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The ‘competitive authoritarian’ turn in Turkey:

bandwagoning versus reality

Düzgün Arslantaş & André Kaiser

To cite this article: Düzgün Arslantaş & André Kaiser (2023) The ‘competitive authoritarian’
turn in Turkey: bandwagoning versus reality, Third World Quarterly, 44:3, 496-512, DOI:
10.1080/01436597.2022.2147061

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2147061

Published online: 01 Dec 2022.

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Third World Quarterly
2023, VOL. 44, NO. 3, 496–512
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2147061

The ‘competitive authoritarian’ turn in Turkey:

bandwagoning versus reality
Düzgün Arslantaş and André Kaiser
Cologne Center for Comparative Politics, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Turkey’s fast-paced democratic backsliding has attracted unprece- Received 18 May 2022
dented scholarly interest from observers both inside and outside the Accepted 9 November 2022
country. Among various labels proposed to define Turkey’s new regime KEYWORDS
type, ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (CA) has by far outdistanced its AKP
rivals. As plenty of time has passed since its coinage, it is timely to com- authoritarianism
mence a scholarly discussion on the appropriateness of the term. Our competitive
analysis reveals that the CA argument comes with three major short- authoritarianism
comings when applied to the case of Turkey. First, although its propo- democratic backsliding
nents discuss the concept adequately and seem to find abundant electoral authoritarianism
evidence to convince most of their audience, they undertake little, if regime change
any, theoretical discussion to show why CA is more plausible than its
alternatives. Second, although the party system is generally regarded
as the main indicator of a certain regime type, the link between the two
remains un(der)-explored. Third, the mechanism leading to the transi-
tion to CA is not fully identified. We conclude that experts have jumped
on the CA bandwagon, dubbing Turkey’s authoritarian regime compet-
itive authoritarian without sufficient conceptual sophistication; this has
proved deleterious rather than beneficial to the relevant literature.

Introduction
When the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) first took office
in Turkey in 2002, few envisaged that this would mark the start of the longest one-party rule
since 1950, and would affect the quality and functioning of governance so dramatically in
the long run. Turkey has now been listed as ‘not free’ for three consecutive years (Freedom
House 2022),1 and has one of the lowest Electoral Integrity scores in the world (Norris and
Grömping 2019).
Democratic backsliding in Turkey has attracted enormous scholarly interest. Among
numerous labels proposed to explain Turkey’s newly emerging regime type, ‘competitive
authoritarianism’ (CA) (eg Somer 2014; Özbudun 2015; Esen and Gümüşçü 2016; Çalışkan
2018; Castaldo 2018; Sezal and Sezal 2018; Sözen 2019) has by far outdistanced alternative
concepts such as ‘weak authoritarian regime’ (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016), ‘delegative
democracy’ (Taş 2015) and ‘illiberal democracy’ (Türkmen-Dervişoğlu 2015).2

CONTACT Düzgün Arslantaş darslan4@uni-koeln.de

© 2022 Global South Ltd
 Third World Quarterly 497

Despite the size of the CA literature, however, the concept of CA when applied to the
Turkish case comes with serious weaknesses in exploring the major underpinnings of the
current regime. First, the proponents of the CA framework do not sufficiently distinguish CA
from its alternatives. Second, its advocates under-analyse, if not entirely neglect, the impact
of regime transformation on the dynamics of the party system – something commonly
regarded as the main indicator of a political regime from an institutional perspective (see
eg Diamond and Gunther 2001; Sartori [1976] 2005). Third, the mechanism that allegedly
drove Turkey’s long-established hybrid regime into CA is not clearly demonstrated.
Before proceeding further, two clarifications are in order. First, we believe that a strong
alternative concept can be formulated only if the drawbacks of the existing literature are
fully grasped. Second, we are well aware of the difficulties of labelling a regime type that
has emerged but not yet stabilised. In this context, therefore, it is preferable to remain at
the highest level of abstraction when defining the regime type. This, for instance, implies
that ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2002) as an umbrella concept would have more
explanatory power than CA in the context of unstable and transitory regimes. Embracing
broader terms would also deter scholars from constantly borrowing concepts from other
settings and refashioning them for Turkey after each and every political development that
does not substantially alter the format of the party system or the systemic properties of the
political regime in question.
The organisation of this analysis is as follows. The first part introduces the concept of CA.
The second part tests the validity of the CA argument in the context of Turkey. The last part
highlights our major findings as well as further avenues of research.

