On the Uses of the Category of Style in the History of Science

Author(s): Jean Gayon

Source: Philosophy & Rhetoric , 1999, Vol. 32, No. 3, The Rhetoric of Science and the
History of Science (1999), pp. 233-246
Published by: Penn State University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40238036

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On the Uses of the Category of Style in the
History of Science

Jean Gayon

Introduction

Since the middle of the 1980s, the term style has become widely used by
historians of science. A series of conferences on "national styles" or "local
styles" of scientific research have taken place.1 At the same time, the terms
"styles of thinking," "styles of reasoning," and "styles of argumentation"
have become widespread in the literature of the history of science.2 How-
ever, authors rarely give a precise definition of what they mean by style. In
fact, historians of science have adopted the term because it expresses an
important aspect of their research. In this paper, I will map out the uses of
the notion of style in science studies.
The map I want to develop bears upon style taken as an interpretative
category that is freely appropriated by historians of science. I will deal not
with the style of texts or books (even scientific ones), but with a particular
extension of the figurative use of the word style. We will see that the term
has taken on a heterogeneous, even contradictory, set of meanings, depend-
ing on the kind of history of science. A historian who is immersed in the
sociological detail of contemporary scientific production does not see sci-
entific style in the same way as a historian employing a synthetic approach
in order to construct an image of European science from antiquity to the
present day. A philosopher of science studying the theories of style of two
such historians would no doubt have yet another concept of style.
By limiting my investigation to the use of the category of style in "sci-
ence studies" I will deliberately put to one side the question of the unity
and coherence of this notion in the varied domains in which it is used. The
epistemological use of the notion of style bears the traces of older debates
on rhetoric, literary criticism, the philosophy of history, and the philoso-

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1999. Copyright © 1999 The Pennsylvania State
University, University Park, PA.

233

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 234 JEAN GAYON

phy of art: the shadows of Cicer

clearly perceptible (see Otte 1991 a
not form part of the visible lands
influence is slightly felt, much as
ments can be detected on a geogra
I shall leave until later a discussio
be given of "style." This is not in
requirement, but quite the opposite
content of a concept. As a work
philosopher who studies the history
definition rather than the other w
different uses of the notion of sty
rary historians of science. One of
be termed the local history of scie
of the general history of science.
clarified, I will situate them in th
philosophy of science.

On style in a local his

In the recent literature of the his

style has been linked to the develop
tional approach. The notions of "
scientific thinking" have gradually
sis, which correspond to two level
munity: local research schools or g
Strictly speaking, the desire to an
ganization is not new (see, e.g., D
characteristic of contemporary his
sense it gives to these units as in
research."

Let us first deal with the example of "research schools." Following

Morrell, modern historians give a technical sense to this expression by re-
serving it for strictly localized institutions that functioned in the nineteenth
century and twentieth century as "knowledge factories." For example, one
can speak of a research school for those scientists and students trained
around Liebig in Germany or Pasteur in France. In general, these research
schools depend on "bosses," enjoy a regular supply of students, have a

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 THE CATEGORY OF STYLE 235

measure of financial autonomy, have the means to

competition with similar units for all these res
sider these schools to be elementary natural units
tific production. Fashioned by a set of intellectua
tional circumstances, "schools" are the matrices w
new concepts and methods, or so it is said.3
In this context, scientific style refers to a set of
ize the production of knowledge. Style or manner
number of intellectual preferences, those techn
materials that characterize a place of research. All
restrict in advance what is accepted as a pertinent
notion of style had in fact been well analyzed by
a study on the history of the Wassermann test fo
the subtitle "Introduction to the theory of style
thought" (see Fleck 1979).
According to this holistic conception, styles of s
easier to identify where the units they are based
localized (see Geison 1993). But few historians h
fine the category of style. Most of the time, just
emplification.
What is the theoretical stance that is related to t
his 1993 book Styles of Scientific Thought: The G
nity, 1900-1933, which deals with German genetic
eth century, Jonathan Harwood provides a good o
position:

As long as one thinks of scientific method as a set

single internal logic, the notion of styles of scien
commonly associate the term style, after all, with
performed in alternative ways, above all with crea
the 1950s and 1960s, however, the emergence of a
in the philosophy of science began to undermine u
ence, (xiv)

What seems to me the most significant point in

sition between method and style. A method con
specified. Historians who have employed the notio
search have tended to emphasize the tacit knowled
creative contemporary research groups or schools
them refer to the definition of tacit knowledge g
Michael Polanyi in 1958: an art cannot be trans

