JOSELLE M.

CORTEZ
STUDENT NO.: 202240209
GENDER SENSITIVITY AND LAWS ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN’S RIGHT
F-6:00PM-8:00PM

1. G.R. No. 193960 January 7, 2013

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE
MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR,
ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC, Respondents.

FACTS:

On or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Dabalos had willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously used
personal violence against the complainant whom he had a dating relationship with. The said
violence constituted the pulling of hair, punching the complainant's back, shoulder, and left eye
which have demeaning and degrading effects on the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as
a human being, in violation of Section 5 (a) of the Republic Act 9262.

In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended
prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the
money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if
he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private
respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in
the Information.

Dabalos’ defense on other hand said that the relationship had already ceased at the time
of the alleged incident.

ISSUE:

Whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused.

HELD:

No, RA 9262 cannot be construed in a manner that will favor the accused.
Based on the definitions of terms on RA 9262, “violence against women” refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman.
a) who is his wife, former wife
b) against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child
c) against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode

which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or

economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to
be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is
committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or
with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child;
and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.

The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment

1) The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2) The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3) The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

Furthermore, applying the rule on statutory construction that says when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts. It is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as
long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship
between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
2. G.R. No. 199522 June 22, 2015

RICKY DINAMLING, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Ricky Dinamling, a policeman, was in a 5-year relationship with AAA. They had 2 common
children, aged 4 and 2. One the night of March 14, 2007, Ricky Dinamling and a friend went to
AAA’s boarding house after a drinking session. As AAA was putting the children to bed, he
started to evict her ordering AAA to pack her things in a trash bag and a carton box for
ducklings for the reason that she was using the place as a “whore house” wherein she “brought
her partners.” She did not want to leave but he threw a baby’s feeding bottle outside. She went
to BBB’s house and requested to fetch her children. However, Dinamling already left the
boarding house with the older child and only the baby was left.

In the past, there were similar incidents that he would hit AAA’s head, pull her hair, and
kick her. When AAA went to the police, she was merely told that it was a family problem that
could be talked over. Dinamling, at that time was a policeman.

Six days later, or on March 20, 2007, at around 9:00 p.m., another incident occurred. AAA
was at the house of CCC when Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted down for AAA to
come out. When she came out, Dinamling punched her at the left ear, which subsequently bled.
When AAA asked him why he kept on following her when she already had left him, Dinamling
shouted her family name and told her she was "good-for-nothing." AAA left for the barangay
captain's house, but Dinamling caught up with her and kicked her until she fell to the ground. On
the road, Dinamling pulled down AAA's pants and panty and shouted at her while people looked
on. Dinamling then threw the pants and panty back at AAA and shouted her family name.
Dinamling, then intoxicated, left on a motorcycle.5 AAA stayed at her friend's home until she felt
some back pain in the next morning. She found out she was bleeding and about to miscarry so
she was immediately brought to the hospital. There, she was told that she was 19 weeks
pregnant and had an incomplete abortion. She was hospitalized for four days.

Dinamling was charged with (2) criminal Informations in the RTC for violation of Section
5(i), in relation to Section 6(f) of RA No. 9262.

His defense was denial and alibi, claiming that he was on duty at the town’s police station
at the time that the offenses were committed. Dinamling also claims that the testimony of Dr.
Diaz, expresses an uncertainty as to whether the mauling of AAA caused her abortion, which
exculpates him from the crime.

RTC found Dinamling guilty of both charges. CA affirmed but modified the penalty by
applying ISLaw.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding his defenses of denial and alibi as well as in
discounting the supposedly exculpatory nature of a part of a prosecution witness' testimony.

HELD:

No. There is no reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of the victim AAA's evidence. In
particular, AAA's testimony narrating the specific incidents which gave rise to the charges was
clear, categorical and straightforward and, therefore, worthy of credence.

As for the first case filed against petitioner Dinamling, the elements have been proven and duly
established. It is undisputed that AAA, as the victim, is a woman who was then in a five-year
ongoing relationship with petitioner Dinamling. At that time, AAA and Dinamling had two
common children. AAA was often in fear of petitioner due to the latter's physical and verbal
abuse.

As for the second case, the crime's elements were likewise proven. In addition to the first two
elements of the victim being a woman and in a relationship with the offender, the prosecution
was able to prove another incident of mental or emotional anguish through public ridicule or
humiliation. AAA's suffering is so much that even the sound of petitioner's motorcycle would put
fear in her.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional
anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the
offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary
to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts.
And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the
victim as such experiences are personal to this party. All of this was complied with in the case at
bar.

In the face of the strong and credible testimony of AAA, petitioner Dinamling relies on a defense
of denial and alibi. On the nights of March 14 and 20, 2007, he claimed that he was on duty at
XXX Police Station. He denied seeing AAA on those dates. However, on cross examination, he
admitted that it takes only two to three minutes to go from the police station to AAA's boarding
house. Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal case, have been consistently
held as inherently weak and which, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot
prevail over the positive declarations of the victim.

The physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done by the
perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i)
of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by the
accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts
of physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means of
causing mental or emotional suffering. In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly
punching, kicking and stripping AAA of her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of
physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and proven
that they resulted in AAA's public ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress.

For his crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating circumstances
which increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with competent
evidence for the penalty to be properly imposed.
3. G.R. No. 247429 September 08, 2020

JAIME ARAZA Y JARUPAY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Complainant testified that she and accused were married on October 5, 1989 at Malate
Catholic Church. She had no marital issues with Accused until he went to Zamboanga City for
their networking business. Accused was formerly working as an Overseas Filipino Worker but
decided to stop in 1993 to join complainant in her business.

One day, she received a text message informing her that her accused-husband is having
an affair with their best friend. At first, she did not believe them. However, that information
brought complainant to Zamboanga to see for her herself whether it was true. Indeed she was
able to confirm that her husband was living with another woman.

She instituted a complaint against the accused and his alleged mistress for Concubinage
at the Philippine National Police. The case was subsequently amicably settled after the parties
executed an Agreement whereby accused and mistress committed themselves never to see
each other again.

After the case was settled accused lived with complainant. However, it was only for a
short time. Without saying a word, accused left complainant. She was looking for the accused
and out of desperation, she sought the help of the NBI to search for him. To her surprise, the
accused had returned to live with his mistress again.

The complainant went emotionally depressed and anxious She was suffering from
insomnia and asthma. Allegedly, she is still hurting and crying. She is took anti-depressant and
sleeping pills to cope with her severe emotional and psychological turmoil brought about by the
accused marital infidelity and having children with his mistress.

A case was filed against the accused for Violence Against Women and their Children on
Psychological Violence caused by his infidelity. RTC found accused guilty of the said offense.
Accused appeal the case to the CA to which it affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in ruling that Araza committed psychological violence upon his wife
AAA by committing marital infidelity, which caused AAA to suffer emotional anguish and mental
suffering.

HELD:

Yes, Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262. Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are
personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained
by the offended party. The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill
due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional
anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering,
jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such
experiences are personal to this party.

