2023 Reviewer in Constitutional Law I

Victoria V. Loanzon

I. Preliminary Concepts

A. Nature of the Constitution

Question: What is a constitution?

Answer: The term constitution may be defined as the body of rules and maxims in
accordance
with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised (Thomas Cooley, LL.D.).

Question: What is the doctrine of constitutional supremacy?

Answer: Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or
by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null
and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount, and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997).

Question: When President Aquino declared a revolutionary government, did the

Filipinos continue to enjoy the protection of their rights?
Answer: In the absence of a Constitution, citizens remain to be protected by the
international agreements which the revolutionary government did not repudiate upon
accession to power. The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de
jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State “to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.” Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the
revolutionary government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.” The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Philippines
is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his property.” Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally
binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State. The revolutionary government is also obligated under international law to observe
the rights of individuals under the Declaration (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
104768, July 21, 2003).

1. Parts of the Constitution

Question: What are the parts of the 1987 Constitution?

Answer: The parts of the 1987 Constitution are:
(a) Constitution of Government
(b) Constitution of Liberty
(c) Constitution of Sovereignty

Question: May parties to a case invoke the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures during the interregnum when President Aquino declared a
revolutionary government?
Answer: While the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Bill
of Rights of the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the revolutionary
government, the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights and the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect. The
revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the

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interregnum. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003)

2. Manner of Interpretation (self-executing and non-self-executing provisions)

Question: What are the ways by which the provisions of the Constitution may be
interpreted?
Answer: The provisions of the Constitution may be interpreted in the following manner:
(a) Verba legis (“plain meaning rule”) – Wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed.
(b) Ratio legis est anima (“intention rule”) – Where there is ambiguity, the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.
(c) Ut magis valeat quam pereat –(“totality rule”) - The Constitution is to be interpreted as
a whole.

Cases:
● Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov 10, 2003: The one-year
in filing impeachment cases applies because the second complaint filed against
Chief Justice Davide was filed on the 4th month after the first impeachment
complaint was dismissed (Section 2(5), Article XI).

● Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice,

G.R. No. 193459, March 08, 2011: The interpretation of initiation of an
impeachment complaint must follow the twin process of filing then the
determination of sufficiency in form and substance and the subsequent action of
referral to the plenary body for action (Section 3(1) to (4), Article XI). The adoption
of the rules of procedure in any impeachment proceeding is the sole prerogative
of Congress (Section 3(8), Article XI).

● Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 and 209251, November 13, 2013, Perlas
Bernabe, J: The Court cannot rule on the issue of violation of political dynasty
because there is a need for an enabling law to define political dynasty (Section 26,
Article II).

Question: What is a self-executing provision?

Answer: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article
II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation,
or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed
or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of
its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997).

Question: What are the rules governing self-executing and non-self-executing provisions
of the Constitution?
Answer: The following rules govern –
General rule: The provisions of the Constitution are self-executing, i.e., it does not need
Congressional action to be a source of a right or a power.
Exception: Except those provisions in Articles II, XIII, and XIV, these provisions have been
jurisprudentially declared as non-self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Hence,
they need further congressional action to be a source of a power or a right or an
obligation.
Exception to the Exception: Those provisions in Articles II, XIII, and XIV which are complete
in themselves and no longer require congressional action to take effect, these provisions

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are self-executing provisions. (Examples are Sections 15 – right to good health and Section
16 – the right to a balanced ecology of Article II)

Question: What is the nature of the Filipino First Policy?

Answer: Section 10, second paragraph of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself, and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When the Constitution mandates that (i)n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when the
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may
be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997).

Question: Are the provisions under National Economy and Patrimony of the
Constitution self-executing provisions?
Answer: As a general rule, the provisions of the National Economy and Patrimony are
non-self-executing provisions. However, there are provisions which are deemed to be
self-executing as ruled in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS (G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997).

Note: the Supreme Court held in Tañada v. Angara (G.R. No. 118295, May 02, 1997) as a
rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to
ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. The agreement was reviewed
extensively and was subjected to the three (3) reading rule before the Senate passed the
resolution giving its concurrence to the country’s membership.

Question: Cite some self-executing provisions under Articles II and XII of the
Constitution.
Answer: The following are self-executing provisions under Articles II and XII:
1. Right to health under Sec. 15, Art II (Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July
30, 1993)
2. Right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Sec. 16. Art. II (Ibid.)
3. Policy of full disclosure under Sec. 28, Art. II (Province of North Cotabato v.
GRP Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008)
4. Preference of Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony under Sec. 10 Art. XII (Manila
Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997).

Cases:
● Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997: Paragraph 2 of
Section 10 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution implementing the Filipino First
policy is a self-executing provision.

● Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997: There is a need
for an enabling law to conduct People’s Initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII
of the Constitution.

● Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 162759, August 04, 2006: Focus on the portion
of the decision where there is command for Congress to enact a law for a system
of absentee voting under Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution.

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2. Process of Change (Amendments and Revisions)

Question: What are the modes of amending the Constitution?

Answer: The modes of amending the Constitution as provided for in Art. XVII are:
1. Constituent Assembly, which is by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its members.
2. Constitutional Convention.
3. People's Initiative whereby upon a petition of at least twelve per centum
(12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein.

Congress, Art. XVII, Sec. 1 Congress may amend the Constitution as a

constituent assembly upon a vote of ¾ of all its
members.

Constitutional Convention, By 2/3 vote of all its members, Congress calls for
Art. XVII, Sec. 3 a constitutional convention or by a majority vote
of all its members, submit to the electorate the
question of calling such convention.

People’s Initiative, Art. XVII, The people in the exercise of its sovereign power
Sec. 2 may amend the Constitution, upon petition of at
least 12% of the total number of registered voters,
of which every district must be represented by at
least 3% of the voters therein.

Question: What are the modes of revising the Constitution?

Answer: The modes of revision of the Constitution as provided for in Art. XVII are:
1. Constituent Assembly, which is by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its members.
2. Constitutional Convention (Section 1, Art. XVII)

Congress, Art. XVII, Sec. 1 The Congress may revise the Constitution as a
constituent assembly upon a vote of ¾ of all its
members.

Constitutional Convention, By 2/3 vote of all its members, the Congress call
Art. XVII, Sec. 3 a constitutional convention or by a majority vote
of all its members, submit to the electorate the
question of calling such convention.

Distinction between Amendment and Revision

Tests Applied (as laid out in Lambino) -

(1) Quantitative Test - examines whether the proposed change is so extensive as to
alter the substantial entirety of the charter. Here the court looks at the number of
provisions which will be affected by the proposed changes.
(2) Qualitative Test - examines the effect of the proposed changes in the charter.
Here the court looks into whether the proposed changes will be substantive and
extensive enough as to be tantamount to a change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan.

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Cases:
● Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997: There is a need
for an enabling law for the conduct of People’s Initiative and the provisions of R.A.
6735 on referendum and initiative
Note: correlate this with Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI, 1987 Constitution).

● Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006: The distinction between
an amendment and a revision can be determined with the application of the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. People’s Initiative is not possible to revise
the constitution since by applying the qualitative test, the proposal to adopt a
parliamentary form of government will substantially affect the principles which
presently govern the three (3) branches of the government under a presidential
form of government.

Stages of the Amending/Revising Process

(1). Proposal
(2). Ratification

Requisites for a valid ratification

(1) Ratification must have been held in a plebiscite conducted under the Omnibus
Election Code;
(2) Plebiscite must be supervised by COMELEC; and
(3) Only registered voters could participate in the plebiscite.

Question: Discuss how changes in the Constitution are ratified.

Answer: Any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution under Section 1 of Article
XVII shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later ninety days after the approval of such
amendment. Any amendment under Section 2 of Article XVII shall be valid when ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of
the sufficiency of the petition. (Section 4, Art. XVII)

Cases:
● Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967: The Supreme Court
held that the proposed amendments may be ratified by the people either through
a general election or a special election called for the purpose.

● Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971: A piece-meal approval
of amendments is not allowed since the constitution must be interpreted as whole.
By resorting to a one-time submission, all inconsistencies are resolved during the
ratification process. The electorate must be given an adequate period of time to
review the amendments.

● De Leon v. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987: Read Teehankee, J.’s
concurring opinion: The exercise of the power of sovereignty is best manifested in
the ratification of the constitution. The effectivity of the new constitution takes
place on the date the people cast their vote. The declaration of the result of the
plebiscite is only a ministerial duty of the President and does not operate as to the
date of the effectivity of the constitution.

B. The Philippines as a State

Question: What are the elements of a state?

Answer: The elements of a state are people, territory, government, and sovereignty
which includes the capacity to enter into relations with other states.

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Question: Distinguish between government and state.
Answer: The following are the basic distinctions between government and state: In the
first place, the government is an essential mark of the state. There cannot be a state
without a government; but there can be a government without there being a state. In the
second place, a state possesses the quality of permanence, while a government may come
and go, leaving the state to continue unimpaired and unaffected. The government of a
state may be overthrown, and another government set up; but the state remains, with the
same personality. In the third place, the state is an ideal person, the government is the
instrumentality of this political unity (Arguego, Principles of Political Science, 1976 edition,
pp.19-20).

Question: What is the distinction between internal and external self-determination?

Answer: Internal self-determination is the right of the people of a state to govern
themselves without outside interference. On the other hand, external self-determination
is the right of peoples to determine their own political status and to be free of alien
domination, including formation of their own independent state.

Case:
● Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Negotiating Panel, G.R. No. 183591, October
14, 2008: The right to external self-determination is possible in a relationship of
an associative state like the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and the central
government. However, this is not possible under the present constitution because
BJE is not among those enumerated as the territorial and political subdivisions
under Section 1of Article X. This associative relationship is only possible under
a federal form of government and not under the present system of government
obtaining in the 1987 Constitution.

Sovereignty

Question: What is sovereignty?

Answer: Sovereignty is the supreme power to command and enforce obedience, the
power to which, legally speaking, all interests are practically subject, and all wills
subordinate. (Arguego, p. 38) According to Garner, the essential characteristics of
sovereignty are: (1) perpetuity; (2) comprehensiveness; (3) exclusiveness; (b) absolutism;
(5) inalienability; and (6) unity (cite in Aruego)

Question: What are the aspects of sovereignty?

Answer: The two aspects of sovereignty are:
1. Legal sovereignty which refers to the supreme authority to enact laws. The
legal sovereign in the words of James Bryce is “no other person than him to
whose directions the law attributes legal force, the person or body in whom
resides as of right the ultimate power of laying down general rules.”
2. Political sovereignty which determines the person or body to be in power.
It is, in other words, the sovereignty of the electorate; or in its general sense,
the sovereignty of the whole body politic. The legislature represents the
legal sovereign; the electorate or the whole people represent the political
sovereign. These do not imply the recognition of dual sovereignty, for
sovereignty is the not divisible; rather, they are manifestations of one and
the same sovereignty. (Arguego, pp. 38-39)

Question: What is the concept of auto limitation of sovereignty?

Answer: By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state
power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact
(Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 02, 1997).

The sovereignty of the State therefore cannot in fact and in reality, be considered absolute.
Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of

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membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations
(Id., 67).
The same principle was applied in the Visiting Forces Agreement when members of the
U.S. Armed Forces facing criminal prosecution are treated differently in terms of their
detention facility during trial (Suzette Nicolas v. Sec. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February
11, 2009).
Members of the U.S. Armed Forces were also extended tax exemption under the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Philippines (Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969).

Cases:
● William C. Reagan v. CIR, G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969: The territory of the
Philippines includes the Clark Air Base. The US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty
did not include the cession of the Clark Air Base as part of the territory of the U.S.
government. With this, the tax laws of the Philippines will govern over the
transactions of American citizens not covered by the tax exemptions under the
treaty.

● Nicolas v. Secretary Romulo, G.R.No.175888, February 11, 2009: Under the concept of
auto-limitation as an aspect of sovereignty in a treaty, a country may treat
differently citizens of the contracting party while undergoing a criminal
prosecution for violating a penal law of the host country.

● Macariola v. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982: The transfer of rule from Spain
to the United States of America includes the abdication of the laws of Spain
operating in the Philippines unless they are expressly reinstated by the U.S.
government.

C. Fundamental Powers of the State

1. Police Power

Question: What is police power?

Answer: The most powerful tool of the state in regulating liberty is police power.
Generally, police power is that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it
to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society(Rubi vs.
Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919).

Question: What are the limitations to the exercise of police power?

Answer: The exercise of police power may be limited by:
[1] the rights guaranteed by the Constitution;
[2] the necessity of a legitimate public purpose; and
[3] a reasonable exercise of other powers

Question: What are the essential elements of the exercise of police power?
Answer: The essential elements of police power are:
[1] The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference by the State; and
[2] The means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object
sought and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Simply put, police power requires a lawful subject and a lawful means to meet the
lawful subject or purpose.

Cases:
● Calalang v. Williams, 70 Philippine Reports 726, (1940) – Police power is the
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare.

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 ● Pimentel v. LEB, G.R. No. 230642, March 12, 2019: The creation of the LEB is
constitutional. The state has an interest in regulating the operation of law schools.

● Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968: The requirement for public
officers to declare regularly their SALNs is a valid exercise of police power. This
power of the state ensures that public servants do not take advantage of their
positions to illegally accumulate wealth.

2. Eminent Domain

Question: What is the power of eminent domain?

Answer: The power of eminent domain, which is also called the power of expropriation,
is the inherent right of the State to condemn private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation. (Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. v. Department of
Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 169914, April 18, 2008)

Question: What are the requisites of the exercise of the power of eminent domain?
Answer: The following are the requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain: (1) the property taken must be private property; (2) there must be genuine
necessity to take the private property; (3) the taking must be for public use; (4) there must
be payment of just compensation; and (5) the taking must comply with due process of
law (Manapat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110478, October 15, 2007).

Question: What are the stages in expropriation?

Answer: The expropriation of property consists of two stages. The first stage is concerned
with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
The second stage is concerned with the determination by the court of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken (City of Manila v. Chinese Community of
Manila, G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919).

Question: What are the rules which govern the determination of just compensation?
Answer: The rules which govern the determination of just compensation are:
1. If the government took over possession of the private property before
instituting an expropriation case, the just compensation is reckoned from
the date of actual take-over of the property.
2. If there was no take-over of the private property prior to the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, the just compensation is determined on the date
of the filing of the expropriation case.

Question: When may the government be held liable for consequential damages in an
expropriation case?
Answer: No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential
damages. Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the
remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value
(Republic v. Soriano, G.R. No. 211666, February 25, 2015).

Question: What is the basis of the award of consequential damages?

Answer: The Court had fixed the amount of consequential damages at the rate of 50% of
the BIR zonal valuation of the affected property (Schutlze, Jr. v. NAPOCOR, G.R. No.
246565, June 10, 2020).

Question: What are the consequences when there is delay in the payment of just
compensation?
Answer: When there is a delay in the payment of just compensation, the court may
impose forbearance of interest at the rate of twelve per cent (12%) per annum up to June
30, 2013, and thereafter, six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction,

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pursuant to Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013
and applicable jurisprudence (NAPOCOR v. Tarcelo, G.R. No. 198139, September 8, 2014).

Question: May a government property be subject to expropriation?

Answer: Yes, a government property may be subject to expropriation. In the case of
PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation v. National Grid Power Corporation of the Philippines
(G.R. No. 224936, September 04, 2019), the Court ruled that a property, though owned by
a State instrumentality, is considered patrimonial property because as such it assumes
the nature of private property.

In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corp. (G.R. No. 186961, February 20,
2012), the Court held that when the subject property therein was classified by the
government as an industrial zone, the subject property therein "had been
declared patrimonial and it is only then that the prescriptive period began to run." The
Petrochemical Industrial Park is described as an industrial and commercial estate. Thus,
the management and operation of the industrial estate is proprietary in character, serving
the economic ends of the State and can be expropriated for a public use to improve the
supply of energy by installing power lines in the property.

Question: May the power to expropriate be delegated by Congress to a private company?

Answer: Yes, the power to expropriate may be delegated by Congress to a private
company. In MORE Power Corporation v. PECO (G.R. No. 249406, March 9, 2021), the
Court said that Congress may delegate the power to expropriate to the President,
administrative bodies, local government units, and even to private enterprises
performing public services. The exercise of the right to expropriate given to MORE
under its franchise is a delegated authority granted by Congress. The restrictive view
that expropriation may be exercised by the State alone, without any consideration for the
State's authority to delegate its powers, cannot be upheld. Being a private enterprise
allowed by the Congress to operate a public utility for public interest, the delegation by
Congress of the power to expropriate PECO's distribution system is valid.

Cases:
● City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila et al., Johnson, J., G.R. No. L-14355,
October 31, 1919: In taking jurisdiction over an expropriation case, the trial court
must first determine if the petitioner has the power to expropriate and the same is
for a public purpose; and thereafter, it determines the just compensation. A private
property already dedicated to public use can no longer be subject to expropriation.

