ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.

, HOTEL DEL
MAR, INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant, VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee
G.R. No. L-24693, 31 July 1967, FERNANDO

LEGAL KEYWORDS/DOCTRINE:
The exercise of police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people, is subject to judicial inquiry to ensure it is
not capricious, whimsical, unjust, or unreasonable and does not violate any constitutional guarantees.
Municipal ordinances are presumed to be valid unless there is a clear invasion of personal property
rights under the guise of police regulation.

FACTS:
A challenge to the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, which regulates hotels
and motels. The petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Hotel del Mar, Inc.,
and Go Chiu, filed a petition for prohibition against the City Mayor of Manila, arguing that the ordinance
violates the due process clause. The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring the ordinance
unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the ordinance is violative of the due process clause, and

Whether the City of Manila has the authority to regulate motels.

MTC/RTC/CA:
Municipal Trial Court. The basis of the lower court's decision is that Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
Manila is violative of the due process clause and is therefore unconstitutional and null and void.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the City of Manila and upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance.

RATIO:
The Court held that an ordinance enacted by councilors who are familiar with the necessities of their
municipality should be presumed valid, unless there is a clear invasion of personal property rights. The
Court also recognized that the ordinance is a manifestation of police power aimed at safeguarding public
morals, and that it is immune from nullity unless there is substantial evidence to support the claim of
unconstitutionality. The Court further explained that the exercise of police power is subject to judicial
inquiry if it is considered capricious, whimsical, unjust, or unreasonable.

The Court also discussed the nature of municipal license fees and the wide discretion given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount of such fees. The Court emphasized that the exercise of police
power may result in the curtailment of liberty, but as long as it affects only property rights, the scope of
regulatory measures is wider.

DECISION:
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With
costs.

RUBI, ET. AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,vs.THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO,

defendant
G.R. No. 14078, 7 March 1919, MALCOLM

LEGAL KEYWORDS/DOCTRINE:
The government has the authority to regulate individual liberties in the interest of the public good, as
long as it is done through due process of law and does not result in arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty,
or property.
FACTS:
An application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes (indigenous people) in the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of Mindoro. The Manguianes are being held on a reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not the provision in Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, which authorizes
provincial governors to direct non-Christian inhabitants to live on designated public lands, is
constitutional.

MTC/RTC/CA:
Court of First Instance. The decision of the lower court is based on the exercise of the police power and
the necessity to promote the general welfare and public interest.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

RATIO:
The court explained that the different laws enacted for the welfare of non-Christian inhabitants in the
Philippines demonstrate a consistent practice and concern for their advancement. The court also
emphasized that the term "non-Christian" does not refer to religious belief, but rather to a geographical
area and natives of the Philippines with a low level of civilization.

The court further discussed the history of the treatment of indigenous people in the Philippines, noting
that the United States has treated the indigenous people as being in a state of pupilage, with the
government acting as their guardian. The court also recognized that it is not within the power of the courts
to overrule the judgment of Congress regarding laws affecting indigenous people.

The court held that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 does not violate the principles of
due process of law, equal protection of the laws, or religious discrimination. The court reasoned that the
authority conferred upon executive officials by the provision does not unduly interfere with the liberty of
the citizens, considering the low level of civilization of the Manguianes.

The court also discussed the police power of the state and the government's right to exercise sovereign
police power in promoting the general welfare and public interest. The court emphasized that the modern
period has shown a belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity.

DECISION:
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not
issue. This is the ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxed against petitioners.
 LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ,
Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasuer of Manila, respondent
G.R. No. L-7995, 31 May 1957, LABRADOR

LEGAL KEYWORDS/DOCTRINE:
The nationalization of the retail trade business in the Philippines, as upheld by Republic Act No. 1180, is
a valid exercise of the state's police power and does not violate international obligations or the equal
protection of the laws.

FACTS:
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1180, which nationalizes the retail trade business in the
Philippines. The petitioner, Lao H. Ichong, filed a petition on behalf of himself and other alien residents,
corporations, and partnerships adversely affected by the law. The respondents in the case are Jaime
Hernandez, the Secretary of Finance, and Marcelino Sarmiento, the City Treasurer of Manila. The
petitioner argues that the law violates the equal protection of the laws and deprives alien residents of their
liberty and property without due process. They also claim that the law violates international and treaty
obligations and certain provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not Republic Act No. 1180 is constitutional, particularly with regards to the equal protection
of the laws, due process, and international obligations.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 1180 is constitutional. The Court held that the law was
passed in the valid exercise of the state's police power, which is authorized by the Constitution in the
interest of national economic survival. The Court also found that the law does not violate international
and treaty obligations. Furthermore, the Court held that the law does not infringe upon the equal
protection of the laws, as it treats all persons within a specified class (alien retailers) alike. The Court also
found that the law's provisions on hereditary succession and capitalization requirements for corporations
do not violate the relevant provisions of the Constitution.

