Giannakas Yiannaka 2023 Food Fraud Causes Consequences and Deterrence Strategies

Annual Review of Resource Economics
Food Fraud: Causes,

Consequences, and
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Deterrence Strategies
Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ. 2023.15:85-104. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Konstantinos Giannakas and Amalia Yiannaka

Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebraska,
USA; email: kgiannakas@unl.edu
Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ. 2023. 15:85–104 Keywords

First published as a Review in Advance on
food adulteration, mislabeling, asymmetric information, credence goods,
May 17, 2023
certification, costly and imperfect enforcement
The Annual Review of Resource Economics is online at
resource.annualreviews.org Abstract
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-101422-
Food fraud represents a serious threat to the integrity of the global agri-food
013027
marketing system and has received considerable attention by policy mak-
Copyright © 2023 by the author(s). This work is
ers, academics, and the public at large. This review presents the conditions
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License, which permits unrestricted that enable fraudulent activity in agri-food supply chains (such as asymmet-
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, ric information, imperfect certification processes, supply chain complexity,
provided the original author and source are credited.
and weak monitoring and enforcement systems) and discusses recent efforts
See credit lines of images or other third-party
material in this article for license information. to document and deter food fraud and the growing theoretical and em-
pirical literature on the economics of food fraud. The article concludes by
JEL codes: K42, L15, L66, M38, Q13, Q58
identifying some gaps in the literature and provides suggestions for future
research.
85
1. INTRODUCTION
A recent article in The New Yorker details what the magazine calls the largest-known fraud in the
history of American organic agriculture that involved nonorganic grain, mainly corn and soy-
beans, being sold as organic. The scheme, which allegedly started in the early 2000s, involved
more than US$142 million in sales of grain falsely labeled as organic between 2010 and 2017 and
is estimated to have caused consumers to pay at least a quarter billion dollars on products misla-
beled as organic between 2001 and 2017 (Parker 2021). Despite the establishment of the National
Organic Program (NOP) in 2000 that provides clear standards for the organic label, a number of
factors allowed a food fraud scheme of this scale to materialize and linger. According to the article,
contributing factors were a certification process that did not require an organic certificate listing
the number of certified acreages, leading to the inability to detect fraud based on volume;1 a lack
of oversight by the certifier, Quality Assurance International; and lax monitoring by the NOP’s
Enforcement and Compliance Division. In addition, while a product can be tested to verify the
absence of unwanted attributes that are incompatible with the organic label [e.g., genetically mod-
ified organisms (GMOs), pesticides, and synthetic fertilizers], no test can prove that the product
is organic; the organic label includes production process requirements that cannot be measured
by a single test, making oversight and monitoring critical components of the certification process
(Ferreira et al. 2021).
Between 2009 and 2016 the number of labeling claims on new food products doubled, with
much of the growth involving claims of provision of credence attributes such as GMO free, or-
ganic, and kosher (Lusk 2018). Credence attributes are attributes that cannot be verified through
search or experience, leaving consumers reliant on producers, retailers, third-party certifiers, and
government regulators to ensure that claims made about these attributes are accurate (Price et al.
2022). In the food sector, most credence attribute claims refer to a product’s production process
(e.g., organic, raised without antibiotics, GMO free, fair trade) and, while well-defined standards
exist for many of these attributes, for others such standards are lacking (e.g., claims that the prod-
uct is ethically produced or produced in a socially responsible manner), making claim verification
even more challenging.
Interestingly, claim verification may be absent even in labels approved by the USDA. A case in
point is raised without antibiotics (RWA) claims.2 Although they are approved by the USDA’s Food
Safety Inspection Service, the agency does not conduct, require, or mandate empirical antibiotic
testing to validate them (Price et al. 2022).3 Perhaps more importantly, no entity other than the
USDA can deem an approved USDA label false or misleading—the USDA has exclusive authority
in determining the validity of these labels—providing liability protection to and undermining
quality controls by other agents in the supply chain (Price et al. 2022).4
1 The Strengthening Organic Enforcement Proposed Rule is an effort to bolster consumer and indus-
try trust in the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) organic label by “strengthening organic control
systems, improving farm to market traceability, and providing robust enforcement of the USDA organic regu-
lations” (https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/strengthening-organic-enforcement-proposed-
rule). Among the proposed changes is the requirement that all certifiers list an operation’s acreage on their
organic certification.
2 RWA claims include “Raised Without Antibiotics,” “Raised Antibiotic Free,” “No Antibiotics Administered,”
“No Added Antibiotics,” and “No Antibiotics Ever” (Price et al. 2022).
3 Although the USDA’s National Residue Program tests for antibiotic residues in meat animals to determine
whether antibiotic levels in animal tissues exceed maximum residue limits, these tests are not designed or
conducted to assess and verify RWA claims (Price et al. 2022).
4 Price et al. (2022) discuss two recent court cases, Cohen v. Conagra Brands Inc. and Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Hormel Foods Group, where the plaintiffs challenged “Natural” claims. The court decisions
86 Giannakas • Yiannaka
Price et al. (2022) tested beef cattle slaughtered for the RWA market under the No Antibiotics
Ever program in 2020 to investigate whether these animals tested positive for antibiotics. They
tested a total of 699 animals from 312 lots (38,219 head of cattle in these lots, representing 12% of
the US RWA beef production for the period of study) and 33 different RWA-certified feedyards
slaughtered in a single facility and found concrete evidence of the presence of antibiotics in a
significant portion of their sample.5 Their findings challenge the integrity of the RWA label in
beef products and highlight the need to protect consumers and honest producers/agents in the
food supply chain who, in addition to the costs they incur to guarantee their products meet the
required standards, have to undertake actions and incur costs to repair the reputation of their
sector following food fraud scandals.
Food fraud incidents, like those discussed above, can undermine consumer confidence and trust
in the food system and government agencies, even when they do not pose a direct health hazard,
and severely impact company and industry reputation and profitability (Spink et al. 2016a, FAO
2021). Despite new scientific approaches that facilitate the detection of food fraud, food fraud
persists, impacting the global food industry; the percentage of product fraud that occurs globally
is estimated at 5–7% of world trade, resulting in a cost that is as high as $40 billion annually (Food
Stand. Agency 2020).
This review focuses on the conditions that enable fraudulent activity in the agri-food system
and discusses the growing theoretical and empirical literature on the economics of food fraud.
Section 2 discusses the various illegal and criminal acts that constitute food fraud, food fraud
incentives, and recent food fraud incidents that have received media attention. Section 3 discusses
the role of asymmetric information in the emergence of food fraud, while Section 4 presents
the processes that have been developed to perform supply chain vulnerability assessment and the
systems and processes that have been developed to document and combat food fraud. Section 5
discusses certification as a solution to food fraud and a vulnerability. Sections 6 and 7 discuss the
theoretical and empirical economic studies on food fraud, respectively, and Section 8 concludes
the study and identifies areas for future research.
2. THE MANY FACES OF FOOD FRAUD, INCENTIVES, AND RECENT