In order to establish psychological violence, proof of the commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar of such acts, is necessary.

The prosecution has established Araza’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt by proving that he
committed psychological violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA’s testimony
was strong and credible. She was able to confirm that Araza was living with another woman.
Marital infidelity, which is a form of psychological violence, is the proximate cause of AAA’s
emotional anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was
adversely affected.
4. G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-

Appellant.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children. - On February
19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-
appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro
City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to
have sex with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital
problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He
treated her well and she, of course, responded with an equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in
1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any
foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically
painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
- One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed
but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot
near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the
cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.” KKK insisted on staying on
the cot and explained that she had a headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted
the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up
from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand
and reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist
by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK
stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his
own legs on them.

She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As
he was carrying out his carnal desires, the KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting:
“Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.” Accused raised the defense of denial and
alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the
control and management of their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

RTC: Convicted the appellant of two (2) separate charges of rape CA: Affirmed

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause. The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently
from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules
for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause
The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-
marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are
either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or
are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional. Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity
from prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone.
He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another
person in raping her. Moreover, Section 1 of the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship with his victim.
Implied consent theory untenable o The Court also ruled against the application of implied
consent theory which was raised by the accused. The accused argued that consent to
copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists
within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits
sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW) and
its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
5. G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L.
TAN, Respondents.

FACTS:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On
January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law,
Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that
Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic
abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004."

Respondents then filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent
Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition, contending that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered
by R.A. No. 9262.

The RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that,
being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under
R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents-spouses Perfecto & Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, are

included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with Republic Act
No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004?

HELD:

Yes. It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts
of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another,
thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through

another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her
child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her
child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals
or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against the woman or her child may include

individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally

or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or

otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
6. G.R. No. 223477 February 14, 2018

CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

FACTS:

An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation Section 5 of
RA9262 the said accused, having the means and capacity to give financial support, with
deliberate intent, did then and there commit acts of economic abuse against one AAA, and her
minor son, BBB (12 years old), by depriving them of financial support, which caused mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son. After arraignment wherein
Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he andAAA entered into a compromise
agreement on the civil aspect of the case. After approval of the compromise agreement by the
Court, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally dismissed with Melgar's conformity.
However, one (1) year later, Melgar sold the property, which was supposed to, among others,
answer for the support-in-arrears of his son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their
compromise agreement. Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal aspect of the case and
allowed the prosecution to present its evidence.

The RTC found Melgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of
RA9262. The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA and their son,
BBB, when he stopped supporting them. The CA affirmed Melgar's conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of RA
9262.

HELD:

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5(e) of
RA 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic
relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c)
Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and (d) his
intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his property
which was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB. In this case,
while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and BBB of support, no
evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or
emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA
9262. This notwithstanding – and taking into consideration the variance doctrine which allows
the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily included
in the crime charged – the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of
RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional
element of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein.
7. G.R. No. 232678 July 3, 2019

ESTEBAN DONATO REYES, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

FACTS:

AAA and Reyes were married on May 15, 1969 with Four children whom only three are
living, and who are all now of legal ages. Reyes was seldom at home since he used to render
military service as a Philippine Air Force pilot, and later he worked as a commercial pilot for the
Philippine Airlines. At the time the complaint for violation of the VAWC was filed against him,
Reyes was employed as a pilot based in Angola, Africa tasked to deliver relief goods by air.
Sometime in 2005, AAA learned that Reyes got married to a certain Marilou Osias Ramboanga
who had borne him four children and with whom he is living with up to the present.

AAA claimed that Reyes used to give her and their children monthly financial support,
ranging from ₱10,000.00 ₱20,000.00, but he suddenly ceased giving the same in July 2005. On
top of this unpleasant situation, AAA got sick of various illness such as hypertension, cardio-
vascular disease, diabetes and osteoarthritis. Due to her advancing age, AAA's health condition
further deteriorated requiring her to take maintenance medicines and to undergo regular
consultation, monitoring and treatment to prevent organ damage, stroke, renal failure and heart
attack. According to AAA, what impelled her to file the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 9262
against Reyes was due to the latter's failure to provide her with monthly financial support.

Reyes assailed the validity of his marriage with AAA alleging that he never attended the
marriage ceremony and that his supposed signature appearing in the marriage certificate was
forged. He also pointed out that his supposed age of twenty-five years old as reflected in the
marriage certificate was erroneous considering that he was born on August 3, 1948. Petitioner
alleged that he lived with AAA in a common-law relationship, which produced three daughters
and a son. He narrated that he met AAA when he went for a vacation at her aunt's house in
Bicol where AAA was a housemaid. He averred that he gave AAA monthly financial support of
₱20,000.00. In addition, he also gave her Christmas bonuses, shouldered the expenses for her
cataract operation, her denture and vacation in Tagaytay, as well as paid for the matriculation of
her grandchildren and the materials of their second daughter. He admitted that he no longer
provides AAA with financial support since July 2006 because he was disappointed with her for
instituting a criminal case for Bigamy against him which he considered as an act of ingratitude.
In 2007, he stopped flying as a pilot after he was prevented from leaving the Philippines by
virtue of a Hold Departure Order issued against him at the instance of AAA.

The RTC ruled that accused Esteban Donato Reyes is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
[of] violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The RTC found the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses: AAA, her attending physician, Dr. Rey Caesar R. Anunciacion and the
victim's daughter, to be credible and sufficient. It ruled that the evidence proffered by the
prosecution has adequately established all the elements of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262.

The CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. The CA
echoed the conclusion reached by the RTC that Reyes committed psychological violence
against his wife AAA when he suddenly stopped giving her financial support and by reason of
which, she suffered emotional and mental anguish. According to the CA, Reyes has an
obligation to financially support his wife AAA and their marriage is valid until annulled by the
court. It held that Reyes could not escape liability by the mere expedient of claiming that his
marriage with AAA is void because violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 can be committed
even against a woman with whom the accused had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child. The CA opined that Reyes can also be convicted for violation of
Section 5(e), assuming that he is indicted for the said crime, because said provision criminalizes
the mere act of depriving a woman of financial support legally due her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for violation of R.A. No. 9262.

HELD:

Yes. Reyes argues that he cannot be held liable for violation of R.A No. 9262 because he has
no obligation to financially support AAA since he never contracted marriage with her. Petitioner
is mistaken.

We find that the National Statistics Office certified copy of a marriage certificate presented by
the prosecution serves as positive evidence of the existence of the marriage between Reyes
and AAA. The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, is admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly
indicates that a marriage was celebrated between Reyes and AAA on May 15, 1969, and it
should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. 22 As correctly pointed
out by the CA, their marriage is deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Hence, Reyes is obliged to support his wife, AAA, the amount of which shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the said petitioner and to the needs of the latter.