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236 JEAN GAYON

but only "by example, from m

main of diffusion to that of pe
historians of science have employ
the importance of "the knack," w
cess of experimental research prog
we can recognize one of the mo
found in literary or artistic crit
ating function of works of cultur
the "style of the Montagnier res
this reminds us of the "style of S
style." As with any individual wo
ture of an individual, the style o
contrary, the idea of a Shakespea
tion, and thus of a certain unive
This leads us to the other social
ans when they invoke the notion
again, this is an old question th
styles" of scientific thought evok
the "spirit" or "genius" of a give
nation (think for instance of Her
teenth century and beginning of
the specificity of English, French
were not always mediocre, they w
of nationalism and fell out of fa
century, for reasons that are lin
ologies and to the internationaliz
Today, when historians try to pr
given sector of science, they ar
nius" of a particular people. Rath
tional traditions that explain the
entific behavior. In her excelle
nineteenth-century France, the A
a good example of this kind of
Nye compares the ways in whic
chemistry and physics in the n
characteristic oppositions that de
of work: abstract/concrete, indiv
tered, cosmopolitan-urban/purita
Each of these dichotomies is expr

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 THE CATEGORY OF STYLE 237

tual style of the individual work of scientists, bu

the institutional factors that maintain these stere
The opposition between an "abstract" French p
English science has been known for many years
chap. 4). The French have always emphasized th
of theories and their unification, whereas the Eng
matic, have systematically emphasized models,
plied according to need. Nye sees a link between t
erence and the pedagogical traditions of the two c
best scientists were (are) generally educated in the Ecole Normale
Supérieure and in some of the other grandes écoles. Entry to these institu-
tions has long been determined by examinations set for the most part by
pure mathematicians. Similarly, up until 1958, there was a single agrégation
examination for mathematics and physics. In England, there was (and is)
no similar institutional bias in favor of pure mathematics. English physi-
cists have thus always required that their more mathematical colleagues be
able to present their theories through mechanical models of nature.
The other dichotomies can be understood in a similar fashion. The highly
personal aspect of the work of French chemists or physicists is linked to
the emphasis on mathematics: mathematicians tend to work in a more iso-
lated fashion than other scientists. Although the English were deeply op-
posed to any idea of overall control of scientific work, they had a more
"cooperative" vision.
The dichotomy between the "fragmented" and "centered" character of
work is linked to the fact that French scientists, and in particular those in
Paris, have always tended to accumulate several separate institutional po-
sitions. This led them to develop thematically dispersed research programs.
English physicists, incited or obliged to work in only one institution at a
time, have tended to concentrate on highly specialized research programs.
The contrast between "cosmopolitan and urban" behaviors, on the one
hand, and "puritan" behaviors, on the other, is related to politics. Through
the links between the Académie des Sciences de Paris and government ad-
visors, French scientists have had a strong tendency to become key politi-
cal figures. This tendency did not exist in nineteenth century Britain.
The opposition between a "chauvinist" French science and a "tourist"
English science is linked to the mobility of young researchers. In the nine-
teenth century and twentieth century, many English physicists and chem-
ists completed their studies in overseas laboratories. For many years, such
behavior was extremely rare among French scientists; in particular, the

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 238 JEAN GAYON

fact that the agrégés or engineers

di fonctionnaire made such travel
tude toward methods and ideas from other countries.

Finally, the "classical" bent of French physicists and chemists seems to

have been closely linked to the kind of work students were asked to do. In
France, the classes préparatoires, which in most cases are followed by the
agrégation examination, require students to have a general scientific cul-
ture. In England, up until recently, science students were virtually full-
time researchers from their third year onward. This explains both the early
specialization and the more rapid assimilation of new theories and meth-
ods that characterized the English scientific community.
I have devoted a certain amount of space to this example (Nye 1993,
33-41) because it shows exactly what contemporary researchers mean by
the category "national scientific style." First, as in the case of local re-
search groups, it refers to a key way in which the construction of scientific
knowledge is stamped with a historical individuation. However, here the
notion of style has a clearer operational definition. It is no longer a matter
of simply describing singularities, but one of testing a structural interpre-
tative hypothesis. The notion of style employed in this context is in fact
very close to that popularized by historians of art such as Meyer Shapiro
(1953) or Ernst Gombrich (1968) in the middle of the century. For these
historians of art, we can speak of the cultural style of a society when dif-
ferent cultural practices repeatedly express distinctive elements. If, for
example, the same distinctive elements A^ Βχ...} Nx, and Λ^ Βγ..., N^ are
found in, say, the pottery, music and myths of two societies, X and Y, it is
legitimate to speak of different cultural styles. This method is similar to
that of the work of Nye and other contemporary historians of science, who
sometimes explicitly employ this method (see, e.g., Harwood 1993, chap.
1). However, the approach is generally restricted to the sciences: the ques-
tion asked is whether there are pertinent distinctive elements that lead to a
homogeneous characterization of local research groups (working in the same
discipline) in the two countries concerned, or again, at a higher level of
observation, in different disciplines. If, for example, physics, chemistry,
and biology all have the same distinctive characters in each country, and if
this can be proven by a comparative method, then the hypothesis of a na-
tional scientific style is firmly established.
At this point, I will close my discussion of the category of "scientific
style" in the context of a local history of science. I have concentrated on
two levels of analysis, the local research group and the nation, because it is

