AN INTRODUCTION TO

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY
Based on the Works of Murtada Mutahhari

by
Abd al-Rassul Obudiyyat

Translated by
Hussein Valeh
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THE TERM ‘PHILOSOPHY’

1.1. On the Greek Term Philosophia

There is a consensus among all the scholars of the ancient and modern
Greek language and thought that the term ‘philosophy’ originates from
the Greek root philosophia that combines the two parts philo meaning
‘to love’ and sophia meaning ‘knowledge’, combined to mean ‘loving
knowledge’. This term was coined as falsafah in the Arabic infinitive,
meaning ‘to philosophize’. Socrates and Plato are referred to as
‘philosophers’, derived from the Greek philosophos, meaning lovers of
knowledge.
In pre-Socratean Greece, there lived a group of thinkers who named
themselves sophist, meaning ‘knowledgeable’. They held that man is the
criterion for truth, hence their use of fallacies in discourse and
arguments. Thus, the term ‘sophist’ gradually acquired a new meaning:
elaborate fraud and deception. This new meaning is now represented by
the Arabic term safsatah, coined as a translation from the Greek word.
Socrates shunned the title sophist or ‘knowledgeable’ out of modesty
and perhaps also out of fear of identification with the sophists and chose
instead, the title ‘philosopher’, introducing himself as a lover of
knowledge. Gradually, the word ‘philosopher’ too, underwent a change
of meaning, to convey ‘knowledgeable’ and the term ‘philosophy’
became synonymous with ‘knowledge’. In this latter sense, the word
philosopher was neither applied to anyone before Socrates, nor to
anyone immediately after him. It is said that Aristotle also did not use
this term. The exact meaning of the term ‘philosophy’ was not defined
at that time. It was much later that ‘philosophy’ and ‘philosopher’
became common currency in everyday language.

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1.2 The Term Falsafah in the Muslim World

Muslims borrowed this term from the Greek, Arabized it, and covered its
meaning with an oriental gloss, signifying intellectual science (or
theoretical and speculative knowledge). It is no longer used to refer to
any specific discipline. Rather, it is used to identify a particular category
of knowledge and distinguish it from another, labelled ‘transmission-
based science’. The latter category includes lexicography, grammar,
syntax, inflection, prosody, rhetoric, semantics, hermeneutics,
jurisprudence, and methodology and logic of jurisprudence. With its
wide-range of implications, the word faylasuf referred to an expert in all
branches of theoretical and speculative sciences, including theology,
mathematics, natural philosophy, politics, ethics, and home economics.
When explaining the Aristotelian division of the sciences, Muslims
used the word falsafah or hikmah (i.e. wisdom) and divided it into two
branches: the theoretical and the practical. Theoretical philosophy,
according to them, studies things as they are. Practical philosophy
studies human behaviour as it should be. The former includes three
areas: metaphysics or the highest branch of philosophy, mathematics or
mid-level philosophy, and natural philosophy or the lowest branch of
philosophy.
Metaphysics consists of two parts: general matters or general
theology, and special theology. Mathematics includes four divisions:
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. Natural philosophy has
many sub-divisions. Practical philosophy includes three spheres: ethics,
home administration (or economics), and politics. A perfect philosopher
is the one who masters all of these.

1.3. The Genuine Philosophy

According to Muslim philosophers, metaphysics, also referred to as ‘the
foremost branch of philosophy’, ‘the highest branch of philosophy’, ‘the
highest branch of science’, ‘general science’, and ‘theology’, is the most
important of all branches of philosophy for three reasons. Firstly, it is
more demonstrable than other sciences and enjoys more certitude when
compared to them. Secondly, it is the queen of sciences, and is sovereign
over them, since they depend on it, yet it does not depend on them.
Thirdly, it is the most general and comprehensive of all sciences. Hence,
in their view, it is the genuine branch of philosophy. Sometimes, though