Reyes will not be exonerated even assuming that his marriage is declared void ab initio by the
court. R.A. No. 9262 defines and criminalizes violence against women and their children
perpetrated by the woman's husband, former husband or any person against whom the woman
has or had a sexual or dating relationship with, or with whom the woman has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse or psychological harm or suffering.
Thus, the offender need not be related or connected to the victim by marriage or former
marriage, as he could be someone who has or had a sexual or dating relationship only or has a
common child with the victim. In the case at bench, it is undisputed that AAA had borne Reyes
four children out of their relationship.
8. G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

FACTS:

This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant
herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently
thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels
became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk, he would
provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical
doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were
quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another
room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for
parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by
beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her
unborn child.

The Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-
examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her
husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to
take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted
the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome”
plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and
Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the
Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant herein suffered from battered woman syndrome?

HELD:

No. In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing
that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period
of time, became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find
sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find
ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started,
Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in
adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not
prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another
battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.

Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She
simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or father's house; that Ben
would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his
words, she would return to their common abode.

In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts
that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed,
they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality
of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe
beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's
testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual
cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that
appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.

We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be
proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would
establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the
case of the Genosas.
9. G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for
herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His
infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left
respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he
would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she
pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of
his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their
businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence
against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO)
pursuant to R.A.No.9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of
violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of R.A.NO. 9262 on making a gender-

based classification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A.No. 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection
clause.

HELD:

No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under R.A.No. 9262 is
justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to
ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally
endowed differences between men and women.

R.A.No. 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental
objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The
gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women
and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives.
Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-
based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in
the 1987 Constitution.
10. G. R. No. 171701 February 8, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner, vs. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-

MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III,
IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN
KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Rosanna Honrado-Tua and Ralph P. Tua were legally married on January 10, 1998 in
Makati City. They have three children, namely, Joshua Raphael born on February 9, 1999,
Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27, 2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born on December 25, 2001.
Respondent claimed, among others, that: there was a time when the petitioner went to her room
and cocked his gun, and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to convince her
not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed; she hid her fears although she was
scared; there was also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken that
her youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in order to stop his child from crying, petitioner
would threaten him with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and insecure with
the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often as he wanted or she
would apply for a protection order, the petitioner got furious and threatened her of withholding
his financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and,
on May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner with companions went to her new home and
forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to her. Respondent thus filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite for the issuance of a protection order pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act. The filing
of the said protection order was brought because of the husband’s abusive conduct towards his
children and spouse; imputing physical harm and threatening them for the purpose of controlling
their actions or decisions; and the deprivation of the children’s custody as well as the family’s
financial support. The Petition was for herself and on behalf of her minor children.

On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) pursuant to the
application. By virtue of said issuance, a hearing was set for the issuance of the Permanent
Protection Order. Thereafter, the respondent filed a petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO.

In his comment, the petitioner denied the allegations and contended that he had been
living separately with his wife and children since November 2004. According to him, his wife has
been involved with a certain Rebendor Zuniga despite their marriage and she violated their
agreement when she and their children moved out of their conjugal dwelling to stay with Zuniga.
Aside from denying the allegations, the petitioner further claimed that the issuance of the TPO
violated his right to due process under the Constitution.

Without waiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition and motion to lift TPO,
the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and hold departure order on the decision of the RTC.

In order not to render the petition moot and to avoid grave and irreparable injury, the CA
initially issued a temporary restraining order but later denied the petition for lack of merit. The
CA in said ruling opined that the factual matters could not be passed upon by virtue of the
petition for certiorari since there is a pending petition under RA 9262 before the RTC. Also, the
TPO was validly issued and there was no grave abuse of discretion attendant to it. As regards
the claim of unconstitutionality, the CA ruled that the requisites to question the constitutionality
of the law were not met.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not, the provision for the issuance of the TPO in RA 9262 is unconstitutional as
it is in contravention of the right to due process afforded by the constitution.

2. Whether or not, there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to
barangay officials to issue protection orders.
3. Whether or not, there was grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC and/or the CA
in this case.

HELD:

As to the first issue

The Supreme Court was not impressed by the contention of the petitioner on the question
of the constitutionality of RA 9262, particularly Sec. 15 of the law. In Garcia v. Drilon (699 SCRA
352, 401), where the same argument was raised, and where the court struck down the
challenge and held: a protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other
necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize
any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their
life.

The court further said that the grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as
violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued
without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to
enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of
VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and
possibly even death if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.

The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where the
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.

As to the second issue

The Supreme Court was also not persuaded as to the allegation of an invalid legislative
power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders. The high court said that
the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte
determination that there is a basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent
need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within
the court’s discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that
the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been
committed.

The violent acts which the court uses for its basis are those enumerated in Section 5 of
R.A. 9262 (Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children). In this case, the petitioner’s
actions would fall under the enumeration of the said portion of the law and these are enough for
the issuance of a TPO.

As to the third issue

The Supreme Court did not find that the CA committed an erroneous decision as to its
affirmance of the RTC’s issuance of the TPO.

It is settled doctrine, according to the court, that there is grave abuse of discretion when
there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,
such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.
11. CABANEZ v. AAA G.R.No. 187175

Justice Singh to the MAC School of Law pioneer batch: “As you start to make a mark in the
legal profession, may you always remember that the conferment of this JD degree is but a call
to serve – a call to serve our countrymen, most especially the most vulnerable in our society.”

Republic act 9262

SECTION 3 Par (a), (f), (g), (d) defined the Following:

"Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis
during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between
two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a
common child.

(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of
taking care of themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it
includes the biological children of the victim and other children under her care.

SECTION 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the
purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section
5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order
serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the
victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain
control over her life. The provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement
agencies. The protection orders that may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection
order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and permanent protection order (PPO).

SC: Anti-VAWC LAW Protects Even Women in Illicit Relationships

The illicitness of a relationship a woman engages in does not diminish her dignity in any way.
She will be protected just the same by the law that values her and her children’s dignity and
guarantees full respect for their human rights.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the Court’s Second Division
upheld a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) issued under Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act, over contentions that sought to straitjacket the
text and spirit of the law.

The petitioner was a man against whom the PPO had been issued to prevent further acts of
violence against the respondents—his longtime live- in partner, a woman, and their children. He
was 47 and admittedly married when he met the respondent woman, then 20, in 1979.

Before the Court, the petitioner primarily argues that Republic Act No. 9262 cannot provide relief
for the respondent woman, as she was only his paramour. For him, although the law’s
protection extends to a woman with whom one has or had a sexual or dating relationship, this
should be interpreted to mean as a relationship without any legal impediment to marry each
other. Otherwise, he says, the law would effectively tolerate adulterous relationships.

Applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not make any distinction,
neither should the courts, the Court corrected the petitioner’s mistaken notion. It said that the
law “protects women and their children from various forms of violence and abuse committed
within a setting of an intimate relationship”—including the respondent woman and their children.

The Court applied the same rule in rejecting the petitioner’s other contention: that since their
children have attained the age of majority by the time the PPO was issued, this precludes the
application of Republic Act No. 9262, which defines “children” as those below 18 years old, or
older but incapable of taking care of themselves.

