Fam Law Paras

Sammi’s Fam Law Paras 2022
3 types of separation in marriage:

1) Divorce
2) Judicial Separation
3) Nullity 无效[void 无效, voidable 可撤销]
Ⅱ.Nullity 无效[void 无效, voidable 可撤销]

In order for a marriage to be valid, 1) there must be a valid licence granted by the
Registrar/special marriage licence granted by the Minister; 2) there must be solemnisation of the
marriage performed by a licenced official and 3) there must be 2 witnesses (s22 of the Women’s
Charter)
Given that [insert ground] has not been complied with, the marriage can be rendered void.
- Note: failure to comply with s22(2) (2 witnesses) and (3) (witnesses not satisfied that
both parties freely consent to the marriage) will not void the marriage
- Note: the ‘licence and the resulting solemnization can and should be regarded as valid
even where a ground for annulment of the marriage as being voidable can be proven’
(Tan Ah Tee at [51]).
Under s31 of the WC, a sign and sealed copy of the marriage certificate will be delivered to the
bride. However, registration is purely administrative in nature and does not affect the legal
validity of the solemnisation of the marriage (LWK at [1.082]).
【Difference：Void and voidable

Void：自始无效；you don’t need to any apply; e.g, marriage between close family member
Voidable：撤销之日起无效；need a judgement; 】
a) Void marriages 无效婚姻
__ could attempt to seek a judgement of nullity and render the marriage void under one of the
grounds under s105 of the Women’s Charter.
- __ could argue that per s105(a) read with s3(4) of the Women’s charter, the marriage is
void since both parties were Muslim at the time of marriage
- __ could argue that per s105(a) read with s5 and 11 of the Women’s charter, the
marriage is void since the parties were not monogamous
- __ could argue that per s105(a) read with s10 of the Women’s charter, the marriage is
void since the parties were too closely related to one another
void since the parties were not male and female respectively
- __ could argue that per s105(a) read with s22(1) of the Women’s charter, the marriage is
void since the solemnization was not authorised by the issue of a marriage license or the
ceremony was not performed by a licenced official
- __ could argue that per s105(a) read with s11A of the Women’s charter, the marriage is
void since the marriage had been contracted for a party to gain an immigration
advantage and where gratification was exchanged as inducement
void since either party was below the minimum age of marriage
- Since __ is under the legal marriage age of 18, unless a special marriage licence
was obtained from the Minister pursuant to s21, the marriage will be rendered
void. __ could raise the case of Gilick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health
Authority to argue that the child has capacity to consent to the marriage since the
child ‘achieves sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand fully what
is proposed’ (per Lord Scarman).
- Since __ is under 21, parental consent is required before a marriage licence can
be granted.
Generally, s105 is an exhaustive provision and lays out the exhaustive grounds which render a
marriage void (Tan Ah Tee at [35]).
The effect of rendering the marriage void:

The effect of rendering a marriage void is that the courts will consider the marriage in issue as
‘never having taken place’ (Tan Ah Tee at [22]).
Assuming that the court finds that the marriage is void and the parties obtain a judgement of
nullity, the courts can exercise ancillary powers to divide certain matrimonial assets or to
provide financial relief (ADP v ADQ). It might be argued that the effect of rendering the marriage
void such that the marriage is void ab initio and no marital relationship between the parties is
created prevents the courts from exercising its ancillary powers. However, Prof Leong suggests
that a void marriage is not indicative of a complete absence of a marital relationship but a
relative absence of one (at 2.024). This suggests the idea that since the parties had attempted
to form a valid marriage and had acted upon this consensus of marriage, the courts should
possess the ancillary powers limited as it may be due to the short duration of the marriage.
3Ps: Since __ is a 3P to the marriage, he cannot invoke the court’s matrimonial jurisdiction to
declare the marriage void (Moh Ah Kiu). However, __ can make an application for an award of a
bare declaration on the validity/invalidity of the marriage if the 3P has an ‘interest in the
existence or non-existence of a marriage’ (Tan Ah Thee at [25]).
- Judgement of nullity is usually for the spouses such that the courts can then invoke their
matrimonial jurisdiction grant ancillary relief 附带救济
- In Moh Ah Kiu, the declaration was sought by the Central Provident Fund Board which
needed to know whether the purported marriage between Mdm Moh and her deceased
“husband” was valid so that it could decide whether to allow her application to the Board
to re-register the Housing and Development Board flat then registered in their joint
names, in her sole name as the surviving joint owner. The court dealt with the
application on the merits and no point was taken that the Central Provident Fund Board
as a stranger to the marriage was not entitled to ask for such a declaration
Children: Under s111(2) of the WC, a child to a void marriage will be deemed to be a legitimate
child of his/her parents if 1) he or she is able to prove biological parentage to either party of the
marriage and 2) either one or both of the parents reasonably believed the marriage was valid.
b) Voidable marriages (Note: only the spouse is accorded this option to render the
marriage voidable and not for 3Ps)婚姻可撤销第三人不能提出，提出撤销的选择
赋予的是夫妻双方
__ could attempt to seek a judgement of nullity and render the marriage voidable under one of
the grounds under s106 of the Women’s Charter. The judgement of nullity rendering the
marriage voidable only declares the marriage invalid from the date of the judgement (S110(2)).
- __ could argue that per s106(a), the marriage is voidable since it had not been
consummated 行房 due to incapacity of either party/ per s106(b), the marriage is
voidable since it had not been consummated due to the wilful refusal 故意拒绝 of the
defendant to consummate it.
- Note: mutual agreement not to consummate is not a voidable cause
- Consummation must take place after the solemnization of marriage
- Incapacity to consummate is an operative reason that can be used by either
spouse to declare incapacity where this incapacity is not only limited to physical
incapacity (L v L)
- Wilful refusal: settled decision not to consummate the marriage without excuse
so proof requires evidence of persistent refusal of sexual intercourse; In Tan Lan
Eng v Lim Swee Eng, the pf made 6 requests for intimacy which was refused and
therefore successfully proved wilful refusal
- __ could argue that per s106(c) of the Women’s charter, the marriage is voidable due to
a lack of consent on __’s part due to duress/mistake/mental disorder.胁迫、错误、精神
障碍
- In Tan Ah Tee, the sons alleged that the marriage was procured by UI but this
allegation was rejected since the voidable cause was only available for use by
the spouses of the marriage and not 3Ps like the sons.
- Mistake: must be mistaken as to the whole of the other party which destroys
consent; mistake as to transexualism 变性 of the other party (Lim Ying v Hiok
Kian Ming Eric and mistake due to Parkinson’s disease 帕金森 and therefore UI
(Tan Ah Tee) were not found to amount to an operative mistake.
- __ could argue that per s106(d) of the Women’s charter, the marriage is voidable due to
__’s mental disorder rendering them unfit for marriage.
- __ could argue that per s106(e) of the Women’s charter, the marriage is voidable since
the defendant was suffering from a communicable venereal disease 可传染的性病
- __ could argue that per s106(f) of the Women’s charter, the marriage is voidable since
the bride was pregnant by some other person other than the plaintiff.
The effect of declaring a marriage voidable is that the marriage will be deemed as valid until
‘decree annulling it has been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction, which can be
done only at the instigation of one of the parties during the lifetime of both parties’ (Tan Ah Tee
at [22])
Alternatively, __ is accorded the option not to act upon the flaw in the formation of the marriage
which renders it voidable, allowing the marriage to remain as completely valid.
3Ps: Since __ is a 3P to the marriage, he cannot invoke the court’s matrimonial jurisdiction 婚姻
管辖 to declare the marriage void (Moh Ah Kiu). While the court’s declaratory jurisdiction 宣告管
辖 can be invoked by a 3P in determining the validity of a marriage, this jurisdiction ‘ cannot be
used to alter the status of the marriage’ or ‘a right rather than simply re-stating it’ (Tan Ah Thee
at [26]). Therefore, in cases of a voidable marriage, it is only the parties to the marriage which
can seek the matrimonial jurisdiction of the court to declare the marriage as void.
However, __ can make an application for an award of a bare declaration on the validity/invalidity
of the marriage if the 3P has an ‘interest in the existence or non-existence of a marriage’ (Tan
Ah Thee at [25]).
Bars to judgement of nullity 婚姻可撤销的救济限制

1) where the pf conducted herself so as to lead the df to reasonably believe that she would not
seek to do so and where it would be unjust to grant the judgement of nullity (s107(1))？？
2) time bar of 3 years from the date of marriage for cases of lack of consent, unfit for marriage,
venereal disease and pregnancy by another man (s107(2)) 结婚三年内以上述理由可以主张婚姻
无效
Ancillary Orders 附带命令: Assuming that the judgement of validity is granted, __ could seek the
court’s ancillary power to make financial orders between the parties (ADP v ADQ). However,
Professor Leong Wai Kum notes that the ancillary powers would be exercised more modestly in
cases of voidable marriages (at 2.126).
Effect of decree nisi 临时法令的效力: While __ could argue that the court has no jurisdiction to
make ancillary orders pursuant to an interim judgement/decree nisi, the court in Sivakolunthu
has clarified that the decree nisi itself is ‘a recognition by the “court that the marriage is at an
end”’ and that there is ‘good reason to construe s 106(1) so as to empower the court to make
such orders after the decree nisi has been pronounced’ (at [25]). Therefore, the courts do
possess the jurisdiction to make ancillary orders pursuant to the pronouncement of the interim
judgement.
Sivakolunthu --> Core issues is whether the settlement can take effect after death of one of
the spouses:
- df filed for divorce against husband but there was a settlement order given by the court but
before it was executed, the husband died.
- Whether the court has the power to make an ancillary order prior to decree nisi has
been made absolute; when does a marriage come to an end - the justification for the
time period between the decree nisi and decree nisi absolute and whether we should
consider it a divorce.
- Holding is that marriage ends at issuance decree nisi (after court hears the
writ/petition, the court grants decree nisi (order which says marriage is dissolved)
which is now called the interim judgement; 3 months between interim judgement and
final judgement but in reality most cases take more than 6 months)
Tan Ah Thee --> Fight was about inheritance

- 2nd will was invalidated since they said he had no capacity - 2nd will was being taken
out. If a person dies without the will, the person dies intestate - we refer to the intestate
succession act - it says 50% goes to the spouse and 50% goes to the children
- Appeal by 2 sons of the deceased who were administrators of the estate and applied
for a bare declaration that there was no valid between their father and the 2nd woman
he married - 6 children from 1st wife only became aware that they had a youngest half
brother after the 1st wife had died in 1994. deceased had allegedly executed a valid
will before the 2nd woman had entered their lives and this will presumably did not
mention the 2nd woman
- Sons of 1st wife alleged that 2nd woman had caused a marriage to be
solemnized between herself and the deceased when he was 81 years old,
wheelchair bound and suffering from Parkinsons - trying to invalidate it since
this marriage would cause the rescission of the allegedly executed will and the
father’s new will created in 2000 leaving everything to the stepbrother and the
2nd woman would be valid
- Holding: court found the 2000 will to be invalid - father’s earlier will rescinded
by the 1996 marriage with the 2nd woman and estate should be distributed
according to Intestate succession act - 2nd woman would received 1/2 while 6
children and first wife would receive 1/2
- Son’s argued that the marriage was invalid since: 1) no consummation due to father’s
incapacity to consummate under s106(a); 2) father’s marriage was void because it was
procured by the actual or presumed UI of the 2nd woman over the father and 3) the
marriage was a sham marriage against public policy since the motive was to revoke
the father’s earlier will
- Holding: all 3 arguments dismissed since 1) would only render marriage
voidable and not void and not open to any person other than the parties of the
marriage 主张婚姻无效权利不属夫妻之外的人 (s104 limits cause to only
spouses, they were tyring to use declaratory jurisdiction which would override;
voidable you are trying alter the status of the marriage so what gives the 3P the
right to say it was valid but now it becomes void; prof leong makes the point
that if it is a void marriage, there is no need to go to court but realistically you
need the declaration to get remarried etc and a 3P can get this declaration) ;
the women’s charter did not render the marriage void via argument 2);
argument 3) was not a recognised cause of invalidity of marriage under the
2009 women’s charter
Ⅲ.Divorce/Judicial Separation
Judicial Separation
__ could attempt to seek judicial separation which provides temporary relief by allowing the
parties to live separately. __ could do so 1) informally; 2) by executing a separation agreement
or 3) obtaining a judgement of judicial separation (Leong Wai Kum at 6.006). To obtain judicial
separation, __ has to rely on the ground of irretrievable breakdown in marriage proven by any of
the 5 facts of divorce (s101(1) of the Women’s Charter).
- However, given the high threshold of an irretrievable breakdown, it is possible that __
would have to rely on informal separation of the execution of a separation agreement in
order to separate.
- Informally: Since __ retains substantial autonomy as to how __ and her spouse wish to
live, separation can occur without having to contend with official regulation or
intervention (Kwong Sin Hwa).
- Separation by agreement: the spouses draw up a separation agreement which will be
considered lawful since there is a high threshold for the marital agreement to be deemed
unlawful (TQ v TR)
Evaluation: Should __ decide to obtain judicial separation, __ should note that judicial
separation has an effect on the law of intestacy. Where spouses have formally separated, the
property of the deceased spouse will not devolve to the remaining spouse under the Intestate
Succession Act (s103 of the Women’s Charter)
- However, judicial separation only provides temporary relief from an unhappy marriage
and therefore I would suggest that __ consider the option of divorce should he/she
desire more permanent relief.
Divorce
Procedure: __ can apply to the Family Justice Courts or Family Division of High Court for
divorce by filing a writ of divorce together with a statement of claim and statement of particulars
stating which of the 5 facts he/she is relying on to prove an irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
- Since the divorce is uncontested (parties agree it is uncontested and agree on all
ancillary matters prior to filing for divorce), there is no need to file a parenting plan or a
matrimonial plan even if there are children or HDB assets involved
- Less than 3 years: Since the parties are seeking to file for divorce within the first 3 years
of marriage, they have to file an originating summons to seek permission. Only after the
parties receive leave to file for divorce within 3 years can they file their writ of divorce.
Things to consider prior to divorce:

1) Three year bar
There is a bar to an application for divorce where the parties seek a divorce within the first 3
years of the marriage (s94(1) of the Women’s Charter). However, there is an exception to this
and a writ of divorce can be filed where there is ‘exceptional hardship’ such that the marriage is
in dire straits (s94(2)). In determining if there is ‘exceptional hardship’, the court will consider if
the ‘hardship suffered [is] something out of the ordinary, judged by the prevailing standards of
acceptable behaviour between spouses’ (Ng Kee Shee at [13]).
- In Ng Kee Shee, the court found that there was exceptional hardship as the wife had
‘absolutely no regard for the union’ by refusing any affection from the husband or to hold
his hand and had returned to her matrimonial home and refused to return.
__ could file an originating summons to ask for permission to file for divorce within the 3 years.
Assuming __ obtains leave to file within the 3 years, he/she can then file their writ of divorce.
2) Parenting Programme
Since __ has a child under 21 years old and has not reached an agreement with his/her spouse
on a number of matters (Women’s Charter (Parenting programme) Rules 2016), __ must note
that the writ of divorce cannot be filed until a ‘parenting programme’ has been completed
(s94A). The duration and the contents of the programme will be determined by the Minister
(s94A(9)) and appoint the conductor of the programme to remind the spouses of their parental
responsibilities and the potential effects of their decisions on their children.
3) Jurisdiction (s93)
__ also has to consider the issue of jurisdiction since the Singapore courts only possess the
jurisdiction to commence divorce proceedings where 1) either party is domiciled in Singapore at
the commencement of the proceedings (s93(1)(a)) or 2) the habitual residence of either party
has been Singapore for 3 years preceding the commencement of the divorce proceedings.
(s93(1)(b))
- Habitual: Lee mei chih v chang kuo-yan - the wife’s habitual trips to NZ and Taiwan
amounted to 12 months and was therefore not considered habitual residence.
- Domiciled at birth: person who is a citizen of the country - domiciled is the place a
person sees as a long term permanent resident; domicile of choice - person chooses
- Under s3(5) of the WC, a citizen of Singapore is deemed to be domiciled in Singapore
(therefore, there is no need for a Singaporean citizen to provide evidence of her
domicile)
Grounds of Divorce:
In order to divorce, __ has to prove 1) an irretrievable breakdown in marriage which is the sole
ground of divorce in Singapore and 2) that the circumstances must make it just and reasonable
for the marriage to be terminated by a judgement of divorce (s95(2) read with s95(1) ).
- The standard of proof is a balance of probabilities (at 6.049)
To prove an irretrievable breakdown, __ can rely on the 5 facts under s95(3).
1) Adultery + intolerable to live with