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not very often, they use the term ‘philosophy’ therefore, to mean
metaphysics alone. Consequently, the term ‘philosophy’ acquired two
distinct uses among early philosophers. On the one hand it referred to
intellectual science in general and on the other hand it signified ‘the
foremost branch of philosophy’, as a branch of theoretical philosophy.
The former usage was more common than the latter.
We can conclude that the early philosophers, in one way, used the
term ‘philosophy’ as a general term, rather than the name for a certain
discipline and hence provided no specific definition for it. Since
‘philosophy’, in its commoner usage, denoted any knowledge that was
not based on transmission, ‘philosopher’ signified a person who had
mastered all of the intellectual sciences. Thus, they stated that
‘philosophy is the vehicle for the perfection of man’s soul, both
theoretically and practically.’ So, if we consider the term ‘philosophy’ in
this sense, we need not give a definition for it. However, the second
usage of the term requires a definition. ‘Philosophy’ understood as the
genuine philosophy and the highest branch of science or primary
philosophy, is defined in terms of knowing the characteristics of beings
as such, as opposed to knowing beings as determinate entities like
bodies, quantities, qualities, plants, humans, etc.
This definition needs further explanation. The information we have
of things can be classified into two categories. In one category, what we
know relates to a particular species or type of being. It includes the
properties, characteristics, or qualities peculiar to a particular entity. For
example, we know that numbers, dimensions, plants, or human bodies
have certain properties. What we know of numbers constitutes the body
of arithmetic. What we know of dimensions falls under geometry. Our
knowledge of the human body and plants is medicine and botany
respectively. Likewise, we study the properties of certain types of
objects in geology, mineralogy, biology, psychology, sociology, nuclear
physics, and the like. But, there is another category of information we
have of things, which relates not to being, because it belongs to a certain
type, but because it exists. This information constitutes the science of
philosophy. It is in this sense that we shall use the term ‘philosophy’
from this point onwards.

1.4. Metaphysics
As we mentioned earlier, the term ‘philosophy’ is sometimes used

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synonymously with ‘metaphysics’. This has led to a historical confusion

we ought to dispel. Aristotle was the first author to realize that there are
a number of issues, which relate to no particular field of study, yet
somehow encompass all sciences whether natural, mathematical, ethical,
social or logical. Therefore, they need to be collated within a specific
discipline. Perhaps he also noted that the subject matter of such a
discipline must be ‘existence’ or ‘being’, for it was this element that
identified these issues as one subject. Nevertheless, he did not choose a
name for that discipline. When his works were posthumously compiled
in a collection, the section containing this study just happened to come
after the section devoted to physics. Not yet having been named, that
part was then subsequently referred to as metaphysics, meaning ‘after
physics’. Later on, that section gradually came to be known as
metaphysics. Arab translators translated that name literally into the
Arabic phrase ma ba‘d al-tabi‘ah. Gradually, the story relating to this
naming sank into oblivion and some readers of Aristotle and some
scholars began to think that the name alluded to issues discussed within
this discipline, or at least to some of them, for example that God and
incorporeal intellects relate to what lies outside the world of nature.
Therefore, certain intellectual scholars like Avicenna questioned the
naming, asking why the discipline was not named ‘before physics’, as its
subject matter takes precedence over physics, because God, for whose
sake the name is given to the discipline, is prior to nature.
This lingual confusion was to later result in a conceptual confusion
and mistranslation, deceiving some Western authors, who mistook
‘metaphysics’ to mean ‘ultra-physical’. They wrongly assumed that the
subject matter of this discipline, related exclusively to what lay beyond
or outside the realm of nature, hence their definition of metaphysics as
‘the science solely related to the study of God and nonmaterial beings’.
As we have seen however, metaphysics does in fact address issues that
are relevant to being in general, whether natural or otherwise.

