival
documents.
Itseems
to
beclear
about
this
question
According
to
the
materials
available
in
China,
the
Soviet
Union
insisted
in
the
negotiations
that
a
secret
"Supplementary
Agreement"
should
be
signed
in
addition
to
the
new
Sino-
Soviet
treaty,
which
stipulated
that
in
the
Soviet
Union's
Far
East
and
Central
Asia,
China's
Northeast
and
Xinjiang
"no
Foreigners
do
not
allow
the
capital
of
third
countries
or
their
citizens
to
participate
directly
or
indirectly
in
industrial,
financial,
commercial
and
other
enterprises,
institutions,
associations
and
by
means
of
concession
rights
Mao
Zedong
was
extremely
dissatisfied
with
this,
but
in
the
end
he
had
to
give
in.
Chinese
materials
also
show
that
Mao
Zedong
questioned
this
proposal
during
the
negotiations
on
January
22,
and
later
refused
to
sign
the
agreement.
However,
under
Stalin's
repeated
insistence,
"in
order
to
take
care
of
the
overall
situation
of
Sino-
Soviet
unity,
we
had
to
make
concessions."
However,
according
to
.Russian
documents,
Mao
Zedong
did
not
express
any
objection
to
this
supplementary
agreement
at
that
time,
but
only
proposed
a
small
revision
"in
terms
of
text",
that
is,
to
change
"concession"
to
"concession
rights".
The
record
of
the
22
January
talks
in
Russian
archives
also
makes
no
mention
of
the
Supplementary
Agreement.
.
Second,
on
the
issue
of
the
secret
Supplementary
Agreement.
However,
the
feelings
of
Soviet
Union
on
this
issue
are
strong.
According
to
Mikoyan:
"As
an
ally,
the
Soviet
Union
transferred
huge
amounts
of
property
free
of
charge:
Changchun
Railway,
Dalian,
Lushunkou
and
all
the
rights
we
have
in
these
areas,
and
the
Soviet
Union
only
mobilized
troops
on
one
line
and
China
did
not
want
to
agree.
Ifthe
Chinese
side
can’t
even
make
such
a
concession,
then
what
kind
of
allies
are
we?”
Although
the
facts
true
and
the
Soviet
Union’s
feelings
are
reasonable,
itis
understandable
for
China
to
propose
such
amendments
based
on
the
principle
of
reciprocity
Moreover,
itshould
benoted
that
the
Chinese
leaders
obviously
have
misgivings
in
the
long
run
about
the
suggestion
that
Soviet
Union
has
the
right
to
move
troops
on
Chinese
territory..
Because
the
two
sides
were
in
dispute,
Mikoyan
finally
pointed
out:
IfChina
objects
to
the
Soviet
side's
proposal,
then
the
Soviet
side's
proposal
can
be
cancelled,
but
the
existing
agreement
should
be
retained,
and
the
validity
period
should
be
shortened
from
the
original
30
years
to
10
years.
Year.
This
means
that
the
period
for
Soviet
Union
and
China
occupy
to
jointly
the
Changchun
Railway
will
be
extended
for
another
three
years
on
the
basis
of
the
agreed
end
of
1952.
Of
course,
Zhou
Enlai
could
not
agree
to
re-
discuss
the
issue
of
the
validity
period
of
the
Changchun
Railway
Agreement,
so
he
had
to
agree
with
the
Soviet
side's
amendment,
that
is,
when
the
Soviet
Far
East
was
threatened
by
war,
the
Soviet
army
could
use
the
Changchun
Railway
to
mobilize
troops,
without
mentioning
China's
use
of
the
Soviet
railway.
question.
However,
Zhou
Enlai
took
a
step
back
and
asked
whether
itwould
be
possible
for
the
Chinese
side
to
transfer
troops
from
the
northeast
to
Xinjiang
along
the
Siberian
Railway
ifnecessary,
although
there
was
no
need
to
make
a
stipulation
in
the
document.
Mikoyan
said
that
the
rejection
of
China's
proposal
to
have
the
right
to
transfer
troops
through
the
territory
of
Soviet
Union
did
not
rule
out
the
possibility
of
using
Soviet
railways
to
transfer
Chinese
troops
in
accordance
with
the
treaty
between
allied
countries
ifnecessary.
That's
the
end
of
debate.
conduct.
The
Soviet
side
explained
that
mobilizing
troops
along
the
route
from
Manzhouli
to
Vladivostok
can
shorten
the
distance
by
half
and
provide
two
routes
for
mobilizing
troops
in
wartime.
This
is
natural
and
convincing,
without
any
proof
which
refers
to
the
time
when
threat
of
war
to
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
Far
East
has
become
a
reality.
At
the
same
time,
Mikoyan
stated
that
"China's
suggestion
that
ithas
the
right
to
mobilize
troops
and
military
supplies
along
the
railway
from
Manchuria
to
Xinjiang
is
incorrect,"
"The
Soviet
side
considers
this
proposal
totally
unacceptable,
not
because
we
,object
to
the
mobilization
of
Chinese
troops
along
our
railway,
but
because
we
consider
this
proposal
to
be
in
response
to
the
Soviet
side's
proposal
to
mobilize
Soviet
troops
along
the
Chinese
Changchun
Railway
between
Manzhouli
and
Suifenhe
The
counter-
proposal
was
a
special
covert
form
of
opposition
to
the
Soviet
proposal".
Mikoyan
and
Vyshinsky
also
complained
that
the
Soviet
side
was
"surprised
at
asking
such
aquestion,
because
itwas
Zhou
Enlai
himself
who
confirmed
that
ifthe
Soviet
Union
would
Changchun
Railway
was
handed
over
to
China,
then
the
Chinese
governme
agreed
that
the
Soviet
Union
could
move
troops
in
any
direction
along
the
Changch
Railway”,
“Now,
when
we
agreed
to
hand
over
the
Changc
Railway
to
China,
the
Chinese
people’
opinion
change
again,
and
they
oppose
our
movem
along
the
Chang
Railwa
They
even
moved
troops
betwe
Manz
and
Suifen
"Zhou
Enlai
explai
the
Chin
prop
in
detail
and
"tried
to
prov
that
this
is
not
a
cou
pro
or
acon
pro
He
poi
out
tha
the
Chi
del
did
not
init
ex
to
sti
th
ter
of
tw
si
tr
in
th
pr
Z
E
fLstia
n
rftr
Machine Translated by Google
Yevgeny
Baganov
concluded
that:
the
full
expansion
of
the
Cold
War
in
1950
made
itacceptable
for
the
Soviet
Union
to
break
out
of
a
war
in
Korea;
Stalin
believed
that
the
establishment
of
North
Atlantic
Treaty
Organization
was
a
serious
threat
to
the
Soviet
Union;
offset
the
United
States
against
What
did
Stalin
mean
by
"the
international
situation
has
changed",
that
is,
what
was
the
main
and
fundamental
reason
for
the
Soviet
Union
to
change
its
policy
towards
the
Korean
Peninsula?
This
issue
has
recently
aroused
extensive
inference
and
debate
in
the
international
academic
circles.
Scholars
from
various
countries
have
noticed
that
Russian
archives
fully
demonstrate
that
Stalin
changed
the
Soviet
Union's
policy
toward
the
Korean
Peninsula
in
early
1950
tis,
—during
the
negotiation
of
the
Sino-
hat
Soviet
Treaty
with
Mao
Zedong.
Throughout
1949,
Moscow
opposed
North
Korea's
military
solution
to
the
unification
of
Korea
despite
the
peninsula's
very
tense
state
of
war,
and
by
early
1950
Stalin
abruptly
agreed
to
Kim
IlSung's
insistence
on
unifying
the
peninsula
by
force
suggestion.
The
only
direct
documentary
evidence
that
provides
the
reason
for
the
change
in
Soviet
decision-
making
is
what
was
stated
in
Stalin's
telegram
to
Mao
Zedong
on
May
14,
1950,
"in
view
of
the
change
in
the
international
situation."
Crossing
the
38th
Parallel
Stalin's
——
Thoughts
on
the
International
Situation
in
Northeast
Asia
third
chapter
However,
Stalin
did
not
think
that
this
would
satisfy
the
Soviet
Union's
demands
in
East
Asia.
The
strategic
goal
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
this
region
formulated
by
Stalin
and
realized
in
1945
was
completely
in
line
with
the
traditional
Far
East
strategy
in
Russian
history.
Stalin
once
compared
the
achievements
of
Soviet
Union
in
the
war
against
Japan
with
defeat
of
Tsarist
Russia
in
the
Russo-
Japanese
War.
He
said:
The
defeat
in
1904
was
a
stain
on
Russian
history.
A
generation
of
people
have
been
waiting
for
this
day
40
years."
Therefore,
when
Stalin
saw
through
the
dialogue
with
Mao
Zedong
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
forced
to
lose
its
sea
outlets
and
ice-
free
ports
in
the
Pacific
Ocean
in
the
near
future,
he
must
seek
a
remedy
to
ensure
or
maintain
this
traditional
Russian
strategy
realization.
As
a
result,
the
issue
of
North
Korea
was
put
on
Moscow's
agenda
-on
Stalin's
map,
only
the
Korean
peninsula
could
satisfy
the
Soviet
Union's
requirements
for
East
Asia
to
some
extent,
that
is,
to
find
a
suitable
base
for
the
Soviet
Pacific
Fleet
and
connect
the
European
part
of
the
Soviet
Union
with
this
outlet
in
the
Pacific
Ocean
with
the
shortest
possible
railway
line.
Therefore,
itwas
precisely
at
this
time
that
Stalin
completely
changed
his
policy
on
the
Korean
peninsula,
that
is,
suddenly
changed
from
the
defensive
strategy
that
Moscow
had
always
insisted
on
to
an
offensive
strategy.
,
The
establishment
of
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
is
undoubtedly
beneficial
to
both
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
politically
and
militarily,
but
from
the
perspective
of
economics
and
diplomacy,
the
understandings
of
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
are
different.
Itshould
be
said
that
the
"Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship,
Alliance
and
Mutual
Assistance"
officially
signed
on
February
14
is
generally
in
line
with
China's
wishes.
Itcan
befully
recovered.
For
Stalin,
this
meant
that
the
strategic
goals
of
the
Far
East
achieved
by
the
Soviet
Union
through
the
Yalta
Agreement
and
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
after
the
war-
Pacific
Ocean
outlet
and
the
ice-
free
port
would
cease
to
exist
by
the
end
of
1952
at
the
latest.
Perhaps
precisely
because
of
this,
in
order
to
make
up
for
this
loss
as
much
as
possible,
Stalin
insisted
on
signing
the
secret
"Supplementary
Agreement",
the
purpose
of
which
was
to
eliminate
the
penetration
and
influence
and
ensure
the
security
of
East
Asian
region
of
the
Soviet
Union.
As
for
the
agreements
of
several
other
ventures
that
joint
Mao
Zedong
also
expressed
strong
dissatisfaction
with,
that
is,
the
so-
called
"cooperatives",
in
fact,
the
Soviets
cannot
be
blamed,
because
as
mentioned
above,
as
early
1949
when
Mikoyan
visited
Xibaipo,
the
leaders
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China
Itwas
proposed
to
invite
the
Soviet
Union
to
come
China
to
set
up
a
venture
company
joint
or
concession
company,
and
during
Mao
Zedong's
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union,
the
issue
of
establishing
a
venture
company
joint
in
Xinjiang
was
also
proposed
by
China
on
its
own
initiative.
The
problem
can
only
wait
for
the
publication
of
Chinese
archives
and
documents.
However,
itis
true
that
Mao
Zedong
was
very
dissatisfied
with
this
secret
"Supplementary
Agreement"
later.
In
many
speeches,
he
referred
to
Northeast
China
and
Xinjiang
as
the
two
"colonies"
or
spheres
of
influence
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Objectively
speaking,
itis
reasonable
for
the
Chinese
leaders
to
express
dissatisfaction
with
this.
