.

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 PART I. REMEDIAL LAW

I. JURISDICTION

1. AAA’s parcels of land were placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Hence, AAA's titles to the parcels of land were cancelled, and new titles pursuant to
the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) were issued in favor of BBBs. AAA filed a petition
for the annulment of the CLOAs before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB). She also applied for exemption from CARP coverage (exemption from CARP case) with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) wherein the status of the BBBs as farmers of the subject lands
was recognized by the Court of Appeals (CA) and the DAR Secretary. While the appeal of the petition
for annulment was pending, AAA claimed that BBBs surreptitiously entered the property and refused
to vacate despite repeated demands. This prompted AAA to file the instant complaint for forcible
entry. BBBs alleged that the properties were awarded to them as CARP beneficiaries. Does the MCTC
have jurisdiction on the complaint for forcible entry?
No, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry. The MCTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry, while the DARAB has primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. An
agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture and transfer of
ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries. The amended
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) provides that the judge or prosecutor shall automatically refer
the case to the DAR if (1) there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature, and
(2) one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker or tenant. Here, the two requisites for referral of the case to the
DAR are met. Despite the filing of the forcible entry case, the BBBs have been consistent in alleging that the
controversy is agrarian in nature as the lands in dispute were awarded to them as CARP beneficiaries. It is
also undisputed that BBBs are farmers of the subject lands as recognized by the CA and the DAR Secretary
in the exemption from CARP case. (Dayrit vs. Norquillas, G.R. No. 201631, December 7, 2021)

II. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

2. Does AAA, who claims to be a legitimate child of deceased BBB and CCC, have legal standing to file
the petition for certiorari imputing to RTC grave abuse of discretion in removing DDD, who was
named by CCC in her will as executor, as special administrator and instead appointing EEE, a
legitimate child of the deceased, notwithstanding that she is not the party being removed from the
office of special administrator?
Yes. A person aggrieved refers to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. To have the
legal standing to avail of the remedy of certiorari, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the assailed act. Here, AAA claimed to be
a legitimate child of BBB and CCC, at the very least. She is an heir of the decedent and has a material
interest to the administration of their estate. Thus, it cannot be denied that she would suffer or sustain direct
injury in the event the estate is dissipated. (Gozum vs. Pappas, G.R. No. 197147, February 03, 2021)

III. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS

3. Does the order of general default apply in probate proceedings?
No, an order of general default does not apply in probate proceedings. A careful reading of Sec. 3 reveals that
an order of default avails only in litigious proceedings. Thus, it cannot be validly issued in a special
proceeding such as the probate of a will. The proceeding to probate a will is not a contentious litigation in any
sense, because nobody is impleaded. It is a special proceeding, and although notice of the application is
published, nobody is bound to appeal and no order for judgment by default is ever entered. Though the action
taken by a Court of First Instance in allowing or disallowing a will is properly denominated a judgment, it is not
a judgment rendered upon default even though no person appears to oppose the probate. (Racca vs. Echague,
G.R. No. 237133, January 20, 2021)

4. AAA filed a petition for allowance of the will of the decedent. The residence of the decedent’s
husband, BBB, and daughter, CCC, were indicated in the petition. Are BBB and CCC entitled to
personal notice despite publication of the notice of hearing?
Yes. The court has the obligation to serve personal notices to petitioners under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 because
they are known heirs of the decedent and their places of residence were made known in the petition for
probate. Notice to the designated and known heirs, devisees and legatees under Section 4, Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court is mandatory. Publication of notice of hearing is not sufficient when the places of residence of
the heirs, legatees and devisees are known. Notable that Sections 3 and 4 prescribe two (2) modes of
notification of the hearing: (a) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation or the Official Gazette; and
(b) by personal notice to the designated or known heirs, legatees and devisees. Under Section 3, publication
of the notice of hearing shall be done upon the delivery of the will, or filing of the petition for allowance of the
will in the court having jurisdiction. On the other hand, personal notice under Section 4 shall be served to the
designated or known heirs, legatees and devisees, and the executor or co-executor, at their residence, if such
are known. In this case, the petition indicated the said heirs’ residence. Thus, they are entitled to the notice of
hearing under Section 4. (Racca vs. Echague, G.R. No. 237133, January 20, 2021)