1.5. Separation of Science from Philosophy

Another confusion common nowadays, especially among dogmatic
followers of Western thinkers in the Orient, underpins the notorious
myth of the separation of science from philosophy. The diachronic
change of the lexical meaning of a conventional term has been
misconstrued as a historical change of mainstream philosophical

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thought. As we have already seen, the term ‘philosophy’ underwent a

change in meaning. It was once used to mean intellectual knowledge, as
opposed to those sciences that relied on transmission as their source. In
this sense, it covered all speculative thought and was used not as a
proper name, but as a general name. In the modern age however, this
meaning has been replaced by what is understood by the word
‘metaphysics’. In the new sense, philosophy includes logic, aesthetics,
metaphysics, and the like. This change of meaning of the term
‘philosophy’ has been misunderstood as an historical fact of a split of
sciences such as mathematics and physics from the one comprehensive
discipline that once included them alongside theology, metaphysics, and
all other branches. This confusion is no less pronounced than the one
produced in the following hypothetical situation. Suppose the term
‘body’ that today signifies the human body as opposed to the human
soul, was at some point in time coined to specifically mean only that
part of the body from the shoulders to the toes. Then, consider that
someone may suppose that since the word ‘body’ no longer includes a
person’s head, as it used to when it signified the whole human body,
that people must, at some time have been beheaded! Another example is
the word Fars, an earlier name for ‘Iran’. Today, it refers only to a
province in Iran. It is therefore, by no means reasonable, to conclude
that other provinces have been separated from the country.
The so-called separation of the sciences from philosophy is no more
sound a story than the disintegration of Iran or decapitation of people
under those hypothetical circumstances. The only difference is in the
reason; the sciences have never been a part of philosophy.

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ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

2.1. Islamic Schools of Thought before Sadr al-

Muta’allihin
Among philosophical trends in the Muslim world before Sadr al-
Muta’allihin, four schools are prominent. This categorization does not
include non-philosophical currents, such as those in the spheres of
jurisprudence, exegesis of the Qur’an, literature, tradition, politics, or
ethics. Under the influence of the teachings of Islam, all of the four
schools are tinged with the spirit of Islamic culture that sets them apart
from their counterparts in the non-Muslim world. The four schools are
the peripatetic, the illuminative, the mystical, and the theological.

2.1.1. The Peripatetic School of Philosophy

This school has many followers. The majority of Muslim philosophers
belong to this school, among them Kindi, Farabi, Avicenna, Khwajah
Nasir al-Din Tusi, Mir Damad, Averroes and Avempace of Andalusia, to
name but a few of the prominent figures. The most prominent
representative of this school is Avicenna. Avicenna’s works such as
Shifa’ (The Book of Healing), Isharat (Remarks and Admonitions), Najat
(The Book of Salvation), Danishnamih-yi ‘Ala’i (The Book of Scientific
Knowledge), al-Mabda’ wa al-Ma‘ad, Ta‘liqat, Mubahathat (Discussions),
and ‘Uyun al-Hikmah are all within the realm of peripatetic philosophy.
This school relies only on reason and proof as the source of knowledge.

2.1.2. The Illuminative School of Philosophy

This school is not as popular as the previous one. It was revived by
Shaykh al-Ishraq (Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi), considered as its perfect
representative, who wrote several books in the Arabic language,

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including Hikmat al-Ishraq (The Philosophy of Illumination), Talwihat

(Intimations), Mutarihat (Havens), Muqawimat (Oppositions), and
Hayakal al-Nur (The Temples of Light). He also wrote several papers in
Persian such as Avaz-i Par-i Jabra’il (The Chant of the Wing of Gabriel)
and ‘Aql-i Surkh (The Red Intellect). Among the renowned followers of
this school are Qutb al-Din Shirazi and Shahrzuri. Holding that not all
truths are explored by reason and argumentation, this school
acknowledges two sources of knowledge: rational demonstration and
self-mortification or purification of the soul.

2.1.3. The Mystical School

The aim of this school is the arriving at and union with the truth, rather
than the exploring of it, and it renders the method of rational
argumentation as unreliable, considering advocates of reason total
failures. The true method according to this school therefore, is
purification of the soul through the spiritual journey to God and
acquisition of proximity to Him.
There are many who follow this school. Numerous great mystics
have emerged in the Muslim world, such as Bayazid of Bastam, Hallaj,
Shibli, Junayd of Baghdad, Zunun of Egypt, Abu Sa‘id Abu al-Khayr,
Khwajah ‘Abd Allah Ansari, Abu Talib of Mecca, Abu Nasr Siraj, Abu al-
Qasim Qushayri, Muhy al-Din ibn ‘Arabi of Andalus, Ibn Farid of Egypt,
Mawlawi, and Khwajah Hafiz of Shiraz. The most prominent figure
among Muslim mystics and the first to write on theoretical mysticism,
subsequently having a profound influence upon all his successors was
Muhy al-Din ibn ‘Arabi.
This school shares with the school of Ishraq the emphasis on the
purification of the soul, but diverges from it on two points: the means
and the end. For mystics, argumentation is of little use, whilst the school
of Ishraq combines rational argumentation with mystical revelation as
two consistent methods. For mysticism, the end is union with the truth,
whilst for Ishraq philosophers, it is only an exploration of the truth.