Competitive authoritarianism
The once-dominant polarity between liberal democracies and completely closed authori-
tarian regimes is over. Only North Korea remains as an exemplar of the second category. The
countries that missed the train of the ‘third wave of democracy’ (Huntington 1991) – such
as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Cuba – are on the way to transition,3 though probably not to stable
democracy, given that recent breakdowns of authoritarianism – particularly in the Middle
East – have been followed by civil war (eg Yemen and Libya) or a military coup (eg Egypt).
Rather than solely exhibiting the characteristics of a single regime type, the regimes that
emerged in different regions after the Cold War tended to combine regular elections with
limited party pluralism and inter-party competition.4 CA, as defined by Levitsky and Way
(2002, 2010), is one of the sub-categories of ‘electoral authoritarian regimes’ (Schedler 2002).5
The merit of the CA argument stems from its explanatory power in understanding recent
regime transitions in Africa, the former Soviet Union and large swathes of Asia and Latin
America (Levitsky and Way 2010).
CA regimes exhibit a set of common characteristics. First, they are under the control of
civilian elites, which distinguishes them from military regimes. Second, formal democratic
institutions – such as the parliament or constitutional court – exist but have no sanctioning
power as in democracies. Third, elections are held regularly, with multiple ‘non-satellite’
parties running (Sartori [1976] 2005). Fourth, the incumbent party exploits state power or
public resources to skew the playing field to its advantage. Fifth, the governing party typically
controls the judiciary and media through the instruments of bribery, blackmailing or
498 D. ARSLANTAŞ AND A. KAISER

co-optation. Finally, although ruling parties from time to time resort to violence to silence
or weaken the opposition, this is not implemented systematically. This is because a high
degree of repression may trigger a political crisis or lead to international isolation that may
potentially work against the interests of the ruling elites (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010).
Despite its geographical reach, the concept of CA has rarely been discussed in the context
of the Middle East.6 Broadly speaking, this can be attributed to two main reasons. First, the
Gulf states traditionally belong to the category of ‘sultanistic regimes’. This refers to autocratic
rule through family ties and kinship rather than through a consistent ideology or value
system (Chehabi and Linz 1998; Way 2011). Second, in most of the remaining states, the
military is ‘ruling but not governing’ (Cook 2007). Military interventionism is typically justified
to counter-balance and suppress strong Islamic grassroots movements, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt and the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia. Against this trend, however,
the CA framework has become very popular among scholars and observers analysing
Turkey’s recent drift towards authoritarianism. This paper questions the validity of this appli-
cation, after briefly highlighting the trajectory of regime change in Turkey.

Regime change in Turkey

Turkey has long been characterised as a hybrid regime. On the one hand, elections in the
multi-party period were free of widespread electoral fraud,7 and parties of genuine oppo-
sition were able to participate. Furthermore, systematic violation of political competition
through the use of gerrymandering and malapportionment was rare – at least until recently
(Bickerstaff 2020; Bekaroğlu and Osmanbaşoğlu 2021).8 On the other hand, the military,
which historically propagated itself as the vanguard of the secular regime, exercised its
long-established tutelage over politics through a series of direct or indirect interventions
(1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, 2007).9 However, the military’s influence over Turkish politics grad-
ually weakened as AKP rule solidified.
The AKP, established in 2001, was the fourth party to form a single-party majority gov-
ernment in the multi-party period.10 As Huntington and Moore (1970) argue, one-party
rule typically emerges due to the domination of one social group over others in bifurcated
societies. In the context of Turkey, this notion is well theorised as the struggle of the
periphery (eg peasants and urban poor) against the centre (eg civilian and military bureau-
cracy and urban secular bourgeoisie) (see Mardin 1973; for a recent discussion, see
Wuthrich 2013).
Under pressure from the civilian and military bureaucracies, the AKP initially adopted a
reformist programme to convince both establishment and international actors that its pol-
icies were not pro-Islamic or illiberal (Dağı 2008; Polat 2013). The AKP experience, which was
propagated as harmonising Islam and democracy, was then supposed to work as a model
for other Muslim countries (Altunışık 2005; Öniş 2014). It was, however, soon apparent that
the AKP’s reformist policies, paving the way to EU membership, were pragmatically motivated
to shift the regime in an authoritarian direction. The establishment of a ‘neoliberal authori-
tarian’ state, based on the enfeeblement of labour (Özden, Akça, and Bekmen 2017; Bozkurt-
Güngen 2018; Kaygusuz 2018; Tansel 2018; Babacan et al. 2021), was the first sign of
authoritarian transformation. More specifically, the top-down implementation of neoliberal
reforms laid the ground for arbitrary governance, one of the main pillars of authoritarian
regimes (Linz 2000 [1975]).11
 Third World Quarterly 499

