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Student Number: 2
6 6 1 8 7 3

Course Title: Southern Europe in International Affairs 2021-2023

Essay/Assignment Title: Management and challenges of environmental and energy

security in Southeastern Europe
Course Co-ordinator: Georgios Karyotis

Date of Submission: 05/12/2021

Word Count: 2917

Introduction
The eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea and south-eastern Europe have an abundance of resources
located in their waters. The seas of the eastern Mediterranean, the Adriatic, Ionian, Levantine, and
Aegean, settle their bordering states not only with the prospects of boosting their energy security and
economies, but also with problems regarding the (marine) environment and marine disputes. Findings of
oil and gas reserves can cause disputes between states as marine borders are not always well defined.
Furthermore, oil spillage can result in great catastrophes for marine life, exemplified by the 2010 BP oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico. (Prontera, 2017, pp. 384-387) Many south-eastern European states have
made recent explorations for gas and oil in their offshore territories. (Prontera, 2017, pp. 383-406) How
are these seemingly international issues being managed and regulated in south-eastern Europe?

Where Spain and Portugal have significantly invested in renewable energy in the past, states in south-
eastern Europe have not. Portugal, where 60 to 70 per cent of its electricity comes from renewable
sources, even closed its last coal plant nine years before it originally was set to close (Reuters, 2021).
Greece and Cyprus, for example, have not made any noteworthy efforts towards building renewable
energy sources, whereas Italy has been expanding its renewable energy sources, which are, however,
for domestic use only. (Coats, 2013, pp. 50-53) Can renewable energy play an important role in the
energy security of south-eastern European states, or will these states be unable to resist the temptation
of gas and oil exploration?

This paper will be structured as follows: first, the theories regarding environmental and energy security
on an international level will be discussed. The theories discussed are liberalism, realism and
securitisation. Secondly, a closer look will be held into how the south-eastern region of Europe manages
environmental and energy security. States included in this paper under the definition of southeast
Europe are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, North
Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey. Thirdly, interstate relations and regulations of environmental
and energy security of the south-eastern region of Europe will be discussed.

Theories
Environmental and energy security are topics mostly concerning liberalism: states without oil and/or gas
can purchase these resources from halfway across the planet. Additionally, for states in south-eastern
Europe, this is made possible by the many pipelines running through the region, mostly coming either
from Russia or the middle east, transiting through Turkey. With three pipelines running through south-
eastern Europe, two connecting pipelines east of Europe and many branches within these pipeline
infrastructures (European Environment Agency, 2010), this part of the European continent is well
connected, and liberalism is applicable as not many states have an excess of energy resources in their
territory. After the cold war ended, energy globalised as a result of the further improving relationship of
states. (Wilson, 2019, p. 116)

Contrarily, the realism approach is also applicable to the case of environmental and energy security,
where renewable energies are often only used for domestic usage, such as in the cases of Italy Spain as
mentioned in this paper. (Coats, 2013, p. 50) Furthermore, energy and energy security are, in the case of
consumer economies, seen as potential security threats as supplies of energy might be stopped by
foreign exporting states. This, on the other side, can be seen as a power tool of the foreign policy of
states with an overflow of energy. This is exemplified by the 65 cases of energy sanctions taken since
1938. (Wilson, 2019, p. 116)
States often securitise the usage of energy. Under this securitisation, three main reasons can be
distinguished: regime, geopolitical and economic securitisation. First of all, energy is securitised under
regime security. In both authoritarian and democratic states energy is securitised as regime security. In
authoritarian states, such as the Gulf states, regimes control the distribution of rent from energy
resources and use it as a tool to gain loyalty from its population. In more democratic states, energy can
also be securitised by ‘purchasing’ support through energy revenues, as exemplified by the South
American states of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela. Secondly, as mentioned in the explanation
regarding the realist approach, states who have an abundance of energy resources have the power to
strategically manipulate states with fewer energy resources. An example of this is the case where Russia,
in the 2000s, threatened to not supply certain states with energy. This happened in the run-up to
important diplomatic negotiations and were seen as a form of blackmailing other states. Furthermore,
Russia subsidised closely linked states with cheap energy prices in order to induce these states. In these
cases, energy security can be securitised under the frame of geopolitical securitisation. Thirdly, energy
usage is securitised for economic reasons as states who do not own enough energy resources to provide
for their own need energy resources from other states to keep their economy afloat. In times of energy
shortages, as happened in 1973 and 1979, and rise of energy prices, energy-dependent states are
vulnerable and thus have their reason to securitise energy. Energy securitisation for economic reasons is
framed as, for example, a means of investing in social and development policies (in the case of Brazil) or
a quasi-welfare measure by subsidisation for the urban middle class (in the case of Indonesia). (Wilson,
2019, p. 116)