2.1.4. The School of Theology

Like peripatetic philosophers, theologians rely on rational
argumentation as the source of knowledge in theology as a discipline.
But they begin their theoretical discourse from a set of axioms somehow
different from those of philosophers. Theologians, especially the

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Mu‘tazilites, start from ‘good and bad’ as their fundamental axiom. The
Ash‘arites divorce themselves from their rival trend, the Mu‘tazilites,
who derive their axiom from pure reason, based on Divine Law.
Mu‘tazilites infer a number of theorems like ‘the Law of Grace’ and ‘the
obligation on the part of God to do what is best’ from that axiom.
Philosophers, however, construe ‘bad and good’ in terms of
conventional human principles agreed upon by people and referred to in
logic as ‘received premises’ or ‘self-evident judgments of practical
reason’ at most. Such premises cannot be used as proof. They are useful
merely for debate. Philosophers therefore, label theology as a dialectical
discipline, rather than one constructed from proof.
Theologians also differ from philosophers in another respect. While
philosophical discourse recognizes no prejudice and targets no pre-
meditated end, a theologian is dedicated to defending a religious faith. In
the Muslim world, there are three major theological trends: the
Mu‘tazilites, the Ash‘arites and the Shi‘a. We cannot explain these
schools in detail here for want of space. So, we will just glance at some
of the important figures from each school. Among the Mu‘tazilites, Abu
al-Huzayl ‘Allaf, Nazzam, Jahiz, Abu ‘Ubaydah Mu‘ammar ibn Muthanna
th th
in the second and third centuries (8 - 9 centuries CE), Qadi ‘Abd al-
Jabbar of the fourth century, and Zamakhshari of the sixth century are
prominent. Abu al-Hasan Ash‘ari, who passed away in year 330 of the
th
Islamic lunar calendar (9 century CE), is the head of the Ash‘arite
school. Qadi Abu Bakr Baqillani, Imam al-Haramayn Juwayni, Ghazali,
and Fakhr al-Din Razi also belong to this trend.
The Shi‘a trend in theology has figures like Hisham ibn Hakam, who
was a pupil of Imam Sadiq (A); the Nawbakhti family, a famous Shi‘a
dynasty; Shaykh Mufid; Sayyid Murtada ‘Alam al-Huda; and Khwajah
Nasir al-Din Tusi, who is a perfect representative of Shi‘a theology. He
was, in addition, a mathematician and a philosopher and left several
works such as Tajrid al-‘Aqa’id (Abstract of Theology), which is a
classical textbook on theology. Subsequently, theology in the Shi‘a
world moved towards metaphysics.

2.2. Transcendental Philosophy

The four aforementioned trends of speculative thought in the Muslim
world finally found culmination in the philosophical school called
transcendental philosophy. This was founded by Sadr al-Muta’allihin,

