"The Civilizing Process" and "The History of Sexuality": Comparing Norbert Elias and Michel

Foucault
Author(s): Dennis Smith, Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 79-100
Published by: Springer
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The Civilizing Process and The History of Sexuality:
Comparing Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault

DENNIS SMITH
Aston University, United Kingdom

This article has three tasks.1The first is to demonstratethat a high

degree of overlapin argumentand method exists between two major
works by thinkers who are usually regardedas being fundamentally
opposed in their approachesto understandingsociety.The two works
are Norbert Elias's The CivilizingProcess and Michel Foucault'sThe
Historyof Sexuality,especiallythe second and thirdvolumes entitled,
respectively,The Useof Pleasureand The Careof the Self.2The second
task is to identify some key modificationsin Foucault'streatmentof
history,power,and knowledgethat occurredbetweenhis earlierwork,
for exampleMadnessand Civilizationand Disciplineand Punish,3and
his later work, especially The Historyof Sexuality.The third objective
is to set out a researchagenda that confrontssome of the main issues
arising from a considerationof some importantremainingdifferences
betweenElias and Foucault.4

ConvergencebetweenFoucaultand Elias

The intellectualapproachesto understandingsociety taken by Michel

Foucaultand Norbert Elias do not seem at first sight to have much in
common.5Adherentsof Elias are likely to have very serious reserva-
tions about a work such as Discipline and Punish, which assumes a
sharphistoricalbreakbetweentwo regimesof politicaland social con-
trol, treats"truth"as an expressionof practicesof power,and sees the
modern self as the prisonerof a docile body, the artefactof a Panoptic
technology operating through the carceralnetwork of a disciplinary
society.

What could be more at odds than this with Elias'sview that individual-
ization [theprocessof becoming,and learning,who we are as particular

Theory and Society 28: 79-100, 1999.

? 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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80

people] and the acquisitionof a "we-image"[the process of becoming,

and learning, who we are as group members]occur within dynamic
social networks or figurationssuch as families, occupationalgroups,
and nations?Elias argues that these figurationscontain complex and
shiftingpowerbalancesamonginterdependentactorssuchas husbands/
wives, subjects/rulers,and so on, and that figurationsof this kind take
shape and are transformedin the course of social processes such as
state-formation,class-formation,nation-formation,and the civilizing
process with a distinctive structure that becomes visible over long
periods of time.6

Elias'stheoryof the civilizingprocesswith its emphasison the inculca-

tion of self-restraint,shame,and repugnancewas profoundlyinfluenced
by Freudianpsychology.7By contrast, in the opening chaptersof The
History of Sexuality. Volume I: an Introduction, Foucault lays into the
Freudian"repressivehypothesis"with gusto, arguingit is misleading
to give a centralplace to the exerciseof psychologicalcontrolsover the
expressionof libidinousimpulseswhen trying to explainthe workings
of modern society.8In spite of this unpromisingbackground,thereis a
remarkabledegreeof intellectualconvergencebetweenthe second and
thirdvolumes of Foucault'sThe Historyof Sexuality,entitled, respec-
tively, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, and Elias's The
Civilizing Process, works separated by over four decades. The Civilizing
Process,Elias'sfirstmajorpublishedwork, appearedin 1939.9The Use
of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, which were Foucault's last major
publishedbooks, appearedin 1984,the yearof his death.10

It is helpfulto begin with a very brief summaryof these two works. In

The CivilizingProcess, Elias looks at "unintendedand unplanned"
changesin "the structureof Westernsociety"and in "the standardof
behaviourand the psychicalmakeupof Westernpeoples."1 He argues
that over time controlled,peaceful,and refinedforms of interpersonal
behaviordeveloped, in the form of courtoisieat the courts of feudal
lords and, later,as civilitein the courtsof absolutistrulers.The warrior
class was increasinglypacified.Its membershad to adopt increasingly
high standards of self-restraintin respect of natural functions and
bodily behavior.As Elias puts it, with the "monopolizationof physical
violence at the point of intersectionof a multitudeof social intercon-
nections, the whole apparatuswhich shapes the individual,the modes
of operationof the social demandsand prohibitionswhich mould his
social makeup,and above all the kinds of fear that play a part [were]
decisivelychanged."12

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 81

In the first volume of his trilogy on sexuality,Foucault outlines the

centralplace of sexualityin the controllingdiscoursesof modern soci-
ety. He emphasizesthe capacityof these invasivediscoursesto shape,
constrict, and distort human impulses and the sense of self. However,
his second and third volumes, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the
Self, contain evidence that within the scope given by their power
situation and knowledgemany citizens of ancient Greece and Rome
were able to live relativelysatisfyinglives accordingto an ethos based
on rationalself-masteryand the pursuitof pleasurewithout ill-health.
In this context, Foucaultconcentrateson three areas:care and enjoy-
ment of the body, with special regardto sex, diet, and medical treat-
ment; relations between husbands and wives; and relations between
adult males and young boys. As part of his argument, he tries to
explain why wives became more powerful and sexual relations more
restrainedand austerebetweenthe fourthcenturyB.C. and the second
centuryA.D.

These two works by Elias and Foucault are both concernedwith how
perceptionsof selfhood and society along with standardsof behavior
with respectto bodily functionsand the managementof humanfeelings
have been transformedin the course of Western history. Foucault's
account relates mainly to Greek and Roman society between the
fourth century B.C. and the second centuryA.D., although he makes
occasional referencesback to Homerictimes and has substantialcom-
ments on the medieval and modern periods in European history.
Elias'sargumentis mainly focusedon Europebetweenthe twelfthand
eighteenthcenturiesA.D. while making many referencesto the centu-
ries precedingand following. In these two works Foucault and Elias,
througha kind of unwittingcollaboration,providea criticalanalysisof
Western social developmentand mores from the pre-Socraticto the
post-Kantianeras.

Socratesand Kant are key figuresfor Foucaultand Elias respectively,

predecessorsto be both greatly admired and heavily criticized.The
two philosophers stand at the ends of a long Western tradition of
philosophy and science that sought to discoverthe underlyingprinci-
ples of life and nature and subject them to control with the aid of a
coherent intellectual system. According to Nietzsche, this approach
was based on "a profoundillusion,"that is, "the imperturbablebelief
that, with the clue of logic, thinkingcan reachto the innermostdepths
of being" (Birthof Tragedy,53). Foucault is deeply influencedby the
Nietzschean and Heideggerianaspirationof sweepingaside the meta-

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82

physics of Socrates and Plato so as to achieve a much more direct

experienceof the "depthsof being."13 He shares Heidegger'sinterest
in pre-Socraticthinkerssuch as Heraclituswhose works, supposedly,
expresseda more primalor authenticexperienceof being.14

Elias is also hostile to the metaphysicaltradition from Socrates to

Kant but believesHeideggerianexistentialismfails to make a decisive
breakwith that traditionin a key respect.It continuesto adhereto the
model of homoclausus,the idea that each humanbeingis an "enclosed"
individual,a self-containedconsciousness.Eliasproposesan alternative
model of hominiaperti, the idea that individualsand groups acquire
their multipleidentities(with respect to, for example,their individual
persona,theirgender,kin-group,occupation,religion,ethnicity,nation,
and so on) throughthe experienceof participatingin complex social
networksor "figurations"shapedby long-termsocial processes.As has
already been noted, in Elias's view, identity formation is a shared
social experience,shapedby social and historicallocation. Elias wants
to make his own approachto sociology a central feature of modern
post-Kantianthinking.'5

In fact, Foucaultand Elias both underminethe model of homoclausus.

