From Modernity as One-Way Street to Postmodernity as Dead End

Author(s): Gérard Raulet and Max Reinhart

Source: New German Critique, No. 33, Modernity and Postmodernity (Autumn, 1984), pp. 155-
177
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/488358
Accessed: 30-12-2015 22:54 UTC

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FromModernity
as One-Way Street
as Dead End
ToPostmodernity

by G6rardRaulet

Postmodernity makes shortworkof the processof history;it even

bringsdown thesubjectofhistory. The historicalsubject/object taken
overfromHegel byMarxand Lukics is dismissed- moreaccurately,
itappears to have walkedoffthejob, to have steppeddown fromthe
stage of both philosophyand history.To the degree thatthe pro-
letariansubject/object has been eliminatedin reality,thephilosophi-
cal construction ofhistory has also fallenapart.In thefaceofthisfallen
modernity, Benjamin's"One-WayStreet"collectionrepresents one of
thelastdialecticalattemptsto apprehendin poeticimages(Denkbilder)
thegeneraldisintegration, whichis nothingotherthanthevictoryof
totalreification,and toexplode thepovertyofreifiedexperience.Only
in thismannercould a dialecticofreification stillbe construed,name-
ly,byreflecting thereified of
fragments experienceand forcingthem,
as itwere,to theextreme. Marx himselfsaid that"theburdenmustbe
made stillmore irksomeby awakeninga consciousnessof it."' The
"destructive character"2 isalwayspreparedfortheworst.Whereverthe
attempt is still
made to read traces,tomakethemdialectically morevis-
ible,he sees them,buthereand there,goinginall directions."Surren-
der to the object,up to the literalself-extinction of the selP' - thus
Adornounderstoodhim."Forthedestructive character,readingtraces
means to takeon the overwhelming powersthatbe and to go to the
extremeend of reification, thatis, to the self-extinctionof one's own
character.In the hope of breakingthroughreification, he liquidates
his own identity. Butas historyhas shown,thispositivebarbarismhas
come offbadly. He imaginedhimselfto be the LastJudgmentand,

1. KarlMarx,"ContributiontotheCritiqueofHegel'sPhilosophy Introduc-
ofRight:
tion," in TheMarx-EngelsReader,trans.T.B. Bottomore,ed. RobertC. Tucker(New
York:W.W. Norton& Co., 1972), p. 14
2. WalterBenjamin,"Der destruktive Charakter,"in Illuminationen:
Ausgewdhlte
2nd ed. (Frankfurt
Schrifien, am Main: Suhrkamp,1968), pp. 289-290.
3. Theodor W. Adorno, "Benjamins 'Einbahnstrasse,'" in UberWalter Benjamin
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,1968).

155

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156 FromModernity
toPostmodernity

indeed,all thesignsof theApocalypseappeared and thebeastswere

loosed, butwithoutanyrevelationin theend. Withtheextermination
ofall hope by 1933,thestrategyofthedestructivecharacterwas effec-
tivelyaborted.4The destructivecharacter,thatwitness"clothed in
sackcloth"(Rev. 11:3),divestedofall humanity,who has denied him-
selfthequalityofbeinga subject,prophesiedinvain.Benjamin'sone-
waystreetendsina dead end,without anyhopeofa return.Ifintimations
ofthiskindofpositivebarbarismcan be perceivedin thepostmodern
discourseon a Sublime,whichis understoodas a flightintowhatlies
ahead, thehistoryofitsfailuremustbe recalledbywayofintroduction.
I havesuggestedelsewherejust howlittletheconjuredSublimeis cap-
able of withstandingthe danger - including the political danger - of
a relapseintoevil.5Lyotardconfusesterrorand totalitarianism, there-
by forfeitingall means foran effective battleagainsteitherone. Ac-
cordingtohim,terrorarisesfromtheHegeliantranscendental illusion
which,byconfusingthoughtand reality, falselyreducestheclearlydis-
tinguishedlanguagegamesofthethreeKantianfaculties(thetheoreti-
cal, the practical,and the aesthetic)to a common denominatorand
totalizesthem. But the finalresultin Hegel is not terror,but the
totalitarianismofreason:bymakingall thingsmeasurablebythesame
yardstick,this totalitarianism equates reasonwithunderstanding and,
consequently, witha certainlanguagegame,as theDialectic ofEnlighten-
menthas shown.6 Butbecause ithas to do withoneparticularlanguage
game, withthatof the concept,terroris onlyits tool. For the same
reason, terrorexists prior to totalitarianism: with Robespierre,as
reason;and withKant,as moraltyranny, whichSchillercriticized.Pre-
ciselythatterroris inseparablefromthe Sublime - in spiteof, or
ratherbecause of,theattemptto freetheSublimefrommorality.7 As
such,theflightforwardis terroristic, whetheritbe thatofmoralstriv-
ing, which at the time of the FrenchRevolutiondevoured its own
childrenlike Saturn,8or thatof "allusions to the conceivablewhich