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th
who lived in the 16 century. Although this term had been used earlier
by Avicenna in his book Isharat (Remarks and Admonitions), it was Sadr
al-Muta’allihin who first selected it as the name for his school.
Sadr al-Muta’allihin’s philosophical school resembles the Ishraq
School methodologically, in that it combines rational reasoning with
mystical revelation, but it differs from it with regards to axioms and
theorems. Many problems inherited from the aforementioned
philosophical schools and unresolved disagreements between
philosophers and mystics or philosophers and theologians were finally
settled by the new school. In fact, Sadr al-Muta’allihin’s school inherits
insights from earlier trends of thought in the Muslim world, yet stands
on its own feet as an independent coherent philosophical system, rather
than a mere amalgam.
Sadr al-Muta’allihin wrote several books, mainly on philosophy.
These include al-Asfar al-Arba‘ah (The Four Journeys), al-Shawahid al-
Rububiyyah (Divine Proofs), al-Mabda’ wa al-Ma‘ad (The Beginning and
the End), ‘Arshiyah, al-Masha’ir, and Sharh-i Hidayah Athiriyyah. His
followers include Haj Mulla Hadi Sabzivari, the author of Sharh-i
Manzumah, a textbook on philosophy taught in seminary schools along
with the Asfar by Sadr al-Muta’allihin, the Isharat and Shifa’ by
Avicenna, and Hikmat al-Ishraq by Shaykh al-Ishraq.
One novelty of Sadr al-Muta’allihin’s work is that he sorted the
different levels of philosophical learning into four stages. This was
essentially an intellectual enterprise based on the mystics’ stages of
spiritual journey and development.
1. The journey from the creation to the Creator, where the traveller
leaves the plane of nature behind and passes through various ultra-
natural worlds arriving in the vicinity of the unveiled Holy Essence
of God.
2. The journey by Him within the Holy Essence, which is accomplished
after the first stage and begins by the pupil exploring the Divine
Names, Attributes, and Aspects of Perfection.
3. The journey by Him from God to creation, where the traveller,
without separation from God, returns to the world and to people,
since he is now able to see the manifestation of God in everything.
4. The journey within creation, where the mystic then assumes the role
of leadership and helps people to find the path to God.
According to this categorization, as a type of mental exercise aimed

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at perfection, philosophising follows four stages, parallel to the four

aforementioned stages of mystical development. First, the general issues
of metaphysics are taught, as basics for monotheism. This corresponds
to the first stage of the mystical journey, since it constitutes our point of
departure in our mental movement towards God. Second comes
theology and issues related to God and His Attributes. This corresponds
to the second stage. The third level of philosophical investigation
addresses the actions of God, i.e. the worlds of existence. And finally,
the soul and resurrection are dealt with, paralleling the fourth stage.
Sadr al-Muta’allihin has thus arranged his magnum opus Asfar in this
manner. He describes the peripatetic and illuminative schools of
philosophy, which are common currency in philosophical circles, as
common philosophy or the philosophy of common man.

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DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY

3.1. The Subject Matter

Muslim logicians and philosophers believe in classical logic. Classical
1
logic states that a real science must have a particular subject matter
around which all problems discussed in the science revolve, for every
problem relates to and explains one of the aspects of that subject matter.
The subject matter of arithmetic is numbers and every arithmetical
problem speaks of a particular numerical feature. The subject matter of
geometry is the continuous quantity, be it line, surface, or a three-
dimensional shape. Every geometrical problem contains a particular
feature of one of these three quantities.
It is the subject matter of a science that connects various problems
together, unifies them in that science, and distinguishes one science
from another. The reason why geometry is different from arithmetic –
and that they both differ from medicine and that all three are distinct
from physics – is that their subject matters are different. Furthermore,
the subject matter of any two sciences accounts for their remoteness
from or proximity to each other. That is why we find a connection
between geometry and arithmetic, yet we do not see one between either
of these and medicine. The subject matter of geometry is the continuous
quantity and that of arithmetic is the number or discrete quantity, and
both of these would seem to be two types of quantity. Medicine, on the
other hand, has diseases of the human body as its subject matter, which
evidently has no such connection to either of the other two. Finally, it is
the subject matter that determines which method of investigation is to
be adopted in a science. If the subject matter is an entity liable to sense
perception, the appropriate method of its investigation would then
include observation and experimentation. But, if it yields solely to
intellectual understanding, then rational contemplation and argum-

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entation alone would suit it.