● Republic v. Castellvi, G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974: The essential factors to
determine the taking of the government in an expropriation case are:
1) The expropriator must enter a private property – this circumstance is present in
the instant case, when by virtue of a lease agreement the Republic, through
PAF, took possession of the property of Castellvi;
2) The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period –
the word “momentary” when applied to possession or occupancy of
property should be construed to mean “a limited period” – not indefinite
or permanent. Entry in the property, under the lease, is temporary and
considered transitory considering that the said contract is renewable from
year to year. The fact that the Republic constructed some installation of a
permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was
transitory or intended to last a year;
3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority – this circumstance is present in the instant case because Republic
entered the Castellvi property as lessee;
4) The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected – this is likewise present in this case because the
property was used by the air force of the AFP; and

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 5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property – this is wanting
in this case as Castellvi remained as owner and she was receiving the
monthly rentals of the property; hence, she was not deprived of the
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
The reckoning period for the determination of just compensation is established under
the following conditions:
1) If government possession preceded the taking, then the compensation is
based on the date of actual taking; or
2) If there was no taking before the institution of the expropriation case, then
just compensation will be considered on the date the expropriation case was
filed.

● Republic v. Jose Gamir-Consuelo Diaz Heirs Association, Inc., G.R. No. 218732,
November 18, 2018: Where a Deed of Sale is executed between the government
and the property owner, there is no just compensation involved. Just
compensation is a judicial function when government exercises the power of
eminent domain. A Deed of Absolute Sale is a consensual agreement since there is
no forcible taking of private property.

● Republic v. Spouses Bunsay, G.R. No. 205473, December 10, 2019: The trial court may
impose not only the just compensation on the government but may also include
the capital gains tax on the property and the transfer taxes because the transaction
being forcible taking of property is not covered by the NIRC.

● MCIAA v. Lozada, G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010: When government
abandons the public purpose, the property owner may seek reconveyance of the
title to the expropriated property subject to the return of the just compensation
received in the case.

3. Taxation

Question: What is the state’s power to tax?

Answer: The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty. It is legislative in character, hence,
only the legislature can impose taxes but it is subject to constitutional and inherent
limitations.

Constitutional Exemption Principles

Question: What are the constitutional exemption principles on taxes?

Answer: The following provisions are the constitutional exemption on taxes:
1. Section 28 (3) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution grants religious and charitable
institutions exemption from real property tax on all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes.
2. Section 28 (4) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that no law granting
any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
3. Section 29 (2), Article VI provides that no public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher,
or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
4. Section 4(3) of Article XIV provides that all revenues and assets of non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for

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 educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the
dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets
shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may
likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law,
including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment.
5. Section 4(4) of Article XIV provides that subject to conditions prescribed by law,
all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.

Cases:
● Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
167330, September 18, 2009: The contracts issued by HMO companies are not
subject to the documentary stamp taxes because they are not considered insurance
contracts. There is no insurable risk which a contract of HMO covers. A contract
of HMO covers medical services which a member can avail when needed.

● Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 180740,

November 11, 2019: Tax burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be
imposed beyond what the statute expressly and clearly imports, tax statutes being
construed strictissimi juris against the government. In case of discrepancy between
the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law
prevails as said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of
the basic law. It must be stressed that the objective of issuing BIR Revenue
Regulations is to establish parameters or guidelines within which our tax laws
should be implemented, and not to amend or modify its substantive meaning and
import.
While the BIR exceeded its statutory powers, the claim for refund/credit of excess
excise tax payments of SMC from January 11 to February 28, 2001 is disallowed on
the grounds of prescription and insufficient evidence. SMC's argument that its
claims should be excepted from the two (2) year prescriptive period based on
equity considerations is untenable; the Court cannot resort to equity when there is
clear statutory law governing the matter.

● City of Cagayan de Oro v. CEPALCO, G.R. No. 191761, November 14, 2012: A cursory
reading of the whereas clauses makes it is apparent that the purpose of the
ordinance is to regulate the construction and maintenance of electric and
telecommunications posts erected within Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, the
ordinance was not intended as a revenue-raising measure, but it was enacted in
the exercise of police power.

D. Relevance of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Read Sections 1 to 28, Article II, 1987 Constitution

Question: What are the modes of internalization of international law?

Answer: Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The vote of 2/3 of all the members of
the Senate is necessary for a treaty or an international agreement become valid and
effective.

Upon the other hand, the incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law (Pharmaceutical
and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, G.R. NO. 173034, October 09,
2007).

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Question: What is the nature of generally accepted principles of international law?
Answer: The Supreme Court characterized the “generally accepted principles of
international law” contemplated under Section 2, Article II of the Constitution as norms
of general or customary international law that are binding on all states (Razon, Jr. v.
Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009).

Note: The Supreme Court said that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of
international law. It said that: “Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of
our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them
for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not
confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory” (Kuroda v.
Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949).

Question: What is the nature of the right to return to one’s country?

Answer: The right to return to one’s country is customary international law. The right to
return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but the right to
return may be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under the Constitution, is part of the law of the land (Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211,
September 15, 1989).

Question: What is the nature of the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of his property?
Answer: The right not to be arbitrarily deprived of his property is generally accepted
principle of international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides in
its Article 17(2) that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the
signatories to the Declaration do not intend it as a legally binding document, being only
a declaration, the Supreme Court has interpreted the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights
as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State
(Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003).

Citizen Armed Force

Question: May a citizen be compelled to render personal civil or military service?

Answer: Yes, a citizen may be compelled to render personal civil or military service under
Section 4 of Article II of the Constitution.
Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa were found guilty of violation of Section 60
of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law for refusing to render
military service despite notice. The Court said that the National Defense Law, in so far as
it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave
the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein
(People v. Lagman, G.R. No. L-45892, July 13, 1938 and People v. De Sosa, G.R. No. L-45893,
July 13, 1938).

Armed Forces

Question: What is the composition of the armed forces?

Answer: The armed forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force
which shall undergo military training and serve as may be provided by law. It shall keep
a regular force necessary for the security of the State. The branches of the Armed Forces
are the Philippine Army, the Philippine Navy, and the Philippine Air Force. (Section 4,
Art. XVI)

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Question: What is the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines?
Answer: The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces shall not exceed three
years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress,
the President may extend such tour of duty (Section 5(7), Art. XVI).

Question: May an active member of the armed forces participate in partisan political
activity?
Answer: No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan
political activity, except to vote. (Section 5(3), Art. XVI)

Note: The following cases deal with the “Hello Garci” tapes where it was alleged that
there was participation of the members of the Armed Forces in the re-election bid of
President Arroyo:
● In Gen. Gudani et al. v. Chief of Staff Gen. Senga (G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006),
the Court held that the President may restrict the movement of the members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines under the principle of command responsibility.

● In COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano v. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 170338,

December 23, 2008), the Court enjoined the congressional inquiry on the “Hello
Graci” for violation of R.A. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law).

Question: May active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines be eligible to
appointment to civilian positions?
Answer: No, a member of the armed forces in active service shall, at any time, be
appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the government
including government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries.
(Section 5[4], Art. XVI)

Question: When does human life begin?

Answer: The Supreme Court said that the undeniable conclusion, whether it be taken
from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance and more importantly,
following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, is that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-
defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization. The Court further said that the
fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete
with DNA and 46 chromosomes. The Court further said that: “Implantation has been
conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To
adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the
Constitution” (Imbong, et. al., v. Ochoa, et. al., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014).

Question: May health care practitioners be compelled to render health care procedures if
it will violate their religious beliefs?
Answer: Health care providers cannot be compelled to render health care procedures if
it will violate their religious beliefs except in cases of emergency. The Supreme Court
struck down the provision in the RH law which punishes health care providers who will
refuse to perform reproductive health services based on their religious conviction as
violative of freedom of religion. Nonetheless, the Court held that the principle recognizes
a valid exception set forth in the law: “While generally healthcare service providers
cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would
contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases
that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to
life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting in unnecessarily placing the
life of a mother in grave danger.”

The Court stressed, however, that in a conflict situation between the life of the mother
and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If,

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however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. (Imbong, et.
al., v. Ochoa, et. al., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

Question: What is the Public Trust Doctrine in relation to the guarantee of preserving
and conserving the country’s natural resources for the current and the future
generations?
Answer: The Public Trust Doctrine holds that specific natural resources belong to all and
cannot be privately owned or controlled because of their inherent importance to each
individual and society. In this framework, a relationship is formed - the state is the
trustee, which manages specific natural resources the trust principal - for the trust
principal for the benefit of the current and future generations – the trust beneficiaries
(Maynilad v. Secretary of the DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August 06, 2019, Hernando, J.).

Question: What is the nature of the constitutional directive in the allocation of the highest
budget to education?
Answer: While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress
is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education” in order to “insure
that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfilment,” it does not
thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state
policies or objectives (Guingona, Jr. v Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991).

Cases:
● De Leon v. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987: The exercise of sovereignty
is manifested when the electorate ratified the 1987 Constitution

● People v. Lagman, G.R. No. L-45892 July 13, 1938 and People v. de Sosa, G.R. No. L-
45893 July 13, 1938: Qualified Filipinos may be required by law to render personal
mandatory military or civil service. This is a constitutional prerogative.

● Peralta v. Philippine Postal Corporation, G.R. No. 223395, December 04, 2018: The
doctrine separation of church and state was not violated when the Philipost caused
the printing of the commemorative stamps to celebrate the centennial founding of
the Iglesia ni Cristo. The Court applied here the benevolent neutrality approach to
conclude that the non-establishment clause was not violated. The Court also
reiterated the Lemon test to determine if the non-establishment clause is violated.

● Imbong v. Ochoa,G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014: Associate Justice Jose Catral
Mendoza: The Court upheld the policy of the RH law when it provided for the
guarantee of right to life of the unborn child and the preservation of the family as
the basic unit of society.

● Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442,
August 8, 2017: In this case, the primary role of parents in child-rearing was
emphasized but it also recognized the supplemental role of the state to protect the
youth.

● Zabal v. Pres. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019: The lockdown of the
Boracay Island was ruled as a valid exercise of the police power of the government
as part of Section 5, Article II of the Constitution as it relates to the right to good
health under Section 15 and right to a balanced ecology under Section 16, both of
Article II of the Constitution.

● Oposa v. Factoran,G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993: Associate Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr.] In this case, the Court adopted the concept of intergenerational

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 responsibility to ensure that the future generation would enjoy the constitutional
guarantee of the right to a balanced ecology.

● Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 and 209251, November 13, 2013: Perlas
Bernabe, J: The Court said that while Section 26 of Article II prohibits political
dynasties, it did not resolve the issue on political dynasty since this is not a self-
executing provision.
● Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 08, 2010: Section 26 of Article II of
the Constitution guarantees equal opportunities to public service and this includes
individuals with different sexual orientation.

● Ha Datu Tawahig v. Cebu City Prosecutor Lineth Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, Mar 20,
2019: Ha Datu Tawahig cannot be protected by the provisions of the Indigenous
Right Act to exculpate himself from the charge of rape. The prosecution of the
crime of rape is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

● National Federation of Hog Farmers, Inc. v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 205835, June
23, 2020: Section 20 of Article II, Section 10, para 2 and Section 13 of Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution provides that foreign investments are allowed subject to the
regulation of the state.

E. Dynamics Among the Branches of Government

1. Separation of Powers

Separation of Powers
Question: What is the principle of separation of powers?
Answer: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in the Philippine system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in the
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936).

Question: May Congress have any post-enactment participation in the implementation

of the General Appropriations Act?
Answer: No, members of Congress may not have any form of post-enactment
participation in the implementation of the General Appropriations Act. The
implementation of laws is the sole prerogative of the executive branch. In Belgica v. Ochoa
(G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013), the Court expressly declared unconstitutional
lump-sum appropriations which are single but divisible sums of money to fund multiple
purposes requiring further determination by the individual legislator or concerned
implementing agency of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose
of the appropriation. Such lump sum appropriations violate the principle of separation
of powers and non-delegability. Only Congress has the sole power to appropriate funds
as a collegial body and each member cannot resort to individual legislation.

Question: May the President exercise veto power over lump-sum appropriations which
are single but divisible sums of money to fund multiple purposes subject to individual
determination of legislators?Answer: Such lump-sum appropriations are
unconstitutional for depriving the President of his constitutional line item-veto power
because there is no specific appropriation of money for a specific project in the
appropriations law that he could veto (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19,
2013).

Question: When may lump sum appropriations be considered constitutional?

Answer: Lump-sum appropriations with specified and single purpose that allow the
President to exercise his line item veto power is constitutional. The item must be for a
specific purpose so that the President can determine whether the specific purpose is

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wasteful or not. This is the "item" that can be the subject of the President's line-item veto
power. Any other kind of item which will circumvent or frustrate the President's line-
item veto power is in violation of the Constitution (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 210503,
October 08, 2019).

Question: May the trial court order the examination of the books of account of Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation, Caltex Philippines, Inc., and Petron Corporation for
alleged violation of the of the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act?
Answer: The books of accounts of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, Caltex
Philippines, Inc., and Petron Corporation may not be opened and examined by the
Commission on Audit (“COA”), Bureau of Internal Revenue (“BIR”), and Bureau of
Customs (“BOC”) because said companies are beyond the audit jurisdiction of these three
(3) agencies for the purposes of enforcing the anti-cartel provisions of the Downstream
Oil Industry Deregulation Act.

As to the COA, the Supreme Court noted that said oil companies are not public entities
nor are they nongovernmental entities receiving financial aid from the government. With
respect to the BIR, its Commissioner is authorized to examine books, papers, records, or
other data of taxpayers but only “to ascertain the correctness of any return, or in making a
return when none was made, or in determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue
tax, or in collecting such liability, or evaluating the person’s tax compliance.” The BOC, on the
other hand, is “authorized to audit or examine all books, records, and documents of
importers necessary or relevant for the purpose of collecting the proper duties and taxes.”
Since there are no taxes or duties involved in this case, the BIR and the BOC likewise have
no power and authority to open and examine the books of accounts of the oil companies
(COA v. Hon. Pampilo [Hernando, J.], G.R. No. 188760/G.R. No. 189060/G.R. No. 189333,
30 June 2020).

Question: Is there judicial supremacy under the Constitution?

Answer: There is no judicial supremacy under the Constitution for the Court only applies
and interprets the laws. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy
the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that
is involved in what is termed “judicial supremacy” which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution (Bernas, p. 158).

Note: In Marbury v. Madison [5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)], the U.S. Supreme Court
established the principle of judicial review. It held that courts have the power to strike
down laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States.

Question: May the Supreme Court scrutinize the internal proceedings of Congress?
Answer: The Supreme Court cannot look into the internal proceedings of the House of
Representatives except if the rights of private individuals are involved. In Arroyo v de
Venecia (G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997), the Supreme Court ruled that it had no power
to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the
Constitution. Likewise, in Santiago v. Guingona, (G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998) the
Court ruled — under the doctrine of separation of powers — [it] has “no authority to
interfere” in the “exclusive realm” of a co-equal branch, absent a showing of grave abuse
of discretion. The SC ruled in that case that it has no authority to restrict or limit the
exercise of congressional prerogatives granted by the Constitution.

Each of the three (3) departments of our government has its separate sphere which the
others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which the constitutional
order rests. Due regard for the working of the system of government, more than mere

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comity, impels the Court not to review the due enactment of a law (Arroyo v. De Venecia,
G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997).

Blending of powers

Question: What is the principle of blending of powers?

Answer: The principle of blending of powers is a principle where certain acts of a
government agency or official require the performance of another act by another person
or organ of the government to complete and validate them. The principle shows an
implication of separation of powers—the interdependence of the branches of the
government.

Question: Cite instances where the principle blending of power is applied under the 1987
Constitution.
Answer: The following provisions show that the principle of blending of powers is
applied under the 1987 Constitution:
1. The grant of amnesty by the President will be valid only upon the concurrence of
the majority of the members of Congress. (Section 19, par. 2, Art. VII)
2. The appointment of the members of the Judiciary may be made by the President
only upon recommendation of the Judicial and Bar Council. (Sections 8(5) and 9,
Art. VIII)
3. Every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, shall be presented to
the President who shall sign it if he approves it. (Section 27(1), Art. VI)
4. The ratification by the President of any treaty will be effective only if the Senate
gives its concurrence by at least two-thirds of all its members. (Section 21, Art. VII)

Non-delegation of legislative power

Question: What is the principle of delagata potestas non potest delegari?

Answer: The principle of delagata potestas non potest delegari means that all the powers of
the branches of the government are merely delegated to them by the people. They enjoy
these powers as a delegated duty. They cannot delegate the responsibility of carrying out
the delegated tasks to some other agencies without violating the principle of non-
delegation.