Citing Estacio v. Estacio, a similar case of violence against women and their children, the Court
explained that neither Republic Act No. 9262 nor the Rule on Violence Against Women and
Their Children distinguishes the age at which children are included in protection orders.

On both issues, the Court upheld the State policy of protecting women and children from
violence and threats to their security and safety, declaring that it “will not interpret a provision of
Republic Act No. 9262 as to make it powerless and futile.”

The Supreme Court Public Information Office will upload the decision to the SC website once it
receives an official copy from the Office of the Clerk Court Second Division. (G.R. No. 187175,
Cabañez v. AAA)
12. G.R. No. 239215. July 12, 2022

RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON, ACTING ON BEHALF OF MINOR RHUBY SIBAL KNUTSON,

PETITIONER, vs. HON. ELISA R. SARMIENTO-FLORES, IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 69, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TAGUIG CITY, AND
ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Randy Michael Knutson, an American citizen and his estranged wife Rosalina Sibal
Knutson had a daughter named Rhuby Sibal Kutson (Rhuby). Randy and Rosalina became
estranged after the former discovered her extra-marital affairs. In spite of that, Randy supported
Rosalina and Rhuby.

Rosalina got hooked in casinos, spending weeks in gambling dens and left Rhuby under
the care of strangers. She incurred large debts prompting her to sell the house and lot and
condominium unit and vehicles that Randy provided for them. Randy learned Rosalina
maltreated her own mother and Rhuby by pulling her hair and slapping her face and knocking
her head. She even threatened to kill her then will commit suicide.

On December 7, 2017, Randy, on behalf of minor Rhuby, filed against Rosalina a petition
under RA No. 9262 for the issuance of Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders before the
Regional Trial Court of Taguig City, Branch 69 (RTC). Randy averred that Rosalina placed
Rhuby in a harmful environment deleterious to her physical, emotional, moral, and psychological
development.

The RTC dismissed the petition explaining that the protection and custody orders in RA
9262 cannot be issued against a mother who allegedly abused her own child. It ratiocinated that
the child’s mother cannot be considered as an offender of the law. The remedies are not
available to the father because he is not a “woman victim of violence.”

Randy moved for a reconsideration and argued that that R.A. 9262 used the term “any
person” which is not limited to male offenders. The law must be liberally construed to promote
the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. His motion for
reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a father can apply for Protection and Custody orders under R.A. 9262?

HELD:

Yes. RA No. 9262 allows the father of the offended party to apply for protection and custody
orders.

Under the R.A. 9262, Section 9 (b) explicitly allows "parents or guardians of the offended party"
to file a petition for protection orders. The exact provision was incorporated in Section 12 (b) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9262 and Section 8 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-
11-SC,29 or the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children.

The statute categorically used the word "parents" which pertains to the father and the mother of
the woman or child victim. Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget. The law speaks in clear
language and no explanation is required. There is no occasion for the Court to interpret but only
to apply the law when it is not ambiguous. Similarly, the statute did not qualify on who between
the parents of the victim may apply for protection orders. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguere debemus.
13. G.R. No. 167693 September 19, 2006 (Formerly G.R. Nos. 147678-87)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MELCHOR CABALQUINTO, appellant.

FACTS:

This is a case of an eight-year-old child who allegedly raped by her own father. The latter
being convicted after the trial before the Regional Trial Court and the same being affirmed with
modification by the Court of Appeals. Thus, the mother of the victim sent a letter addressed to
the Chief Justice expressing anxiety over the posting of full text decisions of the Supreme Court
on its Internet Web Page. The mother submitted that confidentiality and the best interest of the
child must prevail over public access to information and pleaded that her daughter’s case, as
well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the Web Page.

The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), National Press Club (NPC), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Kapisanan ng
mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) to comment on the issue.

In its Comment, the OSG submits that the posting of the full text of decisions in cases
involving child abuse on the Supreme Court Web Page violates the right to privacy of the
aggrieved parties. In order to determine whether the subject matter upon which the right to
privacy being invoked falls within the constitutionally-protected zone of privacy, it must be
shown that the person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable. The reasonableness of such
expectancy depends on a two–part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited
an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable.

Further the OSG stated that the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented,
through a parent or guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of
privacy which the child may later invoke because child victims cannot be presumed to have
intended their initial agreement to extend beyond the termination of their case to the posting of
the decision reached by the Court on the Web Page. Moreover, such an expectation of privacy
is reasonable considering the various statutes and rules which reveal the intention of the State
to maintain the confidentiality of information pertaining to child abuse cases.

The DSWD imparted the same sentiment. It submits that the court records of child abuse
cases should be treated with strict confidentiality not only throughout the court proceedings, but
even after the promulgation of the decision in order to protect the right to privacy of the child and
her family and to preclude instances where undue disclosure of information may impair the
treatment and rehabilitation of the child-victim.

The KBP informs the Court that its members have agreed not to identify in their
broadcasts the names of children who are victims of abuse or are in conflict with the law. On the
other hand, the NPC, stated that the prevailing media practice is to inquire whether these
individuals wish to have their names appear in the report. If they do not, media would normally
take off the names and merely provide a very general description of the individual in recognition
of the need to carefully balance the right to information with the welfare of the parties involved.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is proper to post the full text of decisions of cases involving child sexual
abuse and its similar cases on the Supreme Court Web Page.

HELD:

This case presents an opportunity for the Court not only to once again dispense due requital for
the sufferings of a child who has been defiled by her own father, but also to effectuate the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known as the Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and its implementing rules,
RA 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,
and its implementing rules, and our own Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children.

The provisions on confidentiality of these enactments uniformly seek to respect the dignity and
protect the privacy of women and their children. Records of the cases shall be treated with
utmost confidentiality.

Taking all the opinions of the offices required by the Supreme Court to do so into account and in
view of recent enactments which unequivocally express the intention to maintain the
confidentiality of information in cases involving violence against women and their children, in
this case and henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and shall
use fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the
victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as
well those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed.
14. G.R. No. 239756 September 14, 2020

RODOLFO C. MENDOZA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC in relation to Section 5 (b), RA 7610.

That on or about the 8th day of March 2016, the said accused, with lewd designs by
means of force and coercion, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously perform
lascivious acts upon the person of one AAA, a nine (9) years old, minor, by then and there
kissing her lips twice, done against her will and without her consent, which act debase, degrade
and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human being.

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

The RTC held that the prosecution was able to establish and prove the elements of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness. The direct, clear and straightforward testimony of AAA was
given credence by the RTC compared to petitioner's defense of bare denial. The RTC opined
that petitioner's act of kissing a nine (9)-year-old child is morally inappropriate and indecent
designed to abuse her.