It is interesting to note that the subject matter of a science is one
thing and the subject matter of a scientific problem is another. In every
problem, we have a proposition with at least one subject and one
predicate. Usually, the subject of such a proposition lies within the
extension of the subject matter of the science that studies that problem.
For example, the subject matter of geometry is continuous quantity and
the subject matters of geometrical problems can be volume, length,
plane etc. Evidently, volume, length, and plane are different types of
continuous quantities, hence their inclusion in the extension of the term
‘continuous quantity’. There is a geometrical law that states that the
volume of a cube equals the length of one side cubed. Another law states
that the surface of a square equals the length of one side squared.
The predicate of the proposition constituting a scientific problem
must refer to a property truly stated of the subject of the proposition, as
well as of the subject matter of the relevant science. In everyday
discourse, we often assign properties to things, which if we are to be
precise, do not actually have them. They may be real properties of
something else that has somehow become associated with the object we
describe as having that feature. This kind of attribution is either
figurative or virtual and in any case, by extension. Thus, it is said that
predicates in scientific sentences must state real features of the subject
of the sentence, as well as the subject matter of that science. These types
of predicates are termed ‘essential properties’. So, the subject matter of a
science can be defined as something, the essential properties of which
the science in question studies. A scientific problem, then, is defined as a
proposition stating a property essential to the subject matter of the
science.

3.2. The Subject Matter of Philosophy

As a real [i.e. non-conventional] science, philosophy has a subject
matter. This is ‘beings’. Philosophy studies the essential properties of
beings in the same way that geometry and arithmetic study the essential
properties of continuous quantity and discrete quantity, respectively.

3.2.1. Essential Properties

2
Generally speaking, real properties or essential properties of a thing are

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specific predicates expressed of the subject, because the subject is what

it is, in itself. This needs further explanation. A subject, or a thing, can
be considered from different angles. From each angle, we discover
certain features of that thing, which we may state in a sentence. For
example, man can be viewed as a corporeal being, as a measurable thing,
as a being that possesses certain qualities, or as a being composed of
body and soul. He can also be considered merely as something that
exists.
If we consider man as a corporeal being, we can investigate the
characteristics this has as such. Then we can say of it, for instance, that
it occupies a certain space. As a measurable being, it is said of it that it is
bigger, smaller than, or equal to something else, as the case may be. As a
thing with certain qualities, we say of it that it has such and such a
colour or shape or is warm. As a being possessing a soul, we say it
understands. And as a being, we say of it, that it is one or many,
contingent or necessary, caused or not, actual or otherwise, and created
or eternal.
Consequently, we can say that, had man not been corporeal or
measurable, we could not have said of him that he is spatial, bigger,
smaller than, or equal to something. So, occupying a certain space is a
real feature of the body of man, rather than of man as man. Specifics of
size or number are also not a feature of man as man, but of man as
having quantity. It is the understanding, consciousness, and ability to
think that characterize man as man. For, man is identical with his soul
and the soul is the source and agent of understanding, consciousness,
and thinking. So, these features may be directly attributed to man and
the predicates stating these characteristics of man are directly attributed
predicates stated of man. Man as man enjoys these properties. The other
features mentioned are also man’s features, but via the mediation of
something else, i.e. they are characteristics of man, because man is
corporeal or measurable. So, being big or small and being in space are
the immediate features of body and quantity respectively and not of
man. Being one, actual, caused, and created are the essential properties
of being as being.

3.2.2. Essential Properties of Beings

The above explanations have already clarified that the essential
properties of beings are those properties that are predicated of beings, as
they are beings. In the same manner that quantity or quality or man has

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certain immediate properties, beings as beings also have certain

characteristics. In other words, existence as such has specific properties.
Saying that unity and actuality are immediate properties of being, means
that mere existence demands these features. The attribution of these
properties to something that exists requires no more than its being.
Other concepts used as predicates [or subjects] in philosophical
3
propositions, such as multiplicity, potentiality, causality, contingency,
eternity, necessity, possibility, the state of knowing, the state of being
known, primacy, posteriority, mutability, immutability, being essence,
being accident, dependency, independency, objectivity, subjectivity,
quiddity, and the like, are also all essential properties of existence. In
contrast, the mathematical properties of being ‘equal to’ or ‘bigger than’
or describing characteristics of certain beings, are not immediate
properties of existence, but are attributed to something, because it has
quantity, so it is, by mediation of quantity, that these properties are
predicated of beings.
For this reason, in philosophy, judgments of things are described as
stating ‘the general properties of existence or being’. For, properties
attributed to beings via these judgments, belong to all beings and not to
a particular set of beings. Therefore, for their attribution, no mediation
of anything is required. We can conclude that philosophy is the science
that studies the properties of existence. Thus, philosophy is also named
ontology.

