CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Lecture Notes - Second Semester

Fundamental Rights

Fundamental Rights are those rights that are guaranteed under the Constitution as rights the
citizens of a country are entitled to as of right. They are not privileges and are basically
distinguishable from privileges by the fact that they are guaranteed under the Constitution.
Privileges do not have the force of law, let alone constitutional guarantee. Rights are enshrined in
the constitution and have the effect of conferring democratic legitimacy on a country's political
system.

In the United States, Fundamental Rights are the rights that have been recognized by the
Supreme Court as requiring a high degree of protection from government encroachment. These
rights are specifically identified in the Constitution (especially in the Bill of Rights), or have
been found under Due Process.

In Nigeria, they are rights that are generally accepted as inalienable rights, rights for which the
law has made specific and special provision. These rights are contained in Chapter IV of the
1999 Nigerian Constitution. The Constitution classifies them as Fundamental Rights but they
are also known as Fundamental Human Rights. The uniqueness and special nature of these rights
have been judicially pronounced upon by the courts in a plethora of cases. In Uzoukwu v
Ezeonu (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 200) 708, Nasir, JCA, (as he then was) affirmed that Fundamental
Rights "are fundamental because they have been guaranteed by the fundamental law of the
country; that is by the Constitution."

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted and proclaimed by the United
Nations under the General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) on the 10th of December, 1948, is
the precursor and foundation of all modern human rights instruments globally, Chapter IV of the
1999 Constitution included. This Constitution, like all its predecessors since independence,
makes such rights inalienable rights enjoyed as of right by citizens of Nigeria. The 1960
Independence Constitution expressly guaranteed Fundamental Rights in Chapter III (Section 17-
27). These rights were:

S. 17 - Deprivation of life.

S. 18 - Inhuman treatment.

S. 19 - Slavery and forced labour.

S. 20 - Deprivation of personal liberty.

S. 21 - Determination of rights i.e. fair hearing

S. 22 - Private and family life.

S. 23 - Freedom of conscience.

S. 24 - Freedom of expression.

S. 25 - Peaceful assembly and association.

S. 26 - Freedom of movement.

S. 27 - Freedom from discrimination.

The 1963 Republican Constitution provided for these same rights in Chapter III (S. 18-28). The
rights were re-couched in Chapter IV of the 1979 Constitution as follows:

S. 30 - Right to life.

S. 31 - Right to dignity of human person.

S. 32 - Right to personal liberty.

S. 33 - Right to fair hearing.

S. 34 - Right to private and family life.

S. 35 - Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

S. 36 - Right to freedom of expression and the press.

S. 37 - Right to peaceful assembly and association.

S. 38 - Right to freedom of movement.

S. 39 - Right to freedom from discrimination.

Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution is in pari materia with S. 30-39 of the 1979 Constitution.

We are however primarily concerned with Fundamental Rights under the 1999 Constitution
which has a total of 11 constitutional provisions devoted entirely to the codification of
fundamental rights from S. 33-43.

It must be stated from the onset that as much as these rights are inalienable under the 1999
Constitution, the same Constitution makes provisions for restriction and derogation from them.
In clear terms, fundamental rights in themselves are not absolute.

The 10 fundamental rights guaranteed by the 1999 Constitution are:

A. Right to life: S. 33(1) provides that: "Every person has a right to life, and no one shall be
deprived intentionally of his life, save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a
criminal offence of which he has been found guilty in Nigeria."

The Constitution clarifies this right to mean that no one can be deprived intentionally of his life,
save in execution of the sentence of a court and in such circumstances as are permitted by law.
Under criminal law provisions, the offences that can lead to the sentence of death in Nigeria
include murder, treason, armed robbery, and in some states, kidnapping. Subsection 2 puts the
proviso: "A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of
this section, if he dies as a result of the use, to such extent and in such circumstances as are
permitted by law, of such force as is reasonably necessary -

(a) for the defence of any person from unlawful violence or for the defence of property:

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; or

(c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny."

Thus, the circumstances that can warrant the deprivation of a citizen's life lawfully include:

a. Defence from unlawful violence or for the defence of property.

b. Lawful arrest or prevention of escape of a person lawfully detained.

c. Suppression of riot, insurrection or mutiny.

When these circumstances are not in place, deprivation of life is illegal, wrong, unconstitutional
and absolutely prohibited. The courts frown at any infraction of the right to life with the strictest
eye. Deprivation of life is only acceptable when done in accordance with the law in S. 33(2). See
Nasiru Bello v AG Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828 where the Supreme Court found the
execution of a convicted felon while his appeal to a higher court was pending violated his right
to life and ordered compensation to his family.

Many legal scholars and eminent jurists are of the sound opinion that the right to life is the
primary right from which all other rights derive their essence. The ECOWAS Court, which is the
statutory court of justice for the Economic Community of West African States, has put its
judicial stamp of authority on it in Nura Abdullahi & Ors. v Government of Nigeria & Ors.
(ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/16) [2016] ECOWASCJ 55 that, "...right to life as enshrined in human rights
instruments is very fundamental because other rights necessarily depend on it."

The defence of self-defence will avail an accused person if he acted with reasonable, necessary
or commensurate force in self-defence, defence of another person or in defence of property, as
provided for in S. 32(3) of the Criminal Code Act applicable to the Southern States and S. 59-67
of the Penal Code Law applicable to the Northern States. The ECOWAS Court case cited above
is instructive, "Lethal force under human rights law is legal if it is strictly and directly necessary
to save life."

However, the use of violence in defence of right to life must be such that can pass the test of
reasonable force. The Supreme Court has laid down four cardinal conditions to fulfill to pass the
test of reasonable force. In Kwaghshir v The State (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt.386) 651 SC, the Court
listed the four conditions that must exist before the taking of the life of a person is justified as:

i. Accused must be free from fault in bringing about the encounter;

ii. There must be present an impending peril to life or of great bodily harm either real or so
apparent as to create honest belief of an existing necessity;

iii. There must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by retreat; and

iv. There must have been a necessity for taking the life of the person.