In works such as Discipline and Punish, Foucault argues that the
modern self is shaped from "outside"by the penetrating,disciplining
force of discursivepractices.However,unlike Elias, Foucaultdoes not
believe it is feasible for modern citizens to achieve a high degree of
relativeautonomy in exercisingrational choice. In his view, the only
proper responses to "disciplinarysociety,"once its nature is under-
stood, are either direct political attack upon its structuresor radical
action to subvertthe consciousness of self it imposes upon us. This
action includesthe pursuitof limit-experiencesthroughvariousforms
of experimentationwith the bodily senses. Foucault was engaged in
just such a programof personalexperimentationwhile workingon The
Historyof Sexualityfrom the mid 1970sto the mid 1980s.16

Foucault spent some eight or nine years exploring a Greco-Roman

culturethat was also very interestedin the limits boundingthe experi-
ence of bodily pleasure.However,the Greco-Romancontext differed
from the one experiencedby Foucaultin his daily life in two respects:
first, in Greece and Rome the pursuit of bodily pleasure by adult
citizens was generallyregardedas a natural and proper activity,not
in itself shameful;and, second, the "limits"of interest to Greek and
Roman citizens were the boundariesbeyond which you could not go

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 83

without damagingyour health, showingbad judgment, or losing con-

trol to an unacceptable degree. The idea was to maximize pleasure
within these limits. In other words, pleasure and control could be
combinedwithinthe everydaysocial worldby exercisinggoodjudgment
in the light of relevantknowledgeabout the body, diet, medicine, and
so on. This made a fascinating contrast with the modern world, as
understood by Foucault, for here, in his view, both pleasure and in-
sight could be gained by transgressinglimits, by deliberatelygoing
beyond the frontiersthat led to high physical,psychological,or social
risk.17

In The History of Sexuality and The CivilizingProcess, respectively,

Foucault and Elias make use of contemporaryworks giving advice on
how to behavein relationto yourselfand others, how to manageyour
body and your feelings, and how to do the best for yourself in poten-
tially risky or troublesome situations. For example, in The Use of
Pleasure and The Care of the Self, Foucault cites writings such as
Hippocrates'sRegimen in Health, Xenephon's Oconomicus,Demos-
thenes's Erotic Essay, Artemidorus'sInterpretationof Dreams, and
Plutarch'sDialogueon Love.In TheHistoryof Manners,the firstvolume
of The CivilizingProcess, Elias turns to works such as Erasmus'sDe
civilitate morumpuerilium, Giovanni della Casa's Galateo, and La
Salle'sLes Reglesde la bienseanceet de la civilitechretienne.'8

The advicebooks cited by both Elias and Foucaultgive guidanceabout

how one should behaveas human beings within particularsituations.
They help one decide what to do or not to do. The "should"is pruden-
tial and practical, a guide to getting throughlife in such a way as to
ensure survival,maximize success, and avoid physical, psychological,
and social penalties. In classical Greece and Rome, the "use of pleas-
ure"and "careof the self" were not just, or even mainly, a matter of
sexual practices.Concernwith sexual behaviorwas integralto life but
not central,beingcloselyinterwovenwith medicine,dietetics,economics
(in its originalsense of householdmanagement),politics, and the inter-
pretationof dreams.

In Greek and Roman eyes, how competely you managedyour bodily

passions and your own householdwas an indication of how skillfully
you were likely to behaveas a public figureon the political or military
stage. Similarly,in the Frenchcourt as studiedby Elias, it was accepted
that good table manners,properconduct towardthe opposite sex and,
more generally,skill in conversationand etiquettewere more likely to

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84

advance than retard a courtier'spolitical career. Elias and Foucault

both deal with areas of human conduct in which the managementof
naturalfunctions [for example, sex, eating, drinking,excretion]over-
laps with the strategicor tactical pursuitof survivaland advantagein
respectof health, marriage,friendship,politics, and so on.19

The practicesinvolvedin care,or watchfulmanagement,of the self had

not only political but also ontological implications. In other words,
they were closely bound up with not only how people got on in the
world but also how they understood themselves.Foucault and Elias
are both deeply interestedin the links between how we "manage"or
"copewith"our bodily urges and how we conceptualizethe "self,"its
substance, capacities, and obligations. Foucault's ultimate goal is a
history or "genealogy"of the "desiring"subject.To illustratehis ap-
proach, in the early pages of The Use of Pleasure, Foucault quotes
Socrates'first speech in Plato's Phaedruswhere the philosophercon-
demns the love of elder men for "soft boys ... all made up with rouge
and decked out in ornaments."20Rather then take such a remarkat
face value, Foucault explores how this moral attitude was tied to a
specific "axis of experience"and "clusterof concrete relationships"
that changed in a specific direction over time. He concludes that
Socretes'remarkswere one aspect of "athematiccomplex ... of sexual
austerity"present"veryearlyin the moral thoughtof antiquity,"which
strengthenedsignificantlyin the courseof six centuries.21

While Foucaultbegins with Socrates,Elias begins with Kant. A major

stimulus for The CivilizingProcess was Elias's own critical response
to the moral critique of French "civilization"carried out in the late
eighteenthcenturyby "the middle-classGerman intelligentsia."Elias
quotes Kant'sopinion:"Cultivatedto a high degreeby art and science,
we are civilized to a point where we are overburdenedwith all sorts
of social proprietyand decency. ... The idea of morality is a part of
culture. But the application of the idea, which results only in the
similitudeof moralityin the love of honour and its outwarddecency,
amountsonly to civilizing."22Like Foucault,ratherthan taking such a
remarkat face value, Elias exploreshow particularexperienceswithin
specificfigurationsappearingin the course of the civilizingprocessled
to the appearance of civilite among the French court nobility and
Kulturamong the Germanbourgeoisieof whom Kant was one of the
"spokesmen."23 To be more precise,Elias argues that membersof the
Germanbourgeoisiewere largelyexcludedfrom "good society"in the
provincialcourts of the aristocracy.This contributedto "avery special

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 85

kind of bourgeois self-image, a turning away from everythingto do

with the administration of power monopolies, ... a cultivation of in-
wardness,and the elevationof spiritualand culturalachievementsto a
special place in the table of values."24Elias believes these attitudes
strengthenedthe hold of the homoclaususimage,especiallyin German
thought, making the self problematicin a way that obscuredthe true
characterof people and the societies to whichthey belong.