This
"Supplementary
Agreement"
is
fair
on
the
surface,
but
in
fact
itonly
restricts
China
from
exercising
its
sovereignty
in
the
Northeast
and
Xinjiang.
Because
at
that
time
in
the
Far
East
and
Central
Asia
of
the
Soviet
Union
there
was
no
question
of
capital
and
citizens
of
"third
countries".
Machine Translated by Google
Stalin's
agreement
with
North
Korea
to
use
military
means
to
solve
the
Korean
nation's
unification
problem
meant
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
determined
to
face
a
state
of
war
in
Northeast
Asia.
There
are
two
prerequisites
for
making
this
decision:
first,
the
Soviet
Union
is
already
in
an
international
environment
of
confrontation
with
the
United
States.
may
be
1.
Decision
premise:
the
escalation
of
conflict
on
the
Korean
peninsula
Scholars
have
addressed
various
aspects
of
the
problem,
most
of
which
were
related
to
Stalin's
consideration
of
changing
Soviet
policy
toward
North
Korea.
However,
itshould
bepointed
out
that
they
did
not
act
equally
and
in
parallel,
but
influenced
Stalin's
decision-
making
at
different
levels.
These
levels
are
divided
into
the
premise
of
forming
a
decision,
the
motivation
to
change
the
decision,
and
conditions
to
ensure
the
decision,
most
important
of
which
is
the
motivation,
followed
by
the
condition.
At
same
time,
Stalin's
transformation
of
this
major
decision
involved
the
relationship
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
(including
Japan),
North
Korea
and
China,
these
three
were
not
equal
and
parallel,
the
most
important
of
which
was
the
relationship
with
China
followed
by
estimates
of
U.S.
policy
responses.
Starting
from
such
a
starting
point,
this
book
participates
in
the
discussion
of
this
issue.
,
In
their
works,
Torkunov
and
Ufimtsev
mentioned
that
an
important
factor
in
the
formulation
of
"changes
in
the
international
situation"
was
the
victory
of
Chinese
revolution.
Stalin
thought
that
the
United
States
was
only
concerned
with
Chiang
Kai-
shek's
fate
in
Taiwan
and
did
not
want
to
be
involved
in
the
Korean
conflict.
Another
important
factor
is
that
the
Soviet
Union
broke
the
nuclear
monopoly
of
the
United
States,
making
itimpossible
for
the
United
States
to
intimidate
the
Soviet
Union
with
nuclear
threats.
John
Garver
emphasized
that
the
main
reason
why
Stalin
changed
his
cautious
policy
in
the
past
was
Japanese
issue.
Moscow
believed
that
the
United
States
was
trying
to
support
Japan
and
turn
into
a
US
military
base
in
the
Far
East,
which
the
Soviet
Union
could
not
tolerate.
In
addition,
the
author
of
book
"Uncertain
Partners",
which
is
quite
influential
in
the
West,
concluded
that
Stalin's
goal
of
changing
his
policy
towards
North
Korea
was
to
expand
the
Soviet
Union's
buffer
zone
and
to
attack
Japan
in
future
global
conflicts.
springboard
for
the
United
States,
while
probing
American
resolve,
deepening
US
hostility
with
China
and,
last
but
not
least,
drawing
US
power
away
from
Europe.
John
Merrill
pointed
out
that
war
has
a
pre-
emptive
problem.
Concerned
about
the
survival
of
North
Korean
regime,
Stalin
agreed
to
an
offensive-
defensive
approach,
especially
after
seeing
the
state
of
American
aid
to
the
South
in
the
early
1950s.
James
Mattley
argued
that
the
Russian
documents
did
not
support
the
conclusion
that
Acheson's
famous
speech
was
the
cause
of
Stalin's
decision,
since
itwas
impossible
for
the
Soviet
leader
to
ignore
the
U.S.
response
in
the
following
weeks.
A
signal
of
progressively
tougher
Asian
policy.
He
believes
that
the
main
reason
is
that
Stalin,
Mao
Zedong,
and
Kim
IlSung
despaired
of
the
future
US
policy
in
Asia,
especially
Japan.
Sergey
Goncharov
disagrees
with
the
claims
that
USSR
possessed
nuclear
weapons
and
that
NATO
had
influence
on
the
USSR.
He
believes
that
some
Russian
documents
show
that
Truman's
speech
on
January
5and
Acheson's
speech
on
January
12
to
exclude
North
Korea
from
the
US
defensive
circle
played
some
role,
but
this
was
not
the
only
factor.
Overall,
conditions
in
Germany
and
Europe,
as
well
concerns
about
Japan,
certainly
played
a
role.
Both
Li
Zhongzhi
and
Chen
Jian
believed
that
the
attitude
of
United
States
towards
the
North
Korean
issue,
that
is,
the
possibility
of
American
intervention,
was
a
key
factor
affecting
Stalin's
decision-
making.
Valery
Denisov
insisted
that
Stalin's
so-
called
"changes
in
the
international
situation"
firstly
referred
to
the
victory
of
Chinese
Communist
Party
in
China.
Now
that
the
United
States
has
abandoned
Chiang
Kai-
shek,
itis
impossible
to
wage
a
war
for
South
Korea.
Secondly,
the
Soviet
Union
mastered
nuclear
weapons,
which
made
the
United
States
lose
the
ability
to
use
the
"nuclear
weapon"
in
its
confrontation
with
the
Soviet
Union.
Japanese
control;
the
Chinese
Communist
Party's
victory
in
China
seemed
likely
to
lead
North
Korea's
success;
Stalin
was
also
influenced
by
his
own
knowledge
of
nuclear
weapons
and
the
loss
of
China
by
the
United
States.
Machine Translated by Google
In
June-
July,
the
situation
became
more
tense.
On
June
18,
Shtykov
reported
that
the
South
Korean
leaders
all
advocated
"using
military
means
to
solve
the
problem
of
national
reunification"
and
"there
is
only
adifference
of
opinion
on
determining
the
time".
The
report
states
that
the
South
Korean
army
and
police
have
repeatedly
crossed
the
38th
Parallel
without
authorization
in
the
Ongjin
area,
and
the
fighting
in
this
area
is
still
going
on,
and
the
number
of
South
Korean
troops
has
increased.
At
one
point,
South
Korean
troops
invaded
10
kilometers
into
the
northern
region
and
were
driven
back
to
the
38th
parallel
due
to
the
actions
of
northern
police
brigade.
North
Korean
troops
occupy
On
May
2
of
the
same
year,
Shtykov
reported:
"The
South
Korean
authorities
have
expanded
the
number
of
'National
Defense
Forces'
in
order
to
carry
out
the
plan
of
an
armed
invasion
of
the
North.
According
to
intelligence,
the
number
of
'National
Defense
Forces'
has
increased
from
53,600
on
January
1this
year
to
At
the
end
of
first
quarter,
there
were
70,000
people.
At
the
same
time,
they
also
paid
special
attention
to
technical,
mechanized
and
special
forces,
these
arms
have
increased
by
one
to
three
times.”
The
report
also
said
that
the
South
Korean
authorities
have
assembled
troops
near
the
38th
parallel.
As
many
as
41,000
people,
including
30,000
people
in
the
direction
of
Pyongyang.
"Operational
plans
for
an
offensive
to
the
north
have
been
drawn
up
and
communicated
to
battalion
commander
level
in
the
1st
Brigade.
Positive
action
is
expected
in
June
possibly."
In
view
of
this
situation,
we
consider
itreasonable
to
recommend
that
the
North
Korean
Government
Army
Command
take
appropriate
measures
in
response
to
possible
larger-
scale
provocative
actions
by
"southerners".
At
the
same
time,
as
situation
on
the
38th
Parallel
became
more
complicated,
the
"Southerners"
mobilized
some
field
troops
to
the
vicinity
of
38th
Parallel
from
March
to
April.
Itis
not
ruled
out
that
the
"Southerners"
may
take
new
provocative
actions
against
the
North
Korean
government
forces
and
use
larger
forces
than
hitherto.
In
terms
of
its
nature,
the
incidents
that
violated
the
regulations
were
small-
scale
conflicts
between
security
forces,
usually
company
and
battalion-
scale
conflicts,
using
light
machine
guns
and
mortars,
and
some
"southerners"
crossed
the
38th
parallel.
In
all
these
violations,
itwas
the
"Southerners"
who
fired
first.
After
our
troops
withdrew
from
North
Korea,
the
"southerners"
violated
38th
Parallel
regulations
provocatively
and
frequently.
In
the
past
month,
such
incidents
of
violating
regulations
have
occurred
frequently:
from
January
1to
April
15
this
year,
there
were
37
incidents
of
violating
regulations
on
the
entire
38th
Parallel,
24
of
which
occurred
on
March
15
Until
April
15th.
On
April
20,
1949,
Vasilevsky
and
Shtemenko
reported
to
Stalin
on
the
situation
38th
Parallel:
The
Berlin
crisis
in
Europe
has
not
yet
passed,
and
the
Korean
peninsula
in
Northeast
Asia
is
already
on
the
brink
of
avery
tense
war.
Since
the
38th
parallel
was
drawn,
North
Korea
controlled
by
Moscow
and
South
Korea
controlled
by
Washington
have
been
in
a
state
of
confrontation.
Especially
after
North
Korea
and
South
Korea
established
separate
regimes,
the
situation
worsened.
Syngman
Rhee
(Syngman
Rhee)
and
Kim
Il-
Chengdu
wanted
to
resolve
the
issue
of
reunification
of
the
Korean
nation
through
military
means,
and
incidents
of
friction
and
exchange
of
fire
near
the
38th
parallel
continued
to
occur.
Especially
after
the
Soviet
occupying
forces
withdrew
from
the
Korean
peninsula,
the
Syngman
Rhee
regime
in
the
south
continued
to
make
war
calls
and
repeatedly
carried
out
military
provocations
and
border
violations
against
the
north.
However,
Stalin's
attitude
was
to
suppress
Kim
Il-
sung's
overly
strong
reaction
to
this.
As
mentioned
above,
after
the
Soviet
Union
made
a
strong
confrontational
response
to
the
Marshall
Plan,
the
international
situation
has
shown
a
situation
where
the
two
groups
are
opposed,
and
the
conflict
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
first
appeared
in
Europe.
However,
as
a
result
of
the
first
crisis
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
West
after
formation
of
the
Cold
War,
which
took
place
from
June
1948
to
May
1949
tBerlin
—Crisis
tSoviet
—Union
flinched
he
from
the
hard-
line
he
positions
of
the
United
States
and
the
West.
Although
Stalin
was
determined
to
first
express
Moscow's
determination
to
confront
the
United
States
on
the
most
sensitive
issue
of
Germany
between
the
East
and
the
West,
he
did
not
correctly
estimate
that
the
United
States
would
take
a
tit-
for-
tat
position
from
a
policy
of
strength,
especially
Moscow's
response
to
the
United
States'
solution
to
the
Berlin
issue.
The
economic
strength
of
the
Soviet
Union
was
underestimated,
so
Stalin
decided
to
abandon
the
practice
of
open
conflict
with
the
United
States
in
Europe
when
the
overall
strength
of
the
two
sides
was
not
favorable
to
the
Soviet
Union.
However,
the
fact
that
Soviet
Union
adopted
a
conservative
policy
of
confrontation
with
the
West
in
Europe
does
not
mean
that
Stalin
has
given
up
the
strategy
of
confrontation
with
the
United
States.
The
problem
lies
in
the
conditions
and
methods
of
confrontation.
Moscow
is
waiting
for
the
right
moment
and
choosing
the
right
area.
direct
conflict;
the
second
is
that
the
Korean
peninsula
is
already
in
a
state
of
tense
military
confrontation,
and
North
Korea
under
the
control
of
Soviet
Union
has
already
made
mental
and
material
preparations
to
deal
with
the
war
situation.
These
two
prerequisites
were
met
in
the
second
half
of
1949,
but
Stalin
did
not
change
the
Far
East
strategy
and
tactics
formed
by
the
Soviet
Union
since
1945
at
this
time.
