filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to
RULE 42: PETETION FOR REVIEW FROM
THE RTC IN ITS APPELATE JURISDICTION
TO THE CA
RODGING REYES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
SALUD M. GEGATO, Respondents. G.R. No. 193034, July 20, 2015.
Ponente: PERALTA
Digested by: Kimberly Gargoles
DOCTRINE: The grant of any extensions for the filing of the petition
is discretionary and subject to the condition that the full amount of
the docket and lawful fees are paid before the expiration of the
reglementary period to file the petition.
FACTS: Sometime in 2001, Rodging Reyes, moved by personal
resentment and hatred, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously threatened the life of Mrs. Salud Gegato. So, a complaint
was filed by Gegato and charged Reyes with Grave Threats before
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Agusan del Sur. Before
arraignment, Reyes filed a Motion to Quash based on the ground of
jurisdiction and that the crime is not Grave Threats but Other Light
Threats, but it was denied. Then Reyes filed a Motion to Inhibit the
presiding judge on the ground that Gegato is the Court Interpreter
of the same court, but it was denied. MCTC, in a Decision, found
Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On
appeal, the RTC, denied Reyes’ appeal but found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Other Light Threats. Then, Reyes
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner
File a Petition for Review. However, instead of filing a petition for
review within the 15-day period allowed by the CA, petitioner filed a
second Motion for Extension of Time asking for another 15 days
within which to file his petition for review. The CA, dismissed the
petition for failure to pay the full amount of the docket fees
pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. His second motion
for extension is likewise DENIED as no further extension may be
granted except for most compelling reason. He then filed a Second
and Third Motion for Reconsideration but was denied also. Hence
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the
ground of failure of Reyes to pay the full amount of the docket fees.
HELD: NO, the CA is correct in dismissing the case. The rule is that
payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory. In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a
court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was,
however, relaxed in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion, wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of
time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. Here,this requirement was not met by Reyes
as the docket fees he had paid are actually deficient.
Therefore, the grant of any extensions for the filing of the petition is
discretionary and subject to the condition that the full amount of
the docket and lawful fees are paid before the expiration of the
reglementary period to file the petition.
LILAH GAIL CORPUZ ALFILER,1 PETITIONER, VS. SPS. JOHN
CAYABYAB AND GERALDINE CAYABYAB, REPRESENTED BY
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, JOSE VASALLO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GESMUNDO, C.J.:
This is an Appeal by Certiorari2 seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolutions dated December 13, 20133 and February 17, 20154 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132787. The CA
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Lilah Gail Corpuz Alfiler
(petitioner) for being the wrong mode of appeal in assailing the
January 9, 2013 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 97 (RTC), which, in turn, affirmed the January 3, 2011
Decision6 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43
(MeTC), in an ejectment case filed against petitioner.
Antecedents
The present controversy involves a parcel of land located at 186
Pajo Street, Barangay Quirino 2-C, Quezon City, with an area of
266.9 square meters (subject property). The subject property is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-115646 (324155) and
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of
Quintin Santiago, Jr. (Quintin), married to Violeta E. Santiago.7
Sometime in March 1985, Quintin lodged before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Quirino 2-C, Quezon City, a complaint
for ejectment and squatting against petitioner's mother, Linglingay
Corpuz, and several others (Linglingay, et al.) involving the subject
property. On May 1, 1985, the parties executed an Amicable
Settlement,8 wherein Linglingay, et al. would pay Quintin the total
amount of P146,000.00. The pertinent portions of the agreement
read:
1. That it is hereby agreed that the aforesaid property will be sold
by the owner to the respondents in the amount of P550.00 per
square meter totalling to P146,000.00.
2. That it shall be paid in cash by the respondents upon the delivery
of the certificate of Title and the final Deed of Sale by the
complainant.
3. That the respondents hereby agree that all fees and expenses
incidental to the transfer of ownership of the aforementioned
property including but not limited to registration fees, revenues
stamps, transfer tax, and assurance fee, shall be for the account of
the respondents, and that the capital [gains] tax shall be shouldered
by the complainant.
4. That the respondents shall put-up monthly deposit to a bank of
their own choice representing one fourth (1/4) of the total amount
or about P36,500.00, wherein which a xerox [copy] of their bank
book shall be shown to the Barangay Captain.
5. That the respondents shall purchase the said lot starting May up
to August 23, 1985.9
Pursuant to their agreement, Linglingay, et al. allegedly made five
partial payments to Quintin, which only amounted to a total of
P72,425.00; the last payment of which was in June 1986.10
On March 12, 1997, Quintin died.11
On March 18, 2010, spouses John and Geraldine Cayabyab
(respondents), represented by their attorney-in-fact, Jose Vasallo,
filed before the MeTC a Complaint for Ejectment12 against
petitioner, her sister, Meda Delza Armamento13 (Meda), Spouses
Alfredo and Lolita Garduce, Romeo Magdaluyo, Gina Villanueva,
A.B. Morato,14 and all persons claiming rights under them
(collectively, Garduce, et al.).
In their Complaint, respondents alleged that they are the owners of
the subject property, having acquired the same under a Deed of
Absolute Sale15 (DOAS) dated August 20, 1997, which was
purportedly executed by Quintin through his attorney-in-fact,
Norman Santiago (Norman). Respondents further alleged that
Garduce et al. have been in possession of the subject property,
illegally building their houses without paying rent since 1997.16
Respondents issued a final demand letter dated May 8, 2009 to
Garduce, et al. to vacate the premises, but, despite such demand,
Garduce, et al. continued to refuse to vacate the property.17
In their Answer18 and Position Paper,19 petitioner and Meda raised
the same principal defenses and arguments. Firstly, they denied
respondents' claim of ownership and possession over the subject
property and argued that the DOAS is null and void as Quintin did
not truly execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing
Norman to sell the subject property to respondents. Second, the
DOAS is null and void because assuming that there indeed was an
SPA between Norman and Quintin, such contract of agency was
extinguished by the latter's death on March 12, 1997, or five
months prior to the execution of the DOAS.20 Third, Garduce, et al.
have a better right to possess the subject property by virtue of the
amicable settlement entered into between their predecessors-in-
interest, Linglingay, et al., and Quintin which embodied a contract
of sale. Fourth, the contract of sale was already consummated after
their predecessors-in-interest made payments to Quintin in the
amount of P72,425.00.21 Fifth, the MeTC has no jurisdiction over
the case as the complaint was filed only on March 18, 2010, which is
more than one year from the time respondents were dispossessed
of the subject property in 1997. Thus, respondents' cause of action
should be one for accion publiciana, which is within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.22
The MeTC Ruling
On January 3, 2011, the MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of
respondents. The dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants x x x and LILIA
GAIL C. ALFILER, ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights
under them to immediately vacate the subject premises located at
No. 186 Pajo St., Barangay Quirino, 2-C, Project 2, Quezon City
covered by TCT No. RT-115646 (324155) and to peacefully surrender
the same to the plaintiffs.
Defendants are likewise ordered jointly and severally pay plaintiffs
the following:
(1) The amount of Php1,000.00 per month for every defendant from
May 8, 2009, (date of the demand) and every month thereafter until
the subject premises is vacated;
(2) The amount of Php20,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees;
(3) The cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.23
The MeTC ruled that Garduce, et. al. were not able to prove their
right over the subject property, and thus, did not acquire a better
right than that of respondents. Further, Garduce, et. al. were not
able to prove their claim that the DOAS executed by Quintin and
respondents was void, while respondents were able to prove their
ownership of the subject property by preponderance of evidence.24
Aggrieved, petitioner and Meda appealed the MeTC judgment
before the RTC under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC Ruling
On January 9, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision affirming in toto
the MeTC Decision. The dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated January 3, 2011 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, entitled Sps.
Cayabyab vs. Armamento, et al., is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
The assailed Decision having been affirmed, let the corresponding
writ of execution be issued pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.25
The RTC ruled that petitioner and Meda must anchor the legality of
their material possession of the property on a claim of title in order
for the court to determine who has the better right of possession.
However, petitioner and Meda were only able to prove the
occupation of the subject property as a consequence of the
amicable settlement's compromise instead of on a claim of
ownership. The RTC also agreed with the MeTC's findings that
respondents were able to establish their case by a preponderance
of evidence, and thus, saw no reason to disturb the conclusions
reached by the MeTC.26
Petitioner and Meda filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
same was denied by the RTC in its Order27 dated October 17, 2013.
On November 22, 2013, only petitioner filed, before the CA, a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision and Order of the RTC.
The CA Ruling
On December 13, 2013, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari on the ground that petitioner adopted the
wrong mode of judicial review over the Decision of the RTC.
The CA held that the proper course of action for petitioner was to
assail the judgment of the RTC by appeal via a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Since the remedy of appeal was
available to petitioner, the special civil action for certiorari could not
be entertained – the aforesaid remedies being mutually exclusive,
and not alternative or successive.28
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
the CA. However, such motion was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated February 17, 2015. The CA rejected petitioner's
invocation of substantial justice to exempt herself from the rigid
application of technical rules on giving due course to her petition for
certiorari. The CA also remarked that petitioner posited errors of
judgment, which were the proper subjects of an appeal, and not
errors in jurisdiction, which are the office of a petition for
certiorari.29
Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues:
(1) Whether the CA deviated from the settled jurisprudence when it
dismissed her petition for certiorari on the ground of being the
wrong mode of appeal, notwithstanding the presence of persuasive
and compelling reasons to apply the liberal construction of the rules
in the interest of substantial justice; and
(2) Whether the CA deviated from the settled jurisprudence in not
giving due course to the petition for certiorari notwithstanding the
presence of matters that require resolution on the merits of the
case to effect substantial justice.30
Petitioner argues that the DOAS dated August 20, 1997, upon which
respondents base their right over the subject property, is null and
void and could not confer any right or title in their favor as it was
executed after the death of Quintin.31 Further, petitioner points
out that no SPA was presented in favor of Norman, even when such
SPA was claimed to have been attached to the DOAS. Even
assuming arguendo that there existed an SPA, the death of Quintin
which occurred prior to the execution of the DOAS, extinguished the
SPA to Norman.32 Finally, petitioner argues that the MeTC does not
have jurisdiction over the subject ejectment suit as it was filed after
more than a year from the dispossession of the realty.33
In their Comment,34 respondents state that there was nothing to
add or detract from anything that was decided by the CA, further
reminding that the MeTC and RTC found no merit in petitioner's
cause. Respondents also argue that petitioner's continued
occupation of the subject property without paying rent is enough
ground to end their possession.35
In her Reply,36 petitioner stresses the need to set aside
technicalities to ensure resolution on the merits of the case.37 She
reiterates the arguments in her petition as reasons to warrant a
review of the findings of the lower courts which she alleges to be
based on speculation and misapprehension of facts that are
glaringly erroneous as to constitute abuse of discretion.38
Additionally, petitioner states that the lower courts erred in not
considering Article 131739 and 187440 of the New Civil Code in
resolving the matters of the case.41
The Court's Ruling
The petition has merit.
Procedural Matters
Evidently, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy before the CA by
filing a special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 6542 of
the Rules of Court against the judgment of the RTC. When the RTC
issued its January 9, 2013 Decision and denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration in its October 17, 2013 Order, it did so in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In this case, the remedy of
appeal under Sec. 1, Rule 42 was available to petitioner. Thus, the
proper remedy would have been to file a petition for review from
the RTC to the CA under Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. — A party desiring to
appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, x x x. The petition shall be filed
and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision
sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for
new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. x x x.
However, instead of resorting to a petition for review under Rule
42, which should have been filed within 15 days from petitioner's
receipt of the order denying her motion reconsideration, petitioner
filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari on
November 22, 2013,43 or 31 days from the notice of the order
denying her motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the period
to file an appeal had already lapsed due to her negligence.
A petition for certiorari is a remedy focused on resolving the issue of
whether a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.44 It is only available when the following essential
requisites concur: (a) the petition must be directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi--judicial
functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.45 On the last requisite, it is clear that a petition for
certiorari cannot be made a substitute for an appeal when the latter
remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence.46 The
Court has consistently emphasized that a special civil action for
certiorari and an appeal are "mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive."47
Further, a petition for certiorari has an entirely different purpose
than that of a regular appeal. While the latter is concerned with the
correctness of the judgment of the lower courts on the merits, the
former's primary concern is resolving whether the courts, in the
exercise of its judgment, acted whimsically, capriciously, or even
arbitrarily.48 The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment
on the merits, final order, or resolution is an appeal. This holds true
even when the error attributed to the court rendering the judgment
is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of
power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings
of fact or of law set out in the decision, order, or resolution.49
Nevertheless, jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the strict
application of the rules. The Court allows the filing of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 even if appeal is an available remedy (a)
when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate;
(b) when the broader interests of justice so requires; (c) when the
writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.50
This Court finds that petitioner's case falls under the second and
fourth exceptions as patent errors on the assailed Decisions and
Resolutions are extant.
Ejectment cases — forcible entry and unlawful detainer — are
summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to
protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. The sole question that the courts resolve in ejectment
proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the
property, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the
property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the only
issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of
the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the
parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine
who has the right to possess the property. However, the
adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the property.51
Accordingly, when an ejectment case is filed, the trial court must
determine whether plaintiff has the better right of possession de
facto over the disputed property. Further, if any of the parties raises
the issue of ownership, the trial court should have provisional
determination on such issue, only for the purpose of resolving the
issue of de facto possession.
In this case, the MeTC did not discuss said matters required in an
ejectment case. The January 3, 2011 Decision merely stated the
following:
x x x Plaintiff[s], through their Attorney-in-fact, claims to be the
owner of subject lot by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Quintin Santiago, Jr., through the latter's Attorney-in-fact
Norman Santiago and inked in plaintiff's favor. The answering
defendants, on the other hand, assert ownership of the same land
in question on the strength of the Amicable Settlement entered
between the [defendants'] predecessors-in--interest and the
registered owner Quintin Santiago, Jr. on April 14, 1985 and claimed
that the amount of P72,425.00 was already paid in consideration of
the subject property as evidenced by copy of receipts. Defendants
merely [rely] on such matter, however, said fact has not been
established. By virtue of the deed of absolute sale, the plaintiffs
[demanded] the defendants and all persons claiming rights under
them to vacate the property and to deliver the same to the
plaintiffs; however defendants failed and refused to vacate the
subject premises despite demands. Under the circumstances,
defendants whose right over the property has not been shown did
not acquire a better right than that of the plaintiffs. [Defendants']
claim that the plaintiffs' allegation of ownership over the subject
property is bereft of merit and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by the previous owner is void has not been proven.
The Court finds that the [plaintiffs were] able to prove [their]
ownership of the subject premises by preponderance of evidence it
being the owners thereof. As the lawful owners, plaintiffs are
entitled to the use and possession of the properties and have the
right of action against a holder and possessor in order to recover
the same (Art. 428 of the New Civil Code).
Basic is the rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proof.
The Court finds that defendants failed to present convincing proof
showing their lawful possession by ownership of the [property].
Neither was it substantiated that the plaintiff did not present any
documentary evidence to support how it was able to secure the
Deed of Absolute [Sale]. Allegations must be proven by sufficient
evidence – mere allegation is not evidence.52 (Emphasis in the
original; citations omitted)
It can be gleaned from the decision that the supporting facts,
discussion on probative value of the evidence, and the legal basis of
the MeTC's conclusions above are clearly absent. The MeTC merely
stated that respondents were able to prove ownership, and hence,
they are entitled to the possession of the subject property, without
substantially discussing the rationale behind it. A discussion on the
validity of the DOAS is particularly important, even provisionally,
given that respondents anchored their assertion of ownership and
possession upon the same. In fact, such issue was particularly
identified during the preliminary conference and mentioned by the
trial court in its decision, viz.:
On preliminary conference, the parties failed to stipulate on any
factual matter. The issues to be resolved by the Court as defined
and delimited during the preliminary conference are as follows:
xxxx
3. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale attached to the
complaint is valid;
xxxx
6. Whether [or] not the alleged Attorney-in-Fact in the Deed of
Absolute Sale has authority to sell the parcel of land.53 (Emphases
supplied)
However, such issues, which would have established the basis of
respondents' de facto right of possession, were not discussed by the
MeTC.

