Respondent Moot

NHRC-DNLU MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2023
T.C.- R1
NHRC-DNLU MOOT COURT COMPETITON,2023
Before
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
W.P.No._______/2022
IN THE MATTER OF
\
AARON CHACKO APPELLANT 1
T-CITY APPELLANT 2
Versus
UNION OF TITANIA RESPONDENT
UPON SUBMISSION TO
THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES
OF
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
1
MEMORIAL
WRITTEN ON BEHALF
SUBMISSION OF THE
ON BEHALF OFRESPONDENT
THE RESPONDENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………………..3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………………....5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………...……………...……….
….7
STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………...………...
………….8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES……………………………………………………………...
……….10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………………………………….…….……….11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED…………………………………………………………………...12
ISSUE (1): THAT THE TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF AARON CHACKO VIOLATES

THE RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS……………………………………………………
12
1.1 The Statement made by Appellant qualify as hate speech and the liability imposed on
Appellant is a reasonable restriction on his right to freedom and expression guaranteed under
article 19.
1.2 That the statement made by Appellant 1 qualify as Defamation
1.3That Appellant 1 has breached the privacy of Fiona Connelly ……………….
ISSUE (2): THAT TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF T-CITY VIOLATES THE

RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS
2.1 T-city did not act in accordance with the It act and its associated rules
PRAYER…………………………………………………………………………………………25
2
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
LIST OF ABBREVATIONS
ABBREVIATION EXPANSION
§ Section
¶ Paragraph
A. P Andhra Pradesh
Art Article
Auth. Authority
Ed. Edition
Gov. Government
H.C. High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
IPC Indian Penal Code
IT Information Technology
Ibid Ibidem
Min. Ministry
ors Others
3
p. Page
S.C. Supreme Court
Sec Section
UOI Union of India
v. Versus
W. B West Bengal
w.r.t With Reference to
4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PG. NO.
Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2021) 3 SCC 306. 13
Gautam Deb v. Mukul Roy, 2011 SCC OnLine Cal 5463 19
Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab 1961 CrlLJ 710 18
Khawar Butt v. Asif Nazir Mir, 2013 (139) DRJ 157 18
Lakshmi Prathapan v. State of Kerala, 2014 SCC OnLine Ker 27450 22
Manisha Koirala v. Shashilal Nair, 2002 SCC OnLine Bom 827. 17
Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 8 SCC 1

20
Nikhil Racheti v. State of Maharashtra, 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 1650
24
Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1591.

12
R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu ,1995 AIR 264 22
Radha Mohan Lal v. Rajasthan High Court (2003) 3 SCC 427 15
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1962) 3 SCR 842.

14
Samatha vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors AIR 1997 SC 3297.
15
5
Sewakram Sobhani v. R.K. Karanjia, (1981) 3 SCC 208 18
Sreekumar V. v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 1305

24
Subramanian Swamy vs Union of India, Min. Of Law. (2016) 7 SCC 221
15
Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591. 20
X v. Union of India, (2021) 2 HCC (Del) 16

23
LIST OF STATUTES
India Penal Code , 1860
Information Technology Act ,2000.
IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2022
The Constitution of India, 1950
LIST OF BOOKS
V.G. RAMCHANDRAN, LAW OF WRITS, 26 (Eastern Book Company, 2006)
ARVIND P. DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (2nd ed. 2007)
M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (6th ed. 2010)
DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (14th ed. 2009)
6
*The Legal System, Constitution, and Penal Laws and all Laws are pari-materia with the Union
of India.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE PETITIONER HAS APPROACHED THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA TO