Foucault and Elias apply the same methodology at this point. They
both dig beneath attitudestoward"proper"social behavior.Elias ex-
plores Germanbourgeoisattitudestoward"outwarddecency"in a way
that explainshow a specificnational class acquireda particularontol-
ogy and a distinctive ethical code. Compare Foucault's analysis of
Greco-Romanattitudestoward"proper"behaviorin the specific area
of sexual relations. Foucault also shows that beneath the practical
question of "how should one behave?"there are deeper questions of
ontology,such as "whatis one's ethical substance?"and profoundcon-
cerns about the objectsof ethicalbehavior.25

There are other close parallels between the intellectual strategies of

Foucault and Elias. Foucault points out that as the Empire became
more centralizedand bureaucraticthis changed the life conditions of
Roman citizens and led to alterationsin behavioralstandards.Elias
explainsshiftingbehavioralstandardsin medievaland modernEurope
in terms of the changingsituationof the secularupperclass in Europe,
as feudalsociety was pacifiedand a strongroyal authoritytook shape.
It is obviously importantto recognize major differencesbetween the
sequencesof historicalchangeanalyzedby the two writers.Forexample,
it is evident that in the period studiedby Foucaultthe state apparatus
in Rome did not achieve a power monopoly within the Empire that
was as stable and centralizedas that achieved,within a smaller terri-
tory, by the state in absolutist France.However,there are four major
similaritiesbetweenthe analysesprovidedby Elias and Foucault.First,
they both arguethat the degreeof centralizationand the complexityof
networksof interdependenceincreasedgreatlyover time in both cases.
Second, they each argue that over several generations the group on
which they focus - Roman citizens and medievalknights,respectively
- underwenta considerablereductionin their relativeautonomyand
the simplicityof their life condition. Third, they each show that the
social functionsthat had previouslyaccompaniedthe elevatedstatusof
the group that concerns them were graduallyremoved. Citizens and
knightsretainedtheir status but were no longer free to govern or fight

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86

for themselves.Fourth,the analysesof Foucaultand Elias show that in

eachcase the responsewas twofold:to elaboratethe externalindications
of social status, and to become deeply preoccupiedwith the natureof
the self.

Accordingto Elias, the court aristocrat,no longer a feudal warrior,is

drivenby a "compulsivedesirefor social prestige."He is also supremely
self-aware.To quote La Bruyere,the courtieris "masterof his gestures,
of his eyes and his expression;he is deep, impenetrable."26Compare
La Bruyere'swords with Foucault'sdescriptionof the standardsand
preoccupationsof the propertiedRoman establishmentin the firsttwo
centuriesA.D.: "On the one hand there is an accentuationof every-
thing that allows the individual to define his identity in accordance
with his statusand with the elementsthat manifestit in the most visible
way. One seeks to make oneself as adequateas possible to one's own
status by means of a set of signs and marks pertaining to physical
bearing, clothing and accommodations, gestures of generosity and
munificence,spending behaviour and so on.... But at the opposite
extremeone finds the attitudethat consists of formingand recognizing
oneself as the subject of one's own actions ... through a relation ...
[that]is fulfilledin the sovereigntythat one exercisesover oneself."27

In imperialRome, political activitywas a vocation deliberatelychosen

only by a minority.Those who took part needed the ability to take
responsibilityfor theirown rationaljudgments,navigatea safe passage
through"the complex and shifting interplayof relationsof command
and subordination,"28keep a clear distinctionbetweenthe public face
and a well-governedinner self, and play the game of avoidingmaking
enemies unnecessarilyin the highly unstableconjuncturesof imperial
politics. Foucault often quotes Seneca, especially on the need for ra-
tionality, sensitivity to others, and realistic goals. The sentiment of
Seneca on these mattersare very similarto those of the Due de Saint-
Simon, whose memoirs give Elias insights into life at the absolutist
Frenchcourt.29

Elias and Foucaultboth link changes in standardsof behaviorin the

historicalperiodsthey studyto five othercharacteristicsof figurational
dynamicsor personality.These are:the densityand complexityof inter-
dependencechains; the strengthsof centralizingtendencies;the level
of anxiety or fear; the strength of the desire to avoid specific bodily
functionsor activities["thethreshholdof repugnance"in Elias's anal-
ysis,30the degreeof "austerity"in Foucault's];and contemporaryideas

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 87

about the nature of the self. It is that this point that disagreements
between the intellectual strategies of Foucault and Elias begin to
emerge.

Foucault's discussion of changing perceptions of the self in Roman

times divergesin a significantrespectfromElias'sanalysisof the devel-
opment of the civilized personalityin early modern Europe.Each can
be taken in turn. Elias arguesthat life in court society encouragedthe
personality structureto develop self-control in two respects. One is
conscious self-monitoring and self-regulation combined with close
observation and careful interpretationof the behavior, feelings, and
intentionsof your associates,rivals,and competitors.Strongemotions
are subordinatedto rationalcalculation.The other aspect of self-con-
trol is "an automatism, a self-compulsionthat [one] cannot resist."
This "automatic,blindlyfunctioningapparatusof self-control"develops
earlyin life. It builds"awall of deeprootedfears"aroundeach one of us.
The first aspect of self-controltakes the form of foresight,"psycholog-
ization,"and rationalization.The second producesshame,repugnance,
and embarrassment. These feelingsstem fromgrowingsensitivityto the
nuances of our own and others' behavior.The pressuresof surviving
within highly interdependentsocial networkslead us to treatourselves
and others as a "dangerzone." We feel constant anxiety about being
vulnerableto others' behavior.We sufferunrelentingtension between
our inner drives and the drive-controlfunctions making us behave
"properly."31

This tension betweendrivesand drive-controlfunctioncauses modern

"civilized"humanbeings to see "the individual[as] ... somethingsepa-
rate'inside'while 'society'and otherpeople are 'external'and 'alien.'"32
This is the origin of the tendencyfor each particularperson to think of
himselfor herselfas homoclausus,separatedby an almost impregnable
barrierfrom whateveris "outside."One consequence of this habit of
thought is tremendousdoubt about the "reality"of our perceptionsof
the world outside. Another is the inclinationto see ourselvesas com-
pletely free, unique, and sovereign"individuals"and to deny the fact,
obvious to Elias, that we are profoundlyshaped by the societies or,
more precisely,the "figurations"into whichwe are born.