Question: May the trial court validly expand the application of a provision of law?
Answer: The trial court may not expand the application of a provision of law. In COA v.
Hon. Pampilo (G.R. No. 188760/G.R. No. 189060/G.R. No. 189333, 30 June 2020) the
Supreme Court reiterated that it is the Joint Task Force of the Department of Energy and
Department of Justice which has the sole power and authority to monitor, investigate,
and endorse the filing of complaints regarding cartelization, if necessary, against oil
companies. Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion when the trial court order the COA,
the BIR, and the BOC to open the book of accounts of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, Caltex Philippines, Inc., and Petron Corporation. By resorting to this order,
the trial court effectively encroached on the power of Congress to delegate (COA v. Hon.
Pampilo, G.R. No. 188760/G.R. No. 189060/G.R. No. 189333, 30 June 2020).

Undue delegation of legislative power

Question: How is the essential factor to consider whether there is an undue delegation
of legislative power?
Answer: To determine whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power, the
inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what job must be done, who
is to do it, and what is the scope his authority. Under the principles which govern

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administrative law, administrative agencies are authorized to fill in the details of a law
to effectively implement it (Edu v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-32096, October 24, 1970).

Question: Enumerate the exceptions to the rule on non-delegation of legislative power:

Answer: The exceptions to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power are:
1. Delegation to local governments of the power to enact ordinances.
2. Delegation to the President under the Constitution of the emergency power
(Section 23, 2, Art. VI and Section 17, Art. XII) and the determination of tariff rates
(Section 28 (2), Art. VI.)
3. The power of the people under the concepts of referendum and initiative. (Sec. 1
and Sec. 32, Art. VI)

Question: What are the tests for valid delegation of powers to administrative agencies?
Answer: The tests for valid delegation of rule-making power to administrative agencies
are:
The delegating law must (a) be complete in itself as it must set forth therein the policy to
be carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard or the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions (Pelaez v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, December 24,
1965 – In this case, The Court held that the President cannot create local government
units.).

Note: The Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the
authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the
Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to
control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide
those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper
standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of
making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon
the executive officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion.

Cases:
● Angara v. Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 45081, Jul 15, 1936: In the exercise of the
power of judicial review, the Court may determine whether or not an actual
judicial controversy is present in the case. When the Constitution grants the
exclusive power to the Electoral Tribunal in resolving an election contest, the
Supreme Court defer to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal before it assumes
any judicial intervention.

● Araneta v. Hon. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949: Under the concept of
transcendental importance doctrine, the Supreme Court may relax certain
requisites in the in the exercise of power of judicial review and the power of the
Supreme Court to apply the imperatives of the Constitution to the distinct
branches of government.

● Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 and 209251, November 13, 2013: Perlas
Bernabe, J; The Court held that Congress and the executive branch violated
doctrine of separation of powers when both branches of government connived to
have a lump sum amount of PDAF under the office of the President. Broadly
speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one
branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. Thus, there
is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with
and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions. The enforcement of the
national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function
both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of
government. However, through project lists, prior consultations, or program
menus – members of Congress have been consistently accorded post-enactment

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 authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations.

The principle of checks and balances was likewise violated because the lump sum
amount was not susceptible to item veto by the President. The Congress cannot
likewise exercise any oversight function in the implementation of PDAF projects
because they have post enactment involvement.

Only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no
other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated
legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are
allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted
exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or
other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government. The 2013
PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.

Note: In a Petition which challenged the 2014 GAA (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R.
No.210503, October 8, 2019), the Court said that the requirement of singular
correspondence budget item does not mean that all lump-sum appropriations are
unconstitutional per se. What is prohibited is a prohibited lump-sum appropriation
like the PDF found in the 2013 GAA. It must be observed that an appropriation
may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is
crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding
purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item.

Thus, the Court ruled that the Unprogrammed Fund, to fund the identified
programs; the Contingent Fund, to provide funding to meet contingencies or
programs yet inexistent and unforeseen during budget authorization; the E-
Government Fund, to fund the E-Government Program that subsumes the
strategic ICT projects of various government agencies; and the Local Government
Support Fund, to provide financial assistance to LGUs are valid items with
discernible singular appropriation purpose in compliance with the rule on
singular correspondence.

● Estipona, Jr., v. Lobrigo. G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017, Associate Justice
Diosdado M. Peralta: The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches
of the government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of
this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or
issue orders that effectively repeal, alter, or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by the Court.
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

In defining plea bargaining in criminal cases, jurisprudence has always referred to

it as a process of arriving at "a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject
to court approval" (People v. Villarama, Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 730 [1992]).Thus, mutual

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 consent of the prosecution and the offended party, on the one hand, and the
defendant, on the other has always been emphasized as a condition precedent or
an indispensable requirement to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense.

● Ople v. Torres. G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" was declared null and void for being
unconstitutional. Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President
executes the laws. The Constitution vests in the President executive
power. Executive power is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance. A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. The subject matter of the
subject administrative has far reaching consequences on the constitutionally
protected rights of the people.

● Commission on Audit v. Hon. Pampilo, G.R. Nos. 188760. 189660, and 189333, June
30, 2020 [HERNANDO, J.]: The DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force is duly authorized by
law to investigate and to order the prosecution of cartelization to determine if
there was a violation of Section 11 of RA 8479. The trial court may not intervene
with Section 11 and Section 13 of R.A. 8479 by creating a new set of examiners to
replace the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force. The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and
gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the COA, the BIR, and the BOC to
open and examine the books of account of the Big 3 and allowed private
respondent Cabigao, a certified public accountant, to become part of the panel of
examiners. Clearly, the RTC not only failed to uphold the law but worse, he
contravened the law.
The COA's audit jurisdiction generally covers public entities. However, its
authority to audit extends even to non-governmental entities insofar as the latter
receives financial aid from the government. Since the Big 3 do not receive any
public funding, then it is beyond the audit powers of COA.

With respect to the BIR, its Commissioner is authorized to examine books, paper,
record, or other data of taxpayers but only to ascertain the correctness of any
return, or in making a return when none was made, or in determining the liability
of any person for any internal revenue tax, or in collecting such liability, or
evaluating the person's tax compliance. The BOC, on the other hand, is authorized
to audit or examine all books, records, and documents of importers necessary or
relevant for the purpose of collecting the proper duties and taxes. Since there are
no taxes or duties involved in this case, the BIR and the BOC likewise have no
power and authority to open and examine the books of accounts of the Big 3.

Note: Relate this case to the concept of parens patriae, the prohibition against
monopolies and exercise of police power.

● Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006: Congress in aid
of legislation has constitutional mandate on the conduct of congressional inquiry
of under Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. The President cannot impair
this constitutional prerogative by providing restrictions on the appearance of
public officers in the executive department in the conduct of congressional
inquiries.

● Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021: The Court said that the
criminalization of acts is a policy matter that belongs to the legislative branch of
the government. Therefore, the solution to bridge this apparent gap in our laws is
remedial legislation, which is left to the Congress' prerogative. Insofar as the Court
is concerned when it acquitted Pulido, it followed the definition of the crime of

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 bigamy. Where the first marriage is void due to lack of capacity of Pulido to marry
and where the second marriage did not comply with the formalities of contracting
marriage under the Family Code, bigamy cannot be committed. The Court
abandoned its earlier pronouncement that there is a need to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage to acquit one of the crime of bigamy.

● Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019: The
petitioner assailed that his cognate rights and other constitutionally rights are
likewise violated when he is not allowed to marry a person belonging to the same
sex. The Court dismissed the petition for lack of legal standing to sue of Falcis.

● People v. Edgardo S. Go, G.R. No. 210816, December 10, 2018: The determination of
probable cause to file criminal information is an executive function and the Court
cannot intervene unless there is a palpable grave abuse of discretion.

● In Re Cunanan, Resolution. March 18, 1954: The Court held that the Court has the
prerogative to determine the rules of admission to the practice of law. Under the
present provision of the Section 5(5), Article of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress
can no longer intervene with the rule-making powers of the Supreme Court.

2. System of Checks and Balances

Refer to the above-cited cases on how the Supreme Court exercised its to check on
encroachment of the constitutional mandates of the different branches of the
government.

1. Delegation of Powers
Read: Bayanihan to Heal as One Act (R.A. No. 11469 [2020]) and its extension, consider
the extent of delegation of powers to the IATF, focus on the exercise of police power of
the government when IATF imposes restrictions.
Please note that by invoking Section 23(2), Congress considered the COVID-19 pandemic
as a national emergency. R.A. 11469 delegated to President Duterte limited law-making
powers to respond to the exigencies of the pandemic.

Cases:
● Sema v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008: The creation of
provinces, cities and municipalities is the sole prerogative of Congress. The
creation of provinces cannot be delegated by Congress to the ARMM Legislative
Assembly.

● NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) v. National Power Corporation
(NPC), G.R. NO. 156208, September 26, 2006: When the law designates specific
public officers to compose the Board of Directors of NAPOCOR, these public
officers are considered in view of their expertise and their discretion to act on
matters presented to the board. These powers cannot be delegated to their
alternates attending the board meeting. Thus, the Court ruled that the Board
Resolutions terminating the services of the members of the petitioner and
providing for their separation package are null and void because the same were
signed by alternates in order to constitute a quorum in the adoption of the subject
resolutions.
● CotesCUP v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018: The K to 12
Law complied with the two tests of valid delegation of powers. The law provided
for adequate parameters for the implementation of the new education curriculum.
The IRR specifically address the transition period during the roll-out of the K-12
law and the role of the different government agencies under the law.

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F. State Immunity

1. Basis

Question: What is the doctrine of state immunity from suit?

Answer: The Constitution declares, rather superfluously, that the State may not be sued
without its consent. This provision is merely recognition of the sovereign character of the
State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it from the jurisdiction
of the courts of justice. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1993 edition, p. 29)
The doctrine is sometimes called as the “royal prerogative of dishonesty.” (Id., p. 33)

Note: To Justice Holmes, the doctrine of non-suability is based not any formal conception
or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. Another
justification is the practical consideration that the demands and the inconveniences of
litigation will divert the time and resources of the State from the more pressing matters
demanding its attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare. (Ibid.)

Question: When is a suit against the State?

Answer: The suit is against the State (a) when the Republic is sued by name; (b) when
the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; and (c) when the suit is on its
face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimately liability will belong
not the officer but to the government. In all these instances, suability depends on whether
the State has consented to be sued.

Question: How is consent to be sued be done?

Answer: The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. There
is an express consent when there is a law expressly granting authority to sue the State or
any of its agencies. There is implied consent: (1) When the state enters into a private
contract, unless the contract is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental
function (Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. L-4699, November 26, 1952); (2) When the state enters
into an operation that is essentially a business operation, unless the business operation
is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental function, as for instance,
arrastre service (Mobil Philippines v. Customs Arrastre Service, G.R. No. L-23139, December
17, 1966); and (3) When a state sues a private party, unless the suit is entered into only
to resist a claim (Lim v. Brownell, G.R. No. L-8587, March 24, 1960)

Question: What are the tests to determine whether the government should be impleaded
as party in suits against its officers?
Answer: If the action is for the recovery of title or right of possession to the property held
by the officers or agents in behalf of the government, the suit may prosper even if the
government is not impleaded. If, however, the action would impose a financial burden
or an obligation to the government, then the government as a rule, must be impleaded,
otherwise the suit will not prosper (Lim v. Nelson, G.R. No. L-2412, September 19, 1950).
If the suit against a public officer will result to direct liability of the State and not merely
of the officer, the suit is in reality against the State. The action is dismissible unless the
State gives consent to be sued.

Question: Is the defense of immunity from suit by the government absolute?

Answer: Non-suability principle cannot be a shield for injustice. The doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen. (Ministerio v. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31,
1971)

Note: Please consider the ruling of the Court in Urbano v. Solicitor General Chavez where
the Court ruled that the Solicitor General cannot be represented by lawyers from the
Office of the Solicitor General for criminal charges filed against him in his personal
capacity.

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Question: Can foreign states be sued in the local courts?
Answer: The doctrine of non-suability of State is available also to foreign States. They
may not be sued in the local courts. The added basis in this case is the principle of the
sovereign equality of States, under which one State cannot assert jurisdiction over
another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. To do so would unduly
vex the peace of nations. (Ibid.)

Question: What are the rules when a foreign state enters into a contract with private
individuals?
Answer: If the contract is entered into by the foreign government as part of its
governmental acts (jure imperii), then, there is no waiver of the non-suability principle.
However, if the contract is entered into in its proprietary capacity (jure gestionis), then,
there is a waiver of the non-suability principle.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must
be given explicitly or by necessary implication (Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, G.R. No.
154705, June 26, 2003).

Note:
- State Immunity: There is a distinction between suability and liability. While the
state may be sued under a contract, the liability is another matter. Public funds
and public property are beyond the reach of the courts. Garnishment of public
funds and public property is against public policy. Any money judgment may be
claimed before the Commission on Audit.
- Waiver of Immunity: Waiver may be express or implied.
- Exceptions
(a) Express waiver as provided for by the Constitution under Section 9 of Article
III or by statutes.
(b) Implied waiver
- Distinction between governmental and proprietary functions: Governmental
function refers to delivery of services pursuant to the general welfare clause.
Proprietary functions refer to acts of the government which partake of commercial
nature of transactions.
- Immunity of the national government: An instrumentality of the national
government is exempt from suit while performing governmental functions.
- Immunity of local governments: Local governments may be held liable for breach
of contractual obligation. Article 2189 of the Civil Code makes local governments
liable for tort.
- Immunity of foreign governments and international organizations are exempt
from the jurisdiction of the domestic courts. A claim of diplomatic immunity is
proper only in the discharge of their official duties.

Cases:
● Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197593,
October 12, 2020, [HERNANDO, J]: The function of the CBP as the central
monetary authority is a purely governmental function. Prior to its creation, the
supervision of banks, banking and currency, and the administration of laws
relating to coinage and currency of the Philippines was lodged with the Bureau of
Treasury under the immediate supervision of the Executive Bureau.

● Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014: The rule on claim of state
immunity was invoked by the Philippine government on behalf of the U.S.
government and its agents because the case was actually a suit against the U.S.
government and its agents who were in control of the USS Guardian.

The Court said that despite the fact that U.S. is not a signatory of UNCLOS, it may
be held liable for damages sustained by the Tubbataha Reefs under Article 31of
UNCLOS and public declaration of at least two American Presidents (Reagan and
Clinton) to respect the coastal rights of the coastal states bound by UNCLOS. The

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 Court deferred to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and
rehabilitation measures of the Tubbataha Reefs through diplomatic channels.

● Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.

No. 205466, January 11, 2021, [HERNANDO, J.]: BCDA is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers. As such, it is exempt from the
payment of docket fees.(Read Section 22, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.)

● Holy See v. Hon. Rosario, G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994: There are two theories
which govern the application of state immunity. Under the absolute theory, there
is distinction between the governmental and proprietary functions of the state.
Thus, the state may invoke absolute immunity for suit. Under the restrictive
theory, there is the distinction of the powers exercised by the state. The
government may be sued in the discharge of its proprietary functions.

● Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, March 26, 2001: The best proof to claim diplomatic
immunity is a certification issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs. However,
diplomatic immunity may only be invoked in the discharge of one’s official duties.

G. The National Territory

- Scope (Terrestrial, Aerial, and Fluvial Domains) - Article I, 1987 Constitution:
Components of the Philippine Territory – “The national territory comprises the
Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of
its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed,
the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.”

- Archipelagic Doctrine - Under archipelagic doctrine, an archipelago shall be

regarded as a single unit, so that the waters around, between, and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, irrespective of their breadth and dimensions, form part
of the internal waters of the state, and are subject to its exclusive sovereignty.

Question: What is the right of innocent passage?

Answer: The right of innocent passage to the territorial waters of States is customary
international law. In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now
codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea
or achipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise.
Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus
automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly
invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from
the international community (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011).

Question: What is the nature of UNCLOS?

Answer: UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zone (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical
miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines], and continental shelves [200 nautical miles from the EEZ or 350 nautical miles
from baselines] that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS does not deal with artificially
formed islands (Ibid., page 489).

Question: What are the modes of acquisition or loss of territory under international law?
Answer: Under traditional international law typology, States acquire or conversely, lose
territory through occupation, accretion, cession, and prescription, and not by executing
multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply

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with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial
claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III and are instead governed by the rules on
general international law. (Ibid., page 491)

Question: What is the consequence of classifying the Kalayaan Island Group and the
Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Islands?
Answer: Far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the Kalayaan Island Group
and the Scarborough Shoal, the Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as “Regime(s) of Islands'' under the Republic of the Philippines
consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of
UNCLOS III, any “naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which above
water at high tide,” such as portions of the Kalayaan Island Group, qualifies under the
category of “regime of islands,” whose islands generate their own baselines (Ibid., page
497).

Question: What are the two elements of archipelagic principle?

Answer: The two elements of archipelagic principle are:
1. The claim that the waters around, between and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, irrespective of their breadth and dimensions are parts of internal
waters.
2. The straight baseline method of delineating the territorial sea which consists of
drawing straight lines connecting the appropriate points on the coast without
departing to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast (Bernas,
Primer, 2001 ed., page 6).

