G.R. No.

L-24693
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL
MAR, INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant, VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee
Facts:
The petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, along with Hotel del Mar
Inc. and Go Chiu, filed a petition against Ordinance No. 4760 and the Mayor of the City of
Manila, who was responsible for enforcing city ordinances. The petitioners argued that the
ordinance, enacted in 1963, was inappropriately regulating motels, as there was no legal basis for
such regulation in the City of Manila's charter or other laws. The ordinance also allowed
authorities to inspect the premises of hotels, motels, and lodging houses. The lower court issued
a preliminary injunction on July 6, 1963, preventing the Mayor from enforcing Ordinance No.
4760 starting from July 8, 1963.
Issues:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional
Ruling:
No. The lower court's sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance was inconsistent with
constitutional principles. Decisions should align with established standards of constitutional
adjudication, both in procedure and substance. There is a presumption of the validity of a law,
and the judiciary should not readily overturn legislative action unless it clearly infringes on
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. The challenged ordinance aimed
to reduce practices harmful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution, and also
increased licensing fees to discourage illegal operations while boosting the city's revenue.
Legal concept:
The exercise of police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people, is subject to judicial inquiry
to ensure it is not capricious, whimsical, unjust, or unreasonable and does not violate any
constitutional guarantees. Municipal ordinances are presumed to be valid unless there is a clear
invasion of personal property rights under the guise of police regulation.
G.R. No. 14078
RUBI, ET. AL. (Manguianes), plaintiffs,vs.THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant
Facts:

On February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro passed Resolution No. 25, which was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior on February 21, 1917. Subsequently, on December 4,
1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order No. 2, stating that Rubi and
those in his rancheria hadn't relocated to the Tigbao reservation, making them subject to
punishment under Section 2759 of Act No. 2711. The provincial governor directed the
Manguianes to settle in Tigbao, a location approved by the provincial board and chosen by the
governor, in accordance with Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917. This action's
validity, particularly the challenge to Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, is the central
issue before the court.
Issues:
Whether or Not the provision in Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, which authorizes
provincial governors to direct non-Christian inhabitants to live on designated public lands, is
constitutional.
Ruling:

In a Supreme Court decision with a five to four vote, the constitutionality of a section of the
Administrative Code was upheld. It was clarified that the term "non-Christian" should not be
interpreted in a literal or religious sense, but rather in terms of the level of civilization. "Non-
Christian" was understood to refer to geographical location and, more specifically, to natives of
the Philippines with a lower level of civilization, not their religious beliefs. The Court
emphasized that the Philippine Organic Law did not impede the government of the Philippine
Islands from exercising its sovereign police power through legislation to promote the general
welfare and public interest. The law in question was found to be a legitimate exercise of police
power, particularly in relation to the prompt registration of land titles, which served the public
interest by promoting peace, order among landowners, economic development, and overall
prosperity. The Court also determined that the provincial board of Mindoro's resolution was not
discriminatory or class legislation, as it aimed to benefit both the Manguianes and the Philippines
as a whole. Due process of law and equal protection of the laws were deemed to be observed in
the enforcement of this law, as it applied uniformly to all within a specific class.
Legal concept:
Police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest, when to advance
the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power. The court
held that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 does not violate the principles of due process
of law, equal protection of the laws, or religious discrimination. The court reasoned that the authority
conferred upon executive officials by the provision does not unduly interfere with the liberty of the
citizens, considering the low level of civilization of the Manguianes.
G.R. No. L-7995
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance,
and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasuer of Manila, respondent
Facts:
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1180, which nationalizes the retail trade business in the
Philippines. The petitioner, Lao H. Ichong, filed a petition on behalf of himself and other alien residents,
corporations, and partnerships adversely affected by the law. The respondents in the case are Jaime
Hernandez, the Secretary of Finance, and Marcelino Sarmiento, the City Treasurer of Manila. The
petitioner argues that the law violates the equal protection of the laws and deprives alien residents of their
liberty and property without due process. They also claim that the law violates international and treaty
obligations and certain provisions of the Constitution
Issues:
Whether or Not Republic Act No. 1180 is constitutional, particularly with regards to the equal protection
of the laws, due process, and international obligations
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1180. The Court determined that the
law was enacted in a legitimate exercise of the government's police power, as permitted by the
Constitution for the purpose of safeguarding national economic survival. Additionally, the Court
concluded that the law didn't contravene international agreements or treaty obligations. Moreover, it was
held that the law didn't discriminate among individuals within a specific category (alien retailers), thereby
not violating equal protection under the law. The Court also found that the law's stipulations regarding
hereditary succession and capitalization requirements for corporations were in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Constitution.
Legal concept:
The Court explained that police power is far-reaching in scope and is co-extensive with self-protection
and survival. The power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws are supposed
to coexist, with the balancing of these interests being the essence of a democratic society. The Court also
emphasized that the equal protection of the law clause does not prohibit legislation that applies only to a
specified class, as long as it applies alike to all persons within that class and there is a reasonable basis for
the distinction. The Court found that the classification in the law of retail traders into nationals and aliens
is actual, real, and reasonable, and that the law is necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective
of nationalizing the retail trade business.