In Adeyeye v State (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1364) 47 SC @ 51, the Supreme Court laid down
three ingredients of self-defence. It held that,

“For the defence of self-defence to avail an accused person, he must satisfy the
requirements that:

a. there was an act of grave and sudden provocation:

b. there was the loss of control both actual and reasonable;
c. the retaliation was proportionate.

In other words, all three elements must co-exist and must be within a reasonable time.”

The court further held that,

“For the defence of self-defence to avail an accused person, the nature of assault on him
must be such as to cause reasonable apprehension of death or grievous harm. The extent
of force which could be available as a defence must be from the belief on reasonable
ground that death or grievous harm was the only last resort that must be used as a
defence.”

B. Right to dignity of human person: S. 34(1) is to the effect that, "Every individual is entitled
to respect for the dignity of his person, and accordingly -

(a) no person shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment;

(b) no person shall be held in slavery or servitude; and

(c) no person shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour."

The sum total of the above provision is to ensure that no citizen is subjected to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment, slavery or servitude and forced or compulsory labour. In
Alhaja Abibatu Mogaji & Ors v Board of Customs and Excise & Anor, (1982) 2 NCLR 522,
the plaintiffs proved that between 30th of June and 4th of July, 1982, they were maltreated by
Customs officers who used horsewhips and teargas freely on them when they raided their shops
in search of contraband goods. The court held that the defendants' action violated the plaintiffs'
fundamental rights guaranteed by S. 31(1)(a) of the 1979 Constitution which S. 34(1)(a) of the
1999 Constitution replicates.

The court did not mince words in condemning the defendants, "…The action by the Customs
men aided by police officers and soldiers with the use of guns, firing of same, the use of
horsewhip and tear gas for the apprehension, seizure and detention of goods suspected to be
prohibited as was meted to first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth plaintiffs
and removal of their goods without due investigation violates the rights of the plaintiffs under the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria."

As in S. 33, there is a proviso in S.34(2) that clarifies the right to dignity of human person to the
effect that, "For the purposes of subsection (1) (c) of this section, 'forced or compulsory labour'
does not include -

(a) any labour required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court;

(b) any labour required of members of the armed forces of the Federation or the Nigeria Police
Force in pursuance of their duties as such;

(c) in the case of persons who have conscientious objections to service in the armed forces of the
Federation, any labour required instead of such service;

(d) any labour required which is reasonably necessary in the event of any emergency or calamity
threatening the life or well-being of the community; or

(e) any labour or service that forms part of -

(i) normal communal or other civic obligations of the well-being of the community.

(ii) such compulsory national service in the armed forces of the Federation as may be prescribed
by an Act of the National Assembly, or

(iii) such compulsory national service which forms part of the education and training of citizens
of Nigeria as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

Thus, any labour required in carrying out the sentence or order of a court or in the service of the
Armed Forces or NYSC or in community emergency work or normal civil obligations for the
wellbeing of the community is not regarded as forced or compulsory labour. In construing the
meaning of Armed Forces in this proviso, paramilitary establishments like Nigeria Police Force,
Nigerian Customs & Excise, Nigerian Immigration Service, Nigerian Security & Civil Defence
Corps, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, State Security Service and Nigerian
Correctional Service are included under the term. See Ojuya v Nzeogwu (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt.
452) 42 CA. and NYSC Act, Cap. N84, LFN 2004.

C. Right to personal liberty: S. 35(1) provides that, "Every person shall be entitled to his
personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure permitted by law -

(a) in execution of the sentence or order of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he
has been found guilty;

(b) by reason of his failure to comply with the order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment
of any obligation imposed upon him by law;

(c) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the order of a court or upon
reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence, or to such extent as may be
reasonably necessary to prevent his committing a criminal offence;

(d) in the case of a person who has not attained the age of eighteen years for the purpose of his
education or welfare;

(e) in the case of persons suffering from infectious or contagious disease, persons of unsound
mind, persons addicted to drugs or alcohol or vagrants, for the purpose of their care or treatment
or the protection of the community; or

(f) for the purpose of preventing the unlawful entry of any person into Nigeria or of effecting the
expulsion, extradition or other lawful removal from Nigeria of any person or the taking of
proceedings relating thereto:

Provided that a person who is charged with an offence and who has been detained in lawful
custody awaiting trial shall not continue to be kept in such detention for a period longer than the
maximum period of imprisonment prescribed for the offence."

The critical words here are "liberty" and "personal liberty." Eminent jurists and legal scholars
have attempted to situate these words within the narrow confines of legal definition. Lord
Denning, Master of the Rolls, submitted in his book, Freedom Under the Law, that liberty is,
"The freedom of every law-abiding citizen to think what he will. To say what he will on his
lawful occasions without let or hindrance from any other person." Prof. Albert Venn Dicey, the
20th Century British Whig jurist and constitutional theorist who popularized the phrase "Rule of
Law", asserts that personal liberty is, "The right not to be subjected to imprisonment, arrest, and
any other physical coercion, in any manner that does not admit of legal justification."
Adewole v Jakande (1981) 1 NCLR 262 @ 278 describes personal liberty as "...privileges,
immunities, or rights enjoyed by prescription or by grant. It denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but rights to contract, to have an occupation, to acquire knowledge, to marry,
have a home, children, to worship, enjoy and have privileges recognized at law for happiness of
free men."