FOOD FRAUD INCIDENTS
Although it is not a new phenomenon (Shears 2010), food fraud has recently emerged as a
priority policy issue internationally (Lord et al. 2017). While there is no universally accepted
definition of food fraud, it incorporates the deliberate and intentional economically motivated
adulteration (e.g., ingredient substitution, dilution, or concealment) or misrepresentation of food
such as counterfeiting (i.e., aspects of the fraudulent product or packaging are replicated) or
mislabeling (e.g., false or misleading indications such as words, pictures, or packaging size). In
some cases, food fraud also involves tax evasion, theft, tampering (e.g., alteration of date codes),
simulation (i.e., the illegitimate product is designed to resemble but does not exactly match the
legitimate product it copies), diversion (e.g., gray markets), and overrun (i.e., production in excess
reconfirmed federal preemption over consumer protection laws reestablishing that USDA-approved labels
cannot be challenged by consumers or other advocates despite the fact that, in both cases, the label claims
were not factually or scientifically accurate.
5 They found that three feedyards (9%) had multiple lots (mean lot size was 122 cattle) in which all samples
tested positive for antibiotics, four feedyards (12%) had all samples test positive in a single lot, seven feedyards
(21%) had a positive sample in more than one lot, and 14 feedyards (42%) had at least one animal test positive.
The antibiotics tested in the study are usually administered through feed and water at the pen-lot level so
multiple animals testing positive suggest a systemic problem (Price et al. 2022).
www.annualreviews.org • Food Fraud 87

of production agreements) (Manning et al. 2016, Moyer et al. 2017, van Ruth et al. 2017). This
broad definition of food fraud has been adopted by the European Commission, the Global Food
Safety Initiative, and other global organizations and authorities (Moyer et al. 2017). Manning
et al. (2016) further expand the definition and discuss food crime, which, in addition to the
aforementioned types of food fraud, includes malicious poisoning, bioterrorism, or sabotage.
Manning (2016) argues that fraud in the supply chain can emerge because of misrepresentation
associated with the integrity of food products (i.e., quality/authenticity), processes (i.e., activities
inherent in production), people (i.e., honesty/morality of actors), and data (i.e., consistency and
accuracy of accompanying information). The most widely accepted explanation as to why some
individuals commit fraud is known as the fraud triangle, which posits that, if the conditions of
incentive/pressure (financial or environment-specific pressures), opportunity (e.g., absence of con-

trols or ineffectiveness in enforcement of regulations), and rationalization/attitude are present, a
person is highly likely to engage in fraudulent activities (Free 2015). When these three conditions
are present, capability—which is related to an individual’s position or function, intellectual capac-

ity, and misrepresentation—and coercive ability complete the capacity needed to commit fraud
(Free 2015).
Legitimate actors abusing their position, as well as criminal gangs infiltrating food chains, have
been involved in food fraud (Kendall et al. 2019a). Manning et al. (2016) use the typology of crimi-
nal types developed by Spink et al. (2013) to provide the food crime activities each type of criminal
is typically involved in. According to the authors, the recreational criminal commits tampering and
theft; the occasional criminal commits adulteration, diversion, overrun, tampering, and theft; the
occupational criminal (who conducts their illegal activities at their workplace) commits adulter-
ation, counterfeiting, diversion, overrun, simulation, tampering, theft, and mislabeling; the pro-
fessional criminal commits adulteration, counterfeiting, diversion, overrun, simulation, tampering,
and theft; and the ideological criminal commits malicious poisoning, bioterrorism, and sabotage.
Moyer et al. (2017) find that individuals committing food fraud often belong to the occupational
type who can patiently wait to find opportunity to commit fraud in very complex and fast-moving
food supply chains as well as in short and simple supply chains that rely on trusting relationships.
Food adulteration and mislabeling feature prominently among the food fraud incidents that
have received recent scholarly and popular media attention. Shears (2010) reported food fraud
incidents in beer, spirits, fish, beef, rice, olive oil, organic labeling, and free-range labels in the
United Kingdom. Moore et al. (2012) note that the most common targets for adulteration are olive
oil, milk, honey, and saffron, whereas Kendall et al. (2019a) find that among the most frequently
reported adulterated food products are wine, spirits, olive oil, fish, meat, cheese, honey, and herbs.
Owing to their potential to cause adverse health impacts, food adulteration incidents receive
international media attention, especially when they are linked to severe illness and death. A case in
point is the 2008 melamine-tainted infant powder milk formula scandal where melamine was used
to adulterate protein levels in powder milk produced in China. The incident resulted in illness in
294,000 individuals, hospitalization of 50,000 infants, and in six deaths (Xiu & Klein 2010, Zhang
& Xue 2016, Bouzembrak et al. 2018). Other deadly incidents include spirits adulterated with
methanol in Norway between 2002 and 2004 that resulted in the hospitalization of 51 and the
death of nine individuals. A similar incident occurred in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia
in 2012 that resulted in the death of 42 individuals from methanol poisoning (Zakharov et al. 2014,
Bouzembrak et al. 2018).
Another much-publicized food adulteration scandal that, while not linked to adverse health
outcomes, caused public outcry, is the 2013 European horsemeat scandal where horse DNA
was identified in processed beef products in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and other European
markets (Regan et al. 2015, Ehmke et al. 2019). Following the horsemeat scandal, the European
Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS 2014) produced a briefing document listing the reasons
behind the incident, which included demand for cheap food due to the 2008 financial crisis, the
complexity of food supply chains, low risk of detection, and a lack of strong deterrents such as
penalties (Manning et al. 2016). Manning et al. (2016, p. 45) use the horsemeat scandal as an
example of complex food supply chains fostering food fraud opportunities where the supply chain
“involved a food processor in France, its subsidiary in Luxembourg, a subcontractor in Cyprus,
a meat trader in the Netherlands, abattoirs in Romania, and a number of food businesses in the
UK, Ireland and across Europe selling the end products.”
Similarly, in the Asia-Pacific region where food supply chains are long and complex and lack
transparency and traceability, and where accurate data on food fraud are not available (FAO 2021),
food fraud incidents abound. In Pakistan, which is the world’s fifth largest milk producer, author-
ities frequently confiscate milk adulterated with urea and contaminated water. In the Australian
market, almost 20% of honey is adulterated with cane sugar or corn syrup, and up to 50% of honey
imported from Asia is adulterated (Zhou et al. 2018, FAO 2021). In Bangladesh, a fruit juice man-
ufacturing plant was shut down for producing juice that did not contain any fruit but instead was
produced using hazardous chemical substances (FAO 2021), and in Taiwan low-quality oils were
mixed with harmful-to-human-health artificial colorants and sold as high-quality olive oils (FAO
2021). Finally, in China, cadmium-coated rice was detected in Guangzhou province in 2013, and
more than 200 rice plants in Heilongjiang province in 2015 closed due to reported adulteration
(Ehmke et al. 2019).
In the United States, according to some estimates, 10% of the food on grocery shelves is
adulterated or mislabeled (Pimentel 2014, Meerza et al. 2019). Mislabeling is the most common
type of food fraud in agri-food markets (Charlebois et al. 2016, Ehmke et al. 2019), with many of
these incidents involving products mislabeled as organic (van Ruth & de Pagter-de Witte 2020).
Manning & Kowalska (2021) investigate fraud associated with organic food and identify capacity,
opportunity, and motivation to commit fraud under each incident. One of the incidents they
examined is the 2017 Chilean organic raspberries incident, a global scheme uncovered by Chilean
customs following a tip from a whistleblower. According to Chilean customs, it involved more than
$12 million worth of mislabeled raspberries sold in Canadian markets between 2014 and 2016. In
this scheme, frozen berries grown in China were shipped to Chile where they were repackaged
and rebranded by the fruit trading company Frutti di Bosco as premium organic Chilean-grown
berries and then shipped and sold in Canadian markets (Manning & Kowalska 2021). This incident
demonstrates the challenges involved in deterring intentional fraudulent activity when economic
incentives for mislabeling are present, enforcement and surveillance systems are inadequate, and
there is opportunity to hide fraudulent behavior in complex, cross-border supply chains.
Seafood products are also highly susceptible to mislabeling practices. A seafood fraud inves-
tigation by Oceana that was conducted in 21 states in the United States between 2010 and 2012
found that 74% of seafood sold in sushi restaurants and 18% of seafood sold in grocery stores
were mislabeled (Warner et al. 2013, Meerza et al. 2019).
Mislabeling concerning a product’s country or region of origin has also been detected in var-
ious food products. Ehmke et al. (2019) report that 9% of all food products carrying protected
geographical identification labels in the European Union are fraudulent (EUIPO 2016). An EU
study examining dairy and meat protected designation of origin (PDO) products found species
substitution in 71.4% of the dairy products and 46.1% in meat products sampled (Di Pinto et al.
2019). In the US market, 50% of ginseng labeled as Korean was produced in the United States
(Wallace et al. 2012). Several mislabeling incidents concerning origin have been reported in the
coffee sector, such as false Jamaican Blue Mountain or Kona origin claims (Kennedy et al. 2021),
and in the tea sector (Firmani et al. 2019). In the olive oil sector, where mislabeling typically

