JOSELLE M.

CORTEZ
Student No.: 202240209

1. PEOPLE vs. PAGALASAN, 404 SCRA 275, June 18, 2003

FACTS:
Spouses George and Desiree Lim, and their three young children, one of whom was
a 10-year-old Christopher Neal Lim, resided at Villa Consuelo Subdivision, General
Santos City. The spouses hired a security guard, Ferdinand Cortez, from the Valiant
Security Agency to provide security services to the family.

On September 4, 1994, while the family were in their bedroom, Julita Sarno, the
housemaid, who’s in the kitchen head knocks on the door, thinking it was Ferdinand,
she opened it. Four men, each armed with handguns, two of them were holding hand
grenades, barged into the kitchen. The four intruders were wearing bonnets over their
faces. With them was Ferdinand, whose hands were tied behind his back. When asked
where her employers were, she said that they were in their room. She then was
ordered to knock on the bedroom door. When George’s daughter opened the door,
three of the intruders barged into the room while the one was left in the sala. The three
masked men ransacked the house, getting cash and valuables. One of the masked
men gave a handwritten note to Desiree and dragged George and their son Christophe
out of the bedroom through their garaged. George saw Ferdinand in the sala with his
hands tied behind his back. One of the masked men ordered George to hand over the
key to his vehicle, to board the car and occupy the back seat along with Christopher.
Two of the masked men positioned themselves on either side of George and
Christopher. The third man drove the car, while the fourth sat on the passenger's seat
beside the driver. The car cruised along the national highway. When the car was
nearing the Gambalan Kitchenette, George and Christopher were blindfolded. The
masked men told them that they would be brought to Polomolok. After about fifteen
minutes, the car stopped at Sitio Tupi. The two men who were seated at the back and
the masked man seated beside the driver alighted from the car, bringing Christopher
with them. George was transferred to the front seat beside the driver. George was
told that he would be transported to Maasim.

In the meantime, SPO2 Federico Paño, the duty officer of Police Precinct No. 2,
received a radio report that George Lim and his son Christopher had been kidnapped.
Police investigators were dispatched to the Lim residence to conduct an on-the-spot
investigation. They brought Ferdinand and Julita to the police station for investigation.
SPO2 Renato Daga-as, SPO2 Datur Villanueva and SPO1 Alimuddin Timbao were
directed to establish a mobile checkpoint at the intersection of the national highway
and a dirt road (Espina Road). At about thirty meters from the checkpoint, the masked
driver of the Nissan vehicle saw the police car. Instead of running the car through the
checkpoint, the driver stopped and switched off its headlights. He removed his bonnet
and George's blindfold, warning the latter not to make any false move. George looked
at the driver, who turned out to be the Michael Pagalasan.
The three police officers approached the car. They identified themselves as police
officers on the lookout of a certain George Lim and his son who had been kidnapped
in General Santos City. Daga-as inquired their name, George, identified himself as
Albert Lim, and the driver identified himself as Michael Pagalasan. Daga-as then
noticed that George’s fingers were trembling. Villanueva tried to knock on the driver’s
side, and tried to open he same, but it was locked. When Michael himself opened the
door, Villanueva pulled him out of the vehicle and brought him to the mobile car.
Michael was in the custody of the policemen. George then identified himself as the
one of the kidnapped victims. He also told the policemen that his son was still with the
other kidnappers. The policemen searched the car and found a .38 caliber handgun
with six live bullets and a grenade under the driver’s seat.

George and Michael were brought to the police station, after George gave his sworn
statement, he was allowed to go home. Desiree gave George the handwritten letter
given to her by the kidnappers before they left the house. In the letter, the spouses
were warned not to coordinate with the military, nor to take any action in connection
with the kidnapping without their knowledge or consent. They were also informed that
the malefactors would communicate with them by letter or the telephone only
“MUBARAK II”.

Michael gave his confession under custodial investigation with the assistance of Atty.
Falgui. He admitted that upon orders of Ronnie Cabalo, he, Aladin, Fernando, and
Bong had kidnapped George and his son Christopher. Ronnie Cabalo instructed
Michael to use George's vehicle to transport father and son to the banana plantation
where Aladin, Ferdinand and Boy would alight with Christopher, and to thereafter
return George to his house. Aladin had given him a handgun for his use. Ferdinand
Cortez was in cahoots with them.

In the light of Michael's confession, Hadji Aladin Malang Cabalo, Ronie Puntuan and
Fernando Quizon were arrested and detained at Camp Fermin Lira Barracks, General
Santos City. In the meantime, on September 6, 1994, George received another
handwritten letter, ordering the release of Michael and Ronie Puntuan because they
were innocent, and demanding P3,000,000 for Christopher's release.

On September 9, 1994, George received another handwritten letter, this time from
"MUBARAK II or 2" informing him and his wife that the kidnappers did not want the
military to be involved nor innocent people to be prejudiced. The spouses were also
warned that their son would not be released alive unless Ronie Puntuan was freed in
three days.

On September 10, 1994, Christopher was rescued by policemen without any ransom
being paid. On September 13, 1994, George executed a sworn statement relating to
the incidents that happened from September 4, 1994 to September 10, 1994.

The MTC of General Santos City charged Michael with the other accused, with
kidnapping for ransom and violation of PD 1866.

The RTC rendered judgment acquitting Ferdinand Cortez and convicting Michael of
kidnapping for ransom.
ISSUES:
whether or not there is conspiracy to kidnap Christopher?

RULING: YES.