4. Ffirnkiis,
"La'voie sensunique'weimarienne deWalter Benjamin," inWeimar
oul'explosion . ed. G~rardRaulet(Paris:Anthropos,
dela modernit6, 1984).
5. G6rardRaulet,"Zur Dialektik derPostmoderne," in spuren,No. 3 (August/
September 1983),33-36.
6. MaxHorkheimer andTheodorW. Adorno, DialecticofEnlightenment,
trans.John
Cumming(NewYork:Herderand Herder,1972).
7.
Jean-Francois Lyotard,"R~ponseA laquestion:qu'est-cequele postmoderne,"
in Critique,
No. 419 (Paris,1982);in Englishas "Answering thequestion:WhatIs
Postmodernism?" in ThePostmodern
Condition
(Minneapolis: UniversityofMinnesota
Press,1984),pp. 71-82.
8. G~rardRaulet,"La crisede la raisondansl'histoire," inLa MortdeDantonde
Georg Catalogue
Biichner. duThidtredel'Estparisien
(Nov./Dec.1983).

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 GgrardRaulet 157

cannot be presented,"as Lyotarddefinespostmodernism.?In Lyo-

tard's deciding forpostmodernity at any price, terroris thatof an
aestheticismwhich assertsitselfnext to the totalitarianimpulse of
strategiclanguagegames,butwhichcannotput an end to themwith-
out enteringinto a dialecticwithinstrumental, or withfunctional,
reason.Sucha projectwillneverthelessbe undertakenhere,atleastina
modestway.

1. TheDead End ofReason

Ifanotherresultofthisconfusionis theinabilityto resolvethealter-
nativewithwhichLyotard'sbook ThePostmodern Condition concludes,
namely(as I willshow),theundecidable of
either/or terrorand democ-
racy,of the postmodernconditionof unprecedentedpotentialfree-
dom, on theone hand, or, on theotherhand, of thehopeless ruleof
strategiclanguage games in uncontrollabledisintegration, then the
debatebetweenmodernityand postmodernity does indeed playitself
- to parody Benjamin's one-way street- into a dead end. However
well modernitymay have perfectedan abbreviatedrationality which
has been posingas reasonitself,itcould stillidentify
itselfwiththehis-
toricalhope forsubstantivereason;itcould do so as longas itwas car-
ried forwardby immanentcontradictions whichpolarized in a main
contradiction and whichcould be seen as representing thelogicofhis-
toricaldevelopment.It is preciselyin thissensethatLukics was able to
contrastto "bourgeois" scienceanotherratio,foundedon the"stand-
point of the proletariat."The same holds trueforthe beginningof
CriticalTheoryinthe1930s;thetextoftheprogrammatic treatisefrom
193710 shows unmistakably that Critical Theory - despite all its
doubtsabouttherelationship betweentheoryand praxis- stillreaches
back to the Luk~icsianmodel of a subject/objectin orderto assertits
identityas theoryagainsttraditionaltheory.
But in thisverytext,indeed rightin the middle of its argument,
thingsbeginto go awry.Afterintellectually overcomingthedualisms
characteristicof traditionaltheory,and afterCriticalTheoryhas de-
claredtherelationalityoftheoryand societyto be itsownprinciple,the
of
"standpoint totality," towhichitappeals in oppositiontotraditional
theory,breaks down under closerobservationof thehistoricalsitua-

