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Isaiah's Attitude in the Sennacherib Campaign

Author(s): Kemper Fullerton


Source: The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures , Oct., 1925, Vol. 42,
No. 1 (Oct., 1925), pp. 1-25
Published by: The University of Chicago Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/528476

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The American Journal of
SEMITIC LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES

Volume XLII OCTOBER 1925 Number 1

ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB


CAMPAIGN'
BY KEMPER FULLERTON
Oberlin Graduate School of Theology, Oberlin, Ohio

ISAIAH AND THE ANTI-ASSYRIAN PARTY IN JUDAH

Perhaps some excuse should be offered for retur


to the discussion of this rather hackneyed subject
most important subjects that can engage the atten
Testament student. The attitude of Isaiah towar
Sennacherib campaign involves the question of his
Jerusalem. If the interpretation of his prophecies w
been current is correct, Isaiah defied Assyria in 701
inviolability of Zion where Jahweh dwells. His anti
cies would therefore furnish most important data
the development of the Deuteronomic idea. In f
become, perhaps quite unwittingly, the chief early p
doctrine of Jerusalem's sacrosanct character which late
sion in the slogan of the prophetical and priestly
Jeremiah's day-"The Temple of the Lord, the Tem
the Temple of the Lord"-a slogan which Jeremiah f
in the interest of a higher religion to repudiate along w
which went with it.2 But, though the problem of t
1 An outline of the present essay was given as the presidential address at the meeting
of the American Oriental Society (Middle West Branch) held at Evanston, Ill., March, 1925.
2 Cf. Jer., chaps. 7, 26.
1

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2 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES

prophecies, especially those supposed to have been spoken in the


paign of 701, is so important, no consensus of opinion has yet
secured as to their genuineness or interpretation. Unfortunate
Isaiah's attitude at this time is not only one of the most import
but also one of the most disputed problems in the history of pre-ex
prophecy.
The special reason, however, which leads me to discuss this ques-
tion before a meeting of the Oriental Society is the fact that, in study-
ing the perplexing accounts of the Sennacherib campaign, we are
bound to listen to the Assyriologist and Egyptologist as well as to the
biblical scholar. The fly from the canals of Egypt and the bee from
the land of Assyria have come and settled in the wadies of our bib-
lical Holy Land, and we cannot escape them.' Professor Breasted,
for example, in his invaluable histories of Egypt, does not think the
mention of Tirhaka in II Kings 19:9 = Isa. 37:9 is an anachronism.2
Professor Olmstead, in his very important History of Assyria, appears
to accept the Isaiah narratives of the Sennacherib campaign not only
for substance of doctrine, but in most of their specific details,3 while
Professor Price, in the second edition of his informing book on The
Old Testament and the Monuments (1925), takes practically the same
view as Olmstead. In fact, we have the curious and rather disconcert-
ing spectacle of many biblical critics defending the Assyrian account
of the campaign at the expense of the biblical, while many Assyriolo-
gists incline to accept the biblical account at the expense of the As-
syrian! If any other reason for once more adverting to this vexed
subject were needed, it might be found in the recent edition de luxe of
the magnificent Prism Inscription of Sennacherib just published by
Professor Luckenbill for the Oriental Institute of the University of
Chicago, in which the author takes occasion to present to us all of the
available inscriptional material thus far discovered bearing on the
campaigns of Sennacherib.4 The fact that Professor J. M. Powis
Smith has already taken advantage of the recent literature just men-
tioned to reopen the whole subject of the Isaiah narratives in his
very able article in this Journal for July, 1924, might excuse me from
1 Isa. 7:18, with apologies for the use of the metaphor in this connection.
2 History of Egypt (1905), p. 552; History of the Ancient Egyptians (1908), p. 376.
Op. cit. (1923), chap. xxv.
4 The Annals of Sennacherib (1924), hereafter referred to as OIP (Oriental Institute
Prism).

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ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB CAMPAIGN 3

further discussion of it. Yet I am unable to resist the temptation


afforded by the present occasion to reinforce the exhortations of m
Old Testament colleague and to convert, if possible, the Gojim from
the errors of their Assyrian and Egyptian ways. I shall discuss th
topic under three main heads: (1) Isaiah and the anti-Assyrian part
in Judah, (2) the criticism and dating of Isaiah, chapters 28-33, an
(3) the Isaiah narratives themselves (II Kings 18:13-20:21 = Isaiah
chaps. 36-39). The present essay will be devoted to the first of thes
topics.
I. Down to 720 there is no evidence in the available documents of
the existence of an anti-Assyrian party in Judah. The evidence sup-
posed to be found at Isa. 8:8-10 cannot be regarded as convincing.'
Yet historical probabilities favor the assumption that there was such
a party. The advance of Assyria into the west, from 738 to 701,
under Tiglath-pileser III, Shalmaneser IV, Sargon, and Sennacherib,
determined the policies of the Syrian and Palestinian states for a
generation. In each of these states there were those who favored
submission to Assyria, and there were those who were determined to
resist to the bitter end. In the political crisis, for example, precipitated
by Tiglath-pileser's activities in the West from 738 to 732, while
Damascus, true to its tradition of a hundred years, remained consist-
ently anti-Assyrian, this was not the case in Israel. The dynasty of
Jehu which, so far as we can gather, had remained pro-Assyrian since
the time of Jehu's tribute to Shalmaneser in 842, ended in a bloody
revolt just as Tiglath-pileser came to the throne in 745. The ensuing
anarchy was largely complicated by the question of what attitude
should be adopted toward Assyria. With the accession of Pekah
(ca. 735) the anti-Assyrian party secured control of the state and allied
themselves with Damascus, Israel's traditional enemy. But the party
was temporarily overwhelmed when Tiglath-pileser crushed these un-
natural allies in his great campaigns of 734-732. Pekah was murdered
in a conspiracy, and Hoshea was placed on the throne. The assassina-
tion of Pekah is to be attributed to the pro-Assyrian party, for his
rival, Hoshea, was confirmed in power by Tiglath-pileser.2
1 See the writer's article on "The Interpretation of Isa. 8:8-10," JBL (1924), pp.
253 ff.
2 See II Kings 15:16; The Annals of Tiglath-pileser, 11. 228 f.; "Kleinere Inschriften."
1l. 17 f. (the references here and hereafter are to Rost's edition: Keilschriftliche Texte
Tiglath-pileser's III); and the writer's article on "Isaiah's Earliest Prophecy against
Ephraim," AJSL (Oct., 1916), pp. 31 ff.

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4 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES

An exactly similar situation obtained at the same time in Ash


kelon. There the anti-Assyrian king, Mitinti, was compelled by Ti
lath-pileser to give way to his pro-Assyrian son, Rukiptu.1 Later,
the reign of Sargon, the same struggle between anti-Assyrian and pro-
Assyrian is reflected in Sargon's account of the Ashdod campaign
and later still Sennacherib tells us how he "drew near to Ekron and
slew the governors and nobles who had committed sin [i.e., revolted]
.. . .and the rest of them who were not guilty of sin and contempt,
for whom there was no punishment (or against whom there was no
charge), I spoke their pardon."3 In these words there is as clear evi-
dence of anti-Assyrian and pro-Assyrian parties in Ekron as one could
wish for. Analogously, we have every reason to believe that sentiment
was divided in Judah. Yet it is practically certain that, if anti-
Assyrian sentiment did exist in the Southern Kingdom, it was for a
time completely smothered. The evidence for this is convincing. (a)
We know that Ahaz, at his accession (ca. 735), adopted a pro-Assyrian
policy. He was at that time engaged in a desperate struggle with the
two anti-Assyrian kings, Pekah of Israel and Rezin of Damascus.
These two kings had launched a campaign against Judah while Tig-
lath-pileser was absent in the East, apparently in order to force it into
the great anti-Assyrian coalition which was then forming in the west.
Ahaz formally appealed to Assyria for help against his foes. They
were disastrously defeated, and Judah was delivered from its more
immediately pressing dangers.4 The success of Ahaz's policy secured
the pro-Assyrian party in power for many years to come. This is
clear from our next bit of evidence. (b) In 725-722, Hoshea of Israel,
who owed his throne to Tiglath-pileser, for some reason turned anti-
Assyrian. Shalmaneser IV, Tiglath-pileser's successor, laid siege to
Samaria. It fell late in 722 or early in 721 (whether under Shalman-
eser or Sargon is irrelevant to our purpose), and Israel was reduced
to an Assyrian province. In this great crisis, so fatal to its sister-
kingdom, Judah remained untouched. This can be adequately ex-
plained only on the supposition that Judah was still following a pro-
1 Annals, p. 236.
2 Display Inscription, 11. 90-96. See Rogers, Cuneiform Parallels and the Old Testa-
ment (CP), p. 328.
a OIP. Col. III. 11. 8-13.
4 Cf. II Kings, chaps. 15, 16, and the writer's article "Immanuel" (AJSL, July, 1
pp. 256 ff.).

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ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB CAMPAIGN 5

Assyrian policy as late as 722. When did this policy begin to chan
and why? Before attempting to answer these questions, two othe
tall for remark: (1) What was the relationship of the anti-Assyri
parties in Palestine to Egypt at this time? (2) What was Isaiah
attitude toward this exciting political situation?
1. The strong impression derived from the inscriptions of Tiglath-
pileser which deal with the events of 738-732, as well as from th
Bible, is that Damascus was the head and front of the anti-Assyr
coalition in this early period. This is what one would expect, f
Damascus had always been the chief antagonist of Assyria in Sout
Syria. The biblical documents also offer clear proof that Israel und
Pekah relied upon Damascus.1 The same was also probably true
Ashkelon. At least the Annals seem to state that the defeat of Rezin
had an unfortunate effect upon its king, Mitinti.2 There is no reliable
indication that Egypt played a r6le of any importance in 738-732.
The situation in the kingdom of the Nile would not lead us to expect
that it would do so. The Twenty-third Dynasty, which had begun
to rule Lower Egypt about the time of Tiglath-pileser's accession and
the fall of the Jehu dynasty in Israel (ca. 745), was in a state of almost
total disintegration, and the Ethiopian power under Piankhi had, in
all probability, not yet extended its influence beyond Upper Egypt.
Whether the really able Delta dynast, Tefnakhte of Sais, was reigning
as early as 735-732 does not appear. But the development of his
power was probably later. It is, of course, not impossible that the
Palestinian princes, in their desperate struggle with Assyria, intrigued
more or less with Egypt. The memory of its ancient conquests and
glories may have still exerted an influence upon the imagination of
neighboring peoples. But that it was in a position in this period to
lend any real assistance to anti-Assyrian movements in Palestine is
improbable. That it even promised any assistance is doubtful though
possible.3
1 II Kings, chaps. 15, 16; Isaiah, chaps. 7 and 17.
2 Annals, pp. 235 f. The passage is obscure.
a The foregoing paragraph and what follows hereafter is based on the revised chro-
nology for Egypt as worked out by Breasted and, especially for the Ethiopians, by Reisner
in the Harvard Theological Review (1920), pp. 23 ff. According to Breasted, the Twenty-
third Dynasty (Pedibast, Osorkon III, and Takelot II) dates from 745-718. The Twenty-
fourth Dynasty is represented by only one king, Bekneranef (Bocchoris), 718-712. The
very able father of Bocchoris, Tefnakhte of Sais, ruled for at least eight years before Boc-
choris, his reign being contemporary with the closing years of the Twenty-third Dynasty

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6 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES

Against the very clear evidence derived from the Bible tha
least Israel's main reliance in 738-732 was upon Damascus, the e
dence of reliance upon Egypt on the part of any Palestinian sta
slim. (a) Tiglath-pileser tells us that Hanno of Gaza fled to Mus
(Egypt).' This was the most natural thing for him to do. There
hardly any other place he could flee to. Still, it probably implies
at least Hanno thought he would be welcome in Egypt. (b) Tigl
pileser also tells us that he commissioned the Arab tribe of
Idiba'ili, possibly under their scheich of the same name, to watch
borders of Musri (Egypt).2 This also might imply that there was
or less anti-Assyrian intriguing going on in Egypt. The Assyri
king thought it best to keep an eye on things in the south. (c) In
present text of Isa. 7:18 the prophet refers to danger from Eg
as well as from Assyria. But this passage is open to the gra
suspicion. It is not certain, though probable, that it belongs to
historical context (735) in which it is now found.3 But if it do
and also with the great invasion of Lower Egypt by the Ethiopian, Piankhi (History of
Egypt [1905], pp. 539 ff., 546). The chronological table of the Ethiopians as given by
Reisner is as follows:
King of Max. Min. Probable
6. Kashta...........Ethiopia
6. Kashta........... Ethiopia and Thebes -743
7. Piankhi........... Ethiopia and Thebes 755-734 733-712 743-722
(Son of 6) Ethiopia and Egypt 734-715 712-704 722-714
8. Shabaka .......... Ethiopia and Egypt 715-701 704-692 714-700
(Son of 6)
9. Shabataka........ Ethiopia and Egypt 701-689 692-688 700-689
(Son of 8)
10. Tirhakah......... Ethiopia and Egypt 689-663 688-663 689-663
(Son of 7)
Ethiopia and Egypt 663-661 663-661 663-661
11. Tanutaman ....... Ethiopia and Thebes 661-655 661-655 661-655
(Son of 8) Ethiopia 655-653 655-653 (?) 655-653 (?)
It will be noticed that as the dates recede they become less secure. This is particularly
unfortunate in the case of Piankhi whose great invasion of Lower Egypt took place in his
twenty-first year, which ranges, according to Reisner's table, from 734 to 712. In my argu-
ments I shall follow Reisner's probable dates. But the reader should keep constantly in
mind their provisional character and therefore the provisional character of the argu-
ment in so far as these dates are an integral part of it.
1 "Kleinere Inschriften," I, 8 ff.
2 Annals, pp. 216-25, 240; "Kleinere Inschriften," I, 34; "Thontafelinschrift," Rev. 6.
I hope to show in another connection that Musri in these passages is not an Arabian king-
dom. For the above interpretation of these lines, cf. Meyer, INS, p. 462; Tiele, Babylonisch-
Assyrische Geschichte, p. 235; Olmstead, WesternAsia in the Days of Sargon of Assyria (Sar-
gon), p. 56, nn. 34ff.; Kfichler, Stellung des Propheten Jesaja zur Politik seiner Zeit (Ku),
p. 11; Budge, A History of Egypt, VI, x if. For the identification of Musri with Egypt, see
also p. 25, n. 1.
3 On the one hand, there is a sharp literary transition from the direct address to Ahaz
in Isa. 7:10-17 to the more generalized form of statement in vss. 18 if., which suggests
at least an important literary difference between the two sections. On the other hand, the
logion in vss. 18 f. seems to be a natural companion piece to the one in vs. 20. But the
latter is almost certainly connected very closely with the situation described in vss. 10-17.