RATIO:
The Court explained that police power is far-reaching in scope and is co-extensive with self-protection
and survival. The power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws are supposed
to coexist, with the balancing of these interests being the essence of a democratic society. The Court also
emphasized that the equal protection of the law clause does not prohibit legislation that applies only to a
specified class, as long as it applies alike to all persons within that class and there is a reasonable basis for
the distinction. The Court found that the classification in the law of retail traders into nationals and aliens
is actual, real, and reasonable, and that the law is necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective
of nationalizing the retail trade business.

DECISION:
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels associations and
partnerships referred to therein to wind up their retail business within ten years from the date of the
approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates
and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it compels the alien heirs of a deceased alien engaged in
the retail business in his lifetime, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, are invalid, for
they violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution.
 SILVESTRE M. PUNSALAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
THE CITY OF MANILA, ET AL., defendants-appellants
G.R. No. L-4817, 26 May 1954, REYES

LEGAL KEYWORDS/DOCTRINE:
It is not for the courts to determine which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose
occupation taxes, as that is within the domain of the political departments. Double taxation is not
inherently obnoxious and license fees or taxes can be imposed by both the state and political
subdivisions.

FACTS:
A group of professionals, consisting of two lawyers, a medical practitioner, a public accountant, a dental
surgeon, and a pharmacist, who filed a suit against the Municipal Board of the City of Manila. The
plaintiffs sought the annulment of Ordinance No. 3398, which imposed a municipal occupation tax on
individuals practicing various professions in the city. The plaintiffs argued that the ordinance, as well as
the provision of the Manila charter authorizing it, were illegal and void. The plaintiffs had already paid
their occupation tax under the National Internal Revenue Code but were required to pay the additional tax
prescribed in the ordinance, which they paid under protest.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the ordinance and the law authorizing it constitute class legislation, are unjust and oppressive,
and authorize double taxation.

MTC/RTC/CA:
Court of First Instance of Manila. The basis of the lower court's decision is that the penalty provision in
the ordinance was not legally authorized.
RULING:
The court ruled in favor of the defendants and reversed the decision of the lower court. The court held
that the imposition of the penalty provided for in the ordinance was authorized by law. The court also
held that it is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose
occupation taxes in addition to those imposed by the national government. The court further held that
there is no inherent obnoxiousness in requiring license fees or taxes to be enacted with respect to the same
occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.

RATIO:
The court reasoned that the imposition of the penalty in the ordinance was authorized by law, as the
provision of the Manila charter explicitly empowered the Municipal Board to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances. The court also emphasized that the determination of which cities or
municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes is within the domain of the political
departments and should not be encroached upon by the courts. Additionally, the court explained that
double taxation is not applicable in this case since one tax is imposed by the state and the other is
imposed by the city, and it is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in requiring
license fees or taxes for the same occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions.

DECISION:
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is reversed in so far as it declares Ordinance No.
3398 of the City of Manila illegal and void and affirmed in so far as it holds the validity of the provision
of the Manila charter authorizing it. With costs against plaintiffs-appellants.
 NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE PASTOR P. REYES, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge (on detail), Court of Agrarian Relations, Seventh Regional District,
Branch II, Cavite City, QUIRINO AUSTRIA and LUCIANO AUSTRIA, respondents
G.R. No. L-49439, 29 June 1983, FERNANDO

LEGAL KEYWORDS/DOCTRINE:
Legislative enactments are presumed to be valid and constitutional, and the judiciary must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative branches of government.

FACTS:
A petition filed by the National Housing Authority (NHA) against Honorable Pastor P. Reyes, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II,
Cavite City, and Quirino Austria and Luciano Austria as respondents. The NHA filed a complaint for the
expropriation of a 25,000 square meter parcel of land owned by Quirino Austria, which was needed for
the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project. The NHA later filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession, which was granted by the court. Quirino Austria then filed a motion to withdraw the
deposit made by the NHA, citing the assessed value of the property for taxation purposes. The NHA
opposed the motion, arguing that the owner's declaration of the market value, which was lower than the
assessed value, should be the basis for just compensation.

ISSUE/S:
The main issue raised in the case is the determination of the basis for the payment of just compensation in
expropriation proceedings.

MTC/RTC/CA:
Court of Agrarian Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II, Cavite City. The decision of the lower
court was to issue an order contrary to the provisions of the Presidential Decrees regarding the amount of
just compensation to be paid by the petitioner.