These definitions are expressive enough. In practice, the right to personal liberty is one of the
most abused by security agencies, particularly S. 35(1)(c). The courts have always frowned at the
unacceptable attitude of many law enforcement agents of deliberately misconstruing this
provision to subject citizens to harrowing experiences. In Ukpai v Omoregie & Ors (2019)
LPELR-47206(CA), Ogunwumiju, JCA, as he then was, held, "Constitutionally, S. 35(1)(c)
allows the Police to make an arrest on the basis of reasonable suspicion. Also, the Police is
statutorily empowered to make an arrest under the Police Act. Specifically, S. 4 of the Police Act
provides as follows: 'The police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the
apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property
and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged, and
shall perform such military duties within or outside Nigeria as may be required of them by, or
under the authority of this or any other Act.' The Police is also empowered under Section 24 of
the Police Act to make an arrest on the basis of reasonably suspecting that a crime has been
committed...However, while the Police is empowered to act on the basis of reasonable suspicion,
it is not empowered to detain a person in anticipation that the person has committed an
offence...The power of the Police to arrest and detain any person has to be exercised within the
confines of laid down law. Usually, a proper investigation has to be carried out before an arrest
can be made. And until there is sufficient evidence to caution and charge a suspect, it is unlawful
to make an arrest. Thus, it is completely wrong for the Police to arrest a person before getting
any evidence to ground their suspicion that he had committed an offence."

However, personal liberty can be constitutionally curtailed for the following purposes:

i. sentence or order of a court upon guilty verdict;

ii. failure to comply with the order of a court;

iii. commission of a criminal offence or prevention of same;

iv. education or welfare of children below 18;

v. medical treatment and prevention of the spread of infectious or contagious disease; and

vi. enforcement of immigration penalties.

S. 35 goes further to subject the curtailment of personal liberty to clear provisos in subsections 2
to 7 to avoid wholesale application of the exceptions without restraint:
(2) Any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right to remain silent or avoid
answering any question until after consultation with a legal practitioner or any other person of
his own choice.

(3) Any person who is arrested or detained shall be informed in writing within twenty-four hours
(and in a language that he understands) of the facts and grounds for his arrest or detention.

(4) Any person who is arrested or detained in accordance with subsection (1) (c) of this section
shall be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time, and if he is not tried within a
period of -

(a) two months from the date of his arrest or detention in the case of a person who is in custody
or is not entitled to bail; or

(b) three months from the date of his arrest or detention in the case of a person who has been
released on bail, he shall (without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought
against him) be released either unconditionally or upon such conditions as are reasonably
necessary to ensure that he appears for trial at a later date.

(5) In subsection (4) of this section, the expression "a reasonable time" means -

(a) in the case of an arrest or detention in any place where there is a court of competent
jurisdiction within a radius of forty kilometres, a period of one day; and

(b) in any other case, a period of two days or such longer period as in the circumstances may be
considered by the court to be reasonable.

(6) Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained shall be entitled to compensation and
public apology from the appropriate authority or person; and in this subsection, "the appropriate
authority or person" means an authority or person specified by law.

(7) Nothing in this section shall be construed -

(a) in relation to subsection (4) of this section, as applying in the case of a person arrested or
detained upon reasonable suspicion of having committed a capital offence; and

(b) as invalidating any law by reason only that it authorizes the detention for a period not
exceeding three months of a member of the armed forces of the federation or a member of the
Nigeria Police Force in execution of a sentence imposed by an officer of the armed forces of the
Federation or of the Nigeria police force, in respect of an offence punishable by such detention
of which he has been found guilty.

The above provisos are liable to be abused by mischievous people but the courts are there to
bring their mischief to naught. A case is instructive to serve as a warning to such characters. "...
if every person accused of a felony can hide under the canopy of Section 35 of the Constitution
to escape lawful detention then an escape route to freedom is readily and richly made available to
persons suspected to have committed serious crimes and that will not augur well for the peace,
progress, prosperity and tranquility of the society." - Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari v Federal
Republic of Nigeria (2007) LPELR-958(SC) & (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 375) 558.

D. Right to fair hearing: S. 36(1) goes thus: "In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a
person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal
established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and
impartiality."

Fair hearing is undoubtedly one right that is very central to the whole process of justice delivery.
God Himself is the author of fair hearing. See Genesis 3: 8-18. What is fair hearing? Simply put,
fair hearing is to listen to the other party or parties. It is not just to listen to all sides, it is to act in
good faith and allow all parties to have their say before ruling. The notable phrases in this
provision are:

i. reasonable time

ii. lawfully established and constituted court or tribunal

iii. independence and impartiality.

By the provision of S. 36(1), these elements must be present for fair hearing to be assured.

It is to be noted that fair hearing does not apply only to courts but also quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies exercising judicial functions. In Judicial Service Commission of Cross
River State & Anor. v Young (2013) LPELR-20592(SC), the Supreme Court held that, "The
interpretation that has been given to Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution or its successors or
even just the matter of fair hearing is that apart from the courts, the other adjudicating bodies like
tribunals though not expected to act fully like a court of law is enjoined in their hearing of
matters to act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides before deciding. In that regard, such
bodies even if administrative must always give the parties before them the opportunity to
controvert, correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view. The requirement
includes that an affected party or parties must be given his right to cross-examine any witness
before it. It follows therefore that when an administrative or domestic tribunal is to determine
whether an officer is guilty of misconduct or of a breach of the regulations, then a "lis inter
partes" arises and so throws up the necessity for a hearing before deciding and in such a case, the
administrative body is acting judicially and the principles of fair hearing binding on judicial
bodies would by the same token bind such administrative bodies."

However, where such administrative bodies are exercising powers that "are of a merely advisory,
deliberative, investigatory or conciliatory character or which do not have legal effect until
confirmed by another body, or involved only the making of a preliminary decision" [as held in
Okoye v Lagos State Government (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 136) 115@125] or where the body "is
merely exploring or investigating the facts with no intention or power to decide" [as held in
Baba v NCATC (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 338], the question of fair hearing does not arise.