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ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB CAMPAIGN 7

the reference to Egypt is most surprising. It implies a danger of i


vasion from that quarter which Isaiah neither in 735 nor in any oth
period of his life seems to have felt. Wherever Isaiah mentions
Egypt in his other prophecies, it is always thought of as an ally of
Judah, not as an enemy, and as such the prophet always speaks of it
with contempt. In this view of Egypt the prophet showed himself a
far shrewder observer of the signs of the times than his opponents
were. Neither then nor later was Egypt likely to be a helpful ally,
and certainly not a menace.' It is therefore probable that the pre-
cise reference to Egypt in verse 18 is a gloss, conjecturally out of the
time of Josiah, and verses 18 and 19 as well as verse 20 originally had
only Assyria in mind.2 (d) There remain the frequent references to
reliance upon Egypt in Hosea to prove that the anti-Assyrian senti-
ment in Palestine sought sympathy from that quarter. All these
references are found in the last part of the book, beginning with 7:11,
and the probability is that this portion of the book dates out of
Hoshea's reign and after the death of Tiglath-pileser. We may there-
fore conclude that in 738-732 the main reliance of Anti-Assyrian agita-
tors was upon Damascus, though this does not forbid the supposition
that there were intrigues (probably largely fruitless) carried on with
Egypt even in this early period.
But by 725-722 conditions had changed. The power of Damascus
had been broken in 732. On the other hand, by the time that Samaria
1 The difficulty of the reference to Egypt in vs. 18 is usually avoided by a questionable
exegesis. Egypt is held to be the enemy of Assyria, not of Judah, and the prophecy is
supposed to refer to the collision between these two great world-powers on Palestinian
soil. (So Hitzig, Ewald, Knobel, Delitzsch, Dillmann, Kuenen, Hackmann [Zukunftser-
wartung des Jesaia, p. 66], Wilke [Jesaja und Assur, p. 321, Skinner.) Knobel goes so far
as to say that Egypt is actually coming to the help of Judah when the conflict occurs!
The idea which underlies this explanation seems to be that the harm which Egypt will do
to Judah will not be done intentionally, but will be simply incidental to the conflict be-
tween Assyria and Egypt, since Judah is to be the scene of it. But this is certainly not the
natural interpretation of the verse which suggests, rather, that Egypt as well as Assyria is
to be a menace. Cf. Bredenkamp, Gray, Alt (Israel und Aegypten, p. 63, n. 2); also the
earlier commentators (Vitringa, Lowth, Gesenius, Eichhorn), who see the fulfilment of the
prophecy in the raid of Necho in the time of Josiah.
2 Chap. 7 is notoriously glossed, and cf. especially "the king of Assyria" in vss. 17
and 20. Probably the reference to Assyria in vs. 18 is also a gloss though in this case a cor-
rect one. Duhm seems to have been the first to suggest the deletion of both references to
Egypt and Assyria, but he did this on metrical and not historical grounds, and he holds
that the verse really referred to both nations. Marti; Cheyne, Introduction, p. 36 (prefer-
ably); Kiichler, p. 33 (impliedly); Staerk, Das Assyrische Weltreich, pp. 53, 201 (expressly);
Alt, p. 63 (preferably); Meinhold, Der Heilige Rest, p. 114, n. 1--all hold to the single
reference to Assyria. Yet it must be confessed that the fly is a most adequate symbol of
Egypt as every one must realize who has visited that country.

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8 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES

had resolved on revolt again, the really powerful dynast, Tefna


was ruling in Egypt, and he may very well have become conce
with the steady advance of Assyria toward the Delta. It is there
not surprising to learn from the Bible that in Israel the hope o
anti-Assyrian party seems to have been no longer Damascu
Egypt.' But the hope proved a delusion. There is no record of
assistance having been received from Egypt. By 722, at least,
nakhte was too engrossed with the struggle with Piankhi to b
to give any help to Palestine.
2. The second question concerns Isaiah's attitude toward Ass
and toward the contending parties in Israel and Judah in the p
before 720. The main indication of his political policy at this ti
found in Isaiah, chapters 7 and 8, which date about 735, in the
of Tiglath-pileser. In these chapters we find the prophet resis
with all the energy of which he was capable the pro-Assyrian p
of Ahaz. It was as a supreme attempt to keep the Jewish king f
appealing to Assyria that the sign of Immanuel was offere
might therefore be inferred that Isaiah was anti-Assyrian. Bu
is not a correct definition of his attitude. As a matter of fact,
Ahaz refused to follow his advice, the prophet foretold the succ
Assyrian invasion of Judah as well as of Israel. His protest aga
the appeal to Assyria was due to religious and not to political mo
Isaiah was true to the prophetic tradition which regarded all fo
alliances as inimical to the religion of Jahweh. Such alliances inv
the recognition of the gods of the allies, and this must be avoid
all costs.3 Further, it is clear that in the present instance Isaia
garded the appeal to Assyria as a sign of lack of faith in Jahweh, a
ligious apostasy of the most glaring description. "If ye do not be
surely you will not be established. .... Is it too little a thin
you to weary men that you weary my God also?"4 Accordingly
fact tha;t Isaiah opposed appealing to Assyria by no means ind
that he favored anti-Assyrian intrigues with other nations. In
crisis of 735 an anti-Assyrian policy meant to join forces with
1 II Kings 17:1 ff. For the possible identification of So, see p. 11.
2 See, again, the writer's article, "Immanuel."
a Cf. the traditions as to Solomon's introduction of the worship of foreign gods in
connection with his marriages to various foreign princesses (I Kings, chap. 11). Elijah's
opposition to Baalism also implied an opposition to Ahab's Phoenician alliance.
4 Isa. 7:9, 13.

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ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB CAMPAIGN 9

and Pekah. But this is the last thing the prophet would have propo
to do. He consistently pointed out the certainty of the catastrop
which was to overtake them. The political expression of Isaiah's r
ligious standpoint at this time might properly be called a policy
neutrality, or, if a religious phrase is demanded, a policy of holiness, o
separateness from foreign contacts. Ahaz was neither to fear nor
join the coalition of Rezin and Pekah. He was also to abstain from
alliance with Assyria against them. He was to look to Jahweh and
Jahweh alone for deliverance in this crisis. Whether this advice, giv
in a religious interest, was politically sound or not is another quest
which does not need to be answered in the present discussion. It
clear, however, that Judah did reap certain advantages from the pr
Assyrian policy of Ahaz. It secured relief from the attack of the Syro-
Ephraimitic coalition. The advantages seemed to be so great that,
we have seen, this policy was continued at least until after the fall
Samaria in 722.' But why has 720 been suggested as the possible d
of a change of policy toward Assyria? This leads to a consideration
the next great political crisis in the West.
II. In 720 a new and formidable revolt against Assyria broke o
in the West. The times seemed propitious for it. Only two years b
fore Sargon had come to the throne of Assyria and shortly afterward
became involved in an unsuccessful struggle with Elam and the Ch
daean prince, Merodach-baladan. A battle was fought at Duril
either in 721 or early in 720,2 in which both sides claimed the victory.
As a matter of fact, the Elamites must have got the best of it, f
Merodach-baladan, their ally, was able to secure the control of Ba
ylon which had been in the hands of Assyria since its conquest b
Tiglath-pileser in 729, and to maintain himself there for the next t
years. This disaster must have greatly lowered the prestige of Sarg
for the time being.4 It is not surprising, therefore, to learn of an out-
1 There are no certainly datable prophecies from 735 to 722 except 28:1-4. This
prophecy announces the fall of Samaria, and probably is to be placed in the latter part of
this period. It naturally implies that Isaiah did not approve of the anti-Assyrian policy of
Israel and clearly foresaw its fatal consequences.
2 The Annals date it in 721, but K. 1349 and the Babylonian Chronicle, I, 33, place it
in 720. The latter date is probably to be preferred. Cf. Olmstead, Sargon, p. 43, n. 2,
and Winckler, Forschungen, I, 402, n. 2.
3 For Sargon's claim, see the Nimrud Stone Inscription, line 7, and Display Inscrip-
tion, line 23. But the Babylonian Chronicle, I, 33 if., asserts the exact opposite.
4 His liquidation of Shalmaneser's campaign against Samaria was not suffcient to
offset his misadventure in the east.

