Why Do Farmers Commit Suicide?

The Case of Andhra Pradesh

Individuals and communities are under pressure to cope with the changes brought about
by a churn in socio-economic conditions. The policies associated with the process
of economic liberalisation have imposed a stress on the peasantry leading to suicides. The
tragic developments in rural Andhra Pradesh should compel us to draw
important lessons for India’s agrarian economy.
V SRIDHAR

T
he summer of 2004 was an unprecedented one for rural
Andhra Pradesh, even by the dubious standards estab-
lished in the last two decades when the number of suicides
by peasants had risen alarmingly. In a short span of less than
two months, between May and July 2004, more than 400 peasants
in the state committed suicide. Although peasant suicides have
repeatedly occurred in the state in the past, the significance of
this round of deaths lay in the fact that they were reported from
every single district in the state, barring Hyderabad.
Blaming “drought”, the favourite explanation of do-nothing
politicians, simply failed to explain the tragic phenomenon. The
fact that suicides were reported literally from every corner of
the state (Table 1), in particular, from even the better irrigated
districts, exposed the argument that the scarcity of water, depicted
in a vague and generally deceptive sense, was responsible for
farmers committing suicide. Instead, the stunning sweep of death
across the state brought to the fore all that is wrong in the lives
of the peasantry.
Death hit farmers in varying agro-climatic zones. Unlike the
rounds of suicides in 1987-88, 1997-98 and 2000, when peasants
growing particular crops such as tobacco, cotton, chillies and
groundnut died, in 2004 death stalked everywhere. No crop was
exempted and no section of the small peasantry appeared insu-
lated. The overwhelming proportion of the death toll was among
small and marginal farmers and tenant cultivators, who had no
claim on the land they cultivated and who paid exorbitant rents
to landlords.
What explains the unprecedented number of suicides in such
a short duration? Several theories floated in Hyderabad. The
theory popular among sections of bureaucrats, politicians and
the intelligentsia was that the peasants committed suicide because
of the assistance package announced on the eve of elections by
the then chief minister N Chandrababu Naidu, who hitherto
steadfastly clung to the notion that a relief package for victims
would spur more farmers to their death. On June 2, 2004 the
previous chief minister remarked that the “unusual spurt” in the
number of suicides after Rajasekhara Reddy assumed office was
because of the package.
Another explanation was that it was simply because the media,
particularly the Telugu language press, was reporting such deaths
in a much more systematic manner than before. Some Telugu
papers listed the number of suicides in their district editions.
Media observers pointed out that the coverage by the Telugu
media was much better when compared to earlier rounds of such
deaths. In fact, observers noted that even the English dailies
published from state reported the deaths in a more systematic
fashion than in the past. However, media critics also noted that
there had been no attempt – either by the English language press
or the local media – to collate and analyse the information at
a broader level to highlight the issues at stake.
However, the most plausible reason for the spate of suicides
appears to be related to the fact that farmers were at that time
engaged in the task of planning their next crop. May and June
are months when they prepare for sowing the kharif crop in late
June and July, when the monsoon arrives in most parts of the
state. Those sympathetic to the plight of the farmers argued that
small and marginal farmers across the state had reached the end
of the road. Unable to clear their existing loans or to get fresh
loans for the next season, and seeing no hope on the horizon
they took their lives, they say.
What explains the phenomenon of a sharp increase in the
incidence of suicide among the peasantry? The consensus among
psychiatrists and social scientists who have explored the phe-
nomenon is that a substantial “dislocation” of livelihoods drives
a community to despair and eventually suicide. Although the
phenomenon of suicide is a deeply personal and individual act,
suicidal behaviour is determined by a confluence of factors. These
are basically in two domains. One, the internal domain, relates
to factors which operate at the level of the individual. The other
is external, which suggests that larger social processes determine
suicidal behaviour. It places emphasis on broader society-level
changes, as being responsible for deaths by suicide. The reasoning
is that individuals, unable to cope with the social churn in which
they find themselves, resort to suicide. Of course, this is accen-
tuated when such a churn is also accompanied by widespread
economic distress.
The evolution of the modern understanding of suicides and
suicidal behaviour has been to marry the externalised and the
internalised views. Diego De Leo, psychiatrist and former presi-
dent of the International Association for Suicide Prevention
(IASP), explains that this understanding has come a long way
from the early 19th century view that equated suicidal behaviour
with insanity. Two concomitant revolutions in the late 19th
century – one in the field of sociology, associated with Emile
Durkheim (1951), and the other, the psychoanalytical movement
led by Sigmund Freud, have been synthesised in the modern view
of suicide and suicidal behaviour.
The phenomenon of suicide is therefore widely regarded to
be a result of individuals’ inability to cope with sudden and
cataclysmic changes in socio-economic conditions. It is not
without significance that the highest suicide rates are those
prevailing in the countries of the erstwhile Soviet Union, where
calamitous changes in living conditions have occurred in the last
decade and more.