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5. AAA received a copy of the notice of hearing for the petition for allowance of the will of the decedent 2
days prior to the hearing. Did the notice satisfy the requirement provided by Section 4 of Rule 76
considering that the said notice was published?
No. Under Sec. 4 of Rule 76, personal notice must either be (1) deposited in the post office with the postage
thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, or (2) personally served at least ten (10) days
before the day of hearing. AAA received a copy of the notice 2 days prior to the hearing, which is short of the
10-day period fixed by Sec. 4. Hence, the notice served to AAA did not satisfy the requirement provided by
Sec. 4. Moreover, Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which requires a copy of the notice of hearing
to be sent to the known heirs whose residences are known, is mandatory and cannot be satisfied by mere
publication under Sec. 3 of the same Rules. (Racca vs. Echague, G.R. No. 237133, January 20, 2021)

6. AAA named BBB as executor in her will. He was also appointed as special administrator until the
probate of the will. BBB claimed to be the "loyal and most trusted employee and was treated as
almost the son" of AAA and her husband CCC. CCC, Jr., who claimed to be an illegitimate son of the
deceased, filed a motion to remove BBB as administrator. The court found that BBB fell short of his
duties as administrator as it was DDD, who claimed to be a legitimate child, who was actually in
control of the administration of the estate and not him. The court held that it was EEE, a legitimate
child of the deceased, who is the most suitable person to replace BBB as special administrator of
AAA’s estate because she was already appointed as administratrix of CCC's estate and that the
conjugal properties of CCC and AAA remained undivided. Was the appointment of EEE as special
administrator proper despite the fact that it was BBB who was named by AAA in her will as executor?
Yes. The rules in the selection or removal of regular administrators do not apply to special administrators. In
appointing a special administrator, the probate court is not limited to the grounds for incompetence laid down
in Rule 78, Section 1 and the order of preference provided in Rule 78, Section 6 pertinent to regular
administrators. The appointment of a special administrator rests on the sound discretion of the probate court.
While it was BBB who was named by AAA in her will as executor, the RTC found it logical, practical, and
economical to appoint EEE as special administratrix of AAA's estate as she was already appointed as
administratrix of CCC's estate and that the conjugal properties of CCC and AAA remained undivided. With
this setup, she could facilitate the requisite division of the estates. (Gozum vs. Pappas, G.R. No. 197147, February 03,
2021)

7. Was the appointment of EEE as special administrator proper despite her alleged American
citizenship?
Yes. EEE's American citizenship is not an obstacle for her appointment as a special administrator of the
decedent’s estate. The Rules of Court does not mention foreign citizenship as a ground for incompetence to
be an administrator. Rule 78, Section 1, which may be applied to special administrators, requires residency in
the Philippines, not Filipino citizenship. (Gozum vs. Pappas, G.R. No. 197147, February 03, 2021)

8. Luigi Santos is the son of Lovely Guzman and Bong Revilla, Jr. Lovely and Bong were never married.
Luigi's Certificate of Live Birth did not bear the Revilla surname and his father was marked as
unknown. Lovely married Patrick Santos, who, in turn, legally adopted Luigi. Luigi's name was
changed from "Francis Luigi Guzman" to "Francis Luigi G. Santos." Although Luigi lived with his
mother, he grew up close to Bong Revilla and the latter's wife and children and was treated by the
family as a legitimate son. He also claimed that he used the name "Luigi Revilla" when he entered
show business. Thus, he filed the instant petition under Rule 103 in order to avoid confusion, to show
his sincere and genuine desire to associate himself to Bong Revilla and to the Revillas, and to ensure
that his records show his true identity as Bong Revilla's son.

Is a proceeding under Rule 103 the proper remedy?