Corruption is another important indicator of authoritarian rule (Linz 2000 [1975]), and
was revealed in the December 2013 operations which led to the resignation of four ministers
from cabinet. Additionally, polarisation, a perennial feature of Turkish politics (Özbudun
2002; Sayarı and Esmer 2002), escalated in the new regime (Esmer and Beek 2019; see also
KONDA reports on polarisation since 2010). Another feature of the authoritarian regime is
the selective use of repression. During the Gezi Park protests in 2013, the government mobil-
ised tens of thousands of police against peaceful protesters in the streets, raising awareness
of its repression potential (Arslanalp and Erkmen 2020; Özen 2020). Repression became more
rampant with the declaration of a state of emergency following the failed coup attempt of
July 2016 and reached its zenith with the transition to an à la Turca presidential system. Over
two years, a series of legal decrees under the state of emergency expelled hundreds of
judges, prosecutors and security personnel from the public bureaucracy (Euronews 2018),
and appointed trusted officials to most of the municipalities won by the pro-Kurdish People’s
Democratic Party (HDP) (Evrensel 2020).
Turkey’s authoritarian transformation is well captured by V-Dem data. Figure 1, for
instance, shows that Turkey’s egalitarian democracy index score12 dropped from 0.49 in 2004
to 0.22 in 2016 and 0.18 in 2020, on a scale that goes from 1 = strong to 0 = weak. Its electoral
democracy index score fell from 0.69 in 2004 to 0.32 in 2016 and 0.29 in 2020. Its liberal
democracy index score, similarly, declined from 0.53 in 2004 to 0.18 in 2006 and 0.11 in 2020.
As we saw above, the CA label is by far the most commonly applied to Turkey’s new
authoritarian regime. The next section highlights its flaws in terms of conceptual sophisti-
cation, its link to the party system, and its origins.

Conceptual distinctiveness
As the AKP’s authoritarian policies crystallised, the challenge lay in whether to categorise
Turkey as a ‘democracy’ with some weaknesses or an ‘autocracy’ with some democratic ingre-
dients. The first strand of research situates the new regime closer to the old one, as Turkey
had never been a ‘liberal democracy’ in the post-1980 period, while the second strand puts
Turkey into the basket of established authoritarian regimes such as Russia and Egypt. As will

Figure 1. Turkey’s standing in indexes of democracy (V-Dem data).

Source: Coppedge et al. (2022). The image was pictured from https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/.
500 D. ARSLANTAŞ AND A. KAISER

be highlighted, both lines of research must be approached cautiously, due to several theo-
retical and empirical shortcomings.
In terms of conceptual sophistication, the first thing to note is that the concept of CA has
become popular mainly due to the weakness of alternative concepts in explaining recent
authoritarian transformations. Most notably, at the time the concept of CA was introduced,
few concepts, most of which were under-theorised, were in use to refer to Turkey’s new
regime type. In this context, most scholars did not need to make any viable comparison with
alternative concepts, thus restricting conceptual sophistication. For instance, Özbudun (2015)
restricts the conceptual comparison to Turkey’s formerly illiberal democratic regime. Esen
and Gümüşçü (2016) limit their comparison to a short paragraph on sub-types of democra-
cies such as ‘delegative democracy’. Nor do Akkoyunlu (2017) and Sezal and Sezal (2018)
make comparisons.
The lack of conceptual sophistication is also the result of being mostly unengaged with
the well-established literature on political regimes. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the
leading works, with the notable exception of Özbudun (2015), do not (adequately!) cite the
seminal works of Dahl (1971), Linz (2000 [1975]), Alvarez et al. (1996), or Sartori ([1976] 2005).
Instead they draw merely on Diamond’s (2002) and Levitsky and Way’s (2010) papers. The
lack of theoretical engagement with the major studies not only hampers viewing Turkey’s
regime change from a comparative perspective, but also makes it difficult to understand
the continuities and ruptures with the former regime and within the AKP governments.
Furthermore, the claim that alternative concepts overlooked unfair elections (eg Esen
and Gümüşçü 2016) is neither theoretically nor empirically grounded. The components of
an uneven playing field, such as clientelism, electoral fraud and repression, were in fact
sufficiently stressed by alternative accounts such as ‘tutelary regime’ (Çınar and Sayın 2014),
‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Arbatlı 2014; White and Herzog 2016) and ‘delegative democracy’
(Taş 2015). In particular, clientelism has been a prevailing feature of Turkish politics in the
multi-party period (Güneş-Ayata 1994; Sayarı 2014). As with other Middle East countries
characterised by ‘competitive clientelism’ (Lust 2009), the AKP heavily exploited clientelist
resources to extend its voter base. The economic setback following 2008, however, put the
maintenance of the clientelist machine at risk by increasing the costs of sustaining it, espe-
cially in the urban slums (Ark-Yıldırım 2017; Arslantaş and Arslantaş 2020a; Kılıçdaroğlu 2020).
Contrary to the claims of CA proponents, who base their arguments on secondary literature
alone (eg Esen and Gümüşçü 2016, 2019), fieldwork conducted in various urban poor spaces
shows that the clientelist distribution of public resources was less salient in reproducing the
cycle of dominance in the CA era than previously (see eg Arslantaş and Arslantaş 2020a).
Finally, the universe of cases in which Turkey’s CA turn is situated does not allow mean-
ingful comparisons, as the few studies written from a comparative perspective demonstrate.
For instance, a recent report by the Turkish Economic Social and Political Research
Foundation (TUSES 2021), based on the CA framework, emphasises that the opposition in
Turkey may learn from the experiences of other CA regimes including Ghana, Mexico and
Taiwan. Yet such a comparison would not be meaningful, even if one moves up the ladder
of abstraction. To start with, Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) is an exemplar
of a ‘hegemonic authoritarian regime’, as it long commanded a super-majority and was not
confronted with true opposition parties until the 1970s (Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007).
Similarly, the Kuomintang Party (KMT) in Taiwan ruled the country under a state of emer-
gency for more than three decades (1957–1987), during which opposition parties were not
 Third World Quarterly 501