CompareFoucault.In his analysis,in classicalGreece,it was taken for

granted that rational self-masteryon the part of adult male citizens
"implieda close connection betweenthe superioritythat one exercised
over oneself, the authorityone exercisedin the context of the house-

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88

hold, and the powerone exercisedin the fieldof an agonisticsociety."33

However, six centuries later two major changes had occurred:reci-
procityand equalityhad advancedin the household;34and local urban
politics, the traditionalsphereof the citizen, had becamepart of a "far
more extensiveand complex field of power relations."35This had two
effects:first, increasedanxietyabout the vulnerabilityof humanbeings
within an increasinglycomplex, ambiguous,and unpredictablesocial
world; and second, disruptionof the old taken-for-grantedpattern of
mutual reinforcementbetween the adult male's command of himself,
his command of his household, and his active participationin the
controlof publicbusiness.

An importantdifferencebetweenElias and Foucaultis that according

to Foucault's analysis, the origin of Roman citizens' anxiety about
whetherthey were doing the right thing was cognitive, not affectual.
The disruptionof traditionalexpectationsmade the self as an ethical
projectproblematic,causing the citizen to stop, think, and worry.In-
creasedanxietywas not, in Foucault'sanalysis,caused by the appear-
ance within the psyche of a "wall of deep-rooted fears."In fact, he
argues during the six-hundredyears between the fourth century B.C.
and the second century A.D., sex continued to be experiencedas an
enjoyable activity - natural, necessary, and strenuous - which had
some unfortunateside effects:specifically,it disruptedthe male's rela-
tionshipwith himself and exhaustedhis physicalstrength.Throughout
this period dynamitecontinued,so to speak, to be recognizedas dyna-
mite but as life becamemore complex,turbulent,and uncertaingreater
attention had to be paid to how this substance was stored, guarded,
and used. Rationalcare was the guidingprinciple,not irrationalfear.

What changed was the complexity of the figurations within which

sexual pleasure and its side effects had to be managed. Increased
strategicawarenesswas needed to keep oneself safe but this certainly
did not mean that the sexualdrivebecame experiencedas intrinsically
"repugnant."What it did mean was that sexualiltyhad to be treated
with greatercare and increased awarenessof the prudence of absti-
nence or moderationwhen circumstancesdictated. As Foucault puts
it: "Sexualpleasureas an ethical substancecontinues to be governed
by relationsof force - the force against which one must struggleand
over which the subjectis expected to establishhis domination.But in
this game of violence, excess, rebellion and combat, the accent is
placed more and more readily on the weakness of the individual,on
his frailty,on his needto flee,to escape,to protectand shelterhimself."36

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 89

Sexualitycontinuedto be consciouslyperceivedas a quasi-naturalforce

whose capacityto disruptrationalitywas recognizedand treatedwith
great respect.37This attitudedid not change significantly.38 What did
change over time was people's perception of the rules it was prudent
to follow in their public and private behavior. Specifically,there was
increased insistence on the need to take personal responsibilityfor
choices, and greaterawarenessof the impermanenceof personal ar-
rangements[jobs, appointments,friendshipsand so on] and the shift-
ing characterof social networks.

Crucially,Foucaultarguesthat the majorshifttowardperceivingsexual-

ity itselfas repugnantand evil coincidedwith the spreadof Christianity,
which encourageda furtherand even more radicalredefinitionof the
self as an ethical project. A new ontology produced a new way of
experiencingthe self, a new relationshipto inner drives. Christians
were preoccupiedwith sinfulness.They learnedto fear their own flesh
as a source of temptation leading to evil and punishment.39They
subjectedthemselves"to a generallaw that is at the same time the will
of a personal god."40 Ethical fulfillmentcould only be achieved by
decipheringyour soul, purifyingyour desires, and renouncingearthly
satisfactions.A new regimeof confession, penitence,and hatredof the
fleshwas inaugurated.This was part of a long-termprocess that could
be tracedover severalcenturies.41

The analysisso far has shown that in The Useof Pleasureand The Care
of the Self Foucault converged significantlywith Elias's approachin
TheCivilizingProcessbut that importantdifferencesremainedbetween
them. The next two tasks, carried out in the following section of this
article are: to summarizebriefly the main changes in Foucault'sap-
proach as comparedwith his position in Disciplineand Punish; and,
equally briefly,to identify a researchagenda flowing from the desir-
abilityof exploringthe implicationsof the similaritiesand differences
betweenElias and Foucault.

Foucault'schangingapproach

Between the mid 1970s and the early 1980s Foucault moved in three
directions, intellectually. First, he explored, and implicitly recom-
mended, a way of inculcatingknowledgethat was very differentfrom
the one describedin Disciplineand Powerand the first volume of his
Historyof Sexuality.Second, he developeda differentway of treating

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90

power. Third, he revised his approach to the analysis of historical

change,althoughhe still referredto it as "genealogy."42

On the firstpoint, Foucaultencounteredin classicalGreece and Rome

a form of knowledgetransmissionby scholarsand "experts"that was
an attractive alternative to the oppressive discursive practices of
modernitythat shaped and blinkeredthe self. In The Use of Pleasure
and The Careof the Self, he exploredthe content of "textswrittenfor
the purposeof offeringrules, opinions and advice on how to behaveas
one should."These texts were "designedto be read, learned, reflected
upon, and tested out." They were "functionaldevices that would en-
able individualsto questiontheirown conduct, to watch over and give
shape to it, and to shape themselvesas ethical subjects."43The key
phrase is "shapethemselves."Embeddedin the texts was the assump-
tion that individualswould incorporatethe opinions and advice they
offered within a larger dialogue, not only internal to the individual
consciousnessbut also among friends and fellow citizens, a dialogue
informedby the lessons of success and failurein confrontingthe chal-
lenges of daily life.

The dialogue and practicalexperienceof citizens in the ancient world,

enjoyedunder conditions of equality,44filled the space later occupied
by the strait-jacketof modern discursiveand non-discursivepractices.
In fact, the Greekand Romantexts encounteredin The Useof Pleasure
and The Careof the Self allow us to see Foucault'sown earlierwritings
in a fresh light. The point is that the quotations from Foucault that
havejust been given are equallyapplicableto his own texts.The differ-
ence is that while the ancient writerswere operatingin a social order
attuned to their practices, Foucault is working against the grain of
society, trying to disrupt our habitual assumptions. Books such as
Madnessand Civilizationand Disciplineand Punishwork by stimulat-
ing a new and radical awarenessof the way we experienceourselves,
about the nature of the self. They encourage us to question and re-
evaluatethe way we conduct ourselves.45By their existence they chal-
lenge the practicesof the modernscientific-legalcomplex.

Turningto the second point, in Discipline and Punish Foucault had

been preoccupiedby the differentstrategiesof dominationand resist-
ance in play during the pre-modernand modern epochs. As is well
known, he contrasteda pre-modernstyle of domination, crystallized
in the act of public execution, with a modern style, summed up in
Bentham'sPanopticon.In Foucault'sview, the modern "carceralcity"

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was held in place by "a multiple networkof diverseelements - walls,

spaces, institutions,rules,discourse."These offereda terrainfor acts of
localized resistance, a terrain on which Foucault could alreadyhear
"the distant roar of battle."46In The Care of the Self, Foucault's
approachwas differentin three ways. Comparedto his earlier work,
he was more detached,displayedmore sensitivityto the complexityof
interdependencewithin human relationships,and paid more attention
to the subtletiesof historicalchangewithincomplexchainsor networks
of humaninterdependence.