The CA denied his appeal on the following grounds: (a) petitioner is estopped from
questioning the illegality of his arrest on appeal due to his failure to object to the illegality of his
arrest prior to his arraignment; (b) the prosecution was able to establish the identity of petitioner
as even though AAA remembered petitioner mainly by his haircut, she was already familiar with
petitioner as she saw him working at the construction site before the incident; and (c) all the
elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness and the elements of sexual abuse under Section
5, Article III of RA 7610 have been proven in this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in affirming the decision of the regional trial court in
convicting the petitioner of the crime charged despite the prosecution's failure to establish all the
elements of the crime charged.

HELD:

Yes. In the present petition, herein petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to establish
elements of the crime charged, particularly the age or the minority of AAA. Petitioner asserts
that, other than the allegation of AAA's age in the Information, the prosecution failed to present
her birth certificate or any other authentic documentary evidence to prove her age or minority.

It is well-settled that the presentation of a birth certificate or other pieces of evidence are not at
all times necessary to prove the age or minority of the victim. The courts may take judicial notice
of the age of the victim especially if the victim is of tender age and it is quite manifest or obvious
in the physical appearance of the child. The Court held that the crucial years pertain to the ages
of 15 to 17 where minority may seem to be dubitable due to one's physical appearance.

In People v. Rivera, the Court held that the trial court can only take judicial notice of the victim's
minority when the latter is, for example, 10 years old or below.

The Court concurs with the CA that all the elements of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness
under the RPC and Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 have been
sufficiently established in the case at bench.

Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 provides that:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The elements of the foregoing offense are the following:

(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and

(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

When the lascivious act is committed against a minor below 12 years old, Section 5 (b), Article
III of RA 7610 requires that, in addition to the foregoing requisites, the elements of the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must likewise be met, to wit:

(a) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

(b) that it is done under any of the following circumstances:

(i) through force, threat, or intimidation,

(ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,

(iii) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, and

(iv) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; and

(c) that the offended party is another person of either sex.

Firstly, petitioner was duly proven to have committed a lascivious or lewd act by kissing a nine
(9)-year-old child on the lips against her will and intimidated her in not reporting the incident
under threat of harm against her life.

Secondly, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish that AAA was subjected to other
sexual abuse when she indulged in a lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of an
adult - petitioner.

As explained in Caballo v. People:

As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in
sexual intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the
child is deemed to be a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." In this manner,
the law is able to act as an effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to their development.

In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to
intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will.

As regards the second additional element, it is settled that the child is deemed subjected to
other sexual abuse when the child engages in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult. Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some
compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the
offended party. The law does not require physical violence on the person of the victim; moral
coercion or ascendancy is sufficient.

The petitioner's proposition — that there is not even an iota of proof of force or intimidation as
AAA was asleep when the offense was committed and, hence, he cannot be prosecuted under
RA 7610 — is bereft of merit. When the victim of the crime is a child under twelve (12) years
old, mere moral ascendancy will suffice.
15. G.R. No. 240145, September 14, 2020

JAIME CAPUETA Y ATADAY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Petitioner Capueta was charged with violation of Section 10(a) of RA 7610 for committing
acts of lasciviousness against AAA, a 6-year old minor.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The prosecution formally offered the
following documentary evidence: (1) Sinumpaang Salaysay of AAA, stating that petitioner had
molested her; (2) Sinumpaang Salaysay of BBB, stating that she is the mother of AAA and that
upon learning what petitioner had done, she accompanied her daughter to the barangay hall to
report the incident; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Tanod Cariaso stating that he and his fellow
tanods arrested petitioner after receiving the report of AAA and BBB; (4) Birth Certificate of AAA
showing her date of birth as February 22, 2002; and (5) Investigation Report dated November
18, 2008 prepared by Officer-on-Case, PO1 Padojinog.

The RTC ruled the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610.

The CA affirmed the ruling of RTC that the prosecution had duly proven the elements of
the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, under the RPC, as well as lascivious conduct under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610. The CA held that the prosecution was able to prove AAA's minority at
the time of the incident and that petitioner exercised intimidation over AAA and committed
lascivious conduct against her by touching her legs, arm, and vagina.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed grave error in affirming the RTC’s ruling that petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Acts of Lasciviousness, in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610.

HELD:

No. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are as follows:

The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and

The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Concomitantly, pursuant to Section 5(b) of RA 7610, when the victim is under 12 years of age,
the perpetrator shall be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC for lascivious conduct, which
requires the presence of the following elements for its commission: (a) the offender commits any
act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) the lascivious act is done under any of the following
circumstances: (i) by using force or intimidation; (ii) when the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age; and (c) the offended party is another person of either sex.

All the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 of RA 7610 and Acts of Lasciviousness under
the RPC have been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt in the present case.

Lascivious conduct is defined in Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of RA 7610 as:

The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

In this case, the trial court found AAA's testimony that petitioner molested her by lifting up her
skirt and touching her legs, thighs, and vagina to have been given in a clear, candid, and
categorical manner, worthy of faith and belief. Moreover, AAA positively identified petitioner as
her molester.
16. G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015

RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

On January 30, 2002, at around 2:00 a.m., XXX, then 10 years old, woke up as “he felt
pain in his anus and stomach and something inserted in his anus.” He saw that Ricalde, 31
years old, a distant relative and textmate of XXX, “fondled his penis.” When Ricalde returned to
the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother
that Ricalde played with his sexual organ. RTC found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape through sexual assault. CA affirmed the conviction but lowered the amount of damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the slightest penetration into one’s anus constitutes rape through sexual
assault.

HELD:

Yes. XXX testified that he “felt something was inserted into his anus.” The slightest penetration
into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape. Long line
of cases considers a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing jurisprudence on rape
involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by analogy when the victim
is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of
rape through sexual assault. The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity.
The degree of penetration is not important. Rape is an “assault on human dignity.”
17. G.R. No. 250671 October 7, 2020

Lina Talocod, Petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, Respondent.

FACTS:

The case stemmed from an Information dated October 23, 2012 filed before the Regional
Trial Court accusing petitioner of committing acts of child abuse, defined and penalized under
Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act 7610.

In the morning of November 5,2011, AAA, an 11 year old child was playing with other
children by throwing sand and gravel on the road thus bothering passing motorists. AAA berated
his playmates and told them to stop.

EEE was upset by the reprimand and reported the incident to her mother,herein petitioner.
The petitioner immediately confronted AAA and while pointing a finger at the latter, furiously
shouted “Huwag mong pansinin yan. At putang ina yan. Mga walang kwenta yan. Mana- mana
lang yan”!

AAA went home and relayed the incident to his mother. AAA was allegedly traumatized as
a result of the petitioner’s utterance of harsh words and expletives.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Section 10 (a),Article VI of Republic Act
No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse ,Exploitation, and Discrimination).

HELD:

No. The act of petitioner in shouting invectives against private complainants does not constitute
child abuse under the foregoing provisions of R.A. No. 7610. Petitioner had no intention of
debasing the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. It was an act of carelessness done in the
heat of anger.

For one to be held criminally liable for the commission of acts of Child Abuse under Section 10
(a), Article VI of RA 7610, the prosecution must prove a specific intent to debase debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child; otherwise, the accused cannot be convicted
for the said offense.