Economic and Political Weekly April 22, 2006 1559

 The phenomenon of the widespread incidence of suicides Millets and other inferior cereals have given way to oilseeds,
among peasants in India is of fairly recent vintage – certainly cotton and chillies. This shift has obvious implications for the
not more than two decades. Although Andhra Pradesh is the leader peasantry. Non-food crops imply a greater extent of dependence
of sorts in this respect, the phenomenon is by no means confined on cash incomes not only for cultivation but also for self-
to that state alone. Suicides by peasants have been reported from consumption. The greater dependence on monetised inputs, such
Karnataka, Maharashtra, Kerala, Punjab, Rajasthan, Orissa, as seeds, fertilisers and pesticides also meant increased recourse
Madhya Pradesh, among several other states of the Indian union. to borrowings. Very often the source of credit was also either
Crucially, if it is accepted that the phenomenon of suicides is a supplier of inputs or a landlord who leased out his land to the
driven by dramatic changes in socio-economic conditions, then cultivator. The cash borrowings ensured further integration into
one has to examine what in the lives of the peasants has changed the cash economy because the peasant had to repay the cash loans
so dramatically in the last two decades as to have pushed them which commanded usurious rates of interest. This shift also
to take their own lives. ensured that the peasant could not get back to the earlier situation
While it is foolhardy to pin a single factor as causing peasants of growing subsistence crop, the market for which may also have
to take their own lives, it is becoming clear that the set of policies collapsed in the new situation of a cash-governed crop economy.
unleashed by economic liberalisation in the last decade have The agrarian crisis is reflected by the declining growth rate
played a significant role. The fact that Andhra Pradesh has been, of agricultural output in Andhra Pradesh. The rate of growth of
until recently, a leader in this respect among all the states of the agricultural output declined from 3.4 per cent per annum in the
Indian union, is also not without significance. 1980s to 2.3 per cent per annum in the 1990s. Moreover, agri-
cultural crop yields also grew at a slower pace. For instance, the
Background growth rates of rice yields declined from an annual rate of 3.1
per cent in the 1980s to 1.3 per cent in the 1990s; similarly, cotton
The rural economy in Andhra Pradesh is in the throes of a severe yields also slackened, the figures being were 3.4 per cent and
crisis. Although the drought-hit regions of Rayalaseema and 1.4 per cent, respectively in the two decades. Nationwide studies
Telangana have borne a greater part of the strain of the crisis, estimate that crop yields in the state declined by 1.8 per cent
it is evident that even farmers in the irrigated tracts have not been per year over the 1990s. In addition, the volatility in yields
spared. Moreover, small and marginal farmers, tenant cultivators was also greater in the 1990s, implying a greater instability in
and agricultural workers have borne most of the burden of the agricultural performance.
crisis. Suicides by peasants are only the last step of desperation, The peasantry’s travails due to the declining agricultural
apparently driven by the growing burden of debt. However, this performance could have been offset by better and stable prices.
does not reveal the fact that agricultural activity has not only become However, the prices of crops produced by farmers in Andhra
more unstable and unviable for large sections of the peasants. Pradesh have become much more volatile. This is as much due
Indeed, the failure of the state to act despite repeated media to the failure of state intervention in the product market as the
exposures of kidney sales or of starvation deaths by desperate increasing tendency to be governed by trends in the global
peasants is only indication of the manner in which the state has commodity markets. It has been suggested that since 1996, falling
ignored warning signals of desperation from the peasants. international primary commodity prices of many crops impacted
Frequent droughts, although a significant feature in Rayalaseema Indian markets in India even when the actual volume of imports
and Telangana, is only one aspect of the problem. Soil degradation
and inappropriate agricultural practices; rising cost of inputs; wild Table 1: Suicides by Peasants in Andhra Pradesh –
fluctuations in farm output prices; and rising indebtedness are May 14-July 9, 2004
other aspects of the problem. Indebtedness, in a desperate situation, District/Region Toll
is the proverbial last straw on the back of the peasantry. Indebted-
ness, often described as the proximate cause of suicide, is only Coastal Andhra 121
Nellore 21
symptomatic of the larger malaise that afflicts agriculture and its Prakasam 13
practice in the state. Case studies of suicide victims reveal these Guntur 36
multiple facets of the problem (see Appendix for one such case study). Krishna 18
The general deterioration of conditions in which the peasant West Godavari 15
practices agriculture has been accentuated by the withdrawal of East Godavari 11
Visakhapatnam 3
institutional support for activities that are essential to agriculture. Vizianagaram 2
Conversely, this has meant that the peasant has been forced to Srikakulam 2
seek private sources to provide these support services. For in- Rayalaseema 85
stance, the decline of institutional credit and adequate insurance Chittoor 18
has meant that the peasant has had to depend on moneylenders Cuddapah 14
Anantapur 30
for their credit needs. There are also indications that the market Kurnool 23
for credit, land and inputs are getting more integrated, implying Telangana 222
a greater squeeze on the peasantry. The agrarian crisis has been Mahbubnagar 27
accentuated by stagnant employment; while agricultural employ- Rangareddy 10
ment has declined, opportunities for off-farm employment have Nizamabad 28
Nalgonda 31
also been stagnant. This is reflected in not only a decline in Medak 32
consumption but also increasing migration. Adilabad 13
The shift in cropping pattern, as can be seen from Table 2, Karimnagar 37
indicates an apparent dynamism in agricultural performance in Warangal 27
Andhra Pradesh. It is evident that peasants across the state have Khammam 17
Total 428
shifted away from traditional rain-fed cereal crops to non-food
cash crops. Much of the shift has occurred in the recent past. Source: Andhra Pradesh Rythu Sangham.