9. Lyotard,"What Is Postmodernism?"p. 81.

10. Max Horkheimer,"Traditionaland CriticalTheory,"in Critical Selected
Theory:
Essays,trans. MatthewJ. O'Connell (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), pp.
188-243.

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158 FromModernity
toPostmodernity

tion!For the"standpointof totality"is foundedon theconcretehis-

toricalpolarizationofclassstandpointsand itpresumesthata concrete
socio-economic developmentenables a particularsocio-economic
collectivesubjectto understandtherealityofa givensocialformation.
Horkheimermust now argue thatthe socio-economicsituationno
longercorrespondsto any such cognitiveinterest(Erkenntnisinteresse)
and thata breachhas formedbetweentheobjectiveand thecognitive:
"(. . .) eventhesituationoftheproletariatis,in thissociety,no guaran-
tee of correctknowledge"" - an assertionthatis made more poin-
tedlyat the end of the text:"Nor is therea social class by whose
acceptanceofthetheoryone could be guided.It ispossibleforthecon-
sciousnessofeverysocial stratumtodaytobe limitedand corruptedby
ideology,howevermuch, for its circumstances,it may be bent on
truth."'2The historyof the Lukicsian question and formulationre-
veals theverydubiousness of the Lukicsian model.
CriticalTheoryreallybeginswiththisbreak,althoughtheerroneous
attempthas oftenbeen made to demonstratea break betweenits
theoretical-politicalconvictionsduringthe1930sand itslaterdevelop-
ment,beginningwiththeDialectic ofEnlightenment.The differentiation
oftwophases and thequestionableoverworking ofHorkheimer'slate
writings have resultedfrommisunderstanding thesplitbetweentheo-
ryand praxiswhichhas alwaysexisted in CriticalTheory.I" Even the
questionsposed by theearlyempiricalanalyses- thatregardingthe
consciousnessoftheworkerswas suggestedas earlyas 1929 by Erich
Fromm- bear unequivocalwitnessthatCriticalTheory,long before
theprogrammatic treatisewas composed in 1937,was consciousofthe
"powerlessness the workingclass." Max Horkheimer,under the
of
pen nameHeinrichRegius,used thistitlein 1934in some sketchesthat
he had writtenbetween1926 and 1931.'4
Sincefromtheverybeginningitwas deniedanyidentification witha
historicalsubject,CriticalTheoryin 1937 had to acquire itsidentity
froma historyofrationality. Viewedin thislight,theDialecticofEnlight-
enment, whichHorkheimerand Adorno composed inAmericanexile,
appearstobe merelya radicalizationofthisunavoidablebeginning.In

11. Ibid.,p.213.
12. Ibid.,p. 242.
13. GerardRaulet,"WhatGood Is Schopenhauer?"in Telos,42 (Winter1979-80),
98-106;Raulet,"L'6volutionde Horkheimer:Versle pessimisme?"unpub. ms.(Paris:
Goethe-Institut,1984).
14. Horkheimer,"Die Ohnmachtder deutschenArbeiterklasse," in Diimmerung.
RepublishedasNotizen1950-1969undDdmmnerung(Frankfurtam Main: Fischer,1974),
pp. 281-286.