As an exampleof his changedapproach,take Foucault'sargumentthat

by the second century B.C. the Roman empire had become vast,
discontinuous,flexible,and differentiated:"It was a space in whichthe
centresof powerweremultiple;in whichthe activities,the tensions,the
conflictswere numerous;in whichthey developedin severaldirections;
and in which the equilibriawere obtained througha variety of trans-
actions."47The "smallsocietyof landowners"48 who were self-govern-
ing citizens and, when necessary,citizen-soldiershad passed away.As
a result, "the agonistic game by which one sought to manifest and
ensure one's superiorityover others ... had to be integratedinto a far
more extensiveand complex field of power relations."49 In describing
the situation of Roman citizens in the first and second centuriesA.D.
he writes:"Ratherthan imagininga reductionor cessation of political
activities throughthe effects of a centralizedimperialism,one should
think in terms of the organizationof a complex space. Much vaster,
much more discontinuous,much less closed than must have been the
case for the small city-states, it was also more flexible, more differ-
entiated, less rigidlyhierarchizedthan would be the authoritarianand
bureaucraticEmpirethat people would attempt to organize after the
great crisis of the third century."50Foucault'ssensitivityin such pas-
sages to the complexityof powerbalanceswithin complex and dynam-
ically changingfigurationsplaces him very muchcloser to Elias than in
his earlierwork.

With respect to the third point, in The History of Sexuality Foucault

quietlyabandonshis previousmode of historicalanalysis(for example,
in The Orderof Things),which imposed sharp and absolute breaks
between epochs. Instead, his analysispays more attentionto elements
of continuity in long-term historical change. Specifically,he traces a
phased transitionin the West societies from "'ethics-oriented'morali-
ties" to "'code-oriented'moralities."Four phases can be identifiedin
his analysis. In the first phase, ethics-oriented moralities based on

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92

rational self-masterypredominatedwhose focus was askesis, in other

words,trainingfor self-mastery.Duringa secondphase,ethics-oriented
moralitiesbecame more austere.The thirdphase saw the rise of code-
oriented moralities under the influence of Christianityduring the
medieval era. These moralities have a "quasi-juridicalform," which
emphasizedthe strictobservanceof preciselydefinedrulesof behavior.51
Initially, code-oriented moralities took shape in monastic settings.
Later, their application was extended to include the whole of the
Christianlaity.Confessionand penitencewere the key practices.They
provokeda deep and wide-rangingpreoccupationwith sexualthought,
feeling, and behavior. In the fourth phase, modern science and the
secularprofessions,backedby the centralizingbureaucraticstate, took
over from the Church.They employeddiscourseabout sexualityas the
chief mediumof theirwill to knowledgeand will to power,especiallyin
the spheresof pedagogy,medicine,and demography.

This discussionof code-orientedand ethics-orientedmoralitiesshows

that, despite their similarities,importantdifferencesexist betweenthe
approachesof Elias and Foucault.A numberof theoreticaland empir-
ical questionsare raisedby these differences.First, thereis the question
of the relationshipsbetween the religious and military functions and
theirrelativesignificancein shapingmedievalandearlymodernthought,
feeling, and practice. As we see here, Elias concentrateson the war-
riors, Foucault on the priests. To elaboratea little, Elias follows the
strandthat leads from the warriorfightingfor his life to the figuration
linkingmonarchand courtiers,while Foucaultpoints towardthe inter-
twining strand that leads from the monk fighting for his soul to the
figurationlinking priest and communicants.52What were the contri-
butions made by each set of transformationsto the civilizing process,
especially the inculcation of self-control, rationalization,psycholog-
ization, and the accompanyingfeelings of shame and repugnancein
respect of bodily functions?Furtherresearchmight explore in more
detail the specific social contexts in which the medieval and early
modern manners books studied by Elias were actually used and the
intentionsthat were expressedin their use.

Take, for example, a key text cited by Elias: Erasmus'sDe civilitate.

This work was written in the early sixteenth century for the young
Prince Henry of Burgundy.Elias insists that its precepts are general
and "not ... intendedfor a particularclass."However,two points are
worth making. First, Elias identifies court society as a primary site
wherecivilityand civilizedbehaviortook shape and arguesthat "Cler-

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 93

ical circles, above all, become popularizersof the courtly customs."53

Second, Erasmuswas an Augustinianmonk, a leading figure in cler-
ical circles, and a frequenterof court society.54So the question arises:
to what extent does the emphasis on reserved,tactful, and disciplined
behavior in early modern Europeexpressthe complex adaptationsof
the old feudal aristocracyto the pressuresand opportunitiesof court
life, and to what extent does it expressthe moral imperativesof Chris-
tianityin the era of the Reformation?55

A second area to explore is the nexus of relationshipsamong affect,

rationality,discourse,and self-control.Foucaultsees moderndiscursive
practicesas intrusivelypenetratingthe mind and body so as to impose
disciplines of thought and behavior in the name of rationalityand
science, stifling at birth a wide range of spontaneous impulses and
imposing a narrow,conformist, and highly constrictedversion of the
self. Foucault'sapproachis to search for ways of burstingout of this
straitjacket,so as to allow affect to find full expression, to impinge
freely upon our consciousness, allowing us to know the world and
ourselves in a much richer way. By contrast, Elias assumes it is the
exerciseof self-controlover affectsand drivesthat makesclearpercep-
tion, rationalanalysis,and deliberateaction possible.In his view, lan-
guage and discursivepractices serve two functions.On the one hand,
they provide a means of controlling the self and others through the
deployment of symbolic forms, for example in the guise of courtly
etiquetteor scientificmethod,both of whichprovideways of subjecting
potentiallyunpredictableeventsto a regimeof controland predictabil-
ity. On the other hand, discourse provides the observer(for example,
the social psychologistor sociologist) with evidenceabout the person-
ality and state of mind of the speaker, and about the habitus and
we-imageinculcatedwithin the groupsto whichthe speakerbelongs.56

On this matter,thereare threemajordifferencesbetweenFoucaultand

Elias. First, Foucaulttreatsdiscursivepracticesas an alien imposition
upon human beings, shaping consciousness, whereas Elias treats a
group'sdiscourseas a productof its sharedexperiences,a reflectionof
those experiencesratherthan somethingthat createsthem.57Second,as
we have seen, Foucault has a more positive orientation toward the
affectualdimension of human existence than does Elias. Third, Elias
has greaterconfidence than Foucault about the feasibilityof modern
citizens being able to exercise a relativelyhigh degree of clear-sighted
control over theirown lives.