1560 Economic and Political Weekly April 22, 2006

did not increase. The mere possibility of such imports, it has been
suggested, has dampened commodity prices in Indian markets
[Patnaik 2004: 22-26]. Moreover, prices have not only fallen,
they have tended to be more volatile. This is particularly true
of crops such as cotton and groundnut. In short, prices have
proved to be uncertain and undependable.
It is evident from Table 3 that agriculture is in serious danger
of being a loss-making proposition for most peasants in the state.
Returns from agriculture are either stagnant or in decline for many
crops. In addition, returns are also volatile, reflecting the volatility
in the prices of agricultural produce. Data from the Commission
on Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) show that the returns
from cotton cultivation per hectare in current prices were, in fact,
negative in 1996-97 (implying a loss of Rs 1,641 per hectare
for peasants growing the crop in the state); in 1997-98, the average
peasant growing cotton in Andhra Pradesh made a net profit of
only Rs 72 per hectare. These figures are likely to be wrong
because of the widely held perception that the CACP underes-
timates various elements of cost in Andhra Pradesh. Thus, the
real situation may be far worse than that revealed by the CACP
data. Significantly, while yields have stagnated, and when farm-
ers have been unable to command better prices, prices of a range
of agricultural inputs have increased sharply.
It is but natural that the poor agricultural performance, com-
bined with falling incomes, has had their adverse impact on the
peasantry. The proportion of gross domestic product (GDP)
originating in agriculture in Andhra Pradesh declined much faster
than at the all-India level. Moreover, the per capita GDP in
agriculture, measured in constant terms, has barely increased
since the mid-1990s and, in fact, has actually fallen in recent
years. While aggregate per capita income increased somewhat
since 1993, agricultural income per capita of rural population
has either stagnated or actually fallen. In fact, between 1993-
94 to 1995-96 and 2001-02 to 2003-04, per capita GDP origi-
nating in agriculture actually fell sharply, by about 12 per cent.
Impact of Liberalisation
The emphasis on the impact of shortage of water, often
nonchalantly labelled “crop failure”, misses the point that far too
many things are wrong with agriculture. Over the past 10-15
years, the state has stepped back from its role as a promoter of
agriculture. Significantly, the state has not only vacated the space
that truly belongs to it as the custodian of the poor and marginal
farmers, but actively facilitated the entry of the landed gentry
to occupy this vital space. This is felt in every aspect of the
agricultural sector in Andhra Pradesh today.
The package of a liberal regime, unbundled in 1991 at the
national and state levels, had adverse impact on the peasantry
in Andhra Pradesh, just as it had for the peasantry in other parts
of the country. It is significant that agriculture has been impacted
without the union government actually implementing a set of
policies specifically targeted at agriculture. Although the present
Table 2: Changes in Cropping Pattern
(Per Cent of Cropped Area)
Crops North Coastal Andhra South Coastal Andhra Rayalaseema
1958 1998 1958 1998 1958
Foodgrains 66.90 54.40 72.10 65.40 44.40
Groundnut 7.10 9.50 3.60 1.80 20.30
Oilseeds 11.30 12.90 6.30 3.70 21.40
Cotton 0.20 0.70 0.80 7.00 7.90
Others 21.60 32.00 20.80 23.90 26.30
Source: S Subramanyam (2002).
Economic and Political Weekly April 22, 2006
Congress government in Andhra Pradesh has initiated a series
of measures to stem the tide of suicides in the state (and, it appears
to have halted the march of death at least temporarily), the failure
to recalibrate policy at the national level may have the effect
of neutralising these measures.
Here we need only recount those aspects of the liberal regime
which have a bearing on the way agriculture is practised, and
its consequences for the peasantry. It has worked in two ways.
First, it has worked on the logic of “freeing” agricultural product
markets, based on the argument that this would only be beneficial
to farmers. This has been crucially located in the logic of aligning
Indian agricultural product prices to those prevailing globally.
This rationale has been that this is required as part of its com-
mitments made to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
Secondly, the regime has had the effect of releasing control
over the terms on which peasants access inputs. These inputs,
ranging from power to pesticides have gone outside the ambit
of state control. It is significant that in this respect, there has
been a coincidence of interests among both the central govern-
ment and the states. Nowhere was this more evident than in
Andhra Pradesh, at least as long as Chandrababu Naidu was in
power [Sridhar 2004].
However, the reorientation of government spending priorities,
particularly the fiscal realignment, has reached government
expenditures on rural development and has affected agriculture
adversely. The impact of financial liberalisation has also affected
the terms on which public financial institutions lend for agri-
cultural operations. This is not without significance for large
sections of the peasantry in the state. The single most important
cause for death due to suicide by peasants has been the high cost
of debt. That, in turn, has been caused by the increasing recourse
to borrowing from private moneylenders, often on usurious terms.
The liberal package of the union government in the field of
agriculture has caused expenditures on rural development to fall.
The reduction in subsidies for fertilisers has been accompanied
by the withdrawal of state support for agricultural extension
services. Decline in investments in public infrastructure such as
energy and irrigation has also resulted from the fiscal squeeze.