Yes. It is a threshold principle that the nature of a proceeding is determined by the allegations in the petition
and the ultimate reliefs sought. In the instant case, it is apparent that Luigi does not seek to correct any
clerical or substantial error in his birth certificate or to effect any changes in his status as an adopted child of
Patrick Santos. As such, neither Rule 108 nor R.A. 9048 as amended applies. Rather, the petition is
unequivocal that Luigi merely desires to change and replace his surname "Santos" with the surname "Revilla"
in order to avoid confusion, to show his sincere and genuine desire to associate himself to Bong Revilla, Jr.
and to the Revillas, and to show that he accepts and embraces his true identity. He alleges that while he grew
up close to his biological father and his family and was purportedly publicly known as "Bong Revilla's son,"
there is nothing in his name that would associate him and identify him as one of the Revillas. These
allegations show that Luigi ultimately seeks to alter the designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known and not to effect any clerical or substantial corrections. Thus,
he properly availed himself of the procedure prescribed under Rule 103. (Santos vs. Republic, G.R. No. 250520, May
05, 2021)

Was there any compelling reason to justify the change of Luigi's surname from "Santos" to "Revilla"?
No. Change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. Convenience cannot be considered as one of, or a recognized ground for change of name. While Luigi
may factually identify and associate with his biological father and his family, he remains to be the legitimate
son of Patrick Santos by virtue of the adoption. As adoption severs all legal ties between the adoptee and his
or her biological parents, there is no basis to allow Luigi to change his name to "Revilla" simply because he is,
biologically, the son of Bong Revilla and wants to associate himself with the Revilla family. The mere fact that
Luigi began using a different name, i.e., "Luigi Revilla", when he joined show business does not constitute a

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 proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. (Santos vs. Republic, G.R. No. 250520, May 05,
2021)

IV. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

9. Chief of Police (CP) received a tip from a confidential informant regarding the alleged purchase of
shabu by suspected drug dealers who are the two accused in this case and who were already in the
police watch list and subject of prior surveillance operations. Based on the tip, the CP formed a
checkpoint and flagged a tricycle believed by the CP to have been boarded by the two accused. The
accused were ordered to disembark from the tricycle before the vehicle was searched. The police
found items which later on identified to be shabu. The police brought the two accused to hospital for
medical check-up and then to police station. Is the arresting officers’ search and subsequent seizure
based on the tip by a confidential informant valid thereby allowing the confiscated drugs to be used
as evidence?
No, the arresting officers’ search and subsequent seizure are invalid. Thus, the confiscated drugs cannot be
used as evidence. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a matter of constitutional dictum.
There must be a warrant, issued by a judge and premised on a finding of probable cause, before a search
can be effected. There are, however, exceptions. Among these exceptions are searches of moving vehicles.
Regardless, even a search of a moving vehicle must be premised on probable cause, "the existence of 'a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is+ guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case
at bar, the accused were specifically targeted and the police officers were already convinced of their guilt.
This tainted the police officers' perception, predisposing them to read the accused’s actions as suspicious.
Thus, accused’s prior inclusion in the drugs watch list, allegedly suspicious demeanor, and purportedly
evasive acts cannot be taken as independently suspicious acts sufficient to beget probable cause. This Court
has maintained that, for purposes of probable cause, "[t]here must be a confluence of several suspicious
circumstances. A solitary tip hardly suffices as probable cause; items seized during warrantless searches
based on solitary tips are inadmissible as evidence. (Virgilio Evardo Y. Lopena vs. People, G.R. No. 234317, May 10, 2021)

10. Is the accused’s right against double jeopardy violated when the complainant assailed his acquittal
before the CA considering that the RTC’s order of acquittal is a mere recital of facts with a dispositive
portion?
No, the accused’s right against double jeopardy was not violated because it stemmed from a void judgment
which cannot be the source of legal rights and has no binding effect. RTC’s order is void because it contained
neither an analysis of the evidence nor a reference to any legal basis for the conclusion. It is settled that a
void judgment of acquittal has no legal effect and does not terminate the case. In contemplation of law, it is
non-existent as if no judgment had been rendered at all. (Austria vs. AAA and BBB, G.R. No. 205275, June 28, 2022)

11. Is a criminal case wherein reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed subject to automatic
review by the CA?
No. The enactment of R.A. No. 9346 prohibited the imposition of death penalty. As a result, trial courts are
precluded from imposing the penalty of death and, instead, shall mete out either reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, depending on the nomenclature of penalties used by the law violated. Corollary to this, Secs.
3(d) and 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which prescribe an automatic review by the CA of cases where
death penalty is imposed, became ineffective without, however, the Court simultaneously resolving to
suspend the aforesaid rule. At present and during such time that R.A. No. 9346 is in effect, an automatic
review of criminal cases is no longer available and in no instance should the RTC elevate motu proprio the
case records to the CA. (People vs. Olpindo, G.R. No. 252861, February 15, 2022)