S. 36(2-12) go further to elucidate on the critical elements of fair hearing:

(2) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this section, a law shall not be invalidated
by reason only that it confers on any government or authority power to determine questions
arising in the administration of a law that affects or may affect the civil rights and obligations of
any person if such law -(a) provides for an opportunity for the persons whose rights and
obligations may be affected to make representations to the administering authority before that
authority makes the decision affecting that person; and

(b) contains no provision making the determination of the administering authority final and
conclusive.

(3) The proceedings of a court or the proceedings of any tribunal relating to the matters
mentioned in subsection (1) of this section (including the announcement of the decisions of the
court or tribunal) shall be held in public.

(4) Whenever any person is charged with a criminal offence, he shall, unless the charge is
withdrawn, be entitled to a fair hearing in public within a reasonable time by a court or tribunal:

Provided that -

(a) a court or such a tribunal may exclude from its proceedings persons other than the parties
thereto or their legal practitioners in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public
morality, the welfare of persons who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the protection
of the private lives of the parties or to such extent as it may consider necessary by reason of
special circumstances in which publicity would be contrary to the interests of justice;

(b) if in any proceedings before a court or such a tribunal, a Minister of the Government of the
Federation or a commissioner of the government of a State satisfies the court or tribunal that it
would not be in the public interest for any matter to be publicly disclosed, the court or tribunal
shall make arrangements for evidence relating to that matter to be heard in private and shall take
such other action as may be necessary or expedient to prevent the disclosure of the matter.

(5) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until
he is proved guilty;

Provided that nothing in this section shall invalidate any law by reason only that the law imposes
upon any such person the burden of proving particular facts.

(6) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to -
(a) be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the
offence;

(b) be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

(c) defend himself in person or by legal practitioners of his own choice;

(d) examine, in person or by his legal practitioners, the witnesses called by the prosecution
before any court or tribunal and obtain the attendance and carry out the examination of witnesses
to testify on his behalf before the court or tribunal on the same conditions as those applying to
the witnesses called by the prosecution; and

(e) have, without payment, the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand the language
used at the trial of the offence.

(7) When any person is tried for any criminal offence, the court or tribunal shall keep a record of
the proceedings and the accused person or any persons authorised by him in that behalf shall be
entitled to obtain copies of the judgement in the case within seven days of the conclusion of the
case.

(8) No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission
that did not, at the time it took place, constitute such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed
for any criminal offence heavier than the penalty in force at the time the offence was committed.

(9) No person who shows that he has been tried by any court of competent jurisdiction or
tribunal for a criminal offence and either convicted or acquitted shall again be tried for that
offence or for a criminal offence having the same ingredients as that offence save upon the order
of a superior court.

(10) No person who shows that he has been pardoned for a criminal offence shall again be tried
for that offence.

(11) No person who is tried for a criminal offence shall be compelled to give evidence at the
trial.

(12) Subject as otherwise provided by this Constitution, a person shall not be convicted of a
criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the penalty thereof is prescribed in a written
law, and in this subsection, a written law refers to an Act of the National Assembly or a Law of a
State, any subsidiary legislation or instrument under the provisions of a law.

The elements of fair hearing under S. 36, which Ese Malemi summarized in his book, The
Nigerian Constitutional Law, can be further summarized as follows:

1. A speedy hearing within a reasonable time in line with the maxim, Justice delayed is justice
denied. See Danladi v. Dangiri & Ors (2014) Vol 238 LRCN 1 at p. 41. ("In my view, the
phrase 'within a reasonable time' implies that the time for the determination of the matter should
not be too short or too long, depending on the nature and facts of the case.")

2. A court or tribunal established by law, which is independent and impartial.

3. The fair hearing of the parties to the suit or proceedings.

4. The duty of the judge not to be a judge in his own case unless in the exceptions provided by
law, such as contempt proceedings. (nemo judex in causa sua).

5. The presumption of innocence of an accused. See Chianugo v The State (2002)2 NWLR (pt.
750) 225. ("By the provisions of the said section, an accused person is absolutely presumed to be
innocent till the prosecution proved otherwise. It is not the duty of an accused person to prove his
innocence. Far from it. The prosecution must establish the guilt of an accused person.")

6. Provision of adequate time and facilities for the accused to prepare his defence. See Okoye &
Ors v Commissioner of Police (2015) 4-5 SC (pt. 1) 101. ("The moment an accused is facing a
charge, his personal liberty is at stake and before that liberty is taken away, he must be afforded
every opportunity to defend himself ...... Once he becomes aware that he has a charge hanging
over his neck for an infraction of the law and makes a request either orally or in writing for any
facilities to prepare for his defence, the Court must accede to his request and the prosecution has
to comply...")

7. Opportunity for accused to defend himself in person or by a lawyer of his choice.

8. Opportunity for accused to examine witnesses in person or by his lawyer.

9. Opportunity for accused's witnesses to testify on his behalf in court on the same conditions
applying to witnesses called by the prosecution.

10. Assistance of free interpreter for the accused. See Lanre v State (2018) LPELR-45156(SC).
("The appellant or his counsel must draw the attention of the Court of the necessity of the Court
to provide an interpreter to enable the accused follow the proceedings which are being conducted
in the language that he is not familiar with. If the accused is not represented by counsel, it
becomes the duty of the Court to find out from the accused, the language he understands but
once the accused is represented, the duty is on his counsel to inform the Court that an interpreter
is required to enable the accused follow the proceedings.)

11. The keeping of the records of the proceedings by court.

12. Delivery of judgement within 90 days of the close of case.

13. Right to obtain copies of the judgement in the case within seven days of the delivery of the
judgement.
14. Right not to be tried under retroactive or retrospective laws. See Omatseye v FRN (2017)
LPELR-42719(CA). ("There is no question therefore on the need to have a statutory provision
clearly creating an offence before any person can be convicted for the said offence. The
punishment too must be specifically named in a legislation. The apex Court emphatically stated
that it is rudimentary and elementary for anybody or persons having something to do with
dispensation of justice in this country to know that no citizen can be made to face any criminal
trial for an act which is not qualified as an offence not defined or stated (codified) in any law and
the punishment thereof prescribed. All Courts, so named, cannot claim ignorance of these facts.")
Also see Aoko v Fagbemi (1961) 1 ALL NLR 400.

