Chapter 7: Deeper Cultural Assumptions: What Is

Reality And Truth?

Overview
As groups and organizations evolve, the assumptions they develop about external
adaptation and internal integration reflect deeper assumptions about more abstract
general issues around which humans need consensus to have any kind of society at all.
If we cannot agree on what is real, how to determine the truth or falsity of something,
how to measure time, how space is allocated, what human nature is, and how people
should get along with each other, society is not possible in the first place.

Because different societies have evolved different answers to these questions, we have
many different cultures in the world, and these broader macrocultures influence how
groups and organizations within them will evolve. The most common macrocultures that
have been referred to so far are nations, ethnic and religious groups, and occupations.
Thus individualistic competitive behavior is taken for granted in a U.S. company, just as
teamwork is taken for granted in a Japanese company. Public hugging and kissing
might be entirely acceptable in a public area in the United States and entirely
unacceptable in a comparable area in Saudi Arabia. Telling the boss exactly what you
think might be expected in a German company and quite impossible in a Chinese or
Japanese company.

When we examine the formation of groups that are initially multinational, such as cross-
national mergers like that of British Petroleum and Amoco or joint ventures between
companies from different countries, we see how disagreement on this higher level of
abstraction can make group formation and performance extremely difficult. The best
way to think about the categories we will review is to see them primarily as
characteristics of macrocultures, which influence in a broad way the formation of
organizational cultures, subcultures, and microcultures.
Exhibit 7.1: The Deeper Assumptions of Macrocultures.

▪ Assumptions about the nature of reality and truth

▪ Assumptions about the nature of time
▪ Assumptions about the nature of space
▪ Assumptions about the nature of human nature, human activity, and human
relationships

The dimensions to be reviewed are based on concepts originally developed by the

sociologist Talcott Parsons (1951) and were evolved into a set of value dimensions by
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) in order to do their classic comparative study of four
cultures in the U.S. Southwest — Anglo, Hispanic, Mormon, and Navajo. To varying
degrees, they overlap other dimensions, such as those promoted by Hofstede (2001),
Hall (1959, 1966), and Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1993, 2000), but I have also
elaborated them on the basis of my own experience in different countries. The
categories I will review in the next several chapters are shown in Exhibit 7.1.

Shared Assumptions About the Nature of Reality and Truth

A fundamental part of every culture is a set of assumptions about what is real and how
to determine or discover what is real. Such assumptions tell members of a group how to
determine what is relevant information, how to interpret information, and how to
determine when they have enough of it to decide whether or not to act, and what action
to take.

For example, as I have already pointed out several times, reality and truth in DEC were
defined by debate and by pragmatic criteria of whether things work. If an objective test
was impossible or too difficult to construct, the idea was debated to see whether it stood
the test of being subjected to severe critical analysis. In Ciba-Geigy, much more
emphasis was given to research results from the laboratory and to the opinions of those
considered wise and experienced. Both companies existed in broader Western cultures
dominated by concepts of science and empirically based knowledge. But the fact that
these companies differed greatly from each other shows that even within this broader
macrocultural context, different definitions of reality can be distinguished based on the
occupational macrocultures of electrical engineering and chemistry as well as the
national differences between German Switzerland and the United States.

Levels of Reality

External physical reality refers to those things that can be determined empirically by
objective or, in our Western tradition, “scientific” tests. For example, if two people are
arguing about whether or not a piece of glass will break, they can hit it with a hammer
and find out (Festinger, 1957). If two managers are arguing over which product to
introduce, they can agree to define a test market and establish criteria by which to
resolve the issue. On the other hand, if two managers are arguing over which of two
political campaigns to support, both would have to agree that there are no physical
criteria by which to resolve their conflict.