Financial liberalisation, including the redefining priority sector
lending by banks, has effectively curtailed the public institutions’
ability to make available rural credit, which made investment
more expensive and difficult, especially for small and marginal
peasants. The fact that such moneylenders also double up as
suppliers of inputs such as fertilisers, has heightened the depen-
dence of peasants on these agents, often resulting in desperation
when they are unable to repay their dues. In fact, suicide resulting
from an inability to repay their dues to these agents appears to
be the typical feature of agriculture in Andhra Pradesh.
Things would not have been as bad if the policies of the state
government were different from those unleashed in the rest of
the country. In fact, however, Andhra Pradesh took the lead in
pushing forth the liberal agenda, under the auspices of agencies
such as the World Bank. During the last decade the state
South Telangana North Telangana Total State
1998 1958 1998 1958 1998 1958 1998
23.60 64.40 62.50 74.20 60.60 73.10 53.20
48.30 10.50 9.50 8.00 5.30 10.50 15.30
56.30 19.50 20.30 15.10 10.80 15.30 20.80
5.20 0.40 8.20 4.00 17.60 3.10 8.20
14.90 15.50 9.00 6.70 11.00 11.60 17.80
1561
government in Andhra Pradesh systematically reduced the role Although the feature of a full-blown agrarian crisis was already
of public investment, intervention and regulation. Private agents evident, the department of agriculture in Andhra Pradesh issued
were expected to fill the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of a white paper in 1999 stating that the government could act only
the state. as a facilitator. It said that no public investment would be
The decline in public investment in agriculture led to a sharp forthcoming to provide for these essential services. It pointed
deceleration in the growth of fixed capital formation in agriculture out that it would not fill up the more than one-fourth of the
in the 1990s. This is especially striking when seen in the context sanctioned posts that were vacant, claiming that the government
of the high rates registered in the 1980s. It is not surprising that did not have “resources to employ any more extension workers.”
the area covered by public sources of irrigation, namely, canals, Instead, the department proposed to wind up the entire cadre of
declined in the 1990s. It is also significant that despite the hype agricultural extension officers. It envisaged that extension ser-
of the Naidu’s regime, no new major irrigation project was taken vices would be promoted through the private sector, by taking
up in its tenure extending over nine years; in fact, several projects either the unemployed or retired employees. The burden on the
pending were not even completed. AP Seed Corporation would be reduced by making the private
Resources for irrigation, already scarce because of the fiscal sector more accountable through appropriate memorandum of
squeeze, were thinly spread over a large number of watersheds understanding (MoU). The hiring of agricultural machinery would
instead of making an intensive effort to make investments more be encouraged through the corporate sector, NGOs and others.
effective and worthwhile. The reforms in the electricity sector, Soil survey, soil conservation and collection of market informa-
assiduously promoted by the World Bank, caused a sharp increase tion were to be “encouraged to be developed in private sector
in the cost of power in the state. Although farmers paid only with appropriate policy incentives.”
a flat rate (which increased from Rs 50 to Rs 300), they had to It was but natural that in keeping with this world view of the
incur heavy losses due to erratic power, low voltage and burned state government, a number of public institutions catering to the
motors. needs of the agricultural sector were either undermined or
Although more than 10,000 water users’ associations (WUAs) completely closed down. The government corporations or co-
were constituted (about 80 per cent in the minor irrigation sector), operative institutions, such as the Andhra Pradesh Irrigation
the bulk of the area covered is under canal irrigation. Moreover, Development Corporation, Agro-Industries Corporation, Seeds
irrigation charges were increased by more than three times since Development Corporation, cooperative sugar factories, and
1997 even though the surface water rates cover merely the cooperative spinning mills which were envisaged to help farmers,
maintenance charges. In contrast, those depending on lift irri- were closed down, or allowed to degenerate or handed over to
gation, particularly in the drier tracts of the state – mainly in the private sector.
Rayalaseema and Telangana – bear the full capital cost of the The state, by failing to regulate the supply of inputs, has also
well or bore. seriously jeopardised the interests of farmers. Spurious seeds
The bulk of the incremental addition to irrigation capacity in have been a major problem. All that the state has done is to enter
the last 10-15 years has come from well irrigation. This means into a MoU with seed companies. In reality, the state has no
that the burden has fallen on individual farmers. It is obvious control over the quality of seeds. The large number of suicides
to those who have followed the agrarian crisis that the depletion in Warangal, for instance in 1997-98, were caused by the wide-
of groundwater resources in areas such as Telangana heaped a spread use of spurious cotton seeds provided by private seed
disproportionate burden on those who had made risky invest- companies. The problem with seeds is not confined to their
ments in irrigation. Farmers in this region have repeatedly made quality; farmers now pay much more. Paddy seed prices, for
heavy investments in bore wells and failed miserably (see instance, have doubled since 1990; prices of cotton and chilli
Appendix). The state has not only failed to provide irrigation seeds have increased fourfold during the same period. Similar
facilities, but actually imposed a squeeze on credit for such purposes complaints about adulterated pesticides and fertilisers have
when it was needed the most. As a result, peasants, in a desperate been reported from across the state. It is estimated that
search for water, have had to borrow at usurious rates of interest. fertiliser costs have increased fourfold since 1992. The rise in
The field of agricultural research and extension had also been the cost of inputs, apart from the sharp increase in electricity
under prolonged neglect. In 1992-94 the extent of government charges during the Chandrababu Naidu regime, has placed the
investment in agricultural research and education in the state, farmer in Andhra Pradesh at a disadvantage when compared to
measured in terms of expenses in relation to the GDP originating those in other states.
