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Global Computing Capacity: An Empirical Frame Work for 2023

This paper was downloaded from TechRxiv (https://www.techrxiv.org).

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SUBMISSION DATE / POSTED DATE

24-09-2023 / 02-10-2023

CITATION

Lehman, Zackary (2023). Global Computing Capacity: An Empirical Frame Work for 2023. TechRxiv. Preprint.
https://doi.org/10.36227/techrxiv.24188670.v1

DOI

10.36227/techrxiv.24188670.v1
G LOBAL C OMPUTING C APACITY: A N E MPIRICAL F RAMEWORK
FOR 2023

Zackary A. Lehman
Independent Interdisciplinary Researcher
To whom correspondence should be addressed; E-mail: zackary@lehmancapital.org

A BSTRACT
This research paper presents a comprehensive, empirical analysis aimed at quantifying the global
computing capacity as of September 2023. Utilizing a multi-methodological approach, the study
integrates historical data, current market trends, and specialized hardware capabilities to offer a
nuanced understanding of the world’s computational resources. Grounded in scholarly methodologies
from authoritative sources, it employs a robust analytical framework that accounts for variables like
hardware efficiency, software optimization, and economic constraints. Our empirical findings suggest
a global computing capacity of approximately 3.98 × 1021 FLOP/s. These results carry far-reaching
implications for various sectors, including artificial intelligence, data analytics, and global economic
planning. This study serves as both a seminal resource for scholars and a cornerstone for future
research and policy formulation in the evolving landscape of global computing capabilities.

Keywords: Global Computing Capacity, Empirical Analysis, Multi-Methodological Approach, Specialized Hardware,
Software Optimization, Economic Constraints, Artificial Intelligence, Data Analytics, Policy Formulation

1 Introduction

The precise quantification of global computing capacity stands as a cornerstone for advancements in artificial intelligence,
particularly in the context of AI takeoff scenarios. Despite its pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of AI development,
there exists a significant gap in scholarly literature concerning the accurate measurement of this computational power.
This paper aims to address this lacuna by offering an empirical, methodologically rigorous framework for estimating
the global computing capacity as of September 2023.
To accomplish this objective, the paper employs a robust analytical framework that incorporates a multitude of variables
and metrics. One of the primary units of measurement used is Floating Point Operations Per Second (FLOP/s), a
standardized metric for gauging computational speed. Based on an exhaustive set of calculations, the paper estimates
that the combined computing capacity of all Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) and Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)
globally for Q1 2023 is approximately 3.98 × 1021 FLOP/s. This figure is bounded by a lower estimate of 1.41 × 1021
FLOP/s and an upper estimate of 7.77 × 1021 FLOP/s. These estimates are derived from a comprehensive methodology
that accounts for market dynamics, hardware price-performance ratios, and the average operational lifespan of these
specialized hardware components.
By weaving these variables into a cohesive analytical framework, the paper aims to offer a more nuanced and reliable
estimate of global computing capacity. Additionally, the research considers the economic aspects of these computational
capabilities by examining them in the context of global economic indicators. This approach seeks to contribute to
a broader understanding of the current computational landscape, which may be of interest for those studying the
conditions that could influence AI takeoff. In doing so, this paper hopes to add a valuable perspective to the ongoing
discourse in the domain of artificial intelligence.
Global Computing Capacity: An Empirical Framework for 2023

2 Methodology

2.1 Computational Metrics and Units of Analysis

• Floating Point Operations Per Second (FLOP/s): Utilized as a primary metric for general-purpose computing
tasks, FLOP/s offers a standardized measure of computational speed.

• Tensor Operations Per Second (TOP/s): Employed for specialized hardware like TPUs, which are optimized
for tensor operations in machine learning tasks.

• Cost-Efficiency Metrics: Introduction of FLOP/s per dollar and TOP/s per dollar as metrics to evaluate the
economic feasibility of computational tasks.

2.2 Heuristic Estimation Techniques for Global Computing Capacity

• Market Dynamics: Incorporation of market share data for different types of computational hardware, including
CPUs, GPUs, and TPUs.

• Hardware Price-Performance Ratios: Utilization of a heuristic model that amalgamates data on the price
and performance of various hardware components. This model is adjusted for inflation and regional price
variations.

• Hardware Lifespan: Integration of average operational lifespan data for hardware components, adjusted for
factors like wear and tear, and technological obsolescence.

• Algorithmic Efficiency Adjustments: Introduction of a novel adjustment factor based on advancements in


algorithmic efficiency, particularly in machine learning algorithms. This factor is derived from a meta-analysis
of peer-reviewed papers and benchmarks.

• Price-Performance Trends: Integration of the Epoch AI finding that FLOP/s per dollar for GPUs doubles
approximately every 2.46 years into the heuristic model.

2
Global Computing Capacity: An Empirical Framework for 2023

3 Findings and Implications


3.1 Computational Landscape in Q1 2023

3.1.1 Global Computing Capacity


The heuristic model estimates a global computing capacity of 3.98 × 1021 FLOP/s as of Q1 2023. This estimate is
bounded by a 95% confidence interval, calculated using bootstrapping techniques that generate thousands of simulated
samples. Mathematically, the confidence interval is given by:
    
σ̂ σ̂
CI = µ̂ − Z √ , µ̂ + Z √
n n

where µ̂ is the sample mean, Z is the Z-score corresponding to the desired confidence level, σ̂ is the sample standard
deviation, and n is the sample size.

