BPYG 171 EM 2022 23 9sgovi

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BPYG-171: Applied Ethics (TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT) Course code: BPYG-171 Assignment Code: BPYG-171/ASST/TMA/2022-23 Marks: 100 BPYG-171 Applied Ethics (Generic Course) Note: 1. Give Answer of all five questions. 2. All five questions carry equal marks 3. Answer to question no. 1 and 2 should be in about 400 words each. 1. What are the different ways in which the idea of personhood is defined? And how do these ways affect the ethical debate on abortion? 20 Or Write a note on, 10+10= 20 A) ‘is-ought’ gap. B) Top-down model of justification in applied ethies. 2. Discuss in detail preference utilitarianism of Peter Singer in the context of animal rights. 20 Or What is assisted reproductive technique? Write a note on the ethical implications of assisted reproductive technique. 20 3. Answer any two of the following questions in about 250 words each. 2*1 a) Whatare the salient features of animal-centered ethics? 10 b) Write a note on the tempered use of moral theories in the domain of technology. 10 ©) What are the main arguments given by Tom Regan to defend Animal rights? Explain.10 @) How will you resolve a conflict among principles in the case of medical ethics? Elaborate your answer with an example 10 4. Answer any four of the following questions in about 150 words each. 4*5= 20 a) What are the arguments given by Immanuel Kant to oppose the idea of suicide? 5 b) How reproductive rights can be manifested? 5 ©) What is surrogacy? What are the arguments given against surrogacy? 5 4) What is the argument from theological position against suicide? 5 e) Write a note on the relation between justice and morality, £) Explain fly the arguments against euthanasia. 5. Write short notes on any five of the following in about 100 words cach a) Informed consent b) Choice problem ©) Conventional morality 4) Role of business ethics in corporate governance ©) Coherentialism ) Applied Ethics ) Data breach h) Human rights Bee Re Re = 20 1. What are the different ways in which the idea of personhood is defined? And how do these ways affect the ethical debate on abortion? Controversy over abortion reached a fever pitch on Mayyi2) 2022, when the leaked draft of a U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion was published by Politico. If the draft’s key points are reflected in the final ruling, thig{Would strike down Roe v. Wade, a landmark decision that nearly 50 years ago established the right to choose an abortion. Current constitutional law grants a right to have.an abortion until afetus becomes viable - in other words, until there is a reasonablé probability.it could survive outside the womb with care. Today, this typically occur$ bétWeen the 22nd and 24th weeks of pregnancy. The ruling in Roe v. Wade was (grounded on \the idea that the US. Constitution protects privacy, stemming from the/’14th Amendment. However, the draft majority opinion, written by Justice Samuel Alito/argues Roe v. Wade should be overturned because the Constitution makes nolmention of abortion. While a final ruling is not expected beforé June 2022, the decision will not put to rest controversy over abortion,Why does the legalization of abortion continue to be hotly contested, neafly alhalf centurylafter Roe v. Wade? This question is of great interest to me, asa philosopher and bioethicist, since | study philosophical problems that lie just beneath ‘the surface of contemporary controversies like abortion. One underlying ethical concerf is, "What is a person?” How people answer this question shapes?how they think about a developing human being. When philosophers talk about “personhood,” they are referring to something or someone havinglexceptionally high moral status, often described as having a right to life, an inh@tent dignity, or mattering for one’s own sake. Non-persons may have lesser rights or value, but lack the full moral value associated with persons. To be a person means having strong moral claims against others. For instance, persons have a claim to be treated fairly and a claim not to be interfered with. A healthy adult human being is often considered the clearest example of a person. 3| Pace Yet, most philosophers distinguish being a person from being human, pointing out that no one disputes the fetus’s species, but many disagree about the fetus’s personhood. In current law, fetal viability is often used to mark the beginning of personhood. However, viability varies based on people’s access to intensivélmedical care. It also changes as medicine and technology advance. Some state laws restricting abortion identify the presence of a “fetal heartbeat” as morally significant and use this as a basis for personhood. However, many living things have beating hearts, and they are not all considered persons. And as physicians point out, though they may useithe term “fetalheartbeat” in conversations with patients, the fetus does not yet have afunctioning heart that generates sound during early development Defining the limits of personhood is specially diéeyldue to its far-reaching consequences. Personhood —_carfies_? implications. for how we treat animals, ecosystems and anenephalic infants), who are born with their cerebral cortex and large parts of their skullymissing? It also shapes the rights of people who will be born in the future, people with disabilities and individuals in a persistent vegetative state. Debates overipersonhood have recently extended to robots. Personhood is also importaft for issueSlat the end of life, such as disputes over defining death.sPhysicians have disagreed with families over whether to declare a patient dead or continud to offer medical interventions. Philosophers have debated whéther a persoit's death occurs as soon as “higher” brain activity ceases ~ activity associated consciousness and cognition — or only after all brain activity ends: In short, there are plenty of reasons to figure out what personhood requires. Doing so démands Wrestling with at least three common opposing views. The first holds that fetuses qualify as persons from the moment of conception. Suppotters say that from conception on, the developing fetus has “a future like ours,” and abortion takes that future away. A variation on this theme is that at conception, a fetus has the full genetic code and therefore the potential to become a person, and this potential qualifies the fetus as a person. aye A second view regards personhood as arising at some point after conception and prior to birth. Some people reason that a human being’s moral status is not all-or- nothing, but, like human development, a matter of degree. Others say,that what matters is consciousness and other cognitive capacities, thought'to develop late in the second trimester. Finally, a third view maintains that personhood begins at birthior shortly thereafter, because this is when an infant first acquires a sense of themselves and an interest in their own continued existence. Another source of support for the third view is Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant’s claim that What makes human beings morally special is their rationality and capacity to be autonomous» 2. Discuss in detail preference utilitarianismsof Peter Singer in the context of animal rights. In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that the rights position regards as morally unacceptable any institutionalized exploitation of nonhumans. Regan unambiguously and without equivcation condemns the use of animals for food, hunting, trapping, testing, education,/and reseatch, Regan believes that humans and nonhumans are subjects-of-a-life that have equal inherent value. That is, agents and patients are conscious, possess a complex awareness, and have a psychophysical identity Over timefAgents and patients may be harmed or benefited and have a welfare in that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, independently of ditility that they hav@jfor others or the interest that others have in them. Inherent value theory holds that the individual has a distinct moral value that is separate from aly intrinsi¢ Values and that the attribution of equal inherent value to both moralagents and rélevantly similar moral patients is required because both agents andipatients are subjects-of-a-life. Reganeargues further that the respect principle requires that we treat those individuals who have inherent value in ways that respect their inherent value. The respect principle states simply that no individual with equal inherent value may be treated solely as a means to an end in order to maximize the aggregate of desirable consequences. Regan's respect principle shares important theoretical similarities and differences with the notion articulated by Immanuel Kant that we treat other S| Page persons as ends in themselves and never merely as means to ends. Rational agents, Kant argued, have value in themselves independent of their value to others. Regan's contribution to this notion is his use of the subject-of-ailife criterion to identify in a nonarbitrary and intelligible way a similarity that holds between moral agents and patients and that gives rise to a direct duty to theltter. [FN32] Being a subject-of-a-life is a sufficient condition for having inherentyvalue, but is also a criterion that allows for the intelligible and nonarbitfaryattribution of equal inherent value to agents and patients, including nonhumatianimals. Regan stresses that there is no nonarbitrary way.to separate moral agents from moral patients, and that there is no way to differentiate human moral patients from nonhuman moral patients without relying on/ some form Ofyspecies bias or speciesism. Regan argues that institutionalizédianimal exploitation (such as the use of animals for food, experiments, clothing, and.entertainment)iviolates the respect principle by treating all animal interests as\tradable aslong)as the aggregation of consequences are justified. Although Regan's theory represents an important)contribution that differs qualitatively from Singer's theory of animal liberation, there is a sense in which any coherent and non-speciesist theory of animal rights must rule out all forms of institutional exploitation. As Henry Shue hasargued in