RULING:
the assessed value, should be the basis for just compensation.

RATIO:
The court based its ruling on Presidential Decree No. 464, which states that the compensation should not
exceed the market value declared by the owner or the assessed value, whichever is lower. The court
emphasized that the rule introduced by Presidential Decree No. 76 and subsequent decrees promotes
social justice and ends the practice of under declaring properties for taxation purposes.

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of respondent Judge of July 13, 1978 is
hereby nullified and set aside. The restraining order issued by this Court on January 4, 1979 is hereby
made permanent. The case is remanded to the lower court for further action conformably to law and to
the above opinion. No costs.
 REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. L-19201, 16 June 1965, PAREDES

LEGAL KEYWORDS/DOCTRINE:
A gift tax imposed on property used exclusively for religious purposes does not violate the constitutional
exemption for religious purposes. The head of the diocese, not the parish priest, is the real party in
interest and should be responsible for payment of the gift tax.

FACTS:
In 1957, M.B. Estate, Inc. donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental, for the construction of a new Catholic Church. The donation was used for
its intended purpose. In 1958, the donor filed a gift tax return, and in 1960, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue assessed a donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, with Rev. Fr. Casimiro
Lladoc as the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00, including surcharges and interest. Petitioner
protested the assessment, but it was denied. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals,
claiming that he should not be liable for the gift tax as he was not the parish priest at the time of the
donation and that the assessment would violate the Constitution.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the gift tax on property used for religious purposes violates the Constitution.

Who should be liable for the assessed gift tax.

RULING:
The gift tax on property used for religious purposes does not violate the Constitution. The exemption for
religious purposes in the Constitution only applies to property taxes, not excise taxes. A gift tax is an
excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, and it does not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution.

The head of the diocese, not the parish priest, is the real party in interest in the imposition of a donee's gift
tax on property donated to the church for religious purposes.

RATIO:
The exemption for religious purposes in the Constitution only applies to property taxes, not excise taxes.
A gift tax is an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, and it does not
constitute an impairment of the Constitution. The court reasoned that the gift tax is not a burden on the
exercise of religion, but rather a tax on the privilege of receiving a gift. Therefore, the imposition of a gift
tax on property used for religious purposes does not violate the Constitution.
The head of the diocese, as the guardian, superintendent, or administrator of the properties of the church
within the parish, is the real party in interest in the imposition of a donee's gift tax on property donated to
the church for religious purposes. The court held that the parish priest is not personally liable for the gift
tax. The court emphasized that the parish priest is merely a trustee or administrator of the church's
properties, and it is the head of the diocese who has the authority and responsibility to manage and
administer the properties of the church within the parish. Therefore, the head of the diocese should be the
one held liable for the assessed gift tax.

DECISION:
In view hereof and considering that, as heretofore stated, the assessment at bar had been properly made
and the imposition of the tax is not a violation of the constitutional provision exempting churches,
personages or convents, etc. (Art. VI, sec. 22[3], Constitution), the Head of the Diocese, to which the
parish of Victorias pertains is liable for the payment thereof.

The decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, insofar as tax liability is concerned; it is
modified, in the sense that petitioner herein is not personally liable for the said gift tax, and that the Head
of the Diocese, herein substitute petitioner, should pay, as he is presently ordered to pay, the said gift tax,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA ET AL.,

defendants-appellees
G.R. No. 14355, 31 October 1919, JOHNSON

LEGAL KEYWORDS/DOCTRINE:
The legislature has the authority to determine the necessity for the exercise of eminent domain and the
courts cannot interfere or substitute their own views for those of the legislature. However, when the
statute does not designate the property to be taken, the necessity of taking particular property becomes a
question for the courts to decide.

FACTS:
The expropriation of private property by the City of Manila for the purpose of constructing a public
improvement, specifically the extension of Rizal Avenue. The Chinese Community of Manila and other
defendants, who are the owners of the land to be expropriated, objected to the expropriation, arguing that
it was not necessary or expedient and that alternative routes were available. They also claimed that the
land in question was a cemetery and that the expropriation would disturb the resting places of the dead
and cause irreparable loss and injury.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the courts have the authority to inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation.

MTC/RTC/CA:
Court of First Instance of Manila. The basis of the lower court's decision is that the expropriation of the
private property through the cemetery was unnecessary and alternative routes were available.

RULING:
The court ruled in favor of the defendants, stating that the courts do have the authority to inquire into the
necessity of the expropriation.

RATIO:
The court explained that the right of expropriation is not inherent in a municipal corporation and must be
conferred by law. The purpose of the expropriation must be for a public use, and if the court finds that
neither of these conditions exists, the right to expropriate does not exist. The court also emphasized that
the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are political questions, but when
the right is exercised to deprive citizens of their property, the courts have the authority to inquire into the
necessity in a particular case.