12. Can the non-filing of a notice of appeal by the accused in a rape case where the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was imposed be excused by the fact that RTC forwarded the records of the case to the CA
for automatic review 14 days after it promulgated its ruling?
Yes. Accused-appellant's non-filing of a notice of appeal may be excused because the RTC, on its own,
elevated the records of the case to the CA based on its erroneous assumption that the verdict of conviction is
subject to an automatic intermediate review. To be clear, the RTC order forwarding the records of the case
was issued within the 15-day reglementary period under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court for the
accused to file a notice of appeal. The CA could have just treated the automatic review as if a notice of appeal
was timely filed by the accused-appellant considering the gravity of the crime committed by accused-appellant
and the penalty imposed on him by the RTC. This would better serve the interests of justice as it provides an
additional layer of protection against a possible erroneous judgment. (People vs. Olpindo, G.R. No. 252861, February
15, 2022)

13. What are the guidelines adopted by the Court considering that criminal cases imposed with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment have still been elevated motu proprio to the
appellate courts for automatic review?

1. In cases where the prescribed penalty is death, but where reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment was
imposed by reason of R.A. No. 9346, appeal shall be made by filing a notice of appeal either before the
Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals, as the case may be, pursuant to Sec. 3(c), Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court.

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 2. In cases where the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed not by reason of R.A. No.
9346, appeal shall be made by filing a notice of appeal either before the Regional Trial Court or the Court of
Appeals, as the case may be, pursuant to Sec. 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

3. When the case records of a criminal case imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
whether due to R.A. No. 9346 or not, are elevated motu proprio for automatic review, the following rules shall
apply:

a. If the order to elevate the records for automatic review was issued beyond fifteen (15) days after the
promulgation of the judgment or notice of final order and the accused did not file a notice of appeal within
the same period, the automatic review shall not be given due course. The Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court shall issue an order of finality of judgment.

b. If the order to elevate the records for automatic review was issued within fifteen (15) days after the
promulgation of the judgment or notice of final order, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall
issue an order requiring the accused within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to manifest whether they
are adopting the order to elevate the records as their notice of appeal. If the accused shall refuse to adopt
or fail to timely manifest despite due notice, they shall be deemed to have waived their right to appeal,
and the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall issue an order of finality of judgment.

4. In cases where the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed and the accused files a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised.
However, based on the interests of substantial justice, a petition for review on certiorari that raises questions
of fact may be treated as an ordinary appeal in order to throw the whole case open for review. (People vs.
Olpindo, G.R. No. 252861, February 15, 2022)

14. The accused was convicted for acts of lasciviousness. After the accused filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, the trial court, which was then presided by a different judge, set aside the previous
conviction, dropping all the charges against him. The private complainant, without the Office of the
Solicitor General’s (OSG) prior conformity, went up to the CA questioning the acquittal of the accused.
The accused argued that only the OSG has the personality to question his acquittal. Do the private
complainants have legal standing to question the accused’s acquittal or to file an appeal or petition
for certiorari without the OSG’s participation?

No, the private complainants have no legal personality to appeal or file a petition for certiorari to question the
judgments or orders involving the criminal aspect of the case or the right to prosecute, unless made with the
OSG's conformity. To guide the bench and the bar, these rules should be observed with respect to the legal
standing of private complainants in assailing judgments or orders in criminal proceedings before the SC and
the CA:

(1) The private complainant has the legal personality to appeal the civil liability of the accused or file a petition
for certiorari to preserve his or her interest in the civil aspect of the criminal case. The appeal or petition for
certiorari must allege the specific pecuniary interest of the private offended party. The failure to comply with
this requirement may result in the denial or dismissal of the remedy. The reviewing court shall require the
OSG to file comment within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from notice if it appears that the
resolution of the private complainant's appeal or petition for certiorari will necessarily affect the criminal aspect
of the case or the right to prosecute (i.e., existence of probable cause, venue or territorial jurisdiction,
elements of the offense, prescription, admissibility of evidence, identity of the perpetrator of the crime,
modification of penalty, and other questions that will require a review of the substantive merits of the criminal
proceedings, or the nullification/reversal of the entire ruling, or cause the reinstatement of the criminal action
or meddle with the prosecution of the offense, among other things). The comment of the OSG must state
whether it conforms or concurs with the remedy of the private offended party. The judgment or order of the
reviewing court granting the private complainant's relief may be set aside if rendered without affording the
People, through the OSG, the opportunity to file a comment.