the context of human rights, there is a logical distinction between What She calls "basic" rights and "non-basic rights. According to Shue,.a basic,right is not a right that is "more valuable or intrinsically more Satisfying to enjoy than some other rights." [FN33] Rather, affight is a basieiright'When "any attempt to enjoy any other right by sacrificing the)basic right would be quite literally self-defeating, cutting the ground from beneath itselfi"\(FN34] Shue states that "non-basic rights may be sacrificed, if necessary, in Gfder to secure the basic right. But the protection of a basic(right ay not be sacrificed in order to secure the enjoyment of a non-basic right." [FN35] The reason is that a basic right "cannot be sacrificed successfully. If the right'sacrificed is indeed basic, then no right for which it might be sacrificed can actuallly be enjoyed in the absence of the basic right. The sacrifice would prove self- defeating.” [FN36] Shue emphasizes that basic rights are a prerequisite to the enjoyment and exercise of non-basic rights, and that the possession of non- basic rights in the 6[ Page absence of basic rights is nothing more than the possession of rights "in some merely legalistic or otherwise abstract sense compatible with being unable to make any use of the substance of the right." [FN37] Although Shue identifies several basic rights, the most important of these is the “basic right to physical security--a right that is basic not to besUbjected to murder, torture, mayhem, rape, or assault." [FN38] While acknowledging that it is not unusual in a given society that some members of at least onéethnic group receive less physical protection than others, Shue argues that "feW, if any, people would be prepared to defend in principle the contention that atiyone lacks a basic right to physical security." [FN39] If a person does not enjoy the basic right to security and may be murdered at will by any other person, then itis difficult to understand what other rights that person might enjoy. Most of the time, discussions about rights Occur in thescontext of discussion of human rights, and these discussions do;not concern whether we should be able to kill and eat people, or whether we shouldibe ableto.use people in experiments to which they have not given their informed consent, or whether we should be able to use people in rodeos, or exhibit people in z008pitis assumed--at least under the law of most countries and at least in the moral views of most people--that people have certain rights, or, at least;ithat they have certain interests that cannot be compromised irrespective of consequence. Shue is most certainly correct to/notéjthat we always assume that humans have basic rights to physical Security, whether or not there are social differences in terms of the actual distribution of these fights. In other words, recognition of the basic right to physi¢al security isia right as a matter of law irrespective of whether the state enforces this right in an even-handed manner. In the case of animals, howeverythe situation is precisely the opposite. We talk informally about the rights of aninials, But animals do not have the basic legal right of physical security and they cannot possess it as a matter of law. Because animals are regarded as the property of their human owners, they can be killed for food, used in experiments, and exploited in numerous other ways simply because the owner of the animal regards it as a "benefit" to do so. If animals are to have any rights at all (other than merely legalistic or abstract ones to which Shue refers), they must have certain basic rights that would then necessarily protect them from being used for food, clothing, or experiments. [FN40] 3. a) What are the salient features of animal-centered ethics? The emerging discipline of Animal-Computer Interaction (ACI) aims to take what in Interaction Design is known as a user-centred approach to'the design of technology intended for animals, placing them at the centre ofthe design process as stakeholders, users, and contributors. However, current regulatory frameworks for the linvolveméit, of animals in research are not animal-centred, regarding them as\tesearch instruments, unable to consent to procedures that may harm them, rather thanionsenting research participants and design contributors, Such frameworks aim to minimise the impacts of research procedures on the welfare of individual animals, but this minimisation is subordinated to specific scientific and)sacietal interests, and to the integrity of the procedures required to serve thos@linterestst From this standpoint, the universally advocated principles of replacement, reduction and refinement aim to address the ethical conflicts arising from the assumed inability of individual” animals to)consent to potentially harmful procedures, but such principles in factreflecta lack of individual centrality. This paper makes the.case for moving beyond existing regulations and guidelines towards an animal-centred framework that can better support the development of ACI as a discipline. Firstly,

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