HEAR AND ADJUDICATE OVER THE INSTANT MATTER UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. THE PROVISION UNDER WHICH THE PETITIONERS
HAVE APPROACHED THE HON’BLE COURT IS READ HEREIN AS FOLLOWS:
Article 32.: Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part:
1. The right to move the SC by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
2. The SC shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto & certiorari, whatever may be
appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
3. Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the SC by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament
may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction
all or any of the powers exercisable by the SC under clause (2).
4. The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided
for by this Constitution.
THE PARTIES SHALL ACCEPT ANY JUDGEMENT OF THE COURT AS FINAL AND
BINDING FOR THEM AND SHALL EXECUTE IN ITS ENTIRETY AND IN GOOD FAITH.
7
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Introduction of the parties
 Aaron Chacko is the young member of the Thar community and the user of the T-city
account ACTFT.
 Fiona Connelly is the minister of Reconciliation in the present Titanian government and
belongs to the Zar community. She has outspoken her views against TFT and Borz also
she was alleged of impropriety as she was alleged of favoring her own community but
she has dismissed these allegations by stating that it’s a propaganda by TFT. She is an
active T-city user and posts her professional and personal life images.
 Jack Smith is a controversial figure from Borz. He has resonance with the Zar
community in Titania and is linked to anti-Thar activities.
Communities and their relations
 Titania with the population of 1 billion people, consists of 60% of Zar community and
40% Thar community population. Titania was colonized by Borz, which developed
distaste between the communities even after independence. This gradually led to rise of
conflicts between the two parties leading to destruction of public property, halting of
industries and loss of lives.
 Thar for Titania or TFT is an organization by the Thar, widely active on social media
to advocate their views and are known to carry out widespread protest and boycotts of
Zar.
Social Media
 T-city is a social media platform with half the population as users. Every post is directly
posted in public domain but the followers of that user get higher visibility of the post
made. “Trending across Titania” feature provides list of the three major events items.
8
 The “influencer score” feature enables user to obtain points for the engagement that their
post draw and the internal review found it hit amongst youth. Team of human reviewers
reviews the post which has been flagged as objectionable by the users by the way of
emailing the team. This policy was made clear to users while signing up along with T&C
that if the post is found malicious, false and harmful by the team, they will remove it.
 Action Finance Times is a reliable news channel which also has an account on T-city
under the name of “ACT-FT News”. They post new stories and reshares stories from
other T-city handles.
Timeline of the events
 On 1st July, Aaron creates an account “ACTFT” formed by using his initials and TFT. On
4th July, an account named “Patriot 1” is created on T-city with the bio “Only for laughs”.
On 1st August, he comes across the skillfully doctored picture of Fiona Connelly and Jack
Smith with no caption. In the image, she was naked and was reaching out for a bag of cash
being proffered by Jack Smith; both were unaware of the fact that they being were
photographed.
 On 1st August, 10 AM, Aaron reshares the picture and adds the caption, “…Connelly
finally shows her true colors?”. He also tags Fiona and ACT-FT News and posts and
publishes it. Within an hour it goes viral with 50,000 shares toping the Trending across
Titania lists.
 On 1st August, 4 PM, Fiona’s legal team sends an email to human review team with a
dual request but received an auto generated email stating to check the checkbox. On 2nd
August, 11 AM, Fiona’s legal team wrote a letter to T -city threatening to sue them for
defamation and breach of privacy if it was not removed. On 3rd August, 1 PM, T-city
removed the post and 5,00,000 re shares. On 5th August, the user behind Patriot 1 deleted
the account. On 7th August, Fiona resigned from her public office as she faced protest,
accusing comments on T -city account, and eventually skirmishes broke out.
The Trail and its findings
 Aaron was arrested and convicted for the distribution of fake images, breaching
privacy, inciting hateful speech and violence and was fined with INR50,000 along with
9
a jail time of one year. He further stated that he heard that ACT-FT News was about to
break the story and thus in order to increase the influencer score, which he decided to
publish “to show the actions of Fiona”.
 T -city was trailed for publishing and distributing fake images leading to breach of her
privacy and communicating, facilitating spread of false information and delaying
expeditiously taking down false information for which they were imposed with the
penalty of INR1,00,000. The trial court found that the image was skillfully doctored and
photoshopped over the body of another person from pornographic site.
10
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
~1~
WHETHER TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF AARON CHACKO VIOLATES THE
RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS?
~2~
WHETHER TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF T-CITY VIOLATES THE RELEVANT
LEGAL PROVISIONS?
11
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
ISSUE(1): THAT TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF AARON CHACKO DOES NOT

VIOLATE THE RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS
It is humbly submitted that Aaron Chacko was prosecuted for hate speech, defamation and
breach of privacy. Aaron under the title of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed
under article 19(1)(a) spread hatred, derogatory and disparaging speech about Fiona and
her community by referred her as anti Thar. His act has satisfied the definition of
defamation under sec 499 of IPC. By resharing false and misleading nudes of Fiona on his
Tcity handle, he had violated a women’s right to dignity and her privacy simultaneously.
ISSUE(2): THAT TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF T-CITY DOES NOT VIOLATE THE

RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS
12
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE (1): TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF AARON CHACKO DOES NOT VIOLATES