The essential elements for this crime is the deprivation of liberty of the victim under
any of the above-mentioned circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent of
the accused to effect the same. There must be a purposeful or knowing action by the
accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent.
Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy "the darling of the modern prosecutor's
nursery." There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and
decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven
separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy
need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are
essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature.
It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and
design. Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court in Regina v. Murphy,
conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
The United States Supreme Court in Braverman v. United States, held that the precise
nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the agreement
which embraces and defines its objects. For one thing, the temporal dimension of the
conspiracy is of particular importance. Settled as a rule of law is that the conspiracy
continues until the object is attained, unless in the meantime the conspirator abandons
the conspiracy or is arrested. There is authority to the effect that the conspiracy ends
at the moment of any conspirator's arrest, on the presumption, albeit rebuttable, that
at the moment the conspiracy has been thwarted, no other overt act contributing to the
conspiracy can possibly take place, at least as far as the arrested conspirator is
concerned. The longer a conspiracy is deemed to continue, the greater the chances
that additional persons will be found to have joined it. There is also the possibility that
as the conspiracy continues, there may occur new overt acts. If the conspiracy has
not yet ended, then the hearsay acts and declarations of one conspirator will be
admissible against the other conspirators and one conspirator may be held liable for
substantive crimes committed by the others.
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows
incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural
consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design.[49]
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which
necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result that they are in contemplation of
law, charged with intending the result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts
of another conspirator even though such act differs radically and substantively from
that which they intended to commit. The Court agrees with the ruling of the Circuit
Court of Appeals (Second District) per Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Peoni
"that nobody is liable in conspiracy except for the fair import of the concerted purpose
or agreement as he understood it; if later comers change that, he is not liable for the
change; his liability is limited to the common purpose while he remains in it." Earlier,
the Appellate Court of Kentucky in Gabbard v. Commonwealth held that:
The act must be the ordinary and probable effect of the wrongful acts specifically
agreed on, so that the connection between them may be reasonably apparent, and
not a fresh and independent project of the mind of one of the confederates, outside of
or foreign to the common design, and growing out of the individual malice of the
perpetrator.
Equally persuasive is the pronouncement of the Circuit Court of Appeals (Second
District) in United States v. Crimms, that it is never permissible to enlarge the scope of
the conspiracy itself by proving that some of the conspirators, unknown to the rest,
have done what was beyond the reasonable intendment of the common
understanding. This is equally true when the crime which the conspirators agreed
upon is one of which they severally might be guilty though they were ignorant of the
existence of some of its constitutive facts. Also, while conspirators are responsible for
consequent acts growing out of the common design they are not for independent acts
growing out of the particular acts of individuals.
In this case, the evidence on record inscrutably shows that the appellant and his three
cohorts were armed with handguns; two of them had hand grenades, and all of them
had masks over their faces. They gained entry into the Lim residence after
overpowering the security guard Ferdinand and the housemaid Julita, and tying their
hands behind their backs. One of the masked men remained in the sala, while the
three others barged into the bedroom of George and Desiree, and kidnapped George
and his ten-year-old son Christopher. The appellant and his cohorts forced father and
son to board George's car. The appellant drove the car, dropped off Christopher and
his cohorts at Sitio Tupi, and drove on with George in the car towards the direction of
Maasim.
The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellant and his cohorts
before, during and after the kidnapping constitute indubitable proof that the appellant
and his three companions conspired with each other to attain a common objective: to
kidnap George and Christopher and detain them illegally. The appellant was a
principal by direct participation in the kidnapping of the two victims.
JOSELLE M. CORTEZ
Student No.: 202240209