In Bongalon v People, it was held that the laying of hands against a child, when done in the spur
of the moment and in anger , cannot be deemed as an act of child abuse under Section 10 (a)
of RA 7610, absent the essential element of intent to debase, or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the child, as a human being on the part of the offender.

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse.
18. G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013

GEORGE BONGALON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

On May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors,
joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the
procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a
minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and
Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson
at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face that the petitioner then went to the
brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not
come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the
Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical
treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined
Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions,
to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area
and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left.

The RTC convicted the accused for the crime of Violation of R.A. 7610 and was ordered to
undergo imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day to 8 years.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification on the imprisonment and
damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the liability of the accused should be mitigated because he had merely
acted to protect her two minor daughters.

HELD:

Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, states:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered
by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

xxxx

Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:

Section 3. Definition of terms. –

xxxx

(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes
any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

xxxx

In this case Bongalon struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face.
The laying of hands on Jayson have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger,
indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his
own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the
loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the
petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
19. G.R. No. 235071 January 7, 2019

EVANGELINE PATULOT Y GALIA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

FACTS:

The petitioner was charged with child abuse (RA 7610) “Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.” Patulot(petitioner) poured boiling oil
towards CCC which the latter attempted to avoid but to no avail, she was still poured upon. The
oil upon splashing on CCC slightly hit AAA(3 years old) and BBB(2 months). CCC took AAA and
BBB to her two neighbors and the two children were put to treatment as well as CCC. On the
other hand, according to petitioner’s defense, while she was carrying her merchandise CCC
bumped her making the merchandise fall to the ground and CCC added invectives and cursed
the petitioner. In another time, Patulot while repacking pepper, CCC commented that she should
have joined her husband so that the two of them will be in a wake. Patulot thereafter reported
CCC but was ignored. RTC and CA convicted her.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a need to prove that the acts were intended to debase, degrade, or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as
child abuse.

HELD:

No. Under Section 3(b) RA 7610 “child abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or
not, of the child which includes any of the following: 1.) psychological and physical abuse,
neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; 2.) any act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; 3.)
unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival such as food and shelter or 4.) failure to
immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death. Art. 59 of P.D. 603 as
amended, also punishes four distinct acts 1.) child abuse 2.) child cruelty 3.) child exploitation
4.) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. Contrary to
petitioner's assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution
need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in
the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different
from the former acts. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that when a child is subjected to
physical abuse or injury, the person responsible therefor can be held liable under R.A. No. 7610
by establishing the essential facts above. A person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended. Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "[t]he
State shall defend the right of the children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development." – RA 7610
20. G.R. No. 250671 October 7, 2020

Lina Talocod, Petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, Respondent

FACTS:

The case stemmed from an Information dated October 23, 2012 filed before the Regional
Trial Court accusing petitioner of committing acts of child abuse, defined and penalized under
Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act 7610.

In the morning of November 5,2011, AAA, an 11 year old child was playing with other
children by throwing sand and gravel on the road thus bothering passing motorists. AAA berated
his playmates and told them to stop.

EEE was upset by the reprimand and reported the incident to her mother,herein petitioner.
The petitioner immediately confronted AAA and while pointing a finger at the latter, furiously
shouted “ Huwag mong pansinin yan . At putang ina yan. Mga walang kwenta yan. Mana- mana
lang yan”!

AAA went home and relayed the incident to his mother. AAA was allegedly traumatized as
a result of the petitioner’s utterance of harsh words and expletives.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is guilty of violating Section 10 (a),Article VI of Republic Act No.
7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse ,Exploitation, and Discrimination).

HELD:

ACQUITTED. The act of petitioner in shouting invectives against private complainants does not
constitute child abuse under the foregoing provisions of R.A. No. 7610. Petitioner had no
intention of debasing the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. It was an act of carelessness
done in the heat of anger.

For one to be held criminally liable for the commission of acts of Child Abuse under Section 10
(a), Article VI of RA 7610, the prosecution must prove a specific intent to debase debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child; otherwise, the accused cannot be convicted
for the said offense.

In Bongalon v People, it was held that the laying of hands against a child, when done in the spur
of the moment and in anger , cannot be deemed as an act of child abuse under Section 10 (a)
of RA 7610, absent the essential element of intent to debase, or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the child, as a human being on the part of the offender.

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse.
21. G.R. No. 254005, June 23, 2021

ASELA BRINAS Y DEL FIERRO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Brinas was charged with the crime of Grave Oral Defamation in relation to R.A. 7610 in an
Amended Information, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about the 25th day of
January 2010 in the afternoon, at the Challenger Montessori School, Inc. in Brgy. Zone VI,
Municipality of Iba, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent of bringing 16-year old Micolie Mari
Maevis S. Rosauro and 16-year old Keziah Liezle D. Polojan, into discredit, disrepute and
contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and publicly utter the following
defamatory words, to wit: "pinakamalalandi, pinakamalilibog, pinakamahader[a] at hindot," "Mga
putang ina kayo[."] and other words similar thereto, which debased, degraded and demeaned
Micolie Mari Maevis S. Rosauro and Keziah Liezle D. Dolojan of their intrinsic worth and dignity,
and to the grave humiliation, embarrassment, damage and prejudice of said minors Micolie Mari
Maevis S. Rosauro and Keziah Liezle D. Dolojan. Upon arraignment, Brinas pleaded "not
guilty." Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

RTC In its Decision dated April 13, 2018, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution's
testimonies, found Brinas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged but appreciated
in her favor the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. Brinas appealed to the CA.

The CA concluded that the prosecution was able to establish that Brinas had publicly
defamed the private complainants, with intention to debase, degrade, and demean their intrinsic
worth as human beings. It gave no credence to the claim of Brinas that she merely acted in the
heat of anger and intended to discipline the students. Thus, the present Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Brinas of the crime of grave oral
defamation in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610.

HELD:

Yes. Applying the foregoing case law to the present case, the Court holds that the CA and the
RTC erred in finding Brinas guilty of violation of Section 10(a) in relation to Section 3(b)(2) of
R.A. 7610.

The Court, upon an assiduous and careful review of the records, finds that the lower courts
misinterpreted vital facts that demonstrate merit in Brinas contentions. In simple terms, there
was a failure to establish the specific intent to debase, degrade or demean required in child
abuse cases punished under Section 10(a) in relation to Section 3(b)(2) of R.A. 7610.

Brinas argues that her defamatory remarks against the private complainants were uttered in a fit
of anger as a response to the involvement by the private complainants of her child's name in a
text message which "appears to be a scheme on other students." Brinas claims she was
"deprived of x x x clear thinking [and] had intended no more than telling (sic) off [the] private
complainants, as students under her supervision." As such, she did not have the required intent
to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth of the minors as human beings. On this basis,
she argues that she should only be convicted for oral defamation under the RPC, if at all.