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 THE CATEGORY OF STYLE 239

at these two levels of the institutional organizatio

historians have spontaneously used the category "r
teresting to note that, at other levels of analysis,
not been used by historians. For example, in co
searchers, who are integrated into a wide variety
works, move about from country to country (as
posts, research grants, conferences, and congresse
varied intradisciplinary transnational collaboration
tant as the rigid traditions of local laboratories of
deed, the evaluation of scientific knowledge takes
if personal relations remain extremely important, i
cult to follow precisely the influences that diffuse
vidual, given the enormous variation in careers fr
other. A science that has as its natural unit of research an "invisible col-

lege" (de Solla Price 1963) cannot be considered as a holistic assembly of

instruments, national institutional constraints, and sedentary traditions of
thinking. Such collective individuation of scientific practices cannot be
described in terms of local traditions. But above all, an international sci-
ence, organized as a network, will be much more homogeneous in its meth-
ods, concepts, and norms. This kind of science is more appropriately de-
scribed by the categories of "normal science" and "paradigm" developed
by Thomas Kuhn (1962). It is difficult to imagine anything more different
from a stylized science than a Kuhnian paradigm because, by definition,
when a paradigm is truly installed as a regime controlling the functioning
of "normal science," there is no place for competing styles. In Kuhn's con-
ception of science, the idea of competing scientific styles has meaning, at
best, in periods of crisis and scientific revolution.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this first inquiry over scientific
styles in the context of a local history of science. The first has already been
formulated. In the usages that have been examined here, the individuating
aspect of style has been uppermost (style in the sense of the style o/Stendhal,
rather than a Stendhalian style). The second conclusion touches the limits
of the notion of style for the history of science. After all, the key question
that is posed for all historians of science is that of the processes whereby
knowledge becomes universalized. While, in practice, local styles always
exist, the overall tendency of science is for these local styles to be assimi-
lated into commonly accepted methods. From this point of view, the cat-
egory of "local style" is unsatisfying. We still have to ask how knowledge
that is formed and accepted in a local context ends up being universalized.

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 240 JEAN GAYON

Styles of scientific tho

history of science

In 1994, the sadly missed Alistai

mental work entitled Styles of Sci
tion: The History of Argumenta
Mathematical and Biomedicai Sciences and Arts. This book is the summa-

tion of his life's work. In 2487 pages full of erudition and talent, Crombie
dares to do what most historians of science have long since renounced:
present an overall vision of 2500 years of European science. And it was at
this scale that he found it necessary to use the category "style of thinking"
to organize his historical material.
The "styles" in question have nothing in common with the local styles
dealt with above. These are not cultural styles, specific to given periods
and societies. Crombie accepts the pertinence of the notion of a cultural
style, and indeed occasionally uses this concept, but the classification of
"styles of scientific thinking" that dominates the work is not of this kind.
Crombie does not really provide an analytic definition of his category
of style. Like most historians of science, he is content with an open-ended
definition that qualifies six styles of "scientific inquiry and demonstra-
tion" that traverse the history of European science taken as a whole. Let us
follow Crombie in his open-ended approach. We can ask afterward what
style means in this context.
The six styles described by Crombie are as follows. (1) Postulation.
This is the most ancient of scientific styles. Its model is that of mathemati-
cal argumentation, and it consists of proof by deduction, on the basis of
explicit principles. From astronomy to music, in antiquity and in the Middle
Ages it spread to a large number of sciences, sometimes meeting failure
(in physics or in astronomy, for example). (2) Experimental argument. This
consists of verifying existing postulates and searching for new ones on the
basis of observation and measurement. This attitude, which was occasion-
ally used by the Greeks, was fully elaborated as a method of reasoning at
the end of the Middle Ages and in early Modern Europe. It first appeared
in astronomy and in the commercial arts, and was subsequently extended
to physics. (3) Hypothetical modeling. This style or method involves using
the known properties of an artefact that humans have conceived and thus
fully understand in order to explain the unknown properties of phenomena.
A classic example is that of the camera obscura as a model of vision. It is
not a necessary requirement of analogue models that they be mechanical,