Worse, on appeal with the RTC, the issues raised by the parties
remained unsettled. In its January 9, 2013 Decision, the RTC merely
enumerated the evidence submitted by the parties and thereafter,
concurred with the findings of the MeTC, summarily concluding that
respondents had established their case by preponderance of
evidence. The RTC also made a rudimentary discussion on the
nature of an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer but
failed to apply and discuss how it was applied to the present case.
Verily, there was no discussion at all on the legality of the DOAS and
the SPA, even provisionally, which were so clearly brought forth by
defendants in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and
Position Paper.54 In conclusion, the RTC summarized its decision by
stating that defendants failed to establish the legality of their
material possession of the subject property by not complying with
the terms and conditions of the amicable settlement; hence,
respondents had a better right thereto.55
In Yao v. Court of Appeals,56 the Court emphasized that the parties
to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court.57 This is a requirement of due process and
fair play.58 A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark
as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing
party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for
review by a higher tribunal.59
Additionally, the lower courts' decisions are infirm for being in
contravention to the constitutional mandate of the courts in
rendering a decision, to wit:
Article VIII, Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the
legal basis therefor.60
As stressed in San Jose v. NLRC,61 this Court has previously held
that judges and arbiters should draw up their decisions and
resolutions with due care and make certain that they truly and
accurately reflect their conclusions and their final dispositions.62
Accordingly, this Court will not hesitate to strike down decisions
rendered not hewing to this Constitutional directive63 when it is
clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of
the evidence on record or when there is showing of fraud or error of
law.64 Thus, this Court cannot agree with the CA on the outright
dismissal of the petition for certiorari. To do so would, in effect,
sanction the otherwise defective decisions of the MeTC and the
RTC.
The foregoing considered, this Court rules that the ends of justice
would be better served if substantial issues are squarely addressed,
especially since petitioner stands to lose a family home.65 The
broader interests of substantial justice, as well as the circumstances
of the case, clearly show a justification for the relaxation of the rule
on technical procedures. If a strict adherence to the application of
the rules would result in a grave miscarriage of justice, this Court
will not hesitate to relax the same in favor of substantial justice,
which is after all the avowed purpose of all law and
jurisprudence.66 Accordingly, even though petitioner filed the
wrong remedy before the CA, such procedural error may be set
aside in the interest of substantial justice.
Ejectment suits; cause of action; burden of proof
In ejectment cases, the complaint must allege such statement of
facts in order to bring the party clearly within the class of cases
under Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. Who may inst flute proceedings, and when. — Subject to
the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in
the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.
In Sarmienta v. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc.,67 the Court
explained the two causes of action under Sec. I, Rule 70 of the
Rules, to wit:
There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under
the aforequoted rule, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an
action to recover possession of a property from the defendant
whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he
acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for
recovery of possession from the defendant whose possession of the
property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or
implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his
possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and
prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the property in
dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of
the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer,
there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession
of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any
contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or
building "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied."68
It must be emphasized that unlawful detainer and forcible entry
suits, under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, are designed to provide
expeditious means to restore physical possession of a piece of land
or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived
thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties'
opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.
Unlawful detainer and forcibly entry suits are intended to avoid
disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their
hands supposedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. The
issue in both cases is pure physical or de facto possession, and
pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in
nature. Thus, the provisional determination of ownership in the
ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.69
Nevertheless, in ejectment cases, it is the plaintiff who has the
burden of proof to establish by preponderance of evidence that he
or she is entitled to the de facto possession. Actori incumbit onus
probandi. This is a well-known postulate echoed by Sec. 1 of Rule
131 of the Rules of Court. In civil cases, the plaintiff, who is the
party asse1ting the affirmative of an issue, has the burden of proof
to establish by preponderance of evidence his or her allegations. He
or she has the burden of presenting evidence required to obtain a
favorable judgment, and he or she, having the burden of proof, will
be defeated if no evidence were given on either side.70
In C & S Fishfarm Corporation v. Court of Appeals,71 this Court
stressed that the plaintiff in an ejectment suit has the burden of
showing that the defendants entered the subject property by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or that it is the landlord,
vendor, vendee or other person whose possession of the property
had been unlawfully withheld by the defendants.72
Since ejectment is a possessory action, the plaintiff must show a
right of possession that is present or immediate in the property
sought to be recovered. Unless established, the defendant will
prevail. Plaintiffs in ejectment must show their right to possession
at the time the suit was instituted. Ejectment can be maintained
only by one having a present exclusive right to possession.73
In this case, it was respondents who filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer before the MeTC. Accordingly, they have the burden to
establish that they have a right of possession, even merely de facto,
over the subject property.
Here, respondents anchor their claim of de facto right of possession
over the subject property based on their alleged right of ownership
– by virtue of the DOAS. As stated earlier, where the issue of
ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon
the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the
property. Said adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar
or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to
the property.74
However, it is notoriously apparent that there are severe legal
infirmities that plague such claim. A cursory reading of the DOAS
shows that it was executed on August 20, 1997 by respondents and
Quintin, through an SPA with his attorney-in-fact, Norman.75
Glaringly, Quintin already died on March 12, 1997,76 or five months
prior to the execution of the DOAS. It is settled that that the death
of a person terminates contractual capacity.77 Thus, Quintin does
not have any legal personality to transfer any property rights after
his death.1âшphi1
In Arakor Construction and Development Corporation v. Sta.
Maria,78 the Court declared that "[i]f any one party to a supposed
contract was already dead at the time of its execution, such
contract is undoubtedly simulated and false, and, therefore, null
and void by reason of its having been made after the death of the
party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein."
In addition, Norman's authority to sell the subject property of
Quintin stems from an alleged SPA that was never submitted in
evidence. Basic are the following Civil Code provisions:
Article 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is
through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing;
otherwise, the sale shall be void.79
Article 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the
following cases:
xxxx
(5)To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an
immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a
valuable consideration[.]80
Article 1919. Agency is extinguished:
xxxx
(3) By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the
principal or of the agent[.]81
From these provisions, it is clear that under Article 1878, a special
power of attorney is necessary for an agent to enter into any
contract for the sale of real property. Not only that, Art. 1874
explicitly states that such authority for the sale of land through an
agent, should be in writing, otherwise the sale shall be void. In
Dizon v. Court of Appeals,82 the Court held:
When the sale of a piece of land or any interest thereon is through
an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise,
the sale shall be void. Thus the authority of an agent to execute a
contract for the sale of real estate must be conferred in writing and
must give him specific authority, either to conduct the general
business of the principal or to execute a binding contract containing
terms and conditions which are in the contract he did execute. A
special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by
which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired
either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration. The express
mandate required by law to enable an appointee of an agency
(couched) in general terms to sell must be one that expressly
mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of
the act mentioned. For the principal to confer the right upon an
agent to sell real estate, a power of attorney must so express the
powers of the agent in clear and unmistakable language. When
there is any reasonable doubt that the language so used conveys
such power, no such construction shall be given the document.83
Verily, not only was the seller, Quintin, already deceased at the time
of the sale on August 20, 1997, respondents also could not produce
the mandatory requirement of a written SPA that would have
authorized Norman to sell the land of Quintin. These are significant
defects in the sale that renders the claim of ownership, including de
facto possession, of respondents highly doubtful.£A⩊phi£
Respondents are then mistaken in their belief that the DOAS would
confer to them any right whatsoever to the subject property.
Settled is the rule that an agency is extinguished by the death of the
principal.84 It is by reason of the very nature of the relationship
between a principal and an agent that any act of an agent after the
death of his principal is void ab initio, except as explicitly provided
for in the New Civil Code: (1) Art. 193085 when the agency is
coupled with an interest, and (2) Art. 193186 when the agent
performed an act for the principal without knowledge of the
principal's death and the third person who contracted with him
acted in good faith.87 Neither of which are alleged or applicable in
this case. Additionally, it is not enough that the existence of an SPA
be merely referred to in a deed of sale. It must be offered in
evidence. If no evidence is offered, it only gives rise to the
presumption that no such written authority exists.88
Thus, absent a written SPA and for want of authority, as the seller
was already deceased at the time of sale,89 the DOAS is void ab
initio.90 Respondents do not have any interest, rights, or claim over
the subject property. Accordingly, they have not established their
de facto right of possession because there is no right of ownership
to speak of, even in the provisional sense.
The cause of action for an action for unlawful detainer is the act or
omission by which a party violates the legal right of the other.91
Meanwhile, the real party in interest as a complainant thereto is the
landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession, by virtue of
a contract, express or implied.92 In other words, the plaintiff should
have a right of possession over the property.
Not having acquired any right over the property in question, no
right of respondents' could have been violated. Thus, respondents'
evidence failed to prove their cause of action alleged in their
pleadings. Due to the insufficiency of factual or legal basis to grant
the complaint and the failure to establish their burden of proof,
respondents' complaint should be dismissed.
As respondents failed to establish their burden of proof by
preponderance of evidence regarding their de facto right of
possession over the subject property, it is no longer necessary to
discuss the evidence presented by petitioner, who is currently
residing over the subject property.
It must be reiterated that in giving recognition to ejectment suits,
the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has
actual possession, and in case of a controverted proprietary right,
the law requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or
the other sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent
jurisdiction upon the question of ownership.93 It is obviously only
just that the person who first acquired possession should remain in
possession pending this decision. To permit the contrary would be
highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social
order.94
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
December 13, 2013 and February 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
in CA--G.R. SP No. 132787 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 40058 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED."
SPOUSES MARIANO CORDERO AND RAQUEL CORDERO,
PETITIONERS, V. LEONILA M. OCTAVIANO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LOPEZ, J.:
There are times when strict adherence to the rules of procedure
must yield to the search for truth and the demands of substantial
justice. One such instance is present in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of
Appeals' (CA) Resolution1 dated December 19, 2017 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 11086.
ANTECEDENTS
In 2011, Leonila Octaviano, the registered owner of a land
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-184403,2 filed a
complaint3 for ejectment against Spouses Mariano and Raquel
Cordero before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) docketed as
Civil Case No. C-538. On May 22, 2013, the MCTC ruled in favor of
Leonila and ordered Spouses Cordero to vacate the premises.4 The
Spouses Cordero appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).5 On
December 7, 2016, the RTC affirmed the MCTC's findings.6 The
Spouses Cordero moved for a reconsideration.7 On June 22, 2017,
the RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.8 Aggrieved, the
Spouses Cordero elevated the case to the CA through a petition for
review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 11086.9
On December 19, 2017, the CA dismissed Spouses Cordero's
petition because of the following defects, to wit:
A cursory reading of the petition reveals the following infirmities:
(i) Petitioners failed to state the material date showing when the 7
December 2016 Decision was received, in violation of Section 2 (b).
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court;
(ii) Petitioners failed to append to the petition clearly legible
duplicate original or true copy of the assailed 7 December 2016
Decision, as well as other pertinent portions of the records necessary
for a thorough evaluation of the case by this Court, in violation of
Section 2 (d). Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE. in view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.10 (Emphasis in the original.)
Spouses Cordero sought reconsideration invoking substantial
compliance with rules requiring statement of material dates. They
claimed that the failure to state the date of receipt of the RTC
Decision dated December 7, 2016 is inadvertent and does not
warrant the outright dismissal of their petition for review.
Nevertheless, the petition indicated the date of receipt of the RTC
Order dated June 22, 2017 denying their motion for
reconsideration. This is sufficient to determine the timeliness of the
petition.11 As to the material records of the ease, Spouses Cordero
alleged that the CA overlooked the copy of the RTC Decision dated
December 7, 2016 which was attached as Annex "C" in the petition
for review. Also appended in the petition are the RTC Order dated
June 22, 2017 and the MCTC Decision dated May 22, 2013 which
will enable the CA to evaluate the merits of the case. Furthermore,
Spouses Cordero subsequently submitted additional records such as
the complaint, answer, memoranda and motion for
reconsideration.12
On June 29, 2018, the CA denied Spouses Cordero's motion for
reconsideration on the ground that it was filed one clay late, thus:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On 19 December 2017. We rendered a Decision dismissing
petitioners' appeal and affirming the Decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court x x x in Civil Case C-538. A copy thereof was
received by petitioners' counsel on 17 January 2018, x x x. Under
the circumstances, petitioner|s| had until 1 February 2018, to file a
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner[s], however, did not file such Motion within the period
prescribed. Instead, the petitioners filed their Motion for
Reconsideration on 2 February 2018.
XXXX
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.13cralawlawlibrary
Hence, this recourse. The Spouses Cordero argued that their motion
for reconsideration was timely filed on February 1, 2018 as
evidenced by the affidavit of the clerk who caused the mailing,14
the registry receipt15 and the postmaster's certification.16 They
reiterate that the failure to state the date of receipt of the RTC
Decision dated December 7, 2016 is not fatal. Also, material records
of the case were attached in the petition for review and additional
documents were submitted together with their motion for
reconsideration. Lastly, the Spouses Cordero maintain that a rigid
application of technicalities cannot prevail at the expense of a just
resolution of the case.17cralawred
RULING
We cannot overemphasize that courts have always tried to maintain
a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural
laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full
opportunity for the just disposition of his cause.18 Indeed, the
Court has allowed several cases to proceed in the broader interest
of justice despite procedural defects and lapses.19 This is in keeping
with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice.20 Here, there exists a clear
need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice to Spouses
Cordero which is not commensurate with their failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure. The circumstances obtaining in this
case merit the liberal application of the rule in the interest of fair
play.
The rationale for requiring a complete statement of material dates
is to determine whether the petition is timely filed.21 Accordingly,
the petition must show when notice of the assailed judgment or
order or resolution was received; when the motion for
reconsideration was filed; and, when notice of its denial was
received. However, this Court may relax strict observance of the
rules to advance substantial justice. In Security Bank Corporation v.
Aerospace University,22 the CA denied due course to the petition
for failure to state the dates when the assailed order was received
and the motion for reconsideration was filed. Yet, we held that
"[t]he more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of
Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial court's order denying the
motion for reconsideration" The case was remanded to the CA for
resolution on the merits.
The doctrine was reiterated in Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo23Barroga v.
Data Center College of the Philippines,24Barra v. Civil Service
Commission,25Sara Lee Philippines, Inc. v. Macatlang26Capin-Cadiz
v. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc;27 and Victoriano v.
Dominguez,28 In this case, the Spouses Cordero clearly stated in the
petition for review before the CA the date they received the RTC
Order dated June 22, 2017 denying their motion for
reconsideration. Specifically, the Spouses Cordero received the
Order on July 11, 2017 and timely filed the petition for review to the
CA on July 26, 2017 or within 15-day reglementary period.29 As
such, the Spouses
Cordero are deemed to have substantially complied with the rules.
The failure to indicate the date when they received the other orders
and resolutions may be dispensed with in the interest of justice.30
Similarly, the CA found that Spouses Cordero violated Section 2(d)
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court because they did not submit material
records of the case. The rule requires that the petition for review
before the CA shall "be accompanied by dearly legible duplicate
originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both
lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional
Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition.''
A perusal of the petition for review, however, reveals that copies of
the RTC Order dated June 22, 2017, the MCTC Decision dated May
22, 2013, and the RTC Decision dated December 7, 2016 were in
fact attached as Annexes "A," "B," and "C,'"1 respectively. Hence,
Spouses Cordero complied with the requirement of attaching copies
of the judgments and orders of the trial courts. Moreover, these
attachments are already sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon
the assigned errors and to resolve the appeal even without the
pleadings and other portions of the records. To be sure, the assailed
decisions of the trial courts substantially summarized the contents
of the omitted records.31 Likewise, the CA can resolve the issues by
relying on the principle that the factual findings of the lower courts
are entitled to great weight. It can also direct Spouses Cordero to
submit additional documents or the clerk of court of the RTC and
MCTC to elevate the original records of the case. Notably, the
Spouses Cordero appended the pertinent pleadings and documents
in their motion for reconsideration before the CA. On this point, we
reiterate that there is ample jurisprudence32 holding that the
subsequent and substantial compliance of a party may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure.33 Yet, the CA failed to do so
and insisted on the outright dismissal of the petition.
Lastly, it is undisputed that Spouses Cordero received on January
17, 2018, a copy of the CA Resolution dated December 19, 2017 and
they had 15 days from notice or until February 1, 2018 to file a
motion for reconsideration. Corollarily, Spouses Cordero moved for
a reconsideration. However, the CA denied the motion because it
was filed on February 2, 2018 or one day late. Quite the contrary,
we find that the motion was filed within the prescribed period. The
affidavit of the clerk who caused the mailing, the registry receipt
and the postmaster's certification all established that Spouses
Cordero filed the motion through registered mail on February 1,
2018 and not on February 2, 2018. Applying Section 3, Rule 1334 of
the Rules of Court, the date of mailing shall be considered as the
date of filing when a pleading is filed by registered mail. It does not
matter when the court actually receives the mailed pleading.35

In all, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for review

constitutes a gross error and contravenes Spouses Cordero's right to
be heard on appeal. The ends of justice will be better served if the
case is determined on the merits, after full opportunity is given to
ail parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than
on some procedural imperfections. It is far better to dispose of the
case on the merits, which is a primordial end, rather than on a
technicality that may result in injustice.36

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is GRANTED. The case is

REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to reinstate
and give due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 11086 for a
proper resolution on the merits with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES v. ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL
SUBSTITUTED BY REYNALDO P. VILLAREAL +
DECISION
G.R. No. 181182
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"[T]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor [is it a
component] of due process[. I]t is a mere statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law."[1]
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] seeks a review of the Court
of Appeals' (CA) April 25, 2007 Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK
5711 which dismissed outright petitioner's Petition. Also assailed is
the December 21, 2007 Resolution[4] which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk) is a duly
organized and existing domestic corporation engaged in the selling
of ready-to-wear (RTW) merchandise. Respondent Elvira A. Villareal
(Villareal), on the other hand, is one of Boardwalk's distributors of
RTW merchandise.
On October 20, 2005, Boardwalk filed an Amended Complaint[5] for
replevin against Villareal covering a 1995 Toyota Tamaraw FX, for
the latter's alleged failure to pay a car loan obtained from the
former. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 160116, was filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila and was assigned to
Branch 27 thereof.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
On May 30, 2005, the MeTC rendered its Decision[6] favoring
Boardwalk, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant adjudging that the
former has the right to the possession of the subject motor vehicle
and for the latter to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Villareal moved for reconsideration,[8] but failed.[9]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
She thus appealed[10] to the Manila RTC, which court[11] issued a
Decision[12] reversing the MeTC Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is granted. The assailed judgment of the
lower court is reversed and set aside. Defendant Villareal has the
right of possession to and the value of subject vehicle described in
the complaint. Hence, plaintiff is directed to deliver the subject
vehicle to defendant or its value in case delivery cannot be made.
The complaint and counterclaim are both dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[13]