G.R. No. L-4817

SILVESTRE M. PUNSALAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE
CITY OF MANILA, ET AL., defendants-appellants
Facts:
A group of professionals, consisting of two lawyers, a medical practitioner, a public accountant, a dental
surgeon, and a pharmacist, who filed a suit against the Municipal Board of the City of Manila. The
plaintiffs sought the annulment of Ordinance No. 3398, which imposed a municipal occupation tax on
individuals practicing various professions in the city. The plaintiffs argued that the ordinance, as well as
the provision of the Manila charter authorizing it, were illegal and void. The plaintiffs had already paid
their occupation tax under the National Internal Revenue Code but were required to pay the additional tax
prescribed in the ordinance, which they paid under protest.
Issues:
Whether the ordinance and the law authorizing it constitute class legislation, are unjust and oppressive,
and authorize double taxation.
Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of the defendants and reversed the decision of the lower court. The court held that
the imposition of the penalty provided for in the ordinance was authorized by law. The court also held that
it is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation
taxes in addition to those imposed by the national government. The court further held that there is no
inherent obnoxiousness in requiring license fees or taxes to be enacted with respect to the same
occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.
Legal concept:
The court ruled that the ordinance's penalty was legally authorized, citing the Manila charter, which
granted the Municipal Board the authority to set penalties for ordinance violations. It stressed that the
decision of which cities or municipalities can impose occupation taxes is a matter for the political
branches and not the courts to decide. Moreover, the court clarified that double taxation doesn't apply in
this situation, as one tax is imposed by the state and the other by the city. It's widely accepted that it's not
inherently problematic to require license fees or taxes for the same occupation from both the state and
local governments.

G.R. No. L-49439

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE PASTOR P. REYES, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge (on detail), Court of Agrarian Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II,
Cavite City, QUIRINO AUSTRIA and LUCIANO AUSTRIA, respondents
Facts:
The National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a petition against Judge Pastor P. Reyes, the Presiding Judge
of the Court of Agrarian Relations, along with Quirino Austria and Luciano Austria as respondents. The
NHA sought to expropriate a 25,000 square meter piece of land owned by Quirino Austria for the
expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project. After the court granted the NHA's request for a writ of
possession, Quirino Austria filed a motion to withdraw the deposit made by the NHA, citing the
property's assessed value for tax purposes. The NHA contested this motion, contending that the owner's
declaration of the market value, which was lower than the assessed value, should be used as the basis for
determining fair compensation.
Issues:
The main issue raised in the case is the determination of the basis for the payment of just compensation in
expropriation proceedings.
Ruling:
The assessed value, should be the basis for just compensation.
Legal concept:
The court based its ruling on Presidential Decree No. 464, which states that the compensation should not
exceed the market value declared by the owner or the assessed value, whichever is lower. The court
emphasized that the rule introduced by Presidential Decree No. 76 and subsequent decrees promotes
social justice and ends the practice of under declaring properties for taxation purposes.