in agriculture was a mere 0.26 per cent, compared to the all-India The liberalised policies, which are geared more towards cre-
level of 0.49 per cent. The level in Andhra Pradesh was much ating a pan-Indian primary commodity market with a unified
lower than those prevailing in the other southern states. Expen-
diture on public extension services, mainly borne by state gov- Table 3: Net Income Per Hectare in Andhra Pradesh
ernments, declined in absolute terms in the 1990s in Andhra (at 1971-72 prices)
Pradesh. This was only 0.02 per cent of the state’s GDP during
Paddy Groundnut Sugar Cane Cotton
1992-94, compared to the all-India average of 0.15 per cent. Indeed,
there were attempts to privatise extension services in the state. Early 1970s 314 - 0
The complete collapse of the machinery for providing agri- Mid-1970s 81 -116 186
cultural extension services, combined with the closure of avenues Late 1970s -36 -65 1056 638
Early 1980s 150 -15 809 -
for drawing credit from institutional sources, exposed small and Mid-1980s 140 -88 2194 -
marginal peasants in the state to the caprices of private money- Late 1980s 215 -52 816 104
lenders and input suppliers, more often rolled into one. The Early 1990s 221 -9 1119 -
freedom that these players enjoyed, remaining outside the pur- Mid-1990s 227 -117 1563 474
view of any state control, made matters worse for the peasantry. Late 1990s 167 -123 1139 -
The frequent complaints of poor quality seeds, pesticides and Source: CACP, quoted by Directorate of Economics and Statistics, government
fertilisers have to be placed in this context. of Andhra Pradesh.

1562 Economic and Political Weekly April 22, 2006

price, in alignment with global prices, have clearly worked bear the uncertainty of crop failure without any assistance from
against farmers in the state. The cotton farmer in Warangal the state. Most farmers in Anantapur grow only one crop, which
district, for instance, was cajoled into producing cotton by the means that the fields are fallow for 8 to 9 months a year. Less than
state more than a decade ago. Sudarshan Reddy, who conducted 10 per cent of the cultivated area is irrigated. The tenfold increase
an inquiry into the suicides by farmers in the district in 1997- in the import of edible oils has meant lower prices for the peasant,
98, said that the state encouraged the farmer to grow cotton but according to leaders of peasant organisations [Sridhar 2004].
has since then left him in a lurch. The state did this despite the Even land prices have dropped dramatically in the past few
soil conditions being unsuitable for cotton cultivation. years. Land in Anantapur, which used to command a price of
Rising costs of cultivation have meant that the cost of pro- Rs 40,000 to Rs 50,000 an acre five years ago, now goes for
duction of paddy in Andhra Pradesh is higher by about 16 per Rs 10,000. Peasants in distress have sold all that they had – cattle,
cent when compared to the cost in Punjab; the cost of growing houses and even their land. Many have migrated in the hope of
cotton is higher by more than one-third when compared to that escaping extreme distress.
in Gujarat; and the costs of groundnut production is 38 per cent Even suicide does not appear to relieve the Andhra Pradesh
higher in the state when compared to that in Gujarat. Severe peasant of his debts. Travelling across Telangana and coastal
fluctuations in the prices of produce have added to the uncertainty Andhra, I met at least a dozen peasant-families of suicide victims
in the lives of farmers. Although the state has several agricultural in the summer of 2004. Not a single case was found in which
market committees, which are supposed to act as procurement the death provided deliverance from debt. Barely days after the
agencies and provide remunerative prices, it is obvious that they death, the creditors, moneylenders and dealers of fertilisers,
are defunct. In 2002, a committee, which conducted an inquiry pesticides and seeds and even “friends” and “relatives” continued
into the phenomenon of farmer suicides in the state, reported that to press the hapless families to clear the outstanding debts of
these committees were procuring an insignificant portion of the the deceased. Despite the grief, the families were cautious when
total produce in the state. referring to their creditors. Not a word was spoken in rancour.
The burden of the agrarian crisis has obviously fallen on the In fact, it appeared that they were at the mercy of the lenders
small and marginal farmers. More than 80 per cent of the land- like never before.
holdings are of sizes up to two hectares and constitute 43 per The policies have not only effected a quantum jump in the cost
cent of the cultivated area. Moreover, tenant cultivators with little of crucial inputs such as power, but allowed full play to seed,
or no land, pay exorbitant rents to landlords. High rents charged fertiliser and pesticide dealers. A crucial part of the “package”
by absentee landlords in coastal Andhra Pradesh, amounting to has been the peasant’s lack of access to credit from institutional
more than half the annual produce of the farmer, are a serious sources – nationalised banks, cooperatives and specialised rural
burden on the peasantry. The rising cost of cultivation, coupled banks. Credit from these sources has been virtually frozen in the
with the risks associated with it, has not only added to the burden last few years.