THE RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS
1.1 Whether the statement of Appellant 1 constitutes hate speech, and whether his right to free
expression as protected by Article 19 may be restricted?
1. It is submitted that “Hate speech is an effort to marginalize individuals based on their
membership in a group. Using expression that exposes the group to hatred, hate speech
seeks to delegitimize group members in the eyes of the majority, reducing their social
standing and acceptance within society. Hate speech, therefore, rises beyond causing
distress to individual group members. It can have a social impact. It lays the ground-
work for later, broad attacks on vulnerable that can range from discrimination, to
ostracism, segregation, deportation, violence and, in the most extreme cases, to
genocide. Hate speech also impacts a protected group's ability to respond to the
substantive ideas under debate, thereby placing a serious barrier to their full
participation in our democracy”.1
2. In the present case, the statement made by Appellant 1 along with the picture reshared led
to the incitement of violence among the two communities Zars and Thars which resulted
in death of two and shutting down of many industries. This speech was believed to be
true by many and resulted in Ms. Fiona Connelly receiving threatening calls from
anonymous callers. She also witnessed protests and demonstrations against her and
received comments on her social media handle accusing her of something which she did
not even do. Eventually she had to resign as a repercussion of the caption published by
1
Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1591.
13
Appellant 1. Therefore, in the light of these circumstances it is judicious to Conclude that