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 GirardRaulet 159

thistext,bothauthorsgo so faras toarguethatreason,comingtoterms

withitsmythicalorigin,becomes bewilderingly entangledwithmyth
and arrivesat a statewhose meaningcan be properlyevaluatedonly
now in a postmoderncontext- a contextthatseems naturallysuited
to thiswork.That is, insofaras thistextstillhas a normativebasis, it
turnsreason intoa formof narrativethatcan unreservedly be called
mythical:originallyhavingset itselfapart frommyth,and ultimately
fallingbackunderitsspell,reasonapparentlyneedstoputon thecloak
ofmythin orderto stillbe able to speakabout itself.The knotofAdor-
no's and Horkheimer'stextis well known:it is thesaga of Odysseus.
Odysseus' cunning consists of assertingthe self-conscioussubject
againstthemythicalsuperiority ofmythicalpowers,wherebyhe goes
botharound themand aroundwiththem.'"AsJakobTaubes correctly
infersfromthisduped deception,thisis"a kindofcasuistry ofmythical
consciousness."Adorno and Horkheimerexpound the "primal his-
toryof subjectivity" throughthe Homeric Odyssey "because theyper-
ceivedinitevidencefortheirdouble thesis: is
myth alreadyenlightenment,
and enlightenment relapsesintomythology. So theytoo remain,inthe
final analysis,withinthe frameworkof the centralfigureof myth
This virtuallyimpenetrableaffinity
(Schlzisselfigur).''6 betweenreason
and myth- wherebyreason,alwaysmythical, is stillcapable ofreflec-
tion - mustbe keptin mind henceforthinsofaras the defendersof
postmodernitysee the failureof reason in thatmoment of a disin-
tegratingmodernityin which reason turnsout to be nothingbut a
story,a narrative.What is allegedlynew here is, in fact,not so new.
Modernitymaybe definedas the self-assertion ofreason,but itshis-
toryis markedby criseswhichare expressionsin each instanceof a
similarcrisis-relationship to praxis.The possibilityofreasonabledis-
coursehas alwaysbeen in doubt.Thatis as trueofHdlderlin'sHyperion
as ofthe"Oldest Systematic ProgramofGermanIdealism" (1797), or
of Schlegel's"Discourse on Mythology"(1800), or of Nietzsche'scri-
tique ofmodernity.Whereasthe"Oldest Systematic ProgramofGer-
man Idealism" stillappealed on behalfoftheendiapheron eautd,thatis,
the"one dividedin itselfP' fora"monotheismofreasonand
(Hyperion),
the heart,a polytheismof imaginationand ofart,"in Schlegelmyth-
ologyas pureartifact has alreadytakentheplace ofreason."7These are

15. JakobTaubes, "Zur Konjunkturdes Polytheismus,"inMythos undModerne,

ed.
K. Bohrer(Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,1982), p. 460.
16. Ibid.
17. K. Bohrer,"FriedrichSchlegelsRede fiberdieMythologie,"
inMythosundMod-
erne,pp. 53 ff.

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160 FromModernity
toPostmodernity

modernity'scharacteristic, crises,whicharisedirectlyfromthe
cyclical
logic of theirorigin,namely,fromthe breakwitha traditionwhose
legitimacy restedon itself.Forfromnowon, modernity was no longer
able or willingto borrowitsstandardsoforientationfromthemodels
ofanotherepoch; itnow had to "finditsnormswithinitself.Withno
possibilityof flight,modernityrecognizesthatit must relyupon it-
self."" CriticalTheoryand, especially,theDialectic ofEnlightenmentare
extremeexamplesofthislogic.Theymaintainthattheallegeddown-
fallof reason is, in fact,one of the themesof the recurrentcrisisof
reason comingto consciousness.
The conclusionis thatpostmodernity cannotbe ahistorically abso-
lutizedand thatone shouldattempt, rather,tounderstand itwithinthe
continuumofmodernity's bothas atypical
self-assertion, recurrenceof
characteristiccrisisstates- thatwould mean developing,withBen-
jamin,an "archeologyofpostmodernity" - and also as aconsequence
of
modernity, which,inthissense,would havereacheda qualitativeturn-
ingpointin itsevolution.I shouldliketo followbothhypotheseshere,
locatingin Max Weber the appropriatepointof departure.