15. Trial before a court of competent jurisdiction properly constituted in terms of the
qualification of the judge(s) or quorum, where relevant.

16. Right not to be tried twice for the same offence, except with the order of a superior court.
This is the rule against double jeopardy. See Samson Uwem Sunday v. The State (2017)
LCN/9685(CA). ("For a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict to succeed, the following
factors must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court: 1. That the accused had previously been
tried on a criminal charge – the charge for which the accused was tried must be an act or
omission constituted under a written law as an offence. 2. The former trial must have been
conducted before a Court of competent jurisdiction. 3. The trial must have ended with an
acquittal or a conviction. Where the trial ends with a discharge, the trial has not ended with an
acquittal or conviction and so the accused cannot plead autrefois acquit or autrefois convict to
any subsequent action filed against him. 4. The criminal charge for which the accused was tried
should be the same as the new charge against him or alternatively the new charge should be one
in respect of which the accused could have been convicted at the former trial, although not
charged with it. In analyzing these pleas, there may be the need to make it clear that there must
have been a trial of the accused, that is, hearing and determination of the charge against him on
the merits otherwise a subsequent trial as contemplated by Section 36(9) of the Constitution of
Nigeria, 1999 cannot be prevented. There should also have been the trial of the accused
previously where he must have been convicted or acquitted. If there had been no trial previously,
then the subsequent trial for the same offence is not barred. However, for the acquittal or the
conviction to be an effective defense to the charge, it must have been handed down by a Court of
competent jurisdiction as a preliminary examination before a Magistrate would not constitute
such a trial. See COLLINS vs. LOISEL (1923) 262 US 426. Where the Court, who held the first
trial, was not competent to try the charge put forward in the second trial, Section 36(9) of the
Constitution would have no application. It is for this reason that a trial by a Court having no
jurisdiction in the case is void ab initio and the accused if acquitted is liable to be re-tried for the
same offence. It is important to note in addition, that the accused person must have been either
acquitted or been convicted as it is only then that a person can take the plea of the rule in order to
the second trial for the same offence. A mere discharge of the accused does not amount to an
acquittal.")
17. Right not to be compelled to give evidence in one's own trial.

18. Right to trial in public or in open court, as opposed to secret trial unless within the exceptions
permitted by the Constitution.

19. Offence defined and penalty thereof prescribed in a written law. See Chief Olabode George
v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2013) LPELR-21895(SC). ("Any conduct that must be
sanctioned must be expressly stated in a written law to wit: an Act by the National Assembly.
That is what section 36(12) of the 1999 Constitution provides...The alleged conduct of 'splitting
of contract' was not only outside any written law but in fact, not an offence at the material time.")

E. Right to private and family life: S. 37 provides that, "The privacy of citizens, their homes,
correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is hereby guaranteed
and protected."

This constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous on the types of privacy that it protects.
They are:

a. The privacy of citizens.

b. The privacy of their homes.

c. The privacy of their correspondence.

d. The privacy of their telephone conversations.

e. The privacy of their telegraphic communication.

It is to be noted that the Constitution did not make any exceptions to this right. The consequences
of unlawful invasion of the privacy aforementioned could be trespass, defamation or other tort
which would entitle the victim to seek redress in court by way of damages and other civil
remedies. The reality of abuse of improvement in digital communications has introduced
criminal dimensions to this right, particularly the privacy of telegraphic communication,
telephone conversations and even correspondence through cybercrime.

F. Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion: S. 38(1) is to the effect that, "Every
person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to
change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in
public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching,
practice and observance."

This constitutional provision lends credence to the secular nature of the Nigerian nation. The
country is made of several religions and social strains that make it imperative to fly the secular
flag as the national policy lest there be a combustion that would consume the nation. Any citizen
is free to hold a religious belief or faith of his choice, alone or with others, and practise or
propagate it in private or public, and even change it if he so wishes.

In Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v Okonkwo [2001] FWLR (Pt.
44) 542, the court put a judicial stamp on this right, "The right to freedom of thought, conscience
or religion implies a right not to be prevented without lawful justification from choosing the
course of one’s life, fashioned on what one believes, and the right not to be coerced into acting
contrary to one’s belief."

The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is further strengthened in subsequent
subsections:

(2) No person attending any place of education shall be required to receive religious instruction
or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or observance if such instruction, ceremony or
observance relates to a religion other than his own, or religion not approved by his parent or
guardian.

(3) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious

instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any place of education maintained
wholly by that community or denomination.

(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person to form, take part in the activity or be a
member of a secret society.

G. Right to freedom of expression and the press: S. 39(1) provides that, "Every person shall be
entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
ideas and information without interference."

It does not stop there; it goes further to say in subsection (2) that, "Without prejudice to the
generality of subsection (1) of this section, every person shall be entitled to own, establish and
operate any medium for the dissemination of information, ideas and opinions:

Provided that no person, other than the Government of the Federation or of a State or any other
person or body authorised by the President on the fulfilment of conditions laid down by an Act
of the National Assembly, shall own, establish or operate a television or wireless broadcasting
station for, any purpose whatsoever."

The effect of this provision is the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression to every
citizen and the press, and freedom to own, establish and operate any medium for the
dissemination of information, ideas and opinions. In the First Republic and throughout the
military regimes that lasted from 1966 to 1979, only the Federal and state governments owned,
established and operated radio and television stations. While any person, natural and artificial,
owned, established and operated print media in those times, it was thought that individuals could
not exercise this right in respect of broadcast media. The liberal interpretation of this provision in
several cases involving the press arguably paved the way for the Babangida military regime to
promulgate Decree No. 38 of August 24, 1992 which deregulated broadcasting and allowed
individual ownership of broadcast media with the first one, Raypower FM, owned by Raymond
Dokpesi, commencing test transmission on 15th of December, 1993.