3.3. Research Methods in Philosophy

We saw that methods of research in the sciences are determined by the
nature of the subject matter. Since the subject matter of philosophy is
beyond sense perception, the research method of philosophy might not
include observation and experiment. It is purely intellectual. None of our
senses can capture existence. We see light and colours and shapes. We
hear sounds. We smell, touch, and taste fragrance, warmth and the
tastes of things. Psychology describes what and how we understand by
our sense organs. But, we cannot sense the existence of things. We
perceive existence only by our reason.
Philosophy often makes use of scientific achievements in arguments.
In doing so, it uses an empirical proposition as a minor term of a
syllogism, the major term of which is a philosophical proposition. The
resulted conclusion then is semi-philosophical and semi-empirical. Any

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revision in that empirical premise on account of scientific development

naturally affects that conclusion. Pure philosophical laws, however,
remain immune to such alterations, since they are thoroughly
intellectual and independent of empirical knowledge.

3.4. Importance of Philosophy

Philosophy stems from and quenches man’s natural curiosity for the
truth. Other sciences have a role to play in this too. But, there is a
difference between them. Each branch of science explores only one
aspect of reality, whilst philosophy is concerned with reality as a whole.
We can draw on a simile to explain this point better. Think of the world
as a palace with innumerable rooms, parlours, yards, gardens etc. Each
branch of science selects one room and concentrates on exploring what
it contains and what it is like. Philosophy looks at the palace from a
higher standpoint, studying how the different parts are located and
related to each other. It pays no attention to what is in each particular
room, for example. Therefore, philosophy is concerned with planes of
existence, identifying the plane of the Divine, the plane of Intellects, or
the sphere of non-corporeal beings, the world of Ideas, the material
world and the relations between them, as well as the status of man and
his past and future.
By identifying general features of reality, philosophy provides us
with criteria by which we can distinguish reality from illusion and
discern, in the real realm, abstract reality from concrete, and the entities
existing independently from our conventions from those owing their
very being to convention. There is no scarcity of confusion where one
mistakes his fancy for a fact or wrongly takes a fact as an illusion. To
avoid such confusions, we need scientific criteria. Philosophical laws
constitute such criteria.
In addition, scientific laws are universal and certain, in virtue of the
basic principles that philosophy establishes. Therefore, it is philosophy
that is able to control generalizations in science. It is philosophy that
proves the existence of the subject matter of specific branches of science,
4
where their existence is not self-evident.
There are fundamental questions with direct bearing upon man’s life,
destiny, prosperity, and salvation or damnation. Only philosophy can
answer them. Questions such as whether there is a God or not, whether
He is one, how He acts, whether man has a soul, whether there will be a

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resurrection, and the like, are indispensable, since man’s attitude and
way of life directly depend upon the answers he gives to them and the
beliefs he holds. This by no means implies that everyone must study
philosophy. By nature and instinct, people are disposed to giving correct
answers to these questions. Therefore, common man can provide simple
and convincing arguments for his beliefs in this regard. But there are
atheistic schools that express doubts about these natural beliefs and
spread scepticism. To confront this trend, to verify the truth and to
defend the monotheistic faith, one needs to study philosophy.