permitted (Cheng 1989; Wong 2008). Moreover, questions remain to be addressed. What
are the similarities between Turkey and other cases of CA? What is sui generis in Turkey’s
authoritarian transformation? Since the concept of CA does not originate from detailed
analysis of the Turkish case, answers to these questions are needed to advance the theory.
Some scholars have recently gone so far as to suggest that Turkey has turned into a fully
authoritarian regime (eg Çalışkan 2018). A simple comparison with fully authoritarian
regimes, such as Egypt before the Arab Spring, undermines the credibility of such assertions:
Mubarak typically won with nearly 90% of the vote, and his National Democratic Party con-
sistently commanded a super-majority to change the constitution unilaterally (Koehler 2008;
Blaydes 2010). Equating Turkey with such authoritarian countries mainly results from mis-
understanding party-system dynamics. The next section focuses on the loose link between
the party system and the political regime established within the CA framework.

Link to the party system

The party system is commonly taken as the major indicator of a political regime (Diamond
et al. 1989; Diamond and Gunther 2001; Sartori [1976] 2005). What is noteworthy is that in
the Turkish case the CA turn did not lead to reduced party competition, despite the fact that
limited competition is defined as one of the main characteristics of CA regimes (Levitsky
and Way 2010). Moreover, the ‘(sub)competitive party system’ framework associated with
the CA argument is apparently inadequate to account for the party-system change in Turkey.
Therefore, the hegemonic party system framework, derived from the ‘electoral authoritarian
regime’ argument (Schedler 2002), should also be incorporated into the analysis.
To start with the latter, recent party-system change in Turkey fully fits neither the ‘hege-
monic’ nor the ‘competitive’ party-system framework. Rather, it stands in between, following
the failure of the AKP’s efforts to use the 2018 legislative and 2019 local elections to shift
towards a hegemonic party system. Two elements account for this. First, the AKP failed to
turn all opposition parties into satellite parties, although it had some success in attracting
the leaders of potential contenders (eg Süleyman Soylu of the Democrat Party and Numan
Kurtulmuş of the Has Party) by offering significant posts in its ranks or in the government.
Second, the AKP never captured a super-majority to change the constitution unilaterally (in
Turkey requiring at least two-thirds of the seats) (Arslantaş and Arslantaş 2020b).13
Furthermore, the fact that the AKP lost its legislative majority in the June 2015 elections
poses a serious challenge to linking the party system to regime type. When Turkey’s CA
regime was in its infancy (mid-2013–June 2015), there was a serious prospect that the oppo-
sition parties could end the authoritarian transformation following the snap elections of
November 2015. In particular, because the authoritarian regime was not fully institutionalised
and it was as yet uncertain whether the AKP could renew its electoral dominance, it was
much too early to label the regime CA. Overall, this indicates that the CA turn was not syn-
chronised with the format of the party system, as we will show in more detail below.
Before looking at the statistical data on election results, we must emphasise that the loose
link established between the party system and regime type within the framework of the CA
argument also results from the neglect of party system dynamics by the pioneers of the con-
cept. As Morse (2012) contends in his detailed investigation of the relevant literature, the CA
argument explicitly focuses on state capacity and resources and international leverage in defin-
ing a regime as CA. Therefore, not only are the properties of the party system not incorporated
502 D. ARSLANTAŞ AND A. KAISER