2. PEOPLE vs. LARRAÑAGA, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 3, 2004

FACTS:
On July 15, 1997, while Rusia was loafing around at the Cebu Plaza Hotel, Cebu City,
Rowen approached him and arranged that they meet the following day at around 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon. When they saw each other the next day, Rowen told him to
stay put at the Ayala Mall because they would have a "big happening" in the evening.
All the while, he thought that Rowen's "big happening" meant group partying or
scrounging. He thus lingered at the Ayala Mall until the appointed time came.
At 10:30 in the evening, Rowen returned with Josman. They met Rusia at the back
exit of the Ayala Mall and told him to ride with them in a white car. Rusia noticed that
a red car was following them. Upon reaching Archbishop Reyes Avenue, same city, he
saw two women standing at the waiting shed. Rusia did not know yet that their names
were Marijoy and Jacqueline.
Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed and he and Rowen
approached and invited Marijoy and Jacqueline to join them. But the sisters declined.
Irked by the rejection, Rowen grabbed Marijoy while Josman held Jacqueline and
forced both girls to ride in the car. Marijoy was the first one to get inside, followed by
Rowen. Meanwhile, Josman pushed Jacqueline inside and immediately drove the
white car. Rusia sat on the front seat beside Josman.
Fourteen (14) meters from the waiting shed, Jacqueline managed to get out of the car.
Josman chased her and brought her back into the car. Not taking anymore chances,
Rowen elbowed Jacqueline on the chest and punched Marijoy on the stomach,
causing both girls to faint. Rowen asked Rusia for the packaging tape under the latter's
seat and placed it on the girls' mouths. Rowen also handcuffed them jointly. The white
and red cars then proceeded to Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City.
At Fuente Osmeña, Josman parked the car near a Mercury Drug Store and urged
Rusia to inquire if a van that was parked nearby was for hire. A man who was around
replied "no" so the group immediately left. The two cars stopped again near Park Place
Hotel where Rusia negotiated to hire a van. But no van was available. Thus, the cars
sped to a house in Guadalupe, Cebu City known as the safehouse of the "Jozman
Aznar Group" Thereupon, Larrañaga, James Anthony and James Andrew got out of
the red car.
Larrañaga, James Anthony and Rowen brought Marijoy to one of the rooms, while
Rusia and Josman led Jacqueline to another room. Josman then told Rusia to step
out so Rusia stayed at the living room with James Andrew. They remained in the house
for fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes. At that time, Rusia could hear Larrañaga, James
Anthony, and Rowen giggling inside the room.
Thereafter, the group brought Marijoy and Jacqueline back to the white car. Then the
two cars headed to the South Bus Terminal where they were able to hire a white van
driven by Alberto. Ariel was the conductor. James Andrew drove the white car, while
the rest of the group boarded the van. They traveled towards south of Cebu City,
leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal.
Inside the van, Marijoy and Jacqueline were slowly gaining strength. James Anthony
taped their mouths anew and Rowen handcuffed them-together. Along the way, the
van and the white car stopped by a barbeque store. Rowen got off the van and bought
barbeque and Tanduay rhum. They proceeded to Tan-awan. Then they parked their
vehicles near a precipice where they drank and had a pot session. Later, they pulled
Jacqueline out of the van and told her to dance as they encircled her. She was pushed
from one end of the circle to the other, ripping her clothes in the process. Meanwhile,
Josman told Larrañaga to start raping Marijoy who was left inside the van. The latter
did as told and after fifteen minutes emerged from the van saying, "who wants next?”
Rowen went in, followed by James Anthony, Alberto, the driver, and Ariel, the
conductor. Each spent a few minutes inside the van and afterwards came out smiling.
Then they carried Marijoy out of the van, after which Josman brought Jacqueline inside
the vehicle. Josman came out from the van after ten minutes, saying, "whoever wants
next go ahead and hurry up." Rusia went inside the van and raped Jacqueline,
followed by James Andrew. At this instance, Marijoy was to breathe her last for upon
Josman's instruction, Rowen and Ariel led her to the cliff and mercilessly pushed her
into the ravine which was almost 150 meters deep.
There were other people who saw snippets of what Rusia had witnessed. They
testified that Marijoy and Jacqueline were talking to Larrañaga and Josman before
they were abducted. Roland Dacillo saw Jacqueline alighting and running away from
a white car and that Josman went after her and grabbed her back to the car. Alfredo
Duarte testified that he was at the barbeque stand when Rowen bought barbeque; that
Rowen asked where he could buy Tanduay; that he saw a white van and he heard
therefrom voices of a male and female who seemed to be quarreling; that he also
heard a cry of a woman which he could not understand because "it was as if the voice
was being controlled;" and that after Rowen got his order, he boarded the white van
which he recognized to be previously driven by Alberto Caño. Meanwhile, Mario
Miñoza, a tricycle driver plying the route of Carcar-Mantalongon, saw Jacqueline
running towards Mantalongon. Her blouse was torn and her hair was disheveled.
Trailing her was a white van where a very loud rock music could be heard. Manuel
Camingao recounted that on July 17, 1997, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, he
saw a white van near a cliff at Tan-awan. Thinking that the passenger of the white van
was throwing garbage at the cliff, he wrote its plate number (GGC-491) on the side of
his tricycle.
On August 12, 1998, Rusia testified before the trial court how the crimes were
committed and identified all the appellants as the perpetrators. He then became the
state witness and was discharged as an accused.
The RTC found Rowen Adlawan alias "Wesley," Josman Aznar, Ariel Balansag, Alberto
Caño alias "Allan Pahak," Francisco Juan Larrañaga alias "Paco," James Andrew Uy
alias "MM," and James Anthony Uy alias "Wang Wang," appellants herein, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there is conspiracy.

RULING: YES.
From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no doubt that all the appellants
conspired in the commission of the crimes charged. Their concerted actions point to
their joint purpose and community of intent. Well settled is the rule that in conspiracy,
direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be
deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint design and
community of interest. Otherwise stated, it may be shown by the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Appellants' actions
showed that they have the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters.
Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy and Jacqueline from the vicinity of Ayala Center.
Larrañaga, James Andrew and James Anthony who were riding a red car served as
back-up of Rowen and Josman. Together in a convoy, they proceeded to Fuente
Osmeña to hire a van, and thereafter, to the safehouse of the "Jozman Aznar Group"
in Guadalupe, Cebu where they initially molested Marijoy and Jacqueline. They
headed to the South Bus Terminal where they hired the white van driven by Alberto,
with Ariel as the conductor. Except for James Andrew who drove the white car, all
appellants boarded the white van where they held Marijoy and Jacqueline captive. In
the van, James Anthony taped their mouths and Rowen handcuffed them together.
They drank and had a pot session at Tan-awan. They encircled Jacqueline and
ordered her to dance, pushing her and ripping her clothes in the process. Meanwhile,
Larrañaga raped Marijoy, followed by Rowen, James Anthony, Alberto, and Ariel. On
other hand, Josman and James Andrew raped Jacqueline. Upon Josman's order,
Rowen and Ariel led Marijoy to the cliff and pushed her. After leaving Tan-awan, they
taunted Jacqueline to run for her life. And when Rusia got off from the van near Ayala
Center, the appellants jointly headed back to Cebu City.
Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the
"conspiracy" as they were merely present during the perpetration of the crimes
charged but not participants therein, is bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act
in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended. As shown by the evidence for the prosecution,
Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not merely present at the scene of the crime.
JOSELLE M. CORTEZ
Student No.: 202240209