on the peasantry but made life uncertain for the poor peasant. Prices of inputs in Andhra Pradesh are among the highest in
The tenant’s plight is worse because, apart from the rack-renting the country. That is not difficult to fathom, considering the fact
by landlords, he is also totally outside the loop of the formal that the input suppliers are also the chief suppliers of credit to
credit mechanism. farmers. Credit furnished by private sources is rarely extended
The policies that have come to govern the peasant economy in cash. Inputs are supplied and these are “adjusted” against
have made the peasant unable to cope with even mild shocks borrowings already made by the peasant. This implies that the
in production, and his plight is aggravated by the state abdicating borrower has virtually no control over determining the price or
its role, particularly in extending institutional credit and framing quality of the inputs.1 It has been pointed out that the government
meaningful tenancy laws. had not even deployed geologists to help farmers in their search
Peasants in Andhra Pradesh, particularly the small and marginal for water, after failing to provide either institutional credit or
ones, are in the grip of a predatory commercialisation of agri- an insurance scheme to protect farmers from the enormous risk
culture. This has changed the face of rural indebtedness. In that they have to undertake in their desperate effort to locate
particular, the “withdrawal of the state” either as a facilitator or groundwater. Local residents said “water diviners” are having
as a provider of inputs, extension services or credit has been the a field day.2
key element of the pernicious policies that have wrecked the It is important to situate the ongoing agrarian crisis in the
peasant economy. Of course, the “withdrawal” has not happened context of the statistical fact that more than 80 per cent of the
accidentally. landholdings are about five acres (two hectares). Although some
have argued that the crisis in agriculture has affected sections
The Suicide Phenomenon
Table 4: Institutional Credit in Andhra Pradesh
The single most striking feature of the last round of suicides (Rs crore)
was the fact that they were not concentrated in a pocket of the
Year Crop Loans Term Loans
state as on previous occasions. Anantapur district, which is Target Actual Actual as Target Actual Actual as
possibly best designated as the “suicide capital” of India, used Percentage Percentage
to be better known until the last round of deaths. It has been of Target of Target
estimated that more than 450 peasants in the district have com-
1998-1999 4,115 3743 90.96 659 749 113.65
mitted suicide since 2000. The district has been hit by a series 1999-2000 4,500 4451 98.91 737 932 126.45
of droughts in recent years. But that is only to be expected since 2000-2001 6,019 4184 69.51 906 417 46.02
it generally records the second lowest rainfall in the country (next 2001-2002 7,500 6124 81.65 1200 689 57.41
to Jaisalmer district in Rajasthan). 2002-2003 8,600 6332 73.62 1345 593 44.08
Groundnut is grown in 90 per cent of the cultivable land in 2003-2004 9,667 7902 81.72 1515 733 48.38
2004-2005 11,205 1814
the district. The small and marginal peasant incurs a production
expenditure of about Rs 3,000 to Rs 4,000 an acre, but has to Source: Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Bank, 2004

Economic and Political Weekly April 22, 2006 1563

of all the middle and rich peasantry in parts of the state, it is
obvious that the small and marginal peasant and tenant cultivators
have borne the brunt of the crisis, particularly that of the collapse
of institutional credit. It is evident that the advances made by
formal sources of credit in the last few years have fallen far below
the targets that they set for themselves (Table 4). The shortfall
is obvious, particularly in the release of term loans. One of the
main components of such advances is meant for enabling the
peasant to develop irrigation facilities. A substantial part of this,
according to bankers, is meant for digging wells. In 2003-04,
the government declared that 451 of the 1,127 mandals were
affected by drought. In 2002-03, 1,041 mandals were declared
drought-hit and in 2001-02, 941 mandals were affected by drought.
The fact that term lending fell short by about 50 per cent of the
target in the three drought-hit years, when the peasants in the
state suffered acute water shortage for crops, highlights the gross
failure of the institutional credit mechanism. It is obvious that
institutional credit failed the peasantry at the time when it was
needed the most.
The condition of a tenant farmer is just as precarious as that
of the small and marginal landowner. Having little or no land,
the tenant is forced to pay high rents to the absentee landlord,
who often supplies seeds, pesticides, fertilisers and credit. In the
Krishna and Godavari delta areas of coastal Andhra Pradesh,
where tenancy is as high as 60-80 per cent of the cultivated area,
rents take away more than half of the farmer’s produce. Tenancy
is entirely based on an oral agreement called ‘mooza vani kowlu’.
There are no papers or proof to show that the land is cultivated
by the tenant. The high rents, coupled with rising input costs
and the high cost of informal credit, have made life extremely
precarious for poor tenants, many of whom graduated from the
ranks of agricultural workers in the last few decades. The
commercialisation of agriculture and the high rents mean that
tenants are unable to cope with even relatively mild shocks in
production. Since they have no documents that recognise their
rights as cultivators, the tenant cultivators are entirely outside
the ambit of the formal credit market. In fact, several of them
in the heartland of the green revolution in West Godavari district
told me that they were not even able to collect compensation
from the government for crops lost owing to cyclones and
inundation during the monsoon. They said that their landlords
pocketed the money, because they held the land in their names.