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10 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES

break in the West in 720. The West seems to have always been wa
ful of any possible chance to relieve itself of the heavy Assyrian yok
The two foci of the revolt were Hamath in the north and Gaza in
the south. It is astonishing to learn that not only Arpad and Simirra,
in North Syria and Phoenicia, but also Damascus and Samaria, were
once more induced by the king of Hamath to join forces with him.'
On the other hand, Hanno of Gaza, who had been driven out by
Tiglath-pileser in 7342 but had evidently managed to return later on
at some favorable moment, sought and found help in Egypt. The
inscriptions do not give any certain indication that the outbreaks in
North and South Syria had anything to do with each other. The
historical probabilities favor the view that at least there was an under-
standing between them but that Sargon acted too quickly for them
actually to combine forces.3 The main interest for us lies in Egypt's
assistance of Gaza. According to Sargon's Display Inscription:
Hanno, king of Gaza, had come with Sib'e, the tartan of Egypt, to
Rapikhi [a border town between Egypt and Palestine] against me to offer
battle and slaughter. I accomplished their defeat. Sib'e feared the onset of
my arms, fled and was no more found. Hanno, the king of Gaza, I took
prisoner.4
It is clear from this statement that Egypt very actively interfered,
though in vain, at this time in the anti-Assyrian movement. The
Egyptian commander, Sib'e (Sib'u), who fought the battle of Raphia
is called Tartan. This implies that he had an overlord. The Annals
are usually interpreted to agree with the Display Inscription, though
line 27, which begins the section dealing with the revolt of Gaza, is
not quite clear, as the lines immediately preceding it are mutilated.
It is regularly translated: "Sib'u, his tartan, he called to his side."
There is at present no antecedent for "his," but it is assumed that it is
the king of Musri,5 and in view of the explicit statement in the Dis-
1 Display Inscription, 11. 33-35. 2 See p. 6.
3 Cf. Tiele, p. 259. The Cylinder Inscription mentions the conquest of Israel and
Hanno in the same line (19). But inferences from this alone as to the actual alignment of
the allies are unsafe. Cf. the association of Judah with Hamath in the Nimrud Inscrip-
tion, 11. 7 and 8.
4 Ll. 25-26.
6 So Schrader, Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament (COT), I, 242; Ungnad,
Texte und Bilder zum Alten Testament (TuB), I, 116; Alt, p. 58; Rogers (apparently), CP,
p. 327; and Winckler, Musri, Meluhha, Ma'in, p. 4 ,who, however, identifies Musri with an
Arabian kingdom. Olmstead, on the other hand (Sargon, p. 56, n. 31, and p. 70, cf. History,
p. 207), holds that Sib'u himself was the overlord, and 1. 27 of the Annals should be trans-
lated: "Sib'u called his Tartan to his side." Tiele is not clear on the subject.

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ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB CAMPAIGN 11

play Inscription this assumption seems to be the safest to hold. But


who, then, is the overlord? Unfortunately, the Egyptian texts give
no direct light on the subject. Our reliance must be exclusively upon
the biblical and Assyrian documents. The identification of Sib'u'
overlord is therefore a matter of conjecture. Yet there are only two
probabilities worthy of attention. He was either Piankhi or Tef-
nakhte, and of these the latter seems to be the better guess. Accord
ing to Reisner's "probable" date, 722 was the year of Piankhi's in-
vasion of Lower Egypt. Though he claimed to exercise an overlord-
ship over Egypt after his withdrawal, Tefnakhte was the real power
in the Delta. He was also much more likely to sense the real danger
from Assyria than Piankhi was. Sib'u is also called the Tartan of
Musri (Egypt) not of Melucha or Cush (i.e., Ethiopia), and, as we
shall see, the Assyrians regulaily distinguish between the Ethiopians
and Egyptians. Hence, when Sib'u is called Tartan of Egypt it is
much more likely that his overlord was Tefnakhte, the Egyptian,
than Piankhi, the Ethiopian.' The one objection which may be urged
against this view is found in II Kings 17:2. According to this passage,
Hoshea, king of Israel, relied for help in his revolt of 725-722 upon So,
king of Egypt. There can be little doubt that So (better Sewe) and
Sib'u are the same person. Their names correspond in a striking way,
they are practically contemporary, and they are related to Palestine
in the same way. So aids Israel against Assyria, and Sib'u aids Gaza
against the same foe.2 There seems, then, to be a difference between
the Bible and the Assyrian inscriptions at this point. But the differ-
ence is quite unimportant. Tefnakhte's kingdom was organized on a
feudal basis and Sib'u may well have been one of the less important

dynasts
the under
Bible, but as a him. AsTefnakhte
vassal of such he hecould
may be called
very "king"
well have been(. ) in
employed as a commander of the Palestinian expedition and so could
be spoken of as Tartan in the Assyrian inscriptions.3
1 Alt, p. 58, also, tentatively holds to Tefnakhte.
2 Cf. Alt, 57; Kittel, Geschichte d. Volkes Israel6, II, p. 365, n. 4; Budge, pp. 124 ff.
3 It is therefore unnecessary to adopt Olmstead's translation of 1. 27 of the Annals in
order to bring it into harmony with II Kings 17:2. The passage, II Kings 17:1-6, as a
whole is much confused and needs sifting (cf. Kittel, Bilcher der Kinige). The earlier
identification of So with Shabaka (Oppert, Rawlinson, Brugsch, Wiedemann, Tiele,
Schrader) breaks down on the grave doubt of the philological propriety of the identifica-
tion and on the revised chronology, according to which Shabaka did not appear on the
scene until 715 or 714.

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12 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES

The point of this discussion is that in 720 as well as in 725-7


it was probably not the Ethiopians who showed interest in the an
Assyrian movements in Palestine but rather the Delta princes. T
latter were much closer to the danger from Assyria and hence m
more alive at first to its significance. And of all the Delta rulers it w
Tefnakhte who is most likely to have been the leader of anti-Assy
sentiment in Egypt. The help he promised Hoshea in 725-722 prov
futile, probably owing to the struggle with Piankhi. Later, in 7
he made a real attempt to come to the assistance of Hanno, but
vassal and commander-in-chief, Sib'u, was defeated.'
But now the important question arises: Was Judah implicated
any way in this revolt, and what position did Isaiah take? There a
only two bits of evidence bearing upon these questions and both
disputed. (1) In the Nimrud Inscription there is an obscure refere
to Sargon "who conquered the land Ja-u-du, whose location is dist
who destroyed Hamath."2 Since the inscription dates from 717,
conquest of Ja-u-du must have taken place before this. And if Ja-u-d
is Judah, the only time for its conquest would have been in 720
Sargon was engaged elsewhere in 719 and 718.3 But this evidenc
somewhat qualified by the fact that in the more detailed inscript
dealing with the revolt of 720 Judah is not mentioned and by t
further fact that a North Syrian kingdom with a name closely simila
to Judah has recently been discovered. Scholars are for the most
inclined to leave the question undecided whether the Ja-u-du of t
Nimrud Inscription is the North Syrian state or the biblical Juda
The mention of Hamath in immediate connection with Ja-u-du is
said to favor a North Syrian state, but Samaria is also associated wit
Hamath in the Annalistic account of the revolt in 720;5 if Samari
could be mentioned in connection with Hamath, why not Judah? O
the other hand, the fact that Ja-u-du is said to be "distant" rathe
1 The fact that Sib'u's name is not mentioned in the Egyptian texts of the period is
not surprising in view of their scantiness. But it must be remembered that the foregoing
sketch of the situation is only a hypothesis.
2 L. 8.