3.5. Problems of Philosophy

If we take a glance at the list of problems in philosophy, we can divide
them into five categories.
The first category includes issues about being and its two opposites:
5
nonexistence and quiddity (mahiyyah). Clearly, the world contains only
beings; there is neither nonexistence nor quiddity in the world. But in
our understanding, we form two different concepts, distinct from the
concept of existence, and we use the three to talk about the world. One
set of problems in philosophy, particularly in Transcendental
Philosophy, concerns existence/quiddity/dualism and another set
concerns existence/nonexistence.
The second category relates to issues of existence and its divisions.
Existence can be divided in various ways. One division is into objective
and subjective. Other divisions include divisions into necessary and
contingent, eternal and contingent, immutable and mutable, one and
many, potential and actual, and finally essential and accidental. All these
divisions are primary divisions of beings i.e. existence as such is divisible
into these categories. Beings may be divided in other ways too. For
example, we may categorize them into black and white, big and small,
equal and unequal, odd and even, long and short, and so on and so forth.
These divisions, however, are secondary in the sense that it is not in fact
existence that is divided, but something else associated with existence.
Black and white primarily divide colour, which is a type of quality. Big
and small and the other subsequent six items primarily divide size,
which is a type of quantity, and they all secondarily divide being. Thus,
these divisions do not belong to philosophy.
When we say that existence is either necessary or contingent, or say
that existence is either one or many, we divide existence as such.

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Therefore, these are primary divisions. Philosophers investigate the

reason why a given division is, or is not, philosophical. There exist
differences of opinion among philosophers in this area. There are certain
divisions, which some philosophers have rejected as non-philosophical,
whilst others have justified their inclusion in philosophy, believing that
in order for them to be philosophical, they need only be rephrased.
The third set of problems in philosophy addresses the general laws
governing the world of existence, such as causality, cognation
(sinkhiyyat) of cause and effect, necessary causality, primacy,
posteriority, and simultaneity in orders of existence.
The fourth branch of philosophical problems relates to the question
of whether the world of nature is the only one to exist, or if there exist
other worlds too. By existence we may comprehend several worlds.
Muslim philosophers believe that four worlds or orders of being exist,
6
which contain a hierarchical order: Nasut (the natural world), Malakut
7
(the world of the Divine Kingdom), Jabarut (the world of Domination),
and Lahut (the Divine world).
Nasut refers to the material-physical world of time, space, and
8
movement or the natural sensible world. It is also called Dunya. The
world of ideas or Malakut is higher than the natural world and consists
of forms and dimensions, but lacks movement, time, and change. Jabarut
is the world of Domination and is higher than Malakut, where there is
no form, image, or ideas. Above all is Lahut, i.e. the Divine world.
The fifth set of problems in philosophy addresses the relation
between the natural world and the higher worlds: how existence falls
from the highest order, Lahut or the Divine world, to the lowest order,
Nasut, or the natural world; and how the return takes shape. The rise of
man, in particular, from the lowest order i.e. nature, to the highest order
of being is of prime concern for transcendental philosophy, occupying a
considerably amount of discussion time within the topic of
‘resurrection’.

Notes
1
By ‘real science’ we mean that which is not conventional. Thus, law,
jurisprudence, and principles of jurisprudence are not considered ‘real sciences’ and
the necessity of subject matter for them is obviated.
2
For the reasons explained above, the terms ‘immediate property’, ‘essential
property’, ‘immediate predicate’, ‘essential predicate’, ‘directly attributed property’,
and ‘directly attributed predicate’ will be used interchangeably henceforth.

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3
This English term is homonymous. In one sense it represents the opposite to
necessity and impossibility. In another, it represents the opposite to eternity. Here,
the latter sense is meant.
4
For instance, the subject matters of physics and arithmetic are objects and
numbers, respectively. The existence of the latter, unlike the former, is not self-
evident. But arithmetic cannot undertake to prove this. It is philosophy’s task to do
so.
5
This term has several meanings in English. One of them is close to
‘quintessence’.
6
This Arabic term comes from the root nas meaning people. Sometimes it takes
the meaning of the human world, and sometimes its meaning refers to the world of
entities that have material bodies. Here, the second sense is meant.
7
This Arabic term comes from the root malak, meaning ‘angel’.
8
The term literally means ‘near’. It is mainly used in religious contexts. When
used in the Qur’an, it is often part of the combination al-hayat al-dunya, meaning
‘the near life’, as opposed to al-hayat al-akhirah, meaning ‘the other life’, denoting
the permanent life of man after death. In this text, the editor uses this term as a
synonym for ‘the world of nature’.

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 PART ONE

FEATURES OF THE CONCEPT OF

‘EXISTENCE’