the statement published by Appellant 1 satisfies all the essentials of hate speech.
3. It is submitted that the hon’ble supreme court defined three distinct elements that
governments and courts can employ to define and distinguish hate speech: “The content-
based element involves open use of words and phrases generally considered to be
offensive to a particular community and objectively offensive to the society. It can
include use of certain symbols and iconography. By applying objective standards, one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know that the content would allow anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”. 2 That in the
present case, Appellant 1 referred to Fionna Connelly as an anti-thar politician while
sharing the post. She is the minister of reconciliation in the current administration.
Calling her anti-of a particular community will inevitably cause individuals to think that
she favors that community since she is a member of the Zar Community, which will
make that community the target of hatred in the eyes of the majority. Therefore, the
words and phrases used by appellant 1 were offensive to a particular community and
objectively offensive to the society, satisfying the content-based element to constitute the
offence of hate speech.
4. “The intent-based element of 'hate speech' requires the speaker's message to intend only
to promote hatred, violence or resentment against a particular class or group without
communicating any legitimate message. This requires subjective intent on the part of the
speaker to target the group or person associated with the class group”. In the case hand,
Appellant 1 reshared a morphed picture of Fiona Connelly and jack smith and added the
caption to it “Connelly finally shows her true colors?........ Is she selling out the country
for cash?”. This post shared by the along with this caption was not verified by appellant
1, he did not even bother to read the Bio of the Patriot 1 who posted the picture, which
clearly mentioned "only for laughs".3 Hence he did not take any measures to verify the
information he alleges he was sharing to expose Fiona Connelly. Additionally, Aaron's
justification at the trial court was ambiguous since he did not specify his source for the
information that the ACTFT-News was preparing to break the story. Hence, his intent
2
Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2021) 3 SCC 306.
3
Para 17, Moot Proposition NHRC-DNLU Moot Court Competition 2023.
14
was to incite hatred, violence, or resentment towards a certain class or group while not
communicating any legitimate message, thus satisfying the intent-based element.
5. “The harm or impact-based element refers to the consequences of the hate speech', that
is, harm to the victim which can be violent or such as loss of self-esteem, economic or
social subordination, physical and mental stress, silencing of the victim and effective
exclusion from the political arena.” In this matter, the statement made by Appellant 1
harmed Fionna in a number of ways, including the loss of her public reputation and
mental anguish as a result of countless protests and comments on her post, as well as
anonymous calls threatening her. Furthermore, this statement affected her reputation in
the political realm as the fake or morphed image showed her with the anti-Thar politician
from Borz and eventually she had to resign from the office. Thus, the statement made by
Appellant 1 satisfies the harm or impact-based element to constitute the offence of hate
speech.
6. It is submitted that the above mentioned three elements are not watertight silos and do
overlap and are interconnected and linked. Only when they are present that they produce
structural continuity to constitute hate speech. In the present case the statement made by
Appellant 1 satisfies all these three elements and hence he is liable for the offence of hate
speech.
7. It is submitted that the present cases pertain specifically to derogatory, disparaging
speech, which closely resembles hate speech. Such speech does not fall within the
protective perimeter of Article 19(1)(a) and does not constitute the content of the free
speech right. Therefore, where such speech has the consequence of violating another
person's fundamental right under Article 21, it does not create a situation that calls for the
balancing of conflicting rights, but rather one in which someone has exploited their
freedom of speech to attack the fundamental rights of another. Therefore, in the present
case the conviction of Aaron is a reasonable restriction on his freedom of speech and
restriction.
8. That freedom of speech can be restricted only in the interest of security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality or in relation to
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. 4 In the present case the
4
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1962) 3 SCR 842
15
statement made by Aaron led to demonstrations and protests outside the office of Fiona 5.
There are clashes between Thars and Zars in various parts of the country. One such
incident resulted in the death of two Thar community members at the hands of a Zar mob.
Industries were shut down in a few regions of the nation as a result of the ongoing
protests6. Hence, the liability imposed on Appellant 1 is a reasonable restriction on his
freedom of speech and expression since the consequences of his statement undermined
the security of the State and caused public disorder. Furthermore, the picture reshared by
Appellant depicted Fiona with jack smith who is from Borz. This can also affect relations
between the two countries; thus, the restriction is reasonable in order to maintain friendly
relations with a foreign state.
9. That freedom of expression is a cornerstone of democratic government. This freedom is
essential for proper functioning of democratic process. The freedom of speech under
Article 19(1)(a) includes right to express one's views and opinions at any issue through
any medium, such as spoken words, writing, printing, pictures, films, and other visual
media. Thus, it encompasses the freedom of expression and right to propagate or publish
opinions. But this right, as said by the Supreme Court is subject to reasonable restrictions
being imposed under Article 19(2).7 Free expression cannot be equated or confused with
the right to utter false, reckless, and hateful remarks in order to cause commotion, tumult,
and turmoil. Same is true qua present case. The statement issued by the appellant
endangered state security and public order by inciting conflicts between the two
communities. Furthermore, the statement and the picture also deteriorated relations with
neighboring country Borz. Hence, in light of this the liability imposed on Appellant 1 was
a reasonable restriction on his freedom of speech and expression.
10. It is submitted that the three fundamental principles of our Constitution's Preamble are
8
equality, liberty, and fraternity. ‘Hate speech,’ in the meaning outlined above,
undermines each of these core values by showcasing an unequal society. It also breaches
the fraternity of citizens from all backgrounds, which is a sine qua non of a cohesive
society founded on pluralism and multi-culturalism, such as Titania.
5
6
7
Radha Mohan Lal v. Rajasthan High Court (2003) 3 SCC 427.
8
Samatha vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors AIR 1997 SC 3297.
16
11. That the decision of this Court in Subramanian Swamy establishes precedent of justifying
a restraint on free speech, on the ground of promotion of fraternity 9. It has been
acknowledged that all citizens are obligated by the constitutional value of fraternity to
serve the common good and uphold the equality and dignity of their fellow citizens. It has
been held that restrictions on free speech mandated to achieve these objectives are
justifiable since they serve to uphold the preambular ideal of fraternity. It should also be
noted that, in the aforementioned case, this Court acknowledged that fraternity as a virtue
ought to be nurtured by citizens themselves as part of their social behaviour by refraining
from making defamatory statements. This chord of the said judgment, acknowledges the
idea of self-restraint on inherent restraints as being read into the right to freedom of
speech and expression. In the present case the statement made by Appellant 1 directly
violates the principle of fraternity. His description of Fiona as an anti-thar politician will
inevitably lead to conflicts between the two communities, the Zars and the Thars, hence
the liability imposed on him is reasonable.
12. That every right encompasses and includes a duty to respect another's right and ensure
mutual compatibility and conviviality of persons based on collective harmony,
culminating in social order. Every citizen is expected to uphold the other's dignity under
the Constitution's fraternity idea. In the context of constitutional fraternity, fundamental
duties engrafted under Article 51-A of the Constitution gain significance. 10 Sub-clause
(c), (e) and (i) of Article 51-A of the Constitution which are relevant to these cases read
as follows:
“Article 51-A. Fundamental Duties-. - It shall be the duty of every citizen of India-
(c) to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India;
(e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of
India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities; to renounce
practices derogatory to the dignity of women;”.
13. It is submitted that in the case at hand appellant 1 has violated both of the above-
mentioned duties. He made a statement that sparked demonstrations and conflicts
between the two communities across the nation, undermining the nation's unity and
integrity. He made a statement that sparked demonstrations and conflicts between the two
9
Subramanian Swamy vs Union of India, Min. Of Law. (2016) 7 SCC 221.
10
Ibid.
17
communities across the nation, undermining the nation's unity and integrity. Additionally,
by referring to Fiona Connelly as an anti-thar politician and sharing a picture of her in a
nude state, he incited hostility between the two communities and degraded a woman's
dignity. Hence, the appellant has breached both of his duties.
14. Therefore, in the light of all the above-mentioned provisions and cases it can be
concluded that the liability imposed on Appellant 1 is a reasonable restriction on his
freedom of speech and expression in the interests of the State's security, friendly relations
with foreign states, and public order, as established in Article 19. (2).
1.2 Whether the statement made by Appellant 1 qualifies as Defamation?