(2) The private complainant has no legal personality to appeal or file a petition for certiorari to question the
judgments or orders involving the criminal aspect of the case or the right to prosecute, unless made with the
OSG's conformity. The private complainant must request the OSG's conformity within the reglementary period
to appeal or file a petition for certiorari. The private complainant must attach the original copy of the OSG's
conformity as proof in case the request is granted within the reglementary period. Otherwise, the private
complainant must allege in the appeal or petition for certiorari the fact of pendency of the request. If the OSG
denied the request for conformity, the Court shall dismiss the appeal or petition for certiorari for lack of legal
personality of the private complainant.

(3) The reviewing court shall require the OSG to file comment within a non-extendible period of thirty (30)
days from notice on the private complainant's petition for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused,
the dismissal of the criminal case, and the interlocutory orders in criminal proceedings on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion or denial of due process.

(4) These guidelines shall be prospective in application. (Austria vs. AAA and BBB, G.R. No. 205275, June 28, 2022)

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 VIII. EVIDENCE

15. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted AAA of the crime of homicide relying heavily on the hearsay
testimonies of prosecution witnesses stating that the deceased victim declared to them that it was
AAA who caused the victim’s head injury. The autopsy report revealed that the cause of death was the
said head injury but the Death Certificate issued by another doctor indicates that the death was
caused by respiratory arrest complicated by other illnesses. Should AAA be acquitted for failure to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Yes. The variance between the autopsy report and the Death Certificate leaves the evidence in equipoise that
warrants the AAA's acquittal. Under the equipoise rule, as applied in criminal cases, when there is doubt on
which side the evidence preponderates, the accused must be acquitted as the quantum of proof is not met.
Similarly, when the facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one consistent with
innocence and another with guilt, the evidence is regarded not to have met the test of moral certainty and
does not suffice to produce a conviction. Applied in this case, considering that there is a possibility that the
victim died of natural causes and not of the injury he sustained, the prosecution was not able to meet the
quantum of proof necessary to implicate AAA in the crime of homicide. (Lagao y Garcia vs. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 217721, September 15, 2021)

16. The prosecution witnesses testified that on the night when they were having a drink with BBB, they
noticed that the latter had a head injury which as declared to them by BBB himself was caused by
AAA during their altercation. BBB’s declaration was not made at or near the place where he sustained
his injuries and at least two (2) hours have passed from the time he sustained the injuries and when
he started conversing with the prosecution witness. Despite having the head injury, BBB was able to
procure the alcoholic beverage he shared with one of the witnesses and was able to proceed from
place to place where he had the chance to converse and interact with them properly. Are the
testimonies of the witnesses admissible as evidence being part of res gestae?
No. For a statement to form part of res gestae, the following elements must concur: (a) the principal act, the
res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. In this case, the first and second requisites are missing. For one, at least two (2) hours have
already passed from the time the victim sustained injuries and when he started conversing with the
prosecution witnesses. Furthermore, in view of the intervening events between the occurrence and the
declaration, it cannot be said that the victim "had no time to deliberate and fabricate" the identification of AAA
as his assailant. In the same way, the declaration cannot be regarded to be inspired by the shock or
excitement caused by the startling occurrence as to be viewed deliberately intertwined thereto. (Lagao y Garcia
vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 217721, September 15, 2021)