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 THE CATEGORY OF STYLE 24 1

although they often have been. Contemporary mode

mathematical algorithms, which nevertheless fulfil
Crombie points out that the first three methods
regularities" of phenomena. The other three metho
of objects. (4) Variety by taxonomy. This style of a
in sciences such as zoology, botany, nosography
Although this method had antecedents in thinking i
fully developed from the end of the Renaissance on
and statistical analysis. Born in the seventeenth
junction of studies of gambling and of the control
man populations, this approach was gradually ex
natural situations that medieval logic viewed in ter
uncertainty. All contemporary sciences employ thi
the most fundamental sectors of theoretical physic
mechanics or chaos theory). (6) Historical deriva
gests, this method applies to all the historical scien
geology, from the theory of evolution to human his
What does Crombie mean by style! His classificati
servations: (1) Crombie uses style in a sense that is
In fact, he explicitly suggests that the two terms a
of scientific thinking" are "methods of inquiry and
tion" or "methods of reasoning" (Crombie 1994,
tion thus consists of recording the diversity of me
the scientific object that have existed (and endured
(2) These methodological styles are the generali
In fact, the styles in question appeared more or
philosopher Ian Hacking correctly pointed out in an
basis of Crombie's manuscript (1992b). But these
each other, they did not replace one another. Some
ancient, others are more recent, but they all have
of having survived through time. To describe their
ploys a formulation that is interesting from a phil
"Each style defined the questions to be put to its su
yielded answers within that style. Each introduc
tific inquiry with appropriate scientific methods a
of evidence, demonstration and explanation that
acceptable within that style" (Crombie 1994, 1:8
methodological styles, from the point of view of b
volved in the validation of knowledge and the creat

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242 JEAN GAYON

remarkable characteristic. Cr
method; he prefers to speak o
both historical and permanent.
(3) Crombie's methodological s
in fact, why they are styles. Th
in a given sector of knowledge
ment of problems was confin
proaches described by Crombie
that "methodological styles" can
the case in major scientific rev
ics often combines styles 1, 2,
4, 5, and 6.
We are thus faced with a categ
from that used in the local and
What appears here is the univer
this way, Crombie finds himsel
of the conceptual history of sc
science. Consider, for exampl
style," or the discussion by Ale
ence." Historians have always b
Newton had the ability to open
which today retain the metho
that they had three centuries ag

Style and the philo

I will conclude by posing two

word style mean in the "scient
science attempt to describe an
the question of the definition o
has a role to play, in that it ra
history. On the other hand, lea
the historical notion of "scient
philosophy of science?
As to the meaning of the wor
In the two different usages tha
antinomic functions of style in
tion and an individuating fun

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 THE CATEGORY OF STYLE 243

applied in the production of a work; sometimes it

gression of the rule, the singularity of a productio
tion. It is not surprising that we can see here, stri
a new expression of the dual etymology of the
term) refers to the column of a monument and in
the idea of a system of rules applied to the produc
Latin term) refers to a material writing tool and
of any kind of expression.
It would nevertheless be naïve to think that the
countered here could each exclusively exemplify
tions. The tension between individuation and universalization is to be found

in both cases: the style of a research laboratory must also be able to be

described as a set of rules that frame this research (even if these rules are
not explicitly codified by the actors involved). As to Crombie's "method-
ological styles," these are not the miraculous intrusions of essences into
History: they were born, evolved, and have been maintained for reasons
that can be historically analyzed. And at that point, their plurality demon-
strates the nonhomogeneity of scientific argumentation, albeit at a very
large scale in terms of time and scientific disciplines.
Having stated these reserves, I will note that historians of science have
developed the traditional bipolarity of the category of style to its extreme.
This is not a matter of chance: philosophers have traditionally defined sci-
ence as knowledge of the universal. Having proclaimed itself for millennia
to be the negation of one of the poles of style (the individuating pole), and
thus of style itself, when historians of various orientations tried to inter-
pret science according to this category, the inevitable result was an exacer-
bation of this bipolarization.
That having been said, what is the interest of the category of "style" for
the philosopher of science? If the philosopher takes the word science seri-
ously, he or she will want to find the basis of objectivity, to understand how
objectivity is possible. Not so long ago, in Kant's time, or even more re-
cently during the triumph of logical positivism, philosophers believed they
could state the formal conditions of objectivity, independent of history and
relating either to the structure of human thought or to a kind of general
grammar that would preside over and influence all empirical knowledge.
Today, no one believes such things. We all agree that scientific language
and thinking are historical and collective products through and through.
As the philosopher Hacking (1992b) has argued, it is at this point in the
discussion that the category of "style" becomes interesting. What is inter-
esting for the philosopher is Crombie's observation that, because of their