Like other rights, the right to freedom of expression and to disseminate and impart information is
not absolute. It is subject to limitations enshrined in subsection (3):

(3) Nothing in this section shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society -

(a) for the purpose of preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence,
maintaining the authority and independence of courts or regulating telephony, wireless
broadcasting, television or the exhibition of cinematograph films; or

(b) imposing restrictions upon persons holding office under the Government of the Federation or
of a State, members of the armed forces of the Federation or members of the Nigeria Police
Force or other Government security services or agencies established by law.

The right is also subject to the regulatory frameworks of the National Broadcasting Commission
Act Cap. N11 LFN 2004, National Film and Video Censors Board Act Cap. N40 LFN 2004 and
Freedom of Information Act 2011 as well as extant laws on libel and slander. As held in
Onabanjo v Concord Press Ltd (1982) 2 FNR 75 C639, "The fundamental right to freedom of
expression and to disseminate and impart information is not a licence to defame. It does not
confer a right on the press to disparage the character of any public officer. No special privilege
attaches to the position of a newspaper reporter or editor to defame anyone."

The matter is well settled in Aviomoh v COP & Anor (2014) LPELR-23039(CA) where the
Court of Appeal held, "It is correct that the freedom of expression and freedom to hold opinions,
are rights accruing to Nigerian Citizens. ... However, Section 45(1) of the Constitution is very
clear in its limitations. It states thus - "Nothing in Sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of the
Constitution shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society, in the
interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or for the
purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons." What the above means, is that
Section 39 of the 1999 Constitution as amended, which is relevant for our purposes here, cannot
operate, to invalidate any law promulgated by any legislative body, when that law is made in the
interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or for the purpose
of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons. So when Section 39(1) of the Constitution
entitles a person to freedom of expression and imparting ideas and information, it is not a blanket
right. It must not be utilised or invoked in such a way, that it offends public safety, order,
morality and health, and it must not be injurious to the rights and freedom of other persons. Once
a person lives in a community, his rights stop where the rights of the other members of the
community begin. He has to behave according to the norms of that society, otherwise his conduct
will be injurious to the wellbeing and continued existence of that community. He cannot, in the
guise of exercising his freedom of expression or imparting information, trample upon the rights
of other persons in the society. He must not act in such a way, that he defames their character or
endanger their safety, health, order or morality. The Constitution recognizes the fact that if such
a person acts to the detriment of others, he can be liable in a civil action, but the issue goes
beyond the right of an injured individual to act and the whole society has to be involved to
protect itself. Hence, criminalising such conduct of the individual. That is why Section 45(1) of
the Constitution was promulgated."

H. Right to peaceful assembly and association: S. 40 provides that, "Every person shall be
entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in particular he may form or
belong to any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his
interests:

Provided that the provisions of this section shall not derogate from the powers conferred by this
Constitution on the Independent National Electoral Commission with respect to political parties
to which that Commission does not accord recognition."

This right guarantees any citizen the right to assemble peacefully and to form and/or belong to
any association of his choice, be it political, social or economic as long as the interests being
pursued are legal, lawful and legitimate. It does not extend to non-peaceful and illegal or
unlawful pursuits, e.g. banned secret societies, political parties and social clubs.

It must be stated clearly that this right precludes any one or body from compelling or forcing a
citizen to join or belong to an association as some artisan, market or trade groups go about doing
in the society. In The Registered Trustees of Association of Tippers and Quarry Owners of
Nigeria v Yusuf & Ors (2011) LPELR-5024(CA), it was held that, "In the exercise of his right
to freedom of assembly and association, a citizen has no right to infringe on another's enjoyment
of the same right. It is the right of every citizen to decide which association or group of persons
are in the best position to protect his interests. No association or group of persons can arrogate to
itself the authority to make that determination on behalf of another."

One of the salient features of democracy is citizens' protest. It is characteristic of civil society
groups and organisations to make their feelings known through public protests. Looking intently
at the construction of this constitutional provision in S. 40, the question arises, can the right to
protest publicly find expression and protection under this right taking cognisance of the
limitations embedded in other constitutional provisions, particularly S. 45?

S. 45, which contains the provision on restriction and derogation from fundamental rights, is to
the effect that, "45. (1) Nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall
invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society
(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or

(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom or other persons

(2) An act of the National Assembly shall not be invalidated by reason only that it provides for
the taking, during periods of emergency, of measures that derogate from the provisions of section
33 or 35 of this Constitution; but no such measures shall be taken in pursuance of any such act
during any period of emergency save to the extent that those measures are reasonably justifiable
for the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists during that period of emergency:

Provided that nothing in this section shall authorise any derogation from the provisions of section
33 of this Constitution, except in respect of death resulting from acts of war or authorise any
derogation from the provisions of section 36(8) of this Constitution.

(3) In this section, a "period of emergency" means any period during which there is in force a
Proclamation of a state of emergency declared by the President in exercise of the powers
conferred on him under section 305 of this Constitution."

It is useful for our discourse to take guidance from the judgement of the Court of Appeal in
Inspector General of Police v All Nigeria Peoples Party & Ors (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066)
457 C.A.: “Finally, freedom of speech and freedom of Assembly are part of democratic rights of
every citizen of the Republic; our legislature must guard these rights jealously as they are part of
the foundation upon which the government itself rests. The Constitution should be interpreted in
such a manner as to satisfy the yearnings of the Nigerian society. The 1999 Constitution is
superior to other legislation in the country and any legislation which is inconsistent with the
constitution would be rendered inoperative to the extent of such inconsistency. Section 1
subsections (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and Sections 2, 3, 4 of the Public Order Act are inconsistent
with the constitution – they are null and void to the extent of their inconsistency…Public Order
Act should be promulgated to compliment Sections 39 and 40 of the Constitution in context and
not to stifle or cripple it. A rally or placard carrying demonstration has become a form of
expression of views on current issues affecting government and the governed in a sovereign
state. It is a trend recognized and deeply entrenched in the system of governance in civilized
countries – it will not only be primitive but also retrogressive if Nigeria continues to require a
pass to hold a rally. We must borrow a leaf from those who have trekked the rugged path of
democracy and are now reaping the dividend of their experience."