15. At the outset the counsel for the defendants submits that Fiona Connelly is respected
citizen of the country and a Minister for reconciliation in the current government. 11 By
virtue of the nature of the public office occupied by her with the Government of Titania
she is a highly reputed member of the society. The false image and misrepresentation
reshared by Aaron Chacko12 on T-city has greatly injured her reputation and thus
Appellant no 1 would be liable for defamation.
The statement made by Appellant 1 satisfies all the essentials of defamation
16. The respondent humbly submits that all the essentials required to constitute the offence of
defamation are fulfilled by appellant no. 1’s act of resharing the post originally shared by Patriot
1.
17. That Section 499 of the IPC defines defamation as an imputation concerning a person
intending to or having reason to believe that such imputation would harm the reputation
of that person. The essentials to constitute an offence of defamation are as follows:
I. The statement exposes the person to whom it concerns to hatred, ridicule, and also
has a tendency to injure him in his office or profession;
II. It is a false statement about a person and causes harm to the reputation of that
person;
11
12
18
III. The statement about the person lowers that person in the estimation of right-
thinking members of society generally”13
18. That in the instant case, it is likely that appellant no 1 knew that the image being reshared
by him would harm the reputation of Ms. Fiona Connelly as it was a nude image of her
taking money from a controversial figure, Jack Smith. The reshared post was a morphed
and false Image as concluded during the court proceedings and it greatly impacted the
reputation of Ms. Connelly and lowered her in the estimation of the right-thinking
members of the society. This is evident as Ms. Connelly received a lot of accusing
comments in her T-city inbox, threatening calls as well as witnessed protests and
demonstrations outside her office. 14She was finally forced to resign from her office as the
minister of reconciliation for the Republic of Titania. The imputation made by appellant
no 1 exposed Ms. Connelly to hatred, and injured her profession as a popular minister of
Titania. Thus, Appellant no 1 would be liable for defamation under section 499 of IPC as
the essentials were met and the imputations made by Appellant no 1 caused harm to
Fiona Connelly’s reputation.
Resharing a post would attract the liability of defamation
19. It is submitted that Republication of defamatory material with a view to reach a larger
section would attract the liability of defamation on the person resharing the post. 15 The
liability on the person resharing the post is the same as it would have been had the
imputation been originally made by him.16 In the instant case, as appellant no 1 reshared
the post originally shared by patriot 1, with the intention to boost his influencer score. He
also had an intention to make the post reach a large section as his clear by his act of
tagging accounts with huge number of followers such as Fiona Connelly’s and ACT-FT
news’s T-city account.17 Thus the liability on appellant 1 would be the same as if he had
13
Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221, Manisha Koirala v. Shashilal Nair, 2002 SCC OnLine
Bom 827.
14
Para 12, Moot Proposition NHRC-DNLU Moot Court Competition 2023
15
Para 38, Khawar Butt v. Asif Nazir Mir, 2013 (139) DRJ 157
16
Para 4 Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab ,1961 CrlLJ 710
17
Para 10, Moot Proposition NHRC-DNLU Moot Court Competition 2023
19
himself shared the defamatory post, i.e., he would attract liability under section 499 of the
Indian Penal Code and be liable for defamation.
Defence under exception 9 cannot be used as essentials have not been fulfilled
20. It is submitted that in order to attract the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the Penal Code, 1860,
the imputations must be shown to have been made (1) in good faith, and (2) for the protection of
the interest of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. Section 52 of
the Penal Code, 1860 lays down due care and attention as the essentials of good faith. 18 “To
establish good faith the person taking the defence has to establish as a fact that he made enquiry
before he made the imputation and he has to give reasons and facts to indicate that he acted with
due care and attention and was satisfied that the imputation was true. The accent is on the
enquiry, care and objective and not subjective satisfaction. The appellant must show that the
belief in his impugned statement had a rational basis and was not just a blind simple belief.” 19 The
failure of the appellant to prove good faith would exclude the application of the Ninth Exception
in favour of the accused even if requirement of public good is satisfied. 20
21. That Appellant no. 1 reshared the image originally shared by patriot 1, before making the
imputation he did not make a reasonable effort to find out whether the image was true or not,
despite knowing that it was a nude image and it could potentially cause harm to Ms. Fiona’s
reputation. He reshared the image from an account that he did not even follow and whose bio
mentioned just for laughs.21 Thus, it is evident that to increase his follower count, Appellant no. 1
just reshared patriot 1’s post without taking sufficient care and without a rational belief hence
there is absence of good faith on the side of Appellant 1 and this excludes the application of
exception 9. Thus, appellant no 1 would be unable to take the relief of exception 9 of section 499
of the IPC.
22. That Appellant no. 1 reshared the image originally shared by patriot 1, before making the
imputation he did not make a reasonable effort to find out whether the image was true or not,
despite knowing that it was a nude image and it could potentially cause harm to Ms. Fiona’s
reputation. He reshared the image from an account that he did not even follow and whose bio
mentioned just for laughs.22 Thus, it is evident that to increase his follower count, Appellant no. 1
18
Page 218: Sewakram Sobhani v. R.K. Karanjia, (1981) 3 SCC 208.
19
Supra 16.
20
Page 590, Gautam Deb v. Mukul Roy, 2011 SCC OnLine Cal 5463 .
21
Para 17 Moot Proposition NHRC-DNLU Moot Court Competition 2023.
22
Ibid.
20
just reshared patriot 1’s post without taking sufficient care and without a rational belief hence
there is absence of good faith on the side of Appellant 1 and this excludes the application of
exception 9. Thus, appellant no 1 would be unable to take the relief of exception 9 of section 499
of the IPC.
The liability imposed on appellant no 1 is a reasonable restriction on his right to freedom of