3. PEOPLE vs. GARCHITORENA, G.R. No. 175605, August 28, 2009

FACTS:
On September 22, 1995 accused Arnold Garchitorena y Gamba, alias "Junior", Joey
Pamplona alias "Nato" and Jessie Garcia y Adorino, conspiring, confederating
together and mutualy helping each other, with intent to kill, while conveniently armed
with a deadly bladed weapon, with abuse of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Mauro Biay y
Almarinez with the said weapon, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on the
different parts of his body which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice
of his surviving heirs.
In the proceedings before the trial court, witness for the prosecution Dulce Borero
testified that on September 22, 1995, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she was
selling "balut" at Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision, Brgy. Dela Paz, Binan, Laguna. Her
brother, Mauro Biay, also a "balut" vendor", was also at the area, about seven (7) arms
length away from her when she was called by accused Jessie Garcia. Borero testified
that when her brother Mauro approached Jessie, the latter twisted the hand of her
brother behind his back and Jessie's companions- accused Arnold Garchitorena and
Joey Pamplona - began stabbing her brother Mauro repeatedly with a shiny bladed
instrument. Joey was at the right side of the victim and was strangling Mauro from
behind. Witness saw her brother Mauro struggling to free himself while being stabbed
by the three (3) accused., until her brother slumped facedown on the ground. Arnold
then instructed his two co-accused to run away. During cross-examination, Borero
claims that she wanted to shout for help but nothing came out from her mouth. When
the accused had left after the stabbing incident, witness claimed that she went home
to call her elder brother Teodoro Biay, but when they returned to the scene, the victim
was no longer there as he had already been brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital.
They learned from the tricycle driver who brought Mauro top the hospital that their
brother was pronounced dead on arrival.

Dr. Rolando Poblete, the physician who conducted an autopsy on victim Mauro Biay
and prepared the post-mortem report, testified that the victim's death was caused by
"hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds." Witness specified the eight
(8) stab wounds suffered by the victim - one in the neck, two in the chest, one below
the armpit, two on the upper abdomen, one at the back and one at the left thigh - and
also a laceration at the left forearm of Mauro. According to the expert witness, the
nature of stab wounds indicate that it may have been caused by more than one bladed
instrument.

The victim's widow, Amelia Biay, testified that she incurred burial expenses amounting
to P16,700.00 due to the death of her husband. Also, her husband allegedly earned a
minimum of P300.00 a day as a "balut" vendor and P100.00 occasionally as a part-
time carpenter.
On the other hand, accused Joey Pamplona denied that he participated in the stabbing
of Mauro Biay.
Barangay Captain Alfredo Arcega testified that he investigated the stabbing incident
and, although he had no personal knowledge, he found out that it was Arnold
Garchitorena who stabbed Mauro Biay. Upon questioning Arnold, the latter admitted
that he did stab Mauro.

The other co-accused Jessie Garcia took the stand and claimed that on September
22, 1995, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening, he was still riding a bus from his work
in Blumentritt. He arrived at his home in Binan only at 11:00 p.m. On September 24,
1995, he was fetched by two (2) policemen and two (2) Barangay Tanods from his
house and brought to the Binan Police Station for questioning. Thereafter, he was put
in jail and incarcerated for six (6) months without knowing the charges against him. He
was only informed that he was one of the suspects in the killing of Mauro Biay by his
mother.

With respect to Arnold Garchitorena, Dr. Evelyn Belen, Medical Officer III and resident
physician of the National Center for Mental Health, testified that she examined the
accused Arnold and based on the history of the patient, it was found that he had been
using prohibited drugs like shabu and marijuana for two (2) years prior to the stabbing
incident in 1995. The patient is allegedly suffering from schizophrenia, wherein he was
hearing auditory voices, seeing strange things and is delusional. However, Dr. Belen
also testified that the accused Garchitorena had remissions or exaservation and
understands what he was doing and was aware of his murder case in court.
The Trial Court finds accused Arnold Garchitorena y Gamboa alias Junior, Joey
Pamplona alias Nato and Jessie Garcia y Adorino GUILTY beyond reasonable of the
crime of "MURDER".
The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

ISSUE: whether or not there is conspiracy.

RULING: YES.
Accused-appellant Garcia also argues that there was no conspiracy, as "there was no
evidence whatsoever that he aided the other two accused-appellants or that he
participated in their criminal designs." We are not persuaded. In People v. Maldo, we
stated:
"Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for
conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent
to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or community
of interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each of the conspirators for
the act of one of them is deemed the act of all." (citations omitted, emphasis ours)
In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-appellants were together in
performing the concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective. Garcia grabbed
the victim's hands and twisted his arms; in turn, Pamplona, together with Garchitorena,
strangled him and straddled him on the ground, then stabbed him. The victim was
trying to free himself from them, but they were too strong. All means through which the
victim could escape were blocked by them until he fell to the ground and expired. The
three accused-appellants' prior act of waiting for the victim outside affirms the
existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a common design and purpose.
Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused rendered
the fatal blow is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless
of the intent and the character of their participation, because the act of one is the act
of all.
JOSELLE M. CORTEZ
Student No.: 202240209

4. PEOPLE vs. CARANDANG, G.R. No. 175926, July 6, 2011

FACTS:
On April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of the La Loma Police Station 1 received
a request for assistance from the sister of accused Milan regarding a drug deal that
would allegedly take place in her house at Calavite St., Brgy. Salvacion, Quezon
City. The station commander called SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and instructed him to
talk to Milan's sister, who was in their office. SPO2 Red, accompanied by PO2 Dionisio
Alonzo, SPO1 Estores and SPO1 Montecalvo, talked to Milan's sister. Thereafter,
SPO2 Red formed a team composed of the officers who accompanied him during the
interrogation, with him as team leader. The team received further instructions from the
station commander then proceeded to Calavite Street aboard two vehicles, a mobile
patrol car and an unmarked car.
When the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m., they alighted from their
vehicles and surrounded Milan's house. SPO1 Montecalvo's group went to the left
side of the house, while SPO2 Red's group proceeded to the right. The two groups
eventually met at the back of the house near Milan's room. The door to Milan's room
was open, enabling the police officers to see Carandang, Milan and Chua
inside. SPO2 Red told the group that the persons inside the room would not put up a
fight, making them confident that nothing violent would erupt. However, when the
group introduced themselves as police officers, Milan immediately shut the door.

PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall and propelling
them inside the room. PO2 Alonzo shouted "Walang gagalaw!" Suddenly, gunshots
rang, hitting PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red who dropped to the floor one after the
other. Due to the suddenness of the attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red were not able
to return fire and were instantly killed by the barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo,
who was right behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at the assailants when
Carandang shot and hit him. SPO1 Montecalvo fell to the ground. SPO1 Estores
heard Chua say to Milan, "Sugurin mo na!" Milan lunged towards SPO1 Montecalvo,
but the latter was able to fire his gun and hit Milan. SPO1 Estores went inside the
house and pulled SPO1 Montecalvo out.

Reinforcements came at around 4:30 p.m. upon the arrival of P/Sr. Insp. Calaro, Chief
Operations Officer of the La Loma Police Station 1, and P/Supt. Roxas, the Deputy
Station Commander of Police Station 1 at the time of the incident. SPO1 Montecalvo
was brought to the Chinese General Hospital. Milan stepped out of the house and
was also brought to a hospital, but Carandang and Chua remained holed up inside the
house for several hours. There was a lengthy negotiation for the surrender of
Carandang and Chua, during which they requested for the presence of a certain
Colonel Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo. It was around 11:00 p.m. to 12:00
midnight when Carandang and Chua surrendered. SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were
found dead inside the house, their bodies slumped on the floor with broken legs and
gunshot and grenade shrapnel wounds.

Dr. Winston Tan, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, conducted the post-mortem examination of the bodies of SPO2 Red and
PO2 Alonzo. He found that the gunshot wounds of Red and Alonzo were the cause of
their deaths.

According to SPO1 Montecalvo's account, Dr. Bu Castro of the Chinese General

Hospital operated on him, removing a bullet from the right portion of his nape. SPO1
Montecalvo's hospitalization expenses amounted to P14,324.48. He testified that it
was a nightmarish experience for him as he feared that he might be paralyzed later
on.

P/Sr. Insp. Grace Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, later
testified that the paraffin test on Chua yielded a negative result for gunpowder nitrates,
but that performed on Carandang produced a positive result. She was not able to
conduct a paraffin test on Milan, who just came from the operating room when she
saw him. Milan seemed to be in pain and refused to be examined.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty of two
counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision finding Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty of
two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder.

ISSUE: whether or not there is conspiracy.

RULING: YES.
To summarize, Milan's and Chua's arguments focus on the lack of direct evidence
showing that they conspired with Carandang during the latter's act of shooting the
three victims. However, as we have held in People v. Sumalpong, conspiracy may
also be proven by other means:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the
actual agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for
the commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the
crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When
conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of
participation of each.
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was
established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milan's closing the
door when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in
ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chua's directive to Milan to attack SPO1
Montecalvo and Milan's following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of
appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement,
or that Milan's act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by
direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the
unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered
principals by direct participation.
JOSELLE M. CORTEZ
Student No.: 202240209

5. PEOPLE vs. FELICIANO, JR., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014

FACTS:
December 8, 1994, seven members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity was attacked by
several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes at the Beach House
Canteen of the University of the Philippines. The attacked led to the death of Dennis
F. Venturina and injuries to some members of the Sigma Rho.
Upon the advice of the victims’ legal counsel, affidavits were filed at the NBI and they
subjected themselves to a medico legal exam. An information for murder was then
filed against member of the Scintilla Juris at the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC rendered the decision guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed
against the defendants with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, a penalty which requires
an automatic appeal to the Supreme Court.
However, due to the amendment in the Rules of Appeal, the said case was remanded
to the Court of Appeals which AFFIRMED the decision of the lower court with guild
beyond reasonable doubt on the death of Venturina; however, with modification on the
case of attempted murder to slight physical injuries.

ISSUE: whether or not the presence of conspiracy makes all of the accused-appellants
liable for murder and attempted murder.

RULING: YES.
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the
murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The
appellate court, however, modified their liabilities and found that the accused-
appellants were guilty of attempted murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not
against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court’s reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang “were no
longer chased by the attackers,”[157] it concluded that accused-appellants “voluntary
desisted from pursuing them and from inflicting harm to them, which shows that they
did not have the intent to do more than to make them suffer pain by slightly injuring
them.”[158] It also pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston “was too shallow to
have been done with an intent to kill.”[159] Thus, it concluded that the accused-
appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical injuries.
This is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among
the accused-appellants and the appellate court sustained this finding. Conspiracy,
once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of
their degree of participation, thus:
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as
co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The
foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite
to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes
to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed
by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his
own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly
explained in one case where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking
into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal
act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime
must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the
... accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are
all equally responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated
in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators
attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even
investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present
at the scene of the crime. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The liabilities of the accused-appellants in this case arose from a single incident
wherein the accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in
agreement to do the highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were
able to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their
attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that intent
was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the presence of conspiracy
was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the seriousness of the
injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective liabilities of their attackers.
What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill
and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be
appreciated.
JOSELLE M. CORTEZ
Student No.: 202240209