__ could attempt to rely on the fact of adultery such that __ finds it intolerable to live with [the
defendant] under s95(3)(a) of the Women’s Charter. To establish this fact, __ has to prove that
1) __ committed adultery and 2) that he/she finds it intolerable to live with the df.
Adultery generally occurs where [the defendant] voluntarily engages in sexual intercourse with
someone other than their spouse.
1) adultery
- __ could prove adultery by: 1) confession of adultery; 2) direct evidence of commission
of adultery (witness usually since PI usually cannot get evidence); 3) Inclination and
Opportunity to commit adultery - using indirect evidence which proves on a BOP that
adultery had been committed; 4) birth of child not of the the other spouse
However, the court in Koh Teng Lam noted that ‘Adultery is essentially an act which can rarely
be proved by direct evidence. It is a matter of inference and circumstance’.
- In Koh Teng Lam, the court held that although the wife and her colleague were together
in a locked classroom, the fact that they were thrown into the environment was
insufficient to infer the commission of the offence unless it can be shown by documents
that they were ‘so intimate and their mutual passion so clear that adultery might
reasonably be assumed as the result of an opportunity for its occurrence’. Since there
was no evidence of familiarity between the wife and the colleague, the court did not infer
adultery
2) Intolerable to live with

In determining the fact of intolerability, the courts will make a subjective determination without
consideration of whether a reasonable person would find it intolerable (Goodrich v Goodrich).
- Note: where the court is able to conclude a reasonable person would find it intolerable to
live with the df, the pf has a stronger case.
6 month bar: __ must note that cohabiting with the df for more than 6 months after knowledge of
the commission of the adultery acts as an absolute bar to using adultery as a fact for divorce
(s95(5)(b)).
2) Unreasonable behaviour
__ could attempt to rely on the fact of unreasonable behaviour, that the df had behaved in a
manner such that __ cannot reasonably be expected to live with him/her (ss95(3)(b)).
Unreasonableness in this case does not refer to the behaviour but the expectation that the pf
continue to live with the df (Teo Hoon Ping Angeline at [45]).
In determining if there was unreasonable behaviour, the court will: 1) take a subjective inquiry
into whether [pf] finds it intolerable to live with the [df]: ‘whether his/her attitude is reasonable is
irrelevant’ (Teo Hoon Ping Angeline at [46]); 2) in dealing with the behaviour, apply an objective
test, having regard to the subjective personalities of the parties, in determining if [pf] can be
reasonably expected to live with the [df] (Wong Siew Boey at [8]).
2)
The court will take into account the relevant circumstances and personalities of the parties and
consider if ‘this husband has behaved in such a way that this wife cannot reasonably be
expected to live with him’ (Wong Siew Boey at [9]). Whether the behaviour is unreasonable is
ultimately a ‘finding of fact’ for the court to decide and is objective in nature (Wong Siew Boey at
[8]). However, the test is not purely objective given that the court must have regard to the
‘personalities of individuals before it, however far these may be removed from some theoretical
norm, and it must assess the impact of the respondent’s conduct and the particular petitioner in
the light of the whole history of the marriage and their relationship’ (at [8])/ ‘subjective qualities
of the plaintiff’ (Teh Hoon Ping Angeline at [37]).
- In terms of behaviour that can be considered, the courts will consider the ‘cumulative
effect of behaviour’ inclusive of any ‘conduct, active or passive’, even if the behaviour ‘is
towards other members of the family or towards outsiders’ (at [13]). Therefore, all
behaviour including omissions is relevant for consideration. This can be seen in the
case of Teh Hoon Ping Angeline where the court held that the ‘cumulative effect of [the
husband’s] taunts and abuses over the years’ with no prospect of resolving it made it
unreasonable for the Wife to have to continue to live with him.
- The conduct complained of must be ‘more than a complaint that the parties are
incompatible, that they no longer have anything in common and cannot communicate or
that one of them is bored with the marriage’ (Wong Siew Boey at [12]).
As recognised by the court in Teo Hoon Ping Angeline, the emphasis should be on ‘whether it
was reasonable to expect the plaintiff to carry on living with the defendant, rather than whether
the defendant had acted in a blameworthy manner’ (at [45]). Therefore, the behaviour of the df
is only a relevant factor which the courts will consider in determining if the behaviour is such that
the pf cannot be reasonably expected to live with the df.
- Therefore, the lack of blameworthiness of the df’s behaviour ‘should not be a bar to a
finding that is in favour of a plaintiff under s 95(3)(b) of the Women’s Charter’ (at [46]).
This can be seen in Teo Hoon Ping Angeline, where the court found that despite the
husband’s depression which caused his unreasonable behaviour, the wife could not
reasonably be expected to live with this behaviour.
- ‘the weight which should be placed on this factor depends on many other circumstances,
such as the nature and severity of the defendant’s mental illness, the kind of treatment
which the plaintiff has suffered, and the strength of the causative link between the
defendant’s illness and the behaviour which he or she has inflicted on the plaintiff. In
particular, the strength of the causative link between the defendant’s illness and the kind
of behaviour which he has engaged in is likely to be determinative of the weight that
should be placed on the factor. Where the causative link is weak or non-existent, the
judge is entitled not to place any weight on it at all’ (Teh Hoon Ping Angeline at [46]).
Wong Siew Boey --> The wife alleged unreasonable behaviour on the part of the husband for
being uncaring when she went through an abortion, making her buy her own insurance
policies, siding with his family members in arguments, failing to introduce her to his friends or
to inform her when he changed jobs and for maligning her by calling her crazy and money-
faced in front of her family. The court held that there was an irretrievable breakdown
considering the circumstances and the characters of the parties given the wife’s ‘hopeless
look’, ‘anger in her voice’ and her decisive manner in rejecting the offer of a new home to start
afresh.
- NOTE: the court noted that while the complaints taken in isolation were part of the
‘ordinary wear and tear of family life’ (at [4]), taken together, it sufficed as
unreasonable behaviour
Teh Hoon Ping Angeline --> The wife alleged unreasonable behaviour on the part of the
husband for treating her in a disrespectful and humiliating manner, inclusive of sending her
pornographic links, unstable behaviour and violent outbursts, refusal to communicate with her
and refusal to seek gainful employment.
No bar: Where the parties have lived together for a period which does not exceed 6 months
since the occurrence of the last incident of unreasonable behaviour, the courts will not take into
account the 6 months in determining if it is unreasonable for the pf to continue cohabitation
(s95(6)).
- In Teh Hoon Ping Angeline, the wife’s two returns to stay with the husband after his
abusive emails amounted to no longer than 6 months in total and therefore the court
could disregard these periods of cohabitation.
However, since the parties lived together for a period exceeding 6 months altogether, the court
is likely to take into account this period of resumption of cohabitation in considering if __ can be
reasonably expected to live with __. [df] can argue that this period undermines [pf’s] assertion
that he/she cannot reasonably be expected to live with [df]/
- While the parties had lived together for a period exceeding 6 months after the last
incident of unreasonable behaviour, the last incident relied upon by the pf can still be
taken into account by the court to support the allegation of unreasonable behaviour
(VRN v VRO at [29]). The court held that it is ‘a question of weight to be placed on the
incident’ (at [29]).
3) Desertion for a continuous period of 2 years

__ could rely on the fact of desertion for a continuous period of 2 years under s95(3)(c) of the
Women’s Charter. In determining if there was desertion, the courts will consider 1) if the parties
live separately and 2) if __ possessed the intention to desert with 1) and 2) being operative
throughout the 2 year period. However, the desertion must be non-consensual and agreed
separation will not amount to desertion (Goh Soo Toon) .
The desertion must have continued for at least 2 years and must continue up to application of
divorce and continue during the matrimonial proceedings.
- However, a cohabitation of less than 6 months does not terminate the desertion (s95(7)).
On the facts, it appears that __ could attempt to seek divorce under the facts of both separation
and desertion given that there is a fine line between both facts. However, given that __ was the
party who walked out, __ can only rely on separation./ However, given that _ was the party who
was left behind, __ can rely on desertion as opposed to having to wait for 3 years and obtain
[the other party’s consent].
- E.g. cases where one party walks out and separates with the other side in disagreement
- Note: Since __ developed an intention to desert during the separation, the intention to
desert can supervene separation./ Since __ rejected [the other party’s] desire to cohabit,
desertion will begin.
4) Separation of 3 years + consent

__ could rely on the fact of separation for a continuous period of at least 3 years prior to filing
the writ, with the consent of their spouse (s95(3)(d). The difficulty of relying on this fact is the
proof of separation. __ can prove separation via 1) a separation agreement which records the
terms of separation; 2) a judicial separation agreement.
- Note: a judicial separation will affect intestacy laws in that the surviving spouse will not
inherit the assets of the spouse they judicially separated from.
To establish that the parties have lived apart, it is necessary to show that during this period,
they 1) lived in separate households such that there has been a physical separation; 2) the
separating party had the intention to terminate the marriage; and (iii) that there was a loss of
consortium (UOU v UOV at [10]).
The courts will consider if there is an intention to sever the marital relationship or not to resume
it and ‘act on that intention’ (Leong Kwek Keong at [14]). Therefore, separation requires
something greater than merely physical separation.
- It must be noted that sleeping apart and the lack of sexual intercourse ‘is an important
and significant fact but it is not decisive’ (Tan Lee Tiang at [38]).
Consent: __ must give formal consent to the separation under Appendix A of the Family Justice
Rules.
1) Physical Separation
Determining if there is physical separation is ‘ultimately a question of fact and degree’ and is for
the judge to determine whether there has been living apart (UOU v UOV at [12]). Sleeping
apart and taking turns at the dining table can amount to living in separate households if the
parties were not ‘co-operating with each other and safeguarding the interests of the marriage
and caring and providing for the children’ (UOU v UOV at [11]).
- In Tan Lee Tiang, the parties took turns to sleep on the floor, bed and sofa and took
dinner at separate times. The wife alleged they had separated with no community life
and communication between them. The court found that their separation was ‘limited to
non-communication, the parties sleeping on the bed and on the floor in the same
bedroom, and dining one after the other’ (at [26]) but that the parties still continued to eat
and live under the same roof to jointly maintain the children. Therefore, the court found
that they had cooperated ‘with each other in caring and providing for the children and
that they lived under the same roof and slept in the bedroom because the marriage was
subsisting’ (at [47]).
- In Leong Kwek Keong, the court found that there was no separation despite the wife’s
agreement with the husband that they could not live together and the husband not
sleeping in the house. This was because he was ‘“living” apart from the wife in the very
narrow sense that he was not sleeping at home by choice’ but continued to ‘enjoy all the
advantages and burdens of his married state’ (at [17]). He continued to act as if their
marriage continued by having dinner with the family and resuming sexual intercourse
with the wife. The argument that he had been going home frequently because of his
children was rejected since his visits went beyond that via the sexual intercourse.
- In UOU v UOV, the court found that the parties were sleeping in separate bedrooms in
the same flat with the wife sleeping with the daughter and that the parties led separate
lives. However, the court found that separate bedrooms alone was insufficient to find
living apart since the parties were still interacting ‘on a regular basis over the usual
household matters, matters relating to their daughter, as a married couple would’ (at
[29]).
Evaluation: It can be argued that the requirements of separation do not gel well with the concept
of therapeutic justice since it prevents the parents from co-parenting by ‘invalidating’ their
separation. Therefore, it is possible that future cases may veer away from such a strict sense of
separate households and be more willing to accept ‘separation’ if parties are working together
for the sake of the children.
2) Intention
Living apart requires a mental attitude that the parties have the ‘intention to sever or not to
resume the marital relationship and acted on that intention, or alternatively acted as if the
marital relationship had been severed’ (Leong Kwek Keong at [14]).
- Separation can occur even if only one spouse has the ‘intention to sever or not to
resume the marital relationship and acted on that intention, or alternatively acted as if
the marital relationship had been severed’ (Leong Kwek Keong at [16])
- In Tan Lee Tiang, the court held that the mental element was not fulfilled since the
husband and wife were cooperating ‘with each other in caring and providing for the
children and that they lived under the same roof and slept in the bedroom because the
marriage was subsisting’ (at [47]).
- In Leong Kwek Keong, the court found that although the husband had left the
matrimonial home, he continued to do things he had normally done such as having
dinner with the family, supervising his daughter’s homework and having sexual
intercourse with his wife. Therefore, he was carrying on a ‘normal domestic life’ (at [6]).
- In UOU v UOV, the court found that despite the Wife’s claims of avoiding the husband
due to the PPO he had obtained against her, the parties frequently quarrelled and fought
as evidenced by the police reports. Therefore, despite her allegation that they avoided
communication, there was still significant interaction and communication between the
parties. (at [26]).
3) Loss of Consortium
Generally, the lack of sexual intercourse is ‘not decisive in determining that there was no
consortium vitae’ (UOU v UOV at [16]).
- In Tan Lee Tiang, the parties still continued to eat and live under the same roof to jointly
maintain the children and cooperated ‘with each other in caring and providing for the
children and that they lived under the same roof and slept in the bedroom because the
marriage was subsisting’ (at [47]). Therefore, there was still correspondence between
the parties.
- In Leong Kwek Keong, the court found that the husband continued to support the child
and paid the expenses of the household and was ‘carrying on a normal domestic life’
even if he did not sleep in the flat
In Leong Kwek Keong, the court found that there was no separation despite the wife’s
agreement with the husband that they could not live together and the husband not sleeping in
the house. This was because he was ‘“living” apart from the wife in the very narrow sense that
he was not sleeping at home by choice’ but continued to ‘enjoy all the advantages and
burdens of his married state’ (at [17]). He continued to act as if their marriage continued by
having dinner with the family and resuming sexual intercourse with the wife. The argument
that he had been going home frequently because of his children was rejected since his visits
went beyond that via the sexual intercourse.
- Husband continued to have dinner with the family and supervise his daughter’s
lessons, have his clothes washed at home, paid the expenses of the household and
was ‘carrying on a normal domestic life’ even if he did not sleep in the flat
In Tan Lee Tiang, the husband and wife agreed on separation by taking turns to sleep on the
floor, bed and sofa and took dinner at separate times. The wife alleged they had separated
with no community life and communication between them. The court found that their
separation was ‘limited to non-communication, the parties sleeping on the bed and on the
floor in the same bedroom, and dining one after the other’ (at [26]) but that the parties still
continued to eat and live under the same roof to jointly maintain the children. Therefore, the
court found that they had cooperated ‘with each other in caring and providing for the children
and that they lived under the same roof and slept in the bedroom because the marriage was
subsisting’ (at [47]). Therefore, the marriage was found to have no irretrievable breakdown but
to have been subsisting.
5) Separation of 4 years
__ could rely on the fact of separation for a continuous period of at least 4 years prior to filing
the writ of divorce (s95(3)(e)). Consent of the spouse is not required in this case.
Unilateral separation?: ‘Chan Sek Keong J also considered the question whether one party
alone can bring about the separation or living apart and said that in Santos v Santos ([10]
supra), the Court of Appeal had held that one party alone could bring about a separation or a
living apart if he intended it to be so or his or her attitude of mind was so. It was not necessary
for this unilateral element to be communicated to the other party. The problem was one of proof
and the court has to decide whether the party had such an intention. One does not have to be
married very long to know, without words being spoken or written down, that a unilateral position
has been taken by a spouse, but temporary and permanent positions taken to live apart must be
distinguished and proved’ (Tan Lee Tiang at [22]).
Cohabitation not a bar: Since the parties had resumed cohabitation for a period of less than 6
months, this period shall not be taken into account in considering the period of separation
(s95(7)).
Just and reasonable to terminate the marriage