speech and expression under as provided under article 19(2)
23. The counsel for the respondent humbly submits that the liability imposed on Appellant no
1 is a reasonable restriction on his freedom of speech and expression under article 19(2)
of The Constitution of India, 1950.
24. It is submitted that the Constitution of India provides free speech and expression to all
citizens under article 19(1)(a). However, certain restrictions for the same have been
provided under article 19(2). Freedom of speech can be restricted only in the interests of
(i) friendly relations with foreign State, (ii) public order, (iii) decency or morality, (iv)
defamation.23 In the present case the post reshared by appellant no 1 containing a nude
image of Ms. Conelly accepting a bag of cash from Mr. Jack Smith, a controversial figure
from Borz, was a threat to Titania’s friendly relations with foreign states such as Borz.
Additionally, Ms. Conelly being the minister of reconciliation for the present government
of Titania and harm to her reputation due to the post could also lead to damage in friendly
ties with other foreign nations. The resharing of the post also led to disruption in public
order as is apparent by the large number of people showing up for demonstrations outside
Ms. Connelly’s office. Additionally, skirmishes broke out in different parts of the country
between Thars and Zars and this led to two deaths and some industries were shut down
24
due to the protests. Thus, the liability imposed on Appellant no 1 is a reasonable
restriction on his freedom of speech and expression as it was accordance with the
restrictions laid down under article 19(2) of the Constitution of India.
1.3 Whether Appellant 1 had breached the privacy of Fiona Connelly?