in the analysis, but nor are the internal dynamics of the ruling party, including its organisational
and decision-making structures. In practice, this is particularly troublesome for the case of
Turkey, since the AKP’s strong organisational structure is widely regarded as the major force
behind its unique electoral success (Arslantaş and Arslantaş 2021). Similarly, the lack of interest
in exploring party system dynamics has led to ignoring hostile partisanship, the major cause
of rising political polarisation in Turkey (Arslantaş 2019; Laebens and Öztürk 2021).
Statistical evidence demonstrates that competition has intensified in the CA period (see
Table 1). For instance, fragmentation (the number of effective parties) rose to its highest
level in the 2018 elections (3.7). The level of competition also sharply increased in the 2018
elections (80.1) in comparison to the 2015 November elections (75.8). Similarly, electoral
disproportionality decreased from 6.7 in November 2015 to 5.7 in the 2018 elections. Several
factors made the elections more competitive. First, polarisation led to an increased number
of voters voting strategically, which led to a concentration of votes among major parties
(Arslantaş, Arslantaş, and Kaiser 2020). Second, in the à la Turca presidential system, pre-elec-
toral party alliances are allowed. The Nation Alliance (CHP (Republican Peoples’ Party) + IYIP
(Good Party) + SP (Felicity Party) + DP (Democrat Party) gained an advantage by coordinating
more effectively than its rivals from the People’s Alliance (AKP + MHP (Nationalist Action
Party) + BBP (Great Unity Party)). However, so far this has achieved its intended results only
in local elections, and it remains to be seen whether this strategy will be effective in national
elections. Third, as KONDA research finds (Cumhuriyet 2021), splinter parties such as Gelecek
(Future) and Deva (Remedy) already appealed to some traditional segments of the AKP.
Fourth, the opposition pursued a more moderate electoral strategy, which made democratic
survival more likely (Cleary and Öztürk 2022).
As a result of the tightening competition, the AKP failed to secure a legislative majority
in both the June 2015 and the June 2018 elections. Similarly, the People’s Alliance lost some
of the key metropolitan municipalities (eg Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya, Adana, Mersin) to the
Nation Alliance. This substantially reduced the clientelist resources in the hands of the ruling
party.14 Finally, the decreasing popularity of the People’s Alliance and the growing number
of undecided voters negatively affect Erdoğan’s prospects of re-election in the next presi-
dential elections, due in June 2023.
What about the party-system dynamics of CA regimes in other settings? In this paper, we
restrict our analysis to Hungary, Malaysia and Botswana. The case of Hungary is widely dis-
cussed among experts on Turkish politics (see eg Lancaster 2016; Öniş and Kutlay 2019;
Arbatlı and Rosenberg 2021). First, the Fidesz–Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP)

Table 1. Changes in critical indicators of electoral competition.

Election Fragmentation Competition Disproportionality
2002 5.4 85.1 27.0
2007 3.4 74.3 11.9
2011 2.9 76.2 7.4
2015/1 3.6 84.1 4.9
2015/2 2.9 75.8 6.7
2018 3.7 80.1 5.7
Notes: Fragmentation is calculated based on the formula for Laakso and Taagepera’s effective number
of parties (based on vote shares). Competition refers to the difference between the vote shares of
the largest and the second-largest party subtracted from 100. As the value approaches 100, the
party system becomes more competitive. Disproportionality is calculated according to the Gallagher
index, which takes the square root of half the sum of the squared absolute differences between vote
shares and seat shares of parties. The smaller the value, the more proportional the party system is.
 Third World Quarterly 503

alliance, which capitalised on anti-corruption and anti-austerity discourses, in addition to

terror attacks and the refugee crisis (Enyedi 2018; Vachudova 2019), has commanded a
super-majority since 2010, allowing it to change the constitution unilaterally. Second, the
opposition is much weaker in Hungary than in Turkey. For instance, in the 2018 national
elections, the margin between the Fidesz (133 seats) and the second-largest party (Jobbik,
26 seats) was 107. Such a margin has been unknown in Turkey since the ‘block voting’ of the
1950s. While the recent local election victory of the opposition in Budapest, as well as in
another nine of the largest 23 cities, was interpreted as a major blow for Fidesz in consoli-
dating its power at the local level (O’Dwyer and Stenberg 2022; Kovarek and Littvay 2022),
the April 2022 parliamentary elections nevertheless indicated that Hungarian opposition
parties have a long way to go at the national level.
Unlike Hungary, Malaysia has long been ruled by the United Malays National Organisation
(UMNO), which took advantage of the country’s diverse ethnic and religious structures. Centring
its programme on Malay nationalism (Weiss 2013), the UMNO exhibited hegemonic party
characteristics until the 1990s. The party won the 1971–2008 elections with a supermajority,
which allowed it to change the constitution unilaterally.15 During its tenure in power, the party
has extensively relied on electoral malpractices including gerrymandering and malapportion-
ment (Ostwald 2013), and has heavily exploited the state resources to tilt the playing field
(Levitsky and Way 2010). In Turkey, as noted, neither gerrymandering nor malapportionment
have been commonly implemented during the AKP reign. The historical moment for Malaysia
came in 2018, when the opposition coalition, Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope), led by two
former leaders of the Barisan Nasional, won 113 seats in the 222-seat parliament.16 In Turkey
such a degree of opposition coordination has thus far been manifested only during the local
elections of 2019, but may well develop further in the presidential elections scheduled for 2023.
Finally, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has held a parliamentary majority since
1965 (Poteete 2012).17 Despite its massive organisational presence throughout the country,
the BDP demonstrates the typical characteristics of elite parties with little grassroots support
(Levitsky and Way 2010). But although the opposition has gained strength in recent years,
the BDP benefits from Botswana’s first-past-the-post electoral system.18 A comparison with
the AKP shows the BDP to be much stronger in terms of electoral performance and parlia-
mentary majority.