Machine Translated by Google
After
meeting
with
Kim
Il-
sung
and
Park
Hyun-
young
twice
on
September
12
and
13,
Don
Kim
reported
to
Moscow
on
September
14
the
details
of
North
and
South
Korean
military
forces,
Kim
Il-
sung's
considerations,
and
his
own
views
on
this
issue
The
report
said:
"Kim
IlSung
believed
that
the
combat
effectiveness
of
the
South
Korean
army
was
not
strong"
and
that
the
northern
army
was
"superior
to
the
southern
army
in
terms
of
technical
equipment
(tanks,
artillery,
aircraft),
discipline,
training
quality
of
officers
and
soldiers,
morale."
However,
Kim
Il-
sung
was
undecided
about
public
opinion
and
the
reaction
of
the
people.
He
.believed
that
"if
the
civil
war
drags
on,
they
will
be
in
a
politically
disadvantaged
position.
However,
itis
impossible
to
expect
a
quick
victory
under
the
current
conditions.
Therefore,
he
does
not
advocate
launching
a
civil
war."
war,
but
only
proposed
to
seize
the
Ongjin
Peninsula
and
the
part
of
South
Korea
to
the
east
of
peninsula
approximately
to
the
vicinity
of
Kaesong”,
On
September
11,
Vyshinsky
replied,
instructing
Donkin
to
meet
with
Kim
IlSung
as
soon
possible
to
further
clarify
the
South
Korean
army
and
its
numbers,
weapons
and
equipment,
combat
effectiveness,
as
well
the
status
of
guerrilla
movement
in
southern
Korea.
How
will
the
people
and
the
people
view
this
fact,
what
kind
of
practical
help
the
people
in
the
south
will
give
to
the
northern
army,
what
measures
Kim
IlSung
thinks
the
United
States
will
take
when
the
North
launches
an
attack,
how
the
North
will
estimate
its
military
capabilities,
and
at
the
same
time,
Dunkin
must
make
his
own
decisions.
Judgment
of
the
reality
and
reasonableness
of
the
situation
and
of
the
proposals
made
by
the
North
Korean
leader.
Pyongyang
is
also
actively
strengthening
its
military
preparations
while
implementing
the
plan
for
peaceful
reunification
of
North
Korea.
Kim
IlSung
reacted
strongly
to
the
threat
from
south,
and
he
even
believed
that
this
was
a
favorable
opportunity
to
realize
the
reunification
of
Korea
through
military
means.
On
September
3,
1949,
Tunkin,
Chargé
d'affaires
of
the
Soviet
embassy
in
North
Korea,
reported
to
Moscow
that
Kim
Il-
sung's
personal
secretary,
Mun
Il,
reported
that
South
Korea
had
recently
attempted
to
seize
the
North
of
the
Ongjin
Peninsula
north
of
the
38th
Parallel
Therefore,
Kim
Il-
sung
requested
permission
to
take
military
action
against
the
south
to
seize
Ongjin
Peninsula
and
parts
of
the
South
Korean
area
from
the
east
to
Kaesong
shorten
the
line
of
defense.
Ifthe
international
situation
permits,
itis
also
ready
to
continue
advance
to
the
south.
Kim
IlSung
believed
that
they
could
occupy
South
Korea
within
two
weeks
to
months.
Dunkin
also
confirmed
that
North
Korea
had
indeed
intercepted
an
order
from
the
South
Korean
army
to
bombard
Haeju
City,
but
the
bombardment
time
set
by
the
order
had
passed,
but
nothing
happened.
However,
the
Soviet
military
aid
at
that
time
was
mainly
considered
to
strengthen
the
defense
forces
in
the
north
of
Korea,
rather
than
to
encourage
an
offensive
to
the
south.
Even
when
some
Soviet
military
personnel
advocated
military
action,
Stalin
still
insisted
on
easing
the
tension
on
Korean
peninsula.
try
to
avoid
the
position
of
directly
intervening
in
this
conflict.
For
this
reason,
Moscow
approved
Ambassador
Shtykov's
proposal
that
after
the
US
troops
withdraw
from
South
Korea,
the
Soviet
Union
should
also
try
to
dismantle
the
military
base
in
Hamhung
and
the
military
airfields
established
by
the
Soviet
Union
in
Pyongyang
and
other
places,
because
these
Itis
possible
that
the
facilities
could
be
used
by
the
Korean
People's
Army
and
could
put
the
Soviet
Union
in
a
passive
position.
Not
only
that,
Moscow
also
prevented
Kim
IlSung
from
taking
any
military
action
that
might
lead
to
an
escalation
of
the
conflict.
,
At
that
time,
the
U.S.
had
already
completed
its
withdrawal
from
the
Korean
Peninsula
in
June
1949.
As
Professor
Niu
Jun
said,
the
withdrawal
of
U.S.
troops
from
China
and
South
Korea
during
this
period
“marked
that
the
U.S.
had
basically
completed
the
previous
operations
in
Asia.”
A
strategic
adjustment
characterized
by
shrinking
forces
and
lines
of
defense".
However,
the
south
Korean
authorities
have
stepped
up
military
provocations
and
offensive
preparations,
while
Moscow's
assessment
of
the
intention
of
the
withdrawal
US
troops
from
south
Korea
is
to
"give
the
south
Korean
army
freedom
of
action"
and
"loosen
the
hands
and
feet
of
the
south
Korean
reactionaries."
As
a
result,
tensions
on
the
Korean
peninsula
prompted
the
Soviet
Union
to
step
up
military
assistance
to
the
Democratic
People's
Republic
of
Korea.
In
June
1949,
at
the
request
of
Kim
IlSung,
the
Soviet
Union
agreed
to
provide
military
technical
assistance
to
the
Democratic
People's
Republic
of
Korea
in
the
form
of
a
trade
protocol.
Included
in
the
aid
list
are
100
military
aircraft
of
various
types,
87
tanks,
57
armored
vehicles,
102
self-
propelled
artillery,
44
folding
landing
craft
and
small
rubber
boats,
as
well
various
guns,
ammunition
and
technical
equipment.
On
July
13,
Shtykov
called
Vyshinsky
again,
saying
that
according
to
the
confession
of
soldiers
the
South
Korean
Army
captured
in
the
Wengjin
area
(belonging
to
the
2nd
Battalion
of
the
18th
Regiment),
"their
commander
has
made
many
speeches
since
July,
asserting
that
the
North
The
Korean
army
is
trying
to
attack
the
south,
so
South
Korean
army
should
strike
first,
give
the
North
Korean
army
a
surprise
attack,
and
occupy
North
Korea
before
August
15
(Korean
Liberation
Day)."
The
prisoner
also
confessed,
"The
task
of
the
12th
regiment
is
to
capture
Gelishan
Highland
(30
kilometers
west
of
Haizhou).
The
task
of
the
18th
Regiment
is
to
start
from
the
Wengjin
area
and
attack
northward
with
the
coordination
of
13th
Regiment
(according
to
existing
information,
the
regiment
is
deployed
in
the
Kaesong
area)
to
encircle
Haizhou
Annihilate
the
group
of
northern
army
in
the
city,
and
occupy
Haizhou
within
a
week."
Shtykov
also
reported
the
information
that
Syngman
Rhee
claimed
to
preemptively
"launch
an
attack
on
the
northern
army
in
July".
Two
tactically
important
high
grounds,
and
now
the
two
sides
are
fighting
for
the
high
ground.
Due
to
the
incident
in
the
Wengjin
area,
Syngman
Rhee
issued
an
official
statement
on
June
11
saying
that
"the
surprise
plan
that
will
bring
heavy
losses
to
the
Communists
is
being
formulated.
In
the
next
two
to
three
weeks,
this
plan
will
be
realized."
Machine Translated by Google
 Kim
IlSung
and
other
North
Korean
leaders
have
reluctantly
accepted
Moscow's
advice,
but
have
not
completely
stopped
plans
to
take
military
action.
On
14
October,
fierce
fighting
broke
out
again
near
the
38th
Parallel,
when
the
3rd
Security
Brigade
of
the
Democratic
People's
Republic
of
Korea
attacked
South
Korean
troops
who
had
invaded
the
Fayin
Mountain
Highlands
1.5
kilometers
north
of
the
38th
Parallel,
and
captured
both
highlands
Stalin
was
extremely
dissatisfied
with
the
fact
that
Soviet
ambassadors
and
military
advisers
participated
in
the
discussion
beforehand
and
acquiesced
supported
the
military
action,
but
did
not
report
to
Moscow
afterwards.
Gromyko
severely
accused
Shtykov
of
failing
to
"strictly
and
resolutely"
implement
the
instructions
"prohibiting
to
propose
the
North
Korean
government
to
take
positive
actions
against
South
Korea
without
complicating
instructions"
and
warned
him.
According
to
the
current
Russian
archives,
Stalin
did
not
change
his
policy
towards
the
Korean
peninsula
until
the
end
of
1949.
.
The
above-
mentioned
resolutions
show
that
Moscow's
policy
at
this
time
clearly
hopes
to
achieve
the
goal
of
unifying
the
Korean
peninsula
through
the
people's
struggle
within
South
Korea
instead
of
military
means
by
North
Korea.
Itis
worth
noting
that
in
another
instruction
drafted
by
Bulganin,
Gromyko
and
others,
Shtykov
reminded
Kim
IlSung:
"They
are
far
from
making
full
use
of
all
possibilities
for
peaceful
reunification
of
the
country.
Such
an
important
and
politically
beneficial
document
as
the
Declaration
of
the
Fatherland
Front
on
the
peaceful
reunification
of
the
country."
This
further
proves
that
the
main
consideration
of
the
Soviet
leaders
is
to
resolve
the
Korean
issue
through
peaceful
means.
On
September
24,
the
Politburo
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
discussed
the
situation
in
North
Korea
and
made
a
resolution,
instructing
Shtykov
to
declare
Kim
Il-
sung
and
Park
Hyun-
young
in
strict
accordance
with
the
text
of
resolution:
“Due
to
the
current
North
Korean
armed
forces
Compared
with
South
Korea,
itdoes
not
have
the
necessary
advantage,
so
itcannot
but
be
admitted
that
the
attack
on
South
is
totally
unprepared
and
therefore
itis
not
allowed
from
the
military
point
of
view.”
Since
the
guerrilla
movement
and
mass
struggle
in
the
South
have
not
been
actively
carried
out
Up
to
now,
very
little
work
has
been
done
to
establish
liberated
areas
and
organize
people's
uprisings.
"From
a
political
point
of
view,
the
attack
on
south
you
propose
is
not
well
prepared."
In
addition,
the
partial
campaign
to
attack
the
Ongjin
Peninsula
and
occupy
the
Kaesong
area
would
mean
"the
beginning
of
the
Korean
Civil
War",
and
the
protracted
war
"may
provide
an
excuse
for
the
Americans
to
intervene
in
Korean
affairs
in
various
ways",
so,
"at
present
The
task
of
striving
for
the
reunification
of
Korea
requires
the
concentration
of
greatest
forces:
first,
to
carry
out
guerrilla
campaigns,
establish
liberated
areas,
and
prepare
a
popular
uprising
in
Korea
in
order
to
overthrow
the
reactionary
regime
and
successfully
solve
the
entire
task
of
reunification
of
Korea;
second,
to
further
strengthen
the
People's
Army
with
all
its
strength."
Itshould
be
said
that
the
development
of
entire
Asian
situation
at
that
time
was
very
beneficial
to
the
Soviet
Union’s
policy
of
confrontation
with
the
United
States:
the
Chinese
revolution
had
successfully
won
a
fundamental
victory
without
American
intervention;
the
army
had
withdrawn
from
the
Korean
peninsula;
The
people
showed
high
revolutionary
sentiments;
the
economy
and
politics
within
Korean
society
were
in
an
extremely
unstable
state
and
so
on.
Still,
Stalin
refused
to
take
military
action
on
the
Korean
peninsula.