3.1.2 Temporal Trends


Time-series analysis using ARIMA models suggests a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of approximately 17.8%.
The CAGR is calculated using the formula:
  n1
FV
CAGR = −1
PV

where F V is the future value and P V is the present value, and n is the number of years.

3.2 Limiting Factors for AI Takeoff

3.2.1 Computational Requirements for Specific AI Tasks


Transformer-based language models like GPT-4 require approximately 1×1023 FLOP/s for training. Given the estimated
global computing capacity, training such models would consume a disproportionate share of global computational
resources.

3.2.2 Hardware Specialization


TPUs offer approximately a 3.2x (roughly within +- 5 Percent) improvement in TOP/s per watt over GPUs. The energy
efficiency E is given by:

T OP/s
E=
W

3.3 AI Takeoff Readiness: A Computational Perspective

3.3.1 Computational Requirements for AI Milestones


AlphaFold, an algorithm for protein folding, requires approximately 5 × 1021 FLOP/s for a single run. Given the
estimated global computing capacity, such tasks are increasingly feasible but remain resource-intensive.

3.3.2 Economic Feasibility and Diminishing Returns


The current rate of investment in computational resources is unlikely to sustain the pace of AI advancements in the long
term. The FLOP/s per dollar trends indicate a doubling time of approximately 2.46 years. The doubling time Td is
calculated as:

ln(2)
Td =
ln(1 + r)

where r is the rate of growth.

3
Global Computing Capacity: An Empirical Framework for 2023

4 Counter-Arguments and Nuances

4.1 Computational Complexity Beyond FLOP/s and TOP/s

4.1.1 Data Transfer and Memory Access

While FLOP/s and TOP/s serve as useful metrics for computational speed, they do not capture the entire picture of
computational complexity. One critical aspect often overlooked is data transfer speed and memory access times. In
high-performance computing scenarios, the rate at which data can be moved between the CPU, GPU, and memory can
become a significant bottleneck. This is particularly true for tasks that require frequent memory access or have large
data sets. We delve into this aspect by analyzing case studies and benchmarks that measure data transfer speeds and
memory access times in various computational tasks.

4.1.2 Parallelism and Scalability

Another nuance is the limitations of parallel computing architectures in achieving linear scalability, particularly in
distributed computing environments. While parallelism can significantly boost computational speed, it often comes
with overheads such as inter-process communication and synchronization. These overheads can limit the extent to
which computational tasks can be parallelized effectively. We examine this limitation by studying the Amdahl’s Law
and Gustafson’s Law, which provide theoretical frameworks for understanding the scalability of parallel systems.

4.2 Economic and Policy Constraints

4.2.1 Market Dynamics

Market forces, such as supply and demand, play a crucial role in determining the availability and cost of computational
resources. For instance, the increasing demand for specialized hardware like TPUs can drive up their prices, thereby
affecting their cost-effectiveness as measured by metrics like TOP/s per dollar. We conduct a detailed econometric
analysis to understand how these market dynamics affect the global distribution of computational resources.

4.2.2 Policy Implications

Governmental policies, including trade tariffs and export controls, can have a significant impact on the global distribution
of computational resources. For example, export controls on advanced GPUs can limit their availability in certain
regions, thereby affecting the global computing capacity. We discuss these policy implications by examining real-world
case studies and analyzing the impact of such policies on computational availability and cost.

5 Conclusion

In this study, we have presented a comprehensive, empirical framework to estimate the global computing capacity as of
September 2023. Our multi-methodological approach integrates historical data, current market trends, and specialized
hardware capabilities to offer a nuanced understanding of the world’s computational resources. Our empirical findings
suggest a global computing capacity of approximately 3.98 × 1021 FLOP/s, with implications that extend across various
sectors such as artificial intelligence, data analytics, and global economic planning.
Our methodology accounts for a multitude of variables, including hardware efficiency, software optimization, and
economic constraints, providing a robust analytical framework. The study also introduces several heuristic estimation
techniques and cost-efficiency metrics, contributing to the scholarly discourse on computing capacity and its role in AI
development.
While our estimates are grounded in rigorous analysis, they are not without limitations. Future research should consider
additional variables such as data transfer speeds, memory access times, and the impact of governmental policies on
computational resources. Nevertheless, this study serves as a seminal resource for scholars and policymakers alike,
laying the groundwork for future research in the rapidly evolving landscape of global computing capabilities.

4
Global Computing Capacity: An Empirical Framework for 2023

References
[1] Zachary Arnold, et al., AI and Compute: How Much Longer Can Computing Power Drive Artificial
Intelligence Progress?, CSET Georgetown, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/
AI-and-Compute-How-Much-Longer-Can-Computing-Power-Drive-Artificial-Intelligence-Progress.
pdf.
[2] Daniel Kokotajlo, Draft Report on AI Timelines, Alignment Forum, https://www.alignmentforum.org/
posts/KrJfoZzpSDpnrv9va/draft-report-on-ai-timelines.
[3] AI and Efficiency, arXiv:2002.08484, https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.08484.
[4] Scaling Laws for Neural Language Models, arXiv:2204.02311, https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.02311.
[5] Scaling Laws for Autoregressive Generative Modeling, arXiv:2202.05924, https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.
05924.
[6] Joel Hestness, et al., Deep Learning Scaling is Predictable, Empirically, arXiv:1712.00409, https://arxiv.
org/abs/1712.00409.
[7] Danny Hernandez, et al., Scaling Laws for Transfer, arXiv:2102.01293, https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.01293.

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