Different cultures have different assumptions about what constitutes external physical
reality. For example, many of us would not regard the spirit world or extra-sensory
perception as having a physical reality basis, but in other cultures such phenomena
might be regarded as very real. Vivid examples of how ambiguous the borderline can be
are provided in Castaneda’s (1968, 1972) descriptions of his experiences with the
Indian shaman Don Juan and in the controversies that surround research on
extrasensory perception. At its core, physical reality is obvious; at its boundaries, it
becomes very much a matter of macrocultural consensus, which raises the issue of
“social reality.”

Social reality refers to those things that members of a group regard as matters of
consensus, that are not externally, empirically testable. The nature of human nature —
the correct way for humans to relate to nature and to each other, the distribution of
power and the entire political process, assumptions about the meaning of life, ideology,
religion, group boundaries, and culture itself — are obviously matters of consensus, not
empirically determinable. How a group defines itself and the values it chooses to live by
obviously cannot be tested in terms of our traditional notions of empirical scientific
testing but certainly can be strongly held and shared unanimously. If people believe in
something and define it as real, it becomes real for that group.

In the international context, there is no way to test who is right about a territorial conflict
or a belief system, as the continuing war in Afghanistan has amply demonstrated.
Negotiation becomes very difficult if people hold different assumptions about “reality,”
leading nations to resort to the use of economic and military power. The bad joke about
the na ï ve diplomat who tells the Arabs and the Israelis to settle their differences in a
good Christian manner makes the point well.

One of the reasons why business decisions are often difficult to make and why
management is an intrinsically complex activity is the lack of consensus on whether a
given decision area belongs in the realm of physical or social reality. For an
organization to have coherent action, there must be shared assumptions about which
decisions can be empirically resolved and which ones are based on consensual criteria
such as “Let the most experienced person decide” or “Let’s decide by majority vote.”
Notice that the consensus must be on the criteria and on the decision process to be
used, not necessarily on the ultimate substance of the decision. For example, in the
western democratic tradition, we assume that majority rules, yet there is no empirical
basis for that criterion. In fact, for many kinds of decisions, majority rule can be the
worst kind of decision rule because it polarizes the debate into the two camps of
“winners” and “losers.”

Individual reality refers to what you have learned from your own experience and has a
quality of absolute truth to you. However, that truth may not be shared by anyone else.
When we disagree at this level, it becomes very hard to move forward until we can
clearly articulate what our actual experience base is. We must also have some kind of
consensus on whose experience we are willing to trust. In a traditional society based on
hierarchical authority, if so-called elder statesmen speak, we take their experience as
valid and act as if what they say is objectively true. In a pragmatic, individualistic
society, on the other hand, the attitude might well be “Prove it to me,” and beyond that,
what is accepted as proof might be all over the map. Of course, what is defined as
physical, social, or individual reality is itself the product of social learning and hence, by
definition, a part of a given culture (Van Maanen, 1979b; Michael, 1985).

Reaching consensus is a process of building a shared social reality, which becomes

more and more difficult as groups become more multicultural because each member
brings his or her individual reality and many cultural rules about what it is okay to share
and what must be withheld. As Bushe points out in his book Clear Leadership (2009),
the cultural rules of the social order require us to make our own interpretations about
why others do what they do. We make up stories to explain the behavior of others
because it would be rude to keep asking “Why did you do that” or “I don’t understand
your behavior.” To get into better communication requires us to get into situations where
such rules can be suspended so that the members of the group can explain their own
experience and learn to calibrate the experiences of others. I have called those
situations “cultural islands” and have referred to them frequently in the previous
chapters. To summarize, when group members come with different concepts of reality,
then reaching common ground requires special situations and processes.

High Context and Low Context

A useful distinction can be found in Hall’s (1977) differentiation between what he calls
high-context and low-context cultures and Maruyama’s (1974) contrast between
unidirectional and mutual causal cultural paradigms. In the low-context, unidirectional
culture, events have clear universal meanings; in the high-context, mutual causality
culture, events can be understood only in context, meanings can vary, categories can
change, and causality cannot be unambiguously established.