Cases:
● Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011:The revision of the Philippine
Baselines Law (R.A. 8522) is a congressional prerogative to make the existing
Philippines Baselines Law (R. A. 3045) compliant with UNCLOS II; Read the
discussion as to the nature of UNCLOS.

● In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration Before An Arbitral Tribunal Constituted
under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Between
The Republic of the Philippines and The People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No. 2013-
19, 12 July 2016: The Permanent Court on Arbitration ruled in favor of the
Philippines. China’s claim to historical rights in the region and established that
China’s state practice does not show that China had been enjoying any historical
rights in the South China Sea; rather, it was enjoying the freedom of the high seas
and since it did not create bar to other states’ usage of the same, it could not be
understood as being a historical right. The tribunal also ruled that the area of
Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal form part of the exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf of the Philippines as they lie within 200 nautical miles of the
Philippines’ coast and there are no overlapping entitlements in the area with
respect to China.

The tribunal found that China had breached Articles 77 and 56 of the UNCLOS
through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels (which interfered with
Philippines’ oil and gas exploration) and through its moratorium on fishing which
interfered with the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, respectively.

The tribunal also found China in breach of Article 58 (3) of UNCLOS, due to its
failure to prevent fishing by Chinese flagged ships in the exclusive economic zone
of the Philippines, failing to respect the sovereign rights of the Philippines over its
fisheries in its exclusive economic zone.

The tribunal opined that China had, in the course of the proceedings of the
arbitration, aggravated and extended its disputes with the Philippines, through its

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 actions of dredging, artificial island-building and construction activities. No
award for damages was made because UNCLOS deals only with naturally formed
rocks and islands.

● Republic v. Province of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018: The Court held
that the Province of Palawan is not entitled to any share in the revenues derived
in the operation of the Camago-Malampaya Natural Gas Project since it is located
the territorial waters of the state. Section 7 of Article X provides – “Local
governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the
manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way
of direct benefits.”

II. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Nature of Legislative Power

1. Derivative and Delegated Power

Question: What is the scope of the legislative power of Congress?
Answer: Legislative power includes the power to propose, enact, amend, and repeal
laws. Such laws pertain to the operations of all branches of government as well the power
to provide for appropriations to support government programs, projects, and allied
services.

Question: Distinguish between derivative power from delegated power.

Answer: Derivative power is the authority where one enables another person to perform
an act for him. Upon the other hand, delegated power is the power which Congress by
which grants authorities as specific mandates from the Constitution.

Question: What are the tests for valid delegation of legislative powers?
Answer: The tests of valid delegation of powers are:
(a) Completeness test provides that the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
(b) Sufficient standard test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.

Question: What are the requisites for the formulation of valid IRRs?
Answer: To be valid, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites
to be valid:
1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4) It must be reasonable (Crawford, Earl. T., The Construction of Statutes,
Thomas Law Book Company, St. Louis, Missouri, pp. 29-30 [1940]).

2. Plenary Character:

Question: What is the nature of the legislative power of Congress?

Answer: The legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such
limitations, as are found in the Republic’s Constitution (Vera v. Avelino, G.R. No. L-543,
August 31, 1946). The legislative power of Congress includes the power to propose, enact,
amend, and repeal laws.

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Note: In Ang Nars Party List v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 215746, October 08, 2019), the
Court emphasized that only a bill can become a law. Thus, a resolution of Congress
cannot amend a law, nor could Congress delegate the power to amend a law to the
President. The President cannot by sheer executive order downgrade the pay scale of
nurses in the government service.

Question: Why is legislative power plenary in character?

Answer: The legislative power is plenary in character because Congress acts as a collegial
body. All legislative matters are considered in a plenary session.

3. Limitations

Question: What are the procedural limitations to the power to enact laws?
Answer: Such procedural limitations are:
1) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its members three days before its final passage. (Section
26[2], Art. VI)
2) Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed.
(Section 26(2), Art. VI)
3) All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase in public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives. (Section 24, Art. VI)

Question: What are the substantive limitations of the legislative power of Congress?
Answer: The substantive limitations of the legislative power of Congress are:
1) Bill of Rights: Sections 1 to 22, Article III
2) Congress cannot enact ex post facto or bill of attainder (Section 22, Art. III)]
3) Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
4) No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court without its advice and concurrence. (Section 30, Art. VI)
5) Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the
President for the operation of the government specified in the budget.
(Section 25[1], Art. VI)
6) Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof. (Section 26[1], Art. VI)
7) Congress cannot enact a law granting a title of royalty or nobility. (Section
31, Art. VI)
8) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary as such, is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium. (Section 29 [2], Art. VI)

4. Law-Making Distinguished from Law Execution:

Question: Distinguish law-making from law execution.

Answer: The task of law-making belongs to the legislative branch which has the power
to propose, enact, amend, and repeal laws. Upon the other hand, the power to enforce or
implement laws is vested in the executive branch.

Note: Relate this to the concept of separation of powers.

Cases:

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 ● Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 and 209251, November 13, 2013: The
members of Congress cannot have any post-enactment participation in the General
Appropriations Act or any other congressional statutes.

● Abakada Party List v. Secretary of Finance Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008:
Section 12 of RA 9335 is unconstitutional as it provides for legislative veto where
members of Congress may review the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Attrition Act of 2005 by including in the law the creation of an Oversight
Committee where members of Congress are included.

a) Filling-Up Details

Cases:
● Edu vs. Ericta, No. L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA: In this case, the Court laid
down the concept of delegation of powers. Integral in the plenary powers of
Congress to delegate certain portions of its legislative powers to administrative
agencies. To determine if there is a valid delegation of powers, the Court
scrutinizes the law applying the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
In this case, the Court ruled that there was a valid delegation of power to the Land
Transportation Office. The Court also sustained the power of LTO to fill in the
details necessary for it to determine facts and prescribe the implementing rules
and regulations to carry out the intent of the law.

● CotesCUP v. DepEd Secretary, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018: The Court upheld
the power of the implementing agencies to formulate the rules and regulations to
effectively carry out the core subjects under the K-12 law.

b) Ascertainment of Facts

Case:
● Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940: In this
case, the Court sustained the petition of the workers of Ang Tibay to present facts
which could allow the Court of Industrial Relations to fully determine their right
to reinstatement.

5. Exceptions to Non-Delegability

Question: What are some instances where the rule on non-delegability of

legislative powers will be allowed?
Answer: The rule on non-delegability of legislative powers will be allowed allow
the following circumstances:
a) Local governments may enact ordinances as part of its delegated power to
legislate.
b) The president may exercise legislative powers for a limited period and under
conditions as Congress may provide in times of war and national emergency.

Note: Read Section 23 (1) and (2), Article VI

Cases:
● Araneta v. Hon. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949: The power of the
President to legislate in times of war will cease when Congress reconvenes and
asserts its legislative powers.

● Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003: Under a de jure
revolutionary government operating without a constitution, the Philippines is still

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 under obligation to follow the conditions set forth in the Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights and the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights since
President Corazon Aquino did not rescind the country’s accession to these two
international agreements

Note: Read Bayanihan Heal as One Act under Republic Act No. 11469 and its
extension under R.A. 11494

c) Fixing Tariff Rates, Quotas, and Other Duties

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government (Section 28(2), Article VI).

6. Legislative Power of the People Through Initiative and Referendum

Read Sections 1 and 32, Article on the delegation of power to legislate to the
people.
Read Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI
Read Section 25, Article XVIII
Read Sections 10, 11 and 18, Article X

Question: What is the scope of the delegated power to legislate to the electorate?
Answer: The power of initiative covers all acts of local government units, including
resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan. The Constitution clearly includes not only
ordinances but resolutions as well as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32
of Article VI provides: “The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly
propose and enact laws or approve any act or law or part thereof and passed by the
Congress, or local legislative body xxx.” (Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
111230, September 30, 1994).

Question: What are the kinds of initiative by which the people may exercise the power
to legislate?
Answer: Sec. 3 (b) of RA 6735 as cited in Lambino v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 174153, October
25, 2006) provides for the following kinds of initiative:
(a) Indirect Initiative –This is an exercise of initiative by the people through a
proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.
(b) Direct Initiative – This is an exercise where the people themselves file the
petition with the COMELEC and not with Congress.

Question: What are the types of referendum under R.A. 6735?

Answer: The kinds of referendum under R.A. 6735 are:
(a) Referendum on Statutes – This refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, or
part thereof, passed by Congress.
(b) Referendum on Local Laws – This refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies.

B. Bicameral Congress

Subject Senators District Party-list

Representatives Representatives
Composition 24 80% of the HOR 20% of the HOR
Constituency National Congressional District National -
proportional
Term 6 years 3 years 3 years
Term Limit 2 consecutive terms 3 consecutive terms 3 consecutive terms

Page 29 of 76
Qualifications a. Natural born a. Natural born a. Natural born
citizen citizen citizen
b. At least 35 years b. At least 25 years b. At least 25 years
old old old
c. Resident for two c. Resident for one c. Resident of the
years year in the district Philippines for one
d. Able to read and where he seeks to year
write run. d. Able to read and
e. Registered voter d. Able to read and write.
write e. Registered voter
e. Registered voter

1. Senate: Read Sections 2 to 4, Article V

2. House of Representatives: Read Sections 5(1), 6 and 7, Article VI
a) District Representatives and Mechanics of Apportionment: Read Sections 5(1),
(3) and (4), Article VI

Question: What is gerrymandering?

Answer: Gerrymandering is the formation of one legislative district out of separate
territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes
gerrymandering with the mandate that each legislative district must, as far as practicable,
a contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.

Cases:
● Aldaba v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010: When creating a
congressional district in a city, the number of inhabitants must be certified by the
Chief Statistician of Philippines and not by the Regional Director of the Philippine
Statistics Authority.

● Aquino and Robredo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 07, 2010: The concept of
apportionment of districts is based on the principles of republicanism.
Representation in congress is dictated by the number inhabitants based on a
uniform and progressive ratio. In cities, a threshold population of 250,000
inhabitants is required while the creation of a province would automatically entitle
it to one congressional district.

The reapportionment of congressional districts in the Province of Camarines Sur

is not tantamount to the creation of additional congressional districts in Naga City
[which must strictly observe the population threshold]. The reapportionment may
consider relevant factors to ensure proper representation of the constituents of the
province

● Navarro v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010: The
constitutionality of the Province of Dinagat Islands was upheld by the Supreme
Court despite the fact that land area of 2000 square kilometers was not met by the
province. The Court held that the Province of Dinagat Islands falls under the
exception to the general rule. The Court also discussed that there are other factors
which Congress considers in the creation of a province.

● Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008: The Court held that Congress
violated the non-delegability principle when it vested the power to create a
province to the ARMM Regional Assembly. It emphasized that the creation of the
territorial and political subdivisions of the country is reserved only in Congress.

● Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 08, 2008: The Court that there
is a need for a plebiscite in the creation of local government units but not in the creation
of congressional districts.

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b) Party-List System: Read Section 5(2), Article VI
Note: Read Republic Act No. 7941

Question: Enumerate the entities which may be accredited by the COMELEC under the
party list system.
Answer: The following entities may be accredited by COMELEC under the party list
system: registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

Cases:
● Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 08, 2010: In this case, the Court
denounced the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it did
not cite any provision of the Party List law to disqualify Ang Ladlad to be
accredited under the party list system.

● Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013: In
this case, the Court interpreted how Section 5 (1) and (3) of Article VI should be
applied in terms of the requirement of representation under the party list system.
The Court also cited the new seven (7) parameters for seat allocation of party list
members which modifies the BANAT ruling.

● BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 179271, July 8, 2009: In this case, the Court
explains the 20% maximum membership restriction imposed by the Constitution
on the members of party list in the House of Representatives. It also stressed that
a party list may only occupy a maximum of three seats. The appreciation of
meeting the 2% threshold vote to qualify for a seat. A less than 2% threshold may
qualify for a seat provided the maximum threshold of 20% membership has not
yet been met.

● Lokin v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010: The Congress emphasized
that the importance of delegation of powers by Congress to the COMELEC to carry
out the implementation of the Party List System Act. The Supreme Court ruled
that the COMELEC went the power delegated to it by Congress when it provided
for a fourth ground for substitution of nominees. As a general rule, the Legislature
cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be
unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the
Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may
be delegated. the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative
boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs.

The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose,
or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively
legislative in character but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and
regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary
to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power
of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect.
Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a
legislative enactment.

● Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.

206844-45, July 23, 2013: Term-sharing is not allowed among party-list nominees
because this is against public policy. In the election of party list members, voters
vote for the party list and its nominees are assumed to occupy the post for three
years.

Page 31 of 76
 ● Amores v. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010:
The age requirement for a youth sector representative is fixed by law at 30 years
old. A nominee who is 31 years of age cannot assume the post.

C. Legislative Privileges, Disclosure of Financial and Business Affairs, Prohibitions,

Inhibitions, and Disqualifications

Read Sections 11, 12, 13, and 14, Article VI

Legislative Privileges
1) Parliamentary speech
2) Freedom from arrest

Read: Section 11, Article VI

Question: What is the rationale behind the parliamentary privileges extended to the
members of Congress?
Answer: Parliamentary privilege of speech and debate aims to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge the public trust with firmness and success for it
is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he
should be protected from the resentment of everyone, however powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. (Osmena, Jr. v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144,
October 28, 1960)

Question: What utterances are protected under the parliamentary privilege speech?
Answer: To come under the privilege, it is not essential that the Congress be in session
where the utterance is made. What is essential is that the utterance must constitute
“legislative action,” that is, it must be part of the deliberative and communicative process
by which legislators participate in committee or congressional proceedings in the
consideration of proposed legislation or of other matters which the Constitution has
placed within the jurisdiction of the Congress. (Bernas, Primer, 2011: 233)

Note: In Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago (A.C. NO. 7399, August 25, 2009), the Court
upheld the parliamentary privilege of Sen. Defensor-Santiago despite the fact that she
referred to the Supreme Court as a court of idiots and that she could spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban.

Question: What are the restrictions on the parliamentary privilege of freedom from
arrest?
Answer: The parliamentary privilege of freedom from arrest is limited to (a) offenses
punishable by not more than six years while (b) the Congress is in session. The privilege
is not applicable to a member of the Congress who has been convicted already.

Note: In People v. Jalosjos (G.R. Nos. 132875-76, November 16, 2001), the Court held that
after his conviction, Congressman Jalosjos cannot invoke his freedom from arrest.
In Sen. Trillanes v. Hon. Judge Pimentel (G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008), the Court held that
during his trial, Sen. Trillanes cannot be allowed to attend the plenary sessions in the
Senate and to participate in the Committee hearings of which he is a member.

Duty to Disclose and Notify under Section 12, Article VI

Duty to Disclose Upon assumption of office, members of Congress shall make
a full disclosure of their financial and business interests.
Duty to Notify Members of Congress shall notify the House concerned of a
potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a
proposed legislation of which they are authors.

Disqualifications under Section 13, Article VI

Page 32 of 76
Incompatible Office Forbidden Office
A member of Congress may not hold any A member of Congress cannot be
other office or employment in the appointed to any office which was created,
Government, during his term without or the emoluments thereof increased
forfeiting his/her seat. during the term for which he/she was
elected.
Any member of Congress who accepts an Barred from assuming the position even if
appointment from the President he voluntarily forfeits his seat in Congress
automatically forfeits his/her seat in
Congress.

Cases
● Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, Jul 15, 2009: There is no incompatibility between
holding the post of the Chairman of the PNRC and being a part of the Senate. The
Philippine National Red Cross is not part of the executive branch.

● Legarda v. De Castro, P.E.T. CASE NO. 003, March 31, 2005: The election and the
assumption of office of Legarda as senator is no longer compatible with her
petition challenging the election and assumption of office of Vice President de
Castro. She could no longer pursue her contest to become Vice President since she
has assumed her office as a senator of the Philippines.

Prohibitions under Section 14, Article VI

Prohibition to Practice No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
Legal Profession may personally appear as counsel before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies.
Prohibition to have No member of Congress shall, directly or indirectly, be
financial interest interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office.
Prohibition to intervene A member of Congress shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account
of his office.

Question: Cite the prohibitions which are imposed by the Constitution upon members
of Congress.
Answer: The prohibitions which are imposed by the Constitution upon members of
Congress are:
1) No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. (Section 13, Art. VI)
2) No member of the Congress shall be appointed to any office which may
have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for
which he was elected. (Section 10, Art. VI)
3) No member of Congress may appear as counsel before any court of justice
or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. (Section 14, Art. VI).
4) No member of Congress shall directly or indirectly be interested financially
in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the

Page 33 of 76
 government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporations, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. (Section 14, Art. VI)
5) No member of Congress shall intervene in any matter before any office of
the government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon
to act on account of his office. (Section 14, Art. VI)

D. Quorum and Voting Majorities

Read: Section 16 (2), Article VI

Case:
● Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821, March 04, 1949: The official session of Congress
begins when there is quorum, but it could adjourn with a lower number of
members present.