involves false claims that the olive oil is extra virgin when it is virgin or a blend of vegetable oils with
olive oil (Casadei et al. 2021, González-Pereira et al. 2021), false origin claims are common (Bimbo
et al. 2019); Yan et al. (2020) suggest that 80% of Italian extra virgin olive oil could be fraudulent.6
3. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND FOOD FRAUD

At the heart of the economic incentives for food fraud is the asymmetric information struc-
ture inherent in markets for credence goods. Although producers of credence goods know the
type/quality of the product being sold, this information is hidden to consumers. This hidden
type/information problem is also known in the economics literature as the adverse selection prob-
lem, which, if left unsolved, can result in high-quality products being driven out of the market
(Akerlof 1970).
In particular, in the absence of mechanisms that solve this asymmetric information problem
(such as standards, warranties, certification, and labeling), consumers cannot distinguish between
the different types/qualities supplied in the market and, as a result, they treat them all as an un-
differentiated good (Sexton & Lavoie 2001). With the different types/qualities treated the same
in this pooling equilibrium, producers have no incentives to produce the normally costlier, high-
quality products, as the price of the high-quality products is the same as that of their lower-quality
counterparts. As a result, the high quality is driven out of the market and, at equilibrium, only
low-quality products are supplied to the market.
Certification and labeling have been particularly popular mechanisms of coping with this asym-
metric information problem in the agri-food marketing system because they address the root of the
problem by transforming credence goods into search goods (Caswell & Padberg 1992, Caswell &
Mojduszka 1996). Certification and labeling regimes can solve this asymmetric information prob-
lem and facilitate the existence of a separating equilibrium where different quality products coexist
in the market. However, they also create economic incentives for low-quality-product producers
to misrepresent the type/quality of their offering and receive the price of the high-quality prod-
uct without incurring the higher costs associated with the production of this product (Giannakas
2002). Put in a different way, the price premium enjoyed by the higher-quality product in a sep-
arating equilibrium creates economic incentives for producers to sell a low-quality product as a
high-quality one.
While the price premium of the high-quality product represents the producer benefits from
food fraud, there are also costs associated with this type of fraudulent activity. In many cases,
producers have to incur a certification cost to be able to sell a low-quality product as a high-
quality one. For instance, producers have to be certified as organic to be able to sell conventional
products as organic. In addition, producers involved in food fraud also face a penalty when their
fraudulent behavior is detected by the relevant enforcement agency. This expected penalty is given
by the product of the probability that the producer will be detected when engaged in food fraud
and the penalty for detected fraudulent activity.
It is important to note that, unlike the hidden information/adverse selection problem in mar-
kets for credence goods described at the beginning of this section (where the type of the product
is not observable by the uninformed party through either search or experience), the asymmetric
information problem characterizing most cases of food fraud is one where the type of the misrep-
resented product is not hidden but is, instead, verifiable at a cost. In particular, the uninformed
party(ies) in this case (i.e., enforcement agency or other relevant interested parties) can verify the
6 Bimbo et al. (2019) report that, although Italy is a large importer of Greek, Tunisian, and Spanish olive oil,
Italian olive oil is typically marketed as “100% Italian.”
type of the product being sold (i.e., whether it is a high- or a low-quality product) through costly
monitoring and testing activities.7
In this context, the probability that a producer’s fraudulent behavior will be detected depends
on the probability that the producer will be audited/investigated by the relevant authorities (which
is determined, in turn, by the number of producers and the resource costs of monitoring and en-
forcement) and the observability of the fraudulent behavior in the presence of an audit (i.e., how
easy it is for the enforcement agency to observe the fraudulent activity when auditing a producer).
The smaller the number of producers in the supply chain of interest and/or the lower the resource
costs of monitoring their actions and/or the easier the observability of fraudulent activity in the
presence of an audit, the greater the detection probability of food fraud will be. Penalties for de-
tected fraudulent activity are determined by the legal fines for the specific activity and reputational
harm incurred by the producer caught cheating.
Although both the detection probability and penalties for a detected fraudulent activity can
vary among producers (see Meerza et al. 2021), their relationship with the benefits of food fraud
determines the economic incentives or disincentives for fraudulent activity. The lower a producer’s
detection probability and/or the lower the penalties for detected fraudulent activity and/or the
greater the price premium enjoyed by the high-quality product, the greater the likelihood is that a
producer will find it optimal to engage in food fraud and the greater the extent of food fraud in this
market. The next sections discuss aspects of the global agri-food marketing system that impact the
parameters affecting fraudulent behavior, i.e., detection probability, penalties, and certification.
4. FOOD FRAUD VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT, DOCUMENTATION,

CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION, AND DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES
4.1. Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment
Globalized agri-food supply chains with a large number of intermediaries provide many opportu-
nities to commit fraud; Ehmke et al. (2019) report that the number of times food changes hands
is a critical factor in food fraud risk exposure in agri-food markets. Van Ruth et al. (2017) ar-
gue that because food fraud is intentional, food fraudsters are secretive and creative and seek to
avoid detection (Moyer et al. 2017). Current food safety management systems are not designed for
fraud control or mitigation; a shift is needed from a safety-based approach to a fraud-prevention
and vulnerability-reduction approach. Fraud vulnerability is any weakness or flaw that exposes an
entity to fraud-related hazards and exploitation (Spink et al. 2017).
According to van Ruth et al. (2017) the main drivers of food fraud vulnerability are opportu-
nities, motivations, and control measures, which are further detailed in 31 vulnerability factors.
Opportunity-related factors include technical opportunity and time and space factors. Techni-
cal opportunity refers to the simplicity or complexity of adulteration and counterfeiting, the
technology and know-how of adulteration, and the availability of detection technologies, while
time and space factors refer to accessibility to production and processing materials, supply chain
transparency, and historical evidence. Motivations consist of economic drivers, which include the
supply and pricing of materials, product attributes determining quality, price differences, eco-
nomic health, market competition and financial strains; and culture and behavior drivers, which
7 The adverse selection/hidden information/hidden type problem can be seen as a special case of the costly
verifiability-of-type problem where the detection probability in the presence of an audit is zero. With the de-
tection probability being zero (due to the type being hidden), solutions to adverse selection problems focus on
the provision of incentives that make the truthful revelation of the hidden information/hidden type incentive
compatible.

include business strategy, ethical business culture, previous criminal offenses, and national and
international corruption. Control measure–related factors consist of technical and managerial
measures. Technical measures include how accurate and specific the fraud monitoring system is,
verification issues of the fraud monitoring system, the extent of the tracking and tracing system,
and the fraud contingency plan. Managerial measures include the code of conduct, employee in-
tegrity screening, whistleblowing, social control and self-regulation, laws and enforcement, and
contingency plans (van Ruth et al. 2017).
Various assessment tools and methodologies have been developed to address vulnerabilities and
risks in supply chains. One of the most commonly accepted is the Hazard Analysis Critical Con-
trol Points (HACCP) methodology, which aims at identifying and managing food safety–related
risks. HACCP forms the basis of most food safety management system standards but does not
specifically assess food fraud vulnerabilities and risks. Spink et al. (2016a) discuss the need for
food fraud vulnerability and risk assessment to be conducted in parallel with food safety and food
defense protocols, citing regulations and industry standards that require them as a prerequisite to
countermeasures and decision-making systems. The Global Food Safety Initiative requires orga-
nizations to have a documented food fraud vulnerability assessment procedure in place and a plan
to mitigate against the identified vulnerabilities. In response, a number of food fraud vulnerability
assessment tools are being developed.
SSAFE (Safe Supply of Affordable Food Everywhere), a global nonprofit membership organi-
zation that aims at strengthening food safety along supply chains, used the concepts developed by
van Ruth et al. (2017) and worked with the authors to develop and globally test a food fraud vul-
nerability self-assessment tool consisting of 50 questions. According to its developers, the freely
available tool can help food businesses, irrespective of size or geographic location, identify food
fraud vulnerabilities and prepare mitigation plans (SSAFE 2022).
Spink et al. (2016a) identify the need for an enterprise risk management system given that all
types of food fraud can create enterprise-wide risks and develop a Food Fraud Initial Screening
methodology that reviews and documents emerging food fraud risks. Spink et al. (2016b) discuss
the role of public-private partnerships in formulating a country-wide or industry-wide prevention
strategy. They present the Food Fraud Prevention Strategy, which consists of two stages. In the
first stage, the qualitative Food Fraud Initial Screening model is applied, then followed by a more
detailed quantitative Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessments model in the second stage.
Similarly, the Hazard Analysis and Risk-Based Preventive Controls (HARPC) plan, which is
a US standard mandated by the 2011 Food Safety Modernization Act and an extension of the
HACCP system, focuses on preventive control. In the United States, food facilities must imple-
ment a HARPC plan that identifies hazards related to adulteration and food safety, implement
controls, or corrective actions, and verify the plan (Manning & Kowalska 2021). Finally, the Threat
Assessment and Critical Control Points protocol that focuses on tampering, intentional adulter-
ation of food, and food defense and the Vulnerability Assessment and Critical Control Points
protocol that focuses on food fraud identification and prevention with emphasis on economically
motivated adulteration can also be used by food businesses to develop procedures and strategies
to help them identify and mitigate food fraud in their supply chains.
4.2. Food Fraud Documentation and Cross-Border Cooperation

The need to identify effective ways to prevent and combat food fraud is also emphasized by the
International Food Safety Authorities Network that considers information-sharing platforms and
interagency and intergovernmental collaboration as key factors in food fraud deterrence (Spink
et al. 2019). In recent years, many systems have been developed to document food fraud incidents
and enhance cross-border cooperation to fight food fraud. The Rapid Alert System for Food and
Feed is a notification system operated by the European Commission to exchange information
on identified hazards, including food fraud notifications, between member states (Eur. Comm.
2022). In the European Union, the Food Fraud Network was also established to manage requests
for cross-border cooperation and facilitate the exchange of information about suspected fraud-
ulent practices between national authorities and the European Commission (Bouzembrak et al.
2018). Similarly, the HorizonScan database in the United Kingdom focuses on global food and
feed integrity issues that, in addition to food fraud incidents, includes cases related to microbial
contaminants, allergens, pesticides, and drug residues (Bouzembrak et al. 2018).
In the United States, the Economically Motivated Adulteration (EMA) database and the USP
food fraud database provide information on food fraud incidents. The EMA database, housed at
the National Center for Food Protection and Defense, contains food fraud incidents starting in
1980 and provides information about the food product, fraud incident year, adulterant, type of
fraud, health consequences, country of origin, and how the incident was discovered (Bouzembrak
& Marvin 2016, Marvin et al. 2016). The USP food fraud database provides information on past
food fraud incidents as well as hazard reports on specific adulterants. It allows users to identify
historical trends and vulnerabilities through a customizable dashboard and receive automatic alerts
of new records of food fraud and automated analytics for ingredients of interest (USP 2016).
Bouzembrak et al. (2018) developed a food fraud monitoring tool (MedISys-FF) that collects,
processes, and presents food fraud reports published worldwide in the media. They find that the
most reported fraudulent commodities are meat, seafood, milk, and alcohol.
Interagency and cross-country cooperation has yielded significant results from uncovering and
successfully prosecuting food fraud cases. A prominent example is Operation Opson, an annual
law enforcement operation involving customs and national food regulatory agencies coordinated
jointly by Interpol and Europol that “aims to remove counterfeit and substandard foods and drinks
from the market and dismantle the organized crime groups involved” (Interpol 2022).8 The most
recent operation, Opson VIII, run between December 2018 and April 2019 across 78 countries,
led to the seizure of more than 16,000 tons and 33 million liters of food and drink valued at
$117 million and the arrest of 672 individuals (Ehmke et al. 2019, Interpol 2022).
4.3. Food Fraud Detection Technologies