Secondly, the court must be satisfied that the circumstances must make it just and reasonable
for the marriage to be terminated via divorce (S95(2)). The ‘just and reasonable’ requires the
court to consider all circumstances such as ‘conduct of the parties and how the interests of any
child or children of the marriage or of either party may be affected if the marriage is dissolved’
(s95(4)).
- Misconduct of parties: misconduct of the parties to terminate the marriage must be
exceptional in order for the court to find that it is not just and reasonable to terminate the
marriage (LWK at 6.124). In William Cheng v Chai Mei Leng, the court found that the
misconduct of the husband in utilising the divorce process to get the wife to act in a way
he wanted regarding a property transaction was not exceptional enough.
- Unilateral desire for reconciliation: unilateral desire of a spouse to reconcile is not
sufficient to withhold a judgement for divorce when it is clear that the marriage ‘is an
impossible union’ (William Cheng v Chai Mei Leng at [45]).
- Interest of child: It is possible that the court may choose not to grant a judgement for
divorce given the evidence that the divorce will have a particularly bad effect on the
child. Nevertheless, no such case has arisen, possibly because the judge can simply
delay the judgement while preparing the child to handle the ‘inevitable trauma’ (LWK at
6.128)
Ⅳ.Family Violence
To obtain a personal protection order (PPO), __ must firstly qualify as a family member under
s64 of the women’s charter. Further, __ has to satisfy the following 2 limbs on a balance of
probabilities: 1) that ‘an act of violence has been committed in the past or that there is a
likelihood of its occurrence in the future’ and 2) ‘ it is necessary for the protection of’ __ that the
order be made (Sim Tze Long at [11]; s65(1)).
- The 2nd and 3rd limbs must be satisfied ‘on a balance of probabilities before a court is
able to issue a personal protection order in favour of an applicant’ (Sim Tze Long at
[11]).
- Burden of Proof: Once 2) and 3) have been satisfied, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to prove why the PPO should not be granted by proving that the force was
force lawfully used in self-defence/the PPO is not necessary (TED at [18]).However,

considering that 1) the court in TQY v TQX noted that the limb operates negatively (it will
only operate where commission of the order is unnecessary) and 2) the wording in s65
of the Women's Charter appears to suggest that it is for the court to consider both the
complainant and defendant's arguments as a whole in deciding if the PPO is necessary,
it is arguable that the burden does not shift. Assuming that future appellate courts take
this position, [df] will not have the burden of proving that the PPO is unnecessary but
simply has to put forth arguments as to why the PPO is unnecessary. The judge will
therefore consider both the complainant and defendant's arguments as a whole in
deciding if the PPO is necessary.
- I would advise __ to obtain a PPO which would protect __ from violent conduct or threats
from __. The PPO would be useful because the contravention of the order makes the
subsequent offences of family violence an arrestable one. Therefore, the PPO acts as a
‘deterrent against future family violence by the Respondent’ (TED v TEE at [33]) by
providing a remedy against such future family violence.
- To obtain this PPO, __ would have to make an application to the Family Justice Centre
at the Family Justice Courts following the magistrates complaints process under the
Criminal Procedure Code. Where the complaint is accepted by the Duty Judge, an
issuance of summons will be ordered. Generally, since __ is above 21 years old and not
incapacitated, she can apply for the PPO on her own accord (s65(2)(a) WC)
- Since __ is under 21 years old/is incapacitated, ‘a guardian or relative or person
responsible for the care of’ __ can apply on his/her behalf (s65(2)(b) WC).
- Extra: In determining if the PPO should be granted, the courts will not only consider the
allegations but also ‘understand the dynamics of the relationships and to appreciate the
context in which the incidents arose’ (Sim Tze Long at [13])
DEO: Where a PPO has been granted, _ could seek a Domestic Exclusion Order (DEO) which
grants exclusive occupation of the residence/ part of the shared residence to the protected
party. However, it must be noted that the DEO only prohibits the aggressor from entering the
shared premises.
- Where the aggressor is waiting outside the door, on the street etc.. there is a possibility
of arguing that those acts amounts to harassment (a form of family violence)
Counselling: Where a PPO has been granted, the court may make a counselling group order
(CGO) such that the parties/children attend counselling as directed by the court. However, it is
arguable that the issuance of a CGO should not be dependent on the grant of the PPO. This is
because counselling could benefit the parties and clarify any issues before the grant of the
PPO.
EO: Given the severity of the situation of __, I would advise __ to obtain an expedited order
(EO) since the court can make such an order without requiring summons to be served on the
defendant and without the summons requiring the defendant to appear at some time or place
(s66(1)). __ is likely to succeed in obtaining this EO since the court is likely to be satisfied that
there is ‘imminent danger’ of family violence since....
- The EO is valid only for 28 days (s66(2)) or when the trial for the application of a PPO
begins, whichever occurs earlier but a second EO can be reordered following the expiry
of the first one.
1) Person must qualify as a family member as defined under s64

- __ qualifies as a family member since he/she is a spouse/former spouse of __ (s64(a)).
- __ qualifies as a family member since he/she is the child/stepchild/adopted child of __
(s64(b))
- __ qualifies as a family member since he/she is the father/mother of __ (s64(c))
- __ qualifies as a family member since he/she is the father-in-law/mother-in-law of __
(s64(d))
- __ qualifies as a family member since he/she is the brother/sister of __ (s64(e)).
- __ qualifies as a family member since he/she is a relative of __/is an incapacitated
person who in the opinion of the court should be regarded as a family member of __
(s64(f)).
- Former MIL and FIL not considered
2) s65(1): prove on BOP that 1) family violence has been committed and is likely to be
committed
- __ is likely to have committed family violence under s64(a) by wilfully or knowingly
placing/attempting to place __ in fear of hurt by __.
- __ is likely to have committed family violence under s64(b) by causing hurt to a family
member by an act which is known or ought to have been known to result in hurt
- Definition of hurt is likely to be the same as the definition in criminal law: causing
bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt
- __ is likely to have committed family violence under s64(c) by wrongfully
constraining/confining __ against his/her will.
- Definition of wrongful restraint is likely to be the same as the definition in criminal
law: voluntarily obstructing any person so as to prevent that person from
proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed
- Definition of wrongful confinement is likely to be the same as the definition in
criminal law: wrongfully restraining any person in such a manner as to prevent
that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits
- __ is likely to have committed family violence under s64(d) by causing continual
harassment with an intent to cause anguish to __.
Harassment:
Act must be sufficiently serious: It is not any act which will result in harassment but acts which
are of ‘of sufficient magnitude and seriousness to merit being labelled as “family violence”’ (Yue
Tock Him at [42]). While __ may argue that such a high bar in proving harassment is harsh, the
law must protect parties from ‘frivolous complaints by complainants who may choose to make
an issue of the most trivial of matters’ (Yue Tock Him at [44]).
Act must be continual: Further, ‘a single act of harassment does not in itself constitute
commission of family violence’ and the harassment complained of must be continual with the
intent to cause anguish (Yue Tock Him at [43]).
Harassment can come from 3Ps (Need not be directly from aggressor): While the harassment
did not come directly from __, the court in Yue Tock HIm noted that the course of conduct can
come from third parties (at [33]).
- Where the defendant ‘intentionally makes use of the modern communication
devices in a manner that causes offence, fear, distress and annoyance to
another’, recourse ought to be offered (Malcomson Nicholas Hugh Betram v
Naresh Kumar Metha at [58]).
- In Malcomson, the df was a former employee of the pf’s company and
sent multiple emails, SMS messages, flowers and persistently called in an
attempt to be reemployed. The court found that there was harassment as
the pf was distressed even though the pf was not harmed
- Harassment is defined as ‘a course of conduct by a person, whether by words or
action, directly or through third parties, sufficiently repetitive in nature as would
cause, and which he ought reasonably to know would cause, worry, emotional
distress or annoyance to another person’ (Yue Tock Him at [33]).
Examples of Harassment:
- ZU v ZV --> 3 visits to the complainant’s home did not amount to harassment
- Chua Li Choo v Teo Swee Theng --> calling the police was an overreaction but not
harassment
- AGX v AGW --> ‘not making life easy for each other’ because of the ‘strained
relationship’ is not harassment
- Tan Bee Lay v Leong Khai Meng --> numerous calls and visits to one’s workplace and
home and creating a scene by banging on the gate with a metal road is harassment
- Sim Tze Long --> switching off lights and increasing the tv volume while one party is
on business calls, throwing the party’s clothes, throwing shoes and chairs to create a
mess and pouring water on a party’s bed amounted to harassment.
Exceptions to family violence:

- Self-defence: However, __ could argue that there was no family violence since the force
consisted of ‘force lawfully used in self-defence’ (s64). This requires __ to prove that
there is a rational proportionality between the threat and the retaliation (action of force)
to that threat. This would not involve ‘inflicting of more harm than is necessary to inflict
for the purpose of defence’ (S99(4) of the Penal Code).
- In TED v TEE, the court found that the respondent’s response to the
complainants shouting by putting his hands around her jaw and neck did not
amount to self defence since shouting ‘does not pose an immediate threat to the
Respondent or his property’ (at [32]).
- Correction towards child: However, __ could argue that there was no family violence
since the force consisted of ‘force lawfully used by way of correction towards a child
below 21 years of age’ (s64). However, this force used must be to instil discipline in the
child and must ‘always be exercised for the benefit of the child’ (LWK at 5.030). In this
case, it is likely the courts will find that ___ constitutes force greater than what was
necessary to discipline the child and therefore that it was an act of family violence
- Professor Leong Wai kum argues that there should be a change in the law and
that parents should resort to non-violent means of discipline. She suggests that a
new subsection be added to the women’s charter s46 that violence should never
be inflicted upon a child although no sanction should be imposed on a breach
unless the failure to comply is severe. (at 5.034)
Incidents after the complaint was filed will not be considered: In Sim Tze Long, the court held
that incidents which formed part of a previous PPO application will not be considered for a later
application (at [23]). Similarly in Teng Cheng Sin, the court held that evidence of a disputed
incident which occurred after the application was made should not be considered in determining
if a PPO should be granted (at [20]).
- Prof: Incidents which happen after the complaint was filed will not be considered - that is
the established doctrinal provision
- In Teng Cheng Sin, the court held that the admission of evidence regarding an incident
on 24 August 2002 which occurred 2.5 months after the application was made, should
not have been allowed. (at [19]-[20]). Nevertheless, the court found that ‘this error did
not affect the essential validity of the order’ since the wife believes that she has a right to
return to the house, whereas the husband considers her a trespasser. This will continue
to be a source of annoyance and hostility whenever the wife returns to the house.’ (at
[21])
Taken by surprise?: __ could argue that the PPO should not be granted since he was not
allowed to see the documents (photographs, reports, forms) and therefore had no time to ‘study
or make copies of them’ (Teng Cheng Sin at [18]).
- However, since he was shown the documents and had made no request for for time to
study of make copies of the documents, the force of his complaint is reduced (at [18])
- Evaluation: Given that __ was given notice of the documents relating to [the incident
occurring after the application date], it is arguable that the incident could be considered
given that the other party had the opportunity to study the documents.
3) it is necessary for her protection that the order is made

Under the 3rd element, the necessity of the protection order is ‘measured on the basis of
whether there are likely to be further acts of family violence’ which will be committed should the
order not be granted (Yue Tock Him at [10]). Therefore, the PPO should not be used as a
‘punitive measure to punish a person for past violence’ but only to ‘restrain the person
concerned from committing family violence in future’ (Yue Tock Him at [10]). The burden of
proof is on the complainant to prove that the PPO is necessary on a balance of probabilities
(Yue Tock Him at [10]; TED v TEE)
However, the court in TQY v TQX noted that the limb of necessity is likely to only operate
negatively, meaning that positive proof of necessity is not required where family violence has
already been proven. Therefore, it is likely that this limb will only be operative where
circumstances show that the commission of the order is unnecessary (at [10]).
- Similar to TED v TEE where the incident was an isolated one which ‘arose from very
specific circumstances’ which are ‘most unlikely to ever arise again since parties’ marital
relationship has come to an end’, the incident in this case is unlikely to reoccur therefore
making the PPO unnecessary (at [35]).
- Similar to TQY v TQX where there was a ‘likelihood of the occurrence of family violence’
(at [37]) due to continued contact between the parties/where one party appeared to ‘be
taking pride in his actions and saw no wrong in his behaviour’, this suggests that the
PPO was necessary since there was a high likelihood of family violence of recurring (at
[40]).
EVAL (evidence issues):