Ambassador
Shtykov,
however,
sees
things
differently.
He
expressed
his
approval
of
Kim
IlSung's
plan
in
a
long
telegram
to
Stalin
on
September
15.
Shtykov
first
emphasized
the
basic
idea
of
the
North
Korean
leaders,
that
is,
under
the
situation
that
Korean
people
demand
reunification
and
itis
impossible
to
use
peaceful
means
to
reunify
the
motherland,
"if
reunification
is
not
carried
out
by
military
means
now,
then
the
reunification
issue
will
be
delayed
for
a
long
time."
2019",
the
South
Korean
reactionaries
will
use
this
opportunity
to
"suppress
the
democratic
movement
in
the
south"
and
"build
up
a
stronger
army
to
attack
the
north
of
Korea"
and
"destroy
everything
that
the
north
has
built
in
these
years."
Shtykov
gave
a
detailed
introduction
to
the
economic
and
political
situation
in
North
and
South
Korea.
He
believed
that
"the
political
status
of
the
South
Korean
government
is
not
firm"
and
that
the
situation
on
Korean
peninsula
is
favorable
to
the
North,
although
itis
not
ruled
out
that
"the
Americans
will
intervene
in
this
Conflict
and
provide
active
assistance
to
South
Korea",
while
the
number
of
the
People's
Army
and
the
material
power
itpossesses
cannot
guarantee
the
complete
crushing
of
the
Southern
Army
and
the
occupation
of
South
Korea.
All
kinds
of
support
and
leadership
are
possible
and
appropriate",
under
favorable
circumstances
"can
take
advantage
of
the
provocations
of
the
South
Koreans
on
the
38th
Parallel
and,
as
punishment
for
their
breach
of
the
38th
Parallel,
occupy
the
Ongjin
Peninsula
and
the
Kaesong
area".
The
telegram
also
included
detailed
materials
on
the
military
power
balance
between
North
and
South
Korea.
And
counting
on
"organizing
a
series
of
uprisings
in
South
Korea"
when
the
northern
army
enters
South
Korea,
ifitgoes
well,
"you
can
continue
to
advance
the
south."
Kim
Il-
sung
and
Park
Hyun-
yong
also
believe
that
the
United
States
will
not
directly
intervene
with
troops
when
acivil
war
breaks
out
in
North
Korea.
Dunkin
himself
has
adifferent
opinion.
He
believes
that
the
local
campaign
planned
by
Kim
IlSung
can
and
will
definitely
lead
to
civil
war
between
North
and
South
Korea
"A
protracted
civil
war
is
unfavorable
to
the
North
both
militarily
and
politically,"
so
he
concluded
that
"it
is
inappropriate
to
launch
the
localized
campaign
envisioned
by
Kim
IlSung."
.
Machine Translated by Google
On
January
19,
after
Stalin
agreed
to
a
new
treaty
with
China,
Shtykov
reported
to
Moscow
that
on
January
17
the
North
Korean
Foreign
Ministry
held
a
small-
scale
After
the
luncheon,
Kim
Il-
sung
excitedly
told
Ignatiev
and
Pelishenko,
the
counselors
of
Soviet
embassy:
after
completing
the
cause
of
liberation
in
China,
the
next
question
is
How
to
liberate
the
people
in
the
south
of
motherland
now.
He
said:
"People
in
southern
Korea
trust
me
and
count
on
our
armed
forces.
Guerrillas
cannot
solve
problems.
People
in
the
south
know
that
we
have
a
good
army.
Recently
Ihave
been
awake
at
night
thinking
about
how
to
solve
the
problem
of
unifying
the
whole
country.
Ifthe
liberation
of
the
people
in
the
south
of
Korea
and
the
reunification
of
the
motherland
are
delayed,
then
Iwill
lose
the
trust
of
Korean
people."
Kim
IlSung
also
said
that
when
he
was
in
Moscow,
Comrade
Stalin
told
him
that
there
was
no
need
to
attack
the
south.
In
the
case
of
North,
itis
possible
to
counterattack
South
Korea.
However,
Syngman
Rhee
has
not
launched
an
offensive,
which
means
that
the
liberation
of
the
people
in
the
south
of
motherland
and
the
reunification
of
the
country
are
being
delayed.
He
believes
that
itis
necessary
to
meet
Stalin
again
and
get
an
opinion
on
the
issue
of
the
offensive
actions
taken
by
the
People's
Army
to
liberate
the
people
of
South
Korea.
instruction
and
approval.
Fearing
another
reprimand
from
Moscow,
Ignatiev
and
Pelishenko
dodged
the
questions.
Therefore,
Kim
IlSung
approached
Ambassador
Shtykov
and
asked
him
to
"meet
with
Stalin
to
discuss
the
situation
in
the
south
and
issue
of
launching
an
attack
on
Syngman
Rhee's
army",
because
"the
People's
Army
is
much
stronger
than
Syngman
Rhee's
army
now."
".
Kim
IlSung
also
said
that
ifhe
could
not
meet
with
Stalin,
then
he
would
like
to
go
In
the
early
months
of
1950,
Stalin
fundamentally
changed
Soviet
policy
toward
the
Korean
peninsula.
2.
Motivation
for
Decision-
Making:
Soviet
Goals
in
Korea
Itcan
beseen
that
on
the
issue
of
the
Korean
Peninsula,
Stalin's
real
considerations
were
not
what
he
expressed.
When
itcomes
to
Stalin’s
motivation
for
changing
his
decision,
as
mentioned
above,
since
the
ultimate
goal
of
the
Soviet
Union’s
foreign
policy
is
to
ensure
its
own
national
security
interests,
the
reasons
for
Stalin’s
move
should
be
analyzed
based
on
the
Soviet
Union’s
need
to
realize
its
strategic
goals
in
the
Far
East .
Nor
was
Pyongyang's
readiness
for
military
action
a
motive
for
Stalin's
decision.
In
fact,
when
Stalin
changed
his
mind
in
early
1950,
the
preparatory
work
required
by
the
Politburo
meeting
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks)
on
September
24,
1949,
such
as
the
establishment
of
liberated
areas
and
the
development
of
guerrilla
movements,
etc.,
was
not
strengthened,
but
weakened
even
more .
Whether
the
United
States
will
intervene
in
the
Korean
conflict
certainly
plays
a
very
important
role
in
Stalin's
decision-
making
considerations,
but
logically
speaking,
Stalin
decided
not
to
launch
a
war
on
the
Korean
peninsula
because
the
United
States
would
not
interfere.
This
motivation
is
based
on
the
fact
that
United
States
will
not
interfere
as
anecessary
condition
for
its
realization.
Otherwise,
Moscow
would
not
have
to
take
military
action
in
this
part
of
the
Korean
Peninsula.
As
will
be
discussed
below,
even
after
Stalin
tended
to
accept
the
assumption
that
United
States
would
not
intervene
and
agreed
to
Kim
Il-
sung's
military
actions,
he
was
careful
not
to
give
excuses
for
American
intervention.
Thus,
Stalin's
concern
about
a
possible
American
response
was
largely
tactical
rather
than
strategic.
The
decision-
making
premise
mentioned
in
this
book
refers
to
the
international
background
in
which
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
entered
a
state
of
confrontation
in
1949
and
the
regional
background
in
which
the
Korean
Peninsula
has
entered
a
state
of
war.
So,
in
this
context,
why
did
Stalin
not
agree
to
solve
the
problem
of
reunification
of
the
Korean
peninsula
by
military
means?
Judging
from
the
Russian
archives
cited
above,
Stalin
expressed
two
worries:
one
is
that
the
United
States
may
be
involved
in
the
Korean
conflict,
and
the
other
is
that
Pyongyang
is
not
yet
fully
prepared.
But
none
of
these
can
explain
the
root
cause
of
Stalin's
decision-
making,
or
in
other
words,
these
are
not
the
motives
for
decision-
making,
but
only
the
conditions
to
ensure
the
implementation
of
the
decision-
making.
This
involves
a
question
that
is
currently
doubtful
in
the
historian
circles,
that
is,
whether
Kim
IlSung
had
secret
talks
with
Stalin
at
the
end
of
1949,
and
what
was
the
content
of
talks.
According
to
Khrushchev's
recollection,
Kim
IlSung
came
to
Moscow
at
the
end
of
1949
and
demanded
"to
solve
the
South
Korean
problem
by
force."
Jia
Picai
also
said
in
an
interview
with
Goncharov
and
others
on
April
3,
1992
that
Kim
IlSung
was
inspired
by
the
victory
of
Chinese
revolution
and
came
to
Moscow
with
an
offensive
plan
in
November-
December
1949.
However,
according
to
another
unnamed
senior
Russian
diplomat
who
was
interviewed
by
the
scholar,
he
has
searched
through
Russian
archives
and
found
no
relevant
materials
in
this
regard.
Goncharov
and
others
believe
that
"it
is
very
likely
that
the
frequent
correspondence
between
Moscow
and
Pyongyang
during
this
period
was
mistaken
for
the
talks
between
Stalin
and
Kim
IlSung."
Taking
astep
back,
even
ifsuch
avisit
existed,
itdoes
not
mean
that
Stalin
had
changed
his
policy
at
the
end
of
1949,
because
from
the
recollections
of
Khrushchev
and
Jia
Picai,
Stalin
did
not
agree
with
Kim
IlSung's
proposal
to
take
military
action.
Machine Translated by Google
The
most
significant
event
that
occurred
in
Asia
during
this
period
was
the
Chinese
Communist
Party’s
control
of
the
national
power,
and
the
signing
of
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship,
Alliance
and
Mutual
Assistance
after
the
talks
between
Stalin
and
Mao
Zedong,
which
formed
the
Sino-
Soviet
alliance.
However,
the
victory
of
Chinese
revolution
and
the
establishment
of
Sino-
Soviet
alliance
played
an
important
role
in
Stalin’s
changes
in
the
policy
of
the
Korean
Peninsula
and
the
Far
East,
not
entirely
because
the
Soviet
Union
felt
that
its
power
in
the
Far
East
had
been
strengthened,
as
some
scholars
believed.
Confront
and
fight
the
United
States
on
the
Korean
peninsula
So,
what
happened
in
this
short
period
of
one
month
that
made
Stalin
suddenly
change
his
mind?
Regarding
the
specific
content
of
the
secret
talks
between
Stalin
and
Kim
IlSung,
no
relevant
documents
have
been
found
in
the
Russian
archives,
and
the
statements
that
appear
in
research
works
are
all
citing
the
memories
of
the
parties
involved.
However,
the
"Background
Report
on
the
Korean
War"
submitted
by
the
Soviet
Foreign
Ministry
to
Brezhnev
and
other
leaders
on
August
9,
1966
admitted
that
Stalin's
"final
approval
of
the
program
proposed
by
the
Koreans
was
in
1950
Kim
Il-
sung's
visit
to
Moscow
from
March
to
April,"
itcan
therefore
be
concluded
that
Stalin's
decision
to
change
his
policy
on
the
Korean
peninsula
was
made
in
January
1950
and
finalized
in
April.
On
March
20,
Kim
Il-
sung
requested
an
unofficial
visit
to
Moscow
in
early
April,
and
proposed
to
discuss
with
Stalin
"ways
and
methods
for
the
unification
of
the
north
and
south
of
the
country"
and
"economic
development
prospects".
After
obtaining
Moscow's
consent,
Shtykov
reported
on
March
24
that
he
had
made
specific
arrangements
for
Kim
IlSung's
trip
to
Moscow.
On
March
29,
Vyshinsky
reported
to
Stalin,
"Kim
IlSung
and
North
Korean
Foreign
Minister
Pak
Hyun-
yong
will
leave
Pyongyang
for
Moscow
on
March
30,
accompanied
by
General
Shtykov,
the
Soviet
ambassador
to
North
Korea.
Arrive
in
Moscow."