The plethora of food adulteration and mislabeling incidents demonstrates that food fraud deter-
rence requires a multipronged approach. The uncovering of these incidents also demonstrates,
however, the effectiveness of new technologies in detecting food fraud. These technologies have
been effective at establishing food authenticity and include portable testing devices that enable
risk-based sampling in the field; DNA barcoding, which utilizes a genetic sequence of mitochon-
drial DNA to identify species and can be applied to both raw and cooked food products; and
nuclear techniques, which include stable isotope and trace element analyses that can provide in-
formation about the environment and production process of a food product (FAO 2021). DNA
barcoding has been instrumental in the detection of food fraud in the seafood sector. For example,
Nagalakshmi et al. (2016) used DNA barcoding to investigate the authenticity of fresh and pro-
cessed seafood products in India and found that 22% of the seafood products in their sample were
mislabeled. Similar studies in Greece and South Korea found mislabeling in 12.9% (Minoudi et al.
2020) and 7.6% (Do et al. 2019) of seafood products, respectively. DNA barcoding was also used
to identify mislabeling in seafood catering in Spain, where mislabeled products were found in half
8 Operation Opson started in 2011 with 10 mainly European countries and today includes 78 countries from
Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East (Interpol 2022).

of the catered establishments (Pardo & Jiménez 2020) and in 23 European countries where 26%
of fish was found to be mislabeled (Pardo et al. 2018). In China, Chinese and Italian scientists us-
ing DNA tests found that 58% of Xue Yu fillet samples from 30 different brands were adulterated
with other fish (Xiong et al. 2016, FAO 2021).
DNA sequencing and nuclear techniques have also been used to uncover labeling fraud in the
meat sector, with a prominent example being the infamous 2013 European horsemeat scandal
discussed above (Lianou et al. 2021). A study in South Africa found undeclared meat species in
68% of the samples (Cawthorn et al. 2013), and a similar study in the Italian meat market found
a mislabeling rate of 57% in meat products (Di Pinto et al. 2015). Chuah et al. (2016) report
extensive mislabeling in beef and poultry products sold in Malaysia, where false declaration of
species was found in 78.3% of the samples.

Technologies that can be used to deter food fraud include blockchain technology, a decentral-
ized system for recording transactions that involves storing auditable and unchangeable data in
units called blocks (FAO 2021). Although blockchain technology can be used to improve supply
chain traceability and preserve food integrity by preventing agents along the supply chain from
mislabeling or counterfeiting a food product, fraud can still occur at the first stage where data
are inputted into the blockchain (FAO 2021). In addition, as we discussed previously, for certain
credence attributes (e.g., organic, animal welfare, fair trade), testing alone cannot validate product
authenticity, but rather inspection and monitoring of the entire production process are required
for fraud detection and deterrence. The following section discusses food certification and its role
in combating food fraud.
5. CERTIFICATION AS A SOLUTION TO FOOD FRAUD

AND A VULNERABILITY
Certification that involves the assessment and approval by an accredited party of an accredited
standard (Albersmeier et al. 2009) can reduce informational asymmetries in food markets and serve
as a quality signal when credence attributes are concerned (Giannakas 2002).9 In theory, third-
party certification can build consumer trust by providing auditor independence and objectivity.
In practice, the integrity, validity, and reliability of the certification body determines, to a large
extent, the credibility of the certificate and, consequently, whether it can act as a quality signal.10
A key vulnerability of the certification process is the potential conflict of interest between those
seeking certification (e.g., manufacturers and producers) and certification bodies. The former pay
the latter to provide certification and have an incentive to choose certifiers known to employ low
inspection standards, whereas the latter compete with other certifiers and have an incentive to
reduce their own inspection costs and be lenient to attract more business (Albersmeier et al. 2009,
9 Certification systems can be local, regional, national, or international. They can differ in many aspects such
as whether certification standards and control procedures are developed by the public sector (e.g., National
Organic Standards) or private entities such as nongovernmental organizations, suppliers or retailers (e.g., Fair
Trade International, the GlobalG.A.P. standard, International Food Standard, and the British Retail Consor-
tium Standards Program), and whether the focus is on the supply chain [e.g., a business to business (B2B)
marketing tool] or directed at consumers [business to consumer (B2C) marketing tool] (Albersmeier et al.
2009).
10 Certification bodies receive accreditation by designated accreditation bodies to prove they are capable of
performing inspections and controls according to certification standards and processes. For example, in the
US certification bodies are accredited in food safety by the ANSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board that
oversees conformity assessment (Bar & Zheng 2019). Typically, certification body accreditation is based on
the ISO 65/EN 45011 standard that defines the requirements for assessment and accreditation of certification
bodies (Albersmeier et al. 2009).
Lytton & McAllister 2014, Bar & Zheng 2019). This can lead to unreliable auditing that Schulze
et al. (2006) call checklist governance, where auditors are not incentivized to uncover substantial
deficiencies but rather follow a checklist to evaluate basic performance indicators (Albersmeier
et al. 2009). Low inspection standards and the fact that audits are preannounced give producers/
manufacturers motivated to commit food fraud opportunities to conceal their illegal activities
from inspectors (Fagotto 2014). In addition, even when certification bodies strive to adhere to
high inspection standards, they cannot always guarantee the integrity of their certification agents
who could be bribed to provide fraudulent certificates (Pechlivanos 2004, Meerza et al. 2019).
A recent USDA report lists over 100 fraudulent organic certifications in the United States since
2006 (USDA 2018, Bimbo et al. 2019).
Furthermore, Bar & Zheng (2019), who studied producers’/manufacturers’ choices of cer-
tification bodies using data from the British Retail Consortium Standards Program, find that
certification bodies that are perceived to be more lenient are more likely to be chosen by producers
and manufacturers. In addition, certification bodies may be disincentivized to release information

about producers/manufacturers who fail to meet certification standards, while manufacturers who
fail might opt for a different standard before audit completion, further reducing transparency
and accountability.
A recent case that demonstrates these certification challenges involves an investigation by the
Washington Post of Aurora Organic Dairy, one of the largest organic milk suppliers in the United
States, which claims to have uncovered that the dairy supplier violated organic standards and
sold conventional milk as organic to the biggest grocery chains (Whoriskey 2017b, Meerza et al.
2019). The Washington Post provided high-resolution satellite images and drone footage show-
ing that only a small portion of Aurora’s 15,000 cow herd was grazing, violating organic rules. In
addition, chemical analysis of the milk by Virginia Tech scientists showed that key indicators of
grass feeding matched conventional rather than organic milk. The story also asserted that inspec-
tors conducted annual audits after, rather than during, grazing season, violating USDA inspection
policy (Whoriskey 2017b). The USDA conducted an investigation that concluded that Aurora’s
livestock and pasture management practices comply with USDA organic regulations and NOP
policies; however, this finding does not imply that the agency did not detect violations, rather it
affirms current compliance (Whoriskey 2017a). In fact, the USDA investigation confirmed that
annual audits (which are preannounced) by the certifier, the Colorado Department of Agriculture,
were conducted after the grazing season, violating USDA inspection rules, but the USDA did not
announce any sanctions against the agency (Whoriskey 2017a).
Unlike inspections that are unannounced, audits are preannounced and can thus be ineffec-
tive in detecting noncompliance with certification standards and can inevitably reduce producer/
manufacturer incentives to comply with all the certification requirements year-round (Fagotto
2014). According to Ferreira et al. (2021), the USDA and certifiers have recently increased unan-
nounced visits to organic dairies during the grazing season to confirm that cows are on pasture, as
required by NOP rules. In a study of the Italian organic food sector, Zezza et al. (2020) find that
the outcome of an audit is related to the certification body that performs it; certification bodies
that made unannounced visits and sample tests imposed more penalties and sanctions.
6. THEORETICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FOOD