25. The counsel for the respondents humbly submits before this honorable court that
appellant no. 1 was arrested and convicted for breaching Ms. Connelly’s privacy. The
23
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1962) 3 SCR 842.
24
21
imputations made by the appellant harmed Ms. Connelly’s reputation, which is a facet of
article 21 of the Constitution of India.25
26. It is humbly submitted that the right to privacy is a natural right 26 and thus is available to
each and every citizen irrespective of their caste and race. Right to privacy is guaranteed
under article 21 along with right to dignity. The Constitution of India guarantees freedom
of speech and expression under article 19 (1)(a) but it also safeguards other citizens right
to dignity by putting reasonable restrictions to article 19(1)(a) under article 19(2). Every
citizen is eligible to exercise her right of freedom of speech and expression till it does not
harm others right to reputation or right to dignity. 27 Sharing of the false or unverified
information in public domain amounts to exercise of right of freedom of speech even
though it is done for public good, public good being subjective does not mean spreading
of false information. In the case of Smriti Zubin Irani v. Pawan Khera28, the defendant
had shared false and unverified information which were defamatory allegations about the
plaintiff, a politician on a social media and the case was ruled in the favor of the plaintiff.
In the instant case, appellant no 1 had posted an image and a caption in the public domain
without verifying it, leading to spreading of false information about and breach of Ms.
Connelly’s privacy. The image reshared by appellant 1 had originally been shared by an
account, Patriot 1 even though he had no higher visibility of the same since he didn’t
followed Patriot 1 and hadn’t verified the same.
27. That Protection of an individual right is essential for social stability as when an individual
is harmed, it leads to the whole society being affected. 29 A false allegation about a person
could lead to his reputation being damaged forever. 30 The post reshared by appellant 1
was defamatory towards Ms. Fiona as proved hereinabove and harmed her reputation. It
led to long term consequences on her reputation as she was a popular politician and a
25
Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 8 SCC 1, Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC
591.
26
Ibid
27
Para 18: Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 10 SCC 519.
28
29
Supra 9
30
Supra 27
22
minister in the present government31. Ms. Connelly’s reputation has greatly been harmed
is evident by the large number threatening phone calls received by her and the
demonstrations made against her. As a result of the post reshared by Appellant 1 it not
only led to great harm to Ms. Connelly’s reputation but also led to skirmishes across the
country, deaths and industries being shut down32. Thus, an individual’s right should be
protected as its violation could not only cause harm to the individual but also to the
society.
28. That “None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent _
whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would
be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action
for damages33.” The defense taken by appellant no 1 during the trial, that he had ‘heard’
that the ACTFT-News was about to break the news about Fiona was vague since he
posted the image from Patriot 1 and not from ACTFT-News and even if had heard so, he
did not take due care to verify his source before reposting the image. Even if he had
reshared the image in public good, he did not take Ms. Connelly’s consent before
reposting image and thus is liable for breach of her privacy.
29. It is submitted that Section 66E of the Information Technology Act, 2000 mentions the
Punishment for violation of privacy. To attract the offence under this section, the
accused should have intentionally published the image of a private area of any person
without her consent and he would be liable for violating the privacy of that person. 34 The
person violating the privacy of that person shall be punished with imprisonment which
may extend to three years or with fine not exceeding two lakh rupees, or with both. 35 In
the instant case, Appellant no. 1 had knowingly reshared the post containing a nude
image of Ms. Connelly without her consent and thus violated her privacy. It is mentioned
hereinabove how Ms. Connelly’s privacy was breached by Mr. Chacko’s act of resharing her
nude image. As Appellant 1 violated the privacy of an individual, he would attract punishment
under section 66 E of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and would be liable to imprisonment
up to three years and a fine of INR 100,000.
31
32
33
R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu ,1995 AIR 264.
34
Lakshmi Prathapan v. State of Kerala, 2014 SCC OnLine Ker 27450.
35
Section 66 E, The Information Technology Act, 2000.
23
ISSUE (2): THAT THE TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF T-CITY DOES VIOLATES THE RELEVANT
LEGAL PROVISIONS.
2.1 Whether T-city acted in accordance with the IT ACT, 2000 and its associated rules?
30. It is submitted that T-city is a social media intermediary as defined under Section 2(1)
(w) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics
Code) Rules, 2021. However, as it is not in compliance with the grievance redressal
mechanism required to be followed by a social media intermediary under the Information
Technology Rules and thus would be liable as per Section 79 of the Information
Technology Act, 2000.
T-city did not act in compliance with the grievance redressal mechanism mentioned in the
IT Rules, 2021.
31. It is submitted that Rule 3(2)(b) of the 2021 Rules, 36provides that an intermediary must
take all reasonable and feasible means to delete or prevent access to artificially morphed
images of an individual that is hosted, stored, published, or transmitted by it within 24
hours of receiving a complaint.37 In the instant case, Appellant 1 had reshared an
artificially morphed38 nude image of Ms. Fiona Connelly, this image was hosted as well
as transmitted that is circulated by the platform of T-city. On 1 st August at 11:00 am, Ms.
Connelly’s office wrote a mail to the human review team of T-city, requesting them to
remove Appellant 1’s post from the trending across Titania list and to remove the post
itself. However, T-city did not remove the post and it was only when Ms. Connelly’s
counsel sent a letter threatening to sue T-city on 2 nd morning, that T-city removed the
post. However, T-city removed the post on 3 rd August at 1:00 pm, which was after 24
hours of receiving the complaint.39
32. It is submitted that Rule 7 of the 2021 Rules 40, clearly states that in case the intermediary
is unable to fulfil its obligation under 2021 Rules, the exemption available to an
36
Rule 3(2)(b), IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021
37
X v. Union of India, (2021) 2 HCC (Del) 16
38
. Para 17 Moot Proposition NHRC-DNLU Moot Court Competition 2023.
39
40
Rule 7, IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2022
24
intermediary under 79(1) shall not be available. The exemption from liability provided by
section 79 of the IT Act to an intermediary would be revoked if the intermediary failed to
remove or block access to illegal content. failure by the intermediary o comply with the
2021 Rules, exposes the intermediary to punishment under both the IT Act and the Penal
Code of 1860.41 T-city being an intermediary, has the exemption from liability under
section 79 of the IT Act, 2000. However, as it failed to comply with Rule 3(2)(b), the
exemption provided to intermediaries under section 79 would no longer be available to T-
city as per Rule 7 of the IT Rules,2021.
33. That essential Ingredients for Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 200042, are
as follows: “(i) there must be a publication or transmission of any material in the
electronic form. (ii) this material must be lewd. (iii) This material is likely to deprave and
corrupt those who see the matter contained in it.” 43.44 Conviction under this section shall
lead to imprisonment up to three years and with fine up to five lakh rupees. In the instant
case, the post reshared by appellant 1 was electronically transmitted by T-city. This post
contained a nude image of Ms. Connelly with a Mr. Jack Smith 45 and thus the post could
be considered as lewd or lascivious. Due to the image being nude there is a possibility
that it may corrupt those who come across it. As the post went viral and was seen by a
large number of users on T-city 46, it possibly corrupted the large number of T-city users
who came across the post. As all the essentials of section 67 are met, appellant 2 is liable
for transmitting obscene material in electronic form and would be liable to pay a fine of
five lakh rupees.
41
Supra 37.
42
Section 67, The Information Technology Act, 2000
43
Sreekumar V. v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 1305
44
Nikhil Racheti v. State of Maharashtra, 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 1650
45
46
Para 10, 12 Moot Proposition NHRC-DNLU Moot Court Competition 2023.
25
PRAYER
WHEREFORE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND AUTHORITIES
CITED, IT IS MOST HUMBLY PRAYED THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO ADJUDGE
AND DECLARE:
1. THAT APPELANT 1 LIABLE FOR HATE SPEECH, BREACH OF PRIVACY AND