3 Winckler, KA T, p. 67.
4 Rogers (CP, p. 327), Ungnad (TuB, p. 117, n. 6), even Winckler (KA T, pp. 67, 271)
are uncertain. Tiele (p. 260) inclines to Judah; Alt (pp. 65, 66, n. 1) to North Syria.
Olmstead (Sargon, p. 51) inclines to Judah, but in his History (p. 207) apparently identifies
with North Syria. Kittel6 (p. 368, n. 4) identifies with North Syria auite positively.
a L. 25.

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ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB CAMPAIGN 13

favors Judah, though Alt notes that because of the rhetorical language
used in display inscriptions such phrases cannot be pressed. If the
reference is to Judah, it can hardly imply an actual conquest of the
land; otherwise this would certainly have been mentioned in th
parallel inscriptions. It probably means hardly more than that Judah
paid an indemnity' when the other members of the coalition were
conquered. While the line is admittedly obscure, it seems safest to
identify Ja-u-du with Judah until more evidence is forthcoming,2 but
to interpret the claim of conquest in the weakened sense of paying an
indemnity. In that case it can be fitted into the second piece of evi-
dence which is supposed to bear upon Judah's policies at the time of
the revolt. (2) At 14:29-32 there is a prophecy attributed by the
title (vs. 28) to the death-year of Ahaz. The genuineness and inter-
pretation of both title and prophecy have been much disputed.3 I
shall adopt provisionally the interpretation of both title and text
proposed by Winckler.4 According to this, the death-year of Ahaz wa
720. But this is the same as the accession year of Hezekiah. The
change of ruler meant a change in foreign policy. The pro-Assyrian
policy of Ahaz gave place to an anti-Assyrian policy. Hezekiah was
probably only a young boy when he came to the throne,5 and this gave
a chance to the anti-Assyrian party which had been largely inarticulate
during the reign of Ahaz to come to the front and exert a powerful
influence over the affairs of state. They were favored in their attempt
to secure control by the news that Sargon had been conquered a
Durilu and that Merodach-baladan had seized the throne of Babylon.
Anti-Assyrian sentiment in Philistia had also been greatly stimulated
by the same reports. They were rejoicing because the rod that had
smnitten them (i.e., Assyria, as represented by Sargon) was broken
Accordingly, an embassy was dispatched to Jerusalem, probably by
Hanno of Gaza, who, according to the Sargon inscriptions, was the
Apparently the word musiknis does not necessarily imply an actual military con-
quest (Alt, p. 66, n. 1).
2 See addendum at the end of this article.

3 I hope to discuss this important passage more fully in a later article.


4 Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen, pp. 135 ft.
5 II Kings 18:2 gives Hezekiah's age at accession as twenty-five. This conflicts with
16:2, which makes Ahaz twenty years old at his accession. As he reigned sixteen years, he
would have died at the age of thirty-six, and Hezekiah, if twenty-five years old at this
time, would have been born when his father was only nine years old. The most natural
way out of this difficulty is to cut Hezekiah's twenty-five years down to fifteen.

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14 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES

leader of the anti-Assyrian movement in the south, to induce Ju


to join in the coalition that was being formed against Assyria. T
would hardly have been done had not the Philistines had reason
believe that they would now get a more favorable hearing in Jerusale
than they would have done if Ahaz had been still alive.
It is into this critical situation that Isaiah injects himself an
warns Philistia not to rejoice, for a worse fate is in store for it. T
of course, means that Isaiah was opposed to Judah's joining
coalition. His policy was the same as it was in 735, but the princi
was differently applied. In the former case he protested against resor
ing to Assyria for help against Rezin and Damascus; now he prote
against relying upon Philistia for help against Assyria. It would s
as if Isaiah thought that when once the decision had been made
submit to Assyria, it was far wiser to remain loyal. He had witne
what terrible consequences had come upon Israel through its pursuit o
an anti-Assyrian policy. If Judah were to be delivered it must be
Jahweh, not by diplomatic intrigues with other nations. It is int
esting to observe that the appeal to Judah to join the coalition ca
from Philistia, not from Egypt. If we had other documents
might find that Egypt was also active in fomenting revolts in Pa
tine. Yet the probabilities are that the initiative in these ant
Assyrian activities originated in Palestine. This was almost certai
the case in the revolt of Ashdod in 711.1 Egypt was so distracte
just in this period that it was not likely to have developed any v
aggressive policy toward Assyria on its own initiative, though T
nakhte seems to have lent a ready ear when the call came for h
from across his northern borders, and in 720, as we have seen,
actually attempted to send military aid to Gaza.
If we now combine the evidence of the Nimrud Inscription, li
27, and of Isa. 14:28-32, it will be clear that at the change of ru
from Ahaz to Hezekiah, the anti-Assyrian party in Judah which
undoubtedly existed before this but had been unable to exercise a
influence now begins to forge to the front. It was to this party t
the Philistines would naturally make their overtures. In opposin
these overtures Isaiah would be brought into conflict with the an
Assyrians at home. He seems to have secured a partial triumph.
1 See below.

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ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB CAMPAIGN 15

least, Judah did not become fatally implicated in the revolt. In the
end she concluded that discretion was the better part of valor, paid
her indemnity, and escaped the punishment which overtook the anti-
Assyrians in Gaza. These seem to be the natural inferences to be
drawn from the Nimrud Inscription, line 27, provided it refers to
Judah, and from Isa. 14:28-32, provided Winckler's dating and inter-
pretation of the passage is acepted. If neither of these premises is
admitted, there is no other evidence that can be relied upon to tell u
what part, if any, Judah took in the revolt of 720, or what was
Isaiah's position at this time. Fortunately, when the curtain again
rises there are no such ambiguities. The political situation and the
r6le Isaiah played in it are both clear.
III. About 713, as it would seem, there were again stirrings of
revolt in Palestine. Since 720 Sargon had been occupied elsewhere,
principally in the great wars against Armenia and in putting down
various revolts along his northern borders. In 715 there is an allusion
in the Annals to a tribute of Pharaoh of Egypt in connection with
that of certain Arabian tribes.' The immediate occasion of the revolt
is, however, not clear. Whatever it was, Ashdod was the center of it.
Azuri, its anti-Assyrian king, "sent to the kings of his neighborhood to
stir up enmity against Assyria."2 But Azuri was deposed by Sargon
and Akhimiti, his brother,was placed on the throne.3 The anti-Assyrian
party in Ashdod must have been very powerful and very courageous,
for they refused to submit to Sargon's prot6g6, Akhimiti, deposed
him, and put a certain Yamani in his place. This person seems to have
been a Cypriot and a soldier of fortune.4 These events probably
occupied a couple of years. In 711 Sargon determined to have no more
of this nonsense. He recognized that the revolt, though an irritating
one, was not formidable. Only a small expedition was necessary to
crush it speedily and effectively. When Yamani heard of the Assyrian
advance, he fled without offering any resistance to "the side of Musri

1 Annals, 11. 97-99. If Breasted's and Reisner's chronology is accepted, the PharaQh
would be Bocchoris. Cf. Breasted, History (1905), p. 550.
2 Display Inscription, 11. 90-92.
3 Ibid., 11. 92-94. Cf. the deposition of the anti-Assyrian Pekah and the confirmation
by Tiglath-pileser of the pro-Assyrian Hoshea in 733.
4 L. 95. For Yamani, cf. Olmstead (Sargon, p. 77, n. 62); Rogers (History of Baby-
lonia and Assyria6, p. 355, n. 1): Winckler (KAT, p. 70, n. 1).