AND CERTIFICATION FRAUD
To our knowledge, there are 10 theoretical studies on the economic causes and consequences
of food fraud and/or the optimal policy response to fraudulent behavior. Four of these studies
focus on market and/or welfare impacts of food fraud, four analyze and evaluate different

fraud-combating mechanisms/policies, and two examine the impact of organized activism and
corporate social responsibility activities on firm production and food fraud decisions. All of these
studies consider food fraud in markets for quality- (or vertically) differentiated products; seven
focus on mislabeling, one on food adulteration, and two on both food adulteration and mislabeling.
The first study to formally consider and systematically analyze food fraud by Giannakas (2002)
considers the impact of quality misrepresentation and mislabeling in markets for organic food. The
study develops a model of vertical product differentiation of conventional and organic products
and shows that mislabeling conventional products as organic erodes consumer trust in the labeling
process and reduces consumer welfare and the market share of the organic products. The paper
also shows that when the extent of mislabeling exceeds a threshold level, the value of labeling
is undermined and the organic product market fails. Thus, although certification and labeling
are necessary for preventing supply-side market failures and ensuring the supply of high-quality
organic products, they are not sufficient because the presence of mislabeling can create a consumer
exodus from the high-quality market and result in a demand-side market failure.
Mislabeling is also explicitly considered by Giannakas & Fulton (2002) when analyzing the
effects of the introduction of GM products on consumer purchasing decisions and welfare and
on ranking of different labeling regimes governing the market of these products. Modeling GM
and non-GM products as vertically differentiated goods, the study shows that mislabeling GM
products as non-GM products reduces consumer welfare and the desirability of an imperfectly
enforced mandatory labeling regime.
Hamilton & Zilberman (2006) also consider food fraud in the form of misrepresentation of
conventional “brown” products as high-quality “green” ones using eco-labeling and focus on the
effectiveness of eco-certification in combatting fraudulent behavior. They show that although an
eco-certification policy raises costs of the high-quality product, it reduces fraud and, depending on
the structure of the high-quality product market, the policy can be profit- and welfare-increasing.
They also show that policies that tax the low-quality product or/and subsidize its high-quality
counterpart increase the economic incentives for and incidence of food fraud in the economy.
Finally, the authors show that when monitoring and enforcement are endogenous, they are as
effective as eco-certification in combatting fraud.
Deterrence of food fraud is also the focus of Baksi & Bose (2007), who study the performance/
effectiveness of different certification and labeling regimes in combatting product mislabeling
by low-quality product producers. They show that costly third-party labeling increases the price
of the high-quality products which, in turn, increases the incentives for mislabeling and reduces
the market share of the high-quality products. The study also shows that when third-party labels
can be misused, monitoring is necessary to deter mislabeling by low-quality firms. Although self-
labeling is generally the socially desirable option, when monitoring costs are high and/or the total
number of monitored firms is low, third-party labeling can become socially optimal.
Di Fonzo & Russo (2015) consider product type misrepresentation in the context of geographic
indication (GI) consortia design and show that high quality standards and imperfect enforcement
of GI labeling requirements create economic incentives for consortium members to mislabel
their products. The authors also argue that a command-and-control strategy is not always effi-
cient at deterring mislabeling and protecting the integrity of GI labels, as it can reduce producer
participation in the consortia.
All aforementioned studies focus on food fraud in the form of mislabeling, but Meerza et al.
(2019) explicitly consider and systematically analyze the system-wide market and welfare impacts
of food adulteration. In particular, the authors develop a model of heterogeneous consumers,
heterogeneous agricultural producers, and imperfectly competitive firms/suppliers of quality-
differentiated food products. They analyze the impacts of food adulteration and mislabeling on
the equilibrium quantities and prices of the reference product (i.e., the product mislabeled or/and
adulterated) and its substitutes and the welfare of the interest groups involved (consumers, pro-
ducers, and firms affected by food fraud). In addition to being the first systematic analysis of food
adulteration, Meerza et al.’s (2019) study is the first to cover the system-wide market and welfare
effects of mislabeling. A key result of this study is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, both low-
and high-quality producers have incentives to be engaged in fraudulent activities. The group in-
volved and the subsequent market and welfare impacts of food fraud are determined by the social
attitudes toward food fraud, the enforcement policy of the government, and the relative magni-
tude of the demand and supply effects of food fraud. Comparing the market effects of mislabeling
and food adulteration, the authors show that producers are more likely to mislabel than adulterate
their products even though the equilibrium quantity of the high-quality product is higher in the
presence of mislabeling.
Food adulteration is also the focus of Levi et al. (2020), who develop analytical models of a
supply chain where homogeneous farms supply a manufacturer to study farms’ incentives to en-
gage in preemptive and reactive adulteration (defined as adulteration that reduces the probability
of lowering the product quality and adulteration that increases the perceived quality of the farms’
products, respectively) and the impact of adulteration on the supply chain of interest. They show
that farms’ adulteration behavior depends on the uncertainty or variability of the quality of the
farms’ product, the dispersion and traceability of the supply chain, and the testing capabilities
in the specific supply chain. The analysis also shows that when testing is imperfect, investing in
quality improvement without improving the ability to detect adulteration can increase adulter-
ation because producers feel safe to adulterate up to a moderate level without worrying about
being caught.
Meerza et al. (2021) extend their earlier work (Meerza et al. 2019) by endogenizing the enforce-
ment policy of the government and systematically analyzing the optimal policy response to food
adulteration and mislabeling. Additional differentiating attributes of Meerza et al. (2021) include
the explicit consideration of the asymmetric impacts of food fraud, the endogeneity in producer
quality choices, and asymmetries in the probability of food fraud detection when determining the
optimal regulatory response of the government. Using a Bergsonian nonequally weighted social
welfare function, Meerza et al. (2021) show that the optimal policy response to food fraud depends
on the efficiency of dishonest producers, the type of food fraud, the political objectives of the gov-
ernment, and the relative costs of different fraud-combating policies. For instance, when it is the
more efficient producers that are engaged in fraudulent behavior, monitoring and enforcement
are shown to be the only ways to completely deter food fraud. In contrast, when the less-efficient
producers commit fraud, both increased certification costs and monitoring and enforcement can
effectively deter fraudulent behavior, with the efficiency ranking of these mechanisms determined
by their relative costs. Meerza et al. (2021) also show that a strict monitoring and enforcement pol-
icy is more effective than increased certification costs when the government wants to increase the
average product quality in the market while combating food fraud. The reason is that, although
monitoring and enforcement always increase the average product quality, the impact of increased
certification costs depends on the type of dishonest producers; when the more-efficient producers
commit food fraud, increased certification costs result in reduced (rather than increased) aver-
age product quality in the market. Finally, Meerza et al. (2021) were the first to explicitly study
certification fraud in the form of collusion between corrupt public sector officials and dishonest
producers. They show that by reducing the expected costs of food adulteration and mislabeling,
a corrupt enforcement agency provides increased incentives for food fraud. In contrast, increas-
ing monitoring and enforcement in the presence of corrupt policy enforcers results in increased
(rather than reduced) incentives for collusion between dishonest producers and policy enforcers.