On
March
9,
"In
order
to
supplement
the
equipment
of
People's
Army,
the
Democratic
People's
Republic
of
Korea
requested
the
Soviet
government
to
provide
North
Korea
with
120-130
million
rubles
of
military
technical
equipment
in
1950
according
to
the
application
form
previously
submitted
to
the
Soviet
government,"
and
North
Korea
responded
accordingly.
Guaranteed
supplies
of
gold,
silver
and
molybdenum
concentrates
worth
133
million
rubles
to
the
USSR.
On
March
18,
Stalin
telegraphed
back
that
the
"Soviet
government
had
decided
to
fully
comply"
with
this
request.
Kim
IlSung
was
very
excited
about
Stalin's
reply
and
said
that
he
would
immediately
prepare
to
visit
Moscow.
Kim
IlSung
also
proposed
the
formation
of
three
more
infantry
divisions
in
order
to
increase
the
total
army
to
ten
divisions,
and
requested
that
the
loan
to
be
provided
by
the
Soviet
government
in
1951
be
used
in
1950
to
purchase
Soviet
equipment
for
the
planned
three
infantry
divisions
In
this
regard,
Moscow
immediately
replied
that
itfully
met
Kim
IlSung's
request
and
began
to
provide
weapons
and
equipment
to
North
Korea
on
a
large
scale.
At
the
same
time,
in
order
to
strengthen
the
organizational
and
command
capabilities
of
the
Korean
People's
Army,
Moscow
also
appointed
Lieutenant
General
Vasiliyev
(Vasiliyev)
General
Military
Advisor
of
the
Korean
People's
Army
-since
the
Soviet
Union
withdrew
from
North
Korea,
this
post
was
concurrently
held
by
the
Soviet
ambassador
. .
In
the
archival
materials
seen
so
far,
this
is
the
first
time
that
Stalin
indicated
that
he
agreed
to
give
the
green
light
to
Kim
Il-
sung's
military
plan.
Therefore,
this
document
can
prove
that
the
Soviet
Union
had
begun
to
change
its
previous
policy
towards
North
Korea
in
the
early
1950s.
After
that,
things
went
on
smoothly
according
to
Stalin's
changed
course.
Iunderstand
Comrade
Kim
IlSung's
dissatisfaction,
but
he
should
understand
that
he
needs
to
be
fully
prepared
to
take
such
a
major
move
against
South
Korea.
The
thing
had
to
be
well
organized
and
not
take
too
many
risks.
Ifhe
wants
to
talk
me
about
it,
Iam
always
ready
to
see
him
and
talk
to
him.
Please
pass
this
on
to
Kim
IlSung
and
tell
him
that
Iam
ready
to
help
him
in
this
matter.
Surprisingly,
Stalin
changed
his
attitude
after
hearing
this
report.
On
January
30,
after
Stalin
was
forced
to
accept
the
Chinese
draft
of
the
Changchun
Railway
and
the
Lushun
and
Dalian
Agreements,
Stalin
took
a
new
stand
on
the
Korean
question.
He
himself
called
back
and
said:
Meet
Mao
Zedong.
Kim
IlSung
even
asked
Shtykov,
"Why
is
he
not
allowed
to
attack
the
Wengjin
Peninsula?
Originally,
the
People's
Army
could
take
the
Wengjin
Peninsula
within
three
days.
into
Seoul".
Shtykov
reported
to
Moscow
that
Kim
IlSung
said
these
words
while
drunk,
but
"he
said
these
words
not
by
accident,
but
premeditated,
the
purpose
is
to
express
his
thoughts
and
test
our
understanding
of
these
words.
attitude
to
the
problem".
During
the
conversation,
Shtykov
still
insisted
on
answering
Kim
IlSung
in
the
spirit
of
September
24
meeting
of
the
Political
Bureau
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
the
Soviet
Union
(Bolsheviks).
Machine Translated by Google
(1)
The
Soviet
Army
must
occupy
North
Korea
beyond
the
38th
parallel
for
the
same
period
of
time
as
the
U.S.
Army
occupied
the
rest
of
Korea.
Insisting
on
the
desirability
of
keeping
the
Jeju
peninsula
in
Chinese-
controlled
territory
could
prompt
Chinese
interest
in
strengthening
the
strategic
position
of
the
Sino-
Soviet
naval
base
at
Port
Arthur.
Assuming
that
the
occupation
system
ends
in
two
years,
North
Korea
will
surely
become
a
trust
area
of
the
four
countries,
and
the
three
strategic
areas
of
Pusan,
Jeju
Island
and
Incheon
must
be
controlled
by
the
Soviet
military
commander.
By
insisting
on
the
allocation
of
these
strategic
areas
to
the
Soviet
Union,
we
can
put
pressure
on
the
position
of
the
United
States
by
exploiting
the
desire
of
United
States
to
acquire
strategic
areas
in
the
Pacific.
Ifthe
proposal
to
give
these
strategic
areas
of
Korea
to
the
Soviet
Union
is
opposed,
itmay
be
proposed
that
the
Soviet
Union
and
China
control
jointly
these
strategic
areas.
In
determining
the
future
borders
of
Japan
and
North
Korea,
itis
imperative
to
propose
that
Tsushima
be
assigned
to
North
Korea
on
the
grounds
that
Tsushima
has
historically
been
a
base
for
Japanese
aggression
against
mainland
countries,
especially
North
Korea.
The
Soviet
Union
paid
special
attention
to
several
strategic
locations
in
the
southern
part
of
the
Korean
peninsula,
and
linked
these
strategic
locations
with
China's
Lushun
Port.
A
September
1945
report
in
the
archives
of
Russian
Foreign
Ministry,
entitled
"Opinions
on
the
Question
of
Former
Japanese
Colonies
and
Mandates,"
stated:
Of
course,
itis
an
inference
that
Stalin
thought
of
the
North
Korean
issue
at
this
time,
but
itis
not
unfounded,
because
the
Soviet
Union
had
already
noticed
the
importance
of
the
strategic
position
of
the
Korean
Peninsula
to
the
security
of
Soviet
Far
East
as
early
the
post-
war
period
On
June
29,
1945,
the
report
of
the
Second
Far
Eastern
Department
of
the
Soviet
Foreign
Ministry
pointed
out
the
far-
reaching
significance
of
resolving
the
Korean
issue:
"Russia's
struggle
against
Japan's
expansion
to
the
Asian
continent
through
North
Korea
is
historically
a
action";
just
"Japan
must
be
permanently
expelled
from
Korea,
because
Korea
under
Japanese
rule
will
pose
a
constant
threat
to
the
Far
East
.of
the
Soviet
Union";
"Korea's
independence
must
be
sufficient
to
effectively
prevent
North
Korea
from
becoming
a
Whether
the
aggression
came
from
Japan
or
any
other
country
trying
to
put
pressure
on
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
Far
East".
This
report
clearly
stated
that
although
the
Soviet
Union
did
not
propose
to
control
the
Korean
Peninsula
alone
at
that
time,
and
still
regarded
Japan
as
the
main
threat,
Soviet
government
attached
great
importance
to
the
competition
between
major
powers
in
Northeast
Asia,
especially
to
prevent
North
Korea
from
being
used
as
a
threat
to
Asia.
Springboard
for
continental
expansion.
Stalin
could
have
completely
foreseen
that
a
war
broke
out
on
the
Korean
peninsula,
no
matter
how
itended,
itwould
guarantee
the
strategic
goal
set
by
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
Far
East
o
—
access
to
the
Pacific
Ocean
and
ice-
free
ports.
Because
in
the
case
btaining
of
victory
in
the
war,
Soviet
Union
would
control
the
entire
Korean
peninsula,
and
its
southern
ports,
such
as
Incheon
and
Busan,
could
undoubtedly
replace
Lushun
and
Dalian.
As
early
as
March
1949,
in
order
to
establish
a
direct
railway
link
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
North
Korea,
Stalin
and
Kim
IlSung
agreed
to
build
a
railway
line
connecting
Awudi
(North
Korea)
and
Kraskino
(Soviet
Union).
In
this
way,
although
the
transportation
line
has
been
extended
compared
with
the
Changchun
Railway,
the
Soviet
Railway
can,
after
all,
directly
connect
to
the
two
Pacific
Ocean
outlets
located
south
of
the
38th
Parallel.
Even
ifthe
war
islost,
the
Soviet
Union
can
still
get
what
itwants,
because
the
tense
situation
in
Northeast
Asia
will
force
China
to
ask
the
Soviet
army
to
stay
in
Lushun
and
Dalian.
At
the
same
time,
because
China
and
the
Soviet
Union
agreed
that
once
a
war
situation
arises,
the
Soviet
army
has
the
right
to
use
the
Changchu
Railway.
In
this
way,
the
Changchu
Railway
will
naturally
continue
to
be
under
the
control
of
Soviet
Union.
As
mentioned
above,
to
a
certain
extent,
itcan
be
said
that
Stalin
was
forced
to
agree
sign
the
"Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship,
Alliance
and
Mutual
Assistance",
which
means
that
the
Soviet
Union
will
lose
its
ability
to
pass
the
Yalta
Agreement
and
old
The
main
rights
and
interests
in
the
Far
East
obtained
by
the
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty,
therefore,
ifStalin
wants
to
maintain
the
strategic
goals
of
the
Far
East
set
by
the
Soviet
Union
after
the
war,
he
must
have
other
plans
outside
of
Chinese
territory
to
make
up
for
the
loss
of
power
due
to
the
signing
of
new
Sino-
Soviet
Treaty.
Lost
rights
in
the
Far
East.
Thus,
the
change
of
Moscow's
policy
on
the
Korean
peninsula
came
into
being.
The
grasp
of
victory.
On
the
contrary,
itwas
precisely
because
of
the
change
Chinese
regime
and
the
signing
of
new
Sino-
Soviet
treaty
that
Stalin
felt
the
vested
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
Far
East
would
be
threatened
or
completely
lost,
so
he
needed
to
change
his
policy
to
ensure
the
strategic
goals
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
Far
East
after
the
war
continue
to
exist.
For
Moscow,
the
establishment
of
new
China
may
be
a
double-
edged
sword:
on
the
one
hand,
itexpands
the
Soviet
Union's
security
defense
zone
in
Asia
-which
will
undoubtedly
consolidate
the
Soviet
Union's
rights
and
interests
in
this
region;
Ifitbecomes
stronger,
itmay
pose
a
"threat"
to
the
security
and
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Likewise,
the
signing
of
new
Sino-
Soviet
pact
had
a
double
effect
on
Moscow:
China's
alliance
with
the
Soviet
Union
strengthened
the
Soviet
Union's
political
power
in
Asia,
but
italso
forced
Stalin
to
agree
surrender
much
of
the
political
power
he
had
seized
from
Chiang
Kai-
shek
in
1945.
economic
interests.
Therefore,
itseems
to
be
concluded
that
in
Stalin’s
motivation
for
changing
the
policy
toward
Korean
Peninsula
in
early
1950,
the
key
to
problem
was
consider
maintaining
and
guaranteeing
the
political
and
economic
rights
and
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
Asia,
especially
Northeast
Asia.
Machine Translated by Google
IfStalin
wanted
to
ensure
that
his
decisions
were
implemented,
he
had
to
make
correct
on
judgments
the
responses
from
the
two
most
important
aspects,
and
he
had
to
carefully
consider
and
properly
handle
measures
related
to
these
two
aspects.
These
aspects
are
the
United
States
and
China.
3.
Conditions
for
Decision-
Making:
Positioning
for
U.S.
and
Chinese
Responses
However,
Stalin
was
even
more
of
a
Great
Russiaist,
and
his
consideration
of
personal
reputation
should
be
secondary
to
national
interests.
Therefore,
itwas
precisely
out
of
the
motive
of
safeguarding
the
strategic
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
Far
East
that
Stalin
determined
the
policy
of
taking
military
action
on
the
Korean
Peninsula.
Of
course,
to
implement
this
policy,
there
are
other
guarantees
that
cannot
be
ignored.