Notably, in the present case, the prosecution failed to prove other circumstances which may
indicate said intent to debase, degrade or demean. The alleged subsequent acts of expulsion,
suspension and withholding of the school records of the private complainants by Brinas were
not proven sufficiently. Due to the prosecution's failure to prove the presence of specific intent to
debase, degrade, or demean the victims' intrinsic worth and dignity, Brinas cannot be held guilty
of child abuse under R.A. 7610. Accordingly, petitioner Brinas is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
22. G.R. No. 246231, January 20, 2021

ALLAN DE VERA Y ANTE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

AAA, a 16-year-oId. first year college student of the XXX University, is the private
complainant in this case. AAA is both a Philippine and an American citizen, who was born and
raised in the United States.AAA testified that at around 8:30a.m. of July 7, 2012, she went to the
Filipino Department of the school to ask for her class section under the Special Filipino
Program.

Alone in the office was petitioner, who asked her if she wanted to take the Filipino for
Foreigners Diagnostic Exam. AAA then agreed to take the exam since it is a requirement for the
Special Filipino Program.

While taking the exam, AAA heard a tapping sound, which she initially ignored. When the
sound got louder, she looked to where the sound was coming from and saw the petitioner
masturbating.

AAA immediately ran out of the office and told her classmate CCC and her mother, BBB,
what she saw in the Mini-Library.

When BBB arrived at the university, she was told that the petitioner was already brought
to the police station. BBB and AAA then went to the police station to file a formal complaint
against the petitioner.

The RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

The CA partly granted petitioner's appeal and modified the RTC Decision. The CA
heId.that while petitioner cannot be convicted under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the elements
under Section 10(a) were duly established in this case. The CA heId.that the act of masturbating
in the presence of the child is considered another act of abuse because it is prejudicial to the
development of the child.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of violation of Section
IO(a) of R.A. No. 7610.

HELD:

The CA is correct.

Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 reads:

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child s development including those covered
by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

From the foregoing, Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 punishes not only those enumerated under
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, namely: (a) child abuse, (b)
child cruelty, (c) child exploitation, and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the
child s development.22 Simply put, Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 punishes any other acts of
child abuse not covered under other provisions of the same law.

In relation thereto, Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610 defmes child abuse as:

(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes
any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Umeasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; [or]

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child nbsp;resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

Taking into account the special circumstances surrounding the case at bench, the act of
masturbating in the presence of the minor is considered a lascivious conduct and constitutes
psychological abuse on the minor victim. The act of masturbation then falls within the scope of
R.A. No. 7610 and not the RPC.

In the case at bench, the Information alleged sufficiently all the elements constituting the crime
of other forms of child abuse penalized under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, namely: (a) the
minority of the victim; and, (b) the acts constituting physical or psychological abuse committed
by petitioner against the victim — petitioner fondled his penis and masturbated in the presence
of the victim thereby prejudicing her psychological and physical development and further
debasing, degrading and demeaning her intrinsic worth and dignity.
23. G.R. No. 248729, September 03, 2020

JOEL C. JAVAREZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

The accused was charged under two (2) separate information, respectively in violation of
Section 10, in relation to Section 31 of RA 7610, otherwise known as “Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination.

Sometime in 2008, the accused, being a public officer, being a school teacher, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally commit the alleged crime of physical abuse and cruelty, upon the
victim who is ten (10) year old minor, suddenly without provocation, shoved the victim. The
cause resulted to physical, psychological and social distress to the victim. Apparently at the
same time. the accused committed the same crime to another victim, who is also a minor. The
criminal act was for the accused to hit the victim with a broomstick, while the latter is asking for
pop rice.

The trial court successfully proven the guilt of the accused and found guilty as charged.

Upon review of the case, the appellate court discredit the testimony of the prosecution
witness citing the occurrence of facts, wherein if it true that the accused pushed AAA, in the
chest, he should have on his back, not the other way around, having his face down. The
fabricating of evidence cannot with stall the existence of the actual happening. The appellate
court affirmed the main, but modify the amount of damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime charge to the accused found to be meritorious.

HELD:

CASE- 24935- NO

CASE-24936- YES

As to AAA, in reference to the actual incident and facts, we found the accused did not intend to
maltreat nor debase AAA dignity as a human being. Hence, there was no intent to harm from
the petitioner. More so, has reason or motive to do it. AAA, being an onlooker, may have stood
too close to the protagonist such that when the accused stepped in to disengage the
protagonist, AAA was also pushed back.

The court ruled the ACQUITTAL of the petitioner of the crime charge in violation of Sec 10 (a),
Art VI, of RA 7610.

As to BBB, where there was evidence of abrasions, signed caused by a sharp object like a
fingernail or a broomstick as well as hematoma on his left ear, these facts does adhere to
established that BBB reaches to his incapacity for labor or the required medical attendance, the
offense is therefore “SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES” only.

To be found guilty of the felonious act under Act 262 to 266, there exist the ingredients of mala
in se, couple with dolus malus. Thus the legal maxim says, iniuria ex affect facientis consistat. If
there is no criminal intent, the contention of committing the intentional felony, derive with failure
and reluctance.

The act of the accused did not convinced this court to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of BBB as a human being which is essential requirement under Sec 10 (a) Art
VI of RA 7160, however, the act of laying hands was attended by malicious intent to physically
harm BBB, rightly fall on the criteria of slight physical injury.
24. G.R. No. 176102 November 26, 2014

ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

On March 30, 2000, petitioner Hubilla was at the Dalupaon High School campus watching
the high school graduation rites. At half past seven, while walking towards the gate of Dalupaon
High School on his way home, he was ganged up by a group of 4 men.

The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy and fell to the
ground. He was not able to see or even recognize who attacked him, so he proceeded home.
Shortly after leaving the campus, however, he met somebody whom he thought was one of the
four men who ganged up on him. He stabbed the person with the knife he was, then, carrying
which he had used in preparing food for his friend, Richard Candelaria, who was graduating that
day. He went home after the incident.

While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought him to the
barangay hall, and later to the Pasacao PNP. On his way to the town proper, he came to know
that the person he stabbed was Jason Espinola. He felt sad after hearing it.

After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide as
charged, and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years
and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor,
as maximum; and to pay to the heirs of the victim ₱81,890.04 as actual damages for medical
and funeral expenses, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but modified the penalty
and the civil liability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of

Republic Act No. 9344 and other international agreements.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that a review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals that
the imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5
(c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law the right not to be
unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case
is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a)
the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or
imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time. Thereby, the trial and
appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the
penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last
recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his
sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.

The Supreme Court further discussed that following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the
petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or other
training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of
Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a
manner consistent with the offender child’s best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu
of service in the regular penal institution.

The petition for review on certiorari was DENIED; and the amended decision promulgated was
AFFIRMED, but DELETING the order to remand the judgment to the trial court for
implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of Corrections to commit the petitioner for the
service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or other training facilities under its control,
supervision and management, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
25. G.R. 249307

BBB, Petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, Respondent

FACTS:

BBB was charged with rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A (2) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Republic Act No. 76104 (RA 7610).