- For children: Given that it is necessary for the court to hear evidence from [the child], the
court will have to ‘scrutinise the evidence of young children with particular care, given
their tendency to invent and distort, to confuse fantasy with reality’ (LP v LQ).
Framework:
1) Is client family member
2) Was act family violence
3) Is ppo necessary
4) Practical perspective
- Whether she can prove it evidentially (whether we need an expedited order)
Cases
Sim Tze Long --> husband and wife both applied for PPO’s against one another. However,
the wife’s claim was dismissed while the Husband was granted the PPO. The court was
satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the husband was ‘the victim of continual
harassment by his wife who was bent on causing him mental anguish’ and that ‘in a position
of harm and would continue to do so each time a dispute arose – no matter how minor the
issue’ (at [25])
- Wife’s claims: the door was pushed back by her husband and she landed on the floor;
Her husband was in the habit of causing water to drop on the floors of the apartment
after washing the dishes in the kitchen or after using the sink in the bathroom. This
had caused their son to fall on 2 occasions and her on one occasion; husband kept
calling her to ask about child’s medication (alleged harassment); insulted her in front of
all neighbours; husband threatened to beat her up and end her life
- Husband’s claims: victim of constant harassment and threats by his wife who wanted
to use this to lodge a complaint against him; increased volume when she knew he was
on work calls; use of “vulgar” language against him and his family; throwing his things;
used vulgar language when husband would not ferry her to place she wanted; she had
thrown a cup of hot water in his direction when he was washing some dishes at the
sink and he had felt pain as a result; poured water on his mattress; turned off kitchen
light when he went in
Teng Cheng Sin --> wife left matrimonial home but would return to see children occasionally
and sought a ppo arguing her husband had thrown her against the gate and locked her out.
The judge found that medical reports could be read as supporting her allegation and made the
protection order in her favour. The husband alleged that 1) the judge relied on the medical
reports without confirming if the wife had been assaulted and 2) he was not given copies of
the photographs, medical reports and forms. While the court acknowledged that the judge
should not have considered a disputed incident which occurred 2.5 months after the
application for the PPO, this did not affect the validity of the order since ‘the wife believes that
she has a right to return to the house, whereas the husband considers her a trespasser. This
will continue to be a source of annoyance and hostility whenever the wife returns to the
house.’ (at [21])
TED v TEE --> wife sought ppo after scuffle where husband strangled her and pinned her
down which was witnessed by their child. Self-defence was raised as a counter to the act
being family violence and the husband alleged he had merely responded to the wife’s acts of
hitting and throwing things at him. However, the court held that his response was
disproportionate to her acts and he could have simply ‘ grab the Complainant’s hand’ instead
of grabbing her neck or jaw (at [32]). While the court agreed that family violence had been
committed, the court found that there was no necessity for the PPO given that the incident
‘arose from very specific circumstances involving money relating to a fishing trip the parties
intended to take together. Such particular circumstances that culminated in this singular event
of family violence, are most unlikely to ever arise again since parties’ marital relationship has
come to an end’ (at [35]). This was in spite of the fact that the parties continue to raise a child
together and work in the same company.
TQY v TQX --> The court found that the PPO should be granted given the ‘likelihood of the
occurrence of family violence’ (at [37]). This was because the parties would continue to be in
constant contact due to the child which was likely ‘the cause of friction and the catalyst’ (at
[38]). Further, the Father appeared to ‘be taking pride in his actions and saw no wrong in his
behaviour’, suggesting that there was a high likelihood of family violence of recurring since he
saw his behaviour as ‘exact punishment and/or retribution on the Mother and her family for
any perceived wrong they had done to him’ (at [40]).
Ⅴ.Children
For divorce proceedings: Since the parties have filed for divorce/nullity/judicial separation, the
court has the power to make orders relating to the custody of the child arising from the Women’s
Charter.
For non-divorce proceedings: Pursuant to s5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act, the court
possesses the power to make orders relating to the custody of the child.
The first issue is determining custody, ‘the more important, longer-term decisions concerning
the upbringing and welfare of a child’ (CX v CY at [32]). It must be noted that the welfare of the
child is the first and most paramount consideration (Soon Peck Wah at [24]; s125(2)).
As a general rule, the court will grant a no custody or joint custody order as opposed to sole
custody orders since the ‘preferable position in the law of custody is...to preserve the concept of
joint parental responsibility, even if the parties may harbour some acrimony towards each other’
(at [24], [36]).
Joint custody order: In this case, the court is likely to grant a joint custody order since there is a
need to remind ‘the parents that the law expects both of them to co-operate to promote the
child’s best interest” (at [28]). A joint custody order is in the best interests of the child given that
it allows for the involvement of both parents in the child's life, thereby promoting the child’s
welfare (at [26]).
- In CX v CY, the court held that a joint custody order should be awarded due to the
symbolism of such an order in reminding the mother that the father ‘has an equal say in
more significant matters concerning the child’s upbringing’ and that she should
cooperate with him (at [20]). This was because the mother, who had been awarded care
and control, had previously attempted to deny the father his access rights and exclude
him for the child's rights.
No custody order: In this case, the court is likely to make no custody order since there is little
risk that one parent will exclude the other from future decision making. This is especially since
there is no actual dispute of serious matters and no custody order is preferred since ‘it may be
better to leave matters at status quo’ (at [19]). A no custody order leaves the law on parenthood
to govern the matter (at [18]) and has the same practical effect as a joint custody order.
- Given that there is a need to prevent the parties from ‘drawing the child into the
battle over the extent of their custodial powers’ or causing a negative
psychological impact on the child from a parents ‘win’ or ‘loss’, the court may not
make a custody order (at [19]).
While __ could argue that the subsisting acrimony in their relationship results in an inability to
cooperate such that joint custody should not be granted, it is unlikely that sole custody will be
granted without exceptional circumstances (at [38]). The court noted that there is bound to be
some degree of acrimony between parties undergoing a divorce but that it would be a ‘quantum
leap in logic’ to assume that the disagreement between parties during the divorce amounts to an
‘inability to agree on the future long-term interests of the child’ (at [36]). This is because as set
out in s46(1) of the women’s charter, both parents have an equal responsibility in bringing up
the child until adulthood and therefore there is a need to ‘ensure that the child becomes
attached to both parents’ (at [38]). Further,the concept of custody which involves long-term
decisions will arguably result in fewer meetings between the parties since there will be ‘relatively
few occasions where significant and longer-term decisions need to be made for the child’ (at
[35]).
- The exclusion of one parent in the child’s development would ‘contribute towards a less
balanced as well as a less rounded development of the child’ (ZO v ZP at [12])
CX v CY: father was a dutch national working in Thailand while the mother was a Singapore
national who left the family home with the child and went to Phuket but later returned. The
father applied for custody and care and control. The court awarded joint custody of the child
and dismissed the mother’s appeal for sole custody of the child.
Sole Custody: However, __ can argue that [the acts] fall under the exceptional circumstances
which warrant sole custody orders since a parent ‘physically, sexually, or emotionally abuses
the child’ (at [38]).
- In AVM v AWH, the court granted sole custody to the wife due to the husband’s ‘very
poor ability to make decisions even for his own welfare’ (at [133]). This was because he
had been convicted for possession and consumption of illegal drugs, and led a
promiscuous lifestyle which led to his HIV positive status. Further, he had committed
battery against his wife. While his HIV positive status and sexual orientation were not
reasons which led to the granting of the sole custody order, the court found that his
overall poor-decision making ability were reasons to exclude him from the custody of the
children (at [132],[133]).
Care and Control

The next issue is care and control which ‘dictates which parent shall be the daily caregiver of
the child and with whom the child shall live’ (CX v CY at [31]). In determining who should be
granted care and control, the fundamental critical legal principle is that ‘the welfare of the child is
paramount and this principle ought to override any other consideration’ (BNS v BNT at [19]).
The court noted that the inquiry into what is the best for the welfare of the child is a multifactorial
inquiry (at [20]) In considering welfare, the court will not take a narrow conception of welfare and
consider it in terms of purely money or physical comfort but will consider the ‘child’s moral and
religious well-being’ and the maintenance of ‘ties of affection the child enjoy’ (ABW v ABV at
[22]).
- In extreme circumstances, the court will choose the best alternative, care and control to
a 3P who is not the parents of the child. In Re C, the court awarded care and control to
the maternal grandparents of the child since the father had been sentenced to 10 years
imprisonment for causing the death of the child’s mother. The court noted that a
surviving parent would normally have a sole right over the child, the court possesses the
power to remove the parent as a guardian where it would be in the welfare of the child to
do so (at [15]).
Shared Care and Control: The court in AQL v AQM defined shared care and control to mean
‘that the child spends time living with each parent, who then becomes the child’s primary
caregiver for the duration that the child lives with him (or her)’ (at [8]). The day-to day decisions
regarding the child will be made by the parent the child is currently staying with. However, the
court affirmed that it will take a unique set of circumstances before a shared care and control
order will be issued.
- Court rejected the request for shared care and control since the child was only 3 years
old and uprooting him to a new home every 3-4 days would be overly disruptive. A sense
of dislocation could occur ‘where the presence of two competing primary caregivers
results in the child feeling that she has none’. (at [17])
- Further, the parents had ‘markedly different ideas on how to bring up the child’ which
would result in stress for the child from trying to ‘adapt to different expectations and
approaches every few days’ (at [19]).
- Since [the child] in this case is very young and only [age], the courts will consider ‘a
strong clash in parenting styles’ in deciding if shared care and control should be
awarded. This is because markedly different ideas on how to bring up the child’ could
result in stress for the child from trying to ‘adapt to different expectations and
approaches every few days’ (at [19]).
In VFS v VFT, the court awarded shared care and control to the parties since 1) the shared
care and control arrangement would allow the parents time with the children and keep them
actively involved in the children’s development, an improvement from the status quo which
limited such bonding opportunities (at [23]); 2) the parties were both well placed to care for the
children since they both had family support and intended to enrol the children into childcare
and neither was better than the other (at [23]); 3) both parties had the ability to co-parent for
the best interests of the children and make decisions in their best interests despite any
differences in opinion (at [27]). However, the court noted that shared care and control was
only awarded ‘in light of the unique circumstances of this case’ (at [33]) and that the parents
should find better solutions that were in the children’s best interests.
- E.g parents should move closer so that the children can attend the same daycare and
have shorter commute times
Factors for Custody/Care and Control

1) Continuity
Generally, the courts will consider whether it is beneficial for the child to maintain his/her
environment. The court may therefore award care and control to __ to maintain continuity if its
for the benefit of the welfare of the child.
- In Lim Chin Huat Francis, although there was an irregularity which resulted in the girl’s
current living arrangements, the court ordered that a young girl not be removed from her
current living residence in order to maintain continuity and prevent greater upheaval
since her adoption applications were imminent.
- In Wong Phila Mae v Shaw Harold, the court held that it was in the best interests of the
children for custody to remain with the father. This was because the mother and father
were both often away from Singapore and left, to a large extent, the ‘house maids and
other employees to meet the needs of the children’ (at [28]). Therefore, the court found
that the best interests of the children would be served by maintaining this current
arrangement.
Siblings: The court in Wong Phila Mae v Shaw Harold further noted that a factor the courts
should take into account in determining the welfare of the child is that siblings should not be
separated (at [22(e)]).
Wong Phila Mae v Shaw Harold: factors courts can take into account: (at [22]).
(a) the conduct of the parties;
(b) the wishes of the parents and the wishes of the child where he or she is of an age to be
able to express an independent opinion;
(c) a young child would be best looked after by its mother;
(d) which party can offer better security and stability; and,
(e) that siblings should not be separated.
2) Child’s Wishes
The issue is how much weight should be given to [the child’s] wishes. S125(2)(b) of the
women’s charter provides that the court should have regard to the child’s wishes in determining
the welfare of the child ‘where he or she is of an age to express an independent opinion’. In fact,
Phang JA in ZO v ZP advocated that greater weight be accorded to this provision particularly
where ‘the children are mature enough to convey their views independently’ (at [15]). On the
facts, the child is [insert age] + consider their reason for wanting to stay with the parent.
Therefore, since [child] is of the age to express an independent opinion, is unlikely to be
coached and has a reasonable basis for wanting to live with [parent], it is likely that the court will
give effect to his/her wishes.
- The older the kid, the more mature the kid, the greater the weight placed on the kid’s
words
- Generally a kid's wishes are asked where the evidence is finely balanced between the
parties. Where the balance clearly tilts in favour of one parent, it is unlikely that the
courts will ask for the child’s wishes.
3) Maternal Bond
The courts will give appropriate consideration to the factor of the maternal bond where 1) the
child is young/of tender years (Soon Peck Wah at [45]) and 2) ‘all things were equal’ between
the two parties such that the evidence is not clear that one parent is better than the other (at
[44]). The court clarified that they were not ‘reviving the old presumption of “maternal custody” of
all young infants’ but simply recognising the fact that a child of tender years would be dependent
on his mother for ‘his physical and psychological needs’ and that it would be in the child’s best
interests for him to be provided with his mother’s love and care (at [45]).
- In Soon Peck Wah, the child was 4 years old and found to be of a young age. Further,
the court noted that both parents loved their son dearly and were ‘capable of looking
after him and had their respective families behind them to help out’ (at [44]).
- What is the meaning of welfare of the child - Soon peck wah: not to be measured by
money only nor by physical comfort only; the moral and religious welfare of the child
must be considered as well as his physical well-being; nor can ties of affections be
disregarded (At [25]).
4) Stability
Stability or continuity of the arrangements is a factor the courts will consider since it is ‘an
important factor for the emotional well-being of a child’ (ABW v ABV at [20]).
Child is too young: Where the child is very young, the courts are likely to find that a shared care
and control arraignment should not be granted since ‘children of a young age require a certain
constancy in their routine’ and uprooting them to a new home every few days would be ‘overly
disruptive’ (AQL v AQM at [17]).
Clashing parenting styles: Where the parents have ‘markedly different ideas on how to bring up
the child’ and therefore clashing parental styles, the court is unlikely to award shared care and
control (AQL v AQM at [18]). This is because the clashing parental styles may end up stressing
the child and affecting their development if he or she is ‘forced to adapt to different expectations
and approaches every few days’ (at [19]).
- Child in AQL was 3 years old
5) Alienation
Where there is alienation such that the child’s relationship with [parent] has deteriorated over
time, the courts may reverse care and control as a remedy to resolve this issue of alienation
(ABM v ABW at [29]). The judge is likely to reverse care and control where the parent with care
and control has ‘either deliberately or unconsciously interfering with the bond between the child
and the other parent’ such that the child begins to show animosity towards the parent he had
previously had a loving relationship with (at [29]).
- Eval: it is more likely that care and control will be reversed in this case given that this
approach is helpful where ‘the animosity has recently manifested itself and has not had a
chance to become ingrained’ such as in this case (at [29]).
- The court noted that while stability was desirable, it cannot be the paramount
factor since the risk of the ‘children losing one of the most important human
relationships they could have’ outweighed temporary distress from a change in
care and control (at [46]).
- In ABM, the court reversed the care and control given to the father and awarded the
mother care and control. This was because the mother initially had a good relationship
with her daughters and has no issue with her or her parenting abilities. However, several
incidents where the father overreacted to the idea of the mother spending time with the
children resulted in the children becoming unwilling to see their mother. The court
therefore found that since the father had adversely affected the children’s relationship
with the mother and were in ‘danger of becoming completely estranged from the mother’
(at [45]), care and control should go to the mother. This was especially since the mother
was not abusive and neglectful and had cared for them regularly, suggesting they would
benefit from a good relationship with her.
6) Parent which is better able to care for the child

The court is also likely to consider which parent is more capable in caring for the child in
deciding who should be awarded care and control.
- In AAV v AAW, the court found that care and control should be awarded to the wife since
the husband was too busy running his business to care for the child, ‘more materialistic
than was healthy for the young child’, ‘has ongoing relationships with two other women’
and his ‘idea of discipline [of his young daughter] was questionable’ (at [23]-[30]).
- In Soon Peck Wah, the court found that the mother should be granted care and control
since she was ‘in a more appropriate position to take care of their son’. She was a
private tutor who gave tuition from home, giving her more flexibility to look after the son
as compared to the father who worked at Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore and
could not spend most of the day with the child (at [44]).
7) Whether the parties had help

In Soon Peck Wah, the court found that both parties had their respective families behind them to
help out with the care of the children (at [44]).
8) Education
Education is ‘a very important aspect in the consideration of the welfare of the children’ (Wong
Phila Mae v Shaw Harold at [25]).
- In Wong Phila Mae, the court held that the mother’s living arrangements in the United
States of living in a mobile home caused the children to miss almost half a year of formal
education in Singapore and was not in their interests. The court noted that the children
were ‘at an age where it is essential that they should be properly guided’ (at [25]).
Relocation: In considering if __’s relocation application should be approved, the fundamental

critical legal principle is that ‘the welfare of the child is paramount and this principle ought to
override any other consideration’ (BNS v BNT at [19]). The inquiry into what is the best for the
welfare of the child is a multifactorial inquiry (at [20])
Parent’s/guardian's wishes: A factor that is often considered in determining what is best for the
welfare of the child is the ‘reasonable wishes of the primary caregiver to relocate’ (at [20]) since
the child’s emotional and psychological wellbeing is intertwined with the primary caregiver’s.
However, the court noted that this factor is only relevant to the extent that ‘it is found that there
will be a transference of his or her insecurity and negative feelings onto the child. It is, after all,
the child’s welfare that lies at the heart of the inquiry, and not the interests of the relocating
parent’ (at [20]). Therefore, the wishes of the primary caregiver is just but one factor to be
considered in the inquiry into the child’s welfare and is not a ‘singularly determinative’ or trump
factor (at [21]).
- The court has to balance the wishes of the parent ‘against the child’s loss of relationship
with the “left-behind” parent’ (VLO v VLP at [7]).
- While __ could argue that technology would allow the left-behind parent to keep in touch
with the children and maintain their relationship, it is likely that the couts will find that
‘personal’ contact is preferable. This is because communication via technologies are
unsatisfactory due their limited interaction of only communication as opposed to normal
family life routines (BNS at [34]). The court further noted that the time differences would
be ‘more easily accommodated in any event by an adult (here, the Wife) compared to
the children’ (at [34]).
- Court noted close nature of the relationship between father and children.
However, the test in BNT is arguably impractical and overbearing given its intense focus on the
concept of the welfare of the child which could potentially lead to undesirable results. It is also
unclear how far this concept of the welfare of the child is to be taken and whether it should be
interpreted in a manner that the parents’ rights are subordinated to the child. Therefore, I would
suggest that BNT might be revisited at some point in the future and that the test in Re C which
considers the reasonableness of the party wanting to relocate and whether their motivation for
relocation is one of bad faith is a better approach. Nevertheless, the law as it currently stands is
BNS.
- In VLO v VLP, the court dismissed the mother’s application to relocate the child to
Taiwan since the relocation would ‘result in an irrevocable loss of relationship between
the Father and the Child’ (at [10]). Further, the father was a permanent resident in
Singapore with a rented home and had found a pre-school for a child and arranged for
accommodation. In contrast, there was ‘no life planned out for the Child in Taiwan’ and
the mother had no planned job there (at [9]).
Hague Convention: Given that __ has taken the child out of their habitual residence to [country],
__ can seek recourse via the Hague Convention to expeditiously return the child internationally
abducted from one member country to another. However, the Hague Convention is only
applicable where [the other country] has ratified the convention and accepted Singapore
acceding to the convention/acceded to the convention before Singapore did and has accepted
Singapore acceding to the convention/acceded to the convention after Singapore did and whose
accession Singapore has been accepted. Only where the accession has been accepted by the
2 countries can the provisions of the Hague Convention apply and a claim can be brought by
the parent of a child.
- Each country that is a signatory must set up a central authority; assuming the
other country is a hague convention member, then you contact the other
country’s central authority (in some countries central authority will do
everything there or u will have to hire an overseas lawyer)
- If overseas lawyer calls you that kid was kidnapped to SG, you can use hague
convention or you can use International child abduction act to apply to court
- From Prof: In regard to the Hague Convention, there is a difference
between ratification and accession. The "original" countries involved in
the Convention can "ratify" the Convention. Also those who sign later
"accede" to the Convention. For the purpose of our course, it is
important to know that Singapore has "acceded" to (and not "ratified")
the Convention and the provisions only apply to Singapore and the
following: (1) a country that has ratified the Convention and accepted
Singapore acceding to the Convention, (2) a country that acceded to the
Convention before Singapore did and has accepted Singapore's acceding
to the Convention, and (3) a country that acceded to the Convention after
Singapore did and whose accession Singapore has accepted. For the
purpose of the exams, you will not be required to know the status of
individual countries. Once an "accession" has been accepted (or between

any two countries that "ratified" the Convention), the provisions apply
and a claim can be brought by the parent of a child.
Access
Since __ does not live with the child, __ should seek an access order to gain reasonable access
to the child. In determining if the order should be granted, the paramount consideration is ‘the
best interests of the children’ (BG v BG at [19]). The court in AQL v AQM noted that where the
child does not live with the parent, he/she will be granted ‘reasonable access’ since ‘it is in the
child’s interests to have interaction with both of her parents’ (at [7]).
- It is likely that __ will be granted access since it requires a convincing reason before a
parent will be denied reasonable access to his/her child (Tay Ah Hoe v Kwek Lye Seng).
Types of Access Orders