Of
course,
as
the
center
of
world
communist
movement,
as
the
leader
of
the
world
revolution,
Stalin
may
also
consider
his
reputation.
Moscow
could
not
stop
the
revolutionary
demands
of
Asian
countries
again
and
again,
especially
after
the
facts
proved
that
Soviet
Union
had
made
mistakes
in
the
Chinese
revolution,
and
Stalin
obviously
did
not
want
to
be
criticized
again
on
the
Korean
revolution.
Itshould
also
be
pointed
out
here
that
the
use
of
"exchanging"
spheres
of
influence
in
foreign
policy
has
atradition
in
Russian
history.
After
the
failure
of
Russo-
Japanese
War
in
1905,
Tsarist
Russia
adjusted
its
Far
East
policy,
planned
the
independence
of
Outer
Mongolia,
reached
a
compromise
with
Japan,
and
implemented
a
plan
of
"exchanging"
Mongolia
with
North
Korea".
Itis
not
without
precedent
that
Stalin
used
the
exchange
of
spheres
influence
or
territories
of
occupied
countries
with
the
West
to
ensure
national
security
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union.
The
Korean
peninsula
in
the
Far
East
has
also
been
tried.
As
mentioned
earlier,
on
the
issue
of
dividing
the
38th
parallel,
Stalin
tried
to
exchange
the
US
occupation
of
the
southern
territory
Korean
peninsula
in
exchange
for
the
Soviet
Union’s
occupation
of
part
the
Japanese
mainland
north
of
the
38th
parallel.
Although
the
Soviet
Union's
plan
could
not
be
realized
due
to
the
tough
stand
of
United
States,
Stalin's
means
and
intentions
to
achieve
his
foreign
strategic
goals
by
exchanging
spheres
of
influence
are
obvious.
Itcan
beseen
that,
in
the
Soviet
Union's
consideration
of
the
Far
East
policy
after
the
war,
Korean
Peninsula
originally
occupied
a
special
and
important
position,
only
because
the
Soviet
Union
had
basically
realized
its
goal
in
the
Far
East
through
the
"Sino-
Soviet
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Alliance"
signed
with
the
Chiang
Kai-
shek
government
at
that
time.
On
the
Korean
peninsula,
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
had
already
agreed
on
the
38th
parallel.
Later,
when
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
confronted
each
other,
Stalin
focused
his
attention
on
Europe.
Ithad
already
parted
ways
with
the
United
States
in
1947,
but
itstill
gave
up
its
request
for
strategic
goals
in
southern
Korea,
and
was
content
to
control
North
Korea
and
make
ita
security
barrier
in
the
Soviet
Far
East.
Before
Mao
Zedong’s
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union,
Stalin’s
original
intention
was
to
maintain
the
original
Sino-
Soviet
treaty,
which
would
naturally
guarantee
the
vested
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
Northeast
Asia,
and
there
was
no
need
to
trigger
another
crisis
in
North
Korea
that
might
lead
to
a
conflict
with
the
United
States.
However,
after
negotiating
with
Mao
Zedong
in
early
1950,
Stalin
felt
that
the
vested
interests
of
the
Soviet
Union
in
this
region
were
about
to
be
lost,
so
control
of
the
strategic
objectives
of
the
Korean
Peninsula
was
of
course
put
on
Moscow's
agenda.
Another
report
in
September
1945
also
proposed
that
when
the
agreement
of
four
major
powers
to
impose
trusteeship
conditions
on
North
Korea
was
concluded,
Pusan,
Jeju
Island,
and
Incheon
must
be
designated
as
strategic
areas
for
allocation
in
accordance
with
Article
82
of
the
UN
Charter.
These
areas
were
very
important
in
ensuring
reliable
sea
traffic
and
access
to
the
Lushun
naval
base,
which
was
shared
by
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
Republic
of
China.
They
had
to
be
under
special
military
control
imposed
by
the
Soviet
government
under
the
terms
of
UN
Charter.
(4)
After
the
occupation
period
ends,
(must)
propose
an
international
trusteeship
regime
for
the
Ogasawara
Islands,
the
Iwo
Jima
Islands,
the
Mariana
Islands,
the
Carolina
Islands,
and
the
Marshall
Islands.
Itcan
support
the
United
States'
demands
on
some
strategic
areas,
provided
that
the
United
States
agrees
to
the
Soviet
Union's
proposal
on
the
Korean
issue.
(3)
After
the
occupation
period
is
over,
(must)
propose
that
the
four
countries
implement
a
common
international
trusteeship
of
the
Ryukyu
Islands,
or
China
alone
trusteeship.
Obviously,
the
United
States
wants
to
establish
its
military
bases
in
the
Ryukyu
Islands.
(2)
Must
support
the
return
of
Taiwan
and
the
Penghu
Islands
to
China.
Machine Translated by Google
 Soon
after,
when
Kim
IlSung
visited
Moscow
in
April
1950,
Stalin
asked
the
same
question
again,
and
this
time
Kim
IlSung
answered
more
firmly.
According
to
Moon
Il,
the
interpreter
who
accompanied
Kim
IlSung
on
the
visit,
Kim
IlSung
raised
four
reasons
during
the
meeting
to
assure
Stalin
that
the
United
States
would
not
participate
in
the
war
on
Korean
Peninsula:
(1)
North
Korea
would
achieve
military
victory
within
three
days;
(2)
200,000
South
Korean
communists
will
stage
an
uprising;
(3)
South
Korean
guerrillas
will
support
the
People's
Army
in
operations;
(4)
the
United
States
will
not
have
time
to
prepare
for
this.
Stalin
apparently
believed
in
Kim
IlSung's
It
judgment.
was
after
this
secret
meeting
that
Stalin
finally
agreed
to
Kim
IlSung's
plan
to
launch
a
military
offensive
against
South
Korea.
IfStalin
had
doubts
about
this
estimate,
he
was
impressed
by
the
US
government's
public
statements
in
early
1950.
Moscow
noted
that
US
Secretary
of
State
Acheson
excluded
South
Korea
when
referring
to
the
scope
of
US
defense
in
the
Far
East
in
his
January
12
speech.
Tkachenko,
the
former
head
of
the
North
Korean
affairs
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
CPSU,
recalled
that
after
Acheson's
speech
at
the
National
Press
Club
spread
to
Moscow,
Stalin
conducted
a
careful
study,
which
had
a
major
impact
on
his
thinking.
In
the
summer
and
autumn
of
1949,
when
tensions
were
on
the
Korean
peninsula,
Stalin
was
so
concerned
about
how
the
United
States
would
respond
that
he
asked
Kim
IlSung
and
the
Soviet
embassy
in
North
Korea
to
make
an
estimate.
At
that
time,
North
Korean
leaders
estimated
that
the
United
States
would
not
directly
engage
in
armed
intervention,
at
most
itwould
send
navy
and
air
force
to
support
or
assist
in
military
command.
Second,
Stalin
gradually
tended
to
accept
such
an
estimate
that
the
United
States
would
not
directly
intervene
in
the
crisis
on
Korean
peninsula.
Based
on
the
logical
analysis
of
Stalin’s
thinking
avoiding
direct
conflict
with
the
United
States
and
avoiding
giving
the
United
States
an
excuse
to
intervene
in
the
North
Korean
issue,
itcan
also
be
concluded
that
Stalin’s
determination
to
take
military
action
in
North
Korea
was
not
mainly
out
of
confrontation
with
the
United
States’
implementation
of
military
operations
in
Japan.
policy
considerations.
Although
the
U.S.
policy
of
occupying
Japan
alone
after
the
war
caused
dissatisfaction
among
major
powers
including
the
Soviet
Union,
and
the
Soviet
Union
also
had
endless
disputes
with
the
U.S.
over
the
control
of
Japan
and
the
peace
treaty
with
Japan,
the
overall
U.S.
policy
in
Asia
1949
was
based
on
Itis
characterized
by
shrinking
forces
and
defense
lines,
while
the
United
States
granted
Japan
an
independent
status
and
legalized
its
military
presence
in
Japan
after
the
outbreak
of
Korean
War.
The
Soviet
Union's
control
of
the
Korean
peninsula
was
of
course
conducive
to
preventing
the
developm
of
Japanese
militarism
to
the
Asian
continent
in
terms
of
its
results,
but
in
terms
of
its
motivatio
Stalin
would
never
intention
stimulat
the
United
States
to
change
its
contrac
policy.
Unless
the
Soviet
Union
was
determ
to
control
the
Korea
penins
as
a
spring
for
attack
Japan
itwould
have
no
practi
signif
to
mak
such
adeci
out
just
of
cons
for
the
Jap
issu
and
atta
Jap
wou
inev
lead
to
a
dire
mili
con
wit
the
Uni
Sta
Co
to
the
est
pol
of
M
C
iSt
hctfS
d
w
ltA
ih
te
hl
As
will
be
mentioned
below,
after
the
outbreak
of
war,
the
actions
of
Soviet
Union
became
more
cautious.
On
June
20,
1950,
when
North
Korea
was
in
full
swing
for
war
preparations,
Shtykov
sent
an
urgent
telegram
to
Moscow,
which
said:
"Comrade
Kim
IlSung
requests
to
convey
that
in
order
to
launch
an
attack
and
land
a
warship
is
needed
ships
have
arrived,
but
the
crews
are
not
yet
ready
for
work,
and
he
requests
that
10
Soviet
advisers
be
sent
on
board.
Ithink
that
such
a
request
should
be
granted.”
But
Gromyko’s
telegram
of
June
22
replied
Instead:
"Your
suggestion
cannot
be
accepted.
Doing
so
would
provide
a
pretext
for
interference."
.Two
Although
Stalin
realized
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
already
in
a
state
of
confrontation
with
the
United
States
in
the
world,
and
that
conflicts
even
wars
were
inevitable,
Stalin,
who
acted
cautiously,
believed
that
the
Soviet
Union
was
not
strong
enough
to
face
this
reality
immediately,
especially
the
Berlin
crisis.
The
result
made
him
feel
that
itwould
be
dangerous
to
take
rash
actions
to
put
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
in
direct
confrontation
without
being
sure
of
defeating
the
other
party.
Therefore,
even
after
agreeing
and
supporting
Kim
Il-
sung's
proposal
to
take
military
action
against
South
Korea,
Stalin
only
conducted
behind-
the-
scenes
command
and
provided
military
assistance,
and
never
allowed
the
Soviet
Union
to
participate
directly,
at
least
not
to
leave
such
an
impression
on
the
Americans.
First,
try
to
avoid
direct
military
conflict
with
the
United
States.
According
to
the
materials
currently
available,
Stalin
had
three
considerations
in
handling
relations
with
the
United
States:
Machine Translated by Google
(1)
As
far
as
the
possibility
of
US
intervention
is
concerned,
the
aid
to
Liberation
of
Taiwan
campaign
is
more
likely
to
put
the
Soviet
Union
in
direct
military
conflict
with
the
US,
because
the
confident
Kim
IlSung
only
needs
Soviet
weapons
and
equipment,
while
Mao
Zedong
crosses
the
sea
Operations
required
the
Soviet
Union
to
provide
air
and
naval
assistance.
Such
assistance
became
even
more
necessary
after
the
People's
Liberation
Army's
failed
attack
on
Kinmen
in
October
1949.
On
January
11,
1950,
Liu
Shaoqi
reported
to
Mao
Zedong,
who
was
visiting
Moscow:
"The
materials
on
the
Zhoushan,
Taiwan,
Kinmen,
and
Hainan
Island
operations
have
all
been
transferred
to
you.
According
Su
Yu's
report,
without
the
assistance
of
air
force
and
some
necessary
naval
assistance
itis
impossible
to
carry
out
amphibious
operations
across
the
sea,
and
recent
reports
on
Hainan
Island
and
Jinmen
also
prove
this
point.”