2. History
as Rationalization
andDisintegration
Whatis intendedbythiscouplingofa Benjaminian"archeological"
analysisoftypicalstructures
witha historicalprocesstakestheform,in
Max Weber,ofan ideal-typicalreconstruction ofthedevelopmentof
Occidentalrationalism.Weber no more derivesculturalrationaliza-
tionfromthehistoryof scienceand technologythanhe advancesthe
thesis - he explicitlydenounces it as contradictoryand dogmatic -
whichholds thatWesterncapitalismis theresultofculturalrationali-
zation. One mightask whetherin thisheuristicdemurthereis not a
detectablesenseoftheloss ofa distinct, concretely verifiablehistorical
meaning.The dubiousnessofactionmotivation, afterall, is centralto
Weber's interpretive sociology(verstehende and fromthis
Soziologie),
no
standpoint theory, even one thatis strictlyretrospective, can claim
the certaintyof truth.Justas interpretive sociology makes contem-
porary action motivation itsproblem, the ideal-typical construction,
the past,refrainsfrompostulatingany direct,causal corres-
vis-t-vis
pondence betweentheoryand reality.We shallsee herethedegreeto
whichthistheoreticalstatusconformsto thebalance thatWeber has
drawnformodernity.It can be pointed out immediately,however,
thattheWeberianrepresentation ofmodernizationas rationalization,

18. JfirgenHabermas, "Vorlesungeniber den Diskursder Moderne," unpub.

ms. (1983), p. 11. (Cited hereafter
as "Vorlesungen.")

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 GerardRaulet 161

by allowingan ideal-typicalconstructionto replace real history,as it

were, proves fromthe outsetto be a particularlyusefulmodel for
theoriesofmodernity, all ofwhichmust,to a greateror lesserdegree,
takeintoaccountthesplitbetweentheoryand praxis.Thatis especially
trueof CriticalTheory,whose leadingrepresentatives (Horkheimer,
Adorno,Marcuse),in Americanexile,agreedwithPollock'snotionof
"state capitalism"and consequentlyrejectedan economic basis for
historyin favorof a theoryof rationalizationundeniablyrooted in
Weber.ButtheinfluenceofLukics,thestudentofWeber,has already
weakenedin theprogrammatic text"Traditionaland CriticalTheory"
to such a degree thatthe philosophicalcenterof gravityhas shifted
fromconcretehistoricalagentsto therationaltypestheyembody.And
insofaras therationaltypeof self-reflection, whichdistinguishedthe
"standpointoftheproletariat"in Lukics, no longerfounda represen-
tativein reality,
CriticalTheorynowunfoldedas a history ofrationality
and as a debate betweenrationality types.
In becominga frameofreference fora self-doubting modernity, the
Weberiantheoryalso develops in itscontenta balance of thefateof
modernity, whoseultimateinsightsare perfectly suitedfordescribing
theso-calledpostmoderncondition."The intellectualdeparturefrom
modernity"is understood,ofcourse,"as theovercomingofthat'Oc-
cidentalrationalism'"whose completionWeberhas reconstructed;"9
butWeberhas also shownthatthiscompletionwas equivalentto self-
If thisthesisis correct- as well as the propositionthat
destruction.
categoriescontainingthe self-understanding of postmodernityare
alreadypresent in Weber - thenone should take seriouslytheviewof
as a
postmodernity self-destruction of reason, instead of takinga po-
lemical stancereminiscentof thatin Lukics' TheDestruction ofReason.
In startingwiththatdisenchantment (Eitzauberung)alreadyenacted
by theprophetsof Israel and continuedby Protestantism's thorough
rationalization oflife,theWeberianconstruction primarily thematizes
thecomplexrelationshipbetweenreasonandmyth experiencedby,for
example, the DialecticofEnlightenment, as an ominous fate.Its inter-
pretationof this relationshipis anythingbut a glorificationof tri-
umphantreason.
Weber understandsthe evolutionof modernityas the differentia-
tionofthetraditionalconceptofsubstantivereasonintoautonomous
spheres.In that,he is in agreementwithHegel,whowas thefirst, in his