Complainant testified that she was born on August 24, 2001. On November 14, 2012,
around 2o'clock in the afternoon, while attending an event in school, her classmate Hara Jane
Generosa (Generosa) invited her to go to John Mark Socubos' (Socubos) house together with
petitioner and Robin James Navido (Navido). Due to Generosa's persistent invitation, she
eventually agreed. She and Generosa followed petitioner and his friends to Socubos' house.
There, she noticed that none of Socubos' relatives were home. When Socubos and Navido went
out to buy something, petitioner asked Generosa to go out for a while, leaving her and petitioner
alone in the house.

In the living room, petitioner asked her if she had her monthly period. She answered in the
negative. He then moved closer to her, lowered her pants and underwear, and kissed her on the
cheek. She was so shocked and scared, she failed to do anything. He then inserted his
forefinger into her vagina. Jolted by the pain, she immediately pulled up her pants and
underwear and dashed out of the house. She and Generosa went back to school. Generosa
told her not to tell anyone what happened.

But Generosa herself later told their class adviser what happened to her. The class
adviser, in turn, relayed it to her mother. The following day, on December 4, 2012, her mother
reported the incident to the Municipal Social Development Office (MSDO). There, they
were advised to also report the incident to the police. She was examined at the Municipal
Health Center. Dr. Phillen D. Ureta (Dr. Ureta) found an old hymenal abrasion at 5 to 6 o'clock
positions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Court of Appeals err in finding petitioner guilty of rape by sexual assault.

HELD:

Under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure and affirmed by settled jurisprudence, even though the crime
charged against the accused was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights because said
crime is included in the crime of rape.

It is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the
court contained in the text or body of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the
theory that the dispositive portion is the final order, while the opinion is merely a statement
ordering nothing.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's factual conclusion in the body of
the latter’s decision, thus:

However, this Court disagrees with the RTC in holding that since per Dr. Ureta's findings, the
hymen of the victim was intact, appellant cannot be said to have committed the crime of rape by
sexual assault but only acts of lasciviousness. It bears emphasizing that a broken hymen is not
an element of the crime charged against the appellant.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in finding petitioner guilty of rape by
sexual assault. People v. Bagsic enumerated the elements of rape by sexual assault and the
three elements were proved. Consider (a) petitioner committed a sexual act on
complainant; (b) by inserting his finger into complainant's vagina; and (c) complainant was
only eleven (11) years old at that time.
On whether petitioner, then only fifteen (15) years old, acted with discernment, the Court affirms
the concurrent findings of both courts below. They properly gave weight to the report submitted
by Social Worker Antonia Fernandez to the trial court, which stated:

He invited her inside the house and his classmate left them and he had a chance to be alone
and there he sexually molested her because he observed that she did not refuse [sic] what they
did and kissed her lips. He admitted during the time the incident happened that what they did is
wrong.

All told, the Court of Appeals did not err when it rendered a verdict of conviction against
petitioner for rape by sexual assault.

The offender commits an act of sexual assault;

(2) The act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:

(a) By inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice; or

(b) By inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another

person;

(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:

(a) By using force and intimidation;

(b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or

(d) When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented.

All three (3) elements were proved here.

26. G.R. No. 246146, March 18, 2021

CICL XXX, CHILD IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

At around 7:45 o'clock in the evening of 30 August 2012, private complainant AAA was
inside the campus. To her consternation, CICL XXX suddenly grabbed and pulled her towards a
comer. He poked an icepick on the right side of her body and uttered: "Wag ka sisigaw." CICL
XXX kissed AAA on the lips down to her neck while unbuttoning her blouse. He proceeded by
taking off her sando and bra. Uncontented, he pulled down her panties and mashed her breasts.

When a teacher passed by, CICL XXX ran away, giving AAA the chance to escape. She
immediately went home. She was so afraid, but a week after the incident, she mustered
courage and confessed her ordeal to a priest who encouraged her to report what happened to
her.

She informed her aunt, BBB, about what CICL XXX did to her. They reported the incident
to the school authorities but referred the matter to the barangay office. In turn, they were told to
proceed to the Women's Desk of the Batasan Hills Police Station.

Upon arraignment, CICL XXX pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The RTC promulgated its Decision dated June 2, 2017, finding CICL XXX guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness.

The CA denied CICL XXX's appeal, finding no reversible error in the RTC's judgment of
conviction. Aggrieved, CICL XXX filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA
in its Resolution dated March 4, 2019.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CICL XXX is liable for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness

HELD:

Yes. Based on the Caoili guidelines, it is only when the victim of the lascivious conduct is 18
years old and above that such crime would be designated as "Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision correccional.

Whereas if the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, or 18 years old and above under
special circumstances, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Lascivious Conduct under
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610" with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua, but it should not make any reference to the provisions of the RPC.

CICL XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
and (1) day of prision correccional medium as the minimum term, to ten (10) years, two (2)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor maximum, as the maximum term, with
modification as to the award of damages. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY complainant AAA the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
27. G.R. No. 223477 February 14, 2018

CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

FACTS:

Melgar was charged with violation Section 5 of RA 9262 with emphasis on committing
economic abuse against AAA, and her minor son, BBB (12 years old), by depriving them of
financial support, which caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to
AAA and her son.

Melgar pleaded not guilty, and he and AAA entered into a compromise agreement on the
civil aspect of the case. After the RTC's approval of the compromise agreement, the criminal
aspect of the case was provisionally dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one year
later, the prosecution moved to set aside the compromise agreement and to revive the criminal
action, on the ground that Melgar sold the property, which was supposed to answer for the
support-in-arrears of his son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement.
Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal aspect of the case and allowed the prosecution to
present its evidence.

The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which
resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of
BBB, however, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour as the latter had an affair with a
younger woman. When BBB was just about one year old, Melgar stopped giving support,
prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually granted. This notwithstanding,
Melgar still refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was constrained to file the
instant criminal case against Melgar. To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could
afford to provide support of P8,000.00 per month because he has a lavish lifestyle with his
family.

The Regional Trial Court in its judgment found Melgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 for having committing economic abuse against AAA and their
son, BBB, when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the property which was supposed
to answer for his support-in-arrears from 2001 to 2010. Melgar appealed in the Court of
Appeals. However, the CA affirmed Melgar's conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of
Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.

HELD:

In this case, the Supreme Court denied the petition, finding Melgar guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," sentencing Melgar to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum.

The Supreme Court said that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 are
present in the case, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship,
resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had
failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not
supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his property which was
supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB.

As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262 provides that violations
of Section 5 (e) shall be punished by, inter alia, prision correccional. Notably, while such crime
is punishable by a special penal law, the penalty provided therein is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, provides that if
the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum prison term
of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the special law prescribed. Be that as it
may, the Court had clarified in the landmark ruling of People v. Simon that the situation is
different where although the offense is defined in a special law, the penalty therefor is taken
from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under such circumstance, the legal effects under
the system of penalties native to the Code would also necessarily apply to the special law.

Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under the
RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for
those crimes punishable under the RPC.