6. PEOPLE vs. MORILLA, G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014

FACTS:
On October 13, 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran, Municipality of Real, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, at a police checkpoint, Morilla, Mayor Mitra (incumbent mayor of the
municipality of Panukulan, QuezonProvince), Willie Yang y Yao (Yang), and Ruel
Dequilla y Regodan (Dequilla) were caught transporting methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) by means of two (2) motor vehicles en route to Manila. The said
vehicles used were a Starex van bearing plate number RWT-888 with a
commemorative plate that read “Mayor” and a municipal ambulance of Panukulan,
Quezon Province with plate number SFK-372.
On the way to Manila, the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra was able to pass through
the police checkpoint while the ambulance driven by Morilla was not. This is when the
police noticed, through the untinted window of the ambulance, several sacks that were
inside the vehicle. Morilla told the police that the sacks contained narra wooden tiles
and that he was with Mayor Mitra. The police then pursued the vehicle of Mayor Mitra
in where they also found several sacks similar to the one that was inside the
ambulance. He explained that he had no knowledge of the contents of the sacks and
that he was just requested to transport them to Manila by a certain Ben Tan who bought
his fishing boat. The sacks that were inside the two motor vehicles contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride and had an approximate weight of five hundred three
point sixty-eight (503.68) kilos.
The RTC rendered accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena and Javier Morilla y Avellana GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00 each. Accused Willie Yang y Yao
and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan were ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The CA AFFIRMED the ruling of the trial court. It upheld the finding conspiracy
between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent to transport the said illicit
drugs.

ISSUE: whether or not there is conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla.

RULING: YES.
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must
be a common design to commit a felony.
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was
apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved
in the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.
This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed
in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds
may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete
whole. In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that
Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous
drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy
from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up
by the police operatives. When it was Morilla’s turn to pass through the checkpoint, he
was requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules
scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed
he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police
officers that he was with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he
just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said
vehicle likewise bears no merit.
JOSELLE M. CORTEZ
Student No.: 202240209

7. PEOPLE vs. BOKINGCO, G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011

FACTS:
On February 29, 2000 the accused Michael Bokingco and Reynante Col are alleged
to have conspired to kill their employer Noli Pasion. Victim Noli Pasion was the owner
of a pawnshop in Angeles City, which was connected to an apartment complex that
had 6 units and other units being constructed at the time of his death. The appellants
stayed in Apartment no. 3 as they were construction workers employed by Pasion.
From the testimonies of Pasion’s wife Elsa and his brother-in-law Dante Vitalicio, on
February 29, 2000 at around 1:00 am, they heard a commotion that ensued in
Apartment No.3. According to Vitalicio, upon going to the aforementioned unit, he saw
Bokingco hitting something on the floor and when Bokingco saw him, he was then
attacked by Bokingco with a hammer. Bokingco chased Vitalicio only to be subdued
by a co-worker.
Elsa testified that she heard banging sounds and her husband’s moans that prompted
her to go to Apartment No. 3. However, Reynante Col who allegedly sprayed her eyes
with tear gas prevented her and poked her neck with something sharp. Reynante Col
then proceeded to drag her to open the vault of the pawnshop but before reaching it,
Bokingco told Col, “tara, patay na siya”, and the herein accused ran away with
Bokingco. Vitalicio and Elsa then saw Noli Pasion in a pool of his own blood at
Apartment No.3.
For his defense, Bokingco said he was sleeping at Apartment No.3 when he was
awakened by a drunk Pasion who questioned why he did not report for work with the
later hitting him in the head upon his reply that he merely stayed at the apartment the
whole day. Enraged, Bokingco took a hammer and hit Pasion repeatedly and he
escaped for Manila.
For Col’s part, he admitted that he was an employee of Pasion but that he had resigned
earlier that month and was staying in Cainta. It is important to note that upon
arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. Bokingco
also confessed to the crime during pre-trial.
The trial court rendered judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder, there being the two aggrevating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of
confidence to be considered against both accused and the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilt in favor of accused Bokingo only, sentencing them to Death.
The CA FFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants MICHAEL BOKINGCO
and REYNANTE COL are found GUILTY as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of
MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with the
attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no
mitigating circumstances.

ISSUE: whether or not there is conspiracy

RULING: NO.
This Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings
of the trial court, owing to their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand
and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination.[40]
However, this rule admits of exceptions, namely: 1) when the trial court's findings of
facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or 2) when certain
facts of substance and value likely to change the outcome of the case have been
overlooked by the lower court, or 3) when the assailed decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts. The second exception obtains in this case.
Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before
us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It
may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a
joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.
Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to
establish the existence of conspiracy.
As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime
itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa's testimony that appellants fled
together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the
apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. Xxx
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with
Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Col's actuations can be equated to attempted
robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against appellants before it was
amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder.
Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and
that they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards
the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes
committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from the
crimes they separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already
killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because
while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting
to rob the pawnshop.
In as much as Bokingco's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is
likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a
cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as
hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission
made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the
act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. In order that the admission
of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary
that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;
second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been made while
the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As we have previously
discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of
conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is
inadmissible in evidence against Col.
Bokingco's judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only
attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in the head.
All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was adduced to
implicate him.
JOSELLE M. CORTEZ
Student No.: 202240209