I. Right to freedom of movement: S. 41 makes the following provision, (1) "Every citizen of
Nigeria is entitled to move freely throughout Nigeria and to reside in any part thereof, and no
citizen of Nigeria shall be expelled from Nigeria or refused entry thereby or exit therefrom.

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable
in a democratic society-
(a) imposing restrictions on the residence or movement of any person who has committed or is
reasonably suspected to have committed a criminal offence in order to prevent him from leaving
Nigeria; or

(b) providing for the removal of any person from Nigeria to any other country to:-

(i) be tried outside Nigeria for any criminal offence, or

(ii) undergo imprisonment outside Nigeria in execution of the sentence of a court of law in
respect of a criminal offence of which he has been found guilty:

Provided that there is reciprocal agreement between Nigeria and such other country in relation to
such matter."

It is inconceivable that despite the clarity of this provision, any bonafide citizen of Nigeria would
be expelled from the country, refused entry into it or refused exit from it except in proven cases
of commission of a crime. However, we have witnessed several cases of breach of this right by
overzealous security agencies acting outside the confines of the limitations allowed by the
Constitution. The notorious case of Shugaba v Minister of Internal Affairs (1981) 2 NCLR
459 is a sad example.

An attempt to restrict this right to movement from one state to another within Nigeria and not
movement within a state in Nigeria, surprisingly by Lagos State Government, has been foiled in
the case of Okafor v Lagos State Govt & Anor (2016) LPELR-41066(CA) where the Court of
Appeal held that, "...if the freedom to move does not relate to movement within a state then it
will be well-nigh impossible to move from one state to another since you would first have to
move freely within a state in Nigeria before you can enter another state within Nigeria. It is
therefore as clear as crystal that the right to freedom of movement relates to all corners, nooks
and crannies within Nigeria."

J. Right to freedom from discrimination: S. 42 is to the effect that, "(1) A citizen of Nigeria of
a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not,
by reason only that he is such a person: -

(a) be subjected either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in Nigeria
or any executive or administrative action of the government, to disabilities or restrictions to
which citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religious or
political opinions are not made subject; or

(b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in Nigeria
or any such executive or administrative action, any privilege or advantage that is not accorded to
citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religious or
political opinions.
(2) No citizen of Nigeria shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by reason of
the circumstances of his birth.

(3) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall invalidate any law by reason only that the law
imposes restrictions with respect to the appointment of any person to any office under the State
or as a member of the armed forces of the Federation or member of the Nigeria Police Forces or
to an office in the service of a body, corporate established directly by any law in force in
Nigeria."

The right to freedom from discrimination is of two dimensions. While Nigerians focus on
freedom from disabilities or restrictions in subsection (1)(a), they tend to ignore the provision
that inhibits the conferment of any privilege or advantage on account of a citizen's community,
ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion (subsection (1)(b). However,
freedom from disabilities or restrictions is more important than privilege or advantage.

In Okoli v Okoli & Anor (2002) LPELR-7097(CA) where a child born out of wedlock was
discriminated against, it was held, "...The circumstance of the birth of the 1st respondent in this
appeal cannot be a bar to his legal and properly proven rights."

In Adejugbe v Olagunju (i.e. Ologunja) SC. 230/2000, where the appellant was alleged to be a
descendant of a slave and could therefore not contest a chieftaincy title, the Supreme Court, per
Pats Acholonu, JSC, held that, “No sane person in our society having regards to the provision
against discrimination made patently clear in the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions would support the
nihilistic and obtuse stand of the respondent that the appellant was ineligible to contest because
of the stigma attached to his name. Such insipid and cruel utterance is negativistic and abhorrent
in a modern society. This court should strike down any attempt by anybody or institution to deny
anyone of his rights, interest, privileges or benefits on the altar of any concept or practice that
tends to consign a fellow citizen to a second class position or make him a non-person.”

K. Right to acquire and own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria: S. 43 guarantees

this, "Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, every citizen of Nigeria shall have the right
to acquire and own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria."

This provision, as short and sharp as it is, is subject of endless litigation in our courts. The fact
that the Constitution does not mention movable property does not mean that the right does not
cover this. Nigerians have the right to also own movable property. The right it guarantees is
somehow circumscribed by S. 44 which deals with compulsory acquisition of property in that
government is empowered under it to compulsorily acquire any property but subject to
prescribed procedure. The section is reproduced below:

"S. 44. (1) No moveable property or any interest in an immovable property shall be taken
possession of compulsorily and no right over or interest in any such property shall be acquired
compulsorily in any part of Nigeria except in the manner and for the purposes prescribed by a
law that, among other things -

(a) requires the prompt payment of compensation therefore and

(b) gives to any person claiming such compensation a right of access for the determination of his
interest in the property and the amount of compensation to a court of law or tribunal or body
having jurisdiction in that part of Nigeria.

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall be construed as affecting any general law -

(a) for the imposition or enforcement of any tax, rate or duty;

(b) for the imposition of penalties or forfeiture for breach of any law, whether under civil process
or after conviction for an offence;

(c) relating to leases, tenancies, mortgages, charges, bills of sale or any other rights or
obligations arising out of contracts.