Though this distinction has more meaning when comparing macrocultures, it has utility
for organizations as well. For example, DEC was a high -context culture in which the
meaning of words and actions depended on who was speaking and under what
conditions. Managers knew each other well and always took into account who the
actors were. When a senior manager was observed publicly punishing a subordinate for
doing something “dumb,” this sometimes simply meant that the subordinate should have
gotten buy-in from a few more people before going off on his own. When Ken Olsen
publicly berated one of his engineers, observers often pointed out that Ken only did that
with engineers whom he highly respected and therefore expected perfection from them.
Ciba-Geigy, by contrast, was a low-context culture in which messages tended to have
the same meaning no matter whom they were coming from. To be labeled “dumb” in
Ciba-Geigy would have been a severe negative judgment.

When we refer to language, we often overlook the role of context. We assume that
when someone has learned the language of another country, he or she will be able to
understand what is going on and take action. But as we know all too well from our own
cross-cultural travel experiences, language is embedded in a wider context in which
nonverbal cues, tone of voice, body language, and other signals determine the true
meaning of what is said. A vivid example from my own experience was the previously
cited senior management meeting of the British Petroleum Company at which I thought I
observed polite explanations from the chairman, only to be told later that he had never
been more brutal than he was at that meeting.

Moralism-Pragmatism
A useful dimension for comparing groups on their approach to reality testing is an
adaptation of England’s (1975) moralism-pragmatism dimension. In his study of
managerial values, England found that managers in different countries tended to be
either pragmatic, seeking validation in their own experience, or moralistic, seeking
validation in a general philosophy, moral system, or tradition. For example, he found
that Europeans tended to be more moralistic, whereas Americans tended to be more
pragmatic. If we apply this dimension to the basic underlying assumptions that a group
makes, we can specify different bases for defining what is true, as shown in Exhibit 7.2.
Exhibit 7.2: Possible Criteria for Determining Truth.

▪ Pure dogma, based on tradition and/or religion: It has always been done this
way; it is God’s will; it is written in the scriptures.
▪ Revealed dogma, wisdom based on trust in the authority of wise men,
formal leaders, prophets, or kings: Our leader wants to do it this way; our
consultants have recommended that we do it this way; she has had the most
experience, so we should do what she says.
▪ Truth derived by a “rational-legal” process, (as when we establish guilt or
innocence via a legal process we have agreed to that acknowledges from
the outset that there is no absolute truth, only socially determined
truth): We have to take this decision to the marketing committee and do what
they decide; the boss will have to decide this one, it is his area of responsibility;
we will have to vote on it and go by majority rule; we agreed that this decision
belongs to the production department head.
▪ Truth as that which survives conflict and debate: We thrashed it out in three
different committees, tested it on the sales force, and the idea is still sound, so
we will do it; does anyone see any problems with doing it this way, if not, that’s
what we’ll do.
▪ Truth as that which works, the purely pragmatic criterion: Let’s try it out this
way and evaluate how we are doing.
▪ Truth as established by the scientific method, which becomes, once again,
a kind of dogma: Our research shows that this is the right way to do it; we’ve
done three surveys, and they all show the same thing, so let’s act on them.

This dimension not only highlights the basis on which truth is determined but also can
be related to “uncertainty avoidance,” a major dimension found in Hofstede’s survey-
based cross-national study, and to “tolerance for ambiguity,” an important dimension
that came out of post-World War II research (Hofstede, 2001; Adorno and others, 1950).
Managers and employees in different countries and in different companies vary in the
degree to which they share a certain level of comfort with varying degrees of uncertainty
and ambiguity. As environments become more turbulent and occupations become more
technically complex, the ability of leaders to tolerate uncertainty will become more
necessary for survival and learning, suggesting that organizational and national cultures
that can embrace uncertainty more easily will be inherently more adaptive (Michael,
1985).