The quorum is determined by the actual presence of the members and while
constituting a quorum, the members present may validly replace a Senate
President.

Summary of Required Votes

Subject Matter Voting Voting Jointly
Separately
Choosing the President in case of a tie majority
Determining President’s inability to discharge the 2/3
powers and duties of his office (Section 11, Article
VII)
Confirming nomination of Vice-President (Section majority
9, Article VII)
Declaring the existence of a state of war in joint 2/3
session (Section 23 (1), Article VI
Proposing Constitutional amendments ¾

When revoking or extending the proclamation majority

suspending the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
(Section 18, Article VII)
When revoking or extending the declaration of majority
martial law (Section 18, Article VII)

Summary of congressional votes which requires a threshold other than majority:

Subject Matter Vote required

To enter the Yeas or Nays in the Journal 1/5 of the Members present
To suspend or expel a member in accordance with its 2/3 of all its members
rules and proceedings (Section 16 (3), Article VI)
To concur to a treaty (Section21, Article VII) 2/3 of all of the Senate
To send the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate 1/3 of all members of the
(Section 3(3), Article XI House of Representatives
To convict an impeachable officer by the Senate (Section 2/3 of all members of the
3(6), Article XI Senate

E. Discipline of Members
Read: Section 16(3), Article VI

Case:

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 ● Osmena v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960: The Court cannot interfere
with the rules adopted by Congress unless there is palpable violation of the
Constitution. The Court takes judicial notice of the rules adopted by Congress in
compliance with the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, the Court cannot lift
the sanction imposed on Osmena.

F. Process of Law-Making

Question: What are the requisites for valid passage of a bill?

Answer: The following are the requisites of a valid bill:
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal (Section 26
of Article VI).

General Rule: Only a bill can be passed into a law. Passed resolutions cannot become law
and repeal existing laws.
Exception to the rule: The concurrence of the Senate to a treaty undergoes three readings
and the same is embodied in a resolution.

Case:
● Ang Nars Party List v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 215746, October 8, 2019: In this
case, the Court discussed the distinction between a resolution and a bill. It said
that only a bill can become a law.

Question: What is the effect when the President certifies a bill as urgent?
Answer: The presidential certification may forego with the requirement of not only of
printing but also of reading the bill on three separate days. The phrase “except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, x x x.”

NOTE: Section 26 (2) of Article VI, qualifies two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been
printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved (Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994).

Question: Is the factual basis of presidential certification open to judicial review?

Answer: The factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away
with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by
members of Congress, elicits a different standard of review.

It will be noted that the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under Section 18 of Article VII, or the existence
of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Section 23(2) of Article VI, is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may impinge by the acts of the President. (Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994)

Question: How may a bill become a law?

Answer: A bill becomes a law when (a) the president signs it into law; (b) when the
President vetoes the bill, but such veto was overturned by Congress; or (c) through
presidential inaction for thirty (30) days from receipt of the bill for his signature (Section
27, Article VI).

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Case:
● Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997: In this case, the Court held
that an enrolled bill which is the product of the harmonization of the two versions
of a bill approved both chambers on third reading by the Bicameral Conference
Committee attests to its due enactment.

Note: a bill is approved in a plenary session.

1. Function of the Bicameral Conference Committee

Question: What is the function of the Bicameral Conference Committee?

Answer: The Bicameral Conference Committee is given a wide latitude by the
congressional rules to settle disagreeing versions of the bills. In an attempt to harmonize
conflicting provisions, it may even include additional provisions as long as they are
germane to the subject matter. The product of such compromise does not become final
and is subject to approval of both the Senate and House of Representatives (Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994).

Note: Read Section 24, Article VI

2. Limitations on Legislative Power

Read: Section 26, Article VI
a) Limitations on Revenue, Appropriations, and Tariff
Read: Section 24, Article VI; Section 25 (1) to (7), Article VI
b) Presidential Veto and Congressional Override
Read: Section 27, Article VI

Question: Can the Senate version of the appropriations bill prevail over the version of
the House of Representatives?
Answer: Yes, the Senate version of the appropriations bill can prevail over the version of
the House of Representatives. The bi-cameral committee conference can agree to adopt
the Senate version despite the fact that the Constitution mandates the appropriation bill
must originate from the House of Representatives. The argument of petitioners that the
said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and are therefore inconsistent
with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which requires, among others,
that “all appropriations, xxx bills authorizing increase of public debt” must be passed by
Congress and approved by the President is untenable. Certainly, the framers of the
Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including
existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere “bills” that
must again go through the legislative mill. The only reasonable interpretation of said
provisions of the Constitution which refer to “bills”is that they mean appropriation
measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof was,
otherwise, they should have expressed their decision in a more direct and express manner
(Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994).

Question: Under what circumstance may the President exercise his veto proper in
appropriation measures?
Answer: Inappropriate provisions in an appropriation bill may be vetoed by the
President as they are to be treated as items for purposes of the veto. Explicit is the
requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some
“particular appropriation” therein. According to the Supreme Court, if the challenged
“provisions” do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation, they should be
considered as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power (Gonzales v. Macaraig,
G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990.).

Question: What are the constitutional limitations to the power to appropriate?

Answer: The constitutional limitations to the power to appropriate are:

Page 36 of 76
 1) Congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the
President for the operation of the government. (Section 25[1], Art.VI)
2) A special appropriation bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by
the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposal. (Section 25[4], Art. VI)
3) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriation. However,
the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief
Justice, the Constitutional Commission may, by law, be authorized to
transfer funds within their respective departments and offices provided: (a)
the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting an item in the general
appropriation laws; and (b) the funds so transferred must come from their
savings. (Section 25[5], Art. VI)
4) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation
bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein.
(Section 25[2], Art. VI)
5) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary as such, is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium. (Section 29 [2], Art. VI)

Question: What is the doctrine of automatic re-appropriation?

Answer: When Congress fails to enact the general appropriation bill for the ensuing fiscal
year by the end of any fiscal year, the General Appropriation Law for the preceding fiscal
year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and in effect until the general
appropriation bill is passed by Congress. (Section 25 [7], Art. VI)

Question: Does the President have the power of impoundment under the Constitution?
Answer: The President does not enjoy the power of impoundment under the
Constitution. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to
spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type (PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994).

Question: What is Pork Barrel?

Answer: The Supreme Court defined the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of
rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds,
primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of
the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members (Belgica
v.Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013).

Question: What are the two types of pork barrel?

Answer: The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through
various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In the case of Belgica v. Ochoa (G.R.
No. 208566, November 19, 2013), petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the
2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure
that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization.
(Belgica, et. al., v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

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Question: Does the congressional pork barrel conform to the principle of separation of
powers?
Answer: Congressional Pork Barrel System violates the principle of separation of powers.
According to the Supreme Court, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas
of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions
of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the
foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as
Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and
release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle.

The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from

the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition,
to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this
end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa* which sanctioned the
conduct of legislator’s identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.”
(Belgica, et. al., v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

Note: PHILCONSA v. DBM Sec. Enriquez (G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994) resolved the
issue of the nature of the Countryside Development Fund. In that case, the Court held
that there was no interference on the part of the members of Congress in identifying
projects for its congressional districts as the act is purely recommendatory.

G. Rules on Appropriation and Re-Alignment

Question: What are the stages in the enactment of the General Appropriations Act
(“GAA”)?
Answer: The stages in enacting the General Appropriations Act (GAA) are:

Preparation as After the budget call by the Department of Budget and

prepared by each Management, the agencies of the government shall submit their
government individual budget proposals subject to the limitations and
agency. guidelines of the budget call.
Included in this The budget proposals will then be consolidated by the DBM
stage is a series of creating the National Expenditure Program (“NEP”) and the
budget series to Budget of Expenditure and Sources of Financing (“BESF”). The
justify all budget said documents will be refined by the DBM and the President.
proposals. Upon presidential approval, the DBM shall present the budget
documents: (a) the President’s Budget message; (2) the BESF; and
(3) NEP.
The executive branch must support the budget proposal with the
projected revenues of the national government.
Legislation – After the GAA is enacted on third reading, it is presented to the
After the hearings President for approval. (Section 27, Article VI)
on the budget, the All provisions of the GAA must comply with Section 29(1), Article
GAA undergoes VI.
three readings If the GAA is not approved by the end of the fiscal year, the general
and is duly appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed
enacted by both reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
chambers. appropriations bill is passed by the Congress. (Section 25 (7), Article
VI)

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Execution – After The Implementation of the GAA – Each government agency is
the President responsible to implement their agency appropriations subject DBM
signs the GAA rules and post audit measures of the COA.
into law, each For bodies entitled to fiscal autonomy, the DBM cannot impose any
government kind of condition since the Constitution guarantees the automatic
agency will then and regular release of funds appropriated to these bodies.
implement their
individual
appropriations
Accountability – Accountability is ensured through (a) performance targets and
Consonant to outcomes; (b) budget accountability reports; (c) review of agency
Section 1 of performance; and (d) audit conducted by the Commission on Audit
Article XI, every (COA)
public officer
charged with the
responsibility of
discharging with
public funds,
shall be held
accountable for
non-compliance
with budgeting
and auditing
rules.

Question: What is the doctrine of augmentation?

Answer: Under the doctrine of augmentation, the transfer of funds or appropriations by
law is impermissible or illegal. However, the President, the Senate President, the Speaker
of the House, the Chief Justice, the Constitutional Commission may, by law, be
authorized to transfer funds within their respective departments and offices provided:
(a) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting an item in the general appropriation
laws; and (b) the funds so transferred must come from their savings. (Section 25[5], Art.
VI)

Note: The relevant cases here are: Araullo v. President Aquino (G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014); Demetria v. Alba (G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987); and Goh v. Bayron (G.R. No.
212584, November 25, 2014).

Question: What are the requisites of a valid augmentation?

Answer: The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5) of Article VI
must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds
within their respective offices;
2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations
for their respective offices; and
3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices. (Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et
al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
et al., G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014,).

Note: By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be
authorized to augment any item in the GAA “for their respective offices,” Section 25 (5)
has delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office
are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of augmentation of

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a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or
cross-borders augmentations (Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014).

Question: Are cross-border transfer of funds allowed under the Constitution?

Answer: Cross-border transfers of funds, whether as an augmentation or aid to other
agencies, are unconstitutional. Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-
border transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5) of Article VI, disallowing cross-
border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as
aid, are prohibited under Section 25(5) (Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014).

Question: What are the guiding principles in determining what savings mean under the
contemplation of the power of augmentation?
Answer:
The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the purse. Congress decides how
the budget will be spent; what PAPS to fund; and the amounts of money to be spent for
each PAP.

The second principle is that the Executive, as the department of the Government tasked
to enforce the laws, is expected faithfully to execute the GAA and to spend the budget in
accordance with the provisions of the GAA. The Executive is expected to faithfully to
implement the PAPs for which Congress allocated funds, and limit the expenditures
within the allocations, unless exigencies result to deficiencies for which augmentation is
authorized, subject to conditions provided by law.

The third principle is that in making the President’s power to augment operative under
the GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution. In so doing,
Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for it delegates a fraction of its power
to the Executive. But Congress does not thereby allow the Executive to override its
authority over the purse as to let the Executive exceed its delegated authority.

And the fourth principle is that savings should be actual. “Actual” denotes something
that is real or substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, as opposed to
something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential, or hypothetical (Araullo v. Aquino
III, 728 SCRA 1, 136).

Case:
● Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014: The Court ruled that DAP is
constitutional but the manner by which President Aquino III disbursed public
funds was contrary to Section 25(5) of Article VI.

Based on the Araullo ruling, the Court said that upon scrutiny of the GAA,
“savings” refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in the
GAA free from any obligation or encumbrance which are:
1) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment
of the work, activity, or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized;
2) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and
related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without
pay; and
3) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of
measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled
agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and
services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.

H. Electoral Tribunals and Commission on Appointments

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Electoral Tribunals

Question: What is the primary function of the electoral tribunal?

Answer: Although the composition of the Electoral Tribunal is predominantly legislative,
the function of this body is purely judicial, to be discharged, on the basis solely of legal
considerations without regard to political, personal and other irrelevant considerations.
(Lerias v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 97105, October 15, 1991)
The Electoral Tribunal of each House is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. (Section 17, Art. VI).

1. Composition: Read the second and third sentences of Section 17, Article VI
SET – Three (3) Justices of the SC and 6 members of the Senate based on
proportional representation of the political parties elected in the chamber.
HRET – Three (3) Justices of the SC and 6 members of the House based on
proportional representation of the political parties and those who participated in
the party-list system

2. Powers and Jurisdiction: Read the first sentence of Section 17, Article VI
The SET and HRET are the sole tribunals to determine the qualification, election, and
return of the members of Congress.

Cases:
● Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991: While the composition of the
HRET is based on party affiliation, the term of office of a member of HRET is based
on a three-year period. Disloyalty to the political party is not a basis to remove a
member of HRET.

● Ongsiako-Reyes v. HRET, G.R. No. 207264, Jun 25, 2013: The presence of a member
of the Supreme Court is necessary to constitute a quorum. This conforms to the
intent of the framers of the constitution to ensure the impartiality of the tribunal
in resolving all election contests before it.

● Tañada v. HRET, G.R. No. 217012, March 01, 2016: The HRET cannot take
jurisdiction over the election contest instituted by Tañada because Alvin John
Tanada is not a member of the House of Representatives. The HRET only settles
issues between a proclaimed candidate and a losing candidate. It cannot take
cognizance of the issue related to the disqualification of Alvin John Tanada as a
nuisance candidate.

● David v. SET and Poe-Llamanzares, GR No. 221538, Sep 20, 2016: The Court affirmed
the resolution of the SET because its conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and
exhaustive reading of the Constitution that indeed Grace Poe-Llamanzares met all
the qualifications to become senator of the Philippines.

Commission on Appointments

Question: What is the principal function of the Commission on Appointments?

Answer: The principal function of the Commission on Appointments is either to confirm
or reject nominations made by the President in the exercise of his power to appoint.
(Section 18, Art. VI)

Question: Who are the public officers subject to confirmation by the Commission of
Appointments?
Answer: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.

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All members of the Civil Service Commission, the COMELEC and the Commission on
Audit as well as the four regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council are subject to
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Section 16, Article VII

1. Composition: 12 members from the Senate and 12 members from the House of
Representatives with the Senate President as ex officio Chairman who votes only
in case of a tie.
2. Powers and Jurisdiction: The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission.
It shall rule by a majority vote of all its members.

NOTE: Cases on the role of the COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS would be covered

under the EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

I. Powers of Congress

1. Legislative Inquiries and the Oversight Functions

Question: Are there permissible post-enactment congressional measures?

Answer: Yes, there are permissible post-enactment congressional measures. Any post-
enactment congressional measure should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
1) Scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
2) Investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. (ABAKADA
GURO v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008).

Question: What are the limitations on the conduct of congressional inquiry?

Answer: Section 21 has made explicit the limitations on the power of legislative
investigation: (1) it must be in aid of legislation; (2) it must be in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure; and (3) the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.

Note: In Balag v. Senate (G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018), the Court upheld the
constitutional protection of Balag to his right of liberty. The Balag ruling overturned the
Arnault v. Nazareno (G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950) doctrine which allowed an indefinite
period of detention for contempt.

Question: What is the rule on publication in the conduct of congressional inquiry?

Answer: The publication of the rules of procedure gives the notice that is required for
due process since investigations can affect the rights of non-members of Congress.
Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is ‘continuing,’ as it is not
dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its
members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it (Neri
v. Senate, G.R. 180643, March 25, 2008). Each chamber may adopt its own rules of
procedure. Such rules must be published.

Note: Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]) the
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.”
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of

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due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitute publication is set forth
in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days
following the completion of their publication either in the Officail Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.” (Garcillano v. House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008)

The publication of the Rules of Procedure on the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet
form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tanada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules ‘shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (3) newspapers of general circulation,” precluding any other form of
publication.
Publication in accordance with Tanada is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who
violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate (Garcillano
v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008, citing Justice Carpio).

Question: Who may be summoned to a congressional inquiry?

Answer: The Court in Senate v. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006) specified who
may and who may not be summoned to Section 21 hearings. Under this rule, even a
Department Head, who is an alter ego of the President, may be summoned. Anyone,
except the President and Justices of the Supreme Court, may be summoned.

Question: What is the basis of the power of Congress to compel appearance in the
conduct of congressional inquiry?
Answer: The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution find their
basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal
branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing
to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim
of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only
one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It
is based on the President’s being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-
standing custom. By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this
power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence,
each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on
the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary (Senate v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006).

Question: May the President prevent the appearance of members of cabinet in legislative
inquiry under Sections 21 and 22 of the Constitution?
Answer: In Senate v. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006), Executive Order No. 464
issued by the President directed the cabinet and other officials of the Executive
Department to secure permission of the President first before attending any invitation
from the Congress to appear as resource persons in its investigation. It was challenged
for impinging the power of the Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation. In
resolving the petition, the Court interpreted the nature and scope of the power of
investigations of the Congress under Section 21 and Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution.