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94

This last point leads towardsanothermajorarea of differencebetween

the two thinkers. According to Foucault, the French Revolutionary
period inaugurateda regimeof centralizedscientific-legaldomination
whereas,in Elias'sview, duringthe nineteenthand twentiethcenturies
there have been strong tendenciestowardfunctionaldemocratization
and the equalization of relations between established and outsider
groups.58Elias's ambition,stated clearlyin works such as The Society
of Individualsand Whatis Sociology, is to contributeto the task of
makign the insights of science, whetherin the form of "historical...
social psychology"or Eliasiansociology,availableto ordinarypeople.59
Elias wants to empowerhis fellow citizensby makingscience available
to them, in this way clearingtheir minds of fear and fantasy.Foucault
also wants to empowerthem but by subvertingthe claims of science
and allowing them to experience sharply and, perhaps, for the first
time the promptingsof their innerpassions, the source of the very fear
and fantasyabhorredby Elias.60

A researchagenda

Empiricaland theoreticalinquiriesare both stimulatedby this debate.

To concludethis article,two lines of enquirymay be brieflymentioned.
One majorfocus of interestis the mutualinfluenceof the intertwining
processes of professionalizationand democratizationwithin modern
societies.To what extent, for example, are the interestsand wishes of
"ordinarycitizens"articulatedand served in the practices of science,
the state, and the professions?How are these issues affected by, for
example,the risinglevel of educationwithin the population,the explo-
ration of strategies of "empowerment"and "teamwork"within the
occupationalsphere,the breakdownof deferencein the post-colonial
era, the increasing assertiveness of previously subordinate groups
(includingwomen and ethnic minorities),the widespreadprivatization
of public assets and services, the growing influence of "devolved"
regionalpolities "below"the old nation-state,and the developmentof
supranationalstructuressuch as the EuropeanCommuity"above"it?

Turningto a second area of enquiry,the complex interplay among

affect,rationality,discourse,and forms of control may be exploredby
wideningthe implicitdebatebetweenElias and Foucaultto encompass
other bodies of literatureincluding,for example,the critical theorists
of the FrankfurtSchool.Writerssuch as Fromm and Marcuseshared
Elias's interest in Freud but were, like Foucault, more pessimistic

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 95

about the potentialityfor human emancipationunder modern condi-

tions.61Another valuableresourcein this wideneddebatewould be the
work of Richard Sennett who admiredElias and also workedclosely
with Foucault.62It would also be useful to explore the potential con-
tributionof innovativeresearcherssuch as SilvanTomkinswhose work
on affecttheory and script theory suggestspromisinginsightsinto the
dynamicsof pride and shame within the personalityand in social life,
importantthemes in Elias's work also. Donald Nathanson, a promi-
nent psychiatristwho has continued Tomkins'swork, makes explicit
links betweenthe contributionsof Tomkinsand Elias.63

In the work of Elias and Foucault,theoreticalenquiryleads directlyto

empiricalresearch.Both Elias and Foucaultwere considerablehistor-
ians who spent long periods of time in the archives. For Foucault,
concepts were not an end in themselvesbut, instead, tools with which
to conductpracticalexplorationsof the social world, past and present.
For his part, Elias used to encouragefollowers to conduct empirical
work ratherthan spend much time musing over the details of theory.
However,when empiricalwork is being carried out, it is useful to be
aware of what is at stake, theoretically,to have a clear idea of the
differenceeach empiricalfinding will make when placed on one side
or the other of the balance producedby the ongoing theoreticalargu-
ment.This articleseeks to make clear what is at stake in a comparison
betweenElias and Foucault.64

Notes

1. An earlierversion of the argumentwas presentedat the Norbert Elias Centenary

Conferenceat Bielefeld,Germanyin June1997.At this conferenceArpadSzakolcai
(EuropeanUniversityInstitute,Florence)informedme thathis own researchshows
that in the last few yearsof his life Foucaultbecameacquaintedwith Elias'swork.
See A. Szakolczai,"Thinkingbeyondthe East-Westdivide:Foucault,Patocka,and
the care of the self,"Social Research,61/2 (1994),and Szakolczai,Max Weberand
MichelFoucault.ParallelLife-Works,(London:Routledge,1998).
2. Elias, The CivilizingProcess (Oxford:Blackwell,1994), Foucault,The Historyof
Sexuality,VolI: An Introduction(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1979),Foucault,The
Use of Pleasure(Harmondsworth:Penguin, 1984),Foucault,The Careof the Self
(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1984).
3. Foucault,Disciplineand Punish(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1977).
4. For some initial evidence of the plausibilityof a comparisonbetween Elias and
Foucault,see their discussionsof Velasquez'sLas Meninas:in Elias, Involvement
and Detachment(Oxford:Blackwell,1987),lii-lxviii, and Foucault,The Orderof
Things(London:Tavistock/Routledge,1974).Both use the paiting to illustratea

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96

movementaway from the "subject." Also, both Elias and Foucaultattach signifi-
cance to the increasingfocus in modernityon the eye as the medium of surveil-
lance,control,and appreciation.Elias:"Justas naturenow becomes,far morethan
earlier,a source of pleasuremediatedby the eye, people too become a source of
visual pleasureor, conversely,of visuallyarouseddispleasure,of differentdegrees
of repugnance.The direct fear inspiredin men by men has diminished,and the
innerfearmediatedthroughthe eye and throughthe superegois risingproportion-
ately,"The CivilizingProcess,497; Foucault:"The residenceof truth in the dark
centreof thingsis linked,paradoxically,to... [the]sovereignpowerof the empirical
gaze that turnstheirdarknessinto light,"TheBirthof the Clinic,xiii.
5. For some earlierdiscussionsof Elias, see D. Smith,"NorbertElias - establishedor
outsider?"SociologicalReview(1984):367-389, and The Rise of HistoricalSociol-
ogy (Cambridge:Polity,1991),42-54, 157-174.
6. See, for example,Elias, TheSocietyof Individuals(Oxford:Blackwell,1991).For an
Eliasiancritiqueof Foucault'sanalysisin DisciplineandPunish,see P. Spierenburg,
TheSpectacleof Suffering.Executionsand theEvolutionof Repression(Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress,1984).
7. In The CivilizingProcess, Elias notes, with qualifications,"how much this study
owes to the discoveriesof SigmundFreudand the psychoanalyticalschool,"249.
SigmundFreud'sCivilizationand its Discontents(New York:Dover Publications,
1994)was firstpublishedin 1930.
8. Foucault,Historyof Sexuality.VolumeOne,10-13.
9. Elias preparedthe book subsequentlypublishedas The Court Society (Oxford:
Blackwell,1983),as his Habilitationthesisin 1933.
10. A furthervolume, Confessionsof the Flesh, has not been published.See Use of
Pleasure,12.
11. xv.
12. Ibid.
13. FriedrichNietzsche,TheBirthof Tragedy(NewYork:Dover Publications,1995),53.
14. "Andis it accidentalthat in one of the fragmentsof Heraclitus... the phenomenon
of truthin the sense of uncoveredness(unhiddenness)... shows through?"Martin
Heidegger,Beingand Time(Oxford:Blackwell,1963),262.
15. See, for example,Elias,Whatis Sociology?(London:Hutchinson,1978),125-133.
16. See, for example,JamesMiller,The Passionof MichelFoucault(London:Harper
Collins,1994),chaptereight.
17. Interestingly,the terms"discourse"and "discursivepractice"are practicallyimpos-
sible to find in The Use of Pleasureand The Careof the Self. Foucaultgave these
termsa negativeloadingin his previouswork (e.g., Disciplineand Punish).Was he
reluctantto use the samelanguagein describingformsof self-controlwithwhichhe
was quitesympathetic?Referencesto "discourse" are plentifulin the firstvolumeof
TheHistoryof Sexuality,whichdealt with the nineteenthand twentiethcenturies.
18. See, for example, Use of Pleasure,109, 152, 204, Care of Self, 4, 193, Civilizing
Process,43, 61,76.
19. Foucaultwrites:"It wouldbe interesting... to tracethe long historyof the connec-
tions betweenalimentaryethics and sexual ethics...; one would need to discover
how, over a long period of time, the play of alimentaryprescriptionsbecame
uncoupled from that of sexual morals. ... In any case, in the reflectionof the
Greeks in the classical period, it does seem that the moral problematizationof
food, drinkand sexualactivitywas carriedout in a rathersimilarmanner"(Use of
Pleasure,51;see also Careof Self, 141).