Boardwalk filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[14] but the same was
denied by the RTC in a December 14, 2006 Order,[15] which
Boardwalk received on January 19, 2007.[16] On February 5,
2007,[17] Boardwalk through counsel filed with the Manila RTC a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,[18] praying
that it be granted 30 days, or until March 7, 2007, to file its Petition
for Review. It paid the docket and other legal fees therefor at the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC.[19] On even date,
Boardwalk also filed a Notice of Appeal[20] with the RTC which the
said court denied for being a wrong mode of appeal.[21]
On March 7, 2007, Boardwalk filed through mail[22] its Petition for
Review[23] with the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On April 25, 2007, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED
OUTRIGHT.
SO ORDERED.[24]
In dismissing the Petition for Review, the CA held that Boardwalk
erred in filing its Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees
therefor with the RTC. It should have done so with the CA as
required by Section 1[25] of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It held
that as a result of Boardwalk's erroneous filing and payment of
docket fees, it was as if no Motion for Extension was filed, and the
subsequent March 7, 2007 filing of its Petition with the appellate
court was thus late and beyond the reglementary 15-day period
provided for under Rule 42.
The CA added that Boardwalk's prayer for a 30-day extension in its
Motion for Extension was irregular, because the maximum period
that may be granted is only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
42. A further extension of 15 days should only be granted for the
most compelling reason which is not obtaining in the present case.
Moreover, it held that Boardwalk's Petition for Review failed to
include a board resolution or secretary's certificate showing that its
claimed representative, Ma. Victoria M. Lo (Lo), was authorized to
sign the Petition or represent Boardwalk in the proceedings, which
thus rendered defective the Verification and Certification against
forum-shopping. Finally, the CA faulted Boardwalk for its failure to
attach to its Petition copies of the Complaint, Answer, position
papers, memoranda and other relevant pleadings, as required in
Sections 2 and 3[26] of Rule 42, thus meriting the outright dismissal
of its Petition for Review.
Boardwalk filed a Motion for Reconsideration[27] and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration,[28] invoking a liberal construction of
the Rules in its favor. It further informed the CA that it had paid the
docket fees with the CA Cashier, and submitted the required
secretary's certificate and additional pleadings in support of its
Petition.
In the second assailed December 21, 2007 Resolution subsequently
issued, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration and its
supplement. It held that despite curative action, the fact remains
that Boardwalk's Petition was filed beyond the reglementary 15-day
period. Even if technicality were to be set aside and Boardwalk were
to be allowed an extension of 15 days from the filing of the Motion
for Extension on February 5, 2007, or until February 20, 2007, within
which to file its Petition, its actual filing on March 7, 2007 would still
be tardy.
Issues
Boardwalk thus filed the instant Petition, raising the following issues
for resolution:
PETITIONER IS INVOKING THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE
RULES TO EFFECT SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
RULE 1, SECTION 6 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
SPECIFICALLY, THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS X X X ORDERING THE
OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW X X X DUE TO
PROCEDURAL LAPSES, IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE SUBSTANTIAL
ISSUES CLEARLY RAISED THEREAT, [ARE] CONTRARY TO EXISTING
RULES, LAW, JURISPRUDENCE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY AND
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.[29]
Petitioner's Arguments
In its Petition and Reply,[30] Boardwalk invokes the principle that
litigations should be decided on the merits and not on technicalities;
that litigants should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of their causes, free from the constraints
of technicalities. It claims that it should not be faulted for the error
committed by its counsel's clerk in wrongly filing the Motion for
Extension and paying the docket fees with the RTC Clerk of Court. It
prays that the Court review the merits of its case.
As for the defective Verification and Certification of non-forum
shopping, Boardwalk contends that these are formal, not
jurisdictional, requisites which could as well be treated with
leniency. Its subsequent submission of the proper secretary's
certificate should thus have cured the defect. It adds that the same
treatment should be accorded its subsequent payment of the
docket fees with the CA Cashier and submission of the required
annexes and pleadings in support of its Petition. It prays the Court
to consider these as substantial compliance with the Rules.
Respondent's Arguments
In her Comment,[31] respondent simply echoes the CA ruling. She
insists that Boardwalk's reasons for erroneously filing the Motion
for Extension and paying the docket fees in the RTC are flimsy and
should not be considered.
Respondent adds that Boardwalk's Petition raised factual issues
relative to the merits of the case, which may not be the subject of
review at this stage.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
Petitioner's case is not unique, and there is no compelling reason to
accord it the privilege it now seeks.
"[T]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor [is it a
component] of due process[. I]t is a mere statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law."[32] This being so,
x x x an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be
tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to
appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly
disposition of appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled
by clogged dockets, the Rules need to be followed by appellants
with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims
and caprices of appellants. x x x[33]
In this case, petitioner must comply with the following
requirements laid down in Rule 42 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.
A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the
same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and
other lawful fees, x x x. The petition shall be filed and served within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed
or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration x x x. Upon proper motion x x x, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only
within which to file the petition for review. No further extension
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Sec. 2. Form and contents.
The petition shall be x x x accompanied by x x x copies x x x of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a
certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced
any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he
must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn
that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
In addition, the Rules also require that the Petition must be verified
or accompanied by an affidavit by which the affiant attests under
oath that he "has read the pleading and that the allegations therein
are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records."[34]
And finally, Section 3 of Rule 42 provides that non-compliance "with
any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, x x x and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof."
Records show that petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing
rules.
The Petition must be accompanied by a Verification and
Certification against forum shopping. Copies of the relevant
pleadings and other material portions of the record must likewise
be attached to the Petition.
The Rules require that the Petition must be accompanied by a
Verification and Certification against forum shopping. If the
petitioner is a juridical entity, as in this case, it must be shown that
the person signing in behalf of the corporation is duly authorized to
represent said corporation. In this case, no special power of
attorney or board resolution was attached to the Petition showing
that Lo was authorized to sign the Petition or represent Boardwalk
in the proceedings. In addition, petitioner failed to attach to the
Petition copies of the relevant pleadings and other material
portions of the record.
Petitioner tried to cure these lapses by subsequently submitting a
board resolution showing Lo's authority to sign and act on behalf of
Boardwalk, as well as copies of the relevant pleadings. Now, it prays
that the Court consider these as substantial compliance with the
Rules.
Concededly, this Court in several cases exercised leniency and
relaxed the Rules. However, in this case, petitioner committed
multiple violations of the Rules which should sufficiently militate
against its plea for leniency. As will be shown below, petitioner
failed to perfect its appeal by not filing the Petition within the
reglementary period and paying the docket and other lawful fees
before the proper court. These requirements are mandatory and
jurisdictional.
Petitioner erroneously paid the docket fees and other lawful fees
with the RTC.
Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court specifically states that
payment of the docket fees and other lawful fees should be made
to the clerk of the CA. A plain reading of the Rules leaves no room
for interpretation; it is categorical and explicit. It was thus grave
error on the part of the petitioner to have misinterpreted the same
and consequently mistakenly remitted its payment to the RTC clerk.
Petitioner's subsequent payment to the clerk of the CA of the
docket fees and other lawful fees did not cure the defect. The
payment to the CA was late; it was done long after the
reglementary period to file an appeal had lapsed. It must be
stressed that the payment of the docket fees and other lawful fees
must be done within 15 days from receipt of notice of decision
sought to be reviewed or denial of the motion for reconsideration.
In this case, petitioner remitted the payment to the CA clerk long
after the lapse of the reglementary period.
The CA may grant an extension of 15 days only. The grant of
another 15-days extension, or a total of 30-days extension is
allowed only for the most compelling reason.
Petitioner sought an extension of 30 days within which to file its
Petition for Review with the CA. This is not allowed. Section 1 of
Rule 42 allows an extension of only 15 days. "No further extension
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason x x x."[35]
Petitioner never cited any compelling reason.
Thus, even on the assumption that the CA granted Boardwalk a 15-
day reprieve from February 3, 2007, or the expiration of its original
reglementary period,[36] it still failed to file its Petition for Review
on or before the February 19, 2007[37] due date. Records show that
the Petition was actually filed only on March 7, 2007, or way
beyond the allowable February 19, 2007 deadline. The appellate
court thus correctly ruled that this may not simply be brushed aside.
Petitioner's appeal is not deemed perfected.
More significantly, Section 8 of Rule 42 provides that the appeal is
deemed perfected as to the petitioner "[u]pon the timely filing of a
petition for review and the payment of the corresponding docket
and other lawful fees." Undisputably, petitioner's appeal was not
perfected because of its failure to timely file the Petition and to pay
the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court which is
the CA. Consequently, the CA properly dismissed outright the
Petition because it never acquired jurisdiction over the same. As a
result, the RTC's Decision had long become final and executory.
To stress, the right to appeal is statutory and one who seeks to avail
of it must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for
perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the
law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of
an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence failure to perfect the
same renders the judgment final and executory. And, just as a losing
party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, so also does the prevailing party have the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of a decision in his favor.
True it is that in a number of instances, the Court has relaxed the
governing periods of appeal in order to serve substantial justice. But
this we have done only in exceptional cases. Sadly, the instant case
is definitely not one of them.[38]
At this point, it must be emphasized that since petitioner's right of
appeal is a mere statutory privilege, it was bound to a strict
observance of the periods of appeal, which requirements are not
merely mandatory, but jurisdictional.
Nor may the negligence of Boardwalk's former counsel be invoked
to excuse it from the adverse effects of the appellate court's
pronouncement. His negligence or mistake proceeded from
carelessness and ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. This
does not constitute excusable negligence that would extricate and
excuse Boardwalk from compliance with the Rules.
Boardwalk's request for the Court to review its case on the merits
should be denied as well. The import of the Court's foregoing
pronouncements necessarily renders the RTC judgment final and
unassailable; it became final and executory after the period to
appeal expired without Boardwalk perfecting an appeal. As such,
the Court may no longer review it.

In light of the above conclusions, the Court finds no need to further

discuss the other issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' April

25,2007 and December 21,2007 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK
5711 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA I vs. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, was assigned to Branch 69which ultimately granted the petition for
ZAMBALES certiorari.
G.R. No. 162217 July 22, 2015For review are the resolutions 5
promulgated on October 28, 2003 The petitioners, who meanwhile substituted Bueno upon his death,
moved for the reconsideration of the judgmentgranting the petition
1
for certiorari, but the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration.
and February 10, 2004,
6
2
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively "dismissed" the
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. As earlier mentioned,
petitioners' petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,
the CA "dismissed" the petitioners' petition for review on October
anddenied their motion for reconsideration. At issue is the correct
28, 2003 for not being theproper mode of appeal, observing that
remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) inthe special civil action for certiorari the assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the exercise of
itsoriginal jurisdiction.
brought by the defendant in an ejectment suit to assail the refusal
7
of theMunicipal Trial Court (MTC) to give due course to the latter's
notice of appeal vis-a-vis the judgment in favor of theplaintiff. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was ultimately
denied by the CA.
AntecedentsThe late Melecio R. Bueno was the tenant-farmer
8
beneficiary of an agricultural land located in Poblacion, Iba,
Issue Although admitting that their petition for review under Rule
andZambales. On October 18, 1999, he brought an ejectment suit in
42 was inappropriate, the petitioners maintain that
the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of Iba,Province of Zambales,
theysubstantially complied with the requirements of an ordinary
3
appeal under Rule 41, and pray that the Courtexercise its equity
claiming that in 1983, the Municipality of Iba had constructed the
jurisdiction because a stringent application of the Rules of Court
public market on asubstantial portion of his land without his
would not serve the demandsof substantial justice.Ruling of the
consent; and that his repeated demands for the Municipality of Iba
tovacate the property had remained unheeded. After due CourtWe affirm. An appeal brings up for review any error of
judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction over the subject of
proceedings, the MTC ruled in favor of Bueno.
thesuit and over the persons of the parties, or any error committed
4
by the court in the exercise of its jurisdictionamounting to nothing
Thence, the Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal,but the
more than an error of judgment.
MTC denied due course to the notice of appeal. Thus, the
9
Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorariin the R TC in Iba,
Zambales to assail the denial of due course by the MTC. The case
 It was, therefore, very crucial for the petitioners and theircounsel
to have been cognizant of the different modes to appeal the
adverse decision of the R TC in the specialcivil action for certiorari
brought by the Municipality of Iba. Such modes of appeal were well
delineated in theRules of Court, and have been expressly stated in
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court since July 1, 1997,'0to wit:
Section 2.Modes of appeal.
a) Ordinary appeal.- The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court inthe exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
whichrendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.No record on appeal
shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of
multiple orseparate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall befiled and served
in like manner.(b) Petition for review.- The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Courtin the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in
accordance with Rule 42.(c) Appeal by certiorari.-In all cases where
only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shallbe to
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45. (n)Pursuant to this rule, in conjunction
with Section 3
11
and Section 4
12
of Rule 41, the petitioners should have filed a notice of appeal in
the RTC within the period of 15 days from their notice of the
judgment of the RTC, and within the same period should have paid
to the clerk of the RTC the full amount of the appellate court docket
and other lawful fees. The filing of thenotice of appeal within the
period allowed by Section 3 sets in motion the remedy of ordinary
appeal because theappeal is deemed perfected as to the appealing
party upon his timely filing of the notice of appeal. It is upon
theperfection of the appeal filed in due time, and the expiration of
the time to appeal of the other parties that the RTCshall lose
jurisdiction over the case.
13
On the other hand, the non-payment of the appellate court docket
fee withinthe reglementary period as required by Section 4, is both
mandatory and jurisdictional, the non compliance withwhich is fatal
to the appeal, and is a ground to dismiss the appeal under Section 1,
14
( c), Rule 50 of the Rules ofCourt. The compliance with these
requirements was the only way by which they could have perfected
their appeal from the adverse judgment of the RTC.In contrast, an
appeal filed under Rule 42 is deemed perfected as to the petitioner
upon the timely filing of the petition for review before the CA, while
the RTC shall lose jurisdiction upon perfection thereof and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
15
The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be
taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal
by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the
appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion.
An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the
review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial
court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast,the
discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order
rendered by a court in the exercise of itsprimary appellate
jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its
discretion.
16
Verily, the CA has the discretion whetherto due course to the
petition for review or not.
17
The procedure taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule
41 also significantly differs from that takenunder Rule 42. Under
Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is burdened to
immediately undertakethe transmittal of the records by verifying
the correctness and completeness of the records of the case;
thetransmittal to the CA must be made within 30 days from the
perfection of the appeal.
18
This requirement of transmittal of the records does not arise under
Rule 42, except upon order of the CA when deemed necessary.
19
As borne out in the foregoing, the petitioners' resort to the
petition for review under Rule 42 was wrong. Hence,the CA did not
err in denying due course to the petition for review.Yet, the
petitioners plead for liberality, insisting that their petition for
review, albeit the wrong mode, was as ubstantial compliance with
the proper mode of appeal. The plea for liberality is unworthy of
any sympathy from the Court. We have' always looked at appeal as
not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege.
1âwphi1
As the· parties invoking the privilege, the petitioners shouldhave
faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
Their failure to do so forfeited their privilegeto appeal. Indeed, any
liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be
properly invoked only in cases
of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but
definitely not in cases like now where a liberalapplicationwould
directly subvert the essence of the proceedings or results in the
utter disregard of the Rules of Court.
20
Moreover, the petitioners did not give any good reason or cause
that could warrant the relaxation of the rules intheir favor. Their
bare plea for substantial justice was not enough ground to suspend
the rules. Acceding to theirplea would conceal their shortcomings in
procedure, and thereby belittle the lofty objectives of instituting
rules of procedure. We cannot allow that to happen, for doing so
would sacrifice the smooth administration of justice guaranteed to
every litigant. We have allowed exceptions only for the most
persuasive of reasons, like relieving he litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.
21
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on October 28, 2003 andFebruary 10, 2004 in
C.A. G.R.SP No. 78706; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs
of suit.SO ORDERED.
43: PETETION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARY =
APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
AND QUASI-JUDICUAL AGENCIES TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS
PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION v. CA, GR No. 168612, 2014-12-
10
Facts:
Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) is a domestic corporation
"engaged in the manufacture and repairs of high voltage
transformers."[3] Among its rank-and-file employees were Eleodoro
V. Lipio (Lipio) and Emerlito C. Ignacio, Sr. (Ignacio, Sr.), former...
members of the PHILEC Workers' Union (PWU).[4] PWU is a
legitimate labor organization and the exclusive bargaining
representative of PHILEC's rank-and-file employees.[5]
From June 1, 1989 to May 31, 1997, PHILEC and its rank-and-file
employees were governed by collective bargaining agreements
providing for the following step increases in an employee's basic
salary in case of promotion:[6]
On August 18, 1997 and with the previous collective bargaining
agreements already expired, PHILEC selected Lipio for promotion
from Machinist under Pay Grade VIII[7] to Foreman I under Pay
Grade B.[8] PHILEC served Lipio a... memorandum,[9] instructing
him to undergo training for the position of Foreman I beginning on
August 25, 1997. PHILEC undertook to pay Lipio training allowance
as provided in the memorandum:... n September 17, 1997, PHILEC
and PWU entered into a new collective bargaining agreement,
effective retroactively on June 1, 1997 and expiring on May 31,
1999.[15] Under Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective
bargaining agreement, a... rank-and-file employee promoted shall
be entitled to the following step increases in his or her basic
salary:[16]
To be promoted, a rank-and-file employee shall undergo training or
observation and shall receive training allowance as provided in
Article IX, Section 1(f) of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining
agreement:[17]
(f) Allowance for employees under Training or Observation shall be
on a graduated basis as follows:
For the first month of training, the allowance should be equivalent
to one step increase of the next higher grade. Every month
thereafter the corresponding increase shall be equivalent to the
next higher grade until the allowance for the grade applied for is
attained.
As an example, if a Grade I employee qualifies for a Grade III
position, he will receive the training allowance for Grade I to Grade
II for the first month. On the second month, he will receive the
training allowance for Grade I to Grade II plus the allowance for
Claiming that the schedule of training allowance stated in the
memoranda served on Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. did not conform to
Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining
agreement, PWU submitted the grievance to the grievance
machinery.[19]
PWU and PHILEC failed to amicably settle their grievance. Thus, on
December 21, 1998, the parties filed a submission agreement[20]
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, submitting the
following issues to voluntary arbitration:... or PHILEC's failure to
apply the schedule of step increases under Article X of the June 1,
1997 collective bargaining agreement, PWU argued that PHILEC
committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248[27] of the
Labor Code.[28]... n its position paper,[29] PHILEC emphasized that
it promoted Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. while it was still negotiating a new
collective bargaining agreement with PWU. Since PHILEC and PWU
had not yet negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement when
PHILEC... selected Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. for training, PHILEC applied
the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale in computing Lipio's and
Ignacio, Sr.'s training allowance.[30]
This "Modified SGV" pay grade scale, which PHILEC and PWU
allegedly agreed to implement beginning on May 9, 1997, covered
both rank-and-file and supervisory employees.[31] According to
PHILEC, its past collective bargaining agreements with the rank-and-
file... and supervisory unions resulted in an overlap of union
membership in Pay Grade IX of the rank-and-file employees and Pay
Grade A of the supervisory employees.[32] Worse, past collective
bargaining agreements resulted in rank-and-file employees under
Pay
Grades IX and X enjoying higher step increases than supervisory
employees under Pay Grades A and B:[33]
To preserve the hierarchical wage structure within PHILEC's
enterprise, PHILEC and PWU allegedly agreed to implement the
uniform pay grade scale under the "Modified SGV" pay grade
system, thus:[34]
Pay grade bracket I IX covered rank-and-file employees, while pay
grade bracket A F covered supervisory employees.[35]
PHILEC disputed PWU's claim of unfair labor practice. According to
PHILEC, it did not violate its collective bargaining agreement with
PWU when it implemented the "Modified SGV" scale. Even
assuming that it violated the collective bargaining agreement,
PHILEC argued that its... violation was not "gross" or a "flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of
[the collective bargaining agreement]."[37] PHILEC, therefore, was
not guilty of unfair labor practice.[38]
Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez held in the decision[39] dated August
13, 1999, that PHILEC violated its collective bargaining agreement
with PWU.[40] According to Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez, the June
1, 1997 collective bargaining... agreement governed when PHILEC
selected Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. for promotion on August 18 and 21,
1997.[41] The provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
being the law between the parties, PHILEC should have computed
Lipio's and Ignacio, Sr.'s... training allowance based on Article X,
Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement.[42]
As to PHILEC's claim that applying Article X, Section 4 would result in
salary distortion within PHILEC's enterprise, Voluntary Arbitrator
Jimenez ruled that this was "a concern that PHILEC could have
anticipated and could have taken corrective action"[43]... before
signing the collective bargaining agreement.
Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez dismissed PWU's claim of unfair labor
practice.[44] According to him, PHILEC's acts "cannot be considered
a gross violation of the [collective bargaining agreement] nor . . . [a]
flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with... the economic
provisions of the [agreement]."[45]
On August 29, 2000, PHILEC filed a petition[51] for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, alleging that Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez
gravely abused his discretion in rendering his decision.[52] PHILEC
maintained that it did not... violate the June 1, 1997 collective
bargaining agreement.[53] It applied the "Modified SGV" pay grade
rates to avoid salary distortion within its enterprise.[54]
In addition, PHILEC argued that Article X, Section 4 of the collective
bargaining agreement did not apply to Lipio and Ignacio, Sr.
Considering that Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were promoted to a
supervisory position, their training allowance should be computed
based on the... provisions of PHILEC's collective bargaining
agreement with ASSET, the exclusive bargaining representative of
PHILEC's supervisory employees.[55]
The Court of Appeals affirmed Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's
decision.[56] It agreed that PHILEC was bound to apply Article X,
Section 4 of its June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement with
PWU in computing Lipio's and Ignacio, Sr.'s training... allowance.[57]
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied due course and
dismissed PHILEC's petition for certiorari for lack of merit.[58]
On August 3, 2005, PHILEC filed its petition for review on certiorari
before this court,[60] insisting that it did not violate its collective
bargaining agreement with PWU.[61] PHILEC maintains that Lipio
and Ignacio, Sr. were promoted... to a position covered by the pay
grade scale for supervisory employees.[62] Consequently, the
provisions of PHILEC's collective bargaining agreement with its
supervisory employees should apply, not its collective bargaining
agreement with PWU.[63] To insist on applying the pay grade scale
in Article X, Section 4, PHILEC argues, would result in a salary
distortion within PHILEC.[64]... s an exception to the rule, this court
has allowed petitions for certiorari to be filed in lieu of an appeal
"(a) when the public welfare and the advancement of public policy
dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c)
when the writs issued are null; and
(d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise
of judicial authority."[101]
In
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT PHILEC VIOLATED SECTION 4 (Step Increases)
ARTICLE X (Wage and Position Standardization) OF THE EXISTING
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA) IN IMPLEMENTING
THE STEP INCREASES RELATIVE TO THE PROMOTION OF INDIVIDUAL
COMPLAINANTS.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PHILEC's MANNER OF IMPLEMENTING THE STEP
INCREASES IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROMOTION OF INDIVIDUAL
COMPLAINANTS IN RELATION TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4,
ARTICLE X OF THE CBA CONSTITUTES UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.[21]
Ruling:
We note that PHILEC filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against Voluntary
Arbitrator Jimenez's decision.[69]
This was not the proper remedy.
Instead, the proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary
Arbitrator's or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators' decision or award is
to appeal the award or decision before the Court of Appeals. Rule
43, Sections 1 and 3 of the Rules of Court provide:... n appeal under
this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period
and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
(Emphasis supplied)
A Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has the
exclusive original jurisdiction over grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining
agreements. Should the parties agree, a Voluntary Arbitrator or a
panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall also resolve the parties' other labor disputes,
including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code provide:... n Luzon
Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank
Employees,[70] this court ruled that the proper remedy against the
award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator is an appeal before
the Court of Appeals. This court first... characterized the office of a
Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators as a quasi-
judicial agency, citing Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC[71] and
Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero:[72]
This court then stated that the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, even assuming that the office is not
strictly a quasi-judicial agency, may be considered an
instrumentality, thus:
An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. Thus,
the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are
synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a
government acts, or by which a certain government act or function
is performed. The word
"instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an
authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function. An individual person, like an
administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling
of an estate, in... the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a
bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, and a trustee in
bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the
state.
Since the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators is considered a quasi-judicial agency, this court
concluded that a decision or award rendered by a Voluntary
Arbitrator is appealable before the Court of Appeals. Under Section
9 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court of Appeals has the exclusive
original jurisdiction over decisions or awards of quasi-judicial
agencies and instrumentalities:
Luzon Development Bank was decided in 1995 but remains "good
law."[75] In the 2002 case of Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[76]
this court rejected petitioner Santiago Alcantara, Jr.'s argument that
the Rules of Court,... specifically Rule 43, Section 2, superseded the
Luzon Development Bank ruling:
Article 262-A of the Labor Code provides that the award or decision
of the Voluntary Arbitrator "shall be final and executory after ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision
by the parties":
Thus, in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. Sales Force Union-
PTGWO-BALAIS v. Coca Cola-Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,[79] this court
declared that the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator had become
final and executory because it was appealed beyond... the 10-day
reglementary period under Article 262-A of the Labor Code.
It is true that Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides for a
15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal:
The 15-day reglementary period has been upheld by this court in a
long line of cases.[80] In AMA Computer College-Santiago City, Inc.
v. Nacino,[81] Nippon Paint Employees Union-OLALIA v. Court of
Appeals,[82] Manila Midtown Hotel v. Borromeo,[83] and Sevilla
Trading Company v. Semana,[84] this court denied petitioners'
petitions for review on certiorari since petitioners failed to appeal
the Voluntary
Arbitrator's decision within the 15-day reglementary period under
Rule 43. In these cases, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal assailing the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision.
Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule
that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be appealed before
the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the
decision as provided in the Labor Code.
Appeal is a "statutory privilege,"[85] which may be exercised "only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law."[86] "Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is
not only mandatory but also... jurisdictional so that failure to do so
rendered the decision final and executory, and deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less
to entertain the appeal."[87]