- supervised and unsupervised access orders
- Liberal/reasonable access and fairly liberal access (reasonable access is probably the
most common access order and liberal access is also common)
- Reasonable access: order given where parties can get along sufficiently to make their
own arrangements and between reasonable and liberal, the plain meaning of the
words suggest that liberal means more than reasonable. Liberal access tends to be
ordered when the court wants to make clear to the party that you ought to have
generous access. Common ones will be reasonable and liberal and liberal tends to
convey that you should have lots of access - entirely possible for case with reasonable
access to grant more access than case with liberal access - sometimes court grants
liberal access as a signal not to play games and that the other side must get lots of
access (these 2 will be ordered if the parties get along but liberal ensures that one
party gets more access)
- Basically liberal just means they get a lot of access, dont play
games if not its not very diff from reasonable access
- Overseas access --> some restrictions on bringing children overseas and in
some cases, you might not allow access parent to bring child overseas
- In CX v CY, the court noted that an overseas access order ‘is always an
issue due to the perennial fear of each party that he or she may not get
the child back’, especially where the parties live in different jurisdictions
(at [47]). The court in this case upheld the overseas access order as ‘it
[was] beneficial for the paternal grandparents to be involved in the
child’s upbringing’ (at [49]).
Division of Matrimonial Assets

The issue is how the courts should divide the assets. The court is empowered to divide the
matrimonial assets of the spouses under s112(1) of the Women’s Charter.
Operative date for division of matrimonial assets:

As recognised in Yeo Chong Lin, there is no one fixed operative date for determining what
assets fall within the pool of matrimonial assets due to the ‘possible diverse assets, and the
different circumstances under which they were acquired’ (at [36]). The operative date is
ultimately dependent on the nature of the assets and the circumstances they were acquired
under, with ‘arriving at a just and equitable division’ being the most critical consideration (at
[36]).
The court noted 4 possible cut-off dates: 1) date of separation; 2) date on which the petition of
divorce is filed; 3) date on which decree nisi is granted and 4) date of hearing of ancillary
matters (including the date of the hearing of an appeal) (at [39]).
- In Yeo Chong Lin, the court held that the operative date was the date which the decree
nisi was granted (at [40]). This was because between the period between the decree nisi
and the determination of the ancillary matters was 4 years, such that the party
undertaking new investments should bear the consequences of his/her act ‘provided that
he or she restores to the common pool the funds which he/she had used to acquire the
new asset’ (at [40]).
What is a matrimonial asset

Firstly, it must be determined which assets are ‘matrimonial assets’ subject to the court’s power
to order division under s112(1) of the WC. The term ‘matrimonial asset’ is defined under
s112(10) to mean any asset acquired by the parties before the marriage which has been used
(s112(10)(a)) or enjoyed by both parties or substantially improved on or any other asset
acquired during the marriage (s112(10)(b)).
However, the inclusion of an asset does not need to be on a whole or nothing basis since the
court may, if deemed appropriate, discount the portion that does not amount to a matrimonial
asset (s112(1)).
- In Oh Choon v Lee Siew Lin, the court included the piece of real estate and car acquired
during the subsistence of the marriage to reflect the husband’s mistress’ partial
ownership and ordered only a small portion for the wife even though they were
quintessential matrimonial assets.
Gifts/inheritance: Generally, assets which had been obtained by way of gift/inheritance and
have not been substantially improved on during the marriage are not considered as matrimonial
assets (s112(10)).
- In Ng Kim Seng v Kok Mew Leng, the court excluded properties which were gifted from a
father to his daughter since there was no contribution by both spouses during the
marriage
- In Tan Bee Giok v Loh Kum Yong, the court held that not the whole of the property gifted
to the husband was a gift since 22% of it had been acquired with the proceeds of sales
of the former matrimonial home.
S112(10) defines a matrimonial asset to mean:

(a) any asset acquired before the marriage by one party or both parties to the marriage
(i) ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or one or more of their children while
the parties are residing together for shelter or transportation or for household,
education, recreational, social or aesthetic purposes; or
(ii) which has been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party
or by both parties to the marriage; and
(b) any other asset of any nature acquired during the marriage by one party or both
parties to the marriage,
but does not include any asset (not being a matrimonial home) that has been acquired by one
party at any time by gift or inheritance and that has not been substantially improved during the
marriage by the other party or by both parties to the marriage
Examples of matrimonial assets:

- Matrimonial Home is the ‘cradle of the family’ (LWK at 16.007)
- Fact that property ceased to be matrimonial home does not mean its should be
excluded from matrimonial assets: TXW v TXX (home only served as
matrimonial home for 12/22 years of their marriage)
- Business Assets (Koh Kim Lan Angela v Choong Kian Haw: business assets of the
husband which had been passed on to him from his family’s business was liable to
division)
- CPF savings (Central Provident Fund Board v Lau Eng Mui at [8]: ‘moneys in the CPF
account of a member, if accumulated during his marriage, form part of the matrimonial
assets available for division between him and his spouse’; affirming Lam Chih Kian v
Ong Chin Ngoh)
- Property owned before marriage that is substantially improved upon: Koh Kim Lan
Angela v Choong Kian Haw: wife’s (who was a former model) effort by attending
events to give her husband’s boutique business constituted joint efforts at improving
them. However, the court in USB v USA noted that this was a generous interpretation
of ‘improvement’ which ‘may no longer hold true but that is a matter to be decided in
an appropriate future case’ (at [23]).
- Property acquired as a gift:
- Ng Kim Seng v Kok Mew Leng: excluded property gifted by father to daughter
from matrimonial assets
- Tan Bee Giok v Loh Kum Yong: court scrutinised property transactions and
held that not the whole property was a gift
- Cars: Chow Hoo Siong v Lee Dawn Audrey
- Insurance policies: Neo Mei Lan Helena v Long Melvin Anthony (Yeo Bee Leong, co-
respondent)
- Jewellery that may be of insignificant value but possesses sentimental value: HillField
International Ltd v Chew Lai Yoke Bettina & Anor Action
- Club memberships which remain of some value: Tan Siew Eng v Ng Meng Hin
- Insurance policy as long as no trust has been created over it: CH v CI
- Windfall (
- Modern forms of remuneration considered: employment benefits in the form of stock
options: Chan Teck Hock David v Leong Mei Chuan
Note: matrimonial assets can be located abroad: court gave wife a share of the assets located
in Malaysia and Hong Kong in Yow Mee Lan v Chen Kai Buan
What constitutes substantial improvement of property: Shi Fang v Koh Pee Kaut: physical
improvements including substantial renovation of a house as well as working in the company
that the shares of the company increased in value; wife chose design, colour of tiles and
walls, arranged repairs of things in the house, bought furniture, paid for telephone bills, paid
for household expenses from her maintenance supervised work of maid
Pre-marital property:
- Court will discount pre-marital assets - only the improved value of the pre-marital asset
that is subject to division by the court: UJF v UJG (usually for property acquired by
either spouse before commitment to the marriage but which acquired relevant
connections over the course of the marriage such that it is to be divided with the
spouse)
- Courts need to consider if the windfall, gift or inheritance was something that had been
acquired fully before the solemnization of the marriage (if connection between gift,
inheritance and the marital partnership then court should regard it as material gains of
the equal co-operative marital partnership)
3P Property: Given that a 3P is disputing the claim that the [asset] is a matrimonial asset, the
3P can ‘commence independent civil proceedings against either or both the spouses...for a
declaration as to his interest and other relief’ (at [54]). Given that s112 circumscribes the
power as only being applicable to the parties of the matrimonial proceedings, the 3P cannot
participate in those proceedings but he can apply for the stay of the proceedings ‘pending
determination of his separate civil suit’ (at [54]). Further, the power of the courts to decide on
beneficial ownership stems from s112 of the Women’s Charter rather than the courts general
civil jurisdiction under s16 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (at [44]).
- In UDA v UDB, the wife’s mother alleged that the alleged matrimonial asset was held
on trust for her and disputed the husband’s claim that an immovable property was held
by her on trust for the couple. The court held that the s112 proceedings should be
stayed in order for the property dispute to be separately determined first. .
- 56 If the property is legally owned by the third party, then the following options will be
available to the court and the spouses.
- (a) First, the spouse who claims the property to be a matrimonial asset may obtain
legally binding confirmation from the third party that this is so and an undertaking that the
third party would respect and enforce any order that the court may make relating to the
beneficial interests in the property.
- (b) If this is contested, either that spouse or the other who is asserting that the property
belongs beneficially to the third party would have to start a separate legal action to have the
rights in the property finally determined, vis-à-vis the third party, in which case the s 112
proceedings would have to be stayed until the rights are determined. This would be Option
2.
- (c) The third possibility would be for the spouse to drop his or her claim that the property
is a matrimonial asset and allow the s 112 proceedings to continue without it.
- (d) Alternatively, that spouse may ask the court to determine whether the asset is a
matrimonial asset without involving the third party’s participation at all or making an order
directly affecting the property. This is Option 1.
- The first option requires that both spouses agree to it to prevent prejudice to the spouse
‘who has had to account to the other for the value of an item of property which turns out
not to be a matrimonial asset’ (at [57]).
Defining principles of the power of the court to divide matrimonial assets (Koo Shirley v Mok
Kong Chua Kenneth):
1) any asset acquired during marriage (rather than just the matrimonial home) is liable to
division
2) the power is to be exercised in broad strokes (rather than by misguided attempt at

mathematical precision) and
- Impossible to aim for exactitude; consider wealth of family as a whole and not
individual pieces of property item by item
3) the aim of the court is to reach a fair and reasonable division of the assets between the
spouses (rather than simply enforcing the predecessor provision literally)
Purpose of crediting non-financial contribution: ‘equalise the credit that the spouse who made
financial contribution to the acquisition of property would be given by the principles of property
law by giving equal credit to the spouse who made non-financial contributions’ (LWK at
15.046)
Types of matrimonial assets as classified by USB v USA:

1) Quintessential matrimonial assets: ‘assets which either spouse derived from income
earned during the marriage or to which either spouse or both spouses obtained legal
title during the marriage by applying their own money, and the matrimonial home,
whenever and however acquired’ - entire value of these assets will go into the pool for
division (at [19(a)])
2) Transformed matrimonial assets: ‘assets which were acquired before the marriage by
one spouse (or, more rarely, by both spouses), but which have been substantially
improved during the marriage by the other spouse or by both spouses, or which were
ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties or their children while residing together for
purposes such as shelter, transport, household use, etc’ - if considered transformed,

the assets go into the pool for division (at [19(b)])
3) Pre-marriage assets: ‘assets that either spouse acquired before the marriage and
which the other spouse does not thereafter improve substantially or which are not
used for family purposes’ - assets stay out of the pool unless they are partially paid for
during the marriage (at [19(c)])
4) Gifts and inherited assets: ‘assets whenever acquired by either spouse are not part of
the pool unless transformed by substantial improvement or use as the matrimonial
home’ - not part of the pool unless they are transformed (at [19(d)])
Use this: The court has the power to divide the assets pursuant to s112 of the WC and can
consider the non-exhaustive list of factors under s112(2) which is subject to the ‘overriding
impetus of what is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case’ (NK v NL at [20]). The
courts will ‘adopt a broad-brush approach to the issue’ by taking into account both the financial
and non-financial contributions of the parties (Lim Choon Lai v Chew Kim Heng at [14]).
Generally, regardless of the length of the marriage, the courts will use as a starting point the
assumption that both parties ‘have contributed jointly and equally throughout the marriage to the
acquisition and growth of the equity in the family home’ (Lim Choon Lai v Chew Kim Heng at
[15]).
[insert type of marriage] Following the structured approach in ANJ v ANK, the courts will firstly
ascribe a ratio to each party’s direct contributions through consideration of documentary
evidence of the direct financial contributions of the parties (at [23]). In this case, …
- See eg. mortgage documents, bank slips, CPF statements etc)/where the
documentary evidence falls short, the court is entitled to ‘make a “rough and ready
approximation” of the figures’ (at [23])
Secondly, the court will ascribe a second ratio to their indirect contributions to the well-being of
the family via a broad-brush approach (USB v USA at [43]-[46]). In this case,
- In ANJ, the court found that the indirect contribution was 40:60 in favour of the wife.
This was because while both parties had assistance from the grandparents of the
children, the Wife was their primary caregiver (at [33]). This was especially since one
of the children suffered from ADHD and/or ODD which made it more difficult for the
wife to care for the child, particularly where the parties had no full time helper under
December 2012 (at [34]). Husband was the ‘handyman of the house, carrying out
maintenance, repairs and improvements to household appliances, sewage and
draining systems’ (at [35]). He also took care of the children and drove them to
weekend enrichment classes (at [35]).
- USB v USA at [43]: factors such as the length of the marriage, the number of children,
and which party was the children’s primary caregiver.
- In VYN v VYO, the court found that the indirect contributions were 80:20 in favour of
the wife who ‘did the laundry, prepared lunch and cleaned the house when the
parties had a potential buyer who wanted to view their previous flat’ (at [33]). Further,
the wife tended to all the child’s school matters and was the child’s primary
caregiver. It was conceivable that she also had to take care of the husband due to
his health issues of cataract, insomnia, chronic diabetes. The court further found that
she was ‘essentially a full-time homemaker and an able assistant to the Husband in
his business’ (at [34]).
- In TQN v TQO, the court found that the indirect contributions were 60:40 in favour of
the wife. The wife was the caregiver for the children in their early years since she did
not work while the husband spent time in KL to build up his career. However, the
court noted the wife left the matrimonial home for 2 years and then to Myanmar to
work later so the court gave credit to the husband for the care of the children during
this period. As for daily expenses, the wife bore a share of it while the husband paid
some amount for the renovation works.
Thirdly, the courts derive an ‘average percentage contribution [from the direct and indirect
contributions] to the family which would form the basis to divide the matrimonial assets’ (at [22]).
This ‘average ratio’ is a non-binding figure which is merely an indicative guide to assist the
courts in deciding a just and equitable division (at [26]). In this case,
Fourthly, the court can make further adjustments to this average percentage to shift the average
ratio in favour of one party based on factors such as those s112(2) of the WC (at [22], [27]). In
this case, it is likely that the courts will adjust the percentage to … for [reasons] to ensure just
and equitable division of assets.
- Since the marriage is a long one, the courts are likely to place greater weight on the
indirect contributions (Tan Hwee Lan)/ Since the marriage is a short childless
marriage, the courts are likely to find that the indirect contributions play a de minimis
role (Ong Boon Huat Samuel at [28]).
- Since the size of the matrimonial and its constituents is extraordinarily large and
accrued due to one party’s exceptional efforts, the courts are likely to place greater
weight on direct contributions (Yeo Chong Lin v Tay Ang Choo Nancy)
- Since the wife/husband had ‘painstakingly raised children to adulthood’ and had
made significant career sacrifices to do so, the court is likely to place greater weight
on the indirect contributions (ANJ at [27(c)]).
- Since there was a domestic helper to help relieve the burden of homemaking and
caregiving responsibilities of the parties, the court may attribute less weight to
indirect contributions (ANJ at [27(c)]).
- In VYN v VYO, the court found that there was no need to make any adjustments to the
weightage of the ratio since this was not ‘an exceptionally long marriage nor were
there substantial assets accrued by one party’s exceptional efforts’ (at [36]) -
marriage was dual income marriage of 16 years
Lastly, the court can make final adjustments to the ratio to ensure a just and equitable division.
Husband Wife
Direct contributions 60% 40%
Indirect contributions (both financial and non-financial) 40% 60%
Average percentage contributions 50% 50%
Direct contributions 75% [Step 1] 25% [Step 1]

[Step 4: Assume new weightage is 60%] 60% of 75% is 45% 60% of 25% is 15%
Indirect contributions (both financial and non-financial) 35% [Step 2] 65% [Step 2]
[Step 4: Assume new weightage is 40%] 40% of 35% is 14% 40% of 65% is 26%
Average percentage contributions [Step 3] 55% 45%

New average percentage including adjustments [Step 4] New Overall: 59% New Overall: 41%
Notes (use paras above)

Broad brush approach: In ensuring a ‘just and equitable’ division of matrimonial assets, the
courts will ‘adopt a broad-brush approach to the issue’ by taking into account both the financial
and non-financial contributions of the parties (Lim Choon Lai v Chew Kim Heng at [14]). This
broad-brush approach acknowledges that ‘mutual respect must be accorded for spousal
contributions, whether in the economic or homemaking spheres, as both roles are equally
fundamental to the well-being of a marital partnership ‘ (ANJ v ANK at [17]; NK v NL at [41]) In
exercising its power of division under s112, the court can consider the non-exhaustive list of
factors under s112(2) which is subject to the ‘overriding impetus of what is just and equitable in
all the circumstances of the case’ (NK v NL at [20]).
In Lim Choon Lai, the court found that the wife bore the main burden of supporting the family
and providing for them even though the husband had contributed towards the lesser
expenses. As for the indirect contributions, the wife had spent more time with the children and
family due to her job as a schoolteacher which permitted more flexible hours than the
husband who had a nine-to-five vocation. Therefore, the court ordered that the wife receive a
60% share of the sale profits of the house while the husband receives 40%.
Starting point is equality: Generally, regardless of the length of the marriage, the courts will use
as a starting point the assumption that both parties ‘have contributed jointly and equally
throughout the marriage to the acquisition and growth of the equity in the family home’ (Lim
Choon Lai v Chew Kim Heng at [15]). In doing so, the court will have regard to all circumstances
of the case and not just the factors laid down in s112(2).
Methodology: The court put forth a structured approach for the division of assets under which
the courts will firstly ascribe a ratio to each party’s direct contributions through consideration of
documentary evidence of the direct financial contributions of the parties (eg. mortgage
documents, bank slips, CPF statements etc)/where the documentary evidence falls short, the
court is entitled to ‘make a “rough and ready approximation” of the figures’ (at [23]). Next, the
court will ascribe a second ratio to their indirect contributions to the well-being of the family via a
broad-brush approach. Thirdly, the courts derive an ‘average percentage contribution [from the
direct and indirect contributions] to the family which would form the basis to divide the
matrimonial assets’ (at [22]). This ‘average ratio’ is a non-binding figure which is merely an
indicative guide to assist the courts in deciding a just and equitable division (at [26]).
The court can make further adjustments to this percentage based on the factors in s112(2) of
the WC (at [22]). This method arguably provides room for the court to ‘put financial and non-
financial contributions on an equal footing’ (at [26]).
- The court in ANJ highlighted the unsatisfactory aspects of the uplift approach: 1) the risk
of undervaluing a party’s non-financial contributions, making it inconsistent with the
broad-brush approach and the rationale of s112 (at [19]); 2) the risk of overvaluation of a
party’s non-financial contributions (at [20]).
While the court in UYQ v UYP affirmed the structured approach in ANJ, the court noted that a
‘rigid, mechanistic and overly-arithmetical application’ of this approach should be avoided since
this would be inconsistent with the aspirations of the family justice system to enable harmonious
dispute resolution (at [3]). Instead, the court proposed that there ought to be ‘reasonable
accounting rigour that eschews flooding the court with details that would obscure rather than
illuminate’ (at [4]).
In ANJ v ANK, the marriage lasted 9 years and the couple, both working, had 2 daughters at
the time of the hearing. The High Court applied the uplift method in holding that the
matrimonial assets should be divided 60:40 in favour of the wife (wife made 40% of direct
financial contributions but adding her non-financial contributions such as her being a
homemaker and the child carer, the % was raised to 60% overall). The Court of appeal
criticised this approach and found that the assets should be divided 50:50 between the
spouses.
- The uplift method consists of taking the proportion of the parties’ financial contributions
as a starting point before adjusting the proportions to ‘uplift’ the proportion of the
spouse who had made more non-financial contributions.
Structured approach:
Factors the courts can consider to shift the average ratio in favour of one party (at [27]):
- a) The length of the marriage. Indirect contributions in general tend to feature more
prominently in long marriages (Tan Hwee Lee ([18] supra) at [85]). Conversely, indirect
contributions usually play a de minimis role in short, childless marriages (Ong Boon
Huat Samuel v Chan Mei Lan Kristine [2007] 2 SLR(R) 729 at [28]).
- (b) The size of the matrimonial assets and its constituents. If the pool of assets
available for division is extraordinarily large and all of that was accrued by one party’s
exceptional efforts, direct contributions are likely to command greater weight as
against indirect contributions (see Yeo Chong Lin v Tay Ang Choo Nancy [2011] 2
SLR 1157 (“Yeo Chong Lin”)).
- (c) The extent and nature of indirect contributions made. Not all indirect
contributions carry equal weight. For instance, the engagement of a domestic helper
naturally reduces the burden of homemaking and caregiving responsibilities
undertaken by the parties, and to that extent, the weight accorded to the parties’
collective indirect contributions in the homemaking and caregiving aspects may have
to be correspondingly reduced. The courts also tend to give weighty consideration to
homemakers who have painstakingly raised children to adulthood, especially where
such efforts have entailed significant career sacrifices on their part.
- Other factors that might be considered includes but are not limited to: needs of the
children; the presence of an agreement between the parties with respect to the
ownership and division of matrimonial assets; period of rent-free occupation or other
benefit enjoyed by one party in the matrimonial home to the exclusion of the other
party, whether adverse inference should be drawn against any party who fails to
provide full and frank disclosure of their assets etc. (see para [28]-[29] of ANJ v ANK)
Court of appeal found that the wife was the primary caregiver of the children but that part of
the housemaking and housekeeping responsibilities fell on the husband, played a role in
taking care of the children, washed dishes and prepared food and was the handyman of the
house.
ANJ approach: (a) first, ascribe a ratio that represents each party’s direct contributions relative to
those of the other party, having regard to the amount of financial contribution each party has made
towards the acquisition or improvement of the matrimonial assets; (b) second, ascribe a second
ratio to represent each party’s indirect contribution to the well-being of the family relative to that of
the other throughout the marriage; and (c) third, using each party’s respective direct and indirect
percentage contributions, derive each party’s average percentage contribution to the family that
would form the basis to divide the matrimonial assets (USB v USA at [36]).
Husband Wife
Direct contributions 60% 40%
Indirect contributions (both financial and non-financial) 40% 60%
Average percentage contributions 50% 50%
Short childless marriages: Where the marriage is short and childless, the courts will divide the
matrimonial assets in accordance with the parties’ direct financial contributions since the non-
financial contributions are likely to be minimal (Ong Boon Huat Samuel at [28])
- Issue: how do we define what is considered short?

On the facts, the parties' marriage lasted [years]. Given that the court in Ong Boon Huat Samuel
did not provide any guidance as to what duration of marriage is considered short, it is unclear if
the marriage in this case would fall under the category of short childless marriage.
Nevertheless, considering that the marriage in Ong Boon Huat Samuel lasted 19 months, it is
likely that...
Ong Boon Huat Samuel --> husband acquired a second property which gained value at the
time of the parties divorce. However, although the wife argued that she should receive a
portion of this second property since the matrimonial home had lost value at the time of their
divorce, she had made it clear that she did not want any part in the acquisition of this second
home. The court held that while the second property had been acquired during the marriage
and hence fell within s112(10) of the WC, ‘the court’s power to divide any matrimonial asset is
a discretionary power’ (at [25]) and therefore the court could ‘generally decline to do so where
a valid reason is given’ (at [26]).
- Marriage in this case only lasted 19 months
Long single income marriage: In TNL v TNK, the court held that the ANJ approach should not
apply to long single-income marriages: marriages where one spouse is the sole income earner
and the other is a homemaker (at [43], [46]). The court reasoned that the ANJ approach would
‘unduly favour the working spouse over the non-working spouse’ since financial contributions
are considered under both steps of the approach, leaving the non-working spouse
disadvantaged (at [44]). To ensure that ANJ approach would respect the non-financial
contributions of a party, the court will have to increase the percentage afforded to the non-
working spouse in step 2 or accord a high weightage in step 3, resulting in a degree of
artificiality in the test (at [45]). Instead, the court held that in long Single-Income Marriages, the
courts will ‘tend towards an equal division of the matrimonial assets’ (at [48]).
- In TNL, the court awarded a 50:50 division of assets
- Issue: how do we define what is considered long?

On the facts, the parties' marriage lasted [years]. Given that the court in TNL did not provide any
guidance as to what duration of marriage is considered long, it is unclear if the marriage in this
case would fall under the category of long single-income marriage. Nevertheless, considering
that the marriage in TNL lasted 35 years, it is likely that...
- Issue: what is considered a single-income marriage?
The court defined a single-income marriage as one where ‘one spouse is the sole income
earner and the other plays the role of homemaker’ (at [43]). In this case, while the wife/husband
was not the sole income earner, the small amount earned by the wife/husband suggests that the
marriage was practically a single-income one. Therefore, it is arguable that their marriage falls
under the category of long single-income marriages such that the ANJ approach should not
apply.
- In TNL, the roles of the parties were amongst traditional lines where the husband was
the breadwinner and the wife was ‘the keeper of the hearth and main child-carer’.
Long dual income marriage: Apply ANJ first.
Given that the court in UYQ v UYP acknowledged that there is an inclination towards equal
division of assets in long dual-income marriages but declined to take a position on this, __ could
argue that the courts should incline towards a 50:50 division of assets. This is especially in light
of the view of marriage as a cooperative equal partnership under s46(1) of the WC.
Nevertheless, the court noted that the ‘precise facts and circumstances of the case’ must be
considered and that it is paramount that the ‘courts do not focus merely on a direct and indirect
contributions dichotomy in arriving at a just and equitable division of matrimonial assets’ (at [5]).
Therefore, in this case, it is likely that the courts will not award an equal division because of
[insert reasons]
While the court in UYQ v UYP noted that there is an inclination towards equal division of assets
in long dual-income marriages, the court declined to take a position on this and noted that the
‘precise facts and circumstances of the case’ must be considered and that it is paramount that
the ‘courts do not focus merely on a direct and indirect contributions dichotomy in arriving at a
just and equitable division of matrimonial assets’ (at [5]). Therefore, the ANJ structured
approach will apply to long dual income marriages.
- Basically, apply ANJ for long dual income marriages
Indirect contributions: The court in NK v NL held that there are limitations to ‘using the parties’
direct financial contributions as a starting point’ since direct financial contributions alone are ‘far
from determinative of the actual contributions to the economic partnership as a whole’ (at [27]).
Therefore, the court noted the importance of giving sufficient recognition to indirect contributions
‘like homemaking, parenting and husbandry’ (at [34]). While it is difficult to attribute a precise
financial value to these kinds of contributions, this should not be ‘an obstacle to giving the
spouse concerned his or her just and equitable share of the matrimonial assets that is
commensurate with his or her contributions’ (at [34]). The court in ANJ also acknowledged the
difficulty of ascribing a ratio to non-financial contributions and that the determination of this
value would largely come from the court’s impression and judgement in ‘broad strokes’ (at [24])
- The court noted that the division of assets is ‘not simply a numbers game’ but is a
process that involves ‘a mutual respect for spousal contributions, whether in the
economic or homemaking spheres, as both roles are equally fundamental to the well-
being of the marital partnership’ (at [41]).
NK v NL --> The marriage was 23 years long with 4 children. The court ordered that the wife
be ordered 60% of the disclosed matrimonial assets as well as 60% of the total value of the
companies in the family business. The court came to this value by noting that the wife had
spent more than 20 years assisting the husband in the family business (she took on the role
of director, shareholder and employee of TFI, the company) while simultaneously managing
the household and raising the children (at [69]). The court further noted that an AI could be
drawn against the husband from his failure to disclose his assets (2.7m discrepancy).
- The judge raised the wife’s share of the matrimonial home from 23% to 40% following
the consideration of her ‘indirect contributions towards the welfare of the family as well
as the reinvested profits’ (at [48])
The court is not mandated to exercise their powers of division under s112 and ‘may generally
decline to do so where a valid reason is given’ (Ong Boon Huat Samuel at [26]).
Marital agreement between spouses: The issue is whether the court should give effect to the
marital agreement between the parties given that s112(2)(e) provides that an agreement
between the parties is something the courts can take into account. The court in TQ v TR noted
that all prenuptial agreements are ‘ultimately subject to the scrutiny of the courts’ which is a
necessary safeguard (at [104]). Ultimately, the legal status of a prenuptial agreement is
determined by the interaction of both statute law and common law (at [102]).
- Where the Act covers a category of prenuptial agreement, then the provisions from the
act will be the governing law.
- Where the Act is silent on the legal status of the prenuptial agreement, the agreement
will be governed by common law.
- However, an agreement which contravenes any express provision of the Act/legislative
policy within the Act will not ‘pass muster under the common law’ (at [102]).
1) Prenuptial agreements relating to maintenance of wife/children

Prenuptial agreements relating to maintenance of wife/children will be subject to the scrutiny of
the courts (at [63]). Since the prenuptial agreement in this case relates to the maintenance of
the wife/children, the courts will apply common law principles given the absence of any
applicable provision under the Women’s Charter (at [62]). In determining if the prenuptial
agreement has any legal effect, the courts will consider whether the terms would result in a ‘fair
and just result’ ‘inasmuch as they provide the wife and/or the children with adequate
maintenance in accordance with the various criteria set out in the Act as well as in the relevant
case law’ (at [103(a)(i)]).
- Notably, the court will prevent any attempt ‘by the husband at circumventing his
obligation to furnish the requisite maintenance by disposing of his property’ be it by
direct or indirect means (at [103(a)(ii)]).
- Given that the prenuptial agreement relates to the maintenance of children, the courts
will be ‘be especially vigilant and will be slow to enforce agreements that are apparently
not in the best interests of the child or the children concerned’ (at [103(a)(iii)]).
- Postnuptial agreements relating to maintenance of wife/children: Based on s116, s119
and s132 of the WC, ‘ the courts have the statutory power to override any postnuptial
agreement entered into between the spouses with regard to maintenance’ (at [61]).
2) Prenuptial/postnuptial agreements relating to custody/care and control of children

Given that the agreement relates to custody/care and control of children, the court will operate
on the basis of common law and s129 of the WC. In such cases, there is ‘presumption that such
an agreement is unenforceable unless it is clearly demonstrated by the party relying upon the
agreement that that agreement is in the best interests of the child or the children concerned’ (at
[103(b)]).
3) Prenuptial agreements relating to the division of matrimonial assets

S112(1) of the act governs prenuptial agreements relating to the division of matrimonial assets
such that the ultimate power lies with the courts to divide the assets ‘in such proportions as the
court thinks just and equitable’ (at [103(c)(i)]). The court noted that the prenuptial agreement is
simply one factor that the court should consider in the division of matrimonial assets and that
the weight accorded to the agreement ‘will depend upon the precise circumstances before the
court’ (at [77]).
- In this case, it is likely that the courts will find that considering the circumstances as a
whole, the prenuptial agreement is ‘so crucial that it is, in effect, enforced in its entirety’
(at [77]).
- s112(2)(e) also covers postnuptial agreements (at [74])
- ‘There is no blanket rule that a prenuptial agreement must be enforced to the exclusion
of all the other relevant circumstances before the court’ (at [80])
- In this case, since the prenuptial agreement has been entered into by foreign nationals
and is governed by foreign law, the court is more likely to accord ‘accord significant
(even critical) weight to the terms of that agreement’, provided the agreement is not
contrary to public policy in Singapore (at [87])
Further, the prenuptial agreement must comply with the requirements under the general law of
contract such that it has been validly formed and has not been entered into as a result of
vitiating factors such as duress and fraud (at [96],[97]).
- Note: these requirements do not apply to a foreign prenuptial agreement that does not
contravene any public policy in Singapore. The court also possesses the discretion to
accord weight to the prenuptial agreement if it does not comply with the requirements
under the common law of contract (at [105]).
4) Post-nuptial agreements
Generally, postnuptial agreements are subject to the scrutiny of the courts since s 112(2)(e) of
the WC allows for the consideration of ‘any agreement’ between the parties in the exercise of
power of the division of assets. However, the court noted that postnuptial agreements are made
in circumstances very different from prenuptial agreements and therefore may warrant
according ‘more weight than prenuptial agreements in the exercise of their discretion under s
112(2)(e) of the Act.’ (at [75]).
TQ v TR: Dutch husband and Swedish Wife had an uncontested divorce where the decree
nisi was granted in 2005. The couple had a prenuptial agreement executed via Dutch law,
relating to the division of matrimonial property. The court found that the agreement was valid
under Dutch law and that the proper law governing it was Dutch law. However, the court
interpreted the agreement to mean that there shall be no division of matrimonial assets.
- Note: court upheld finding that no matrimonial assets existed
Court drew a distinction between 4 types of marital agreements:

1) Prenuptial agreements: ‘agreements reached by a husband and a wife before their
marriage concerning what would happen in the event of a divorce. Such agreements
can cover any issue which is usually the subject of ancillary proceedings, including
maintenance, the division of matrimonial assets, and children.’ (at [45])
2) Prenuptial settlements: ‘regulate rights and obligations only during the marriage but
not after its termination’; ambit can be wide and cover any aspect of married life be it
big or small; agreement can sometimes be both a prenuptial agreement and a
settlement if it ‘makes provisions concerning both the subsistence as well as the end
of the marriage’ (at [46]).
3) Postnuptial settlements: made after a marriage where the parties agree on what is to
happen after their separation/divorce; these agreements can address any ancillary
matter. (at [47])
Conduct of the parties: The court in Chan Tin Sun noted that s112(1) of the WC accords the
court a broad discretion on the division of matrimonial assets and therefore is not precluded
from ‘considering the conduct of the parties in exercising its power to order the division’ (at [22]).
However, the court noted that the conduct of the parties should not always be taken into
account in light of the ‘no fault’ basis of divorce law to prevent the court from lapsing into ‘a
minute scrutiny of the conduct and efforts of both spouses’ (at [23]). In that case, the court found
that it was possible to ascribe a negative value to a spouse’s conduct in the division of assets as
a factor to be considered in the division of the assets (at [28]). The court emphasised that such
a negative value did not serve a punitive function of punishing the spouse for wrongdoing (at
[28]).
Given the extreme circumstances of Chan Tin Sun where the wife had poisoned the husband
over a period of time, it is unlikely that such facts would reoccur such that the court’s
consideration of the parties' negative conduct will occur again. Therefore, it is unlikely that the
courts will consider [party’s] negative conduct.
In Chan Tin Sun, the court held that the wife’s premeditated conduct of poisoning her
husband over a period of time was ‘so extreme and undisputed’ that it could be taken into
account in determining what is just and equitable for the division of assets. The court therefore
ascribed a negative value to her conduct to be considered in the division of the matrimonial
assets (at [54],[55]). Nevertheless, despite her negative conduct, the court held that the wife
was still to be awarded some share of the assets, awarding her a 28% of the share (reduced
from 35%).
Adverse inferences: Since [party] has not made full and frank disclosure of his assets, the court
is ‘entitled to draw inferences adverse’ to him/her (Wee Ah Lian v Teo Siak Weng at [57]). In
Yeo Chong Lin, the court laid down 2 methods of drawing adverse inferences: 1) by taking a
broad-brush approach and ordering a ‘a higher proportion of the known assets to be given to the
wife’ (at [65]) or 2) by making a finding on the value of ‘the undisclosed assets on the available
evidence and it would be for the other party to prove that such a value is unreasonable’ (at [64]).
Ultimately, which method is to be applied would depend on the facts of each case and the court
will apply the method which would ‘best achieve an equitable and just result’ via not an
arithmetic but a ‘judgemental exercise’ (at [66]).
What is just and equitable will be considered in light of the purpose of drawing an AI to ‘counter
the effects of non-disclosure of assets which diminishes the value of the matrimonial pool and
thereby places those assets out of the reach of the other party for the purposes of division under
s 112 of the Women’s Charter as matrimonial assets’ (UZN v UZM at [29]).
- Since there is sufficient evidence that [the asset] exists and ought to have been
disclosed and the court is able to make an assessment of its likely value, the court can
include the value of this asset into the matrimonial pool. (UZN v UZM at [30]). This
approach can be applied even if ‘the value of the undisclosed assets cannot be
determined with precision’ (at [31]).
- In BPC, the court found that there was insufficient disclosure of the sources of
income of a party and estimated the total value of these assets at 10% of the
value of the total matrimonial pool.
- In Mok Kah Hong v Zheng Zhuan Yao, the court estimated the true value of the
matrimonial pool to be about 40% larger than the total value of the known
matrimonial assets, based on the extensive failure by one party to disclose his
assets.
- Since there is insufficient evidence as to the value of the assets, the courts are likely to
apply the uplift approach to ‘to eliminate the effects of non-disclosure by awarding a
greater share of the total pool of matrimonial assets to the other party’ (UZN v UZM at
[34]).
However, the court acknowledged that both approaches would be ‘undoubtedly to a large extent
speculative’ (at [66]).
- NK v NL applied the first method: instead of speculating and adding a specific sum to the
matrimonial pool for division, the court held that it would be more ‘just and equitable (not
to mention, practical) to order a higher proportion of the known assets to be given to the
wife’ (NK v NL at [62]) The court applied the uplift approach since there was a possibility
that the cash assets had expended over the course of the year and it was unclear what
proportion of the assets could be attributed to actual expenditure and what proportion
had been concealed
- In TQU v TQT, the court applied the uplift approach since there was no information
regarding the various overseas properties.
- Evaluation (practical aspect): On a more practical note, the division of assets ultimately
comes down to an issue of evidence. Therefore, where __ suspects that the other party
is not being entirely truthful in the disclosure of their assets, they can attempt to seek a
discovery application, an application to require the other party to disclose certain
documents or file for interrogatories to require the other party to answer certain
questions which would shed light on the evidential issues regarding the assets.
In Yeo Chong Lin v Tay Ang Choo Nancy, the parties sought a divorce after being married for
49 years. All the direct financial contributions of the family’s wealth were made by the
husband and the indirect non-financial contributions were made by the wife. The court held
that the assets should be divided 35:65 in favour of the husband and that the husband should
pay to the wife a 10% markup for non-disclosure. The husband had failed to disclose and
furnish evidence of assets he had acquired after the date of the decree nisi (did not disclose
how much he had paid for SIL shares so the court drew and AI and placed the entire value of
the shares in the matrimonial assets; husband did not provide evidence that his contributions
to 2 properties were independently amassed; husband argued his acquisition of shares in SIL
should not be considered a matrimonial asset but could not provide evidence as to what funds
he had used to acquire the shares aso the court drew an AI)
- Long single-income marriage but this was a 2011 case which was before the 2017
case of TNK v TNL.
In Koo Shirley v Mok Kong Chua Kenneth, the wife claimed that the husband’s income had
increased during his overseas posting while the husband declared it did not. The court held
that the husband had failed to make a full disclosure of his monthly income since he merely
mentioned his monthly salary and had failed to mention his living allowances or other
perquisites. Further, his disclosure of his monthly salary was found to be unbelievable given
his prior employment salary of a much higher level. The court held that there must have been
some financial attractions or inducements for him to have changed jobs and that therefore his
financial position in terms of income must have improved.
In Chan Siew Fong v Chan Fook Kee, the court drew an inference that the husband had other
assets apart from those which were subject to the order to divide. Such assets included the
husband’s CPF account and his business assets accumulated over 30 years as well as his
business activities in South Africa.
In Tan Siew Eng v Ng Meng Hin, the court drew and inference that the husband was likely still
left with other assets that had not been disclosed despite his order of division giving the wife
94.4% of the assets disclosed.
In NK v NL, the court drew and adverse inference in the husband due to the discrepancy in
his declared assets where there was a discrepancy of $2.7m. The court therefore awarded the
overall proportion of matrimonial assets awarded to the wife (at [66]).
In Chan Tin Sun, the husband was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for a large
amount of money drawn from his bank account via cash cheques. The court found that there
was no credible evidence to support the husband’s account of investments in Indonesia and
the fact that his maid had stolen the documents given his trips to Indonesia with the maid.
Further, his lack of medical documents to prove expenditure was found to be a poor excuse
given the ease of obtaining such documents by simply writing to the hospital.
Interspousal gifts: As recognised by the court in Wan Lai Cheng, an inter-spousal gift is not a
‘gift’ for the purposes of s112(10) but are ‘matrimonial assets as defined in s 112(10) without the
need to satisfy any further conditions’ (at [41]) since it is an asset acquired during the marriage.
- In this case, the 10% Skeve shares that the husband had gifted to the wife was found to
be a quintessential matrimonial asset that the husband had acquired during the marriage
and not a gift
Regift: Since [the asset] was originally a gift/inheritance from a 3P which was then regifted to
[the non-recipient spouse], the gift is not a pure interspousal gift but a re-gift and do not form
part of the pool of matrimonial assets (at [55]). This is because no effort would have been
expended by the donor spouse in acquiring the asset (at [55]). However, in interpreting
s112(10), the court held that the substantial improvement exception would not be applicable to
interspousal regifts (at [56]).
- The 40% of the shares the husband had inherited which he had regifted to the wife did
not form part of the pool of matrimonial assets.
- Note: interspousal gifts here refer only to ‘pure’ interspousal gifts of gifts from spouse to
spouse as opposed gifts acquired by the donor spouse by way of a 3P gift then regifted
to the other spouse (at [41]).
- Substantial improvement exception is applicable to gifts from third parties (at [45]) but
not applicable to re-gifts (at [56]).
- ‘Only gifts from third parties are “gifts” for the purposes of the Exclusion Clause in s
112(10) and are, accordingly, excluded from the pool of matrimonial assets (unless the
conditions set out in the “substantial improvement” exception are fulfilled).’ (at [46])
- Interspousal gift embodies the effort of the donor spouse in the acquisition of the gift and
therefore it is just and equitable that the effort be recognised (balance between allowing
donor to have ownership of the gift but recognising it as a matrimonial asset) (at [40])
- Summary: 1) interspousal gifts form part of the pool of matrimonial assets; 2)

interspousal regifts do not form part of the pool of matrimonial assets regardless of any
substantial improvement; 3) gifts from 3Ps are not matrimonial assets unless it can be
proven that there is substantial improvement on the part of the non-recipient spouse.
In Wan Lai Cheng v Quek Seow Kee, the parties had been married for 36 years. The wife did
not own property in her name and simply played an indirect non-financial role in the marriage.
The husband gave her 40% of the shares in Hawick, 40% of the shares in Kelso and 10% of
the shares in Skev as a gift. The issue was whether the inter-spousal gift of the shares were
gifts for the purposes of s112(10) of the Act and thus not matrimonial assets. The court held
that inter-spousal gifts are not gifts within s112(10) but are matrimonial assets without the
need to satisfy any further conditions (at [41]).
Cohabitation: While the parties might argue that the assets before marriage should be
considered as matrimonial assets given the cohabitation of the parties, the court will not take
into account such assets since it is ‘inherently self-contradictory to treat parties as “married”
when they were simply cohabiting’ (USB v USA at [18]). Although s112(2) allows the court to
take into account ‘all the circumstances of the case’, this does not allow the courts to take into
account ‘matters that are unrelated to the parties’ marriage’ (at [51]) since s112 only relates to
marriage.
- Transformed asset: However, if __ can prove that the asset acquired before marriage
had been transformed into a matrimonial asset, the asset will be added to the pool of
assets for division. As recognised by the court in USB v USA, a transformed asset is one
which has been substantially improved during the marriage or had become part of family
life following their use by the family (at [20]).
- Substantial improvement: The improvement of an asset entails more than just the
increase in value of the asset but ‘the investment of money or money’s worth for
the improvement of the asset’ (at [22]). The court in USB provided the example of
renovation works performed on a commercial or residential property such that the
sale value of the property is increased. (at [22]). There must be ‘an increase in
turnover or in profitability or some other measurable improvement’ and the court
will consider on a fact specific basis if ‘there has been some expenditure or
application of effort towards the improvement of the asset (in an economic
sense).’ (at [22]). Further, the effort must come from the efforts of both spouses
or either spouse (at [23]).
- Regular use by family/for the benefit of the family: Since the asset is ‘regularly
used or enjoyed by the members of the family or for the benefit of the family’, the
court is likely to consider it a transformed asset (at [24]). The court gave an
example of such assets such as a ‘pre-owned saloon car which is regularly used
to ferry family members around for activities like school and shopping and family
outings’ and contrasted it to a ‘pre-owned sports car which is generally driven
only by the owning spouse with the children being taken out for a spin once in a
blue moon’ which would not be considered a transformed asset (at [24]).
USB v USA: Husband and Wife were married for 5.5 years before obtaining a divorce but had
cohabited for 12 years before their marriage.
Maintenance
Maintenance:
- framework and concept - when maintenance might be ordered, types of maintenance
(nominal, lump sum, periodic)
- Child maintenance: goes until 21, exception under 21, if above 21 then child has to apply
themselves under s69
Maintenance of Children
The court can order a parent to provide maintenance for the child via a monthly allowance or a
lump sum payment (s69(2)). S68 provides for the parental liability to maintain a child. The
maintenance order ceases when the child reaches 21 years of age unless the order was
‘expressed to continue in force for a period ending after that day’ (s69(6)).
- In Wong Ser Wan v Ng Cheong Ling, the court ordered that the father provide
maintenance for the eldest child who was dependent since he was studying and
receiving medical treatment in the US.
If the child is above 21: Since __ is above 21 years of age, __ has to apply for maintenance
himself/herself under s69(2) of the WC (s69(3)(b)).
- Generally, parental liability for child maintenance continues for the rest of the child’s life
although practically, such maintenance will be unnecessary where the child is financially
independent.
- Basis of the responsibility comes from s46(1) - logically parents not liable once
the child is an adult although theoretically parents are liable for the rest of the
child’s life
- Lump sum vs monthly allowance: During the subsistence of the marriage, the
court is less likely to order a lump sum maintenance of the wife or child since the
responsibility of the payor is likely to continue for a certain period of time (LWK at
12.142).
- The court is likely to award a lump sum payment where the spouses are
separated and a ‘clean break’ is desirable. (such as in cases of a former
husband maintaining a former wife
Child: Based on s69(5) of the Women’s charter, the court can only make a maintenance order
for a child under 21 years of age unless there are exceptional circumstances.
Exceptional circumstances (s69(5)):