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16 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES

[Egypt] which is on the border of Melucha [Ethiopia]."' After th


account of the capture of Ashdod, the Display Inscription goes on
state that the king of Melucha, overcome by the fear of Sargon,
tradited Yamani, who was carried captive to Assyria.2 The Pr
Inscription adds to this a couple of details of the greatest importa
It tells us who the "neighboring peoples" whom Azuri stirred up
In addition to Philistia, it speaks of "Judah, Edom, Moab, those w
live by the sea,"3 as taking part in the revolt. It also adds that
allies, "planning hostilities, to rebel against me they sent their presen
to Pharaoh king of Musri [Egypt], a prince who could not help th
that he might set himself in hostility to me, they invited him in
confederation."'4
Several points in these two inscriptions call for remark. (1) I
very clearly stated that the initiative in this anti-Assyrian movem
proceeds from Palestine, not from Egypt. It is the Palestinian st
which seek to induce Egypt to help them, not the reverse.5 (2) S
who figured in the crises of 722 and 720, has disappeared from
scene, and in his place two new royal personages appear-Pir
(Pharaoh) of Musri (Egypt) and the unnamed king of Meluch
(Ethiopia). There can be no question that these two individuals m
be kept distinct. (3) While the Palestinian states expected help fr
both of them, they were disappointed in their expectation. Mus
furnished no assistance as it did at Raphia in 720, and Yamani w
obliged to flee without offering battle. The king of Melucha als
failed them. Yamani evidently counted on protection from him b
was treacherously surrendered to Assyria. Why Yamani did
seek protection from the Pharaoh of Egypt but fled as far as t
border of Melucha is an interesting question. (4) The forego
arrangement assumes that the anti-Assyrian intrigues began un
Azuri in 713 but the actual expedition of Sargon which crushed
revolt did not take place until 711.6 This chronology probably fin
corroboration in Isaiah, chapter 20, to which we now turn.
1 So, according to a personal communication from Professor Luckenbill, the difficult
lines, 102-3, of the Display Inscription are to be translated.
2 Ibid., 11. 96-112. 3 Ibid., 11. 29-31. 4 Ibid., 11. 32-35.
5 This corroborates the conjectures made on p. 14.
6 This follows a suggestion of Winckler (A T U, pp. 142 ff.; KA T, p. 69), who seeks to har-
monize in this way the two different dates for the expedition given in the Prism Inscription
(713) and in the Annals (711). Winckler supposed that in the one case the scribe brought

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ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB CAMPAIGN 17

This chapter fits into the historical situation reflected in the Sargon
inscriptions admirably. (1) The three years during which Isaiah went
naked and barefoot as a protest against the anti-Assyrian coalition
finds its explanation in the probable duration of the revolt in its
various phases from 713 to 711. (2) The Cush (Ethiopia) and Miz-
raim (Egypt) of the biblical text correspond to the Musri (Egypt) and
Melucha (Ethiopia) of the inscriptions. Both sources thus keep the
two powers distinguished, and the coalition evidently expected help
from both of them. (3) Isaiah foresees that these expectations will be
bitterly disappointed, which proved to be the case according to the
inscriptions. (4) Even the phraseology in both sources at times i
strikingly similar.' (5) It is important to observe that now for the
first time in both the biblical and the Assyrian texts the Ethiopian
power (Cush, Melucha) is introduced on the stage. Is there anything
in the situation in Egypt to account for this?
Unfortunately, the Egyptian sources for this crisis again fail us.
They are silent upon the conflict between Egypt and Assyria.2 Even
the internal situation in Egypt is most confused and uncertain, though
the researches of recent years have tended to clear up certain impor-
tant points bearing upon the relationship at this time of Egypt and
Ethiopia. As we have seen, after Piankhi's withdrawal in 722 (Reis-
ner's "probable" date), Tefnakhte, though nominally vassal to
Piankhi, resumed his control of the Delta with the Pharaonic titles
all the details of the campaign under the date of the outbreak of the revolt and in the other
case under the date of its defeat. While there is nothing in either inscription to suggest
such a harmonistic method and it must therefore be regarded with some suspicion, Isaiah,
chap. 20, makes in favor of it. Most authorities accept the date of the Annals. Olmstead
(Sargon, p. 78) defends the date in the Prism Inscription. Even if 711 is adopted for the
date of the actual campaign, the series of events described in the inscriptions may have
begun sometime before.
1 Cf. "Judah, Edom, and Moab, those who live by the sea" of the Prism Inscription
(11. 29-30) and "the inhabitant of this coast-land" (Isa. 20:6) and "Pir'u, king of Egypt, a
prince who could not help them" (Prism Inscription, 1. 34) with the Isaianic statement:
"Behold, such is our confidence whither we have fled to save ourselves from the king of
Assyria, but how shall we escape" (20:6).
2A possible exception to this statement is the papyrus discovered in recent times
which dates from the thirty-fourth year of Augustus Caesar (7-8 A.D.) and records the
prophecies of a lamb uttered in the sixth year of Bocchoris concerning an impending
Assyrian invasion and conquest of Egypt (for translation, see TuB, p. 207). Though the
document is late, it probably contains a sound tradition of the dangers to Egypt at this
time. Manetho and Aelian also allude to the lamb but do not record what it said (Breasted,
History [1905], p. 547; Budge, History of Egypt, VI, 120 fr.). Diodorus i. 45 also tells a
story of an experience of Bocchoris "when the king was leading an army into Arabia,"
but says nothing about the purpose or fate of the campaign itself, and probably no im-
portance is to be attached to this allusion. The passage is cited in Budge, op. cit., pp. 118 f.

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18 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES

Though the Twenty-third Dynasty continued to drag along for a


at Bubastis, Tefnakhte was the real power in Lower Egypt. His
came to the throne about 718 and ruled for six years, dying in 7
He represented Manetho's Twenty-fourth Dynasty. Meanwh
Shabaka, Piankhi's successor, renewed the attack upon Lower Eg
about 714 ("probable" date). According to Manetho, he burne
Bocchoris alive. Shabaka now became the suzerain of all the Delta
princes, assumed the title of "Pharaoh," and founded the Twenty-
fifth Dynasty. If we accept Reisner's probable date, 714, for the es-
tablishment of Shabaka's authority over Lower Egypt, and Breasted's
date, 712, for the overthrow of Bocchoris, it will be noticed that these
events occur just at the crisis of the anti-Assyrian revolt in Palestine.
We can now understand why reference to Ethiopia is made for the
first time in the biblical and Assyrian texts of 713-711. It was then
that Ethiopia finally became the controlling power in Egypt. It
also becomes clear why Egypt and Ethiopia gave no real assistance to
the Palestinian states at this time. Both Bocchoris and Shabaka may
very well have promised aid, and Bocchoris, at least, following the
policy of Tefnakhte, his father, may have intended to give it. But
both kings were absorbed in the struggle for the mastery of Egypt
itself and had no time for foreign adventures. The struggle was for
Bocchoris a life-and-death one, and ended tragically. It was for this
reason, perhaps, that Yamani did not seek protection in Egypt when
he fled from Sargon, but went to the king of Melucha (Shabaka).
The policy of the latter toward Assyria seems to have been a wavering
one. At first he apparently encouraged the anti-Assyrian coalition.
The statements in Isaiah, chapter 20, and the fact that Yamani fled
to the neighborhood of Melucha, evidently intending to put himself
under the protection of Shabaka, prove that the anti-Assyrian coali-
tion counted on the Ethiopian power as well as upon Bocchoris for
support. On the other hand, Shabaka in the end betrayed Yamani.
This shows that after he had firmly established himself on the throne
of the Pharaohs, he concluded it was safer to make friends with his
dangerous neighbor on the north than to quarrel with him. The situa-
tion in Egypt does not permit us to hold that the Palestinian coalition
was primarily fomented either by Bocchoris or Shabaka, as has often
1 Breasted's dates.