Tenancy reforms, to feed the poor peasant’s acute hunger for
land, are obviously an urgent requirement. But it is not even on
the radar screens of the political class. It is not even a demand
that is being articulated by the poor peasant, who is hopelessly
marginalised and is in utter despair.
It is well accepted, even in government circles, that the credit
institutions indulge in “ever-greening” of their accounts. It
is known that a substantial portion of loans advanced by
institutions are not really “fresh advances”. Frequently, banks or
credit cooperatives ask the peasant to clear his/her old dues
including interest, upon which they extended the same
amount again as a “fresh” loan to the farmer. In effect, the bank
merely makes a book adjustment, while managing to show an
increase in its credit disbursement. All this despite several
studies on indebtedness among small farmers showing that
the rate of recovery of loans from small and marginal farmers
is higher than that for loans made to large farmers. Banks,
increasingly under the sway of the logic of a liberal financial
regime, are discouraged from lending to small farmers. The policy
appears to be oriented to the logic that it is better to lend to a
small number of large borrowers than to a large number of small
borrowers.
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State Response to Suicides
Till recently, the government’s response to the phenomenon
of suicides by farmers was confined to adopting a posture of
denial. Even when it was accepted it was repeatedly argued that
any relief measure would only cause more peasants to take their
own lives. However, since the new government assumed power
after May 2004 elections, it has initiated a number of measures.
Although the long-term efficacy of the measures remains to be
seen, it is generally accepted that they have effectively stemmed
the tide of suicides that erupted in 2004.
The Congress government in Andhra Pradesh which assumed
office in 2004 has recognised the magnitude of the agrarian crisis
and has already made clear its intention to redirect state policy
bearing in mind the need and interests of farmers. The cabinet
sub-committee report on the causes of farmers’ suicides indicates
that the government is already aware of the main forces behind
the crisis and the policies required. There are a number of positive
measures which the state government has already instituted,
which deserve to be noted.
The state government announced an ex-gratia amount of rupees
one lakh to the family of a deceased peasant and Rs 50,000
towards liquidation of his/her farm debt. However, observers
have pointed out that there are no budgetary allocations to ensure
that this happens on a sustained basis. This is now dependent
on funds being available with the concerned district collector.
It has also been pointed out that the process of identifying deaths
by suicide has been excessively bureaucratic in many cases,
which defeats the very purpose of the measure. Since the relief
measure is available to “farm-related causes”, it is difficult for
the members of the victim’s family to prove that a particular
suicide death is farm-related. However, the most important move
has been the moratorium on loans taken by farmers. A bill was
passed in the state assembly in 2004 providing a moratorium for
six months on private moneylenders. In addition, the two-year
moratorium on institutional credit recovery by commercial banks
as declared by government of India is also being implemented.
There was also a drive to ensure increase disbursement of credit
by the banking institutions.
The deep-rooted nature of the agrarian crisis, resulting from a
liberal package initiated in New Delhi, implies that much more needs
to be done at the state level to counter the effects of policies
in the sphere of agriculture. The crisis in agriculture is so deep and
widespread, that in spite of these positive measures, the conditions
of farmers remain precarious, as evidenced by the continuing
suicides despite various relief measures. Much more will be required
to make material improvements in the conditions of farmers.
Conclusion
The act of suicide, or the phenomenon of suicides on a wide-
spread basis, is usually provoked by a churn in socio-economic
conditions. Individuals and communities are under pressure to
cope with the changes in the conditions of their lives, when society
is in a state of flux. This is important in the case of Andhra Pradesh
because it has the dubious distinction of accounting for three out
of four suicides by farmers in India. Once it is accepted that the
growing number of suicides within a community is provoked by
sudden or dramatic changes in the terms on which their lives
are lived, it is necessary to explore what these changes are and
how they have impacted the lives of the community, in this case,
the peasantry.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the policies associated
with the process of economic liberalisation, particularly since
Economic and Political Weekly April 22, 2006
the 1990s, have impacted the lives of the peasantry in a major
way. It has also imposed a stress on the peasantry, which is
possibly responsible for them taking their own lives. A one-to-
one straightforward causal relationship is difficult to establish.
However, it is evident that the logic of liberalisation, fundamen-
tally defined as allowing a greater play for market forces, whose
corollary is inevitably a “withdrawal” of the state, has added a
qualitatively new dimension to the stress on the peasantry. It is
significant that the field of agrarian studies has suffered precisely
at a time when the peasantry has been the height of its distress.
It is therefore necessary to explore the dimensions of distress
in Andhra Pradesh on a more extensive basis, particularly with
greater field-based exploration. The lessons from such an exercise
in Andhra Pradesh could have important lessons for peasants
across the country, particularly because of the serious threat of
farmer suicides erupting across the country.
Appendix
Case study: Suicide victim from Warangal district
Name: Sunka Mallesam
Age: 35
Village: Chilpur
Mandal: Station Ghanpur
District: Warangal
Date of death: May 27, 2004
A crowd is assembled under a shamiana as the priest conducts
the ceremony on the tenth day after the death of Sunka Mallesam,
a marginal farmer. He tried raising cotton on the three acres that
he owned. In order to provide a measure of insurance from the
repeated failure of the cotton crop in this part of Warangal
district, he also leased three acres and grew maize and paddy on
it. His brother Raja Komariah (40) migrated to Khammam five
years ago to work as a construction worker. He preferred to leave
his three acres fallow and migrate rather than suffer repeated
losses like his brother by cultivating the “treacherous crop”,
cotton.