8. PEOPLE vs. CASTILLO, G.R. No. 132895, March 10, 2004

FACTS:
On March 1, 1995, Rossana Baria the yaya of Luis Cebrero IV aka Rocky, was
informed by Fernie another maid of the household, that someone else would fetch
Rocky. A tricycle arrived with Evangeline Padayhag who fetched Rocky. They went to
McDonald’s were they met Elizabeth Castillo. The three of them then went to the house
of Imelda, sister of Elizabeth. About 5:30 pm, the father of Rocky reported to the police
that his son was missing. About 7:30 pm, the father received a phone call from the
kidnapper wanting ransom amounting to 1 million. Mrs. Cebrero withdrawn 800,000.00
from the bank which gave them the serial numbers of the said money. The kidnapper
called again stating the address where the father would leave the money. It was in a
church in Paco, Obando, Bulacan. Major Ronnie Eleazar of the Intelligence Security
Group (ISG) with his officers, watched the vicinity of the money drop off area. After 40
minutes, 2 women arrived and took the money bag. March 5, 1995, Rocky was
returned to his father. Acquiring the addresses of the accused in the Employment
Agency, the ISG went to Navotas to locate Padayhag. Padayhag went willingly with
the ISG. No money was found with her. Another ISG team was dispatched to Dipolog
were Elizabeth Castillo was located. The ISG found the black bag containing
277,000.00 with the same serial numbers.
Elizabeth Castillo, was a former house helper at the Cebrero household who did not
payher monthly wages. Castillo called Padayhag, saying that Padayhag’s boyfriend is
sick. The two did not go tothe boyfriend’s house but went instead to a playground.
Castillo instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky. Upon return, they went to Imelda’s house.
Castillo admitted to Imelda that she wanted to see Rocky but she had no permission.
Castillo was with Rocky for four days. Castillo was then searching for a new
employment around Obando. The same time the money was to be left in a church
there. Padayhag and Castillo alleged that she was coerced into confessing the crime,
the reason why they pleaded guilty the first time. They later on retracted the guilty plea.
The RTC convicted Castillo and Castillo and Padayhag of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention as charged.

ISSUE: whether or not there is conspiracy to extort ransom.

RULING: NO.
The failure to prove Padayhag’s involvement as a conspirator reveals how tenuous
the evidence is linking her to the crime. Padayhag’s culpability hinges on how her act
of fetching Rocky and bringing him to Castillo formed part of a concerted effort to
kidnap the child. The act of fetching the boy, by itself, does not constitute a criminal
offense. By itself, it is not even sufficient to make her an accomplice. For a person to
be considered an accomplice there must be a community of design, that is, knowing
the criminal design of the principal, the co-accused concurs with the latter. Mere
commission of an act which aids the perpetrator is not enough. As we explained in
People v. Cual:
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which
cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be
executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the
accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.
There was therefore a need for clear and convincing proof that this single act was
committed to kidnap the child. The prosecution failed to prove this. Padayhag
explained that Castillo coaxed her into fetching Rocky through another deception and
by playing on her feelings of sympathy and friendship. Castillo corroborated this on
the witness stand. The prosecution failed to prove otherwise.
The facts as established show that the only thing Castillo told Padayhag was to fetch
Rocky because Castillo missed her former ward. Upon reaching the house of the
Cebreros, the boy’s nanny handed over to Padayhag the child. There is no allegation
or evidence that Padayhag knew the criminal plan of Castillo. Neither is there any hint
that Castillo told Padayhag to abduct the boy, or to misrepresent herself or use means
that would have led Padayhag to suspect that Castillo had some criminal design. Nor
was there any proof that Padayhag knew that Castillo had no permission from the
boy’s parents. The appearance of the boy itself, newly bathed and dressed for a stroll,
would have led Padayhag to believe whatever story Castillo contrived to ask her in
fetching the boy.
A criminal conviction must stand on the strength of the evidence presented by the
prosecution, and not on the weakness of the defense of the accused. The prosecution
should have done more to establish Padayhag’s guilt. Instead, the prosecution left a
lot of room for other possible scenarios besides her guilt. This is a fatal error. The
presumption of innocence imposes a rule of evidence, a degree of proof that demands
no less than total compliance. As we explained in United States v. Reyes:
The presumption of innocence can be overborne only by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, which means proof, to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in
mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except
that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability,
even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely true than the contrary. It must
establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty- a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, we find Padayhag’s explanation sufficiently supported by
circumstances aside from Castillo’s testimony. Padayhag’s acts before, during and
after the crime all point to the conclusion that she was no more than an unwitting tool
of Castillo. Castillo misled her into a meeting. Castillo again misled her into fetching
Rocky. Castillo never met or contacted her after the day of Rocky’s abduction. Castillo
also testified that she did not bring Padayhag along with her when she went to Obando
on the day that coincided with the “pay-off.” The only circumstance linking Padayhag
to that event is the shaky account of two police officers who admitted that their quarry
inexplicably disappeared before their very eyes. Even the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty, by itself, cannot prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Nothing links Padayhag to the demand for ransom. She
never received any part of the ransom, precisely because she did not even know it
existed.
JOSELLE M. CORTEZ
Student No.: 202240209

9. FERNAN vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 145927, August 24, 2007

FACTS:
On June 21, 1978, COA Regional Director Sofronio Flores Jr. of COA Regional Office
No. 7, directed auditors Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes to verify and submit
a report on sub-allotment advises issued to various highway engineering districts in
Cebu, particularly, the Cebu City, Cebu 1st, Cebu 2nd and the Mandaue City Highway
Engineering Districts. Complying with the directive, they conducted an investigation
and in due course submitted their findings. Their report confirmed the issuance of fake
Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs) in the districts mentioned. All disbursement of
these were approved by Finance Officer Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat.
Mangubat, however, had no authority to approve them because since October 1977,
he had already been detailed to the MPH Central Office. There were indications that
the practice had been going on for years.
Due to these serious irregularities, then President Marcos created a Special Cabinet
Committee on MPH Region VII "Ghost Projects Anomalies" which in turn organized a
Special Task Force composed of representatives from the Finance Ministry
Intelligence Bureau (FMIB), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of
Treasury and the Commission on Audit. The mission of the task force was to conduct
a wider and more extended investigation in all the fifteen (15) highway engineering
districts of MPH Region VII, including the Cebu First Highway Engineering District, the
1977 questionable disbursements of which are the subject matter of these cases.
The instant petition under Rule 45 originated from 119 criminal cases filed with the
Sandiganbayan (SB) involving no less than 36 former officials and employees of the
then Ministry of Public Highways (MPH) and several suppliers of construction
materials for defalcation of public funds arising from numerous transactions in the
Cebu First Highway Engineering District in 1977. Because of the sheer magnitude of
the illegal transactions, the number of people involved, and the ingenious scheme
employed in defrauding the government, this infamous 86 million highway scam has
few parallels in the annals of crime in the country.
The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando Mangubat, Jose Sayson, and
Edgardo Cruz, all of MPH Region VII, were found guilty in all 119 counts and were
accordingly sentenced by the SB. The other conniver, Delia Preagido, after being
found guilty in some of the cases, became a state witness in the remainder. On the
basis of her testimony and pertinent documents, Informations were filed, convictions
were obtained, and criminal penalties were imposed on the rest of the accused.
On the other hand, petitioners were both Civil Engineers of the MPH assigned to the
Cebu First Highway Engineering District. Petitioner Fernan, Jr. was included among
the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918 allegedly
for having signed six (6) tally sheets or statements of deliveries of materials, used as
bases for the preparation of the corresponding number of general vouchers. Fund
releases were made to the suppliers, contractors, and payees based on these general
vouchers.
The anti-graft court was fully convinced of the guilt of petitioners beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents.