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ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB CAMPAIGN 19

been supposed. And the Sargon inscriptions are explicit that it was
the Palestinian states who took the initiative in this revolt and sought
to induce both Egypt and Cush to help them. Isaiah was the one man
in Palestine, apparently, who saw the futility of this appeal. For
three years he protested against the madness of the anti-Assyrian
schemes, and the results tragically confirmed his forecast. Thus we
see Isaiah adopting exactly the same policy in 713-711 as he did in
720. He would have nothing to do with intrigues against Assyria
This might be construed by his opponents as a pro-Assyrian policy
That was really not the case, thbugh his policy might quite properly
be called anti-Philistine or anti-Egyptian.' He counseled submission
to Assyria not because he favored Assyria, but because he was opposed
to reliance upon any other power than Jahweh for deliverance from
Assyria. His reasons for his attitude, as already noted, were pri-
marily religious reasons, not political. But whatever may be said of
his advice to Ahaz in 735, his advice in 720 and 713-711, though
prompted by religious considerations, was undoubtedly politically
sound.

In 720 we saw that it was probably due to this advice that Judah
did not become fatally implicated in the revolt. In 713-712 Isaiah
seems to have had a much harder time to get his policy adopted.
The anti-Assyrian party was evidently beginning to get the upper
hand in Jerusalem. In the Prism Inscription Sargon very definitely
classes Judah with Philistia and the other revolting states. On the
other hand, the inscriptions only speak of the vengeance taken upon
Ashdod and her unlucky king, Yamani. This city, like Gaza in 720,
seems to have been the center of the revolt. Judah apparently again
withdrew in time to save herself any severe punishment. Though the
anti-Assyrian party had carried their policies farther than in 720,
Isaiah finally seems to have been able to check once more their influ-
ence and save Judah from the fatal consequences of persisting in
their ill-advised policy. Our evidence is admittedly both scanty and
fragmentary but this conclusion is the natural inference from such
evidence as exists.
IV. At the death of Sargon in 705, the times were ripe for a new
effort in the West to shake off the domination of Assyria. Sargon had,
1 In the world-war there were a great many people who opposed the policies of the
Allies but who would yet not admit that they were pro-German.

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20 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES

indeed, achieved his greatest triumph after the close of the Ashd
campaign. In 710-709 he drove out Merodach-baladan from Baby
and united that great city with his empire. But in the last years of h
life new dangers arose. Babylon itself was divided by the us
pro-Assyrian and anti-Assyrian sentiment. On the north the Ci
merians were beginning their encroachments. Sargon conducted
last campaign against these new enemies and perished on it.
sources are very obscure at this point, but the Assyrian army seems
have sustained a serious reverse at the time of his death.' Sennacherib
tame to the throne in the midst of a great political upheaval. An
attempt was again made by Merodach-baladan to re-establish himself
in Babylon, and in 702 he succeeded for several months in doing so.
These various events would naturally have the same effect upon the
West Land which the successes of Merodach-baladan at the beginning
of Sargon's reign had exercised.
But in addition to this, the situation in Egypt was now such as to
encourage the hope that powerful aid could at last be looked for from
this quarter. After 714 Shabaka had firmly established himself in
Lower Egypt. The various Delta princes continued to reign, it is true,
but as vassals to Shabaka. He continued the feudal organization as it
had existed under Piankhi, Tefnakhte, and Bocchoris,2 but Shabaka
himself was in supreme control. As founder of the Twenty-fifth or
Ethiopian dynasty he seemed ready to revive the traditions of Egypt's
ancient power and splendor. These traditions included a suzerainty
over Palestine. What would be more natural than for the Palestinian
states to think that Egypt would stand by them in their attempt to
shake off the Assyrian yoke? This great revival in Egypt under the
Ethiopians after 714 must have been at least a silent threat against
the Assyrian supremacy in Palestine. Hence there was every reason
for the Palestinian states to think that the time was propitious for
another great anti-Assyrian coalition. It was this coalition which
Sennacherib undertook to suppress in the famous campaign of 701
"when the Assyrian came down as a wolf on the fold."3
1 Cf. Olmstead (Sargon, p. 157) and Rogers (HistoryG, p. 347).
2 We meet with the same organization in the time of Asshur-banipal (Rassam Cylin-
der, I, 90-113).
a This campaign is described in detail in the Oriental Institute Prism and in the Isaiah
narratives (II Kings 18:13--20:19 =Isaiah, chaps. 36-39).

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ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB CAMPAIGN 21

Even before the Assyrian and biblical sources for this campaign
are examined in detail, certain outstanding facts of great importanc
are easily ascertainable from them. (1) The anti-Assyrian party had b
this time gained complete supremacy in Judah. This is clear from th
fact that Judah actually did revolt.' Further, Judah was an importan
member of what was a very formidable coalition. This is clear from
the fact that when the anti-Assyrian party of Ekron deposed thei
pro-Assyrian king, Padi, they sent him to Hezekiah for safekeeping.
Indeed, the narrative of Sennacherib might very naturally suggest
that Jerusalem had assumed the r6le which Gaza played in 720 and
Ashdod in 713-711, and had become the leader of the anti-Assyrian
parties in Syria and Palestine.3 (3) It is finally of the greatest impor
tance to observe that Egypt and Ethiopia actually did do what the
situation sketched above would lead us to expect them to do. They
made a very determined attempt to come to the assistance of the
hard-pressed Palestinian states. "They [the allies] called upon th
Kings of Musri, the bowmen, chariots and horses of the king o
Melucha, a countless host and these came to their aid."4 A grea
battle was fought at Eltekeh, and Sennacherib tells us how he took
alive in the midst of the battle "the charioteers and princes of Musr
together with the charioteers of the King of Melucha."5 The biblica
documents say nothing about this battle, but, on the other hand,
refer to an advance of Tirhaka, king of Cush (Ethiopia), which seem
to have occasioned the withdrawal of Sennacherib.6 The reference to
Tirhaka presents one of the most difficult problems connected with
the campaign of 701,7 but it is significant that both the Assyrian and
the biblical records agree in the view that Ethiopia took an active
part against Assyria in this campaign. It is clear, however, that the
king of Ethiopia was not present in person. The Assyrian inscription
keeps the princes of Egypt and the king of Melucha distinguished.
This fits exactly into the situation in Egypt as described above.
The unnamed kind of Melucha is almost certainly Shabaka. But
even if he was Shabaka's successor, this could make no difference to
1 Hezekiah admits that he had committed sin ("Ir ",I), using exactly the same word
which Sennacherib himself uses of the revolting rulers of Ekron (bi-it-tu) (OIP, III, 8).
2 Ibid., 11. 14-15. & Ibid., 11. 1-5.
3 ,ecq Part III in more detail. 6 II Kings 19:9.
4 OIP, III, 78-80. ; For discussion, see Part III.