19. JilrgenHabermas,"Vorlesungenfiberden DiskursderModerne:Resfimees,"

unpub. ms.,Groupede recherchesurla culturede Weimar(Paris:Maisondes Sciences
de l'Homme, 1983).

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162 FromModemrnity
toPostmodemrnity

critiqueoftheEnlightenment, todefinereason'sdivisionintoseparate
scientificand empiricalareasas theessentialcharacteristic ofmoderni-
ty."Withscienceand technology, withautonomousartand thevalues
of expressiveself-presentation, withuniversallegal and moral rep-
resentations, there emerges a differentiation ofthreevaluespheres,
each
ofwhichfollowsitsownlogic"20;simultaneously, thetensionbetween
thesespheresalso grows.Hegel shows,in thePhenomenology ofMind and
elsewhere,thatreasonthusdividedcan no longerovercomethesepar-
ationwithitsownpower,and infactbecomesentangledinitsowncon-
tradictions:beliefand knowledge;absolute freedomand terror;and
the antinomiesof the moral world view fromwhich aestheticand
religiousRomanticism(Novalis,Jacobi, Schelling,Schleiermacher)
arises(Phenomenology ofMind,Chpt.VI). He sees philosophypresented
withthe taskofproducinga self-confirmation of
(Selbstvergewisserung)
modernity.He recognizestheattemptto save modernity fromitsself-
imposed dichotomiesas the"source ofphilosophy'sneed" - which,
forhim,presumesa critique ofmodernity in theformofa critiqueofsub-
jective idealism.2 In otherwords,modernity'sself-discipline is co-
originalwiththeknowledgeofitscrisis-nature: as I haveemphasized,
modernityhas neverbeen consciousofitselfexceptin itscrises,which
stakeoutitshistory. In thepostmoderncontext,reasonagainsees itself
facingthe same problem. Meanwhile,however,reason has become
further differentiatedto theextentthateven theinternalcoherenceof
autonomousspheresno longerseemspossible,and thattheHegelian
philosphicalprojectitselfhas become untenable.
The Weberianconstruction leads toa statement ofthisuntenability.
Weberleavesthetheoryofmodernity ina balance;he does notpretend
tounifythedivision,butstopsinsteadatthepointatwhichreflexive re-
telling,whichis supposed to enablemodernity tobecome consciousof
itself,turnsintoa consciousnessofitsown powerlessness.This begins
alreadywiththe relationshipbetweenbeliefand knowledge.In "Sci-
ence As A Vocation"(1919), Weber equates knowledgewiththebelief
thattheworld'smysteriousand presumablyunforeseeableforcesare
controllable;in the act of disenchantingthe world, indeterminacy
becomes theobjectofcalculation,and calculationthemeansbywhich
scienceand technologyrationallyand teleologicallypursuetheirgoal
of world-domination.The necessarycomplementto calculationap-
pears here as a scientific
beliefowingprimarilyto the scientific mind's

20. JeirgenHabermas, Theory ofCommunicative I, trans.Thomas McCarthy

Action,
(Boston: Beacon Press,1984), p. 163 f.
21. Habermas, "Vorlesungen,"pp. 17-25.