We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of
decisions rendered by Voluntary Arbitrators.[88] Statute provides
that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision "shall be final and executory
after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy... of the award
or decision by the parties." Being provided in the statute, this 10-
day period must be complied with; otherwise, no appellate court
will have jurisdiction over the appeal. This absurd situation occurs
when the decision is appealed on the 11th to 15th day from...
receipt as allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under the
law, has already become final and executory.
In Shioji v. Harvey,[91] this court held that the "rules of court,
promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law, if
not in conflict with positive law."[92] Rules of Court are
"subordinate to the... statute."[93] In case of conflict between the
law and the Rules of Court, "the statute will prevail."[94]
A petition for certiorari is a special civil action "adopted to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial
agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of...
jurisdiction."[97] An extraordinary remedy,[98] a petition for
certiorari may be filed only if appeal is not available.[99] If appeal is
available, an appeal must be taken even if the ground relied upon is
grave... abuse of discretion.[100]
None of the circumstances similar to Unicraft, Leyte IV Electric
Cooperative, and Mora are present in this case. PHILEC received
Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's resolution denying its motion for
partial reconsideration on August 11, 2000.[107] PHILEC filed... its
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on August 29,
2000,[108] which was 18 days after its receipt of Voluntary
Arbitrator Jimenez's resolution. The petition for certiorari was filed
beyond the 10-day reglementary period for filing an... appeal. We
cannot consider PHILEC's petition for certiorari as an appeal.
There being no appeal seasonably filed in this case, Voluntary
Arbitrator Jimenez's decision became final and executory after 10
calendar days from PHILEC's receipt of the resolution denying its
motion for partial reconsideration.[109] Voluntary Arbitrator
Jimenez's decision is already "beyond the purview of this Court to
act upon."[110]
A collective bargaining agreement is "a contract executed upon the
request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees incorporating the agreement
reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and
all other terms and... conditions of employment, including proposals
for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such
agreement."[111] A collective bargaining agreement being a
contract, its provisions "constitute the law between the
parties"[112] and must be complied with in good faith.[113]
PHILEC, as employer, and PWU, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of PHILEC's rank-and-file employees, entered into a
collective bargaining agreement, which the parties agreed to make
effective from June 1, 1997 to May 31, 1999. Being the law between
the parties, the June

1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement must govern PHILEC and its
rank-and-file employees within the agreed period.
Contrary to PHILEC's claim, Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were not
transferred out of the bargaining unit when they were selected for
training. Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. remained rank-and-file employees
while they trained for the position of Foreman I. Under Article IX,
Section 1(e) of... the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining
agreement,[114] a trainee who is "unable to demonstrate his ability
to perform the work . . . shall be reverted to his previous
assignment. . . ."[115] According to the same provision, the trainee
"shall hold that job on a trial or observation basis and . . . subject to
prior approval of the authorized management official, be appointed
to the position in a regular capacity."[116]
Thus, training is a condition precedent for promotion. Selection for
training does not mean automatic transfer out of the bargaining
unit of rank-and-file employees.
Had PHILEC wanted the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale applied
within its enterprise, "it could have requested or demanded that
[the 'Modified SGV' scale] be incorporated in the [collective
bargaining agreement]."[120] PHILEC had "the means under the law
to... compel [PWU] to incorporate this specific economic proposal in
the [collective bargaining agreement]."[121] It "could have invoked
Article 252 of the Labor Code"[122] to incorporate the "Modified
SGV" pay grade scale in its collective... bargaining agreement with
PWU. But it did not. Since this "Modified SGV" pay grade scale does
not appear in PHILEC's collective bargaining agreement with PWU,
PHILEC cannot insist on the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale's
application. We reiterate Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's... decision
dated August 13, 1999 where he said that:
We note that PHILEC did not dispute PWU's contention that it
selected several rank-and-file employees for training and paid them
training allowance based on the schedule provided in the collective
bargaining agreement effective at the time of the trainees'
selection.[124] PHILEC cannot choose when and to whom to apply
the provisions of its collective bargaining agreement. The provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement must be applied uniformly and
complied with in good faith.
Given the foregoing, Lipio's and Ignacio, Sr.'s training allowance
should be computed based on Article X, Section 4 in relation to
Article IX, Section 1(f) of the June 1, 1997 rank-and-file collective
bargaining agreement. Lipio, who held the position of Machinist
before... selection for training as Foreman I, should receive training
allowance based on the following schedule:
Considering that Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's decision awarded
sums of money, Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. are entitled to legal interest
on their training allowances. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's decision
having become final and executory on August 22, 2000, PHILEC is
liable for... legal interest equal to 12% per annum from finality of
the decision until full payment as this court ruled in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[125]
The 6% legal interest under Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board shall not apply,
Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's decision having become final and
executory prior to the effectivity of the circular on July 1, 2013. In
Nacar v.

Gallery Frames,[127] we held that:

Principles:

An appeal to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or

decision must be filed before the Court of Appeals within 10
calendar days from receipt of the award or decision.

spite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule that

the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be appealed before the
Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the
decision as provided in the Labor Code.
FELIX T. BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS.,
INC., MARLOW NAVIGATION NETHERLANDS B.V., and ANTONIO
M. GALVEZ, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution
dated June 17, 2020, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 238348 (Felix T. Bautista v. Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc.,
Marlow Navigation Netherlands B.V., and Antonio M. Galvez).
Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is the Decision dated November 7, 2017 and the
Resolution dated March 27, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 142472, awarding partial disability benefits to petitioner
Felix Bautista (Bautista) amounting to US$20,896.00.
Facts of the Case
On April 10, 2013, Bautista began working as an able seafarer on
board MV Veersedijk for Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. and its
foreign principal, Marlow Navigation Netherlands B.V. (MARLOW).
His employment contract is covered by a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA).
On January 7, 2014, Bautista injured his left hand after accidentally
getting caught and pulled by a large rope during a mooring
operation. He was then brought to a hospital in Valencia, Spain for
immediate treatment, where he was recommended for medical
repatriation. On January 9, 2014, Bautista was repatriated to the
Philippines. The company-designated physicians ordered Bautista's
x-ray test, which showed that he was suffering from a "fracture with
lateral displacement at the base of the metacarpal bone of the
second digit."
Bautista underwent medical treatment and a series of physical
therapy sessions with the company-designated physician. On the
104th day from repatriation or on April 23, 2014, the company-
designated physician issued an interim assessment at Grade 11.
While still undergoing medical therapy with the company-
designated physicians, Bautista sought for a second opinion from
another physician, where he was found "not fit for sea duty."
On July 30, 2014 or the 202nd day from Bautista's repatriation, the
company-designated physician issued a disability assessment at
Grade 10. It was estimated that Bautista would need to undergo
another month of "aggressive" therapy. On August 27, 2014, the
company-designated physician stated that Bautista's conditions
have reached the "maximum medical improvement." Bautista was
found to tolerate at least an eight-pound dumbbell exercised on his
left upper extremities.
Bautista then sought a second medical opinion from another
physician. In a medical report dated October 18, 2014, Bautista was
found by his physician as unfit to resume his duties as a seafarer.
Through the help of the labor union, Associated Marine Officer's
and Seamen's Union of the Philippines, Bautista appeared before
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board presenting the
contradicting assessments of the company-designated physician
and his physician. The parties agreed to secure the services of a
third physician, where Bautista's condition was classified under
Disability Grade 9. The medical certificate of the third physician also
stated that Bautista's condition is assessed at 80% disability under
from the Disability of Arm, Shoulder & Hand (DASH) form. MARLOW
refused to pay 80% disability benefits pursuant to the DASH form
because it is only the patient's self-assessment of his ability to do
certain activities, but MARLOW is amenable to payment of disability
benefits at Grade 9 because it was issued following the disability
grading in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).
In a Decision dated August 25, 2015, the Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators (VA) awarded payment of permanent and total disability
benefits to Bautista. The VA held that when MARLOW issued a
Grade 10 assessment, such fact is an admission that the disability
caused by the injury is already permanent. The VA held that
disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14 are partial and
permanent. The condition will be "under legal contemplation"
permanent and total when the seafarer is incapacitated from
performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240
days. It has not been shown that Bautista was able to resume his
seafaring duties in said period. As a result, his disability was deemed
permanent and total. He was awarded US$80,000.00 in accordance
with the CBA. He was also awarded US$2,348.00 as sickness
allowance. Although the company presented wages account
receipts, the VA held that there was no way to identify if said
documents were Bautista's pay during the medical treatment. Ten
percent of the money award was also given to Bautista as attorney's
fees. As to the assessment of the third physician, the VA held that
the third physician did not conduct an independent and unbiased
examination and evaluation of a seafarer's actual physical condition
because the assessment was based on the patient's perception.
Section 7, Rule VII of the Revised Guidelines on the Conduct of
Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings of the NCMB prohibits the filing
of a motion for reconsideration to the award or decision of the VA.
For this reason, MARLOW filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court with the CA. In a Decision dated November 7,
2017, the CA modified the VA's decision awarding partial disability
benefits corresponding to the Grade 9 disability assessment issued
by the third physician. Following Article 22.4.2 of the CBA, the third
doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. Thus,
instead of US$80,000.00, Bautista is awarded. US$20,896.00 in
accordance with the Grade 9 disability rating under the CBA. The CA
deleted the award of sickness allowance finding that MARLOW
presented proof of payment to Bautista. The award of attorney's
fees was also deleted because there was no proof of unlawful
withholding from Bautista's wages. In fact, payment of sickness
allowance and wages during Bautista's medical treatment was duly
proven.
On reconsideration, Bautista argues that MARLOW filed its Petition
for Review beyond the reglementary period. Bautista argues that it
has been settled that the award or decision of the VA shall be
appealed with the CA within 10 days. Otherwise, the decision of the
VA will be final and executory. Bautista points out that MARLOW, in
its petition, manifests filing of its pleading five days after the 10-day
reglementary period, without a reasonable explanation for the late
filing.
In a Resolution dated March 27, 2018, the CA held that judgements
or final orders of the VA which are declared final are not exempt
from judicial review when so warranted, as in this case. The CA
found that the VA gravely abused their discretion, which warrants
the exercise of the CA's appellate jurisdiction. The CA also ordered
Bautista to return the excess amount that he received from the
execution of the arbitrators' decision.
Bautista filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. He restates that MARLOW filed its
Petition for Review with the CA beyond the reglementary period of
10 days. For failure of MARLOW to follow the rules, the decision of
the VA already attained finality. Even if the petition for review filed
with the CA was timely filed, the same should have still been
dismissed on the merits. Contrary to the findings of the CA,
Bautista's injury is permanent and total. His inability to substantially
do all material acts to perform his occupation without serious
discomfort or pain may be construed as total and permanent
disability. Further, a comparison of the assessments issued by the
company doctor, his physician, and the third physician consistently
shows that he was suffering from weakness in grip. Clearly, there is
an inability to perform his previous tasks. Disability grading is not
the sole basis for determining the seafarer's rights in the event of
work-related injury. The injuries or disabilities with a disability
grading from 2 to 14, are considered partial and permanent. If one
is incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties for a period of more
than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical
treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and
permanently disabled.
MARLOW, on the other hand, admits to the late filing of the petition
with the CA, but argues that the rules regarding the reglementary
period "should be harmonized in order not to cause injustice
between the parties." MARLOW argues that a decision can become
final and executory and even fully executed prior to the filing of an
available remedy provided under the rules. By way of example,
MARLOW emphasizes that the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission becomes final and executory after 10 days.
Yet, parties are sanctioned under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
file a petition for certiorari within 60 days from receipt of the
decision, or final order. In the same way, the fact that the decision
of the VA becomes final and executory within 10 days in accordance
with the Labor Code, will not prevent a party to file an appeal under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15 days after receipt of the
decision or final order. Moreover, judicial review is warranted in this
case because Bautista is not entitled to full disability benefits. The
assessment of Grade 9 by the third physician was properly upheld
by the CA. The POEA-SEC and the CBA explicitly provide that the
findings of the third doctor, chosen by the parties, shall be final and
binding. Bautista's incapacity to perform his usual sea duties for a
period of more than 120 or 240 days has no bearing on the amount
of benefits to which he is entitled. It is only after the lapse of the
240 days of treatment that a seafarer can be considered as
permanently disabled, if the company-designated physician failed to
make or issue an assessment or disability grading. Here, Bautista
was issued a final disability assessment of Grade 10 on July 30, 2014
or 202 days from his repatriation, which is still within the 240-day
period of medical treatment. Finally, MARLOW argues that it has
sufficiently proven payment of accrued salaries, including sickness
allowances to Bautista.
Ruling of the Court
Article 262-A (renumbered as Article 276) of the Labor Code
provides that the award or decision of the VA or Panel of VA shall be
final and executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the copy
of the award or decision by the parties. An appeal under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court may be filed to reverse or modify the VA's or
panel of VA's decision or award. Section 4 of the same rule provides
for a 15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal. In this case,
Marlow argues that it had timely filed its Petition for Review with
the VA within the 15-day period under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
We cannot agree.
The VA's decision or award must be appealed to the CA within 10
calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor
Code. To settle the conflict between which period, under the Rules
of Court or the Labor Code, to follow in filing an appeal to reverse or
modify the voluntary arbitrator's decision or award, We ruled in the
case of NYK-FIL Ship Management, Incorporated v. Dabu that:
Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule
that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be appealed before
the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the
decision as provided in the Labor Code.
Appeal is a "statutory privilege," which may be exercised "only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law."
"Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so rendered
the decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the
appeal."
We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of
decisions rendered by Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute provides that
the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision "shall be final and executory
after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or
decision by the parties." Being provided in the statute, this 10-day
period must be complied with; otherwise, no appellate court will
have jurisdiction over the appeal. This absurd situation occurs when
the decision is appealed on the 11th to 15th day from receipt as
allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under the law, has
already become final and executory.
Furthermore, under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution, this
court "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" in
promulgating rules of procedure in courts. The 10-day period to
appeal under the Labor Code being a substantive right, this period
cannot be diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules of
Court.
In Shioji v. Harvey, this court held that the "rules of court,
promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law, if
not in conflict with positive law." Rules of Court are "subordinate to
the statute." In case of conflict between the law and the Rules of
Court, "the statute will prevail."
The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or
decision shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10
days from receipt of the award or decision. x x x. (Citations and
emphasis omitted)
MARLOW, in its petition with the CA, stated that it received the VA's
decision on September 21, 2015 and had 15 days from said date, or
until October 6, 2015 to file its petition. However, and as discussed
above, what is governing is the reglementary period of 10 days
under the Labor Code. Therefore, MARLOW only had until October
1, 2015 to file the Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. On record, the Petition for Review filed with the CA was
dated October 5, 2015. Notably, appended to the petition was an
Affidavit of Service dated October 6, 2015 for the NCMB and
counsel of Bautista. As proof of service is required in filing a Petition
for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. We conclude that
the petition was filed with the CA on October 6, 2015 in view of the
appended proof of service or Affidavit of Service dated October 6,
2015. Clearly, the petition was filed beyond the 10-day
reglementary period. MARLOW did not present any proof or
allegation that would show otherwise. Hence, the Decision dated
August 25, 2015 of the Panel of VA has attained finality for failure of
MARLOW to timely file its Petition for Review with the CA.
MARLOW argues that while the VA's decision becomes final and
executory in 10 days, an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
can still be availed similar to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
This is erroneous as the two remedies are entirely different in
nature and cannot be likened with each other.
To reiterate, an appeal is a statutory privilege. "The perfection of an
appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional so that failure to do so rendered the decision final
and executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to
alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal."
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, on the other hand, is an
extraordinary remedy, a special civil action "adopted to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial
agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." It
cannot be a substitute for an appeal under Rule 43, even if the
latter petition cites grave abuse of discretion.
As discussed, an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the
proper recourse to reverse or modify the decision of the VA's
decision or award. The reglementary period of 10 days provided
under the Labor Code is mandatory and jurisdictional. Further,
failure to observe the period will render the decision final and
executory.
Since the timely perfection of an appeal is jurisdictional, the CA
should have dismissed the Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court filed by MARLOW because it no longer had any
appellate jurisdiction to alter or nullify the decision of the VA. The
decision of the VA attained finality and the same may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
whether made by the highest court of the land. The doctrine of
finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental considerations
of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some
definite date fixed by law. Corollary, other issues raised need not be
discussed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