Section 1 of E.O. 464 cannot be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries

in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the

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department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself/himself or by the Executive Secretary.

However, the Court held that Section 1 of E.O. 464, in view of its specific reference to
Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries
in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of
Article VI. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1 of E.O.
464, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the
question hour is discretionary on their part.

Question: What is the extent of the questions which may be propounded to a witness
during the conduct of the congressional inquiry?
Answer: Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, The Court said that the investigating committee has the power
to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to
his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise
of power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a Member; and
every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must
be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry.

But from this it does not follow that every question that may be propounded to a witness
must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other words, the materiality
of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and
not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is that the
necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action
itself is determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question
(Arnault v. Nazazreno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950).

Question: May Congress cite a person in contempt during the conduct of congressional
inquiry?
Answer: The exercise by the Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish
contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government
vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its
authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches
not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the
legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government
(Standard Charter Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial
Institutions and Currencies, G.R. NO. 167173, December 27, 2007).

Question: Who may claim executive privilege?

Answer: Only the President may claim executive privilege. Executive privilege is
recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the
fulfilment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those
instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly
important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised
on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in
pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such
high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential
to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize
the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive
Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that

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he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be
wielded only by the highest official in the executive. (Neri v. Various Committees of the
Senate, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008)

Note: Congress has the right to know the nature of executive privilege claimed by an
official refusing to respond to questions propounded during the conduct of a
congressional inquiry. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive
considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that
the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the
President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the
dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the
message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege
only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question
of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.
(Neri v. Various Senate Committees, G.R. 180643, March 25, 2008)

In Sereno v. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND RELATED MATTERS (CTRM) OF THE

NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (G.R. No. 175210,
February 01, 2016), the Court held that the information sought fell within the concept of
established privilege provided by jurisprudence under Section 3 (c) of Rule IV of the
Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713, the May 23, 2005 meeting being regarded as a closed-
door Cabinet meeting.

Question: May the President prevent members of the armed forces from testifying before
legislative investigations?
Answer: The President has constitutional authority to prevent member of the armed
forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry by virtue of his power as commander-
in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. (Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006)

Note: If the President is not inclined to allow the appearance, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. (Gudani v.
Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006)

Question: What is the basis for the authority to prevent military officers from attending
legislative inquiry?
Answer: The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as
commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces.
The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same
limitations as in executive privilege (Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006).

Congressional Inquiry
Question Hour
Under Section 21, Article VI, the following requisites
must be met:
1. Inquiry must be in aid of legislation.
2. Rules governing the inquiry must be published.
3. The rights of the persons appearing during the
inquiry must be respected.
In a congressional inquiry, the Congress may cite a
person in contempt and order his/her detention.
The invitation to appear is mandatory but during the
inquiry, the person may invoke his constitutional rights.
Section 22 of Article VI is purely voluntary. It may be
initiated either by the executive department with the
consent of the President or through a request of either the
Senate or the House of Representatives.

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 Written questions shall be submitted to the President of
the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives
at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions
but may cover matters related thereto. When the security
of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.

3. Non-Legislative
Question: What are the non-legislative powers of Congress?
Answer: The non-legislative powers of Congress include the following:
1) By vote of 2/3rd of both Houses, in joint session assembled, voting
separately, Congress shall have the sole power to declare the existence of
war. (Section 23[1], Art. VI)
2) The Senate’s power to concur treaties or international agreements entered
into by the President requiring at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
(Section 21, Art. VII).
3) To act as canvassing body for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
elections and to proclaim the persons duly elected. (Section 4, paragraphs 5
and 6, Art. VII)
4) The power to concur to the amnesty granted by the President. (Section 19,
Art. VII)
5) The House of Representatives has the power to initiate the impeachment
process against any of the impeachable officers enumerated in the
Constitution. (Section 3[1], Art. XI)
6) The Senate’s power to try and decide all impeachment cases. (Section 3[6],
Art. XI)

a) Informing Function
Question: What is the informing function of Congress?
Answer: The informing function of Congress is found in Section 15 of Article VI where
Congress hosts the President to deliver the State of the Nation Address every fourth
Monday of July. Section 15 of Article VI provides:
“The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in
session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.”

b) Power of Impeachment
Read Section 1, Article XI for the officers who may impeached
Read Section 1, Article XI for the grounds for impeachment
Read Section 2 (1) to (8) for the process of impeachment

Question: Enumerate the impeachable officers under the Constitution.

Answer: The impeachable officers under the Constitution are:
1) President
2) Vice-President
3) Members of the Supreme Court
4) Members of the Constitutional Commissions
5) Ombudsman

Question: What are the grounds for impeachment?

Answer: The grounds for impeachment are:

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 1) Culpable violation of the Constitution
2) Treason
3) Bribery
4) Graft and corruption
5) Other high crimes
6) Betrayal of public trust

Question: Discuss the steps to be followed in impeachment.

Answer: The steps to be followed in impeachment are:
1) A member of the House of Representatives, or any citizen upon a resolution
of endorsement by a member of the House, may file a verified complaint.
2) The complaint is included in the Order of Business of the House of within
three (3) days thereafter.
3) The proper Committee of the House conducts the hearing after which, by a
majority of all the members of the committee, submits a report to the House
within sixty (60) days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution.
4) The resolution of the Committee shall be calendared for consideration of
the House within ten (10) session days from receipt of the resolution.
5) The House will either affirm or override the recommendation of the
committee by a vote of at least one-third of all the members of the House.
The vote of each member shall be recorded.
6) If, the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least
1/3 of all the members of the House, the same shall constitute as the Articles
of Impeachment and forthwith forwarded to the Senate for trial and
decision (Sec. 1 [2,3,4], Art. XI).

Note: The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting as an impeachment body, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate.

Question: When is an impeachment complaint initiated?

Answer: The term to “initiate” refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled
with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initiation takes place by the act
of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3(5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period (Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003).

Question: What constitutes a political question in impeachment proceedings?

Answer: The determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature
(Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003).

Note: The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment

complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making power of the
House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to public
respondent. In the discharge of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable
standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential
considerations behove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duly to
effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the
minimum constitutional guidelines (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives on Justice, G.R.
No. 193459, February 15, 2011).

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Question: What are the effects of impeachment?
Answer: Removal from office of the impeached official and disqualification to hold any
office under the Republic of the Philippines.

Question: May an impeachable public officer be removed through a quo warranto

proceeding?
Answer: Yes, an impeachable public officer be removed through a quo warranto
proceeding. In Republic v. Sereno (G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018), the Court held
impeachment and quo warranto proceeding are two distinct ways of removing a public
officer. The nature of an impeachment case is covered under Article XI of the
Constitution. The grounds for instituting an impeachment complaint are distinct and
procedure goes through Congress, with the House of Representatives determining the
sufficiency in form and substance of an impeachment complaint while the Senate acts as
the impeachment tribunal to convict the impeachable public officer.
In a quo warranto proceeding, an infirmity in the qualifications is raised by the Solicitor
General before the court. This is purely a judicial proceeding. The Court found Chief
Justice Sereno failed to meet the constitutional requirement of proven integrity when she
consistently failed for several years, her SALN while she was a professor at the U.P.
College of Law.

Question: May Mrs. Cristina Roco Corona, as surviving spouse of the late Chief Justice
Corona, claim the retirement and other benefits as well as survivorship pension despite
his impeachment?
Answer: Yes, Mrs. Cristina Roco Corona, as surviving spouse of the late Chief Justice
Corona, can claim the retirement and other benefits of the Chief Justice as well as
survivorship pension despite his impeachment. Impeachment is a constitutional process
that takes place within the political departments of the government. The effects of a
judgment on an impeachment complaint extends no further than to removal from office
and disqualification from holding any public office. An impeached public officer whose
civil, criminal, or administrative liability was not judicially established may be
considered involuntarily retired from service. As such, he is entitled to the retirement
benefits provided under R.A. 9946 [An Act Granting Additional Retirement,
Survivorship, and other Benefits to Members of the Judiciary, amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 910, as amended, providing Funds Therefor and for other Purposes]
and R.A.8291[. Mrs. Corona is entitled to the payment of Chief Justice Corona's
survivorship benefits and other allowances under R.A. 9964 [An Act amending
Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended, Expanding, and Increasing the Coverage and
Benefits of the Government Service Insurance System, Instituting Reforms therein and
for other Purposes] (Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona, AM. No. 20-07-10-SC,
January 12, 2021, Hernando, J.).

III. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Nature of Executive Power

Read Sections 1 and 17, Article VIII
1) In Relation to the implementation of laws (Including Delegated Powers)
2) Express or Implied (Including the Faithful Execution of Laws and Residual
Powers)

Question: What is the extent of the executive power enjoyed by the President?
Answer: The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than
the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power is
inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has be executive.

Question: What is the residual power of the President?

Answer: Residual power is the unstated power residing in the President to do anything
which is not forbidden by the Constitution and designed to promote and safeguard the

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welfare of the people founded on his duty as steward of the people and protector of peace.
(Aguirre, Postulates in Constitutional Law 1, 199 edition, p. 170)

Case:
● Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989: President Corazon
Aquino can invoke the prerogative not to allow former President Marcos to return
to the Philippines.

B. Concept of Presidential Immunity

C. Immunity from suit

Question: What is the nature of the immunity from suit of the President?
Answer: Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide
for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court while serving as such (David
v. PGMA, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006).

Question: What is the rationale behind the grant of immunity from suit in favor of the
President?
Answer: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the government is a job that,
aside from being from requiring all of the office holder’s time, also demands undivided
attention. (Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988).

1. Conduct Covered:

Question: What is the extent of the President’s immunity from suit?

Answer: The President is immune from all civil and criminal cases during his term of
office. He cannot be sued during his term even if the acts complained of beyond the scope
of his authority.
The presidential immunity assures the President of the exercise of his duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction.

Cases:
● Zabal v. Pres. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019: President Duterte should
have not been made a respondent to the case because of the immunity he enjoys.
The Court upheld the valid exercise of police power when he ordered the
lockdown of Boracay Island.

● De Lima V. Pres. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019: The U.S. Supreme
Court in Clinton v. Jones could not be applied in the case because the immunity of
the President from suit is absolute.

● Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001: Former President Estrada
cannot invoke presidential immunity for the violation of the Plunder Law because
he was no longer President of the Philippines when the information was lodged
against him.

● Trump v. Vance, 591 U.S. ___ (2020): The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
incumbent U.S. President is subject to subpoenas in criminal prosecutions for
personal conduct with the same legal threshold as anyone else. The requesting
party has the burden to show the show the need for the documents and the
President just like any citizen could avail of defenses available under the
circumstances.

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 ● Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997): The U.S. Supreme Court held that a sitting
President does not possess absolute immunity from civil litigation surrounding
acts he committed before becoming President.

2. Waiver and Exceptions

The President enjoys absolute immunity except for acts which are considered grounds
for impeachment. The immunity is only a privilege and can be waived.

Cases:
● Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988: The Court said that
presidential immunity is personal to the President and cannot be invoked by the
accused.

● Sabio v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 233853-53, July 10, 2019: Sabio as
the Chairman of the PCGG cannot invoke the alter ego doctrine in the case
instituted against him before the Sandiganbayan. The immunity is personal to the
President.

● Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982): A sitting President and government
officials enjoy absolute immunity from civil litigation for official acts undertaken
while in office.

D. Concept of Executive Privilege

Question: What is executive privilege?

Answer: Executive privilege is the power of the Government to withhold information
from the public, the courts, and the Congress. The executive department cannot be
compelled make public disclosure on matters involved in maintaining governmental
operations and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents
integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive’s domestic decisional and policy
making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in
intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.
.
Question: What is the scope of executive privilege?
Answer: Confidential information which are covered by executive privilege include:
1) Conversations and correspondence between the President and other
officials of the government.
2) Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the
interest of national security should not be divulged.
3) Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of
treaties and executive agreements.
4) Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings. (Sereno v. Committee on Trade and
Related Matters, G.R. No. 175210, February 01, 2016)
5) Matters affecting national security and public order (Senate v. Ermita, G.R.
No. 169777, April 20, 2006)

Cases:
● Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006: The claim of
executive privilege may be in the conduct of the question hour, but the President
may not put restrictions on the officials in the executive branch in the conduct of a
congressional inquiry.

● United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974): The U.S. Supreme ordered President
Nixon to deliver taped recordings and other subpoenaed materials to a federal
district court thereby limiting the power of any U.S. president to claim executive
privilege. There was a greater public interest involved to ferret out the truth in the
Watergate scandal.

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 1. Types

Question: What are the types of executive privilege?

Answer: The types of executive privilege are:
a) The presidential communications privilege; and
b) The deliberative process privilege.

Note: The principle of executive privilege, by order of the President, may cover
1) conversations of the President in the exercise of executive and policy
decision-making; and
2) information, which might impair diplomatic as well as economic relations.
It may also include military and national security matters.

Question: What are the factors considered to determine if the information is covered by
the presidential communications privilege?
Answer: The following factors are considered to determine if the information is covered
by the presidential communications privilege:
a) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power;
b) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the President.
c) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought "likely contains important evidence" and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

2. Who May Invoke

Question: Who may invoke executive privilege?

Answer: The privilege is personal to the President. The recipient of the information may
be covered by the operational proximity rule. This refers only to communications at that
level to those who are close enough to the President.

Cases:
● Neri v. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008: The Court allowed
Executive Secretary Ermita as the alter ego of the President to invoke executive
privilege on behalf of President Arroyo.

● Sereno v. CRTM, G.R. No. 175210, February 01, 2016: Citing Chavez v. PEA-Amari
and Senate v. Ermita, the Court held that certain matters beyond the scrutiny of the
public which are covered by executive privilege. Closed door cabinet meetings
and other similar meetings may fall within the scope of executive privilege.

E. Qualifications, Election, Term of the President and Vice-President, and Rules on

Succession
F. Read Section 2, Article VII for the qualifications of the President
G. Read Section 3, Article VII for the qualifications of the Vice-President

Requirement Qualification
Citizenship Natural-born Filipino
Age At least 40 years of age at the time of the election
Residency Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately
preceding the election
Registration Registered voter

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Education Able to read and write

Read Section 4, Article VII

Manner of Election: Both the President and the Vice President are elected at large.
Term of Office: The President serves a term of six years and shall not be eligible while
no Vice President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.
Restrictions on term of office: No person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same
office at any time.
Voluntary renunciation of the office of the Vice President for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Canvassing of votes and proclamation: The Joint Committee of Congress shall
canvass the votes for the President and the Vice President. The Joint Committee shall
proclaim the duly elected President and Vice President.
Election Contest: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Rules of Succession
Filling up the vacancy in case of a tie
Section 4, paragraph 5, Article VII
In case two or more shall have an equal
and highest number of votes, one of them
shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

Failure of President-elect to qualify. The Vice-President-elect shall act as

Section 7, paragraph 2, Article VII President until the President-elect shall
have qualified.

No President is chosen by the Joint The Vice-President-elect shall act as

Committee President until a President shall have been
Section 7, paragraph 3, Article VII chosen and qualified.

Death or permanent disability of the The Vice-President-elect shall become

President-elect at the beginning of his President.
term
Section 7, paragraph 4, Article VII

No President and Vice President shall The President of the Senate or, in case of
have qualified, shall not have been his inability, the Speaker of the House of
chosen or should die or become Representatives shall act as President until
permanently disabled. a President, or a Vice-President shall have
Section 7, paragraph 5, Article VII been chosen and qualified.
Death, permanent disability, removal The Vice-President shall become the
from office or resignation of the President to serve the unexpired term.
President
Section 8, first sentence, Article VII
Death, permanent disability, removal
The President of the Senate or, in case of
from office or resignation of the his inability, the Speaker of the House of
President and the Vice President Representatives shall act as President until
Section 8, second sentence, Article VII
a President, or a Vice-President shall have
been elected and qualified.
Vacancy in the office of the Vice The President shall nominate a Vice-
President President from among the Members of the
Section 9, Article VII Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon

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 confirmation by a majority vote of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.

Manner to fill up the temporary vacancy under paragraph 5 of Section 7, Article VII–
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as
President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified,
in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the
next preceding paragraph.

Manner to fill up the temporary vacancy under the second sentence of Section 8, Article
VII –
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death,
permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the
President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject
to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.

Read Section 10, Article VII

Manner of filling up the permanent The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the
vacancy in the offices of the President morning of the third day after the vacancy
and the Vice President in the offices of the President and Vice-
President occurs, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call and
within seven days enact a law calling for a
special election to elect a President and a
Vice-President.
Period of campaign No election shall be held earlier than forty-
five days nor later than sixty days from the
time of such call.
Nature of the bill The bill calling such special election shall
be deemed certified under paragraph 2,
Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution
and shall become law upon its approval
on third reading by the Congress.
Funding the special election Appropriations for the special election
shall be charged against any current
appropriations and shall be exempt from
the requirements of paragraph 4, Section
25, Article VI of this Constitution.
Restrictions in holding the special The convening of the Congress cannot be
election suspended, nor the special election
postponed. No special election shall be
called if the vacancy occurs within
eighteen months before the date of the
next presidential election.