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 97

20. Ibid., 6,19.

21. Ibid., 21-23.
22. Ibid.,7.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 512.
25. Useof Pleasure,26-27.
26. CivilizingProcess,473,476.
27. Careof Self, 85.
28. Ibid., 9.
29. See, for example, Careof Self, 12, 39, 51, 85-86, 103, 148, 167, 178 (Seneca),and
CivilizingProcess,417-418,478-479, 483, 535, 538, 540 (on Saint-Simon).See also
CourtSociety,passim.
30. On "shameand repugnance,"see CivilizingProcess,492-498.
31. Ibid., also 445-446.
32. Elias, TheSocietyof Individuals(Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1991).
33. Careof Self, 94.
34. Like Elias, Foucaultrelatesthese changesto shifts within marriageand the struc-
tureof the RomanEmpire.He agreeswith Elias thatmarriagebecamea concernof
publiclaw and that most upper-classhusbandswereunlikelyto be activein affairs
of state. Like their wives, they were "effectivelyexcludedfrom this sphere,"Elias,
"Thechangingbalanceof powerbetweenthe sexes - a process-sociologicalstudy:
the exampleof the ancientRomanstate,"Theory,Cultureand Society(1987):304.
35. Careof Self, 95.
36. Ibid., 67.
37. Elias himselfnotes that humanbeings in the classicalera recognizedthe powerof
passion. In a study of the Greekcity states of the fifth centuryB.C. he comments
that expressionsof "veryhigh passionateness,"for examplein the sphereof vio-
lence, elicited feelings of wonder combined with "compassion"for those who
sufferedas a result.See Elias,"Thegenesis of sport as a sociologicalproblem,"in
N. Elias and E. Dunning, Questfor Excitement.Sportand Leisurein the Civilizing
Process(Oxford:Blackwell,1986),145-147.
38. This aspect of Foucault'sanalysisdiffersfrom the equivalentpart of the argument
in The CivilizingProcesswhere Elias suggests that sexual drives were over time
increasinglyregardedas repugnantand shamefulin themselves.
39. The Christian moral code seems to play a part in Foucault's analysis that is
equivalentto the image of homo clausus in Elias's account. Both are treated as
burdensuponhumanbeingsthatinhibittheirfullerself-realization. See,forexample,
FoucaultHistoryof Sexuality.VolumeOne, 159,Elias, Society of Individuals,56,
Civilizing Process, 445.
40. Careof Self, 239. There is insufficientspace to explorethe parallelsand overlaps
with Weber but for relevantdiscussions see Szkolczai, Max Weberand Michel
Foucault,and David Owen, Maturityand Modernity.Nietzsche,Weber,Foucault
and theAmbivalenceof Reason(London:Routledge,1994).
41. In TheCivilizingProcess,Eliasnotes that the "increasedinwardnessand rationalisa-
tion"of Protestantism- the "changein religiousfeelingto whichsociologyhas paid
most attention hitherto is obviously closely connected to certain changes in the
situationand structureof the middle classes"while the "correspondingchangein
Catholicism"(e.g., the foundationof the Jesuits)seems to be "in closer touchwith
the absolutistcentralorgans,in a mannerfavouredby the hierarchicalandcentralist
structureof the CatholicChurch"(494). Elias'sreferenceto the attentionpaid by

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98

sociologiststo Protestantismmay referin part to Max Weber'scollectedessayson

the sociology of religion, which were publishedin 1920just after Weber'sdeath.
This collection included The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1976,originallypublishedin 1904-1905).Duringthe 1930s,Elias
was operatingwithinan intellectualfield in whichthe memoryof Max Weberwas
powerful. At Heidelberg,Elias has attended the soirees conducted by Weber's
widow and he was, for a while, a Habilitationcandidateunderthe sponsorshipof
Weber'sbrother,Alfred.See Elias, Reflectionson a Life (Cambridge:Polity,1994),
96-99. ForWeber'scommentson the Church'sinfluenceoverthe petty-bourgeoisie,
the part playedby the Humanistsin "the transformationof a feudal and clerical
education into a courtly culture based on the largesse of patrons,"the early
Church'srigorousadherenceto a "soberlypracticalrationalism,"which "set the
tone of a dogmaticand ethicalsystematisationof the faith,"and the Church'sdeep
antipathyto sexuality,see Weber,Economyand Society(Berkeley,California:Uni-
versityof CaliforniaPress, 1968),462-463, 513, 554-555, and 60-66 respectively.
In The CivilizingProcess,Elias makesvery few directreferencesto Weber.See xv,
526 (a critiqueof Weberon "idealtypes"),529, and 533.Thereare more references
to Weberin TheCourtSociety,e.g., 37-38, 41-42, 63, 85, 110,and 121-122.
42. A genealogical approachto historical analysis assumes that events and forces
collide with each other throughtime in a haphazardand unpredictablefashion
leading sometimes to conflict, sometimes to fusion. The historian adopting this
approachhas to give carefulattentionto preciseindividualdetails on the grounds
that this is all thereis to be discovered.It wouldbe misleadingto look for heuristic
or explanatoryguidancein terms of some notion of broaderencompassingsocial
processes.Foucault adapted the idea of "genealogy"from Nietzsche. See, espe-
cially, Foucault, "Nietzsche, genealogy, history,"in Paul Rabinow, editor, The
FoucaultReader(Harmondsworth:Penguin, 1986),76-100. In practice,Foucault
does seem to be working with some idea of "process"in the second and third
volumesof TheHistoryof Sexuality,althoughit is not theorized.For example,he
writesthat "Inthe slow developmentof the art of livingunderthe themeof the care
of the self, the firsttwo centuriesof the imperialepochcan be seen as the summitof
a curve"(Careof Self, 451) and, elsewhere,that "The setting up of the Christian
model of marriage [was] ... a slow, belated and difficult occurrence ... in the course
of the Middle Ages" (Use of Pleasure, 221).
43. Use of Pleasure, 12-13.
44. As Foucaultexplicitlyrecognizes,this was equalityamong adult male citizens,not
betweenmales and femalesor betweencitizensand slaves.See, for example,ibid.,
47.
45. Elias was engagedon a parallelmission throughhis work for the GroupAnalytic
Society.He undertookgroup therapysessions, applyingthe analysisdevelopedin
The Society of Individuals. See Reflections on a Life, 63-64.
46. Discipline and Punish, 308.
47. Care of Self, 82-83.
48. Use of Pleasure, 152.
49. Care of Self, 95.
50. Ibid., 82.
51. Useof Pleasure,29-30. Foucaulttakes the Socraticterm askesis from the work of
Platowhereit refersto the rigoroustrainingof the bodyand soul neededto produce
self-masteryand self-awareness.Askesis is a form of knowledge that "was not
reducibleto the mere awarenessof a principle."Foucaultfound that moral con-