Transition to competitive authoritarianism

Levitsky and Way (2010) highlight three paths that prepare the ground for the rise of CA
regimes in the post-Cold War period. The first is the collapse of full-blown authoritarian
regimes. This frequently occurs in sub-Saharan Africa, where weak opposition actors and
political institutions persist. The second path points to continuity rather than rupture; it
includes the replacement of one authoritarian regime by another authoritarian regime. This
occurs because of a weak civil society and an anti-democratic tradition (eg Armenia and
Ukraine). The third path is the collapse of a democratic regime. In this scenario, an incumbent
party exploits the ongoing political and economic crisis and consolidates its rule through
either a presidential coup or gradual change.
Whether Turkey’s transition to CA fits any of these paths is doubtful, mainly because
Turkey is not an example of the ‘third wave of democracy’, which informed the CA argument
504 D. ARSLANTAŞ AND A. KAISER

at the outset.19 That is to say, given that Turkey has a long tradition of democratic elections,
it would be problematic to put it in the same basket as regimes that transformed from military
dictatorships or single-party regimes into CA. In particular, Turkey’s regime has long been
described as ‘hybrid’ under military tutelage, which differs from the regimes mentioned
above (see eg Polity IV Turkey Report 2010; Cook 2007; Bayulgen, Arbatlı, and Canbolat 2018;
Yıldırım 2018). Nevertheless, we acknowledge that Turkey’s trajectory to the CA may well be
taken as a fourth path. If this line of argument is pursued, then the CA theory would need
to be revised accordingly.
In addition, given the alternation rule (Przeworski et al. 2000), the incumbent party losing
elections should have some (important) consequences for the nature of the political regime
in question. This closely relates to the ‘(sub)competitive’ dimension of authoritarian rule
which is central to the CA argument. The fact that the AKP lost its legislative majority for the
second time in June 2018 further adds to the analytical problem: the exception – losing the
legislative majority – seems to become the rule.
Another aspect that needs attention is the level of institutionalisation of the new regime.
As Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) and Snyder et al. (1999) stress, to speak of a full-scale regime
change, either new institutions must be created or existing ones must be reconfigured.
Turkey’s recent transition reveals instances of both, which became even clearer after the
transition to the à la Turca presidential system in June 2017. In the new system, the office of
the prime minister, as well as those of the undersecretary, deputy undersecretary and central
governor, was abolished. Instead, the newly founded government offices, councils and min-
istries share the tasks of decision-making and implementation, leading to questions as to
the efficiency of inter-ministerial coordination, consistency and adaptability (European
Commission 2020; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2021).
The AKP government also opted to reconfigure well-established institutions to reduce
checks and balances, and to subordinate the bureaucracy to allow an unmediated link
between the ruler (president) and the ruled. Parliament and the judiciary have been most
adversely affected by the new configuration. While deputies from the opposition parties
have been largely criminalised by revoking their immunity, mandatory rotation within the
country functions as a sword of Damocles hanging over judges and prosecutors whose
loyalty is not yet bought. Moreover, some respected institutions have been put under the
direct control of President Erdoğan by eliminating their autonomy (eg the Central Bank,
Turkish Statistical Institute). The remaining institutions were either redesigned to weaken
the old guard and established hierarchies (eg the Ministry of Finance) or abolished (eg the
State Planning Organization).20
These characteristics indicate that the new authoritarian regime is still in flux. In other
words, although the authoritarian regime has taken some important steps in institutional-
ising itself, it is far from being stable. It is not surprising, therefore, that scholars tend to adopt
new concepts, most of which are under-theorised, to explain the emerging regime after
every significant political development that does not affect the format of the party system.
In this context, we believe that using broader concepts would better account for the unstable
authoritarian regime in Turkey.21
What concept, then, may better account for ongoing regime transformation in Turkey?
The answer does not lie within the ‘democracy with adjectives’ (Collier and Levitsky 1997)
debate; the elimination of separation of powers has disqualified Turkey from the accolade
 Third World Quarterly 505

of democracy. On the other hand, Turkey cannot be categorised as one of the extreme ver-
sions of non-democratic regimes, such as ‘sultanism’ (Cagaptay 2020) or ‘totalitarianism’
(Tuğal 2016; Candaş 2021). The absence of consistent ideology, the selective use of repres-
sion, and the lack of political mobilisation – except during election periods – underpin this
judgement. Taking all these factors into account, we posit that ‘electoral authoritarianism’
seems to work better than its alternatives in capturing the dynamics of the unstable
Turkish regime.
In addition to being a more abstract construct that captures the transitory nature of the
new regime, electoral authoritarianism has at least three further analytical values. First, as
in other electoral authoritarian settings (Schedler 2002), elections still serve as the major
battlefield that ensures the legitimacy of the regime. This is best expressed in the long-es-
tablished discourse of the ‘national will’ (milli irade) (Bilgiç 2018; Gümrükçü 2022). The fact
that the opposition parties have not so far boycotted the elections shows that they are still
seen as the most legitimate way to challenge the regime.22 This further shows that the inter-
party and the presidential races are still regarded as to some extent ‘competitive’, from the
perspective of most of the opposition actors. Second, under the pressure of tightening
electoral competition, the government increasingly relies on institutional measures to pre-
vent the transfer of power. In particular, the 2019 repeat elections in Istanbul indicate the
potential of the ruling party to use its authority to not recognise victories by opposition
parties. Third, shutting down the opposition HDP and deficiencies in electoral integrity
(Schedler 2002) further demonstrate that Turkey is moving increasingly closer to an electoral
authoritarian regime.

Conclusion
A long time ago, Sartori (1991) warned us about four types of miscomparison in the field
of comparative politics: parochialism, misclassification, degreeism and concept stretching.
In the context of Turkey, parochialism and misclassification are the results of adopting
the concept of CA without sufficient theoretical and comparative sophistication. It is
unsurprising, therefore, that bandwagoning among scholars in thus designating Turkey’s
regime does not lead to a better understanding of the major underpinnings of the cur-
rent regime.
This article set out to show three major shortcomings of the CA argument in the case of
Turkey that weaken its theory-confirming potential. First, CA proponents have not invested
enough in scholarly discussion to justify why the concept works better than its alternatives.
Their studies misleadingly treat unfair elections, repression and polarisation as unique fea-
tures of CA regimes. Furthermore, the cases with which Turkey is equated within the CA
framework do not allow meaningful insights into the functioning of the current regime and
its changing character over time.
Second, we show that the link between the party system and the new regime is not well
established within the CA framework. Normally, such a shift from democracy to autocracy
should lead to reduced political competition and tighter authoritarian rule. What is para-
doxical in the Turkish case is that interparty competition has intensified. This stems from a
better coordination strategy among ideologically distant oppositional parties, as well as the
switching of some of the AKP’s loyal base to splinter parties. Accordingly, the AKP has not
managed to change the party system into a hegemonic one where the incumbent party
506 D. ARSLANTAŞ AND A. KAISER

typically secures a majority large enough to change the constitution unilaterally. Growing
interparty competition led to the loss of some AKP strongholds in the 2019 local elections
and recent surveys suggest it has even put the re-election of President Erdoğan into jeopardy
(see eg Euronews 2021).
Finally, we argue that the mechanism that led to Turkey’s transition to authoritarianism
has not been clearly identified. Turkey’s recent authoritarian drift sprang from its well-insti-
tutionalised hybrid regime under military tutelage. The proponents of the CA framework
also overlook the constantly changing character of the regime, a failing that derives from
using narrow categories, such as CA, in defining the authoritarian regime. Given that the
new regime is neither fully institutionalised nor stabilised, broader terms such as electoral
authoritarianism would offer a more consistent and comprehensive framework to under-
stand the dynamics and the functioning of the emerging regime.
This study opens up several avenues of research for further investigation. First, the robust-
ness of the new regime must be questioned, along with its level of institutionalisation.
Second, the blueprint of authoritarianism within the AKP organisation deserves a more
detailed investigation. Finally, more work is needed to understand whether it is possible to
stabilise such a hybrid structure.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors
Düzgün Arslantaş is Lecturer and Post-doctoral Researcher at the Cologne Center for Comparative
Politics, University of Cologne. He was Doctoral and Post-doctoral Researcher at the Max Planck
Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, and the University of Cologne, Cologne Center for
Comparative Politics. He was Visiting Scholar at Columbia University in 2018. His research focuses on
parties and party systems, clientelism, and authoritarianism. His publications have appeared in the
Swiss Political Science Review, the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies and New Perspectives
on Turkey.
André Kaiser is Professor of Comparative Politics at the Cologne Center for Comparative Politics,
University of Cologne. His research focuses on the relevance of institutions for political action. His
publications have appeared in, among other venues, the American Journal of Political Science,
Comparative Political Studies and the European Journal of Political Research.

Notes
1. Other monitoring institutions highlight the same tendency. For instance, the Economist ranks
Turkey 88th out of 167 countries in its 2020 Democracy Index, while Bertelsmann’s 2020
Transformation Index ranks Turkey 77th out of 157 countries.
2. Weak authoritarian regimes refer to ‘regimes that are unconsolidated as democratic or author-
itarian, and whose fundamental characteristics are being intensely, sometimes violently, con-
tested through hegemonic struggles to wrest control of institutions and reshape them’
(Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016, 506). In delegative democracies, despite holding free and fair
elections, the balance of power between the legislature, judiciary and executive is highly
skewed in favour of the executive: ie the president (O’Donnell 1994). Illiberal democracies, on
the other hand, fulfil the criterion of procedural democracy only.
 Third World Quarterly 507

3. Carothers (2002) lists five main features of the transition paradigm. First, all dictatorial regimes
are on the path to democratisation once authoritarianism breaks down. Second, democratisa-
tion does not occur swiftly but consists of interlinked sequences. Third, elections build closer
links between voters and politicians and provide legitimacy to the regime. Fourth, the desire
of elites outweighs structural factors in pushing the regime into a democratic direction. Fifth,
institutions need to be rebuilt in order to accelerate democratisation.
4. Changing regime dynamics rendered once-dominant typologies obsolete, especially those of
Linz (2000 [1975]) and Geddes (1999).
5. In Diamond’s (2002) classification, CA is one of the hybrid regime types, along with ‘hegemon-
ic authoritarian’ and ‘ambiguous’ regimes. In hegemonic authoritarian regimes, elections are
no more than a show to affirm the ruling party’s power, as only satellite parties are allowed to
run. Ambiguous regimes lie between electoral democracy and CA.
6. Exceptions include Muslim countries such as Bangladesh (Mostofa and Subedi 2021) and
Malaysia (Giersdorf and Croissant 2011).
7. The most notable exception was the 1946 election. It is known as ‘elections with stick’ (sopalı
seçimler) because of open voting and secret counting, and is notorious for widespread elector-
al malpractice and fraud on the part of the CHP. The illegal counting of unsealed ballot boxes
in the 2017 constitutional referendum is another instance of serious violation of electoral in-
tegrity in Turkey.
8. Gerrymandering practices in Istanbul’s Şişli district include the 2012 transfer of three of its
neighbourhoods (Maslak, Ayazağa and Huzur) to the Sarıyer district, where the competition
between the AKP and the CHP is tighter. In fact, though, this gerrymandering did not work well
for the government until more recently (Arslantaş 2019).
9. For an excellent account of militarism in Turkey, see Öztan (2014).
10. The others were the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, 1950s), the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi,
1960s) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, 1980s).
11. The trajectory of the Public Procurement Law (PPL) best illustrates this tendency. To date, the
PPL has been changed more than 190 times (Birgün 2021).
12. The liberal democracy index of the V-Dem dataset measures the rule of law, civil liberties,
checks and balances, and limitations on executive power. The egalitarian democracy index
refers to the level of material and immaterial inequalities, along with electoral democracy. The
electoral democracy index looks at the institutions of representative democracy, such as free
and fair elections, as well as the independence of civil society and media.
13. Nonetheless, the AKP government succeeded in changing the constitution several times, most
notably with the 2010 and 2017 referendums.
14. Currently, CHP-controlled municipalities host half of Turkey’s population and produce 60% of
the total gross domestic product (Sözcü 2019).
15. From 1957 to 1971, the UMNO had extraordinary powers in the process of becoming indepen-
dent from Britain. Greene (2007) therefore rightly calls it a ‘fully-closed authoritarian regime’ in
this period.
16. For a detailed account of developments during the 2000s up until 2018, see Wong and Ooi (2018).
17. Exceptions include the 1994, 2014 and 2019 elections, which indicate growing discontent with
one-party rule in the country.
18. For instance, in the 2019 elections, the BDP won 38 seats in the 65-seat parliament with 52.6%
of the vote, while the UDC won only 15 seats with 35.8% of the vote.
19. The third wave of democracy started with the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal and
­involved the transition of more than 30 countries to democracy by 1990 (Huntington 1991).
20. On the scope of these changes, see eg Cumhuriyet (2011), Deutsche Welle (2021) and
Gazeteduvar (2018).
21. As Sözen (2020) argues in his excellent review article, the most important contribution of the
CA framework (along with ‘electoral authoritarianism’), however, was in triggering a shift to
categorising Turkey as a diminished subtype of authoritarianism rather than as a democracy.
22. Using an original data set for the years 1981–2006, Smith (2014) shows that boycotts can be an
effective strategy to weaken authoritarian rule without destabilising it much.
508 D. ARSLANTAŞ AND A. KAISER

ORCID
Düzgün Arslantaş http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8133-6280
André Kaiser http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6633-2452

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