Finally, Deka (2022) develops multi-stage, sequential game-theoretical models to study the im-
pact of private politics on firms’ quality and food fraud decisions. In particular, the study focuses
on (a) the strategic interaction between a firm producing a credence good and an activist who
monitors the firm and decides whether to launch a campaign to remove false quality claims and
(b) the impact of organized activism on firms’ decisions on the quality they produce and the qual-
ity they claim. A key result of this research is that, even in the presence of an activist who can
always detect food fraud, the firm can still find it optimal to misrepresent its product quality when
(a) it produces low-quality products and (b) the reputational costs of misrepresentation are rela-
tively low. Although the presence of an activist does not always deter food fraud, it does increase
the actual quality produced by the firm. In the context of the strategic interaction described above,
Deka also examines the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) investments by the firm
on (a) the activist’s incentive to monitor the firm and (b) the firm’s incentive to misrepresent the
quality of its products. The analysis shows that the greater are the CSR investments, the lower
the probability of success of the activist’s campaign, the weaker the activist’s incentives to monitor
the firm, and the stronger the firm’s incentives to misrepresent the quality of its product.
Overall, the theoretical literature on the economics of food fraud suggests that food fraud
affects consumer purchasing decisions and welfare and, through this, the market share of high-
quality products and the profits of their suppliers. The literature also shows that, contrary to
what is traditionally assumed, both low- and high-quality product producers can have incentives
to commit food fraud. Policies and strategies that increase the price premium received by the
high-quality product increase the incentives for food fraud, whereas certification and monitoring
and enforcement can deter fraudulent activity. The effectiveness and desirability of these policies
are determined by the efficiency of dishonest producers, the type of food fraud, the objective of
the government, and the costs associated with the implementation of these policies. Although
monitoring and enforcement can deter food fraud, the presence of a corrupt enforcement agency
results in increased enforcement efforts increasing (rather than reducing) the incentives for food
adulteration and mislabeling. Finally, the theoretical literature on food fraud shows that organized
activism can also deter food fraud, and firm engagement in CSR activities increases the economic
incentives for quality misrepresentation and mislabeling.
7. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FOOD FRAUD

The vast majority of empirical studies on food fraud focuses on consumer perceptions, attitudes,
and/or reactions to food fraud. Kendall et al. (2019a) review and analyze 15 recent studies on Eu-
ropean consumer perceptions and attitudes towards food fraud, and Kendall et al. (2018, 2019b)
and El Benni et al. (2019) focus on consumer attitudes, perceptions, and behavioral responses to
food fraud in China. Methodologies utilized in the quantitative and qualitative consumer studies
include quantitative surveys, focus groups and interviews, and experimental studies involving hy-
pothetical events or actual food fraud cases. More specifically, the consumer research has utilized
willingness-to-pay assessments, online and/or administered surveys, focus group studies, online
deliberation tools, in-depth interviews, and social media analysis.
Key findings of this consumer research are that (a) food fraud reduces consumer trust and
confidence in the integrity of the agri-food system and its governing agencies/institutions, and
(b) the pursuit of profits and supply chain vulnerabilities, caused by the complexity and scale
of the global food chain, are considered important determinants of fraudulent activity. The
regulatory agencies are considered indirectly responsible for the occurrence of food fraud. The
provision of information by credible sources and improved transparency of the production and
marketing processes are shown to increase consumer trust in the food system, and penalties
are considered a proper response to detected fraudulent behavior and an important consumer
confidence (re)building mechanism. Finally, this literature reveals that food fraud incidents can
cause change in consumer behavior and purchasing decisions (e.g., product avoidance, brand
and/or retailer switching, and product substitution) that can affect actors within the supply chain
not involved in fraudulent activities. An important difference between European and Chinese
consumers is that the latter consider food fraud an important food safety risk.
In more recent studies, Moreira et al. (2021) utilize principal component analysis to assess the
value of information on food labels and European consumer perception of food fraud. They show
that age and education influence consumer perception of labeling information as well as their
confidence and knowledge of food fraud. Muhammad & Countryman (2019) utilize a Rotterdam
demand system and switching regression analysis to study the impact of negative media reports
on fraudulent wine cases on Chinese consumer demand for wine. They show that these reports
have a negative impact on the demand for French wine, which is the wine most affected by fraud.
Results from studies on US consumer attitudes and reaction to food fraud are generally con-
sistent with the main findings in Europe and China. In particular, Jones Ritten et al. (2019) use
a laboratory experiment to study the impact of information on the health effects of laundered
Chinese honey and find a 27% increase in the consumer willingness-to-pay for local fraud-free
honey. Meerza & Gustafson (2019) use a laboratory experiment to determine whether knowledge
of food fraud persistently affects consumer behavior and show that prior knowledge of food fraud
significantly affects consumer valuation of the affected product. Meerza & Gustafson (2020) use
a laboratory valuation experiment to examine whether the occurrence of food fraud in a country
affects the valuation of products from that country as well as products from other countries. They
focus on extra virgin olive oil from different countries and show the presence of negative spillover
effects as fraud in one country affects the valuation of the product from all countries. Théolier
et al. (2021) apply a risk analysis approach to evaluate consumer behavior toward food fraud and
show that consumers’ knowledge of food fraud is limited and their understanding of the potential
risks is incomplete.
Regarding the producer research on food fraud, a small number of studies focus on the behavior
of individuals involved in fraudulent activities. Hirschauer & Zwoll (2008) examine fraudulent
behavior in the poultry sector in Germany and utilize a principal-agent model to determine the
level of penalties that would make fraudulent behavior unprofitable to poultry producers. Gambelli
et al. (2014) focus on misrepresentation of conventional feedstuff as organic by Italian and German
producers and use binary choice models to identify the occurrence of food fraud and farm acreage
as key determinants of the producer decision to be involved in this fraudulent activity. Finally,
Lippert et al. (2014) develop an econometric model of noncompliance with the provisions of the
Bio Suisse certification agency to study fraudulent behavior of organic producers in Switzerland.
Random effects logit models show that the probability of producer fraudulent activity increases
with processing activities, livestock diversity, and past fraudulent activities.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS

FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Food fraud represents a serious threat to the integrity of the global agri-food system and has re-
ceived considerable attention by policy makers, academics, and the public. This review presents
the conditions that enable fraud in agri-food supply chains and discusses recent efforts to docu-
ment and deter fraudulent activities and the growing theoretical and empirical literature on the
economics of food fraud.
Although the existing literature offers valuable insights into the economic causes and mar-
ket and welfare consequences of food fraud and the optimal regulatory response to fraudulent