Finding water for cultivation was always a problem, and it
drove Mallesam to death. Komariah said that Mallesam spent
about Rs 30,000 on digging a bore well, laying pipelines and
installing a motor in May 2003. Although the bore ran 90 metres
deep, there was no water. A desperate Mallesam dug another bore
well in January 2004, which also turned dry. By then the total
debts he had piled up in trying to procure water amounted to
more than Rs 75,000. In what turned out to be a gamble, he
invested Rs 35,000 on the cotton crop.
Rajamma (27), Mallesam’s wife, said that he was already
burdened by debts incurred in 1998 when their daughter suffered
from “brain fever”. The couple had spent Rs 40,000, borrowed
mainly from friends and relatives, to treat her. Komariah said that
they managed to repay some of the earlier loans but their debts
amounted to Rs 96,000 at the time Mallesam took his own life.
Damera Ramanathan (45), whose field was adjacent to
Mallesam’s, said that they used to discuss their debts. He said
he too had debts, amounting to over Rs 40,000. He too suffered
losses because of failed bore wells. Ramanathan said Mallesam
had told him that he proposed to migrate to Bhadrachalam to
work as a “coolie”. “I persuaded him not to migrate, but I do
not know whether I gave him the right advice,” Ramanathan said.
They met for the last time 15 days before Mallesam died. Mallesam
said he had sold his two bullocks for about Rs 6,000. On the
morning of May 27, Mallesam was found lying near his well.
Barely conscious, he told a neighbour that he had consumed
pesticide. He died soon after.
Economic and Political Weekly April 22, 2006
Ramanathan, who normally grows cotton or chillies on his two
acres, said agriculture was laden with risk. “Water is not the only
problem”, he said. “A good harvest means poor prices, but a bad
harvest is bad in every way”. He sold his chilli crop at Rs 1,200
a quintal in March 2004, but the current price is Rs 4,000. He
pointed out that although the official procurement price of chillies
had increased to Rs 2,600 from Rs 2,000 last year, his failed
crop would not get him anything anyway.
The ruling “market rate” for credit in Chilpur is between 2.5
and 3 per cent a month, which works out to 36 per cent interest
on an annual basis. Mallesam’s loans were taken mostly from
friends and relatives, but he had also borrowed from a farmer
in a nearby village. Mallesam’s father Sunka Venkatiah said that
the loan taken from the farmer bothered him more than anything
else as the lender demanded early repayment. Mallesam had
sought time in the past by signing a promissory note enabling
him to rollover the debts. But this obviously could not go on
indefinitely. Four days before he committed suicide, Mallesam
signed a promissory note mortgaging his next crop and agreeing
to pay compound interest on the accumulated debt. His father
said: “He must have known that his crop would not fetch him
anything. He just ran out of hope.”
Asked if the lenders exerted any pressure in the days before
his death, Mallesam’s family is reticent. His neighbours explain
that violence was never really needed to recover loans from
desperate borrowers. The existence of a cooperative bank at
Venkatadripet, 2 km away, does not seem to have been an option
for Mallesam. Venkatiah said that most people avoided the
cooperative bank because of the threat of attachment if dues were
not repaid. Mallesam’s neighbours said that windows of the
houses would be broken and taken away and even television
antennas would be seized if the loans were not cleared. Nationalised
banks located in Ghanpur also do not issue fresh loans if earlier
loans are not repaid. In short, public institutions do not offer a
flexible repayment schedule when the borrower is in difficulty.
In contrast, the private lender is willing to extend credit, but at
a very steep price. Even that eventually drives the borrower to
a corner. The family also said that it had not received any succour
from the government. It fears that the lenders will descend on
them if it got anything at all from the government. -29
Email: vsridhar@thehindu.co.in
Notes
1 In parts of Nalgonda district, which reported 31 suicides in the two-month
period between May and July 2004, peasants have dug bore well after
bore well in a desperate search for water. The money advanced by private
moneylenders is paid directly to the rig operators, enabling them to
collude against the peasants [Sridhar 2004a]. An average farmer in the
district, with about three acres of land, had struck at least three or four
bore wells going down to 250-300 feet, each attempt costing him at least
Rs 10,000.
2 One technique, apparently a popular one, involves the “diviner” walking
around the farm carrying a coconut in his palm. The stalk supposedly stands
upright at the spot where the bore is to be drilled. This bizarre technique
even stipulates that the blood group of the “diviner” should be O positive.
References
Durkheim, Emile (1951): ‘Suicide: ‘A Study in Sociology’ ’, translated by
George Simpson and John A Spaulding, The Free Press, New York.
Patnaik, Utsa (2004): ‘It is a Crisis Rooted in Economic Reforms’, Frontline,
21(13), pp 22-26.
Sridhar, V (2004): ‘Neoliberalism Spurned’, Frontline, 21(12), pp 23-28.
– (2004a): ‘From Debt to Death’, Frontline, 21(13), pp 13-16.
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