Managing of environmental and energy security in South-eastern Europe

After the start of the economic crisis in 2008, the import of natural gas to Greece, Spain and, Italy eased
as the demand, both industrial and consumer, had slowed down. Portugal continued their dependence
on natural gas from other states, even though its renewable energy development was making serious
progress. However, the dependence of southern Europe on other states for their energy was
exemplified in 2011 by the Arab Spring. Protests in Tunisia started the Arab Spring, which was felt in
southern Europe in terms of energy security. As protests turned into civil war in Libya, the north African
country even had to lay off production and export. Spain and Italy, mostly dependent on Algeria (one-
third of their energy), Egypt and Libya (both 10%), were hurt the most. (Coats, 2013, p. 47)

Both Spain and Portugal aimed for the European Union’s goal for sustainable development, which
entailed a 20 per cent usage of renewable energy by 2020. Spain saw its share of solar and wind power
grow from two per cent in 2000 to 20 per cent in 2008. Portugal expanded its solar and wind power
from two to 15 per cent from 2004 to 2009 of its total energy usage. But how did the south-eastern part
of Europe cope with the energy security and usage of renewable energies? As south-eastern Europe
gets, approximately, the same amount of sun hours on average per day (Eurostat, 2004), the region
should be able to compete with the numbers Spain and Portugal are providing. Additionally, Bulgaria,
Greece, Italy, and Turkey have considerable amounts of land area free for the usage of wind turbines.
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Slovenia all have
significantly less land area to build wind turbines on, but all states hold availability. (Dalla Longa et al.,
2018, pp. 17-18) Italy implemented solar energy as well in the 2000s, but not as much wind energy.
Greece and Cyprus improved its sustainable energy even less. In the same way as states around the
globe, the progress of renewable energy in south-eastern Europe was slowed down significantly after
the start of the financial crisis in 2008, and, consequently, subsidies were cut. (Coats, 2013, pp. 48-49)
Cyprus is expected to quadruple its amount of energy coming from renewable energy sources by 2030
compared to 2015. Currently, the islands renewable energy supply is 14 per cent of its total energy
generation. Cyprus, with one of the most average sun hours per day in Europe (Eurostar, 2004),
currently only produces 76 Megawatts coming from solar energy. This is expected to multiply by seven
in 2030 compared to 2015. By 2030, 44,6 per cent of Cyprus’ energy should come from renewable
sources. (IRENA, 2020, p. 77)

Within ten years, starting in 2020, 34 per cent of the energy of the states of Central and South-eastern
Europe, which include, amongst others, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece,
Italy, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia (European Commission, 2020), should be able to come from
renewable resources. (European Commission, 2020) These renewable resources mostly include hydro,
solar and wind power, coming from both on and offshore wind turbines. (Irena, 2020, p. 38)

Italy has a high dependence on other states regarding its energy; about 80 per cent of its energy comes
from foreign states (Coats, 2013, p. 50), of which between 10 and 20 per cent of its oils and gases come
from Russia. (Eurostat, 2021) To be less dependent on other states, Italy is, along with renewable
projects which are only for domestic use, looking into natural gas and oil production within its territory.
The government even reversed a ban on offshore drilling, which was implemented after the Deepwater
Horizon catastrophe of 2010. The aim is to increase crude production by 150 per cent, as the third-
largest oil find in Europe is located within the Italian borders. However, such a plan is hard to make a
reality in a state with, after the February 2013 election, a 5 per cent confidence in the government.
(Coats, 2013, p. 50)

To recover from the financial meltdown Greece suffered in 2008, the state explored the possibility of
offshore oil and gas extraction, as well as a 10-gigawatt solar plant. The solar plant had an estimated
price tag of 27 billion US Dollars and would not even reach its full capacity for decades to come.
Contrarily, Greece received eight bids for oil and gas exploration after a discovery in Western Greece.
Greece continued to look for oil and gas in the Aegean Sea, but not much progress has been made.
(Coats, 2013, p. 51)

Albania re-started the process for offshore energy search in 2006 with the National Agency of Natural
Resources, whereas Croatia established the Energy Strategy of the Republic of Croatia in 2009. Croatia
decided to enlarge its extraction for energy sources and make Croatia an important energy hub to
improve the energy security of the European Union with the Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline, which also runs
through Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a Liquified Natural Gas facility. Additionally,
an estimated 3 million barrels of oil have been found in offshore Croatian borders, which the
government is eager to extract to not only supply Croatian needs, but also European energy needs. For
Montenegro 2011 was the year of its start towards extraction of gas from within in maritime border in
the Adriatic Sea. (Prontera, 2017, pp. 394-395)

Interstate relations and regulations of environmental and energy security

The Eastern Mediterranean, specifically the Adriatic, Ionian, Aegean and Levantine Seas, have high
concentrations of hydrocarbon resources. These seas, however, are home to many maritime disputes
which do not help the process of oil and gas extraction as a collaboration between these states (Slovenia
and Croatia, Greece and Turkey, Cyprus and Turkey, etc.) is almost non-existent. Furthermore, after the
2010 BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico people became warier of the environmental risks of such oil
and gas extractions, especially in a semi-enclosed sea such as the Mediterranean. This was followed by a
European Union framework on environmental protection. (Prontera, 2017, pp. 384-387)