activities in the agri-food system, there remain areas where relevant and significant research con-
tributions can be made. For instance, with the existing literature focusing on food fraud in markets
for vertically differentiated products, a meaningful extension of the research would be to study the
economic impacts of and optimal regulatory response to food adulteration and mislabeling in mar-
kets with horizontally (or variety) differentiated products. This is important because, just like the
markets for vertically differentiated products, horizontally differentiated product markets are not
immune to food fraud and have certain idiosyncrasies that could result in different incentives for
fraudulent activity and, therefore, different mechanisms for inducing the desired behavior of those
involved. Further research on the economics of food fraud could also include the (theoretical and
empirical) study of the economic causes and consequences of food adulteration and mislabeling by
different types of oligopolistic firms in markets for vertically and horizontally differentiated prod-
ucts. Such studies could determine both the exact conditions under which different types of firms
would find it optimal to engage in fraudulent activities and the different combinations/profiles of
strategies that would constitute Nash equilibria in different types of food fraud games in these
markets.
Extensions of the literature on the economics of food fraud could also focus on the strate-
gic interaction between firms/producers and the certification agencies and the determination of
mechanisms that could reduce the possibility of collusion between the parties involved, which
could reduce food fraud and increase the average product quality in the market. Finally, a greater
focus on the development of improved, more credible certification and testing and labeling
regimes and the design of more efficient and effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
could be important contributions to deterring food fraud and improving the confidence in and
integrity of the agri-food system. Hoping that our review will encourage more research on the
economics of food fraud, we look forward to important new contributions in this relevant and
significant area of research.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that
might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank Antonios Tiganis for outstanding research assistance.
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RE15_FrontMatter ARjats.cls August 16, 2023 17:15
Annual Review of
Resource
Economics
Contents Volume 15, 2023

Autobiographical
Sir Partha Dasgupta: Meeting the Challenges of Environmental

and Development Economics
Partha Dasgupta, Gordon C. Rausser, and David Zilberman p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 1
Agricultural Economics
Economics of Crop Residue Management

Vijesh V. Krishna and Maxwell Mkondiwa p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p19
Food Losses in Agrifood Systems: What We Know
Luciana Delgado, Monica Schuster, and Maximo Torero p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p41
Inferential and Behavioral Implications of Measurement Error
in Agricultural Data
Kibrom A. Abay, Tesfamicheal Wossen, Gashaw T. Abate, James R. Stevenson,
Hope Michelson, and Christopher B. Barrett p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p63
Food Fraud: Causes, Consequences, and Deterrence Strategies
Konstantinos Giannakas and Amalia Yiannaka p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p85
Environmental Economics
The Economics of Nutrient Pollution from Agriculture

Gemma Del Rossi, Mohammad Mainul Hoque, Yongjie Ji, and Catherine L. Kling p p p p 105
The Market Stability Reserve in the EU Emissions Trading System:
A Critical Review
Simone Borghesi, Michael Pahle, Grischa Perino, Simon Quemin,
and Maximilian Willner p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 131
Behavioral Economics and Neuroeconomics of Environmental Values
Phoebe Koundouri, Barbara Hammer, Ulrike Kuhl, and Alina Velias p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 153
xiii
Environmental Regulation and Labor Demand: What Does the Evidence

Tell Us?
Wayne B. Gray, Ron Shadbegian, and Ann Wolverton p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 177
Competition Policy and the Environment
Roman Inderst and Stefan Thomas p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 199
The Effects of Temperature on Labor Productivity
Wangyang Lai, Yun Qiu, Qu Tang, Chen Xi, and Peng Zhang p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 213
A Review of the Financial Sector Impacts of Risks Associated
with Climate Change

Fujin Zhou, Thijs Endendijk, and W.J. Wouter Botzen p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 233
Development Economics
Do Different Estimation Methods Lead to Implausible Differences in the

Size of Nonobserved or Shadow Economies? A Preliminary Answer
Friedrich Schneider p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 257
Food Insecurity in the United States: Measurement, Economic Modeling,
and Food Assistance Effectiveness
Travis A. Smith and Christian A. Gregory p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 279
Social Protection and Rural Transformation in Africa
Juan Sebastian Correa, Silvio Daidone, Benjamin Davis, and Nicholas J. Sitko p p p p p p p p 305
Resource Economics
Economics of Ecosystem Restoration

Alisher Mirzabaev and David Wuepper p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 329
Agroecology for a Sustainable Agriculture and Food System: From Local
Solutions to Large-Scale Adoption
Frank Ewert, Roland Baatz, and Robert Finger p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 351
The Role and Use of Mathematical Programming in Agricultural,
Natural Resource, and Climate Change Analysis
Chengcheng J. Fei and Bruce A. McCarl p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 383
Health and Nutrition Economics
A New Wave of Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Taxes: Are They Meeting

Policy Goals and Can We Do Better?
Kristin Kiesel, Hairu Lang, and Richard J. Sexton p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 407
xiv Contents
Heterogeneous Effects of Obesity on Life Expectancy: A Global

Perspective
Sangeeta Bansal and Yanhong Jin p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 433
Advances in Causal Inference at the Intersection of Air Pollution
and Health Outcomes
Dylan Brewer, Daniel Dench, and Laura O. Taylor p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 455
Research and Development

Slow Magic: Agricultural Versus Industrial R&D Lag Models

Julian M. Alston, Philip G. Pardey, Devin Serfas, and Shanchao Wang p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 471
The Rigor Revolution: New Standards of Evidence for Impact

Assessment of International Agricultural Research
James R. Stevenson, Karen Macours, and Douglas Gollin p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 495
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Resource Economics articles may be
found at http://www.annualreviews.org/errata/resource
Contents xv

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Annual Review of Resource Economics

Food Fraud: Causes,

Konstantinos Giannakas and Amalia Yiannaka

Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ. 2023. 15:85–104 Keywords

2. THE MANY FACES OF FOOD FRAUD, INCENTIVES, AND RECENT

www.annualreviews.org • Food Fraud 87

incentive/pressure (financial or environment-specific pressures), opportunity (e.g., absence of con-

are present, capability—which is related to an individual’s position or function, intellectual capac-

www.annualreviews.org • Food Fraud 89

3. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND FOOD FRAUD

4. FOOD FRAUD VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT, DOCUMENTATION,

www.annualreviews.org • Food Fraud 91

4.2. Food Fraud Documentation and Cross-Border Cooperation

4.3. Food Fraud Detection Technologies

www.annualreviews.org • Food Fraud 93

species was found in 78.3% of the samples.

5. CERTIFICATION AS A SOLUTION TO FOOD FRAUD

and manufacturers. In addition, certification bodies may be disincentivized to release information

6. THEORETICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FOOD

www.annualreviews.org • Food Fraud 95

www.annualreviews.org • Food Fraud 97

7. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FOOD FRAUD

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS

www.annualreviews.org • Food Fraud 99

100 Giannakas • Yiannaka

www.annualreviews.org • Food Fraud 101

102 Giannakas • Yiannaka

J. Food Compos. Anal. 91:103521

www.annualreviews.org • Food Fraud 103

104 Giannakas • Yiannaka

Contents Volume 15, 2023

Sir Partha Dasgupta: Meeting the Challenges of Environmental

Economics of Crop Residue Management

The Economics of Nutrient Pollution from Agriculture

Environmental Regulation and Labor Demand: What Does the Evidence

with Climate Change

Do Different Estimation Methods Lead to Implausible Differences in the

Economics of Ecosystem Restoration

Health and Nutrition Economics

A New Wave of Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Taxes: Are They Meeting

Heterogeneous Effects of Obesity on Life Expectancy: A Global

Research and Development

Slow Magic: Agricultural Versus Industrial R&D Lag Models

The Rigor Revolution: New Standards of Evidence for Impact

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