This discussion can be summarized best by showing how it applies to our two cases.
DEC had both high consensus that reality was defined by pragmatic criteria and debate
and a very high tolerance for ambiguity. In my consultation work with DEC, for instance,
I was never asked for a recommendation. If I gave one, it was usually overridden
immediately by various ideas from the client, which were then debated among the
members. In Ciba-Geigy, I was always treated as an authority and asked what
I knew from my research and other consulting experience and what I
would recommend. I was treated as a scientist who was bringing knowledge to the
organization, and I often found that my recommendations were implemented in a very
precise manner. If what I recommended conflicted with other cultural elements, for
example, when I suggested more lateral communication, the recommendation was
dismissed outright. Ciba-Geigy did not tolerate ambiguity well and operated much closer
to the moralistic end of the dimension.

What Is “Information”?
How a group tests for reality and makes decisions also involves consensus on what
constitutes data, what is information, and what is knowledge.

As information technology has grown, the issue has become sharpened because of
debates about the role of computers in providing “information.” Information technology
“professionals” often hold shared assumptions that differ in substantial ways from the
assumptions of senior managers. For example, many company presidents will point out
that all you get on a computer screen is “data” and what they really need is information,
which implies a level of analysis of the data that is typically not available unless a
sophisticated decision support system or expert system has been programmed in
(Rockart and DeLong, 1988). For a group to be able to make realistic decisions, there
must be a degree of consensus on which information items are relevant to the task at
hand.

A good example of the inherent ambiguity of abstract words such as information was
illustrated in Dougherty’s (1990) research on new product development teams. She
identified five separate “thought worlds” that were represented by the functional
specialists who were brought together in product development teams. The team knew
that a good decision required having lots of information about the customer, and each
member of the team believed that he or she had all the necessary information about
customers. But each person knew something different and did not realize it until they
attempted to reach a decision.
▪ Marketers/business planners knew in general whether or not a market existed,
the size of the potential market, what price and volume would produce
appropriate profit levels, what the market trends were, and so on.
▪ The field salespeople knew what the potential customers would use the product
for, what the users’specific needs were, and how important the product was to
customers relative to competitor’s products.
▪ The distribution people knew how the product would be sold, what the
merchandising plans were, and how many sales channels there would be.
▪ The engineers knew just how big the product should be, what its technical
specifications should be, where the power plug should go, and so on.
▪ The manufacturing people knew what the potential volumes were, how many
models might be needed, and what the costs of production would be.

Each of these groups, by virtue of its members’ occupational background and functional
experience, had built up concepts and language that were common to their occupational
group but not necessarily understood clearly or valued by the others.
When members of these subcultures were brought together into a product development
team, their ability to discover the others’ realities was a major determinant of whether or
not the product that was developed would succeed in the marketplace. To achieve
mutual understanding, the groups had to go beyond the formal meeting processes into
a more personal level of dialogue to create opportunities to discover where they agreed
and disagreed, and how their information sets differed in content. They had to become a
temporary cultural island to become an effective working group.

The question of “what is information” is of especial interest now as encyclopedias are

being replaced by network-based sources such as Wikipedia. Pure scientific criteria for
truth are being replaced by a process much more akin to how DEC found truth —
through proposal, challenge, debate, and ultimately resolution through survival.

Summary and Conclusions

One of the most important categories of culture is the assumption made about how
reality, truth, and information are defined. Reality can exist at the physical, group, and
individual levels, and the test for what is real will differ according to the level — overt
tests, social consensus, or individual experience. Occupations and macrocultures differ
in the degree to which they rely on moralistic traditional criteria for truth as contrasted at
the other extreme with pragmatic scientific criteria. Groups develop assumptions about
information that determine when they feel they have enough information to make a
decision, and those assumptions reflect deeper assumptions about the ultimate source
of truth. What is a fact, what is information, and what is truth — each depends not only
on shared knowledge of formal language but also on context and consensus.