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 99

ceptions in Greek and Greco-Romanantiquitywere much more orientedtoward

practicesof the self and the questionof askesisthantowardcodificationof conduct
and the strictdefinitionof whatis permittedandwhatis forbidden(Use of Pleasure,
29-30,72).
52. Elias is quiteawarethat in medievalEurope,as in the earlydaysof Rome,"Besides
fightingpotentialit was only the possession of magicalpowerthat formeda sim-
ilarlyimportantsourceof social power - the priestlyfunctionhence stood along-
side the warriorfunction"(Elias,"Changingbalanceof powerbetweenthe sexes,"
294). In Rome, as Elias points out, the leading warriorand clan exercisedthe
function of the priest. In medieval Europe, the functions of warriorand priest
became more clearlydifferentiated.The issue of who would have the upper hand
was in disputefor a long time.
53. See The CivilizingProcess,59, 61, 83,451.
54. Elias locates Erasmus'sworkin "thephasein whichthe old, feudalknightsnobility
was still in decline,while the new aristocracywas still in the processof formation."
He arguesthat "Thissituationgave, among others, the representativesof a small,
secular-bourgeoisintellectualclass, the humanist,and thus Erasmus,not only an
opportunityto rise in social station, to gain renown and authority,but also a
possibilityof candour and detachmentthat was not present to the same degree
eitherbefore or afterward.This chance of distancingthemselves,which permitted
individualrepresentativesof the intellectualclass to identifytotally and uncondi-
tionally with none of the social groups of their world - though, of course, they
stood closerto one of them,that of the princesand of the courts,than to the others
- also finds expressionin De civilitatemorumpuerilium"(The CivilizingProcess,
58-59). The backgroundinfluenceof Mannheimseemsevidentin this passage.
55. One relevantsource of evidenceis the work of Dilwyn Knox who has examined
school curricula,timetables,and similardocumentsfromthe period.On this basis,
Knox is able to paint a picture of De Civilitatebeing used as a strictlyenforced
manualof pedagogicaldiscipline,imposedthroughstrictmonitoringby inspectors,
teachers,and prefects.This is a world of pious obedience,mental restraint,and
bodily conformitythat remindsus of Foucault'scarceralsociety,with its Christian
origins,ratherthan Elias'scourt with its turbulentwarriorpast. Much more work
needs to be done in respectto the issue to whichElias devoteda meretwo pagesin
the section of The CivilizingProcess entitled "A brief survey of the societies to
which the texts were addressed,"81-83. See, for example,Knox, "Disciplina:the
monasticand clericaloriginsof Europeancivility"in J. Monfasaniand R. G. Musto,
editors, RenaissanceSociety and Culture.Essays in Honorof EugeneF Rice, Jr.
(New York:ItalicaPress),1991,107-135.
56. Foucaultagreeswith this last pointbut sees "theobserver"as the guardin the tower
at the centerof the Panopticon.
57. See, for example,CourtSociety,240-241.
58. CompareKarl Mannheim,Ideologyand Utopia(New York:Harcourt,Braceand
World,1936),35-38.
59. Societyof Individuals,vii-x; Whatis Sociology?50-70, CivilizingProcess,484.
60. For the viewsof someonesympatheticto Elias'sperspectivebut awareof Foucault's
critique, it is worth considering Pierre Bourdieu, who argues that "The most
advancedfields are the site of... an alchemywherebyscientificlibidodominandiis
forciblytransformedinto libidosciendi.This is the rationalebehindmy resistance
to a soft consensuswhich,in my eyes, is the worstpossiblesituation.If nothingelse,
let us haveconflicts!"(interviewwith Bourdieuin P. Bourdieuand L.Wacquant,An

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100

Invitationto ReflexiveSociology(Cambridge:Polity,1992),62-215, 178.See Fou-

cault, TheBirthof the Clinic,Historyof Sexuality.VolumeOne,Elias,"Problemsof
involvementand detachment,"BritischJournalof Sociology(1956):226-252, What
is Sociology?,"The sociology of knowledge:new perspectives,"Sociology (1971):
149-168. 355-370, "The sciences:towardsa theory"in R. Whitley,editor, Social
Processesof ScientificDevelopment(London: Routledge,1974),"Scientificestab-
lishments"in N. Elias, H. Martins,and R. Whitley,editors, ScientificEstablish-
mentsand Hierarchies(London:Reidel, 1982),Involvementand Detachment(Ox-
ford:Blackwell,1987,introductionand Part 1),Societyof Individuals.
61. See, for example,EricFromm,TheFearof Freedom(London:Routledge,1942)and
HerbertMarcuse,Erosand Civilization(Boston:BeaconPress,1955).For Foucault
on the FrankfurtSchool,see Foucault,Remarkson Marx(New York:Semiotext[e],
1991),115-129.
62. See, for example,Sennett, The Fall of Public Man (New York:Alfred A. Knopf,
1977)and FleshandStone(London:Faberand Faber,1994).
63. Nathanson'sdevelopmentof Tomkins'sapproachis presentedin ShameandPride.
Affect,Sex and the Birthof the Self (New York:Norton, 1992).On Elias, see 437-
448.
64. For a contrastingperspective,see Robert van Krieken,"The organisationof the
soul: Elias and Foucaulton disciplineand the self,"ArchivesEuropeennesde Socio-
logie (1990):353-371.

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