G.R. No. L-19201

REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents
Facts:
In 1957, M.B. Estate, Inc. donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental, for the construction of a new Catholic Church. The donation was used for
its intended purpose. In 1958, the donor filed a gift tax return, and in 1960, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue assessed a donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, with Rev. Fr. Casimiro
Lladoc as the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00, including surcharges and interest. Petitioner
protested the assessment, but it was denied. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals,
claiming that he should not be liable for the gift tax as he was not the parish priest at the time of the
donation and that the assessment would violate the Constitution.
Issues:
Whether the gift tax on property used for religious purposes violates the Constitution.
Ruling:
The gift tax on property used for religious purposes does not violate the Constitution. The exemption for
religious purposes in the Constitution only applies to property taxes, not excise taxes. A gift tax is an
excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, and it does not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution. The head of the diocese, not the parish priest, is the real party in interest
in the imposition of a donee's gift tax on property donated to the church for religious purposes.
Legal concept:
A gift tax imposed on property used exclusively for religious purposes does not violate the constitutional
exemption for religious purposes. The head of the diocese, not the parish priest, is the real party in interest
and should be responsible for payment of the gift tax.

G.R. No. 14355

THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA ET AL.,
defendants-appellees
Facts:
The City of Manila initiated the expropriation of private property to extend Rizal Avenue for a public
improvement project. The owners of the land, including the Chinese Community of Manila, opposed the
expropriation, contending that it was unnecessary and that alternative routes were viable. They also
asserted that the land in question served as a cemetery and that the expropriation would disturb the burial
sites, resulting in irreparable harm and loss.
Issues:
Whether the courts have the authority to inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation.
Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of the defendants, stating that the courts do have the authority to inquire into the
necessity of the expropriation.
Legal concept:
The court clarified that the right of expropriation is not automatically granted to a municipal corporation
but must be conferred by law. To exercise this right, it should be for a public use, and if either of these
conditions is not met, the right to expropriate doesn't apply. While the necessity and expediency of
exercising eminent domain are typically political matters, when property is taken from citizens, the courts
can scrutinize the necessity in a specific case. The court also argued that if the legislature grants a
municipal corporation general authority to expropriate private land for public purposes, the courts have
the power to assess whether the land is indeed private and if the purpose genuinely serves the public
interest. The court's authority extends beyond confirming the existence of a law allowing expropriation; it
also includes ensuring that the expropriation adheres to the law.

G.R. No. 78742

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ,
GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIFE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR
B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G.
ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J.
PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. APRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES,
BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent
Facts:
Several petitions have been filed challenging the constitutionality of various agrarian reform measures in
the Philippines. The petitioners, who are small landowners and farmers, contend that these measures
infringe on their rights to due process, equal protection, and just compensation. In the first case, the
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. and other individuals brought a petition against
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, contesting the constitutionality of agrarian reform measures, especially
Presidential Decree No. 27, which mandates the compulsory acquisition of private agricultural lands.
They argue that these measures violate their right to just compensation and due process. In the second
case, Arsenio Al. Acuña and other landowners filed a petition against Joker Arroyo, Philip E. Juico, and
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. They challenge the constitutionality of agrarian reform
measures, including Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Orders Nos. 228 and 229, which involve the
redistribution of agricultural lands. They claim these measures infringe on their right to just compensation
and due process. In the third case, Inocentes Pabico filed a petition against Philip E. Juico, Joker Arroyo,
and other government officials, arguing that agrarian reform measures, particularly Proclamation No. 131
and Executive Orders Nos. 228 and 229, are unconstitutional and violate his right to just compensation
and due process. In the fourth case, Nicolas S. Manaay and Agustin Hermano, Jr. filed a petition against
Philip Ella Juico, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and the Land Bank of the Philippines. They also
challenge the constitutionality of agrarian reform measures, including Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Orders Nos. 228 and 229, alleging violations of their right to just compensation and due
process.
Issues:
Whether or Not the agrarian reform measures are constitutional, particularly with regard to the right to
just compensation and due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the agrarian reform measures are constitutional. The Court held that the
measures were enacted in accordance with the powers granted to the President under martial law and the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court also held that the measures did not violate the
right to just compensation and due process, as they provided for the payment of just compensation and the
opportunity for landowners to be heard.
Legal concept:
Emancipation Patent (EP). The doctrine of judicial supremacy, which grants the judiciary the power to
annul acts of the legislative or executive branches that are not conformable to the fundamental law.