PART II. ETHICS

17. Judge AAA posted on his Facebook account showing him half-dressed and revealing tattoos on his
upper body that were used as "cover photos" and "profile pictures" in his profile page. Judge AAA
explained that his Facebook account was hacked during which, his account privacy setting was
switched from private to public. He asserted that the subject pictures were exclusively meant for his
own viewing pleasure and for his Facebook friends only and never posted for public consumption.
He admitted, however, that he had a "sizeable" number of Facebook friends who can access his daily
posts, including the subject pictures, and even share content on his account profile page. Is the act of
Judge AAA violative of any provisions under New Code of Judicial Conduct?
Yes, particularly Canon 2 and Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 2 requires Integrity.
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges. Canon 4, on the other hand, requires Propriety. Propriety and the appearance of propriety are
essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. Here, Judge AAA had breached his duty to avoid
impropriety, or even just the appearance of impropriety, when he posted the subject pictures showing his
half-dressed body and tattooed torso on his Facebook account that eventually became readily accessible to
the general public. While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social
networking activities, they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace
the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday
activities. While Judge AAA's act of posting the subject pictures on his Facebook account would no doubt
seem harmless and inoffensive if it was done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible
personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must
accordingly comport themselves. By doing so, Judge AAA likewise failed to adhere to the standard of
propriety required of judges and court personnel under OCA Circular No. 173-2017, which mandates all
members of the Judiciary who participate in social media to be cautious and circumspect in posting
photographs, liking posts, and making comments in public on social networking sites like Facebook. Indeed,
Judge AAA should have known better than to post highly personal content on his Facebook account that was
viewable not only by his family and close friends, but also, by his "regular followers or, in other words,
members of the general public. [(Office Of The Court Administrator vs. Hon. Romeo M. Atillo, Jr., Executive Judge and Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 31, Agoo, La Union, A.M. No. Rtj-21-018 (Formerly A.M. No. 20-07-109-Rtc), September 29, 2021)]

18. The Court found Judge AAA guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law. It imposed the penalty of dismissal
from service. In his four motions for reconsideration, Judge AAA maintained his innocence, and
alternatively, posited that the penalty of dismissal was not commensurate to the offense committed.
Judge AAA filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency, praying that he be allowed to retire with full benefits

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and that his disqualification from reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, be lifted, citing a long and satisfactory
track record of government service both in the Executive and Judicial departments, mounting
indebtedness, and ailing conditions requiring continuous medical maintenance. He claimed that after
his dismissal, he gave "free legal advice" for "needy individuals," and has been assisting the Lord's
Vineyard Covenant Community in their socio-civic legal services. In support, Judge AAA attached a
Certificate from the Lord's Vineyard Covenant Community which was generally worded. The petition
for Judicial Clemency complied with the five (5)-year minimum period required before dismissal or
disbarment can be the subject of any kind of clemency. Should the petition for judicial clemency be
granted?
No. Although the instant petition was filed after the five (5)-year minimum period, there is a lack of prima facie
showing of petitioner's genuine repentance and remorse for his past infractions. Records show that not up
until recently, petitioner was still insistent upon his innocence and the unfairness of his dismissal. It was only
in this present petition that petitioner openly admitted that he was remorseful for his misdeeds and has
accepted the Court's verdict of dismissal against him. Petitioner claimed that after his dismissal, he gave "free
legal advice" for "needy individuals," and has been assisting the Lord's Vineyard Covenant Community in their
socio-civic legal services. However, the Certificate is generally worded, and lacks any specific details, such as
the scope/extent as to how these socio-civic legal services were actually rendered, as well as how often these
were conducted. There are likewise no written testimonies or accounts of his rendition of free legal advice
following his dismissal. While the determination of whether a prima facie case exists is to be conducted on a
case-to-case basis, it is essential that the allegations contained in the petition are duly supported by proof,
else they be regarded as conveniently self-serving. The Court cannot simply allow clemency cases to proceed
without first thoroughly sifting through the petition and uncovering, at least, ostensible proof of a prima facie
case. It is only when such prima facie case exists that this Court would refer the case to a fact-finding
commission, whose role is to receive the evidence and render a report thereon on the authenticity/probative
value of such evidence in support of the petitioner's claims. Once the commission renders its report
containing its factual findings on the case, the Court can then proceed to render its verdict on the clemency
plea. (DOJ vs. Mislang A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369, February 15, 2022; HDMF vs. Mislang, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372, February 15, 2022)