Gas and oil exploration in seas is a sensitive topic, as this is where many (maritime) disputes between
governments arise. Therefore, the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
implemented some rules. These rules are as follows: the right of a state to explore and develop natural
resources in their own territorial seas for up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, their continental
shelf for up to 200 nautical miles, or 350 in some cases, and their exclusive economic zones also up to
200 nautical miles. Israel, Libya, Syria and Turkey are the only states of the Mediterranean and the
European Union who are not part of the UNCLOS agreement, making things more complicated especially
around the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. (Prontera, 2017, p. 386)

For the Mediterranean Sea, a system called the Barcelona System was implemented. This system, which
serves as a governance system for the Mediterranean, originated from the Mediterranean Action Plan
and is meant to encourage marine environment protection. This system entails international laws
regarding sustainable development, integrated management of coastal zones, public participation in
decision-making and more. Additionally, there are seven protocols that aim for cooperation among
states and address environmental risks. (Prontera, 2017, p. 386) The Barcelona System consists of 22
nations including Albania, Algeria, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Libya, Montenegro,
Tunisia, Turkey and more. (European Environment Agency, n.d.) In 2011, the Protocol for the Protection
of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from the Exploration and Exploitation of the
Continental Shelf was implemented. The Offshore Protocol, in short, considers all factors regarding
offshore oil and gas pursuits in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, it entails pollution reduction measures
regarding all components included in offshore activities. (United Nations Environment Programme, n.d.)
the European Union acceded the Offshore Protocol. However, most of the member states have not
approved it. Moreover, the European Union has its own laws on environment and marine policy
regarding offshore activities in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2010, the European Union established the
Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) which makes it mandatory for member states to
collaborate upon the creation of plans that can have major trans-boundary effect on marine
environment and marine activities. In 2014 the European Union Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian
Region (EUASIR) was created, partly thanks to the MSFD. The EUASIR has the aim protect its sea
ecosystem on an interstate level. The different frameworks of the European Union strengthen interstate
relations and the transnational layers of governance regarding offshore pursuits for energy resources.
Moreover, non-European Union member states apply directives of the European Union, indicating the
influence of the multilateral agreements regarding environmental and energy security. Montenegro, a
member state candidate, applied directive 94/22/EC, entitled Law on Exploration and Production of
Hydrocarbons, when implementing new laws on its pursuit to gas in the Adriatic Sea. (Prontera, 2017,
pp. 386-395)

The possibility of a European Exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean has been discussed
between Greece and the European Commission. This would help to clarify Greece's claim of offshore
reserves and it would make it a European Union matter, rather than just a Greek one. This would
specifically help Greek's position towards Turkey. However, it is unsure whether Ankara will accept this
as Turkey is also continuously searching the Aegean Sea for oil and/or gas reserves. (Coats, 2013, p. 51)
Furthermore, Greece is slowly building its reputation as an energy hub for Europe, increasing the energy
security for all the European Union. (Prontera, 2017, p. 394) Connected with multiple pipelines, the
Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Interconnector-Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline perhaps most notable,
Turkey earns a similar reputation with the ‘Southern Gas Corridor’, which the European Union calls one
of the most important energy security priorities. (Winrow, 2013, p. 150)

Conclusion
Energy is used as a tool for states who possess excess amounts of it for securitisation. However, this also
accounts for states who are not able to meet their own energy demands. Energy is, overall, securitised
under three main frames: regime, geopolitical and economic securitisation. Two other main theories of
International Relations apply to the matter of environmental and energy security: liberalism and realism.
The liberalist approach is applicable to this case as states in southeast Europe work closely together
regarding energy security, for example with pipelines. Furthermore, these states also work together in
the prevention and solution of maritime disputes, as sea borders are often hard to define, and energy
reserves are regularly found in sea beds. The realist approach is applicable as states with an overflow of
energy can keep the energy for themselves, using it as a power tool for their foreign policy.

It can be concluded that southeast Europe is very dependent on energy coming from foreign sources,
making the region’s energy security weak. However, plans to increase the energy security of the region
have been proposed and are already in works. Where many states are improving their renewable energy
infrastructure or exploring offshore extraction of oil and/or gas, the future seems brighter in terms of
energy security. This is strengthened by the many pipelines, turning the region into an energy hub for
the European Union. Not all of this can be considered positive news, as the extraction of oil and/or gas
in the eastern part of the semi-enclosed Mediterranean Sea could lead to serious damage to its marine
life. However, interstate laws, regulations and protocols should prevent these types of catastrophes
from happening. The European Union as a frontrunner of such regulations, aims to protect the Adriatic,
Ionian, Aegean and Levantine Seas, and non-EU member states such as Montenegro follow this law as
an example. Moreover, the European Union is further emphasising the reputation of an energy hub by
discussing the possibility of a European Exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean. Despite all these
efforts of interstate laws, regulations and protocols, marine life will forever be at risk if humans decide
to keep extracting natural resources from underneath its feet and the switch to renewable energy
sources is not fast enough for climate change to handle.
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