But
Stalin
worried
that
the
Soviet
Union
would
send
out
the
air
force ,
Second,
at
the
beginning
of
1950,
Stalin
faced
demands
from
two
sides:
Kim
IlSung’s
unification
of
the
Korean
peninsula
needed
the
consent
and
assistance
of
the
Soviet
Union,
and
Mao
Zedong’s
campaign
to
liberate
Taiwan
did
not
require
Moscow’s
approval,
but
he
also
needed
Soviet
military
assistance.
That
is
to
say,
Stalin
had
to
consider
how
to
solve
the
problem
of
the
CCP’s
liberation
of
Taiwan
while
considering
the
issue
of
Korean
reunification.
Comparing
the
two,
Stalin
would
certainly
think
that
itwould
be
more
beneficial
for
the
Soviet
Union
to
resolve
the
North
Korean
issue
first.
The
reason
is
that:
First,
on
the
one
hand,
Stalin
was
unable
and
unwilling
to
let
the
Soviet
Union
fall
into
the
possible
conflict
between
China
and
the
United
States;
on
the
other
hand,
Stalin
needed
China
to
become
an
ally
and
vanguard
of
the
confrontation
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
in
Asia.
In
the
face
of
tensions
in
Northeast
Asia,
Moscow
has
two
fundamental,
interrelated
and
seemingly
contradictory
intentions
in
its
relations
with
Beijing:
However,
in
Stalin's
view,
dealing
with
relations
China
is
more
important
and
more
difficult
than
dealing
with
the
United
States.
According
to
Jia
Picai's
recollection,
in
the
last
meeting
between
Stalin
and
Kim
IlSung
in
April
1950,
he
once
again
urged
Kim
IlSung
to
discuss
with
Mao
Zedong.
The
Soviet
leader
said:
"If
you
encounter
strong
resistance,
Ican't
help
you
at
all.
You
must
ask
Mao
Zedong
for
all
help."
On
May
14,
Stalin
called
Mao
Zedong
directly,
telling
him
that
Moscow
had
"agreed
to
the
proposal
of
the
Koreans
on
the
realization
of
unification",
but
then
added
that
"this
issue
should
ultimately
be
resolved
jointly
by
the
Chinese
and
Korean
comrades."
Ifthe
Chinese
comrades
do
not
agree,
then
the
discussion
on
how
to
solve
this
problem
should
be
re-
discussed".
This
is
obviously
forcing
Mao
Zedong
to
accept
the
fait
accompli,
and
its
fundamental
intention
is
that
in
case
the
United
States
intervenes,
China
will
bear
the
responsibility
of
aiding
North
Korea.
Because
only
in
this
way
can
Stalin
handle
the
relationship
with
the
United
States
with
ease.
Stalin
has
always
been
cautious,
and
of
course
he
would
have
thought
about
how
the
Soviet
Union
would
deal
with
the
United
States
in
case
of
intervention.
Stalin's
countermeasure
is
that
ifthis
happens,
he
hopes
that
China
will
come
out
and
take
responsibility,
that
is,
the
Chinese
military
will
directly
face
the
threat
of
United
States
and
contend
with
it.
Itwas
precisely
because
of
this
consideration
that
when
approving
North
Korea's
military
action,
Stalin
repeatedly
emphasized
that
Mao
Zedong's
opinion
should
be
sought
on
this
issue.
Third,
ifthe
United
States
intervenes,
China
needs
to
stand
up
and
support
the
situation.
This
situation
shows
that
Moscow
estimates
that
once
a
war
breaks
out
on
the
Korean
peninsula,
the
United
States
will
not,
or
at
least
will
not
have
time
for,
direct
military
intervention.
Itwas
precisely
because
of
this
guarantee
that
Stalin
agreed
to
take
military
action
on
the
Korean
peninsula.
In
addition,
Yoo
Songchol,
chief
of
operations
the
Korean
People's
Army,
was
directly
involved
in
the
entire
process
of
formulating
North
Korea's
operational
plan.
In
the
early
1990s,
he
recalled
that
the
Soviet
military
advisory
group
believed
that
North
Korea's
war
plan
was
unfeasible,
so
they
drafted
a
plan
to
conduct
military
exercises
in
response
to
the
invasion
of
the
South.
This
combat
plan
includes
the
marching
routes
and
combat
orders
for
each
unit,
as
well
the
documents
for
coordinated
operations
of
various
services
and
arms.
The
offensive
force
was
divided
into
two
groups.
The
1st
Front
Army
under
the
command
of
Kim
Woong
was
the
main
offensive
force
to
attack
Seoul,
and
the
2nd
Front
Army
under
the
command
of
Moo
Jeong
was
the
flanking
force
to
face
Seoul
from
the
south.
surrounded
by.
In
short,
the
goal
of
plan
is
to
take
Seoul.
At
that
time,
they
believed
as
long
as
the
capital
was
seized,
coupled
with
the
uprising
in
the
south,
military
operations
in
North
Korea
could
be
ended.
Later
facts
showed
that
after
the
Korean
People's
Army
captured
Seoul,
its
military
operations
did
come
to
a
halt
for
a
while.
Machine Translated by Google
In
Mao
Zedong's
briefing,
the
issues
concerning
the
establishment
of
Eastern
Intelligence
Bureau
and
the
assistance
of
North
Korean
army
cadres
and
weapons
were
basically
consistent
with
Kim
IlSung's
briefing,
but
when
itcame
to
the
situation
in
North
Korea,
there
was
a
big
difference.
According
to
this
report,
Mao
Zedong
said
that
ifa
war
breaks
out
in
North
Korea,
China
will
Kim
IlSung's
briefing
stated
that
Mao
Zedong
pointed
out
that
two
of
the
three
Korean
divisions
of
the
Chinese
People's
Liberation
Army
were
stationed
in
Shenyang
and
Changchun,
the
other
was
fighting.
China
is
ready
to
hand
over
the
two
divisions
stationed
in
the
Northeast
together
with
all
the
equipment
to
North
Korean
government
at
any
time.
The
other
division
can
only
return
from
the
south
after
fighting
is
over,
and
itwill
take
at
least
a
month
before
itcan
be
transferred
back.
Regarding
Jin
Yi's
question
about
whether
the
ammunition
needed
by
the
three
divisions
could
be
supported,
Mao
Zedong
replied
that
they
could
manufacture
ammunition,
and
they
could
give
the
North
Korean
side
as
much
as
itneeded.
Mao
Zedong
and
Zhu
De
inquired
about
the
situation
in
North
Korea
in
detail.
Mao
Zedong
said
that
North
Korea
may
take
military
action
at
any
time,
and
Kim
IlSung
should
have
estimated
this
situation
and
made
careful
preparations.
In
North
Korea,
wars
can
be
quick
or
protracted.
Mao
Zedong
said:
"A
protracted
war
is
not
good
for
you,
because
then
Japan
may
get
involved
and
help
the
South
Korean
'government'.
You
don't
have
to
worry:
the
Soviet
Union
is
nearby,
and
we
are
in
the
Northeast.
Ifnecessary,
we
can
quietly
send
you
more
Chinese
The
soldiers
are
all
black-
haired,
and
no
one
can
tell
the
difference."
Regarding
the
Eastern
Intelligence
Bureau,
Mao
Zedong
wondered
whether
this
issue
was
mentioned
during
the
North
Korean
government
delegation's
visit
to
Moscow,
and
what
opinion
does
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Workers'
Party
of
Korea
have
on
this
issue?
Kim
replied
that
he
knew
nothing
about
the
matter.
Mao
Zedong
talked
about
his
views.
He
believed
that
itwas
too
early
to
establish
an
intelligence
bureau,
because
China
and
Indochina
were
at
war,
and
the
situation
in
North
Korea
was
tense.
Ifan
intelligence
bureau
was
established,
itwould
be
regarded
as
the
establishment
of
a
military
alliance.
.
Regarding
this
matter,
there
are
two
documents
in
the
Russian
archives,
one
is
Kim
Il-
sung's
circular
conveyed
by
Shtykov
to
Vyshinsky,
and
the
other
is
Mao
Zedong's
circular
conveyed
by
Kovalev
to
Stalin.
The
situation
reported
in
the
document
is
not
quite
the
same.
At
the
end
of
April
1949,
Kim
IlSung
commissioned
Kim
Il,
director
of
the
Political
Department
of
the
Korean
People's
Army,
to
visit
China
secretly.
Jin
Yi
first
went
to
Shenyang
meet
with
Gao
Gang
and
contacted
the
Central
Committee
of
the
Communist
Party
of
China.
In
Beiping,
Jin
Yi
met
with
Zhu
De
and
Zhou
Enlai
four
times,
and
Mao
Zedong
once,
and
discussed
with
Chinese
leaders
the
transfer
of
North
Korean
division
in
the
formation
of
Chinese
People's
Liberation
Army
to
the
North
Korean
government,
the
situation
in
North
Korea,
and
the
establishment
of
Eastern
Intelligence
Bureau.
As
early
as
May
1949,
Chinese
leaders
such
as
Mao
Zedong
were
aware
of
the
tension
on
Korean
peninsula
and
the
need
for
assistance
in
the
Democratic
People's
Republic
of
Korea.
Mao
Zedong
promised
to
help
Kim
IlSung,
but
did
not
advocate
that
Kim
IlSung
take
the
initiative
to
take
military
action.
The
materials
we
have
so
far
show
that:
First,
when
the
new
China
was
not
stable,
Mao
Zedong
did
not
want
tension
and
a
state
of
war
on
the
northeastern
border
of
China.
Secondly,
Stalin
was
very
clear
about
this
attitude
towards
Chinese
leaders.
So,
did
Mao
Zedong
understand
and
support
Kim
IlSung's
plan
to
unify
the
Korean
nation?
Does
China's
position
on
the
Korean
Peninsula
conflict
with
that
of
the
Soviet
Union?
Did
Stalin
know
Mao
Zedong's
attitude
on
North
Korea?
This
is
the
question
to
be
answered
in
the
study,
and
itis
aprerequisite
for
understanding
Stalin's
approach
to
dealing
with
Beijing's
relationship
with
impending
military
action
on
the
Korean
peninsula.
Therefore,
first
of
all,
itis
necessary
to
fully
complete
the
military
operations
on
the
Korean
peninsula,
and
at
the
same
time
make
Mao
Zedong’s
actions
conform
to
the
needs
of
the
Soviet
Union
to
achieve
its
strategic
goals
as
much
as
possible.
This
should
be
Stalin’s
basic
consideration
in
resolving
the
contradictions
between
Moscow
and
Beijing
when
making
decisions.
In
fact,
the
result
of
the
outbreak
Korean
War
did
play
such
a
role:
on
the
one
hand,
itprevented
Mao
Zedong
from
launching
a
campaign
to
liberate
Taiwan,
and
on
the
other
hand,
itbrought
China's
power
and
actions
into
the
strategic
track
of
Soviet
Union.
(3)
As
far
as
the
Soviet
Union's
strategic
interests
in
Asia
were
concerned,
Kim
IlSung's
unification
of
the
Korean
Peninsula
was
of
course
in
line
with
Stalin's
strategic
goals
and
interests
in
Northeast
Asia
at
this
time.
However,
after
New
China
strengthened
its
position
in
Asia
through
the
Liberation
of
Taiwan
campaign,
itis
uncertain
how
Mao
Zedong
would
act
against
Stalin.
Maybe
China
would
pose
a
potential
threat
to
the
Soviet
Union
in
the
future.
(2)
As
far
as
the
relationship
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
Pyongyang
and
Beijing
is
concerned,
North
Korea
developed
entirely
with
the
support
and
assistance
of
the
Soviet
Union,
so
North
Korea's
behavior
can
be
under
Moscow's
control.
Although
the
Soviet
Union
formed
an
alliance
with
China,
Stalin
did
not
trust
Mao
Zedong
and
was
not
at
ease.
Itwill
cause
the
United
States
to
intervene,
which
he
made
very
clear
when
he
talked
with
Liu
Shaoqi
and
Mao
Zedong.
Machine Translated by Google
The
above
situation
can
show
that
the
return
of
the
North
Korean
soldiers
in
the
Chinese
army
was
not
because
the
Chinese
leaders
approved
and
supported
the
unification
of
the
Korean
peninsula
by
military
means
at
that
time.