November 7, 2017 and the Resolution dated March 27, 2018 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 142472 are hereby SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated August 25, 2015 of the Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED."
 BONPACK CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA SA BONPACK-
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMB-SUPER),
REPRESENTED BY ITS UNION PRESIDENT,
ZOSIMA** BUCIO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
GESMUNDO, C.J.:
This Appeal by Certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision2 dated July 29, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated
February 14, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 141529. In that case, the CA modified the Decision4 dated
July 13, 2015 of the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) in AC-820-
RCMB-NCR-LVA-008-02-2015. The VA found the complaint for
violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) filed by
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Bonpack – Solidarity of Unions in
the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (respondent)
against Bonpack Corporation (petitioner) partly meritorious.
The Antecedents
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of manufacturing flexible packaging for snack foods, breads,
juices, and candies.5 Respondent, on the other hand, is a
legitimate labor organization and the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employees of petitioner.6
From August 2, 2009 to August 1, 2014, the parties were
governed by their duly executed and registered CBA. On October
17, 2014, the parties executed a new CBA, which also had a term
of five years.7
On compensable working hours and payment of overtime
work, Sections 1 and 2 of Article VII of the CBA essentially states
that the working hours shall be eight hours a day including meal
break of 30 minutes and two 15-minute coffee
breaks.8 Regarding overtime, it provides that any employee who
works in excess of eight hours in any regular working day shall be
entitled to an additional 25% of the daily hour basic rate as
overtime premium.9
On the exercise of management prerogatives, Sec. 3 of Art.
VI of the CBA provides that "[t]he COMPANY shall discuss with
the UNION matters that may involve decisions or policies that
may adversely affect the general welfare of the members."10 The
parties likewise agreed to establish a labor-management
committee, per Art. XXIV of the CBA, a forum in which the parties
are compelled to meet at least once a month to tackle matters of
"mutual interest particularly those affecting labor-management
relations" and/or even resolve "any dispute, controversy, problem,
complaint or disagreement between the COMPANY and the
UNION or its members on matters arising out of employer-
employee relationship" with the end goal of "promoting and
maintaining harmonious labor-management relationship."11
Petitioner then unilaterally revised its old Company Rules and
Regulations (CRR),12 purportedly to harmonize it with the new
CBA.13 According to petitioner, it rearranged the CRR's layout for
easy reference of their employees and incorporated therein the
120-minute grace period policy. The revised CRR14 also defined
the act of committing an "over break" as an offense with a
corresponding disciplinary action of "final written warning," thus:
Over break. Taking coffee or snack breaks of
more than fifteen (15) minutes, lunch breaks
more than one (1) hour for non-straight
time and more than thirty (30) minutes for
straight time employees.15 (Emphasis supplied)
 From January 16-17, 2014, petitioner conducted a general
assembly of its employees and held a discussion about the
revised CRR. By the end of said gathering, each employee was
handed a copy of the revised CRR. Petitioner subsequently
implemented the same.16
However, respondent unfavorably reacted to the
implementation of the revised CRR without it being consulted at
all, especially on the imposition of harsher penalties in the
commission of company-defined offenses. It further lamented that
the revised CRR was unfair and discriminatory for being
applicable only to rank-and-file employees.17 Respondent also
claimed that petitioner was underpaying the employees' overtime
pay by deducting their one-hour meal period from their total
number of working hours with overtime.18
In order that its concerns may be heard and given the
appropriate response, respondent repeatedly requested petitioner
to formally organize a labor-management committee. However,
said requests went unheeded.19
Respondent raised its concerns during the grievance
proceedings but no settlement was reached. Thus, in February
2015, respondent lodged a complaint before the NCMB
questioning the validity of the issuance and implementation of the
revised CRR on the abovementioned grounds, and asking for the
correct payment of the employees' overtime pay. Thereafter, the
case was referred to the VA for appropriate action.20
In the course of the conferences conducted by the VA, the
parties attempted to amicably settle the case on several
instances, but all to no avail. Consequently, the parties
exchanged position papers21 and replies.22
Respondent claimed that the relevant CBA provisions
requiring the parties thereto to organize a labor-management
committee was violated by petitioner when it adopted and
implemented the revised CRR "without consulting or discussing it
with the officers of [respondent] union." Through the revised
CRR, petitioner allegedly imposed a harsher system of punishing
erring employees, which matter definitely "affects the rights,
duties and welfare of its members." The revision allegedly had no
other purpose than to prejudice the tenure of the regular rank-
and-file employees.23
As to its claim of underpayment of overtime pay, respondent
contended that petitioner required the employees to consume a
full hour as meal break, instead of the CBA mandated 30-minute
meal break and two 15-minute coffee breaks included in the
eight-hour workday. In treating the meal break to a complete and
continuous one-hour meal break, petitioner essentially created a
60-minutc non-compensable meal period, contrary to the intent of
Secs. 1 and 2 of Art. VII of the CBA. Therefore, a number of
employees who worked for 12 hours in an eight-hour workday
were paid only for 11 hours of work rendered or merely three
hours of overtime pay.24
Petitioner countered that it merely exercised its management
prerogative when it adopted and implemented the revised
CRR.25 According to petitioner, respondent's contention that the
CRR was unreasonable, unfair, and oppressive is completely
baseless. It explained that the offenses enumerated in the revised
CRR are all work-related; that the penalties prescribed are
commensurate to the degree of the infraction committed; and that
due process shall be strictly observed in disciplinary cases.
These rules and regulations have long been in existence and
remained substantially unaltered, and that the same are being
enforced on all employees of petitioner without regard to their
ranks as a necessary means of enhancing their performance.26
As to the claim of underpayment of overtime pay, petitioner
contended that it had long been observing the "statutory eight-
hour workday with one-hour meal break and two 15-minute coffee
breaks."27 The one-hour meal break is non-compensable under
the law. Thus, as illustrated by petitioner, an employee who
renders 12 hours of work in an eight-hour workday is entitled only
to an overtime pay equivalent to three hours of overtime work.
Similarly, an employee who had a 30-minute meal break and who
renders 12 hours of work in an eight-hour is entitled to an
overtime pay for three and a half hours of overtime work.28
The VA Ruling
In its Decision dated July 13, 2015, the VA partially ruled in
favor of respondent. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, a Decision
is hereby rendered ordering the respondent Company to
immediately comply with the express mandate of the CBA.
A decision is also hereby rendered upholding the validity of
the reformatted Company Rules and Regulations.
SO ORDERED.29
On the issue of underpayment of overtime pay, the VA ruled
that, since the CBA is the law between the parties, the agreed 30-
minute meal break must be viewed as included in their normal
hours of work. However, the VA also found that some employees
of petitioner were actually taking meal breaks longer than 30
minutes. The VA, thus, resolved to treat differently those
employees taking the one-hour meal break from those taking the
30-minute meal break. Those employees taking the one-hour
meal break were declared as not entitled to be compensated for
such time-off from work, following the no work, no pay policy. On
the other hand, those employees taking the 30-minute meal break
were deemed already compensated for such time-off, as agreed
upon in the CBA. Accordingly, the VA devised a formula in the
computation of the overtime pay of petitioner's employees:
Those employees who worked for twelve (12)
hours and finished their meal breaks within thirty
(30) minutes and resumed working, are entitled
to four and half (4.5) hours of overtime work.30
As regards the revised CRR, the VA upheld its validity finding
that its implementation was in the exercise of petitioner's
management prerogative in disciplining employees. Petitioner
allegedly made no substantial changes from the old CRR that
merited consultation with respondent before adopting the revised
CRR.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration dated July 23, 2015, seeking re-examination of
the computation of the overtime pay. The VA granted said motion
in its Resolution31 dated January 5, 2016, and partially modified
its ruling as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 13 July 2015 is
hereby partially modified as follows:
1. Those employees who worked for twelve [(12)] hours and
finished their meal breaks within thirty (30) minutes and resumed
working, are entitled to four (4) hours of overtime work;
2. Ordering the respondent Company to immediately comply with
the express mandate of the CBA.
Other portion of the DECISION is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.32
Meanwhile, instead of filing a motion for reconsideration,
respondent opted to assail the July 13, 2015 Decision of the VA
directly before the CA via a Petition for Review33 under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court. The petition was filed on August 3, 2015, or
within fifteen (15) days from the date respondent received a copy
of the July 13, 2015 VA's Decision. In said petition, respondent
appealed to the appellate court and prayed that petitioner be
ordered to implement the revised CRR on all of its employees. It
likewise prayed that petitioner be directed to pay in full the four
hours overtime work of those employees who rendered 12 hours
of work.34
By way of comment to respondent's petition for review before
the CA, petitioner pointed out that the July 13, 2015 Decision of
the VA had already attained finality because respondent failed to
file its petition within 10 calendar days from their receipt of a copy
thereof, as provided under Sec. 6 of Rule VII of the 2005 Revised
Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration
Proceedings (2005 VA Procedural Guidelines) and, citing as well
the relevant ruling in Philippine Electric Corporation v. Court of
Appeals35 (Philec). Nonetheless, petitioner contended that the
VA did not err in declaring the validity of its adoption and
implementation of the revised CRR. However, it still maintained
that the rank-and-file employees were not entitled to four hours
overtime pay from the 12 hours of work rendered because said
employees already consumed a non-compensable one-hour meal
break.36
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision dated July 29, 2016, the CA granted
respondent's petition and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. BONPACK is hereby
ordered to pay:
a) the wage for the 8-hour workday to the employees who are
able to prove that they took meal and rest periods in accordance
with the CBA;
b) the four (4) hours overtime pay to the employees who are
able to prove that they worked for 12 hours and took their meal
and rest periods in accordance with the CBA;
c) the wage for the 8-hour workday to the employees who are
able to prove that they took their meals in an hour equivalent to
the CBA compensable meal and rest periods included in a regular
workday;
d) the four (4) hours overtime pay to the employees who are
able to prove that they worked for 12 hours and took their meal
and rest periods in an hour, which should be equivalent to the
CBA compensable meal and rest periods included in an 8-hour
workday.
BONPACK is likewise ordered to immediately comply with the
provisions of the CBA on consultation with the union on the
interpretation and enforcement of the new CRR.
SO ORDERED.37
The CA ruled that respondent timely filed its petition in
accordance with Sec. 4 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, which allows the filing of an appeal within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the order, resolution or decision being
elevated for review.38
The CA also ruled that there were substantial changes made
in the revised CRR that involve questions on its interpretation and
enforcement, contrary to the claim of petitioner.39
Anent the issue of underpayment of overtime pay, the CA
found that petitioner's policy of requiring its employees to observe
one-hour meal break, and to consequently deduct said time-off
from the employees' total number of hours of work in a day
because the law treats the same as non-compensable, was
clearly against the CBA-mandated compensable hours of work of
eight hours a day including meal break of 30 minutes and two 15
minutes coffee breaks.40 The appellate court, thus, sustained
respondent's claim to be compensated in accordance with the
CBA as follows:
 Thus, We hold that employees who took their
meals in an hour equivalent to the CBA
compensable meal and rest periods included in a
regular workday should be compensated for the
8-hour workday. As to entitlement to overtime
pay, employees who worked for 12 hours and
had their meal and rest periods in an hour, which
should be equivalent to the CBA compensable
meal and rest periods included in an 8-hour
workday, must be paid four (4) hours overtime
pay.41
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration42 dated August 25, 2016, but the same was
denied by the CA in its assailed February 14, 2017 Resolution.
Hence, this present petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner essentially raises the following issues:
I.
Whether the VA's Decision had already been rendered final
and executory since respondent failed to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof and/or their petition before the CA was
filed beyond ten (10) days from notice of the VA's decision;
II.
Whether the CA seriously erred in finding that petitioner
violated respondent's CBA-mandated right to participate in policy
and decision-making processes on matters affecting the general
welfare of petitioner's employees; and
III.
Whether the CA seriously erred in finding that petlt10ner
required its employees to observe one-hour meal break and in
ruling that petitioner's employees were entitled to be
compensated for said meal break.
Petitioner submits that respondent filed its Petition for Review
before the CA beyond the reglementary period. It asserts that
respondent should have first filed a motion for reconsideration of
the VA's decision within ten (10) days from the date respondent
received notice thereof, citing Teng v. Pahagac43 (Teng), or filed
the petition before the CA within the said 10-day period following
the ruling in Philec.44 Since respondent failed to file a motion for
reconsideration and that its petition before the CA was filed
beyond the 10-day period, the VA's decision had therefore
attained finality and had become immutable.45
Petitioner also asserts that the VA correctly upheld the
validity of the revised CRR. With respect to the issue of
underpayment of overtime pay, petitioner denied requiring its
employees to have their meal break for one hour instead of30
minutes. It was allegedly the employees who opted to take either
the compensable 30-minute meal break or the routinary one-hour
meal break.46
In its Comment,47 filed on October 17, 2018, respondent
argues that the CA correctly found that petitioner violated the
CBA provisions on hours of work and payment of overtime
premiums. Thus, the appellate court aptly sustained the VA's
order for the payment of the employees' four hours, instead of
just three hours, of overtime pay. Respondent also asserts that,
despite its insistence "to have a proper venue to discuss
company new policies and other proposed productivity
incentives," petitioner still refuses to comply with its CBA-
mandated obligation to organize a labor-management
committee.48 The appellate court, therefore, pertinently ordered
petitioner to comply with said obligation and to make the
necessary consultation with respondent respecting the adoption
and implementation of the revised CRR.
 In its Reply49 dated March 5, 2019, petitioner reiterates its
claims that respondent's CA petition should have been dismissed
for having been filed out of time; that it did not violate their CBA
with respondent; and that it correctly paid its employee's overtime
pay.50
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, the Court finds that respondent substantially
complied with the 15-day reglementary period on filing the petition
for review before the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies which include voluntary
arbitrators. Sec. 4 thereof provides that the petition for review
shall be taken within "fifteen (15) days from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution" subject of the appeal.
Accordingly, once a petition for review is filed before the CA
within the 15-day reglementary period from the time the party
receives the notice of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution of the quasi-judicial agency, then the petition is
deemed filed on time.
In addition, it must be noted that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies to Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.51 The principle mandates "[t]he policy of judicial bodies to
give quasi-judicial agencies x x x an opportunity to correct its
mistakes by way of motions for reconsideration or other statutory
remedies before accepting appeals therefrom[.]"52 Thus, "before
a party is allowed to seek intervention of the courts, exhaustion of
available administrative remedies, like filing a motion for
reconsideration, is a pre-condition," and that failure to comply
thereto will generally lead to the dismissal of the case for lack of
cause of action.53 As emphasized in Teng, "an appeal from
administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court requires exhaustion of available remedies as a condition
precedent to a petition under that Rule.54
On the other hand, Art. 276 of the Labor Code55 provides
that the award or decision of the VA shall be "final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the
copy of the award or decision by the parties." This provision
was echoed in Sec. 6 of Rule VII of the 2005 VA Procedural
Guidelines. However, Sec. 7 of Rule VII of the said
guidelines explicitly prohibited the filing of a motion for
reconsideration against the VA's decision.
Evidently, there appears to be a conflict between Rule 43 and
Art. 276 of the Labor Code, regarding the proper reglementary
period of ten (10) days or fifteen (15) days to appeal to the CA,
and whether a motion for reconsideration is not required under
Sec. 7 of Rule VII of the 2005 VA Procedural Guidelines.
In this case, at the time respondent filed their petition before
the CA on August 3, 2015, jurisprudence56 was already replete
with variable and conflicting rulings on the reglementary period to
be followed, whether ten (10) days or fifteen (15) days, in
appealing the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators or
Panel of Arbitrators, as well as on the propriety of filing a motion
for reconsideration thereof. It was only on August 28, 2018 that
the Court finally settled these inconsistencies in the case
of Guagua National Colleges v. Court of Appeals (Guagua).57
In Guagua, the Court categorically held that the petition for
review against the decision or award of the VA shall be filed
before the CA within 15 days pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. On the other hand, the 10-day period under Art.
276 of the Labor Code refers to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration vis-à-vis the VA's decision or award.58 The Court
explained:
 Given the variable rulings of the Court, what should now be
the period to be followed in appealing the decisions or awards of
the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators?
In the 2010 ruling in Teng v. [Pahagac], the Court clarified
that the 10-day period set in Article 276 of the Labor Code gave
the aggrieved parties the opportunity to file their motion for
reconsideration, which was more in keeping with the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, holding thusly:
In the exercise of its power to promulgate
implementing rules and regulations, an
implementing agency, such as the Department of
Labor, is restricted from going beyond the terms
of the law it seeks to implement; it should neither
modify nor improve the law. The agency
formulating the rules and guidelines cannot
exceed the statutory authority granted to it by the
legislature.
By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious
intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to
Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the
party adversely affected by the VA's decision to
seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for
reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy
in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. For this reason, an
appeal from administrative agencies to the
CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires
exhaustion of available remedies as a condition
precedent to a petition under that Rule.
The requirement that administrative remedies
be exhausted is based on the doctrine that in
providing for a remedy before an administrative
agency, every opportunity must be given to the
agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all
opportunities for a resolution under the given
remedy before bringing an action in, or resorting
to, the courts of justice. Where Congress has not
clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial
discretion governs, guided by congressional
intent.
By disallowing reconsideration of the VA's
decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and
Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went
directly against the legislative intent behind
Article 262-A of the Labor Code. These rules
deny the VA the chance to correct himself and
compel the courts of justice to prematurely
intervene with the action of an administrative
agency entrusted with the adjudication of
controversies coming under its special
knowledge, training and specific field of
expertise. In this era of clogged court dockets,
the need for specialized administrative agencies
with the special knowledge, experience and
capability to hear and determine promptly
disputes on technical matters or intricate
questions of facts, subject to judicial review, is
indispensable. In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, we ruled that relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even
though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction
of a court. x x x
Hence, the 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be
understood as the period within which the party adversely
affected by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of
Arbitrators may file a motion for reconsideration. Only after
the resolution of the motion for reconsideration may the
aggrieved party appeal to the CA by filing the petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15 days
from notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43.59 (Emphasis
supplied)
Further, in Guagua, the Court ruled that a motion for
reconsideration should be filed with the VA before a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court can be filed before the
CA. The Court explained that the unchanged provision under the
2005 VA Procedural Guidelines has sown confusion among the
parties, despite the clarification made in Teng that the 10-day
period under Art. 276 of the Labor Code refers to the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before the VA as a condition precedent
to the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 in the CA. Thus,
to put a stop to the confusion, the Court directed the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the NCMB to "cause the
revision or amendment of Section 7 of Rule VII of the Revised
Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration
Proceedings in order to allow the filing of motions for
reconsideration in line with Article 276 of the Labor Code."60
Since then, the rulings in Guagua in 2018 resonated in Del
Monte Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Del Monte Fresh Supervisors
Union,61 Chin v. MaerskFilipinas Crewing, lnc.,62 Bahia Shipping
Services, Inc. v. Castillo,63 Social Housing Employees
Association, Inc. v. Social Housing Finance
Corporation,64 and DORELCO Employees Union-ALU-TUCP v.
Don Orestes Romualdez Electric Cooperative, Inc.65 However, it
was only on February 5, 2021 that the NCMB reflected the
Court's directive to allow the filing of motions for reconsideration
in its 2021 Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of
Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings.66
Applying the foregoing, it is clear that on August 3, 2015,
when respondent filed its petition for review under Rule 43 before
the CA within the 15-day reglementary period but without filing a
prior motion for reconsideration before the CA, the categorical
ruling of the Court in the 2018 case of Guagua National
Colleges was not yet in effect. Consequently, at that time,
respondent cannot be blamed for honestly relying on Sec. 7 of
Rule VII of the 2005 VA Procedural Guidelines for not filing a
motion for reconsideration and immediately resorting to a petition
for review under Rule 43 within the 15-day reglementary period.
The Court, therefore, finds no reason to disturb the CA's
ruling in favor of respondent's non-filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the VA's decision before elevating the same for
review in the CA under Rule 43. To repeat, at the time
respondent filed its CA petition, Sec. 7 of Rule VII of the 2005 VA
Procedural Guidelines persisted. This provision expressly stated
that a motion for reconsideration was not allowed. Respondent's
resort to a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
without seeking reconsideration of the VA's decision, was due to
its sincere reliance on the 2005 VA Procedural Guidelines.
Besides, respondent timely filed its CA petition within the 15-day
reglementary period under Rule 43, which was still the proper
remedy as pronounced in Guagua.
Right to participate in policy and decision-making processes
on matters affecting the general welfare of the employees
Petitioner claims that it is within its management prerogative
to revise the old CRR, and that the CBA does not even require
respondent's "prior approval or conformity" thereof for its valid
implementation.67 Nevertheless, petitioner asserts that there
were no substantial changes made in the revised CRR from the
old one and it suffices that, before the revised CRR was
implemented, the employees were duly apprised thereof during
the January 16 to 17, 2014 general assembly organized by
petitioner.
The Court disagrees.
It is settled that the exercise by an employer of its
management prerogative is not absolute and is subject to
limitations imposed by "law, collective bargaining agreement,
and general principles of fair play and justice."68
Sec. 3 of Art. VI of the CBA obligates petitioner to discuss
with respondent "matters that may involve decisions or policies
that may adversely affect the general welfare of the
members."69 Art. XXIV of the CBA even demands petitioner and
respondent to tackle all matters of "mutual interest particularly
those affecting labor-management relations" and/or even "any
dispute, controversy, problem, complaint or disagreement
between the [parties] arising out of employer-employee
relationship."70
The CRR, be it the old or revised one, lays down the omnibus
policies, rules and regulations, which petitioner demands from its
employees to strictly observe. It defines the offenses, the severity
of their commission, and the corresponding penalties to be
imposed on the erring employee. Surely, petitioner's CRR
involves matters that affect the general welfare of respondent's
members, as well as the parties' labor-management relationship,
and any changes to the same necessarily affect them. Clearly,
petitioner is duty-bound under the CBA to discuss with
respondent any revision and/or modification in the CRR.
Moreover, the obligation imposed by the parties upon
themselves is mutual. The reason behind this policy requiring a
discussion between labor and management is obvious in the CBA
itself – to promote and maintain a harmonious labor-management
relationship. The objective of this shared obligation may be
achieved through prior and bilateral consultation of the parties
with each other, and certainly not through a one-sided
presentation of the revisions or modifications already arrived at by
only one party.
Evidently, while petitioner indeed had management
prerogative, such prerogative was limited or regulated by the
relevant provisions of the CBA, particularly, Art. VI and Art. XXIV
thereof. These provisions essentially require petitioner to discuss
7!ᕼ dM ᗄ7
with respondent matters that involve decisions or policies that
may adversely affect the general welfare of its members and
labor-management relations, including any dispute arising out of
the employer-employee relationship.71
However, petitioner did not comply with its obligation under
the CBA to consult and discuss with respondent regarding these
matters affecting labor-management relations. It failed to cite any
instance showing that it tried to reach out to respondent to obtain
and consider the latter's position on the matter. In fact, it was
never disputed by petitioner that it ignored respondent's calls to
create a labor management committee, thus, deliberately
depriving respondent of its right to participate in policy and
decision-making processes on matters affecting the general
welfare of the employees.72 To the Court's view, petitioner
practically conceded that it never really consulted respondent
before it implemented the revised CRR.
The mere fact that petitioner organized a general assembly
on January 16-17, 2014 to discuss the revised CRR with its
employees cannot be considered as faithful compliance with the
relevant CBA provisions. It should be emphasized that the CBA
requires petitioner to discuss matters that affect the general
welfare of the employees specifically with the "UNION." The
union referred to is herein respondent, a juridical person vested
by law with certain rights which only it may exercise, such as the
authority to represent all the rank-and-file employees on matters
concerning them. Certainly, a general assembly of employees
regardless of rank does not possess such legal personality. It
must also be stressed that petitioner and respondent agreed to
establish a labor-management committee precisely to have a
forum where they can have a bilateral discussion on matters
affecting labor-management relations. However, this did not
happen because during the general assembly, petitioner merely
presented to all the employees the revised CRR, which was
already established without respondent's participation. In fact, the
employees were simply handed a copy of the revised CRR.
Subsequently, petitioner implemented the revised CRR sans the
comments of respondent.73 Indeed, the general assembly was a
mere farce or simulation as petitioner was already set on
implementing the onerous revised CRR regardless of
respondent's views.
Likewise, petitioner's assertion that the changes it made in
the CRR were unsubstantial is inaccurate. A cursory review of the
old and the revised CRR reveals that petitioner indeed introduced
changes, which affect the rights of the employees.74 As aptly
noted by the CA, the majority of the offenses outlined in the old
CRR have a corresponding punishment depending on the
number of times of its commission. This escalating degree of
penalty based on the number of times of the commission of the
offense was entirely deleted in the revised CRR. Accordingly, the
revised CRR imposed a harsher system of punishment, without
consulting respondent.
All of these controversies regarding the revised CRR could
have been avoided had petitioner genuinely and sincerely
complied with the mandate, under the CBA, to discuss and
consult with respondent on matters relating to labor-management
relations and the employees' general welfare. However, petitioner
did not. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner sufficiently
complied with the CBA in imposing the revised CRR.
The one-hour meal break, which is divided into 3 parts, is
compensable
Lastly, petitioner denies ordering their employees to have
their meal break for one hour instead of 30 minutes. Petitioner
asserts that it just so happened that they have employees taking
the compensable 30-minute meal break and those still having
their routinary one-hour continuous breaktime. According to
petitioner, those who took the one-hour rest period were no
longer entitled to be compensated following the no work, no pay
policy.75
The Court is not persuaded.
Sec. 83, in relation to Sec. 85 of the Labor Code, states that
the compensable eight hours of work in a day does not include
the 60 minutes time-off for the regular meals of an
employee, ergo, this statutory one-hour meal break, not being
part of the normal working hours of an employee, is non-
compensable. In short, the normal eight-hour work period does
not include the statutory and non-compensable one-hour meal
break.76
Nevertheless, the hours of work of the employees may be
modified or regulated in a duly signed CBA between the employer
and its employees. It is rudimentary that: "[a] collective bargaining
agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a
legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning
wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of
employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in
a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it
becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is
mandated by the express policy of the law."77
Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule VII of the CBA regarding meal times are
unambiguous, to wit:
Section 1. Hours of Work. – The working hours in the
COMP ANY shall be Eight (8) hours a day including meal
break of thirty (30) minutes and two (2) fifteen (15) minutes
coffee break. The regular working day shall be Six (6) days a
week, from Monday to Saturday. Sunday is considered the
general rest day of all employees in the COMPANY. All
employees shall be found stationed at their designated place of
work at the start of their time of work.
 a) Grace Period – Employees who come to work late shall
be entitled to grace period of an aggregate of One Hundred
Twenty (120) Minutes consumable in a month. Provided that
corresponding disciplinary actions found in the employees
handbook shall be imposed on the employee who incurred more
than three (3) of fifteen to thirty (15-30) minutes late in a month; in
excess of thirty (30) minutes will be subject for approval of
department head.
Section 2. Overtime Pay – Any employee who works in
excess of Eight (8) hours in any regular working day shall be
entitled to an additional Twenty Five percent (25%) of the daily
hour basic rate as overtime premium. The overtime work of
employees shall not be used to offset absences incurred by them
on regular working hours.78 (Emphasis supplied)
The short rest periods of meal time, or those periods shorter
than one-hour, have been purposely integrated by the parties in
the normal eight-hour workday. The intent of the parties is
1a ⍵⍴ h!1
readily ascertainable. The CBA divided the meal time of the
employees into three parts, i.e., the 30-minute lunch break and
two 15-minute coffee breaks. Evidently, the meal time was
divided into shorter rest periods so that these periods can be
considered as compensable.
Petitioner, however, essentially admitted that it wittingly
allowed the employees to consume one whole hour of continuous
meal break instead of strictly implementing the CBA mandated
30-minute meal break and two 15-minute rest periods. In defining
the commission of the offense of "over break" in the revised CRR,
petitioner even classified those consuming the one-hour meal
break as "straight time" employees and those consuming the 30-
minute meal break as "non-straight time" employees. Evidently,
petitioner had established two policies on hours of work and meal
period. As the Court sees it, petitioner cunningly permitted the
"straight time" employees to lump the short meal breaks into one-
hour, which is against the CBA.
Thus, through petitioner's scheming policy, it authorized a
one-hour meal break that is not compensable, contrary to the 30-
minute meal break and two 15-minute coffee breaks under the
CBA. The obvious intent of petitioner in this policy of allowing the
one-hour meal break is to lessen the compensable work hours of
its employees; instead of allowing the compensable meal break of
30-minutes and two 15-minute coffee breaks in the CBA. This is
clearly a circumvention of the unequivocal provisions of the CBA
providing for compensable meal and rest periods.
In effect, those employees rendering 12 hours of work in an
eight-hour work day, were only compensated with three hours of
overtime pay,79 instead of four hours. Clearly, the policy
implemented by petitioner thwarted the provision of the CBA
regarding the meal time of its employees.
In sum, the CA correctly ruled that petitioner's employees
who worked for 12 hours in an eight-hour workday, and took the
30-minute and two 15-minute rest breaks as their meal time in
accordance with the CBA, must be compensated for four hours of
overtime pay.80
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
July 29, 2016 and the Resolution dated February 14, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 141529, are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
RODOLFO R. MAHINAY v. CA
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari[1] alleging that the Court of
Appeals (CA) acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolutions dated
October 30, 2000, April 6, 2001
and March 6, 2002, dismissing petitioner's petition for
certiorari, which in effect sustained the Decision of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) dismissing petitioner from the
service.
The facts are as follows:
On June 10, 1998, the Philippine Economic Zone Authority
(PEZA), through Officer-in-charge Jesus S. Sirios, charged its
employee, petitioner Rodolfo R. Mahinay, for receiving unofficial
fees from FRITZ Logistics Phils. Inc. by reason of his office and in
consideration of the latter's rendering escort service to FRITZ'
trucks from Baguio City to Manila and vice-versa. The formal
charge reads:
That from 1996 to receipt by the BCEZ Police Station
Command of P/Major JOSE C. PANOPIO's February 19, 1998
directive prohibiting all BCEZ Policemen from accepting unofficial
fees from FRITZ Logistics Phils. Inc., respondent P/Capt.
RODOLDO R. MAHINAY of the BCEZ Station Command
received unofficial fees from FRITZ Logistics Phils. Inc. by reason
of his office and in consideration of the latter's rendering escort
service to FRITZ' trucks . . . from Baguio City to Manila and vice-
versa, and whose presence during such escort service is to help
lessen delay in the scheduled trip of FRITZ' cargo by police
checkpoints and unscrupulous traffic enforcers encountered
along the way, particularly during implementation of the truck ban
policy in Metro Manila.[2]
The said conduct of petitioner was alleged to be in violation of
Sec. 46 (b) (9), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to Sec. 22 (i), Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.[3]
In his Answer, petitioner admitted receiving the fees from
Fritz Logistics Phils., Inc., thus:
xxx
That respondent hereby states that the very purpose on why
he, or any other special PEZA Police Officer for that matter, is
escorting freight trucks from Baguio City to their point of
destination is to ensure that the goods will be intact and safely
and completely delivered to their destinations; that it would
therefore be inaccurate to state that their rendering escort duty is
purposely to "lessen delay in the scheduled trip xxx by police
checkpoints and unscrupulous traffic enforcers encountered
along the way, particularly during the implementation of the truck
ban policy in Metro Manila," that the latter act would just be
incidental and relative to their main task above-mentioned;
That anent the charge, respondent hereby admits that before
the directive by SPL. P/MAJOR JOSE C. PANOPIO dated
February 19, 1998, ALL police officers stationed at the Baguio
City Economic Zone (BCEZ) were receiving and amount of P300
VOLUNTARILY GIVEN by the FRITZ LOGISTICS PHILS., INC.
(FRITZ, for brevity) as and by way of traveling and meal
allowance of an escort in proceeding back to Baguio City after
coming from NAIA; that hereto attached and made an integral
part hereof as Annex "I" is a copy of a confirmation letter by
JERRY H. STEHMEIER, Managing Director of FRITZ;
That herein respondent declares that his, as well as the other
police officers' receipt of the aforesaid amount of PhP 300.00 was
done in all good faith with no intention whatsoever of enriching
themselves therefrom;
That, concededly, there is remitted by FRITZ to the BCEZ an
amount of P500 for the escorts as escort fee resulting into receipt
by the escort in the amount of P400 NET; that is, however,
indisputable that the same will be received by the particular police
officer who went on escort duty after he shall have arrived from
Manila and upon presentation of the Certificate of Appearance
secured from the Security Services Department of the Philippine
Economic Zone Authority x x x;
That, at first, there was no such thing as additional allowance
from FRITZ but after the transportation fare from Manila/Pasay
City to Baguio City increased substantially by half, as well as the
costs of other incidental expenses ballooned, FRITZ voluntarily
offered the additional allowance after understanding very well that
the P400 escort fee is not reasonably sufficient; simple
mathematics applied;
That, without being repetitive, it must be straightened for the
record, that the giving of the P300 by FRITZ was on its own
volition without any demand from the escorts;
That after receipt of the DIRECTIVE from SPL. P/MAJOR
PANOPIO, herein respondent no longer received the P300.00
tendered by FRITZ through its drivers whenever he does escort
duty, that in fact, herein respondent directed all his men to stop
receiving the P300 allowance from FRITZ in compliance with the
directive of their superior, SPL. P/MAJOR PANOPIO;
That, like himself, respondent could very well say that all of
the other Police Officers in the BCEZ Force never received the
additional allowance from FRITZ thereafter, that almost every
after an escort duty by a Police Officer, he silently complains that
the P400 escort duty received from the Financial Services
Division as remitted officially by FRITZ to BCEZ was not sufficient
in covering all the incidental expenses he incurred in escorting;
That it would not be amiss to state even that considering that
these FRITZ closed trucks being escorted leave Baguio City at
2:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less; that considering the
time, the escorts could not make cash advances for their
expenses and really have to shell out their personal money in the
meantime to be reimbursed only after the duty;
That on another point, herein respondent feels that this
charge against him was only maliciously hurled by some officers
who take in slight the prudent and conscientious acts of the
respondent in protecting foremost the interest of PEZA;
That more particularly, BCEZ Officer-in-Charge Digna D.
Torres maliciously imputed these things to malign my reputation
and personality after having learned that herein respondent filed
several criminal charges against her before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Baguio City solely for the purpose of redressing a
wrong committed against his person and honor by Mrs. Torres.[4]
At the hearing of September 30, 1998, petitioner appeared
with two counsels who manifested that they were reiterating the
defenses stated in petitioner's Answer. The Hearing Committee
required petitioner to put the manifestation in writing because it
was, in effect, a waiver of his right to be present and to be heard.
Petitioner and his counsels left after submitting the written waiver.
Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor presented his lone
witness, Mr. Jerry H. Stehmeier, managing director of FRITZ, who
affirmed the contents
of his Affidavit[5] dated September 9, 1998. He testified that
the "extra amount" of P300 was in fact actually received by
petitioner, who exacted the same from FRITZ, for escorting their
"trucks all the way to the airport or all the way to our FRITZ office
in Manila." The testimony was a recantation of his earlier
statement contained in a letter dated February 10, 1998 that the
extra amount was voluntarily given by FRITZ.
On January 8, 1999, the PEZA rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Authority
finds the Respondent guilty of the offense as charged and is
hereby meted out the penalty of forced resignation without
prejudice to the grant of monetary and other fringe benefits, as
allowed by existing law and the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations.[6]
The PEZA held that all the elements of the offense charged
were present in the case. The testimony of Jerry H. Stehmeier
proved that the amount of P300 per escort was received by
petitioner, and that the receipt of the money was done in the
course of official duties. Petitioner's receipt of P300 per escort
from FRITZ was over and above what was officially paid by PEZA
to petitioner for escort services rendered.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
PEZA in a Resolution dated March 11, 1999.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC. In Resolution No. 000878
dated March 30, 2000, the CSC upheld the PEZA's decision, but
modified the penalty of forced resignation to dismissal from the
service in accordance with Sec. 52 (A.9), Rule IV, Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and Sec. 22 (i),[7]
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
The dispositive portion of the CSC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Rodolfo Mahinay is hereby
dismissed. Accordingly, the decision dated January 8, 1999 of
PEZA finding Mahinay guilty of violating Sec. 46 (b) No. 9, Book
V of E.O. 292 is affirmed. However the penalty of Forced
Resignation is modified to Dismissal pursuant to section 52, Rule
IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.[8]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
CSC in Resolution No. 001698 dated July 21, 2000. Petitioner
received a copy of the resolution on August 11, 2000.
On September 12, 2000, petitioner filed with the CA a Motion
for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Certiorari, requesting
for a period of up to November 10, 2000 within which to file his
petition.
On October 30, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying
the said motion for being the wrong mode of appeal and for being
filed out of time. The CA stated that since the assailed Resolution
was rendered by a quasi-judicial body, the proper mode of appeal
is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which
petition should be filed within 15 days from notice of the
resolution.
On November 9, 2000, petitioner filed the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
nullification of the CSC Resolution dismissing him from the
service.
On April 6, 2001, the CA issued a Resolution stating that it
had promulgated the Resolution dated October 30, 2000
dismissing the petition for certiorari, and that the Judicial Records
Division Report showed that neither a motion for reconsideration
nor a Supreme Court petition on the resolution had been filed.
Consequently, the CA ordered the issuance of the corresponding
entry of judgment, and noted without action the petition for
certiorari filed on November 9, 2000.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA
of Appeals in a Resolution dated March 6, 2002.
Hence, this petition.
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's appeal by way of special civil
action for certiorari on the ground that it was the wrong mode of
appeal and that the appeal was filed out of time.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that the petition
for certiorari was made to substitute a lost appeal because while
a petition for review under Rule 43 was available, it was not an
adequate remedy for petitioner considering that he was dismissed
from the service on June 9, 1999 by PEZA even before the case
was appealed to the Civil Service on June 22, 1999.
 The contention is without merit.
As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper
mode of appeal from the decision of a quasi-judicial agency, like
the CSC, is a petition for review filed with the CA.
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court may be resorted to only when any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In this case, petitioner clearly had the remedy of appeal
provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Madrigal Transport,
Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation[9] held:
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action
for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal
(including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not
and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own
negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such
loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no
available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if
the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
The Court is aware of instances when the special civil action
of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an
appeal, such as when public welfare and the advancement of
public policy dictate; when the broader interests of justice so
require; when the writs issued are null; and when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[10]
However, the circumstances in this case do not warrant the
application of the exception to the general rule provided by Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.
The CA, therefore, properly denied petitioner's Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Petition for Certiorari, which in effect
dismissed his Petition for Certiorari.
There have been instances when a petition for certiorari
would be treated as a petition for review if filed within the
reglementary period. In this case, the petition was filed beyond
the reglementary period for filing an appeal under Rule 43, which
period is within 15 days from notice of the judgment. Petitioner
received a copy of the CSC Resolution dated July 21, 2000 on
August 11, 2000, so his last day to file an appeal would be
August 26, 2000. However, petitioner filed his Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Petition for Certiorari on September
12, 2000, while the petition was actually filed on November 9,
2000. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the appeal
was filed out of time.
Consequently, the decision of the CSC dismissing petitioner
from the service stands. The Court deems it proper to reiterate
that dismissal from the service carries with it disqualification for
reemployment in the government service, and forfeiture of
retirement benefits except leave credits. Petitioner is, therefore,
entitled to receive the monetary equivalent of his accrued leave
credits.[11]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
VIRGILIO S. SUELO v. MST MARINE SERVICES
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by
petitioner Virgilio S. Suelo, Jr. (petitioner) assailing the
Resolutions[2] dated September 3, 2019 and March 6, 2020 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA -G.R. SP No. 161699, which dismissed
his petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
due to several procedural infirmities.
The Facts
On May I 0, 2016, petitioner was hired by respondent MST Marine
Services (Phils.), Inc. (respondent) as Second Engineer for a six (6)-
month contract on board the vessel "Janesia Asphalt V," with a basic
monthly package of $1,551.00 as salary, $1,155.00 as overtime pay,
and $466.00 vacation leave pay, among others. On May 28, 2016,
he boarded the vessel and commenced his duties as Second
Engineer.[3]
On October 29, 2016, he was brought to Singapore General Hospital
due to severe headache, slurring of speech, neck pain, and a recent
history of loss of consciousness. Upon evaluation, he was diagnosed
with uncontrolled hypertension. His X-ray results revealed
degenerative change at C5-6 and C6-7 levels. Subsequently, he was
given medications, declared unfit for all marine duties, and signed
off in Singapore on medical grounds. He arrived in the Philippines
on November 4, 2016 and immediately flew to his hometown in
Iloilo.[4]
On November 7, 2016, he reported to respondent's branch office in
Iloilo. He alleged that respondent did not allow him to report to its
Manila office and refused to refer him to a company-designated
physician. Instead, respondent allegedly asked him to seek medical
treatment subject to reimbursement. However, he averred that
when he submitted his request for reimbursement, respondent
denied the same.[5] Accordingly, he filed a complaint for permanent
and total disability benefits, damages, and attorney's fees before
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
For their part, respondent argued that it was petitioner who refused
to undergo treatment with the company-designated physician,
thereby forfeiting his right to claim disability benefits and sick
wages. Moreover, petitioner was not entitled to sickness allowance,
damages, and attorney's fees in the absence of bad faith from
respondent's end.[6]
The VA Ruling
In a Decision[7] dated February 18, 2019, the Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators (VA) denied petitioner's claim, rejecting his allegation
that respondent asked him to seek medical treatment subject to
reimbursement. The VA found that the medical abstract he
submitted, which was dated two (2) years from the time of his
disembarkation from the vessel, revealed that he sought medical
treatment almost a year after such disembarkation, or around
August 2017. Moreover, the VA ruled that petitioner cannot claim
medical reimbursement since he failed to submit any evidence of
his medical expenses. On the other hand, it found that respondent
was able to prove through substantial evidence that it was
petitioner who actually refused to be referred to a company-
designated physician because he believed that his condition was
already cured.[8]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[9] which
was denied in a Resolution[10] dated June 28, 2019. Petitioner,
through counsel, received the copy of the order of the denial of the
MR on July 12, 2019. On July 22, 2019, petitioner moved for a
twenty (20)-day extension within which to file a petition for review
before the CA, or until August 11, 2019.[11] On August 9, 2019,
petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
(Rule 43 Petition) before the CA.[12]
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution[13] dated September 3, 2019, the CA dismissed the
Rule 43 Petition outright citing the following procedural infirmities:
(a) it was filed two (2) days late, and (b) the affidavit of service was
inaccurate, since it stated that the service of the copy of the petition
upon the adverse parties was done personally, when in fact it was
served through registered mail. With respect to the first ground, the
CA explained that since petitioner received the VA's June 28, 2019
Decision denying his motion for reconsideration on July 12, 2019, he
only had until August 7, 2019, reckoned from July 22, 2019 (or ten
[10] days from July 12, 2019), within which to file the Rule 43
Petition before the CA. However, he belatedly filed the same on
August 9, 2019 in violation of Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. Anent the second ground, the CA ruled that the inaccuracy in
the affidavit of service was in violation of Section 13, Rule 13 of the
same Rules.[14]
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration.[15] He admitted
that he had only fifteen (15) days from July 12, 2019, or until July
27, 2019, within which to file the Rule 43 Petition before the CA.
However, believing that he had only ten (10) days to do so, he opted
to file a motion for extension of the period to file the Rule 43
Petition, thus asking for an additional twenty (20) days or until
August 11, 2019, to file the same. He likewise admitted that he
inadvertently stated in his explanation that the copy of the petition
was served to the adverse party through personal service.[16]
In a Resolution[17] dated March 6, 2020, the CA denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, holding that the right to appeal is not a
natural right as it is merely a statutory privilege to be exercised only
in accordance with the law. Although the law admits exceptions, as
the Rules may be relaxed to save litigants from injustice
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed rules,
the CA found said exception to be wanting in this case.
Consequently, the VA's Decision became final and executory, and
thus, immutable and unalterable.[18]
Hence, the present petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
dismissing the Rule 43 Petition on procedural grounds.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
In the recent case of Chin v. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc.,[19]
(Chin) citing Guagua National Colleges v. CA,[20] (Guagua National
Colleges) the Court categorically declared that the correct period to
appeal the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel
of Arbitrators to the CA via a Rule 43 petition for review is the
fifteen (15)-day period set forth in Section 4[21] thereof reckoned
from the notice or receipt of the VA's resolution on the motion for
reconsideration, and that the ten (10)-day period provided in Article
276 of the Labor Code refers to the period within which an
aggrieved party may file said motion for reconsideration, viz.:
Hence, the 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be
understood as the period within which the party adversely affected
by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators
may file a motion for reconsideration. Only after the resolution of
the motion for reconsideration may the aggrieved party appeal to
the CA by filing the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court within 15 days from notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule
43.[22] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, under Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, upon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket
fees before the expiration of the reglementary period, the CA may
grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to
file the petition for review, and no further extension shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case shall
it exceed fifteen (15) days.
In this case, records reveal that petitioner received a copy of the
VA's Decision denying his motion for reconsideration on July 12,
2019. Thus, he had fifteen (15) days therefrom or until July 27, 2019
within which to file the petition, or to move for a 15-day extension
of time to file the same. Assuming that an extension is granted, he
had until August 11, 2019, reckoned from the expiration of the
reglementary period on July 27, 2019, within which to file his
petition.
Indeed, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file his
Rule 43 Petition within the allowable period or on July 22, 2019.
Although the Rules allow only for a 15-day extension or until August
11, 2019, he was able to file his petition on August 9, 2019, also
clearly within the allowable extended period. Hence, in both
instances, petitioner filed his pleadings on time. Moreover,
petitioner's error in the affidavit of service stating that he served
copies of the Rule 43 Petition to the adverse parties through
personal service instead of registered mail appears to have been an
honest mistake. In any case, the inaccuracy in the statement of the
manner of service appears inconsequential considering that, after
all, he was able to serve copies of the petition to the adverse
parties.
In sum, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing outright the
Rule 43 Petition based solely on procedural grounds; therefore, a
remand of the case for a resolution on the merits is warranted.
Finally, following the Court's recent disposition in Chin, the
reminder to the Department of Labor and Employment and the
NCMB to revise or amend the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the
Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings to reflect the ruling in
the Guagua National Colleges case is hereby reiterated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
September 3, 2019 and March 6, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 161699 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the present case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals
for resolution on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: Tender of Payment and Consignation G.R. No. 169501
On all these dates, however, [petitioner] allegedly refused to accept
payment from [respondent].
June 8, 2007
B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., petitioner, vs. ROSARIO T.
ALZUL, respondent.
FACTS: On February 10, 1975, respondent purchased from
petitioner four (4) subdivision lots with an aggregate area of 1,275
square meters located at Aurora Subdivision, Maysilo, Malabon.
(bought through installment under Contract to Sell No. 867 at
(₧100.00) per square meter--interest was (12%) per annum until
fully paid--total purchase price was (₧237,660.00). On July 25,
1977, [respondent] signed a "Conditional Deed of Assignment and
Transfer of Rights" which assigned to a certain Wilson P. Yu her
rights under the Contract to Sell. [Petitioner] was notified of the
execution of such deed. Later on, the Contract to Sell in
[respondent’s] name was cancelled, and [petitioner] issued a new
one in favor of Yu although it was also denominated as "Contract to
Sell No. 867".
On November 11, 1996, [respondent] filed a Manifestation in GR
No. 109078 informing the Supreme Court that [petitioner], on three
(3) occasions, refused to accept [her] payment of the balance in the
amount of ₧187,380.00. On January 29, 1997, a Resolution was
issued by the Supreme Court referring the case to the court of origin
for appropriate action, on account of [respondent’s] manifestation.
On October 21, 1997, [respondent’s] counsel wrote a letter to
[petitioner] citing the latter’s refusal to accept her payment on
several occasions. It was also mentioned therein that due to its
refusal, [respondent] would just consign the balance due to
[petitioner] before the proper judicial authority. Thinking that an
action for consignation alone would not be sufficient to allow for
the execution of a final judgment in her favor, [respondent] decided
to file an action for consignation and specific performance against
[petitioner] before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board on
March 12, 1998.
On July 4, 1979, [respondent] informed [petitioner] about Yu’s
failure and refusal to pay the amounts due under the conditional
deed. She also manifested that she would be the one to pay the
installments due to respondent on account of Yu’s default.
HLURB through Housing and Land Use Arbiter Dunstan T. San
Vicente: "The purported "consignation" in this case is thus of no
moment, inasmuch as the amount allegedly due was not even
deposited or placed at the disposal of this Office by the
complainant.
On August 25, 1980, [respondent] commenced an action for
rescission of the conditional deed of assignment against Yu before
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. (Trial Court & CA in favor
of respondent) Subsequently, on September 30, 1985, [respondent]
caused the annotation of notices of lis pendens on the titles
covering the subject lots.
In any event, we agree with [petitioner] that even if the
complainant had actually made the consignation of the amount,
such consignation is still ineffective and void for having been done
long after the expiration of the nonextendible period set forth in the
17 June 1996 Supreme Court Resolution that expired on 20
September 1996.
On February 17, 1989, [petitioner] notified [respondent] that
Contract to Sell No. 867 was declared rescinded and cancelled. On
April 28, 1989, the subject lots were sold to spouses Carlos and
Sandra Ventura who were allegedly surprised to find the annotation
of lis pendens in their owner’s duplicate title.
[Respondent] then filed an appeal to the Office of the President.
The single question resolved was whether or not [respondent’s]
offer of consignation was correctly denied by the HLURB. Said office
ruled in the affirmative, and We quote:
On May 8, 1990, the Ventura spouses filed an action for Quieting of
Title with Prayer for Cancellation of Annotation and Damages (RTC:
in favor of spouses--CA: reversed--SC: affirmed) SC: Private
respondent Rosario T. Alzul is given a nonextendible period of thirty
(30) days from entry of judgment, within which to make full
payment for the properties in question. On July 12, 1996, an Entry
of Judgment was issued. In an attempt to comply with the Supreme
Court’s directive, herein [respondent] tried to serve payment upon
[petitioner] on August 29, 1996, August 30, 1996 and September 28,
1996.
"From the foregoing, it is evident that there was no valid
consignation of the balance of the purchase price. The 30day non-
extendible period set forth in the 17 June 1996 resolution had
already expired on 20 September 1996. The HLURB is therefore
justified in refusing the consignation, otherwise it would be accused
of extending the period beyond that provided by the Supreme
Court. A valid consignation is effected when there is an actual
consignation of the amount due within the prescribed period, CA:
agreed with the HLURB that no valid consignation was made by
respondent but found that justice would be better served by
allowing respondent Alzul to effect the consignation, albeit
belatedly. It cited the respondent’s right over the disputed lots as
confirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
109078, which, if taken away on account of the delay in completing
the payment, would amount to a grave injustice. ISSUE: Now we will
address the main issue—whether respondent Alzul is still entitled to
consignation despite the lapse of the period provided by the Court
in G.R. No. 109078 entitled Yu v. Court of Appeals. Petitioner
stresses the fact that respondent Alzul did not comply with this
Court’s June 17, 1996 Resolution20which gave a non-extendible
period of thirty (30) days from entry of judgment within which to