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 GerardRaulet 163

inability,as a resultof the increasingspecializationof knowledge,to

fulfillitsclaim to totalcontrol.The firstconclusionto be drawnfrom
theWeberianinterpretation is thatscienceas suchisnotable tocomplete
itsown programof totaldemythologization and disenchantment.
The mannerin whichsciencecarriesout thisprogramnevertheless
does cause themeaningto disappearwhichGod is said to have given
theworld.22 The resultingmeaninglessness is,on theone hand,compen-
sated by ersatz religions(scientificbeliefitselfis just such an ersatz
religion,butwhatis meanthereis mainlythecontemporary revivalof
religious models of behavior).23 On the other hand, a ofsub-
multiplicity
jectiveworldviewsarises:"The multiplicity oftheseworldviewscorres-
ponds toa'polytheismofvalues,'althoughone does notknowwhether
Weberthinksofitas thegreatestfreedomor as culturaldisorder."24 At
anyrate,he interprets itas theimpossibility ofa closedvalue system,as
the "possibilityof elusive final values, in principle and irrecon-
cilably."25 And he emphaticallystresses,both in "Science As A Voca-
tion"and also inan essayof1904,thatthelimitsofscientific knowledge
become visiblehere:"The fateofan epoch whichhas eatenofthetree
of knowlegeis thatitmust..,. recognizethatgeneralviewsoflifeand
theuniversecan neverbe theproductsofincreasingempiricalknowl-
edge, and thatthe highestideals,whichmove us mostforcefully, are
alwaysformedonlyin thestrugglewithotherideals whicharejust as
sacred to othersas ours are to us."''26 This insightis radicalizedin the
"polytheismof values" motif.The second conclusion,therefore,is
that,at theend ofa "processofdemystification, lastingforthousands
of years in Westernculture,""the battleof the gods of individual
ordersand values"27willcontinuein virtuallyunalteredform;indeed,
thatdemystification hasmadetheconflicts
itself amongthedifferent valuesand
worldviewsevenmorerelentless! The postmodernthemeof polytheism,

22. Isambert,"Non-sensdu monde etsensde l'activit6 sociale chez Max Weber,"

unpub. ms.,Groupede recherchesurlaculturede Weimnar(Paris: Maisondes Sciences
de l'Homme, 1983).
23. Raulet,"WhatGood Is Schopenhauer?";Habermas,Theoriedeskommunikativen
Handelns,II (Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,1981), p. 580 f.
24. Isambert,"Non-sens du monde."
25. Max Weber, GesammelteAufsiitze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 2nd ed.
(Tiibingen,1968), p. 503.
26. Max Weber," 'Objectivity'in Social Scienceand Social Policy,"inMax Weber:
On theMethodologyoftheSocialSciences,
trans.EdwardA. Shilsand HenryA. Finch(New
York:The FreePressofGlencoe, 1949),p. 57; Weber,"ScienceAs A Vocation,"inFrom
Max Weber:EssaysinSociology,
trans.H.H. Gerthand C. WrightMills(NewYork:Oxford
Univ. Press,1946), pp. 129-56.
27. Weber,Gesammelte p. 604.
Aufsditze,

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164 FromModemrnity
toPostmodemrnity