DEFAMTION, THUS THE FINE OF 50,000 IMPRISONMENT OF ONE YEAR
WOULD BE APPLICABLE
2. THAT APPELANT 2 DID NOT ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH IT ACT AND RULES
AND IS LIABLE UNDER AND THUS THE FINE OF 200,000 WOULD BE
APPLICABLE.
3. THAT THE LIABILTY IMPOSED BY TRIAL COURT IS AN REASONABLE

RESTRICTION ON THEIR FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.
AND/OR
PASS ANY OTHER ORDER THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.
ALL OF WHICH IS MOST HUMBLY PRAYED.
DATED: 22-23, January 22, 2023. S/d-

PLACE: Titania. COUNSEL for RESPONDENTS.
26
27

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NHRC-DNLU MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2023

NHRC-DNLU MOOT COURT COMPETITON,2023

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

AARON CHACKO APPELLANT 1

UNION OF TITANIA RESPONDENT

ISSUE (1): THAT THE TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF AARON CHACKO VIOLATES

1.2 That the statement made by Appellant 1 qualify as Defamation

1.3That Appellant 1 has breached the privacy of Fiona Connelly ……………….

ISSUE (2): THAT TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF T-CITY VIOLATES THE

H.C. High Court

IPC Indian Penal Code

S.C. Supreme Court

UOI Union of India

w.r.t With Reference to

CASES PG. NO.

Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2021) 3 SCC 306. 13

Gautam Deb v. Mukul Roy, 2011 SCC OnLine Cal 5463 19

Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab 1961 CrlLJ 710 18

Khawar Butt v. Asif Nazir Mir, 2013 (139) DRJ 157 18

Lakshmi Prathapan v. State of Kerala, 2014 SCC OnLine Ker 27450 22

Manisha Koirala v. Shashilal Nair, 2002 SCC OnLine Bom 827. 17

Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 8 SCC 1

Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1591.

R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu ,1995 AIR 264 22

Radha Mohan Lal v. Rajasthan High Court (2003) 3 SCC 427 15

Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1962) 3 SCR 842.

Sewakram Sobhani v. R.K. Karanjia, (1981) 3 SCC 208 18

Sreekumar V. v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 1305

Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591. 20

X v. Union of India, (2021) 2 HCC (Del) 16

India Penal Code , 1860

Information Technology Act ,2000.

IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2022

The Constitution of India, 1950

V.G. RAMCHANDRAN, LAW OF WRITS, 26 (Eastern Book Company, 2006)

ARVIND P. DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (2nd ed. 2007)

M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (6th ed. 2010)

DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (14th ed. 2009)

THE PETITIONER HAS APPROACHED THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA TO

Article 32.: Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part:

Introduction of the parties

Communities and their relations

Timeline of the events

The Trail and its findings

ISSUE(1): THAT TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF AARON CHACKO DOES NOT

ISSUE(2): THAT TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF T-CITY DOES NOT VIOLATE THE

ISSUE (1): TITANIA’S PROSECUTION OF AARON CHACKO DOES NOT VIOLATES

Appellant 1. Therefore, in the light of these circumstances it is judicious to Conclude that

1.2 Whether the statement made by Appellant 1 qualifies as Defamation?

The statement made by Appellant 1 satisfies all the essentials of defamation

Resharing a post would attract the liability of defamation

The liability imposed on appellant no 1 is a reasonable restriction on his right to freedom of

1.3 Whether Appellant 1 had breached the privacy of Fiona Connelly?

1. THAT APPELANT 1 LIABLE FOR HATE SPEECH, BREACH OF PRIVACY AND

3. THAT THE LIABILTY IMPOSED BY TRIAL COURT IS AN REASONABLE

ALL OF WHICH IS MOST HUMBLY PRAYED.

DATED: 22-23, January 22, 2023. S/d-

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