ISSUE: whether or not petitioners acted on conspiracy

RULING: YES.

Indeed, the burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the
prosecution. Considering, however, the difficulty in establishing the existence of
conspiracy, settled jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by direct evidence. In
People v. Pagalasan, the Court explicated why direct proof of prior agreement is not
necessary:
After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.
Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had
acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved
that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent of each other, were in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused
guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we categorized two (2) structures of multiple
conspiracies, namely: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is
a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons
or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the
distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and
then retailer and consumer.
We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the "wheel" conspiracy. The
36 disparate persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the
government were controlled by a single hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief
Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and
Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the separate "spokes" of the conspiracy.
Petitioners were among the many spokes of the wheel.

We recall the painstaking efforts of the SB through Associate Justice Cipriano A. Del
Rosario, Chairperson of the Third Division, in elaborating the intricate web of
conspiracy among the accused, thus:
Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All three agreed to help him
carry out his plan. Xxx xxx xxx
The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. Other government
employees, tempted by the prospect of earning big money, allowed their names to be
used and signed spurious documents.
Xxx xxx xxx
Thus, it is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general voucher
cannot be prepared and completed. Without the general voucher, the check for the
payment of the supply cannot be made and issued to the supplier. Without the check
payment, the defraudation cannot be committed and successfully consummated.
Thus, petitioners' acts in signing the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are
indispensable to the consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents. Surely, there were ghost or false deliveries of supplies and materials as
convincingly shown by the testimonies of the barangay captains, officials, and
residents of the areas where the materials were allegedly used. More importantly, if
there were actual deliveries of materials made, then there would be no need to fake
the LAAs because the suppliers will have to be paid the cost of said materials plus a
reasonable profit. As a result, there is nothing or not much to share with the more than
30 or so co-conspirators, for the suppliers would not be too dim-witted to part with
even their cost in buying the materials they allegedly supplied. Moreover, the fake
delivery receipts and tally sheets signed by petitioners were linked to the general
vouchers upon which check payments were made to the suppliers who were found
guilty of participating in the fraud. With respect to petitioner Fernan, Jr., he signed tally
sheets on the ghost deliveries of Juliana de los Angeles and Ismael Sabio, Jr. On the
part of petitioner Torrevillas, he signed false tally sheets and delivery receipts on
supplies allegedly delivered by Rufino V. Nuñez, Juliana de los Angeles, Ismael Sabio,
Jr., and Manuel Mascardo. Lastly, the checks issued to these suppliers based on
general vouchers supported by the false tally sheets and general vouchers signed by
petitioners cannot be traced to any genuine LAAs, resulting in the inescapable
conclusion that these LAAs were unauthorized; hence, fake or fabricated. These are
undisputed tell-tale signs of the complicity by petitioners with the Mangubat syndicate.
In People v. Mangubat, the court a quo elucidated the conspiracy in the Cebu highway
scam in a trenchant manner:
Where the acts of each of the accused constitute an essential link in a chain and the
desistance of even one of them would prevent the chain from being completed, then
no conspiracy could result as its consummation would then be impossible or aborted.
But when each and everyone of the accused in the instant cases performed their
assigned tasks and roles with martinet-like precision and accuracy, by individually
performing essential overt acts, so much so that the common objective is attained,
which is to secure the illegal release of public funds under the guise of fake or
simulated public documents, then each and everyone of said accused are equally
liable as co-principals under the well-established and universally-accepted principle
that, once a conspiracy is directly or impliedly proven, the act of one is the act of all
and such liability exists notwithstanding no-participation in every detail in the execution
of the offense.
In sum, the required quantum of proof has been adduced by the State on the
conspiracy among the accused including petitioners. The conviction of petitioners
must perforce be sustained.
JOSELLE M. CORTEZ
Student No.: 202240209

10. GO-TAN vs. TAN, G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008

FACTS:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen
Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a
Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against
Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice granting petitioner's prayer for
a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the
Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,
contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law
of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition to respondents'
Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a
liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of
violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the case as to respondents
on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of
law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration contending
that the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of
substantial justice and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the
alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage
of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.

ISSUES: whether or not the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can
be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262

RULING: YES.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as
"any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim
by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude
the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application
of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code
and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or
in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of
this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No.
9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno, the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary
penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise
known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not contain
any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung, the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of
sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found
guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury, the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the
RPC to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No.
8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,"
because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the
same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People, the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an express provision on
subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People, the Court applied suppletorily the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of
Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions
of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of
each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.