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22 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES

my argument. It is clear that the "princes of Egypt" mentioned


the Sennacherib Annals could scarcely have been fighting on th
own account, especially in view of the fact that the king of Melucha
associated with them. They must have been fighting under t
authority of the Ethiopian Pharaoh. In that case the policy
Shabaka toward Assyria must have decisively changed during th
decade which had intervened between 711 and 701. It had now be-
come definitely anti-Assyrian.'
If the foregoing sketch of the historical development from 735 t
701 is approximately true, the growth of the anti-Assyrian party i
Judah and Israel and its relationship to Egypt may be summed up a
follows:
a) In Tiglath-pileser's campaign in 734-732 Israel followed an
anti-Assyrian policy; Judah, under Ahaz, a pro-Assyrian policy. Th
reliance of the anti-Assyrian policy in Israel was at this time upon
Damascus. Egypt was in a state of almost complete disintegration
under the Twenty-third Dynasty. The Ethiopians had not as ye
extended their control into Lower Egypt, and Tefnakhte had prob
ably not yet gained his power or prestige.
b) In 725-722, at the fall of Samaria under Shalmaneser and Sar
gon, Israel sought help from Egypt, the power of Damascus havin
been broken by Tiglath-pileser in 732. By this time Tefnakhte had
probably established himself in control of the Delta and had adopte
an. anti-Assyrian policy. How vigorous this was we have no means o
knowing. But the struggle in which Tefnakhte became involved with
Piankhi about 722 effectually prevented him from lending any assist
ance to Israel even if he had wished to do so. At this time Judah still
remained pro-Assyrian.
c) In 720 a new and very widely spread revolt in the West broke
out, occasioned quite probably by the fact that the successes of Elam
and Merodach-baladan over Sargon had led the restless conquered
states to think that now was the time to throw off the burdensome
Assyrian yoke. The two main centers of the revolt were Hamath in
the north and Gaza in the south. Samaria and Damascus threw in
their lot with Hamath, and a Philistine embassy (probably from Gaza)
invited Judah to join with the southern allies. This time Egypt not
1 This is contrary to the view of Reisner, op. cit., p. 35. The reason for it will appear
on p. 25.

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ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB CAMPAIGN 23

only promised assistance but actually undertook to fulfil her prom


by advancing as far as Raphia. But it was disastrously defeated.
was probably Tefnakhte who represented the anti-Assyrian sentim
in Egypt. He was in control again, for by this time Piankhi h
withdrawn. Yet it may well be that Piankhi was not averse to hav
his nominal vassal do what he could to put obstacles in the way
the Assyrian progress southward. Still there is no evidence of th
in the existing documents. Judah was tempted to join the coalit
The accession of Hezekiah to the throne had given a chance to the anti
Assyrian party to reassert itself. But so far as we can tell, Judah
not implicate herself irretrievably at this time.
d) In 713-711 a new revolt broke out, on this occasion under
leadership of Ashdod. The coalition again sought help from Egyp
and also from Ethiopia, for Shabaka was now advancing into Egy
But the time was most unpropitious, for Egypt was distracted by
war for control between Bocchoris and Shabaka. Both parties pr
ably promised aid to Palestine, but Bocchoris was unable and Shab
was finally unwilling to give it. The revolt proved a fiasco. At t
time the anti-Assyrian party had become much stronger in Jud
and the Hebrew kingdom seems actually to have joined the ot
revolting principalities, but again managed to withdraw in time
save itself from any very serious consequences. In all these crise
Isaiah maintained a consistent policy, if it be judged by the religi
motives which governed him. In 735 he opposed the pro-Assyria
policy of Ahaz which was adopted in the crisis of the Syro-Ephraimiti
attack upon Judah, and urged Ahaz to rely upon Jahweh alone f
deliverance. But his country, having once adopted the policy
dependence upon Assyria, Isaiah was for sticking to it. In 725-72
we are not certain what his policy was, for no documents thus f
examined throw any direct light upon it though we may argue w
considerable assurance from Isa. 28:1-4 that Isaiah thought th
anti-Assyrian policy of Israel would end only in disaster. But in 7
when the anti-Assyrian party were threatening, under the new a
inexperienced king, Hezekiah, to secure control of the state, Isai
opposed them. He protested against accepting the invitation of t
Philistine embassy. He thus adopted the policy of opposing all effo
to seek relief from Assyrian oppression through foreign intrigue

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24 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES

may well be that Judah's escape from any serious consequences in


720 was due to the influence which Isaiah exerted at this time. The
same is true in 713-711. But now Isaiah seems to have had a much
harder task. The anti-Assyrian party seems to have been growing very
much in power since 720, and Judah became more deeply involved in
anti-Assyrian activities than in the earlier crisis. Isaiah made the
most strenuous effort to oppose this dangerous policy, and in the end
he seems to have been again successful, for Judah must have sub-
mitted in time to escape Sargon's vengeance (contrast the fate of
Ashdod). Both in 720 and in 713-711 Isaiah adopted an attitude that
would naturally be considered by his opponents to be pro-Assyrian,
and no doubt such pro-Assyrian sentiment as still existed in Judah
gathered around the prophet. But again it must be insisted upon that
to call Isaiah pro-Assyrian is to interpret his activities from a purely
political point of view, whereas they are to be judged by the religious
motives that guided him. He was opposed to all intrigues with other
nations against Assyria because these seemed to him to express a lack
of faith in Jahweh. It was to Jahweh alone that the people must look
for help in the agony of the Assyrian oppression. But even if he can-
not properly be called pro-Assyrian, it is fair to speak of him as
anti-Philistine or anti-Egyptian, for he was emphatically opposed to
the political policy which sought alliances in these countries.
e) At the death of Sargon and accession of Sennacherib the anti-
Assyrian party in Judah which we have seen steadily gaining in in-
fluence ever since the accession of Hezekiah in 720 now secures com-
plete control over the foreign policy of the nation. Hezekiah becomes
an active and influential member of a great anti-Assyrian coalition.
The time seemed ripe as never before for such an enterprise. In the
east, Sennacherib was hampered by the difficult situation in Babylon
occasioned by the new attempts of Merodach-baladan to regain his
throne. And in Egypt, Shabaka, after having wavered in his policy
toward Assyria in 713-711, had listened to the new appeals for assist-
ance from across his northern border and had made up his mind to
come to the support of the Palestinian states. The stage was set for a
great and dramatic struggle. What was Isaiah's attitude in this great
crisis? Did he change the policies which he had maintained for thirty-
five years and at last exert his influence in favor of the anti-Assyrian

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ISAIAH'S ATTITUDE IN THE SENNACHERIB CAMPAIGN 25

party and of a defiance of the empire of the Tigris, or did he remai


true to his earlier convictions? In order to answer this question, tw
great sections of the Book of Isaiah must be carefully studied. The
first section contains the Isaiah narratives. The second contains the
immensely important group of prophecies (ca. 28-33). As the Isaiah
narratives purport to give a detailed account of the campaign of 701
and of Isaiah's attitude during it, it might seem as if the proper ap-
proach to our subject would be to consider these narratives first. But
these narratives are among the most disputed portions of the Book of
Isaiah. It is very questionable whether they even originally belonged
to any collection of his prophecies. We will be on far safer ground
if we begin with a study of ca. 28-33.1
[To be continued]

ADDENDUM

Since the manuscript of this essay was sent to the pub


have read Professor Luckenbill's very important article o
of Judah" in the July number of this Journal. In it he makes
ful attack upon Winckler's identification of the Azrijau o
in Tiglath-pileser's Annals (11. 104 f., 111, 123, 131) with a
of the North Syrian Ja'di, an identification which has hith
commonly accepted. If Luckenbill's linguistic arguments, w
quite convincing to a layman, should finally commend the
his fellow-Assyriologists, it would settle the question of th
of Sargon's Nimrud inscription (1. 8). It would have to
Luckenbill's identification would also require a complete r
the usual views of Azariah's reign and a rehabilitation of m
Chronicler's picture of it. If this, too, should be accepted
tenacious pro-Assyrian policy of Ahaz could be explained
tion against the anti-Assyrian policy of his grandfather,
Judah would seem to have learned the sharp lesson taught
lath-pileser more readily than Israel did.
' In the foregoing discussion I have assumed that the Musri and Melucha in the in-
scriptions of this period everywhere refer to Egypt and Ethiopia respectively. On another
occasion I hope to show that Winckler's theory, which would identify them with an
Arabian Musri and an Arabian Cush, is without any real foundation. Reisner's characteri-
zation of the foreign policy of Ethiopia referred to above, according to which the
Ethiopians did not enter into any conflict with Assyria until the reign of Tirhaka (689-
663), is based on Winckler's theory which Reisner has very unfortunately attempted to
revive.

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