(d) relating to the vesting and administration of property of persons adjudged or otherwise
declared bankrupt or insolvent, of persons of unsound mind or deceased persons, and of
corporate or unincorporated bodies in the course of being wound-up;

(e) relating to the execution of judgements or orders of court;

(f) providing for the taking of possession of property that is in a dangerous state or is injurious to
the health of human beings, plants or animals;

(g) relating to enemy property;

(h) relating to trusts and trustees;

(i) relating to limitation of actions;

(j) relating to property vested in bodies corporate directly established by any law in force in
Nigeria;

(k) relating to the temporary taking of possession of property for the purpose of any examination,
investigation or enquiry;

(l) providing for the carrying out of work on land for the purpose of soil-conservation; or

(m) subject to prompt payment of compensation for damage to buildings, economic trees or
crops, providing for any authority or person to enter, survey or dig any land, or to lay, install or
erect poles, cables, wires, pipes, or other conductors or structures on any land, in order to provide
or maintain the supply or distribution of energy, fuel, water, sewage, telecommunication services
or other public facilities or public utilities.

(3) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the entire property in and control of
all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or
upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the
Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the
National Assembly."

It is important to note that, by virtue of Subsection (3) above, the entire property in and control
of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or
upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria is constitutionally vested
in the Federal Government, and not in any state or local government. As at today, this is the law,
not whatever activists or politicians say.

Derogations, Restrictions or Limitations to Fundamental Rights

Just as the Constitution provides for fundamental rights to be enjoyed by all Nigerians, it also
provides for derogations, restrictions or limitations to these rights in line with the maxim that
rights are not absolute. In clear terms, the Constitution recognizes that rights have limits and
provides for such in S. 45.

The section contains the provision on restriction and derogation from fundamental rights to the
effect that:

(1) Nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall invalidate any law that is
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society

(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or

(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom or other persons

(2) An Act of the National Assembly shall not be invalidated by reason only that it provides for
the taking, during periods of emergency, of measures that derogate from the provisions of section
33 or 35 of this Constitution; but no such measures shall be taken in pursuance of any such act
during any period of emergency save to the extent that those measures are reasonably justifiable
for the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists during that period of emergency:

Provided that nothing in this section shall authorise any derogation from the provisions of section
33 of this Constitution, except in respect of death resulting from acts of war or authorise any
derogation from the provisions of section 36(8) of this Constitution.
(3) In this section, a "period of emergency" means any period during which there is in force a
Proclamation of a state of emergency declared by the President in exercise of the powers
conferred on him under section 305 of this Constitution."

The import of the provision in S. 45 is that fundamental rights can be curtailed by laws that are
reasonably justified in a democratic society in respect of:
1. Defence
2. Public safety
3. Public order
4. Public morality
5. Public health
6. Protection of the rights and freedom of other persons, and
7. Periods of emergency.

Fundamental Rights under the Child Rights Act

S. 3(1) of the Child Rights Act, 2003 makes applicable Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution to
the Act to the effect that, “The provisions in Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria 1999, or any successive constitutional provisions relating to Fundamental
Rights, shall apply as if those provisions are expressly stated in this Act.
By S. 3(2) of the Act, every Nigerian child is entitled to some other rights as set out in the Act in
addition to the rights guaranteed under Chapter IV of the Constitution or under any successive
constitutional provisions. The rights include:
a. Right to survival and development – Every child has a right to survival and development.
- S. 4 of the Act
b. Right to name - Every child has a right to a name and, accordingly, shall be given a name
on his birth or on such other date as is dictated by the culture of his parents or guardian. -
S. 5 of the Act
c. Right to leisure, recreation and cultural activities - Every child is entitled to rest and
leisure and to engage in play, sports and recreational activities appropriate to his age. S.
12 of the Act
d. Right to health and health services - Every child is entitled to enjoy the best attainable
state of physical, mental and spiritual health. - S. 13 of the Act
e. Right to parental care, protection and maintenance - Every child has a right to parental
care and protection, and accordingly, no child shall be separated from his parents against
the wish of the child. - S. 14 of the Act
f. Right of a child to free, compulsory and universal primary education, etc. - Every child
has the right to free, compulsory and universal basic education and it shall be the duty of
the Government in Nigeria to provide such education. See S. 15 of the Act
g. Right of a child in need of special protection measure - Every child who is in need of
special protection measures has the right to such measure of protection as is appropriate
to his physical, social, economic, emotional and mental needs and under conditions
which ensure his dignity, promote his self‐reliance and active participation in the affairs
of the community. – See S. 16 of the Act
h. Right of the unborn child to protection against harm, etc. - A child may bring an action
for damages against a person for harm or injury caused to the child willfully, recklessly,
 negligently or through neglect before, during or after the birth of that child. See S. 17 of
the Act
i. Contractual rights of a child - No child shall enter into a contract, except as provided in
this section. See S. 18 of the Act

The rights guaranteed to every child in the Child Rights Act as stated above go hand in hand with
responsibilities. By S. 19 of the Act, the child is under obligation to perform certain
responsibilities, to wit:
(1) Every child has responsibilities towards his family and society, the Federal Republic of
Nigeria and other legally recognized communities, nationally and internationally.
(2) A child shall, subject to his age and ability and such other limitations as may be contained
in this Act and any other law, to ‐
(a) work towards the cohesion of his family and community;
(b) respect his parents, superiors and elders at all times and assist them in case of need;
(c) serve the Federal Republic of Nigeria by placing his physical and intellectual abilities
at his service;
(d) contribute to the oral well‐being of the society;
(e) preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity;
(f) preserve and strengthen the independence and integrity of Federal Republic of
Nigeria;
(g) respect the ideals of democracy, freedom, equality, humaneness, honesty and justice
for all persons;
(h) relate with other members of the society, with different cultural values in the spirit of
tolerance, dialogue and consultation;
(i) contribute to the best of his abilities at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and
achievement of Nigerian, African and world unity; and
(j) contribute to the best of his abilities. at all times and at all levels, to the solidarity of
the African people and the human race.