Temporary Incapacity of the President under Section 11 of Article VII

Voluntary declaration of incapacity
Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, and
until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers

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Involuntary declaration of incapacity:
Cabinet declaration is contested by the When the President transmits to the
President
Declaration of the President is contested Should a majority of all the Members of
by majority of the cabinet
Resolution of conflicting declarations of The Congress shall convene, if it is not in
the President and majority of the cabinet session, within forty-eight hours, in
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the members of
the Cabinet transmit to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President
President of the Senate and to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists,
he shall reassume the powers and duties
of his office.
the Cabinet transmit within five days to
the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Congress shall
decide the issue.
accordance with its rules and without
need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after
receipt of the last written declaration, or, if
not in session, within twelve days after it
is required to assemble, determines by a
two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall act as the
President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office.

President Health Status under Section 12 of Article VII

President has a serious illness The public shall be informed of the state of
his health.
Limited access to the President in case of Members of the Cabinet in charge of
serious illness national security and foreign relations and
Reason: The President as Commander-in- the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
Chief cannot delegate his powers under the Philippines, shall not be denied access
section 18, Article VII. to the President during such illness.
Being the sole architect of the country’s
policy, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs is
given full access to the President in case of
his serious illness.

Case:
● De Leon v. Pres. Duterte, G.R. No. 252118, May 8, 2020: There is no obligation on
the part of the President to reveal his actual health status.

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E. Other Privileges, Inhibitions, and Disqualifications

Question: What are the prohibitions on the President, Vice-President and members of the
Cabinet, their assistants, and deputies?
Answer: The prohibitions are:
1) They shall not hold any other office or employment during the tenure,
unless otherwise provided in the Constitution.
2) They shall not, during their tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
3) They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office
(Section 13, Art. VII)

Read Section 6, Article VII – official residence of the President; salaries and restrictions
on increase/decrease; and prohibition to receive any other emolument

Read Section 13, Article VII – Inhibitions and Disqualifications

Prohibition to hold other The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
office and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure.
Prohibition to practice They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
profession practice any other profession.
Prohibition to conduct They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
business participate in any business.
Prohibition to have They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
financial interest or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.
Prohibition on conflict of They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
interest of their office.
Prohibition on nepotism The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not,
during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.

F. Powers of the President

Question: What are the powers of the President?
Answer: The powers of the President are:
1. Execute the laws of the land
2. Appointment and removal
3. Control over the executive departments, bureaus, and offices
4. Military power
5. Pardoning power
6. Diplomatic power
7. Supervisory power over all local governments
8. Contract loan

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 9. Residual power

1. Executive and Administrative Powers

“Section 1, Article VII. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.”
“Section 17, Article VII. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.”

2. Power of Appointment

Question: What are the limitations on the appointing power of the President?
Answer: The limitations on the power of appointment of the President are:
1) The President may not appoint his spouse and relatives by consanguinity
and affinity within the fourth civil degree during his term as members of
the Constitutional Commissions, Office of the Ombudsman, or as
secretaries, undersecretaries, chairmen, or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government owned and controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries (Section 13, Art. VII).
2) The President or acting President cannot exercise the power of appointment
two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety (Section 15, Art. VII).
3) Appointment in the Judiciary shall be made upon recommendation of the
Judicial and Bar Council (Section 8, Art. VII).
4) Appointments extended by the Acting President shall remain effective,
unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his
assumption (Section 14, Art. VII).

a) Process of Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

Question: What are the four groups of officers whose appointments are subject to the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments?
Answer: These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel, or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution;
second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law; third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
and fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone (Sarmiento III v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987).

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints
(id.).

Note: Other officers whose appointment are subject to confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments are:
1) The regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council
2) The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission
3) The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Commission on Elections
4) The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Commission on Audit

b) By-Passed Appointments and their Effects

Question: What are the effects of a bypassed appointments?

Page 56 of 76
Answer: When an appointment is bypassed by the Commission on Appointments, a
vacancy is thereby created upon adjournment of Congress. The President may then issue
an ad interim appointment to fill up the vacancy. The bypassed appointee of the
President should vacate the post after failing to secure the confirmation from the
Commission on Appointments.

Read Section 16, Article VII – “The President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until after disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.”

c) Appointments by an Acting President

Read Section 14, Article VII – “Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain
effective, unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption or
reassumption of office.”

d) Scope of Midnight Appointments

Question: Will the prohibition on midnight appointments cover appointments in the

Judiciary?
Answer: Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article
VII, the court held that it does have any doubt that the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments made in Executive Department. The framers
did not need to extend the Judiciary because appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberative prior process of the JBC ensured that there
would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary (De Castro v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010).

Case:
● Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015 The Court
ruled that all appointments issued by outgoing President Arroyo in favor of the
petitioners are null and void because all the appointments were issued during the
election ban period.

Read Section 15, Article VII – “Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.”

e) Recess and Ad-Interim Appointments

Question: What is the nature of an acting appointment?

Answer: The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It
is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment
of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter
ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office. (Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978,
October 13, 2005)

Question: Discuss the distinctions between ad interim appointment and appointment in

acting capacity.
Answer: Both ad interim appointment and appointment in acting capacity are effective
upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended anytime there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments

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for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission
on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices
but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments (Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005).

Read Section 16, Article VII - “The President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until after disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.”

f) Power of Removal

Question: May an elective official hold any other position?

Answer: The view that an elective official may be appointed to another position if
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference
in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Section 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While
the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official
when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph
appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to other government posts, except as
are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the
economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of
the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council (Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993).

Power to Remove
Case
● Gonzales III V. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014: Under the
doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a
general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable
by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise—that
is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the
appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to
remove from the power of the President’s power to appoint. Under Section 9,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of
the Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by
Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only
by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its
personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of
the Civil Service Commission [Section 1(2), Article IX (B)], the Commission on Elections
[Section 1(2), Article IX(C)], and the Commission on Audit [Section 1(2), Article IX(D)]
shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself
shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed
only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).

Question: May the President remove an appointive official through impeachment?

Answer: Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power
to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also
removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise—
that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than
the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to
remove from the power of the President’s power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be
removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI),

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while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its
administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The
Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Section 1(2), Article
IX (B)], the Commission on Elections [Section 1(2), Article IX(C)], and the Commission on
Audit [Section 1(2), Article IX(D)] shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they
may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the
Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may
also be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). (Gonzales III V. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014)

Question: May the President’s power to appoint the Board of Trustees be restricted by a
provision creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines?
Answer: The President’s power to appoint the Board of Trustees cannot be restricted by
a provision creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines. The Court ruled the provision
is unconstitutional. Thus, President Estrada may appoint a new set of Board of Trustees
of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006).

3. Power of Control and Supervision [Read Section 17, Article VII]

a) Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency [Read Section 13, Article VII]
b) Executive Departments and Offices [Read Sections 1 and 17, Article VII]
c) Local Government Units [Read Section 4, Article X]

Question: What is the extent of power of control?

Answer: The power to control means the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. It does not include the power to remove an
officer or employee in the executive department. The power merely applies to the exercise
of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the
act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a
subordinate in the performance of his duties.
(Ang-Angco v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-17169, November 30, 1963).

Question: What is the doctrine of qualified political agency?

Answer: All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law that he act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts
of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive. (Villena v. Secretary of Interior, G.R. No. L-46570, April 21,
1939).

Question: What is the scope of the power of the President to create an ad hoc investigative
body?
Answer: The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the
faithful execution of the laws is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive.
That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to
execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not
mean that he is bereft of such authority. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010)

Note: The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws—in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency—is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this

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power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he
is bereft of such authority (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935,
December 7, 2010).

4. Emergency Powers [Read Section 23(1) and (2), Article VI and relate this with Section
17 of Article XII]

5. Commander-in-Chief Powers [Read Section 3, Article II and Section 18, Article VII]
a) Calling Out Powers
b) Declaration of Martial Law and the Suspension of the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Including Extension of Period)

Commander-in-Chief and Martial Law Powers

Question: What is the scope of the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President?

Answer: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law (Section 18, Art. VII).

Section 18 of Article VII grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of

graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public
safety requires the exercise of such power.

Question: When may the President exercise the calling out power?
Answer: The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may
call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
(Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004)

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion, and rebellion. This involves ordinary police
action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered
illegal or ultra vires (David v. PGMA, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006). Calling-out power
cannot validate any of the following acts: (a) arrests and seizures without judicial
warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and
press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, as they are powers which can
be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid
declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. (David v. PGMA,
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

Question: What are the constitutional checks to prevent possible abuses in the exercise
to declare martial law?
Answer: The constitutional checks are:
1) The Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all the
members, in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, as the case maybe (Section 18, Art. VII).
2) The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof. The
Supreme Court must promulgate its decision within thirty days from the
date of filing of the petition (Ibid.).

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Note: The power of Congress to review the basis of the declaration of martial is automatic.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in
tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense
jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the
ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the
Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the
Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather
than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the
Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final
rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of
Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. (Fortun, et. al. v.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012)

Question: What are the grounds for the declaration of martial law or the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus?
Answer: The grounds are:
1) invasion or
2) rebellion, when public safety requires it.

Note: A declaration of rebellion at most, only gives notice to the nation that such a state
exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the
declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even
on the entire nation. The Supreme Court’s mandate is to probe only into the legal
consequences of the declaration. The Court found that such declaration is devoid of any
legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written (Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004 cited in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R.
No. 231658, July 4, 2017).

Question: Is there a need to have a joint session for Congress to approve the declaration
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
Answer: There is need to have a joint session for Congress to approve the declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A joint session
of Congress is required only to revoke the declaration of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No.
231671, July 25, 2017).

Question: Is the extension of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus limited to a period of 60 days?
Answer: The extension of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not limited to a period of 60 days. Congress has the
power to determine the period of extension (Lagman v. Pimentel III, G.R. No. 235935,
February 6, 2018).

Question: May a provincial governor exercise the calling out powers of the President to
resolve a kidnapping incident in his territory?
Answer: A provincial governor cannot exercise the calling out powers of the President to
resolve a kidnapping incident in his territory. The Commander-in-Chief powers are
reserved only in the President (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012).

6. Pardoning Powers [Read Section 19, Article VII and Section 5, C [COMELEC] of Article
IX.]

a) Scope and Limitations

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Pardoning power

Question: What is the nature of the pardoning power of the President?

Answer: The pardoning power of the President is a private, though official act, and its
exercise rests on the absolute and uncontrollable discretion of the President. The reason
for its exercise is not open to judicial scrutiny. It proceeds from the power of the President
to execute the laws. (US v. Guarin, G.R. No. L-9900, March 15, 1915)

Question: What are the limitations to the pardoning power of the President?
Answer: The limitations to the pardoning power of the President are:
1) It can only be exercised after conviction by final judgment.
2) It cannot extend to cases of impeachment.
3) It cannot be exercised on matters involving violation of election laws, unless
favourably recommended by the Commission on Elections.
4) Pardon cannot extinguish civil liability awarded to third persons.
5) Pardon does not restore offices forfeited or vacated after conviction.

Question: Can a pardoned official cannot claim back position which was forfeited by
virtue of conviction in the criminal case?
Answer: A pardoned official cannot claim back position which was forfeited by virtue of
conviction in the criminal case. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a
mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense would be
grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing
power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral
risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. (Monsanto v. Factoran,
Jr., G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)

b) Forms of Executive Clemency

Question: What are the forms of executive clemency under the Constitution?
Answer: The forms of executive clemency under the Constitution are reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress. (Section 19, Article VII)

Question: What is the nature of an absolute pardon granted by the President?

Answer: An absolute pardon granted by the President restores the person to his full civil
and political rights. (Risos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206666, January 21,
2015).

7. Foreign Relations Powers

a) In General
b) To Contract or Guarantee Foreign Loans [Read Section 20, Article VII]
c) Entry into Treaties or International Agreements [Read Section 21, Article
VII]

Note: Constitutional provisions providing for the diplomatic power of the President
include:
1) The President is the head of State and the repository of executive power
(Section 1, Art. VII)
2) The President shall nominate with the consent of the Commission on
Appointment, among others, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls (Section 16, Art. VII)

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 3) The President may enter into a treaty or executive agreement with the
concurrence of at r two-thirds of all the members of the Senate (Section 21,
Art. VII)
4) The President may contract foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines (Section 21, Art. VII)

Note: In the recent case of Esmero v. President Duterte, the Court citing Saguisag v.
Ochoa, Jr. said that the following are the constitutional restrictions to the President's
foreign affairs powers:
a) The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within Philippine territory;
b) The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts, which must be pursuant to the authority
granted by Congress;
c) The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant to a law concurred
in by a majority of all the Members of Congress;
d) The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the Philippines, of foreign
loans that must be previously concurred in by the Monetary Board;
e) The authorization of the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred in by
the Senate; and
f) For agreements that do not tall under paragraph 5, the concurrence of the
Senate is required, should the form of the government chose to be a treaty.

Diplomatic negotiations privilege:

Question: May petitioners pray for issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the President
to allow them to participate in the negotiations of a treaty?
Answer: No, petitioners may not be granted a writ of mandamus to compel the President
to allow them to participate in the negotiations of a treaty Diplomatic negotiations are
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, but such privilege is only presumptive
(Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008).

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative

process and presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the
rational for the confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process,
and presidential communications is similar, if not identical (Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No.
170516, July 16, 2008).

Question: What is the deliberative process privilege?

Answer: Deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents
rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the “obvious realization that
officials will not communicate candidly a month themselves if each remark is a potential
item of discovery and from page news,” the objective of the privilege being to enhance
the quality of agency decisions (Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008).

Cases:
● Vinuya v. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014: Being the sole architect of the
country’s foreign policies, the Court cannot compel the President to demand a
written public apology from the Japanese government for the alleged indignities
suffered by the Malaya Lolas during World War II when the Japanese Imperial
Forces occupied the Philippines. The Court may not also direct the President to
demand for additional reparations on their behalf.

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 ● Esmero v. Duterte, G.R. No. 256288, 29 June 2021: By constitutional fiat and the
intrinsic nature of his office, the President is also the sole organ and authority in
the external affairs of the country. The petitioner argues that it is the ministerial
duty of the President, as part of his mandate to enforce the laws and see to their
faithful execution, to "defend" the national territory by going before the United
Nations (UN) to ask the latter to send "UN Patrol Boats x x x to protect our
fishermen." In dismissing the petition, the Court said that ultimately, the decision
of how best to address our disputes with China (be it militarily, diplomatically,
legally) rests on the political branches of government.

● Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483, and 240954, 16 March 2021: The
Court held that the issue has become moot and academic because the International
Criminal Court has accepted the withdrawal of the Philippines from the Rome
Statute.

8. Powers Relative to Appropriation Measures

SECTION 25, Article VI. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the
budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed
by law.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may,
by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for
public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines
as may be prescribed by law.

9. Veto Powers

Section 27(1) and (2), Article VII – “The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object.”

IV. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

A. Concept of Judicial Power

Question: What is the nature of judicial power?

Answer: The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before
the Supreme Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because the Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred. Otherwise, the Court would be shirking from its duty
vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with
authority thus, the Court is duty bound to take cognizance of the petitions before it. In
the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, “jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a
solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would
be a dereliction of duty” (Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov 10,
2003).

B. Judicial Review

Question: What is the power of judicial review?

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Answer: The power of judicial review is the power of the Supreme Court to declare a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. It includes the power to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (sec. 1, 5, Art.
VIII).

1. Requisites

Question: What are the requisites of exercise of the power of judicial review?
Answer: The requisites of judicial review are:
1) Actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial review.
2) The person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
3) The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity.
4) The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Question: What is an actual case or controversy?

Answer: An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite of
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest; a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief (David v. PGMA, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006).

Question: Who has the legal standing to sue?

Answer: Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing
to sue, provided the following requirements are met:
1) The cases involved constitutional issues.
2) For taxpayer, there must be a chain of illegal disbursement of public funds
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional.
3) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question.
4) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be settled early.
5) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. (Province of North Cotabato
v. GRP Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008)

Question: What matters are outside the power of judicial review?

Answer: In deciding to take jurisdiction over a petition for constitutionality of a statute
or any act of branches of government, the Supreme Court will not review the wisdom of
the decision of the Executive in taking the questioned action or of the Congress in
enacting the assailed statute. (Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 02, 1997)

2. Moot Questions

Question: What is the general rule on moot and academic cases?

Answer: The Supreme Court cannot decide moot and academic cases. A moot and
academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
(Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 02, 1997.)

Note: Exceptions to mootness principle

1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution.
2) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved.