The court further argued that if the legislature grants general authority to a municipal corporation to
expropriate private land for public purposes, the courts have the authority to make inquiries and hear
proof regarding whether the land is private and whether the purpose is truly public. The court concluded
that the power of the court is not limited to simply determining whether a law exists authorizing the
expropriation, but also extends to determining whether the expropriation is being done in accordance with
the law.

DECISION:
For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D.
GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIFE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE,
CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J.
SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO
B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. APRESTO,
CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON
S. FERRER, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent
G.R. No. 78742, 14 July 1989, CRUZ

LEGAL KEYWORDS/DOCTRINE:
Emancipation Patent (EP). The doctrine of judicial supremacy, which grants the judiciary the power to
annul acts of the legislative or executive branches that are not conformable to the fundamental law.
FACTS:
Several petitions challenging the constitutionality of various agrarian reform measures implemented in
the Philippines. The petitioners, who are small landowners and farmers, argue that these measures violate
their rights to due process, equal protection, and just compensation.

In the first case, the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. and other individuals filed a
petition against the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. They argue that the agrarian reform measures,
particularly Presidential Decree No. 27, which provides for the compulsory acquisition of private
agricultural lands, are unconstitutional. They claim that the measures violate their right to just
compensation and due process.

In the second case, Arsenio Al. Acuña and other landowners filed a petition against Joker Arroyo, Philip
E. Juico, and the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. They argue that the agrarian reform measures,
particularly Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Orders Nos. 228 and 229, which provide for the
redistribution of agricultural lands, are unconstitutional. They claim that the measures violate their right
to just compensation and due process.

In the third case, Inocentes Pabico filed a petition against Philip E. Juico, Joker Arroyo, and other
government officials. He argues that the agrarian reform measures, particularly Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Orders Nos. 228 and 229, are unconstitutional. He claims that the measures violate his right to
just compensation and due process.

In the fourth case, Nicolas S. Manaay and Agustin Hermano, Jr. filed a petition against Philip Ella Juico,
as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and the Land Bank of the Philippines. They argue that the agrarian
reform measures, particularly Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Orders Nos. 228 and 229, are
unconstitutional. They claim that the measures violate their right to just compensation and due process.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not the agrarian reform measures are constitutional, particularly with regard to the right to
just compensation and due process.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the agrarian reform measures are constitutional. The Court held that the
measures were enacted in accordance with the powers granted to the President under martial law and the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court also held that the measures did not violate the
right to just compensation and due process, as they provided for the payment of just compensation and the
opportunity for landowners to be heard.

RATIO:
The Court based its ruling on the powers granted to the President under martial law and the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court held that the agrarian reform measures were enacted
within the President's authority and were necessary to address the social and economic problems in the
country.
With regard to the right to just compensation, the Court held that the measures provided for the payment
of just compensation to landowners. The Court explained that just compensation does not necessarily
mean the full market value of the property, but rather the value determined by the government based on
certain factors such as the tax declarations and the current use of the property.

The Court also held that the measures did not violate the right to due process. The Court explained that
the measures provided for the opportunity for landowners to be heard and to present evidence to support
their claim for just compensation. The Court further explained that the determination of just compensation
by the government was only preliminary and did not foreclose judicial intervention.

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the
constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of
compensation to their respective owners.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the
retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
costs
 United States v. Causby
328 U.S. 256, No. 630, 27 May 1946

FACTS:
Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. The farm was located
near an airport used regularly by the United States military. According to Causby, noise from the airport
regularly frightened the animals on his farm, resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The problem
became so severe that Causby was forced to abandon his business. Under an ancient doctrine of the
common law, land ownership extended to the space above and below the earth. Using this doctrine as a
basis, Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the airspace above his farm. By flying planes
in this airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated his property without compensation, thus
violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of Claims accepted
Causby's argument, and ordered the government to pay compensation.

ISSUE/S:
Did the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm constitute a violation of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

RULING:
Yes, to an extent. In a 5-2 opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court concluded that the
ancient common law doctrine "has no place in the modern world." Justice Douglas noted that, were the
Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea." However, while the Court rejected the unlimited reach
above and below the earth described in the common law doctrine, it also ruled that, "if the landowner is to
have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the
enveloping atmosphere." Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the land
could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate interference
with the enjoyment and use of the land." Given the damage caused by the particularly low, frequent
flights over his farm, the Court determined that the government had violated Causby's rights, and he was
entitled to compensation. (Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died on April 22; Justice Robert H. Jackson
took no part in the consideration or decision in the case, leaving the court with 7 members.)