make full payment for the subject properties. The entry of judgment
shows that the December 26, 1995 Resolution21 in G.R. No. 109078
became final and executory on July 2, 1996. Respondent Alzul
received through counsel a copy of the entry of judgment on August
21, 1996. Thus, respondent had until September 20, 1996 within
which to make the full payment. After three (3) unsuccessful
tenders of payment, respondent Alzul made no consignation of the
amount to the court of origin. Moreover, petitioner argues that
respondent’s delay of a year and a half to pursue full payment must
be regarded as a waiver on her part to claim whatever residual
remedies she might still have for the enforcement of the June 17,
1996 Resolution in G.R. No. 109078. Petitioner further contends
that even if the action before the HLURB was made on time, that is,
within the 30-day period, still it is fatally defective as respondent did
not deposit any amount with the HLURB which violated the rules for
consignment which require actual deposit of the amount allegedly
due with the proper judicial authority. HELD: After a careful study of
the factual milieu, applicable laws, and jurisprudence, we find the
petition meritorious. Respondent Alzul was accorded legal rights
over subject properties. In G.R. No. 109078, finding no reversible
error on the part of the CA, we denied Wilson P. Yu’s petition and
affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that as between Wilson P. Yu,
the Ventura spouses, petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc., and respondent
Alzul, respondent has inchoate proprietary rights over the disputed
lots. We upheld the CA ruling declaring as "null and void" the titles
issued in the name of the Ventura spouses and reinstating them in
the name of B.E. San Diego, Inc., with the corresponding notices of
lis pendens annotated on them in favor of respondent until such
time that ownership of the subject parcels of land is transferred to
respondent Rosario Alzul. It is thus clear that we accorded
respondent Alzul expectant rights over the disputed lots, but such is
conditioned on the payment of the balance of the purchase price.
Having beenconceded such rights, respondent had the obligation to
pay the remaining balance to vest absolute title and rights of
ownership in his name over the subject properties. In our June 17,
1996 Resolution, we clearly specified thirty (30) days from entry of
judgment for respondent to promptly effect the full payment of the
balance of the purchase price for the subject properties. The non-
compliance with our June 17, 1996 Resolution is fatal to respondent
Alzul’s action for consignation and specific
performance.Unfortunately, respondent failed to effect such full
payment of the balance of the purchase price for the subject
properties. No consignation within the 30-day period or at a
reasonable time thereafter It is clear as day that respondent did not
attempt nor pursue consignation within the 30-day period given to
her in accordance with the prescribed legal procedure. It must be
borne in mind however that a mere tender of payment is not
enough to extinguish an obligation. There is no dispute that a valid
tender of payment had been made by respondent. Absent however
a valid consignation, mere tender will not suffice to extinguish her
obligation and consummate the acquisition of the subject
properties. The records also reveal that respondent failed to effect
consignation within a reasonable time after the 30-day period which
expired on September 20, 1996. Indeed, we have accorded
respondent, through said Resolution, all the opportunity to pursue
consignation with the court of origin and yet, respondent failed to
make a valid consignation. This is already inexcusable neglect on the
part of respondent. No valid consignation made.We agree with
petitioner’s assertion that even granting arguendo that the instant
case for consignation was instituted within the 30-day period or
within a reasonable time thereafter, it would still not accord
respondent relief as no valid consignation was made. Certainly, the
records show that there was no valid consignation made by
respondent before the HLURB as she did not deposit the amount
with the quasi-judicial body as required by law and the rules. REFER
TO: Article 1258 of the Civil Code It is true enough that respondent
tendered payment to petitioner three (3) times through a Solidbank
Manager’s Check No. 1146 in the amount of PhP 187,38028 on
August 29 and 30, 1996 and September 28, 1996. It is true likewise
that petitioner refused to accept it but not without good reasons.
Petitioner was not impleaded as a party by the Ventura spouses in
the Malabon City RTC case for quieting of title against Wilson Yu nor
in the appealed case to the CA nor in G.R. No. 109078. As cited
earlier, consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the
court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or
refuses to accept payment and it generally requires a prior tender of
payment. 29 It is of no moment if the refusal to accept payment be
reasonable or not. Indeed, consignation is the remedy for an unjust
refusal to accept payment.
The first paragraph of Art. 1256 of the Civil Code precisely provides
that "[i]f the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made
refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released
from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due. The
proper and valid consignation of the amount due with the court of
origin, which shall judicially pronounce the validity of the
consignation and declare the debtor to be released from his/her
responsibility, shall extinguish the corresponding obligation.
Moreover, in order that consignation may be effective, the debtor
must show that:
(1) there was a debt due;
(2) the consignation of the obligation had been made because the
creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it,
or because s/he was absent or incapacitated, or because several
persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due or
because the title to the obligation had been lost;
(3) previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person
interested in the performance of the obligation;
(4) the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court; and
(5) after the consignation had been made, the person interested
was notified of the action.30 Respondent did not comply with the
provisions of law particularly with the fourth and fifth requirements
specified above for a valid consignation.
In her complaint for consignation and specific performance,
respondent only prayed that she be allowed to make the
consignation without placing or depositing the amount due at the
disposal of the court of origin. Verily, respondent made no valid
consignation. The question is—can the Court, the CA, or the
Malabon City RTC order petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc. to accept the
tender of payment made by respondent Alzul? Definitely, they
cannot. The reason is that petitioner was not impleaded as a party
in the Malabon City RTC civil case, CAG.R. CV No. 33619, nor in G.R.
No. 109078 and hence is not under the jurisdiction of said courts.
What were determined and decided in the CA Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 33619 were the annulment of the titles of spouses Carlos
and Sandra Ventura, the reinstatement of said titles to the name of
petitioner, and the declaration that the ownership of the lots
subject of said titles will be transferred to respondent. There is no
directive to respondent granting her the right to pay the balance of
the price to petitioner and, more importantly,there is no order for
petitioner to accept the payment.
The dispositive or fallo of the decision is what actually constitutes
the judgment or resolution of the court that can be the subject of
execution. Where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion
of the decision and its body, the dispositive portion controls
irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision.34 Such
being the case, petitioner is not duty bound to accept any tender of
payment from respondent precisely because such diktat is absent in
the fallo of the CA Decision which was affirmed by this Court in its
December 26, 1995 Resolution in G.R. No. 109078. It is for this
reason that respondent cannot ask for a writ of execution from the
trial court where the complaint was originally instituted as said
court has no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Even if a writ
is issued, it should conform to the judgment, and the fallo of the CA
Decision does not impose the duty or obligation on the part of
petitioner to accept the payment from respondent. It is the settled
doctrine that a writ of execution must conform to the judgment and
if it is different from or exceeds the terms of the judgment, then it is
a nullity.36 The cause of action available to respondent is to file an
action for consignation against petitioner which she did by
registering a complaint for consignation before the HLURB on March
12, 1998. Unfortunately, it was filed way beyond the 30-day period
which lapsed on September 20, 1996 or immediately thereafter.
Because of the failure of respondent to effect payment to petitioner
within the 30-day period or soon thereafter, her rights to buy the
disputed lots have been forfeited, lost, and extinguished. While we
commiserate with the plight of respondent, the CA ruling will not
prevail over the established axiom that equity is applied only in the
absence of and never against statutory law or judicial rules of
procedure.39 For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in
the absence of law and not as its replacement.40 Equity as an
exceptional extenuating circumstance does not favor, nor may it be
used to reward, the indolent. This Court will not allow a party, in
guise of equity, to benefit from respondent’s own negligence. 41 In
the light of the foregoing considerations, we find that the grant of
respondent’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 81341 and the recognition
of the belated consignation of the amount find no support nor basis
in law, rule, or jurisprudence. However, respondent had made
payments over the subject properties based on her agreement with
petitioner. So as not to enrich itself at the expense of respondent,
petitioner is obliged to reimburse respondent whatever amount
was paid by her in form of monthly amortizations. On the other
hand, if respondent is in possession of the subject properties, she
and all persons claiming under her should surrender the possession
to petitioner
Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencerina
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari are the Resolutions dated June
15, 2006 and April 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 91977 which enjoined the execution of the Order dated June
8, 2005 of Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo in OMB-ADM-0-00-0547,
pending appeal.
The Facts
Sometime in October 1997, Ecobel Land, Inc. (Ecobel) through its
Chairman, Josephine Boright (Boright), applied for a medium term
loan financial facility with the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) Investment Management Group (or Finance Group) to
finance the construction of its condominium project in Ermita,
Manila (project). The loan application was denied due to the
following grounds: (a) the collateral was insufficient; (b) Ecobel did
not have the needed track record in property development; and (c)
the loan was sought during the Asian financial crisis.
Intent on pursuing the project, Ecobel, this time, applied for a surety
bond with the GSIS to guarantee the re-payment of the principal
loan obligation to be procured with the Philippine Veterans Bank
(PVB). Ecobel's application was "APPROVED in principle subject to
analysis/evaluation of the project and the offered collaterals".
In a Memorandum dated January 27, 1998, respondent Alex M.
Valencerina (Valencerina), then Vice-President for Marketing and
Support Services of the GSIS General Insurance Group (GIG),
submitted Ecobel's Guarantee Payment Bond application for
evaluation and endorsement of the GSIS Investment Committee
(INCOM). In the said Memorandum, Valencerina made it appear
that Ecobel's application was fully secured by reinsurance and real
estate collaterals, and that its approval was urgent considering
Ecobel's limited time to avail of the loan from the funder. Such
memorandum was coursed through GIG Senior Vice-President,
Amalio A. Mallari (Mallari), who scribbled thereon his own
endorsement, stating "Strongly reco. based on info and collaterals
herein stated".
On March 10, 1998, the INCOM approved Ecobel's application and
GSIS Surety Bond G (16) GIF Bond 029132 dated March 11, 1998
(subject bond) was correspondingly issued indicating the following
parties: Ecobel, represented by its Chairman, Boright, as principal
(obligor), PVB as obligee, and Mallari, in representation of the GSIS
General Insurance Fund, the purpose of which was to guarantee the
repayment of the principal and interest on the loan granted to the
principal through the obligee to be used for the construction of the
project. ISHaTA
Later, however, or on November 19, 1998, GSIS President and
General Manager Federico Pascual issued a memorandum
suspending the processing and issuance of guaranty payment
bonds. Accordingly, Valencerina prepared a cancellation notice to
Ecobel for Mallari's signature, but was told that the subject bond
could no longer be cancelled because it was already a "done deal."
Thus, upon the request of Mallari, Valencerina signed a Certification
dated January 14, 1999, stating that the subject bond: (a) was
genuine and authentic; (b) constituted a valid and binding obligation
on the part of GSIS; and (c) may eventually be transferred to Bear,
Stearns International, Ltd. (BSIL), Aon Financial Products, Inc. or any
of their assignees, subject to the prior written or fascsimile
notification to the GSIS by the current obligee, PVB, and that
confirmation or approval from GSIS is not required. Said
certification further stated that GSIS had no counterclaim, defense
or right of set-off with respect to the subject bond, provided that
drawing conditions (covered in a separate certification) have been
satisfied.
Notwithstanding the issuance of the subject bond on March 11,
1998, Ecobel paid its yearly premium only on February 9, 1999
through a postdated check dated February 26, 1999, and thereon
submitted the certificates of title for the collaterals required
therefor. However, the certificate of title of the major collateral
(situated in Lipa City, Batangas), i.e., Transfer Certificate of Title No.
66289, was eventually found to be spurious.
Consequently, Valencerina, in the letters dated February 12 and 24,
1999 informed Boright that the subject bond was "invalid and
unenforceable" and that Ecobel's check payment was disregarded
by the GSIS. Despite the bond cancellation notices, Ecobel was still
able to secure a US$10,000,000.00 loan from BSIL using the subject
bond. Thereafter, it offered to pay the bond premiums to the GSIS
London Representative Office, which was accepted by Vice-
President for International Operations of the GIG, Fernando U.
Campa a (Campa a), who was neither furnished copies nor informed
of the cancellation of the subject bond.
Ecobel defaulted in the payment of its loan, prompting BSIL to serve
upon it a notice of default and its intention to recover the
repayment amount under the terms of their loan agreement and
the subject bond. The GSIS was similarly advised.
In a Certification dated March 20, 2000, PVB Executive President
and Chief Operating Officer Florencio Z. Sioson declared that PVB
did not accept the proposal for it to be named obligee under the
subject bond and that there was no contract between Ecobel and
PVB.
In view of the foregoing events, the GSIS conducted an investigation
on the circumstances surrounding the processing and issuance of
the subject bond and forwarded its report to the Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the On May 31, 2000, the FFIB issued a
Fact Finding Report, recommending the filing of appropriate
criminal and administrative charges against the concerned GSIS
officials including Valencerina. Accordingly, an administrative case
was filed against the said officials for Gross Neglect of Duty, and
Inefficiency and Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties
before the OMB, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-00-0547.
The OMB Proceedings
In a Decision dated January 27, 2005, the OMB Preliminary
Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau-B (PIAB-B)
found Valencerina, among others, guilty of gross neglect of duty,
and inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties, and ordered his dismissal from service with the accessory
penalties provided for under Sections 57 and 58 of the CTAIHc
In an Order dated June 8, 2005 (June 8, 2005 Order), Ombudsman
Simeon V. Marcelo modified the PIAB-B decision, among others,
finding Valencerina guilty, instead, of grave misconduct, but
imposing the same penalties.
Valencerina moved for reconsideration but was, however, denied in
an Order dated September 1, 2005. Dissatisfied, he filed before the
CA a petition for review under
The CA Proceedings
On November 22, 2005, the CA issued a 60-day TRO which expired
on January 21, 2006.
Subsequently, in an Order dated April 25, 2006, Ombudsman Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez directed GSIS President and General
Manager Winston F. Garcia to execute the June 8, 2005 Order. Thus,
in a Memorandum dated June 8, 2006, the GSIS informed
Valencerina that he is "deemed dismissed from the service as of the
close of office hours" that day.
Aggrieved, Valencerina filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the CA, which, finding the
necessity to preserve the status quo between the parties, granted
the same in a Resolution dated June 15, 2006 (June 15, 2006
Resolution). Consequently, the corresponding writ of preliminary
injunction was issued on June 20, 2006, and in a Memorandum
dated June 21, 2006, the GSIS directed Valencerina to return to
work.
At odds with the return directive, the OMB filed a motion for
reconsideration of the June 15, 2006 Resolution which was denied
in a Resolution dated April 24, 2007. The CA pointed out that "under
and that it has resolved to stay the assailed judgment and orders
during the pendency of the case.
Unperturbed, the OMB filed the instant petition for certiorari.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction.
The Court's Ruling
There is merit in the petition.
Section 7, (Section 7, ted September 15, 2003, provides that the
office's decision imposing the penalty of removal, among others,
shall be executed as a matter of course and shall not be stopped by
an appeal thereto, viz.:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent
is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the
decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions
set forth in les of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case
the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such
appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the . The HTSIEa
Based on the afore-quoted provision, it is clear that the OMB's June
8, 2005 Order imposing the penalty of removal on Valencerina was
immediately executory, notwithstanding the pendency of his
appeal. The general
First, Section 3,
Second, it is a fundamental legal principle that when two while
Section 12, in general, including the OMB. Thus, as between the two
rules, Section 7, :
Section 7, les of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, les of Court
when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is
appealed to the CA. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory
is a special Specialis derogat generali. When two
Third, the OMB is constitutionally authorized to promulgate its own
rules of procedure. This is fleshed out in Sections 18 and 27 of
otherwise known as "es of procedure for the effective exercise or
performance of its powers, functions, and duties" and to
accordingly amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may
require. As such, the CA cannot stay the execution of decisions
rendered by the said office when the
Fourth, the previous ruling in (as quoted in and ) wherein the Court,
relying on the old i.e., cannot be successfully invoked by Valencerina
in this case for the reason that the said pronouncement had already
been superseded by the more recent ruling in (. In , the Court
applied the current i.e., ruling are hereunder quoted for ready
reference:
In interpreting the above provision, this Court held in Laja, citing
Lopez that "only orders, directives or decisions of the sman Act
gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally
carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise,
the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would
be rendered nugatory".
However, as aptly stated by the istrative Order No. 07 has been
amended by Administrative Order No. 17, thus: ACIDSc
Sec. 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is
absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the
decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions
set forth in les of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case
the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such
appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the . The
Clearly, considering that an appeal under Administrative Order No.
17, the amendatory . (Emphases and underscoring supplied, with
those in the original omitted)
as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the CA's Resolutions granting
Valencerina's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction staying the
execution of the Ombudsman's June 8, 2005 Order are therefore
patently erroneous and, thus, tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. As jurisprudence dictates, grave abuse of discretion
arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the as in this
case. IAETSC
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated June
15, 2006 and April 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91977 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated June 20, 2006 issued in the said case is
LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

Lastly, it must be emphasized that the :

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly

procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is
considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal.
Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the
salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a
vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity