By Philip Loft

4 May 2023
Yemen: Conflict and peace,
2021-2023

Summary
1 Brief history of the conflict
2 The conflict in 2021 and 2022
3 Peace negotiations

commonslibrary.parliament.uk
Number 9327 Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

Image Credits
Sana'a, Capital of Yemen by Ferdinand Reus from Arnhem, Holland - cropped
version of Yemen. Licensed by CC BY-SA 2.0/ image cropped.

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Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

Contents

1 Brief history of the conflict 6

2 The conflict in 2021 and 2022 10

2.1 The Battle for Marib, 2021/22 10

2.2 Human rights violations 13

2.3 Arms sales to Saudi Arabia 15

2.4 The changing US approach to the conflict 16

3 Peace negotiations 18

3.1 The UK as the penholder for Yemen at the UN 18

3.2 Events in 2022 19

3.3 2023 talks 20

3.4 Continuing international sanctions 23

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Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

Summary

Fighting first broke out in Yemen in 2014, and the UN Development

Programme estimates that, to November 2021, 377,000 people have been
killed through direct and indirect means. The World Food Programme has
described Yemen as the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis,” with 24 million
now in need of humanitarian assistance.

The conflict has its origins in 2011, when President Ali Abdullah Saleh was
forced to resign following popular protests. Following an UN-backed
transition negotiated by the Gulf Cooperation Council, President Abd-Rabbu
Mansour Hadi took power in 2012. Despite attempts to negotiate a new
political settlement, conflict broke out in 2014 and the capital, Sana’a, was
captured by Houthi rebels. The following year, a Saudi-led coalition
intervened in support of the internationally recognised Hadi Government.

This briefing provides a summary of key events in the conflict, concerns for
human rights, and ongoing peace negotiations. This includes the April 2022
ceasefire, which expired in October, Hadi handing power to a presidential
council, and hopes for further negotiations in 2023.

Current political control

Yemen is now divided between the Houthi rebels in the north of the country,
which includes the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, and the internationally recognised
Government, which controls much of the south and east of the country. The US
and Saudi Arabia judge the Houthis to receive military support from Iran.

Authority in the south is split between the Government and the Southern
Transitional Council, a UAE-backed separatist group. In 2020, the two agreed
to enter into a coalition Government. However, much of their agreement
remains unimplemented, with a lack of integration between their forces.

In 2021 and 2022, fighting focused on the city of Marib, which is the last
northern stronghold of Yemen’s recognised Government. The Houthis have
also been blamed for several missile and drone attacks on areas within Saudi
Arabia and the UAE. While January 2022 saw the UN warn that participants
were "doubling down” on military options, a ceasefire was agreed in April and
ran to October 2022—see below. Although this has now expired, there has
been no sustained fighting since.

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Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

Human rights abuses and arms sales

The UN, NGOs and UK Government have raised concerns about human rights
abuses committed by all sides in the conflict. These include indiscriminate
shelling of civilians and air strikes against civilian areas.

UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia have proved controversial, as the Saudis have
been accused of committing breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL)
during its military operations in Yemen. The UK Government has argued there
is “not a clear risk” that these UK military exports are used to violate IHL.

Negotiating a political settlement

The UK is the penholder for Yemen at the UN Security Council. Acting as a
penholder means the UK often takes the lead on Council activities relating to
the country and the drafting of relevant resolutions.

Ceasefire in 2022 and further talks in 2023

The first nation-wide ceasefire in the conflict for six years was agreed in April
2022. This partly reflected that both sides were struggling militarily. The truce
was renewed twice but expired in October.

April 2022 also saw Hadi hand power to a presidential council. This was
believed to be the result of pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who
pledged financial support to Yemen’s Government shortly after Hadi
announced his decision. The UK and US have been among those to welcome
the action, but the Houthis argue the government remains illegitimate.

While the ceasefire has expired, there has been no return to high-level
conflict, though some fighting has been reported.

From April 2023, there have been further peace talks between the Houthis, the
internationally recognised government, and Saudi Arabia, brokered by Oman.
A major prisoner swap occurred the same month. Both the UN and UK have
welcomed these initiatives and argue momentum is building for peace.

The decision of Iran and Saudi Arabia to re-establish diplomatic relations in

April 2023 is expected to further facilitate negotiations towards a ceasefire in
Yemen, though some challenges remain between the parties to the conflict.

Yemen’s humanitarian crisis

A summary of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is described in the separate
Library briefing: UK aid and Yemen’s humanitarian crisis (CBP09326). This
also includes details on UK aid spending in the country.

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 Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

1 Brief history of the conflict

Transition from President Saleh to President

Hadi, 2011-2012
The civil war has its immediate origins in 2011, when protests took place
against President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who ruled Yemen from 1990 to 2012. The
Gulf Cooperation Council, 1 backed by the UN, subsequently negotiated a
transition plan for Yemen. President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi was elected
President in 2012 for a two-year transition period. 2

Prior to 1990, Yemen was two states—the northern Yemen Arab Republic,
which Saleh ruled from 1978 before becoming President of a unified Yemen,
and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. 3 Religious
divisions largely paralleled the political borders—Sunnis are the majority in
the south and east, while Shia Muslims are mainly found in the North around
Sana’a.4

Houthi capture of the capital, Sana’a, 2014

Despite attempts from 2012 to resolve political divisions and agree a new
constitution, negotiations between the parties broke down in January 2014.

In September 2014, the Houthis, known officially as Ansar Allah, launched an

attack on the capital Sana’a, capturing it and much of Northern Yemen,
including the Red Sea Port of Hodeidah. 5

The Houthis, who are Shia Muslims, are judged by the US and others including
Saudi Arabia to receive substantial support from Iran. 6

1
Gulf Cooperation Council members are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman and
Bahrain.
2
BBC News, Yemen crisis: Why is there a war?, 19 June 2020. Unless stated, all sources accessed 13
October 2021, 10 February 2022, 7 October 2022 and 4 May 2022.
3
Al-Jazeera, Yemen: Who was Ali Abdullah Saleh?, 5 December 2017
4
European Council on Foreign Relations, Mapping the Yemen conflict, 19 October 2015
5
Reuters, Houthi Rebels take over Yemen’s Heodeidah port: Residents, 15 October 2014
6
Reuters, Iran provides Yemen’s Houthis “lethal” support, US official says, 21 April 2021

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Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

While around 70% of the Yemen population live in areas controlled by the
Houthis, the Government originally led by Hadi remains the internationally
recognised government of Yemen, being endorsed in a UN Resolution of 2015. 7

Entry of Saudi-led coalition, 2015

In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition, which included Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar,
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), intervened in support of the Hadi
Government. The Saudis, like most of the Gulf states that joined the coalition,
are Sunni-majority countries and sought to reduce Iranian influence. 8

The Saudi-led coalition have carried out successive air strikes against Houthi-
controlled areas, which has resulted in calls to suspend the sale of arms to
the country (see section 2.4).

From mid-2019, direct Saudi Arabian air strikes in Yemen reduced—from

around 7,000 in 2015 to 1,200 in 2019. 9 In June 2021, air raids were
temporarily halted in an attempt to encourage peace talks. 10

Coalition restrictions on sea and air ports

Since 2015, Saudi ships and aircraft have been patrolling the Red Sea to
intercept Iranian ships delivering arms to the Houthi rebels. This has
impacted on the delivery of essential supplies to Yemen.

In 2021, this was been judged by ACAPS, an independent NGO, as leading to

increases in already high fuel prices. 11 However the delivery of goods has also
been slowed by other factors, such as the requirement for ships to receive
approval from the recognised Government before docking and the lack of
infrastructure across Yemen. 12

In 2017, the Saudi-led coalition temporarily closed access to all Yemen’s entry
points in response to a missile strike on Saudi’s Riyadh airport by Houthi
forces—a position criticised by the UN who urged the blockade to be fully
lifted in response.13 The UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, also called for the

7
UN Resolution 2216 (2015); ACAPS, Terrorist designation of Ansar Allah, 14 January 2021
8
BBC News, Sunnis and Shia in the Middle East, 19 December 2013
9
Carnegie Middle East Center, What does Biden’s Yemen policy mean for Saudi Arabia?, 12 February
2021
10
Al-Jazeera, Yemen air raids halted to boost peace efforts: Saudi-led forces, 10 June 2021
11
Reuters, In blocking arms to Yemen, Saudi Arabia squeezes a starving population, 11 October 2017;
ACAPS, Yemen: Effects of the fuel embargo at Al Hodei port […], 17 August 2021
12
Vox, “It’s not a blockade”: US says Saudi Arabia isn’t to blame for Yemen’s fuel shortage, 14 April 2021
13
UN, Yemen: As threat of famine looms, UN urges Saudi0led coalition to fully lift blockade of Read Sea
ports, 2 December 2017

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Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

lifting of restrictions on the flow of commercial supplies, as did President

Trump. 14

Data collected by UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen

(UNVIM), which facilities the free flow of commercial vessel to certain Yemeni
ports, shows that the amount of fuel and food arriving into Yemen in 2020 was
higher than in 2018, though fuel was only around 75% of that delivered in
2019. The UNVIM also undertakes inspections of vessels and issues
clearances. 15

Human Rights Watch (HRW) have argued the Saudi-led coalition’s restrictions
threaten the delivery of aid. 16 Some restrictions on access have been eased
since 2022—see section 3, below.

Weakening of Saudi coalition, 2017-2019

The Saudi coalition has weakened since it first intervened. In 2017, Qatar was
expelled from the coalition, 17 and in 2019 the UAE announced most of its
forces would be withdrawn from the country. 18

The UAE and Saudi Arabia have not always acted as one in Yemen—in the
same year, the UAE conducted airstrikes against Hadi forces in support of
their separatist allies, the Southern Transitional Council (STC). 19 Analysts cite
several factors for the UAE’s withdrawal including support for the Southern
separatists, and considering the war unwinnable. 20

Not a two-sided war

There are many participants in addition to the Houthi rebels and Government
forces including the separatist STC, backed by the UAE. Following clashes
between the STC and Hadi Government in 2018 and 2019, a coalition
government was formed in 2020. 21

14
Number Ten, PM visit to Saudi Arabia: 29 November 2017, 30 November 2017; CNN, Trump calls on
Saudi Arabia to end Yemen blockade, 6 December 2017
15
UNVIM for Yemen, Monthly situation analysis, August 2021
16
HRW, Yemen: Coalition blockade imperils civilians, 7 December 2017
17
BBC News, Qatar row: Saudi and Egypt among countries to cut Doha links, 5 June 2017
18
Middle East Institute, The UAE drawdown in Yemen is a welcome step […], 11 July 2019
19
Reuters, UAE carries out air strikes against Yemen Government forces to support separatists, 29
August 2019
20
Al-Jazeera, Saudi-UAE: Despite turmoil geopolitical goals remain steadfast, 16 July 2021
21
Al-Monitor, Yemeni government, southern separatists agree to government formation, 18 December
2020; Reuters, Yemen government says southern separatists staged coup in Aden, 10 August 2019; Al-
Jazeera, Yemen: What is the STC?, 26 April 2020; Middle East Institute, The UAE may have withdrawn
from Yemen, but its influence remains strong, 25 February 2020

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Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

While a power-sharing Government is in place, many STC forces continue to

operate separately and dispute control of Aden (the temporary capital of the
Republic of Yemen Government). 22

During the 2022 ceasefire (April to October) there were some clashes between
forces of the coalition government.23

Al-Qaeda is also present, as are various local militias and tribal groups. In
February 2020, the US announced it had killed the leader of Al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, Qassim al-Rimi. 24 The group appears to have become less
active in recent years, though analysts warn that the lack of a strong state in
Yemen provides a space for recovery. 25 There were some attacks by Al-Qaeda
in September 2022. 26

Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) in Yemen first emerged in 2014
but has recently maintained a low profile following the death of its leaders. 27

2022: Hadi stands down

As set out in section 3, in April 2022 a ceasefire was agreed and Hadi handed
power to a presidential council (this does not include the Houthis).

22
Reuters, Fighting between separatist brigades kills two in Yemen’s Aden—sources, 25 June 2021;
Middle East Institute, The Riyadh Agreement: Yemen’s new cabinet and what remains to be done, 1
February 2021
23
Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, Showdown in Shabwa shakes government, August 2022
24
BBC News, Yemen Al-Qaeda leader al-Raymi killed by US strike, 7 February 2020
25
ACLED, The wartime transformation of AQAP in Yemen, 14 December 2020; Elisabeth Kendall for
Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, Twenty years after 9/11: The Jihadi threat in the Arabian
Peninsula, September 2021
26
Al-Jazeera, Deadly Al-Qaeda attack targets Yemen’s southern separatists, 6 September 2022
27
UN Security Council, Letter dated 21 January 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council […], 3
February 2021, para B. 21

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 Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

2 The conflict in 2021 and 2022

2.1 The Battle for Marib, 2021/22

The Houthi rebels currently hold much of north and western Yemen, including
the capital Sana’a.28 The internationally recognised Government shares
control over the south and centre of Yemen with the STC.

Notes: Situation as of 21 November 2021—zones of control were largely unchanged a year later. “IRG” stands for
internationally Recognized Government of Yemen, i.e. that previously led by Hadi. “DFA” is a reference to the
Houthi Group. STC= Southern Transitional Council, AQAP=Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Copyright: Yemen: Civil unrest and worsening humanitarian situation in southern governorates, 29 November 2021
from ACAPS. Licensed by CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.

In February 2021, the Houthis escalated their attacks on the city of Marib,
which is the last northern stronghold of the internationally recognised

28
Council on Foreign Relations, Yemen’s tragedy: War, stalemate, and suffering, 5 February 2021

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Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

Government (being previously part of the North Yemen state prior to 1990).
The battle has been long-lasting.

From September 2021, fighting intensified in the region, with the Houthis
making significant progress. 29 However, in January 2022 the STC and Hadi
Government successfully counter-attacked and recaptured much of the
territory lost in 2021. 30

The number of casualties in Marib remain uncertain. The UN has said it

expected January 2022 to “shatter records” for the number of civilian
causalities in the country. 31 The International Organization for Migration
estimates that 100,000 people in Marib were displaced by conflict in 2021. 32

Marib is important to both sites—it is considered the last stronghold of the

internationally recognised Government in northern Yemen and holding it
would strengthen the position of either side in any future negotiations. 33

Other fronts: Missiles and air raids

The Houthis have launched, or been blamed for, several missile and drone
strikes. In August 2021, they launched a strike against Al-Anad Air Base in the
Government-held Lanhij province. In September, missile attacks on
warehouses storing humanitarian supplies in Mocha on the Red Sea were also
blamed on the Houthis. 34 These attacks came amid international efforts to
secure a ceasefire and restore peace negotiations. 35

Escalation in 2022 saw a marked use of airstrikes by Saudi-led coalition

forces, including against Sana’a. In January, an attack which hit a prison
killed at least 70 people, though the coalition denied responsibility. The UN
condemned the incident and called for de-escalation. 36 The coalition has
subsequently announced an investigation. 37

Saudi-led air raids on Sana’a also caused the delivery of UN aid to the city to
be halted in December. 38

29
ABC News, Fighting in Yemen’s central province kills 28 in one day, 2 September 2021; Reuters, Houthis
rally in north Yemen as their fighters push south, 21 September 2021
30
Washington Institute, Breaking point: Consolidating Houthi military setbacks in Yemen, 19 January
2022
31
UN, January will “almost certainly” shatter records for casualties in Yemen, 25 January 2022,
32
IOM, Marib response. Flash update, 20 November 2021, accessed 10 February 2022
33
Fikra Forum, The battle for Marib: The challenge of ending a stalemate war, 9 July 2021
34
ABC News, Yemeni officials say Houthi attack destroy aid warehouses, 11 September 2021
35
Al-Jazeera, Dozens killed in Houthi attack on Yemen’s largest base, 29 August 2021
36
Al-Jazeera, Yemen: UN urges investigation into Saudi-led coalition air raids, 22 January 2022
37
France 24, Saudi-led coalition says probing deadly prison attack, 27 January 2022
38
France 24, Saudi-led coalition strikes halt UN aid flights to Yemen’s capital, 21 December 2021,

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Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

Attacks on sites in Saudi Arabia

The Houthis have used missiles and drones to attack several sites in Saudi
Arabia, including oil refineries and military installations. The US estimates
there were 240 such attacks from January to August 2021. 39

On 31 August 2021, a Houthi attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abha airport wounded

eight people.40 On 5 September, the Saudis intercepted three ballistic missiles
fired into the country, 41 and December saw further missiles intercepted. 42 A
further attack against Abha airport in February 2022 wounded 12.43

Attacks on the UAE, 2022

In January and February 2022, the Houthis stepped up attacks against the
UAE. This included the seizure of an UAE-flagged ship in January and missile
and drone strikes against the country. 44 These are seen as a response to the
losses in Marib experienced by Houthi forces in January. 45 The UAE, which
withdrew forces from the country in 2019, may now choose to scale-up its
involvement.

Attacks against Abu Dhabi killed three on 17 January and destroyed fuel
facilities. 46 Seven days later, more ballistic missiles were intercepted by the
UAE. 47

In February the UAE was also subject to drone strikes, potentially from
Iranian-aligned militias in Iraq. Analysts see these attacks as a potential
message by Iran against the normalisation of diplomatic ties between Israel
and the UAE. 48

These attacks have been condemned by the UN and powers including the US
and UK. 49 The UK believes the weapons used against the UAE originate in
Iran. 50

39
US Department of State, Condemning the recent Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, 31 August 2021
40
Al-Jazeera, Several wounded in a drone attack on Saudi airport: Coalition, 31 August 2021
41
Reuters, Saudis intercept Houthi missile and drones aimed at oil region, 5 September 2021
42
Al-Monitor, Saudi Arabia intercepts ballistic missile over Riyadh, 6 December 2021
43
Al-Jazeera, Shrapnel wounds 12 as Saudi defences blow up drone near airport, 10 February 2022,
44
Reuters, Houthis seize “hostile” ship off Yemen that Saudis say carried medical equipment, 3 January
2022
45
Al-Jazeera, Why did the Houthis attack the UAE? Everything you need to know, 31 January 2022
46
Al-Jazeera, UAE pledges to retaliate after three killed in Houthi attacks, 17 January 2022
47
AL-Monitor, UAE intercepts Houthi ballistic missile attack, 24 January 2022
48
Al-Jazeera, Iraqi militia attack on UAE a “message from Iran,” 4 February 2022
49
UN, Guterres condemns attack on Abu Dhabi airport and oil facility, 17 January 2022; US State
Department, Attacks in Abu Dhabi, 17 January 2022; PQ 111592 [Ansar Allah], 28 January 2022
50
PQ 117743 [UAE: Ansar Allah], 9 February 2022

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 Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

The US Al Dhafra airbase is believed to be one of the sites targeted by missile

attacks. In response to the attacks, the US has deployed additional military
forces to the UAE. 51 The Biden Administration has also approved the sale of
missile defences to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 52

2.2 Human rights violations

In September 2021, the UN Group of Experts on Yemen published a report on

the human rights abuses committed by the Governments of Yemen, Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, the STC, and the Houthi rebels. 53

The independent panel, appointed by the UN, stressed that “all parties” were
responsible for violations, and stated that “many […] may amount to
international crimes.” It cited as examples Saudi-led airstrikes,
“indiscriminate” shelling of civilians by the Houthis, Yemen Government and
the Saudi-led coalition, restrictions on humanitarian access, arbitrary
detention, and gender-based violence.

It urged the end to the supply of arms by third parties—section 2.3

summarises debates over whether to sell arms to Saudi Arabia in the UK and
US. 54

In response to the committee’s report in September 2021, the UK Government

urged all the parties involved to investigate the allegations and committed to
work with the UN to pursue a political end to the conflict. 55

UN human rights body shut down, October 2021

In October, the UN Human Rights Council voted to shut down the body’s
mandate to investigate war crimes in Yemen. Russia and Bahrain were
amongst the countries who voted against the renewal of the mandate. 56
Rights activists have accused Saudi Arabia of lobbying against the resolution.
The Kingdom is not a member of the Human Rights Council. 57

51
Al-Monitor, US to deploy fighter jets, Navy destroyers after missile attacks, 2 February 2022
52
Al-Monitor, US approves $4.2 billion F-16 sale to Jordan, air defence systems to the Gulf, 4 February
2022
53
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on
Yemen, Situation on human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since 2014, 10 September
2021
54
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on
Yemen, Situation on human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since 2014, 10 September
2021, p18
55
FCDO, UN Human Rights Council 48 […], 14 September 2021
56
Al-Monitor, UN vote shuts down Yemen war crimes investigations, 8 October 2021
57
Reuters, Saudi lobbying jeopardises UN Yemen war crimes probe, activists say, 6 October 2021

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Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

The UN Group of Experts on Yemen said it was a “major setback for all victims
who have suffered serious violations” during the conflict. 58

In February 2022, the Norwegian Refugee Council called for its reinstating,
citing the rising number of civilian casualties reported since monitoring
ended. The Civilian Impact Monitoring Project reports civilian casualties
numbered 823 in the four months to October 2021 and increased to 1,535 in the
four months since. 59

UK Government concerns for human rights

Yemen is the one of the UK’s “priority countries” for human rights.

The Government has said the situation in the country remains “deeply
concerning,” and recent UK reports on Yemen have stressed abuses such as
arbitrary arrests, the mistreatment of journalists, sexual violence against
women and girls, and the persecution of religious minorities.60

The UK has also condemned the use of child soldiers in the conflict. The UN
estimates that the year to June 2021 saw 686 children recruited. 61

The Government has said it regularly raises the importance of complying with
international humanitarian law with the Saudi-led coalition, including to
request investigations into alleged incidents. 62

The Government has recently raised concerns with Saudi Arabia regarding the
expelling of migrants from the Kingdom to Yemen. 63 HRW has reported
Yemeni workers are at risk of mass forced returns following new Saudi
legislation limiting the proportion of workers businesses may have from
certain nationalities, including Yemeni nationals. 64

2 Further reading on human rights in Yemen

• UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen,
Situation of human rights in Yemen […] since 2014, September 2021
• Human Rights Watch, Yemen: Key human rights concerns for UN envoy, 12
September 2021
• Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), Human rights and
democracy reports, 2003-2021

58
UN OCHA, Statement by Group of Experts on Yemen […], 8 October 2021
59
Norwegian Refugee Council, Yemen: Civilian causalities double since end of human rights monitoring,
10 February 2022
60
FCDO, Human rights priority countries: Ministerial statement, January to June 2020, 20 November
2020
61
FCDO, Human rights and democracy report 2020, July 2021, pp67-8
62
PQ 31323 [Yemen: Armed conflict], 15 July 2021
63
PQ 50738 [Yemen: Deportation], 21 September 2021
64
HRW, Saudi Arabia: Yemeni workers at risk of mass forced returns, 31 August 2021

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 Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

• US State Department, 2021 report on religious freedom: Yemen, June 2021

• US State Department, 2022 country reports on human rights practices:
Yemen, March 2023
• Amnesty International, Yemen country page, 2022/23
• UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen,
Situation of human rights in Yemen […] since 2014, September 2020

2.3 Arms sales to Saudi Arabia

From 2010 to 2019, around 19% of arms imports to Saudi Arabia came from
the UK, and around 60% from the US. 65 These have proved controversial
because of Saudi Arabia’s human rights record and the accusation that UK-
built and licenced arms have been used in Yemen by Saudi forces.

According to the Yemen Data Project, since 2015 the Saudi-led coalition has
conducted nearly 24,700 air raids which have resulted in around 19,200
civilian casualties. 66 Using the data from the project, in August 2020 Oxfam
estimated that medical and water infrastructure had been hit almost 200
times since the air raids began in 2015. 67

Pause of US arms sales to Saudi Arabia

In January 2021, the Biden Administration announced a pause on arms sales
to Saudi Arabia in order to conduct a review of such sales. 68 Reuters has
reported only those arms considered “defensive” may be sold. 69 The
Administration announced an intention to sell around $500 million in
maintenance services to Saudi Arabia in September 2021. 70

Under the Biden Administration, the US has sought to reset its relations with
Saudi Arabia, releasing intelligence linking the country, including Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
In September, it was reported the US removed the majority of its missile
defence systems from Saudi Arabia.71 However, the US retains a significant
military presence in the Gulf and has participated in exercises with the Saudi
military in 2021. 72

65
Commons Library, UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia: Q&A
66
Yemen Data Project, Homepage, accessed 10 February 2022
67
Oxfam, One air raid every ten days on hospitals, clinics, wells, and water tanks […], 18 August 2020
68
CNN, Biden Administration pauses arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, 27 January 2021
69
Reuters, Biden team considering a halt to “offensive” arms sales for Saudis, 26 February 2021
70
Al-Monitor, US military sale to Saudi Ariba moves ahead, 17 September 2021
71
Al-Jazeera, US pulls missile defences in Saudi Arabia amid Yemen attacks, 11 September 2021
72
Commons Library, The Gulf in 2021, Section 4.

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 Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

UK Government position
In response to requests that the UK Government reconsiders its position on
arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the Government states that it assesses arms sales
on a case-by-case basis against arms export criteria. 73

In July 2020 the then-International Trade Secretary, Liz Truss, said the
Government had concluded there was “not a clear risk” that the export of
arms and equipment to Saudi Arabia might be used to commit a serious
violation of international humanitarian law.74

In April 2021, the Campaign Against Arms Trade group was given permission
to bring a judicial review of the Government’s decision to recommence arms
sales to Saudi Arabia the previous July. 75

More information can be found in the Library Briefing UK arms exports to

Saudi Arabia: Q&A.

2.4 The changing US approach to the conflict

Obama administration
In 2015, the Obama Administration backed the Saudi-led coalition as a means
of restoring the then Hadi-led Government and supported the accompanying
UN Security Council Resolution 2216 calling for the Houthis to withdraw and
disarm.76

However, the Administration became more critical over time following

criticism of Saudi operations by human rights organisations and, in 2016,
halted some arms sales to the country. 77

Trump administration
While President Trump restored arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Congressional
opinion during his Presidency suggests American support for the war has
waned. In 2019, the Democrat-controlled House and Republican-controlled
Senate both voted to end American military assistance for Saudi Arabia in
Yemen. 78 President Trump successfully vetoed the Resolution. 79

73
PQ 156485 [Yemen: Arms sales], 2 March 2021
74
HCWS339 Trade Update, 7 July 2020
75
The Guardian, High court to hear legal battle over UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia, 22 April 2021
76
Susan Alamer for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Biden and the war in Yemen, 14 April
2021
77
Reuters, US to halt some arms sales to Saudi, citing civilian deaths in Yemen campaigns, 13 December
2016
78
The Guardian, Yemen War: Congress votes to end US military assistance to Saudi Arabia, 4 April 2019
79
Brookings Institute, Where Trump’s vote leaves the Yemen resolution, 18 April 2019

16 Commons Library Research Briefing, 4 May 2023

Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

Biden administration
In February 2021, President Biden announced the US would stop supporting
offensive operations in Yemen in support of the Saudi-led coalition, including
ending arm sales. He also said the war “has to end” and appointed a new
Special Envoy, Tim Lenderking, to achieve this.80

Under the Biden Administration, the United States has also removed the
Houthis from the State Department’s foreign terrorist organisation list, which
had been put in place under the Trump Administration. 81 The UN said the
designation of the Houthis as terrorists had threatened to disrupt the flow of
aid and commercial commodities into Yemen. 82

The attacks on the UAE by the Houthis in January 2022 ignited debate on
whether they should be redesignated as a terrorist group 83—something some
NGOs continue to oppose for the reasons stated in the above paragraph.84

80
Carnegie middle East Center, What does Biden’s Yemen policy mean for Saudi Arabia?, 12 February
2021; White House, Remarks by President Biden on America’s place in the world, 4 February 2021
81
US Department of State, Revocation of the terrorist designations of Ansar Allah, 12 February 2021
82
UN, The decision to designate the Houthis (Ansar Allah) a foreign terrorist organisation […], 2
February 2021
83
Al-Jazeera, President Biden mulling re-designating Houthis as “terrorist” group, 20 January 2022,
84
Al-Jazeera, Rights groups warn Biden against re-backlisting Yemen’s Houthis, 29 January 2022

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 Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

3 Peace negotiations

Stockholm agreement, 2018

Agreed in Sweden in 2018, the Stockholm agreement is an accord between the
parties to the conflict in Yemen, which was endorsed by the UN. It was the first
agreement between the Hadi Government and Houthi forces. It had three
elements:
1. An agreement on the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah,
Salif and Ras Issa. At its signing, an attack on the city of Hodeidah
appeared imminent, while most of Yemen’s food and medicine imports
came via these ports. The agreement established a ceasefire
surrounding the city and the ports.
2. An executive mechanism on activating the prisoner exchange
agreement, via the UN and international Committee of the Red Cross.
3. A statement of understanding on Taïz, which was then besieged.
The agreement was not fully implemented, and Taiz was among the areas to
see continued conflict. However, it is seen as a significant moment where
those involved in the conflict were willing to enter into negotiations. 85

3.1 The UK as the penholder for Yemen at the UN

At the UN Security Council, the UK acts as the penholder for Yemen. This
means the UK often takes the lead on Council activities relating to the country
and the drafting of relevant resolutions.

This has included draft resolutions to call for a ceasefire following the
Stockholm talks in 2018, and to renew financial and travel ban sanctions in
February 2021. 86

85
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, A year after the Stockholm
agreement: where are we now?, December 2019 and Middle East Institute, Yemen’s Stockholm
agreement one year on, 22 January 2020. Sources accessed 4 May 2022 and 4 May 2023.
86
FCDO, Foreign Secretary welcomes adoption of new UN Security Council Resolution on Yemen peace
process, 21 December 2018; Security Council Report, Security Council Resolution on Yemen, 25
February 2021.

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 Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

In July 2021, the then Minister for North Africa and the Middle East, James
Cleverly, said the Government was engaging “constructively” with the Saudis
and Government of Yemen, but that it had “difficulty engaging meaningfully”
with the Houthis. 87

In 2022, the UK Government said it was willing to facilitate further talks, to

use its penholder role to push for a new UN resolution for a comprehensive
peace plan when required, and to support more widely UN-led negotiations. 88

During 2023, the Minister for the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia,
Lord Ahmad, has engaged directly with the foreign minister of Yemen and UN
officials. 89

The UK welcomed the formation of the Presidential Leadership Council in April

2022 and called for it to work quickly towards negotiations with the Houthis. 90
The Government has also welcomed peace talks in 2023 (see section 3.3).

3.2 Events in 2022

Ceasefire, April to October 2022

In April 2022, following UN-led negotiations, the first nation-wide truce in six
years came into force. All air and ground attacks from within and outside
Yemen were halted for an initial period of two months.

Analysts saw the decision as a reflection of neither side making significant

recent progress: Houthi attacks in Marib had stalled and attacks on the UAE
and Saudi Arabia were high in early 2022. 91

The ceasefire was renewed twice but expired in October 2022. The UN says the
ceasefire led to a reduction in civilian casualties and allowed the docking of
fuel ships. 92

Although the ceasefire was not extended, the UN said talks in late 2022 had
been “constructive.” 93 Some elements the ceasefire contained, such as
allowing commercial flights between Sana’a and Jordan and fuel ships
entering the city of Hodeidah, have continued into 2023. 94

87
HC Deb, 20 July 2021, c794
88
HC Deb, 3 November 2022; c463WH
89
HL Deb, 20 April 2023, c768
90
FCDO, The truce in Yemen provides an opportunity that must be seized, 14 April 2022.
91
CNN, What Yemen’s first nationwide truce in 6 years means for the world’s worst humanitarian crisis,
6 April 2022
92
UN, Yemen truce renewed for another two months, 2 August 2022
93
UN Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Statement from the UN envoy, 2
October 2022
94
UN, Diplomacy in Yemen reaches new pitch following year of relative calm, Security Council hears, 15
March 2023

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 Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

The UK Government expressed regret at the expiry of the ceasefire and called
on the Houthis to engage constructively with the UN. 95

Hadi stands down, April 2023

In April 2022, Hadi also permanently handed executive power to a
Presidential Leadership Council.

This was likely to reflect pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who
pledged US$3 billion in financial aid following the announcement, and be an
attempt to broaden the political base of Yemen’s internationally recognised
government. 96 The UK and US also backed Hadi’s decision. 97

The Houthis have previously called for Hadi to stand down but rejected the
Council as illegitimate. Both sides continue to honour the Ramadan ceasefire,
though there have been some instances of local violence. 98

Whether the new Council can negotiate a peace will partly be dependent on
whether the political coalition holds, the attitudes of foreign actors (notably
the Gulf states), and ability to address longer-standing challenges for
negotiation—see section 3.3, below.

3.3 2023 talks

Oman-facilitated talks, 2023

From April 2023, peace talks between the Houthis, the internationally
recognised government, and Saudi Arabia, brokered by Oman, have been
held. 99

The news-agency Reuters reports these talks are centred on a new ceasefire,
full opening of Houthi-controlled ports and Sana’a airport, the payment of
public sector wages, rebuilding, and withdrawal of all foreign forces from the
country. 100

A major prisoner swap, seen as a confidence-building measure between the

parties, also took place in April. 101

95
FCDO, Truce in Yemen: Foreign Secretary’s statement, 1 October 2022
96
International Crisis Group, Behind the Yemen truce and presidential council announcements, 8 April
2022
97
UN Security Council, Truce offers chance to steer Yemen in “new direction,” special representative
tells security council, 14 April 2022
98
Arab Gulf States in Washington, Yemen’s presidential council launches a new era, 28 April 2022
99
Al-Jazeera, Saudi, Omani envoys hold peace talks with Houthi leaders in Yemen, 9 April 2023
100
Reuters, Houthi official says Yemen peace talks made progress, 14 April 2023
101
BBC News, Yemen war: Major prisoner swap raises hopes, 14 April 2023

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Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

Analysts have argued that the decision of Iran and Saudi Arabia to re-
establish- diplomatic relations in April 2023, having suspended them in 2016,
is likely to further facilitate negotiations for Yemen. 102

Both the United Nations and United Kingdom have welcomed these initiatives
and argue momentum is building for peace. 103 In April, the UK Government
said the Omani-brokered talks and prisoner exchange both represent
progress towards a formal cease-fire, and a potential end to the conflict. 104

Challenges to a renewed agreement

Both sides blamed one another for allowing the 2022 agreement to expire.
Several challenges to establishing a new ceasefire or permanent settlement
have been identified by analysts. 105

Security guarantees
Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE are likely to seek security reassurances from
the Houthis, including a pledge to stop missile and drone attacks, and to
reduce its engagement with Iran, which they see as a strategic competitor in
the region, in return for withdrawing direct military assistance. 106

The restoring of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran suggest
that some regional tensions are cooling. 107

The Houthis wish to see the full and unrestricted opening of Sana’a airport
In the past, Houthi rebels have refused to participate in wider talks until
Saudi-led coalition restrictions on aid and sea ports are lifted. These include
Sana’a’s airport and Hodeidah’s port. Most of Yemen’s food is imported via
the port. 108

The ceasefire in April 2022 did not resolve this issue: It did not allow for the
unconditional opening of Sana’a’s airport but instead allowed a limited
number of flights. 109

102
European Council on Foreign Relations, Internalising peace: How to build on Saudi-Iranian de-
escalation for a settlement in Yemen, 19 April 2023
103
UN, Diplomacy in Yemen reaches new pitch following year of relative calm, Security Council hears, 15
March 2023
104
British Embassy Sana’a, UK statement on developments in Yemen, 18 April 2023
105
The below list is taken from Al-Jazeera, Does the end of Yemen’s truce mean return to full-blown
fighting?, 3 October 2022; International Crisis Group, A moment of truth for Yemen’s truce, 30
September 2022
106
International Crisis Group, How Huthi-Saudi negotiations will make or break Yemen, 29 December
2022
107
See Commons Library, Iran’s influence in the Middle East, section 4.2
108
Reuters, End of the Yemen quagmire? Saudi-led coalition, Houthis near peace deal, 21 June 2021
109
The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Ramadan cease-fire in Yemen, 4 April 2022

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Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

The payment of public servant salaries

Many public servants have not been paid in Houthi-controlled areas.

However, there is disagreement over whether to meet the costs for those
hired after the Houthis took control, the responsibility of the Houthis to pay
their own officials, and how to ensure any funding does not directly benefit
the group. 110

Divisions within the coalition government

The Riyadh Agreement, which was signed between the STC and Republic of
Yemen Government in 2019, has experienced challenges to its
implementation, including appointing officials acceptable to both parties.
This has threatened the operation of effective government in the south of
Yemen and may potentially do the same to any peace agreement. 111

Potential amending of past UN resolutions

An additional stumbling block may be the need for the UN Security Council to
revisit the 2015 resolution which provides the framework for negotiations.
Resolution 2216 called for the restoration of the Hadi Government, withdrawal
of Houthi forces from all areas seized, and for the relinquishing of arms by
Government opponents. 112

The Houthis were not the only group challenging the Hadi Government’s
influence. The STC also hold considerable power, including over the
temporary capital, Aden, which they captured from the Hadi Government in
2019. 113

Some analysts argue the UN Resolution needs to be revisited to increase

incentives for the Houthis to enter negotiations, such as by removing the
demand for their withdrawal to their pre-2014 positions, and to recognise the
multiple actors, such as the STC, that the UN must now engage with. 114

The UK Government, as penholder at the UN Security Council for Yemen, has

said it stands ready to replace UN Resolution 2216 “when there is a real
consensus on a political settlement.”115

110
Middle East Institute, The dilemma of public sector salary payments in Yemen, 23 February 2023
111
Middle East Institute, Southern inclusivity is key to Yemen’s chances for lasting peace, 31 August 2021
112
UN, Security Council demands end to Yemen violence […], 14 April 2015
113
UN Security Council, Letter dated 22 January 2021 from the panel of experts on Yemen addressed to
the President of the Security Council, 25 January 2021, pp15-20; Crisis Group, Ten challenges for the
UN in 2021-2022, 13 September 2021
114
The New Humanitarian, Give peace a chance in Yemen, 16 April 2018; Crisis Group, The international
approach to the Yemen war: Time for a change?, 23 October 2020; Brookings Institute, Getting
Yemen’s Houthis to “yes” on a ceasefire, 1 March 2021; Helen Lackner for The European Council on
Foreign Relations, Yemen’s seven years of war: How the new UN envoy can lay foundations for peace,
6 September 2021
115
HC Deb, 3 November 2022, c463WH

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 Yemen: Conflict and peace, 2021-2023

3.4 Continuing international sanctions

Since April 2015, a targeted arms embargo against the Houthi group has been
in place.

Financial and travel ban sanctions are also in place against those deemed to
have undermined the peace process or have committed human rights
abuses. 116

Some separate sanctions are also in place. For example, in February 2022 the
US imposed sanctions against an international network that funds the
Houthis. 117

In November 2021, the UN Security Council, including the UK and US, applied
sanctions against some Houthi military leaders, stating they had
orchestrated cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia, circumvented the
UN arms embargo, and led Houthi offensives throughout Yemen. 118

116
UN Security Council, Security Council renews arms embargo, travel ban, asset freeze imposed on
those threatening peace in Yemen, 28 February 2022, accessed 4 May 2022
117
VOA, US sanctions target finance network for Yemen’s Houthis, 23 February 2022,
118
FCDO, Sanctions against Houthi military leaders: UK statement, 11 November 2021 and Al-Jazeera, UN
sanctions three Houthis over Marib offensive, Saudi attacks, 11 November 2021,

23 Commons Library Research Briefing, 4 May 2023

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