In
1949,
the
North
Korean
division
returned
to
China
because
Mao
Zedong
worried
that
North
Korea
would
be
attacked
by
the
South,
so
he
never
The
question
of
another
North
Korean
division's
return
was
raised
in
early
January
1950.
At
that
time,
Lin
Biao
sent
a
telegram
to
Mao
Zedong,
who
was
visiting
Moscow,
saying
that
there
were
more
than
16,000
North
Koreans
in
the
People's
Liberation
Army.
As
the
war
was
coming
to
an
end,
Lin
Biao
hoped
to
combine
them
into
one
division
or
4-5
regiments
and
send
them
back
home.
Subsequently,
the
Chinese
government
notified
Kim
IlSung:
"Due
to
the
end
of
combat
operations,
the
existing
Korean
troops
in
the
Chinese
People's
Army
are
gradually
being
idled.
Ifthe
North
Korean
government
is
willing,
they
can
be
handed
over."
The
existing
North
Koreans
formed
an
infantry
division
in
China
according
to
the
establishment
of
North
Korean
division,
with
two
regiments
under
it,
and
the
rest
of
the
officers
and
soldiers
were
used
to
supplement
the
motorcycle
regiment
and
the
mechanized
brigade,
and
Kim
Kwanghyeb,
chief
of
operations
the
People's
Army,
was
sent
to
China
for
negotiations
this
matter.
It's
that
the
just
North
Korean
government
hopes
that
these
troops
will
return
to
the
country
after
April
because
of
difficulties
in
stationing
North
Korea.
Finally,
this
force
reached
Wonsan
on
18
April.
After
the
talks
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Jin
Yi,
he
instructed
Gaogang
in
the
northeast
to
prepare
arrange
for
the
two
North
Korean
divisions
stationed
in
Shenyang
and
Changchun
to
return
China
in
July-
August
1949.
These
two
divisions,
the
164th
Division
commanded
by
Li
Deshan
and
the
166th
Division
commanded
by
Fang
Hushan,
were
both
part
of
the
Northeast
Military
Region
at
that
time
and
entered
North
Korea
in
July
1949.
When
returning
home,
there
were
10,821
real
members
of
the
164th
Division
and
10,320
real
members
of
the
166th
Division.
The
massive
return
of
ethnic
Korean
troops
came
after
Kim
Il's
talks
with
Chinese
leaders.
Regarding
the
number
and
timing
of
returning
to
China,
past
studies
have
given
different
opinions.
Judgment
can
be
made
based
on
the
archives
and
memories
of
the
parties
involved:
after
the
meeting
between
Mao
Zedong
and
Jin
Yi
in
May
1949,
a
total
of
about
37,000
Korean
officers
and
soldiers
from
three
divisions
returned
to
North
Korea
in
July
1949
and
April
1950
respectively.
In
fact,
there
are
historical
roots
in
the
return
of
Korean
officers
and
soldiers
in
the
Chinese
army.
During
the
War
of
Resistance
Against
Japan
and
the
War
of
Liberation,
many
Koreans
entered
Northeast
China
and
the
Chinese
joined
Communist
Army.
As
early
as
the
end
of
Anti-
Japanese
War,
Wu
Ting
led
a
regiment
of
1,000
Korean
soldiers
back
to
North
Korea.
During
the
Chinese
Civil
War,
North
Korean
soldiers
returned
home
one
after
another.
So,
does
China's
transfer
of
Korean
troops
in
the
People's
Liberation
Army
to
North
Korea
prove
its
support
for
military
action
on
the
Korean
peninsula?
Some
scholars
in
the
past
believed
that
the
transfer
of
some
North
Korean
troops
who
had
been
part
of
the
People's
Liberation
Army
to
the
North
Korean
army
was
strong
evidence
of
the
so-
called
"collusion"
theory.
This
claim
is
unfounded.
In
short,
the
reality
was
that
Mao
Zedong
was
not
in
favor
of
military
action
in
Korea
in
the
spring
of
1949,
at
least
not
until
after
the
Chinese
Civil
War
had
ended,
and
the
matter
was
to
be
discussed
with
Moscow.
Itcan
beseen
from
these
two
notifications
that
Mao
Zedong
was
worried
that
North
Korea
would
be
attacked
by
the
South.
However,
in
Kim
IlSung's
briefing,
itwas
not
mentioned
that
Mao
Zedong
was
opposed
to
taking
the
initiative
to
attack,
while
in
the
Chinese
briefing
Mao
Zedong
clearly
advised
Kim
IlSung
not
to
take
the
initiative
to
attack.
As
for
which
report
is
more
accurate,
you
can
refer
to
what
was
said
at
the
meeting
between
Kim
IlSung
and
Don
Kim
on
September
12,
1949.
According
to
the
Dunkin
report,
when
Kim
Il-
sung
talked
about
the
military
situation
on
the
Korean
peninsula,
he
mentioned
that
"this
spring,
when
Mao
Zedong
talked
with
North
Korean
representative
Kim
Il,
Mao
Zedong
once
said
that
according
to
his
opinion,
the
North
should
not
take
military
action
now
because
First,
itis
politically
unfavorable;
second,
Chinese
friends
are
busy
with
their
own
domestic
affairs
and
will
not
give
them
strong
help.”
Apparently,
what
Kim
IlSung
later
said
was
consistent
with
Mao
Zedong's
briefing.
In
their
research,
Torkunov
and
Ulmtsev
have
paid
attention
to
the
difference
between
the
two
notifications
from
China
and
North
Korea.
They
believe
that
this
shows
the
delicate
relationship
between
China,
North
Korea
and
the
Soviet
Union.
The
United
States
will
provide
everything
within
its
capacity,
especially
the
supplies
and
weapons
of
the
above-
mentioned
divisions.
When
Kim
Ilsaid
that
after
the
U.S.
troops
withdrew
from
South
Korea,
the
South
might
attack
North
Korea
with
the
help
of
the
Japanese,
Mao
Zedong
advised
them
to
counterattack,
but
they
should
be
cautious
ifJapanese
troops
were
involved.
Mao
Zedong
also
said
that
there
may
be
a
situation
where
the
enemy
has
the
upper
hand,
and
advised
them
to
make
the
party,
army
and
the
people
mentally
prepared
for
this.
Mao
Zedong
also
pointed
out:
"If
the
Americans
leave
and
the
Japanese
do
not
come,
in
this
case,
we
advise
the
North
Korean
comrades
not
to
launch
an
attack
on
South
Korea,
but
to
wait
for
amore
favorable
situation,
because
in
the
course
of
this
attack,
MacArthur
was
able
to
quickly
transfer
Japanese
troops
and
weapons
to
North
Korea,
but
itwas
impossible
for
us
to
give
strong
support
quickly,
because
all
our
main
forces
had
gone
south
of
the
Yangtze
River."
"When
the
Japanese
army
invaded
North
Korea,
we
could
quickly
send
own
elite
troops
to
destroy
the
Japanese
army.”
But
Mao
added:
“All
these
steps
will
only
be
taken
in
coordination
with
Moscow.”
Machine Translated by Google
Only
then
did
Stalin
indicate
to
Chinese
leaders
for
the
first
time
that
attitude
of
the
Soviet
Union
on
this
issue
had
changed.
On
May
14,
Vyshinsky
forwarded
Stalin's
telegram
to
Mao
Zedong:
"During
the
talks
with
Korean
comrades,
Comrade
Filipov
and
his
friends
proposed
that,
in
view
of
the
changed
international
situation,
they
agreed
with
the
Koreans
on
the
realization
of
unification.
At
the
same
time,
Iwould
like
to
add
that
this
issue
must
ultimately
be
resolved
by
the
Chinese
and
North
Korean
comrades.
Ifthe
Chinese
comrades
disagree,
they
should
re-
discuss
how
to
resolve
this
issue.
Kim
IlSung
and
his
party
flew
to
Beijing
on
May
13
and
held
talks
with
Chinese
leaders
that
night.
No
information
about
the
content
of
talks
has
been
found
so
far,
but
according
to
Roshin's
report
to
Moscow,
the
first
talks
did
not
go
well,
and
the
talks
were
interrupted
on
the
night
of
the
start.
Luo
Shen
said
in
the
telegram:
Zhou
En
came
to
the
Soviet
embassy
at
23:30
on
the
evening
of
13th
and
requested
to
immediately
report
to
Stalin
the
matter
"commanded
by
Mao
Zedong":
"Comrade
North
Korea
informed
Comrade
Filipov
of
the
following
instructions:
current
situation
Unlike
in
the
past,
North
Korea
can
start
to
act;
but
this
issue
must
be
discussed
with
Chinese
comrades
and
Mao
Zedong
himself."
"Comrade
Mao
Zedong
wants
to
get
Comrade
Filipov's
own
explanation
on
this
issue."
The
telegram
concluded:
"The
Chinese
comrades
request
a
quick
call
back."
Apparently,
the
Chinese
leaders
did
not
believe
what
Kim
IlSung
said,
so
they
broke
off
the
talks
at
that
time
and
demanded
confirmation
from
Moscow
overnight.
This
also
shows
from
another
aspect
that
Stalin
never
mentioned
Kim
IlSung's
demands
and
plans
to
Mao
Zedong
in
Moscow.
After
Kim
Il-
sung
returned
from
Moscow
in
April
1950,
he
decided
to
visit
Beijing
secretly
at
the
request
of
Stalin.
The
purpose
was
to
"inform
China
of
their
intention
to
unify
the
country
by
force
and
the
results
of
talks
on
this
issue
in
Moscow."
Kim
IlSung
also
told
Stalin
that
he
did
not
need
Chinese
aid,
"because
all
his
demands
have
been
met
in
Moscow."
Of
course,
people
would
think
that
there
might
have
been
secret
meetings
between
Stalin
and
Mao
Zedong.
Regarding
this
issue,
Professor
Westa
talked
to
the
author
about
asituation.
Vesta
worked
for
six
years
in
Moscow
digging
Russian
archives,
during
which
time
he
interviewed
many
parties.
According
to
Jia
Picai,
Stalin
did
invite
Mao
Zedong
twice
to
meet
in
his
private
villa,
but
no
official
personnel
from
either
side
appeared.
Stalin
only
invited
a
personal
friend
of
his
in
the
military
intelligence
department
to
act
as
an
interpreter.
During
a
second
private
meeting
on
February
15,
Stalin
and
Mao
discussed
North
Korea,
but
the
details
were
unknown.
However,
what
happened
after
Stalin's
meeting
with
Kim
IlSung,
as
will
be
described
below,
shows
that
even
ifthere
was
asecret
meeting
with
Mao
Zedong,
Stalin
certainly
did
not
mention
his
decision
to
him.
There
has
been
much
debate
in
the
past
about
whether
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
had
agreed
to
take
military
action
in
North
Korea
during
their
talks
in
Moscow.
Now,
a
large
number
of
materials
and
research
results
have
confirmed
that
during
his
stay
in
Moscow,
in
addition
to
attending
banquets
and
celebrations,
Stalin
and
Mao
Zedong
held
three
official
talks
(December
16,
1949,
December
24,
1950
and
a
small
talk
(late
January
1950)
on
the
statement
of
Acheson's
speech,
none
of
which
dealt
with
this
issue.
During
the
talks
on
December
24,
although
Mao
Zedong
and
Stalin
may
have
discussed
the
situation
in
North
Korea,
they
never
mentioned
the
question
of
taking
military
action
on
the
Korean
peninsula.
Not
only
that,
when
Stalin
and
Kim
)IlSung
discussed
this
issue
through
telegrams,
although
Mao
Zedong
was
in
Moscow,
Stalin
did
not
agree
to
his
decision
to
support
military
operations
in
South
Korea
and
invite
Kim
IlSung
to
the
Soviet
Union
for
consultations.
The
Chinese
guests
did
not
mention
a
word.
The