Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Conflict Resolution After The Pandemic
Conflict Resolution After The Pandemic
the Pandemic
Author biosviii
Forewordxi
PART I
Conflict resolution in a period of social crisis 7
PART II
Global political conflicts after the pandemic 33
PART III
Intergroup conflicts after the pandemic 71
PART IV
Conflict resolution initiatives after the pandemic105
Index 134
Author bios
Editors
Contributors
The outbreak of the coronavirus and global spread of the disease COVID-
19 in the spring and summer of 2020 shocked and frightened the world. The
shock was particularly disconcerting, however, in relatively prosperous,
advanced industrial nations that had long considered themselves immune
from such ancient dangers. With the advantage of hindsight, one can see
that the plague was not the only recent threat to human security that seemed
strangely antediluvian. Rather than experiencing the nuclear exchanges and
cyberwars feared by many experts, nations rich and poor were afflicted by
natural disasters, many linked to climate change, that appeared almost bibli-
cal in their scope and effects: earthquakes, cyclones, fires, and floods. But in
important respects, the pandemic was even more devastating, since it was
followed by a series of aftershocks that intensified and extended the crisis.
To begin with, combating the virus meant quarantining populations
and imposing new controls over the social behavior of large numbers of
people. The immediate effects of such measures were to suspend normal
business activities, generating massive losses of capital and jobs, to curtail
internal and international travel, and to close schools and places of public
accommodation. The results soon began to resemble the effects of the Great
Depression of the 1930s, with workers, poor farmers, and people of color
bearing the brunt of the economic damage, as well as suffering dispropor-
tionate losses from the COVID-19 plague itself. Moreover, as it became
clear that authoritative figures and institutions in a number of nations had
failed to secure their people against these biological and economic threats,
the relations between citizens and authorities were subjected to enormous
strain. In the United States and certain other nations, the shocks of medi-
cal vulnerability, economic decline, and exacerbated inequality were com-
pounded by militant (although largely nonviolent) movements of protest
challenging the systems that had allegedly failed to secure people’s basic
rights and interests. Protests and demonstrations organized by groups on the
left emphasized the role of political and economic institutions and attitudes
2 Richard E. Rubenstein and Solon Simmons
in perpetuating racism, sexism, and other forms of structural and cultural
inequality, while those emanating from the right emphasized threats to indi-
vidual freedom posed by bureaucratic authorities and scientific experts.
For researchers in the field of conflict analysis and resolution, the suc-
cessive shocks of the pandemic and ensuing conflicts constituted a major
challenge. Although it was not clear that the crisis had generated new social
struggles, it seemed undeniable that it had inflamed existing conflicts,
especially those between antagonistic socio-economic, political, and cul-
tural groupings. What, then, could be said about the likely course of these
struggles? Would they expand and escalate? Would new opportunities for
peaceful conflict resolution be presented? The scholars’ attempts to project
existing trends into the near-term and middle-term futures were complicated
by two further features of this unusual crisis: the rise of radical uncertainty
and the delegitimization of established governance systems.
Radical uncertainty
Normally, advanced industrial nations rely heavily on short term planning
that assumes the predictability of everyday events. (The stock phrase, “busi-
ness as usual” reflects this assumption). But the pandemic and its after-
shocks undermined predictability, making it virtually impossible to say
when the virus would be brought under control, how it could be expected
to develop pending the development of an effective vaccine, or when eco-
nomic and social activity in affected nations could safely resume. In fact, as
the crisis continued throughout 2020 with no end in sight, the uncertainty
increased and became more general. People’s expectations that social and
political relations would return to some “normal” status quo ante tended to
erode. Analysts assumed that the coronavirus would eventually disappear as
a major public health problem, but many came to believe that post-corona
society would be altered in fundamental respects. For example, serious envi-
ronmental threats would almost certainly continue to cause destruction and
alarm the public as a result of ongoing climate changes, creating demands
for protective and preventative government action not unlike those made in
response to the COVID-19 crisis. Meanwhile, the inability of private and
public organizations to make reliable short-term plans played havoc with
the economy, as well as with many people’s sense of personal stability.
First, the editors determined that the book as a whole should express a
global perspective and should examine the pandemic’s likely impact
on transnational, not just local, conflict and conflict resolution trends.
For this reason, they solicited essays on such topics as climate change,
transnational peacebuilding, nationalist vs. globalist struggles, inter-
national migration, great power competition, contentious politics and
authoritarianism, and the history of multinational crises. This same
focus, which transgresses the customary boundary between “interna-
tional” and “domestic” studies, also guides the research and teaching
efforts of the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution, the
academic home of a number of the contributors.
Second, hypothesizing that social conflicts are likely to escalate where
crises such as the pandemic exacerbate social inequality, make mar-
ginalized groups conscious of unsatisfied needs, and frighten more
Introduction 5
secure or privileged groups, we solicited essays on current and poten-
tial intergroup conflicts involving vulnerable social formations. This
produced the contributions to the present volume on class struggle,
gender-related conflict, race-related conflict, and conflicts involv-
ing religious organizations. In keeping with the general thrust of this
book, the authors explored not only the possibilities that such con-
flicts might escalate, but also the opportunities that periods of crisis
and recovery might present for breakthroughs to peace.
Finally, the authors were strongly encouraged to engage in “educated
speculation” about the likely course of conflicts after the pandemic
and the possibilities of resolving or mitigating them in the mid-term
and long-term future. Several essays produced in response to this
challenge outlined new possibilities of dealing with conflicts vis-
ibly escalating under the pressures of the interrelated biomedical,
economic, and political crises. Two authors presented a meaningful,
wide-ranging discussion of “peace engineering”; a third brought the
insights of social psychology to bear on Israeli-Palestinian relations;
and a fourth offered a unique process-oriented perspective on the
intensifying conflict between the U.S. and China. In addition, innova-
tive methods of conflict resolution in response to systemic changes
were discussed in contributors’ explorations of a “big peace” perspec-
tive, “regenerative” methods of conflict resolution, possible United
Nations reforms, and the use of conflict resolution methods in build-
ing anti-racist coalitions.