19 Republic Vs Vda de Castellvi

Eminent Domain
The requisites for taking are:1. The expropriator must enter private property;2. The entry must be
for more than a momentary period;3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;4. The
property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
FACTS:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease
agreement over land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis.
Before the expiration of the contract of lease in June 1956, the Republic sought to renew the
same but Castellvi refused. When AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the
termination of the contract, Castellvi wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff demanding that the
property be vacated in 30 days for they had decided to subdivide the property to sell to the
general public; hereafter, the Chief of Staff answered her saying that it was difficult for the army
to vacate the premises given the permanent installations and other facilities and worth Php
500,000.00 and there is no recourse to acquire her property other than expropriation proceeding
to be recommended to the president. Castellvi then brought suit to eject the Phil Air Force from
her property. While the ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted an expropriation
proceeding the Republic was placed in possession of the lands on Aug. The trial court appointed
3 Commissioners to determine the actual fair market value of the lands sought to be
expropriated. The Commissioners recommended unanimously that the lowest price was Php 10
per square meter for both the lands of Castellviand Toledo
–
Gozun. But the Defendants contended that it should be are

15 per square meter, on one hand, the Republic averred that the fair market value of the lands of
the appellees was 20 or at P2000 per hectare, as the lands in the year 1949 were valued at such
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947 and that just
compensation should not be determined based on the value of the property that year.The
requisites for taking are:
The expropriator must enter a private property;

2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;

3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;

4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated orinjuriously
affected;

and5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the ownerand deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947when the republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when applied to
possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a limited period”-- not
indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from
year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The
fact that the Republic, through AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter
the fact that the entry into the lant was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from
year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the
republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time
the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy
the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this
“intention” cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. The 5th requirement is
also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same
for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Cstellvi
remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the
renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the
Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was
Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to
pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint
for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s property should not be determined
on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when
it held that the “taking” of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint
in this case. Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the
property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.