(a) of a mental or physical disability of the child;
(b) the child is or will be serving full-time national service;
(c) the child is or will be or (if an order were made under subsection (2)) would be
receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade,
profession or vocation, whether or not while in gainful employment; or
(d) special circumstances, other than those stated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), exist
which justify the making of the order.
Non-parent
In this case, __ is not a parent of the child. However, he/she will be liable maintenance of
another person’s child where: 1) non-parent voluntarily assumed responsibility over the child;
and 2) where the parents of the child fail in discharging their liability (non-parent’s duty is to
maintain the child so far as the father or mother of the child fails to do so) (TDT v TDS at [88];
s70(1) of women’s charter)
- Condition 1: voluntary assumption of parental responsibility: look for
factual link where non-parent brought child into home and begun the
process of assimilating the child - just need to prove that the parent had
accepted responsibility for the child by bringing her into the family (‘the
question is whether the non-parent had accepted parental responsibilities.
This is ultimately a question of fact’ (TDT at [103]).
- Condition 2: non-parental liability arises only so far as parents fail -
immaterial whether biological parents are capable of providing reasonable
maintenance: liability of non-parent who has voluntary assumed liability
arises once the biological parents are not making sufficient provision for
the child
- S70(2) provides that the duty imposed on the non-parent shall cease
once the child is taken away by the mother or father
In determining what amount of maintenance is reasonable, the court will consider all the
circumstances of the case and the factors as provided under s69(4). Nevertheless, where the
parent has an inability to meet the full financial needs of the child, the court will order a lower
sum of maintenance (THG v LGH). Notably, this maintenance order will continue unless another
court order for its rescission is made or the payer/recipient dies.
- In THG v LGH, the court found that the husband was unable to afford an additional $550
per month given his remarriage and 2 young children from this second marriage.
Instead, the court increased the maintenance from $150 to $375
Marital agreement is subject to court scrutiny: see TQ v TR above

- Given that the prenuptial agreement relates to the maintenance of children, the courts
will be ‘be especially vigilant and will be slow to enforce agreements that are apparently
not in the best interests of the child or the children concerned’ (TQ v TR at [103(a)(iii)]).
- The court will consider 1) the welfare of the child as an overriding objective and 2)
prevent the parents from abdicating their responsibility of parental support. (AUA v ATZ).
Therefore, where the agreement leaves the child with inadequate support or results in an
uneven distribution of the burdens of parenthood, the court is unlikely to endorse the
substance of the terms of the agreement.
Enforcement of orders
Where __ fails to comply with the maintenance order, the court can seek to enforce this
maintenance order via certain mechanisms.
1) Attachment of earnings order

Under s82(1), 88(1) of the Women’s Charter, the court can make an attachment of earnings
order such that the employer of the payor is required to deduct a stated amount from the salary
to be paid as maintenance to the wife/child.
2) Levy Fine
Under s71(1) of the WC, the court is entitled to levy a fine on __ for breaching his maintenance
order.
3) Garnish Debt
The court could apply a garnishee order such that the debtor has to pay any money owed not to
the creditor but the party who should receive maintenance.
Child is usually considered to be under 21 but in exceptional cases where the child is a
dependent one, s69(5) provides that the child can still receive maintenance.
- Where child is physical/mentally disabled, serving full time NS, undergoing training for
a trade, profession or vocation and not in gainful employment and special
circumstances which justify the making of the order.
Maintenance of Spouse
S69: Maintenance of spouses during marriage

S113: maintenance of spouse upon application of divorce of after divorce
As Prof Leong Wai Kum pointed out in Elements of Family Law in Singapore [(LexisNexis,
2007)] at p 476:
In the former situation, the objective is to provide modest maintenance, namely, to

help her overcome her immediate financial need which may well be the same objective
when ordering maintenance for a dependent child. In the latter situation, maintenance
ordered for a former wife, however, serves the far more ambitious objective of giving
her a fair share of the surplus wealth that had been acquired by the spouses during the
subsistence of the marriage (ATE v ATD at [22]).
Maintenance of Wife:Under s69(1A), the court may order that the husband pay periodic or lump
sum maintenance for the wife.
- In assessing the maintenance to be ordered, the court will consider the applicant’s
financial needs and the df’s ability to meet them.
- In LJ v LK, the court found that the wife’s expenses were inflated and that she
should trim her petrol and parking expenses.
- In Palvit Singh v Sawaran Kaur, the court held that a lower sum of maintenance
be ordered for the wife since the husband had proven he had ‘precious little
afford’ to give her
Maintenance of Incapacitated Husband: Under s69(1A), the court may order that the wife pay
periodic or lump sum maintenance for her incapacitated husband.
- What does incapacitated mean?
- Incapacitated defined in s2: incapacitated by physical or mental ability from
earning a livelihood, unable to maintain himself
General intro para for maintenance after divorce: Pursuant to s113(1)(a) of the WC, the court
can order the husband to pay maintenance to his former wife during the course of any
matrimonial proceedings/Pursuant to s113(1)(b) of the WC, the court can order the husband to
pay maintenance to his former wife when granting a judgement for divorce, judicial separation or
nullity of marriage. The court in ATE v ATD noted that the purpose of ordering such
maintenance is to provide the former wife a ‘fair share of the surplus wealth that had been
acquired by the spouses during the subsistence of the marriage’ (at [22]).
- 2 main goals for maintenance: 1) applicant’s financial needs and 2) ability of df to meet
them (LWK at 13.041). LWK suggests that the goal of ordering maintenance is to help
spouse tide over period of financial distress
Lump sum vs periodic maintenance: Pursuant to s69(2), the court can order maintenance in the
form of a ‘monthly allowance’ or a ‘lump sum’. During the subsistence of the marriage, the court
is less likely to order a lump sum maintenance of the wife or child since the responsibility of the
payor is likely to continue for a certain period of time (LWK at 12.142).
- The court is likely to award a lump sum payment where the spouses are separated and
a ‘clean break’ is desirable to prevent ‘further litigation and acrimony between the
parties’ (AYM v AYL at [18(a)]). (such as in cases of a former husband maintaining a
former wife
- In TNL v TNK, the court awarded the wife a lump sum maintenance of ‘$100,000, which
was approximately the sum obtained using a multiplier of three years, which was more
appropriate’ (at [64]).
- In AYM v AYL, the court held that a lump sum maintenance should be ordered since
there was much acrimony between the parties such that a clean break’ is desirable (at
[19]). Further, given that the parties had moved on with their lives with the Wife and
children moving to Australia and the husband remarrying, the lump sum payment would
‘enable both parties to be able to move on with their lives and avoid further rancorous
interactions’ (at [20]).
AYM v AYL at [18]:

18 The following principles concerning lump sum maintenance payments may be extracted from
the case law:
(a) A lump sum payment allows for a clean break in the marriage and should be availed of
whenever feasible (Lee Puey Hwa v Tay Cheow Seng [1991] 2 SLR(R) 196 (“Lee Puey Hwa”)
at [9]). Such a clean break may help avoid further litigation and acrimony between the
parties (Wan Lai Cheng v Quek Seow Kee [2012] 4 SLR 405 (“Wan Lai Cheng”) at [88]).
(b) A lump sum payment should not be ordered if it would cripple the husband financially
(Lee Puey Hwa at [9]; and Neo Mei Lan Helena v Long Melvin Anthony [2002] 2 SLR(R) 616
(“Neo Mei Lan Helena”)).
(c) A lump sum payment is appropriate where there is reason to believe that defaults in
payments may be likely (Neo Mei Lan Helena; and BCS v BCT [2012] SGDC 338).
Interim maintenance: Pursuant to s113(a) of the WC, the court has the power to order interim
maintenance a ‘sum of maintenance to tide the wife over whilst the divorce and/or ancillary
proceedings are in progress’ (AXM v AXO at [16]). This interim maintenance order operates
only until the ancillary matters have been concluded and the judgement of divorce is made final.
Nominal maintenance: The issue is whether the court should order nominal maintenance in
order to ‘preserve the right of the wife to apply for substantive maintenance should the need
arise in the future’ (ATE v ATD at [27]). While the court in ATE noted that a careful consideration
of the circumstances of the case is necessary since a rejection of such an application precludes
a wife from reapplying for such maintenance should the need arise in the future, the court held
that they cannot and ought not to ‘order nominal maintenance automatically or as a matter of
course’ (at [27]-[28]).
The court is likely to order a nominal maintenance of $1. This nominal maintenance may be
ordered such that the wife can vary the maintenance in the future should she be able to prove a
material change in circumstances (s72).
- Generally, the court will not award nominal maintenance to compensate the wife for ‘the
vicissitudes of life’ since it would make the husband a ‘general insurer of sorts’ (at [29])
and is contrary to the purpose of maintenance of maintaining the wife ‘at a standard that
is, to a reasonable extent, commensurate with the standard of living she had enjoyed
during the marriage’ (at [31]). Therefore, something more than she potential
retrenchment or unemployment in the future must be shown on the facts and
circumstances
- In ATE v ATD, the court held that nominal maintenance should not be awarded since the
wife was seeking such maintenance ‘in the event any misfortune should befall her’ in the
future, which would result in the husband becoming a ‘general insurer for the wife for an
indefinite period of time’. The court noted that the possibility of something occurring in
the future is an insufficient reason for asking for maintenance and ‘something more must
be shown on the facts and circumstances of the particular case to justify the court
awarding the wife concerned nominal maintenance’ (at [43]).
- Rationale for maintenance of former wives: ‘the overarching principle embodied
in s 114(2) is that of financial preservation, which requires the wife to be
maintained at a standard that is, to a reasonable extent, commensurate with the
standard of living she had enjoyed during the marriage’ (at [31]). However, the
award of maintenance ‘is not intended to create life-long dependency by the
former wife on the former husband’ (at [31])
- Maintenance of wife vs incapacitated husband

- Order for children: possible to order maintenance under guardianship of infants act
- Maintenance for parents: maintenance of parents Act
- Maintenance reciprocal enforcement act: where one spouse is overseas, a person
overseas can apply for maintenance from a person here and vice versa
- Women’s charter maintenance is divided into: 1) s69 maintenance (maintenance during
marriage/separation/interim maintenance) and 2) maintenance at divorce
- S69 maintenance: complainant and respondent since application is by way of
magistrate’s complaint
- Maintenance at divorce: 2 forms: interim and final
- Final: ancillary matters hearing we decide whether to order maintenance:
no order, nominal or substantial/sizable sum or lump sum (more common
for the wife and uncommon for the child since the circumstances may
change so if children’s circumstances change, lump sum might not be
feasible)
- Variation: material change of circumstances but statute talks about fraud
and misrepresentation - definition of child is below 21 so children above
21 cannot claim for maintenance as part of the divorce order but they can
claim for maintenance separately under Part 8.
- If they get order for maintenance when they’re under 21, the
maintenance order can go beyond when their 21
- Interim maintenance: upon a divorce being filed, a divorce may take time
and there is a provision for them to file a summons to ask for
maintenance in the meantime: divorce application is filed by way of a writ
--> this is diff from a summons to attend court
- Chapter 4A of the women’s charter: foreign divorce asking for financial
relief: maintenance is a possible order that can be granted here
- Final maintenance is when ancillary matters are being divided; interim starts after
the divorce proceedings and does not start before the judgment
- If parties are still married, no divorce proceedings in progress, then apply under
Part 8.
- Can still apply under Part 8 if divorce proceedings are in progress.
- Final divorce = When ancillary matters are being decided.
- S69 is a quasi criminal process and undergoes process similar to a trial
- for interim & s69 maintenance - Some judges have given nominal – but prof
thinks it is not appropriate because it is meant to tide a person over until the
hearing (usually for interim). $1 is not sufficient.
- S69 for child: if child is under 21, can be ordered that maintenance continues under certain
circumstances
- Variation: material change of circumstances, fraud, misrepresentation, fraud
- S72: change of circumstances or other good cause: one argument is that potentially s72
variation may be broader but prof thinks at the endy of the day there is a limited number
of cases on this
-
- Magistrates complaint procedure: going before magistrate and taking an oath to report something
and then ask the court to do something about it: because it is a simple process, it was decided
this should apply
- Applications for orders of maintenance of married spouse can be used as evidence for
unreasonable behaviour later on
Maintenance:
ANJ v ANK: 12 Given that the Wife was gainfully employed earning a monthly salary of $6,810
and therefore fully capable of maintaining herself, the Judge found that there was no need to award
her a substantial sum of maintenance. He nevertheless awarded her $1 monthly maintenance to leave
the window open for the court to increase the quantum in the future should circumstances justify an
increase.
13 As for the children’s expenses, the Judge ordered the Husband and the Wife to bear 65% and
35% of their expenses respectively. He arrived at this proportion by comparing the Husband’s monthly
income of $12,700 against the Wife’s monthly income of $6,810.

Fam Law Paras

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Sammi’s Fam Law Paras 2022

3 types of separation in marriage:

Ⅱ.Nullity 无效[void 无效, voidable 可撤销]

【Difference：Void and voidable

The effect of rendering the marriage void:

Bars to judgement of nullity 婚姻可撤销的救济限制

Tan Ah Thee --> Fight was about inheritance

Things to consider prior to divorce:

To prove an irretrievable breakdown, __ can rely on the 5 facts under s95(3).

1) Adultery + intolerable to live with

2) Intolerable to live with

3) Desertion for a continuous period of 2 years

4) Separation of 3 years + consent

Just and reasonable to terminate the marriage

force lawfully used in self-defence/the PPO is not necessary (TED at [18]).However,

1) Person must qualify as a family member as defined under s64

Exceptions to family violence:

3) it is necessary for her protection that the order is made

EVAL (evidence issues):

Care and Control

Factors for Custody/Care and Control

6) Parent which is better able to care for the child

7) Whether the parties had help

Relocation: In considering if __’s relocation application should be approved, the fundamental

individual countries. Once an "accession" has been accepted (or between

Types of Access Orders

Division of Matrimonial Assets

Operative date for division of matrimonial assets:

What is a matrimonial asset

S112(10) defines a matrimonial asset to mean:

Examples of matrimonial assets:

2) the power is to be exercised in broad strokes (rather than by misguided attempt at

Types of matrimonial assets as classified by USB v USA:

purposes such as shelter, transport, household use, etc’ - if considered transformed,

Direct contributions 60% 40%

Indirect contributions (both financial and non-financial) 40% 60%

Average percentage contributions 50% 50%

Direct contributions 75% [Step 1] 25% [Step 1]

Average percentage contributions [Step 3] 55% 45%

Notes (use paras above)

Direct contributions 60% 40%

Indirect contributions (both financial and non-financial) 40% 60%

Average percentage contributions 50% 50%

- Issue: how do we define what is considered short?

- Issue: how do we define what is considered long?

Long dual income marriage: Apply ANJ first.

1) Prenuptial agreements relating to maintenance of wife/children

2) Prenuptial/postnuptial agreements relating to custody/care and control of children

3) Prenuptial agreements relating to the division of matrimonial assets

Court drew a distinction between 4 types of marital agreements:

- Summary: 1) interspousal gifts form part of the pool of matrimonial assets; 2)

Exceptional circumstances (s69(5)):

Marital agreement is subject to court scrutiny: see TQ v TR above

1) Attachment of earnings order

S69: Maintenance of spouses during marriage

In the former situation, the objective is to provide modest maintenance, namely, to

AYM v AYL at [18]:

- Maintenance of wife vs incapacitated husband

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