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 244 JEAN GAYON

success in problem-solving, cultu

methods of justification and inve
eral conceptions of such methods
course, such methods have to app
of their emergence is no differe
have appeared, argues Hacking, th
tures that can indefinitely give r
search style that characterizes ma
of postulation") continues to give
as it did in the time of Euclid. Ha
general historical category of sci
ment for the Kantian a priori in
Let us push this idea a bit furthe
Foucault accepted the paradoxical
time, a discursive formation dev
ditions that define the "conditions of existence" of what can be described

and proved. However, the epistemologist finds Foucault's position unsat-

isfying when it comes to understanding the persistence of certain knowl-
edge and of certain forms of the appearance and evolution of this knowl-
edge. It can be argued that styles à la Crombie are better candidates for the
position of a "historical a priori" precisely for the reason that they leave
traces that are sufficiently long-lasting for science and are not to be diluted
in the morass of collective beliefs. Each "style of reasoning" is in fact
characterized by stabilization techniques, which are often highly complex
and essential to the social acceptance of theories. These techniques are not
only linguistic. Over the course of history, they have developed material
and institutional dimensions that have continually become simultaneously
more historicized and dominant (see Pickering 1989 and Hacking 1992b).
A "style of reasoning" is precisely that: a nonexclusive line of exploration
and substantiation of objectivity. In the history of science, such lines of
approach can be seen to appear and become rigid. Some, perhaps many,
fade away, but the fact that some continue to exist is particularly impres-
sive and renders somewhat ridiculous the most radically relativist inter-
pretations of science. Yet what is remarkable in "styles of scientific think-
ing" is not only their durability, but also their plurality, their openness at
the scale of vast historical periods. New canons of the production of scien-
tific objects have appeared in the course of history and have coexisted with
other, older, canons. The method of analogue models has not abolished the
fecundity of the method of postulation or that of experimental argumenta-
tion. Nothing prevents new methodological conceptions of the production

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 THE CATEGORY OF STYLE 245

of scientific questions and objects from appearing

losopher, of course, could be satisfied here with t
theless, the philosophical tradition has rarely acce
in the plural. The word style, with its diverse and
origins and influences, is no doubt more approp
complex historical process whereby knowledge th
upon a given context becomes universalized. Th
word that can express both the contextual sing
vocation of scientific knowledge. In fact, if style
tion were irreducibly contingent, if they connote
ity of the production of scientific knowledge, we
the very concept of science. Conversely, if there
prescriptible canons of the production of science,
tory of science. 8

LIFR GHSS
Université Paris 7 Denis Diderot

Notes
1. For example: The congresses of the History of Science Society in 1986, 1988, 1990;
"Style as a Category of the History and Philosophy of Science" (University of Bielefeld,
Germany, 1987); "National Styles in Science" (Dibner Institute, Boston, USA, 1988); "Styles
locaux en histoire des sciences" (Paris, Cité des sciences et de l'industrie, 1990). The con-
ferences at Bielefeld and at the Dibner Institute were the subject of a special issue of Science
in Context (4.2, 1991), under the title Style in Science (Daston and Otte 1991).
2. See, e.g., Crombie 1992, 1994; Fruton 1990; Gavroglu 1990; Hacking 1983, 1992a,
1992b; and Harwood 1993.
3. The first historian to use this notion rigorously was Morrell (1979). A good overview
of the question can be found in Geison's "Scientific Change, Emerging Specialities, and Re-
search Schools" (1981), and in the collective work edited by Geison and Holmes, 1993.
4. See, e.g., the thesis by Gaudillière (1991), which is thoroughly imbued with this
principle of historical interpretation.
5. See the apposite and fully documented remarks of Wessely (1991).
6. For more details of this system of classification, see Crombie 1994, 1: 83-87.
7. On the term, see "Foucault," 1994. On the concept, see Foucault 1971.
8. This paper is a reworked version of an article that appeared under the title "De la
catégorie de style en histoire des sciences" in 1996.

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 246 JEAN GAYON

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Duhem, Pierre. 1915. Lu Science allemande

Fleck, Ludwig. 1979. Genesis and Development of a Scientific F

"Foucault." In Dictionnaire des philosophes, ed. Denis Huisma
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