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 3) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public.
4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review (David v. PGMA, G.R.
No. 171396, May 3, 2006).

3. Political Questions Doctrine

Question: What is apolitical question?

Answer: A political question refers to those issues which under the Constitution are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or regard to which full discretionary
authority has been e delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
(Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989)

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries
the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches
of government." Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political
question doctrine under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr (369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691,
L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962]).

Note: Criteria for determining whether a question is political -

1) A “textually demonstrable” constitutional commitment of the issue to the
political branches.
2) Lack of manageable standards for judicial resolution.
3) A need for finality in the action of the political branches.
4) Difficulty or impossibility of devising effective judicial remedies (Baker v.
Carr, 369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962])

4. Operative Fact Doctrine

Question: What is the operative fact doctrine?

Answer: The operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or executive act
prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced
consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored, or disregarded. In short, it nullifies
the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the
general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.

C. Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy

Question: What are the guarantees of judicial independence under the Constitution?
Answer: The guarantees of judicial independence under the Constitution are:
1) The members of the judiciary shall hold office during good behaviour until
they reach the age of seventy or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office (Sec. 11, Art. VIII)
2) The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary
may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for
the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released (Sec. 3, Art. VIII)
3) Members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment on
grounds provided in the Constitution (sec. 2, Art. XI).
4) The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be increased by law
without its advice and concurrence (Sec. 30, Art. VI)
5) Congress shall not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII (Sec. 2, par. 2, Art. VIII)
6) No law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary when it will undermine
the security of tenure of its members (Sec. 2, par. 2, Art. VIII)
7) Appointment to the Judiciary shall be made upon recommendation of the
Judicial and Bar Council without need of confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments (Sec. 9, par. 1, Art. VIII)

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 8) Members of the Supreme Court and other lower courts shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions (sec. 12, Art. VIII).
9) The Supreme Court shall have exclusive power to discipline and remove
judges of lower courts (Sec. 11, Art. VIII)
10) The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts
and the personnel thereof (Sec. 6, Art. VIII)

D. Appointments to the Judiciary

1. Qualifications of Members

a. Supreme Court Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the

Supreme Court, Presiding Justices, and Associate Justices of
other collegial courts (Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals) -
1) Natural Born Citizen;
2) Forty (40) years of age;
3) Fifteen (15) years as a judge of a lower or practice of
law; and
4) Must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.

b. Presiding Judge of Lower Courts

Under B.P. 129, as amended, the following are the
requirements for RTC judge:
1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
2) at least thirty-five years of age,
3) for at least ten years, has been engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines or has held a public office in
the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of
law as an indispensable requisite, and
4) Must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence

Under B.P. 129, as amended, the following are the

requirements for first level judge:
1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
2) at least 30 years of age,
3) for at least five years, has been engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines, or has held a public office in
the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of
law as an indispensable requisite; and
4) Must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence

Note: Failure of the applicant to have all the qualifications at the time of the
appointment would be subjected to quo warranto proceedings. (Republic v. Sereno,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

2. Judicial and Bar Council

a) Composition –

Question: What is the composition of the JBC?

Answer: The JBC is composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of

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the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. [Section 8(1), Article VIII].

b) Powers

Question: What are the powers vested in the JBC?

Answer: The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to
the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it [Section 8(5), Article VIII].

E. The Supreme Court

1. Composition, Powers, and Functions

Composition -
SECTION 4. (1), Article VIII - “The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof.”

Powers and Functions –

Question: What is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?

Answer: The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court includes -
1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.
e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the
consent of the judge concerned.
4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law (Sec. 5, Art. VIII).

2. En Banc and Division Cases

Question: Cite the en banc cases which fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Answer: The en banc cases which fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:

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 1) Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
2) Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty
or reclusion perpetua;
3) Cases raising novel questions of law;
4) Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;
5) Cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit;
6) Cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the dismissal of a
judge, the disbarment of a lawyer, the suspension of any of them for a
period of more than one year, or a fine exceeding forty thousand pesos;
7) Cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement
in the judiciary of a dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the
roll of attorneys, or the lifting of a judge’s suspension or a lawyer’s
suspension from the practice of law;
8) Cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding
Justice, or any Associate Justice of the collegial appellate court;
9) Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by a
Division may be modified or reversed;
10) Cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions;
11) Cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;
12) Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on
businesses or affects the welfare of a community;
13) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion
of at least three Members of the Division who are voting and present, are
appropriate for transfer to the Court en banc;
14) Cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its
attention; and
15) All matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of
all courts and their personnel.

Question: What are the cases which are decided by the Divisions of the Supreme Court?
Answer: All cases and matters under the jurisdiction of the Court not otherwise provided
for by law, by the Rules of Court or by the Internal Rules to be cognizable by the Court en
banc shall be cognizable by the Divisions.

3. Administrative Supervision of the Supreme Court Over Lower Courts

Question: Cite the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court over the lower
courts.
Answer: The administrative supervision of the Supreme Court over the lower courts
includes the following:
1) The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts
and the personnel thereof (Section 6, Article VIII).
2) The Supreme Court may assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other
stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall
not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned (Section
5(3), Article VI).
3) The Supreme Court may .order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
a miscarriage of justice (Section 5(3), Article VIII).
4) The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of
lower courts or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon (Section 11, Article VIII).

4. Original and Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

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Original Jurisdiction - Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

Appellate Jurisdiction - Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,

as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts
in:
1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.
5) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

V. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

A. Constitutional Safeguards to Ensure Independence of Commissions

Question: What are provisions which guarantee the independence of the Constitutional
Commissions?
Answer: The provisions which guarantee the independence of the Constitutional
Commissions are:
1) The salary of the Chairman and Commissioners shall be fixed by law and
shall not be decreased during their tenure (Section 3, Common Provisions,
Article IX -A);
2) The members of the Commission have a fixed term of office.
3) The members of the Commission cannot be removed from office except by
impeachment and upon their expiration of their term.
4) The Commission enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriation shall be automatically and regularly released (Section 5,
Common Provisions, Article IX -A).

Question: Is the Civil Service Commission covered by “No report-no release” policy of
the DBM?
Answer: The “No report-no release” policy of the DBM violates the Constitution.
“Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to commissions vested with
fiscal autonomy should be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to them
maybe imposed. (Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and Management, G.R.
No. 158791, February 10, 2006)

B. Common Provisions

Question: Cite the common provisions which govern the three constitutional
commissions?
Answer: The common provisions applicable to the Constitutional Commissions are:
1) Prohibitions to hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
2) Proscription against engaging in the practice of their profession or in active
management or control of any business which in any way may be affected
by the function of their office.
3) Injunction against financial interest, directly or indirectly, in any contract
with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.
4) Enjoyment of fiscal autonomy.

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 5) Authority to promulgate their respective rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any of its offices, provided such rules shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
6) The decisions of the Commissions may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of
the copy of the decision.
7) The Commission is authorized to appoint their officials and employees in
accordance with law.

Read Sections 1 to 8, Art. IX-A

Note: The Constitution prohibits the temporary or acting appointment of any member of
the Commission (Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C). The appointment by the President of a temporary
Chairman for the COMELEC is unconstitutional. (Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac, G.R. No. 93867,
December 18, 1990)

Please see the ruling of the Court in Matibag v. Commissioner Benipayo et al. (G.R. No.
149036, April 2, 2002)

C. Powers, Functions, and Jurisdiction

Civil Service Commission

Question: What is the scope of the civil service?

Answer: The Civil Service Commission embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government owned- or
controlled corporations with original charters. (Sec. 2, 1, Art. IX)

No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law. (Sec. 2, Art. IX-B)
Note: Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness
to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.

Commission on Audit

Question: What are the powers and functions of the Commission on Audit?
Answer: The powers and functions of the Commission on Audit are:
1) Examine and audit all forms of government revenues.
2) Examine and audit all forms of government expenditures.
3) Settle government accounts.
4) Define the scope and techniques for its auditing procedures.
5) Promulgate accounting and auditing rules including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures.
6) Decide administrative cases involving expenditure of public funds (Art. XI-
B).

Note: The auditing authority of the Commission over government-owned corporations

extends only to those with original charters.

Agencies under the post-audit authority of the COA

1) Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution.
2) Autonomous state colleges and universities.
3) Other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

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 4) Such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly,
from or through the government, which are required by law or by the granting
institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.

Question: Is the promotional appointment to the position of the Chairman of the

Commission valid?
Answer: Yes, it is valid. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the
unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and
provided further that the vacancy in the position of the Chairman resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment (Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012).

Commission on Elections

Question: What is the scope of the powers of the COMELEC?

Answer: The Commission on Elections possesses quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
powers. Its main function is to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. (sec. 2 (1) (2),
Art. IX-C)

Question: Can the COMELEC prosecute?

Answer: The Commission on Elections is vested with the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecution of election offenses. (People v. Delgado, G.R. Nos. 93419-32,
September 18, 1990)

Civil Service Commission on Commission on

Commission Elections Audit
Compositio 1 Chairperson, 2 1 Chairperson, 6 1 Chairperson, 2
n Commissioners Commissioners Commissioners
Qualificatio a. Natural-born a. Natural-born a. natural-born
ns citizens of the citizens of the citizens of the
Philippines, Philippines; Philippines,
b. At the time of b. at the time of b. at the time of
their their their
appointment, at appointment, at appointment,
least thirty-five least thirty-five at least thirty-
years of age, years of age; five years of
c. With proven c. holders of a age;
capacity for college degree; c. certified
public d. Must not have public
administration, been candidates accountants
and for any elective with not less
d. Must not have position in the than ten years
been candidates immediately of auditing
for any elective preceding experience, or
position in the elections; and members of
elections e. a majority of the the
immediately members, Philippine
preceding their including the Bar who have
appointment. Chairman, shall been engaged
be Members of in the practice
the Philippine of law for at
Bar who have least ten
been engaged in years;
the practice of d. must not
have been

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 law for at least candidates
ten years. for any
elective
position in
the elections
immediately
preceding
their
appointment;
and
e. At no time
shall all
Members of
the
Commission
belong to the
same
profession

E. Prohibited Offices and Interests

SECTION 2, Article IX -A: No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his

tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of
any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way
be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the
Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

F. Judicial Review of Final Orders, Resolutions, and Decisions

1) Rendered in the Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Functions

2) Rendered in the Exercise of Administrative Functions

SECTION 6, Article IX-A: Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules,
however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

SECTION 7, Article IX-A: Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision
or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt
of a copy thereof.

THE CITIZEN IN RELATION TO THE STATE

I. Citizenship

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A. Who are Filipinos
Read Article V

B. Modes of Acquiring Citizenship

1. By birth under the concept of jus sanguinis
2. By marriage under Section 4 of C.A. 473 but will apply only to the alien wife
3. Through naturalization in judicial proceedings under C.A. 473
4. Through reacquisition of citizenship in administrative proceedings
(repatriation under
R.A. 9225)
5. By act of Congress

C. Loss and Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship

1. By renunciation
2. Through denaturalization
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
another foreign country

D. Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance

E. Foundlings
Read Foundling Recognition and Protection Act (R.A. 11767)

Cases:
● Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016: A
foundling is considered a natural-born Filipino citizen.

● Republic v. Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012: There is no judicial
proceeding for one to be declared a Filipino citizen.

● So v. Republic, G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007: In naturalization cases before the
courts, it is mandatory for the petitioner to present to the trial court the testimony
of two credible witnesses to establish one’s qualifications under C.A. 473. An alien
can only avail of one option to acquire Philippine citizenship if s/he is born in the
Philippines, s/he can file a judicial proceeding under C.A, 473 or avail of the
administrative proceeding under R.A. 9139 [An Act Providing for the Acquisition of
Philippine Citizenship for certain Aliens by Administrative Naturalization and for other
Purposes]. R.A. 9139 is a remedial measure intended to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship for those aliens born in the country less tedious,
less technical, and more encouraging.it likewise addresses the concerns of degree
holder, who by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their
profession.

● Calilung v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007: R.A. 9225 makes a
distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. For those who were naturalized in a
foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship, which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a
foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. In
the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall
retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided
they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.

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● David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015: Editha A. Agbay opposed the
application for registration of land of David alleging that being a Canadian citizen,
he is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification
of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. David said that
by availing of the provisions of R.A. 9225, the defect was already cured. The Court
ruled that what is material is the date when he applied for the registration of the
parcel of land.
● Tan v. Crisologo, G.R. No. 193993, November 8, 2017: To become a district
representative, one must be a natural born Filipino citizen and a registered voter
of the district where s/he intends to run. Tan applied with the COMELEC on 26
October 2009 which was approved on November 16, 2009.

When took her oath as a Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225 on November 30, 2009.
On December 1, 2009, she filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for
the reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. On the same day, she filed her
Certificate of Candidacy. The right to vote is reserved only to Filipino citizens. In
the present case, it is undisputed that Tan filed her voter's registration application
on 26 October 2009, and that she only took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines on 30 November 2009, or more than a month after the ERB
approved her application.

● In Re: Benjamin M. Dacanay (Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law), B.M. NO.
1678, December 17, 2007: The practice of profession belongs only to Filipinos. For
Dacanay to resume his practice of law, he must show proof that he already
denounced his Canadian citizenship, and he already took his oath as a Filipino
under the provisions of R.A. 9225.

● Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013: The
continued use of his American passport after availing of the provisions of R.A.
9225 only indicated that Arnaldo was not a Filipino when he was elected mayor of
his town.

● Uy-Belleza v. Republic, G.R, No, 218354, September 15, 2021, HERNANDO, J.: The
Court ruled that Uy-Belleza’s prayer to change the entry of the citizenship of her
mother, Adelaida, from Chinese to Filipino should be granted. She was able
sufficiently establish her mother’s citizenship in the following evidence:

First, Adelaida was issued a Philippine passport, the genuineness and authenticity
of which was not disputed at all by the OSG.

Second, the certificate of live birth of petitioner's brother, whose genuineness and
authenticity was also not disputed by the OSG, stated the citizenship of Adelaida
as "Fil."

Lastly, the testimony of Adelaida regarding her illegitimacy and the citizenship of
her mother, Teodora Guinto, was never questioned by the prosecutor. Being an
illegitimate child, The requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when a child
reached the age of majority under Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution,
the governing law when Adelaida was born on November 24, 1942, and Section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 625, did not apply to her.

● Republic v. Karbasi, G.R. No. 210412, July 29, 2015: The core of citizenship is the
capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government
principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right
to petition the government for redress of grievance. Naturalization is not a right,
but one of privilege of the most discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting

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 nature, affecting, as it does, public interest of the highest order, and which may be
enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor.

The Court affirmed the grant citizenship to Karbasi and agreed with the Court of
Appeals when it said – “Karbasi went from being a refugee - who was dependent on
the UNCHR for support - to a self-made entrepreneur who can ably support himself
and his family. As such, there is no showing that Karbasi may turn out to be a
public charge and a burden to our country's resources. The fact moreover that he
overcame this adversity through his education and skills shows that he is a
potential asset of the country.”

● Rule on Facilitated Naturalization of Refugees and Stateless Persons (A.M. No. 21-07-
22- SC [15 February 2022]) – This issuance of the Supreme Court governs the
procedure for the filing of petitions for naturalization by refugees and stateless
persons recognized by the government. Under the 1951 Convention Relating to
Status of Refugees, a refugee is a “person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is
unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his or her former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” On the other hand, a stateless
person refers to “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under
the operation of its law.”

The Rule allows the filing of the petition on behalf of an unaccompanied child, as
well as a joint petition involving related unaccompanied children, by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, the appropriate Local Social
Welfare and Development Office where the unaccompanied child resides, or the
child-caring agency having his or her custody (Sec. 6, A.M. No. 21-07-22-SC). An
unaccompanied child is a child who is “separated from both parents and other
relatives and is not being cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, has
responsibility to do so” (Sec. 5(d), A.M. No. 21-07-22-SC). With this, the right of
unaccompanied children to acquire nationality is assured, with the courts being guided
by the best interests of the child principle.

To ease the financial burden of the petitioner-refugee or stateless person is the

relaxation of the relevant publication requirements, the Rule now allows the
electronic publication of the petition in the official website of the Supreme Court (Sec. 12,
A.M. No. 21-07-22-SC) and the petitioner is also required to pay only fifty percent
(50%) of the docket and other legal fees, unless exempted by law (Sec. 27, A.M. No.
21-07-22-SC).

● Republic Act (RA) 11767 or the Foundling Recognition and Protection Act [signed by
President Duterte on May 5, 2022] - Republic Act No. 11767, or the Foundling
Recognition and Protection Act states that a foundling found in the country or in
Philippine embassies, consulates, and territories abroad, is presumed a natural-born
Filipino citizen regardless of the status or circumstances of the child’s birth. A
foundling is a deserted or abandoned child or infant with unknown facts of birth and
parentage. It also includes those who have been duly registered as a foundling
during her or his infant childhood but have reached the age of majority without
benefitting from adoption procedures upon the passage of this law.

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