derivedfromNietzsche,is thusunmaskedbyWeberas beingthecon-

sequenceofmodernity's self-assertion,as itsfailureand self-destruction.
Byrefusing tointerpretiteitheras greatestfreedomoras incurabledis-
order,Weberdeprivespolytheism ofthepositivemeaningofa liberat-
ingflight ahead,whichithadwithNietzscheand whichpostmodernity
would liketo restoreto it.
WhatWeber thus describesis a newmythology, withwhichhistory
would end,so tospeak,as itbegan:"It is as intheold world,notyetdis-
enchantedofitsgods and demons,onlyin a different sense:Justas the
Hellene once sacrificedto Aphrodite,and thento Apollo, and, espe-
cially,to each ofthegods ofhiscity,so itis yettoday,even thoughthe
mythical,but internally true,cohesionof thatbehaviorhas been dis-
enchantedand eliminated.And above thesegods and in theirbattle,
fateholdssway,butmostcertainly no 'science' .... The ancient,many
gods, disenchantedand thereforeimpersonalpowers,climb from
theirgraves,striveforauthorityover our lives,and once again com-
mence the eternalwar among themselves."2sIn denyingthis poly-
theismitsformer, truecohesionofbehavior,.he withholds thatharmony
whichHegel, for one, stillattributed to Greek art.Polytheismat the
end ofmodernityis onlydecay,disintegration, dissonance,and irrec-
oncilability. A dialecticalconstruction which, like Hegel's, would en-
deavor to forcethe hope of reconciliationupon the signsof decay,
would illegitimately exchangeitsown merelyconceptualmovement
fora real one, which,to all appearances,is no more.
So, at theextremeend of theWeberianconstruction, we have also
arrivedatthefundamental alternative ofpostmodernity: if,throughits
realization,reasonitselfhas led toa dead end,and ifrationalization in
history has turned out to be irreconcilable disintegration,it then
appears - for want of any concretelyverifiablemovementwhich
would drivebeyondthissituation,and ofanyhistoricalrepresentative
thatcould legitimatethecorrespondinghistorical-philosophical con-
struction- thata resigned"affirmation" is theorderoftheday.Ifany
wayout can stillbe imagined,then,as I shallshow,itwillhaveto reck-
on with these "postmodern conditionsfor emancipation."At the
pointwhereWeber,in faceofthemultiplicity ofworldviews- which,
at best,can produceonlyprovisional,labile,and fragilecompromises
- introduces his interpretivesociology, postmodernity- at least in
architectureand in Frenchpoststructuralism - validatesdisintegra-
tion,relishingit cynicallyand exploitingiteclectically."29

28. Ibid.,p. 604 and p. 665.

29. The NeoconservatismofDaniel Bell seeksratherto conjureup newbonds. -
Daniel Bell, TheComingofPost-Industrial
Society(New York: Basic Books, 1973), p.
418.

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 GCrardRaulet 165

3. Postmodern andBeyond
Conditions
The postmodernrehabilitationof myth,which conformsto the
"new mythology"diagnosed by Weber,means thatafterthe break-
down ofthe"grandnarrative," as Lyotardhas called it,namely,ofthe
saga of "reason in history,"a multiplicity of narrativeinitiatives,
or
"valuations" (Nietzsche,Weber) become admissible.Modernity,in
fact,no longerappears capable of producingmetacriteria and legit-
imatingthem.This questionconcerningthemetacriteria or thelegit-
imacyof a metadiscours- as itis called in French- is thecruxof the
debate betweenHabermas and Lyotard.The historicalsplitbetween
theoryand praxishas now weakeneda historically concretebasis for
the metacriteria. of
Sociological description postmodernconditions
cannotgetbeyondtheobservationof a bottomlessfragmentation. If
postmodernity conforms, as Marc Guillaume believes it does,s0to
ofexcessthatBaudrillard
thosefigures inLesstrate'giesfatales,3'
describes
thenwe findourselvesalreadybeyond thepossibility
ofa metadiscours.
Postmodernity wouldbe characterizedbytheinabilitytodistinguish
thesamefromtheother;an inflational wouldmakeall
multiplicity
experiencescommensurable, as WalterBenjaminforesaw at thebe-
ginning ofthe1930s.According to MarcGuillaumeandJeanBaud-
onewouldno longerbe able todrawthelinebetweenthereal
rillard,
and thefictional.
Whatremains, then,butto acceptthegeneralized
hegemony ofillusion?
Hence,ifoneregrets,
withPeterBuirger,
that"the
termpostmodernity... designatesthe New only abstractly,"32
and
thatitdoes notevenopen,letalonedecidethequestion"howdeeply
rootedsocialchangesareandwhether theynecessitatea newepochal
then
designation,'"" one really seems to be clingingto an outdated
problematic and to be unwilling to considerthefactualrupturebe-
tweensocio-historicaldevelopment and ideologicalsuperstructure.
For,accordingtothepostmodern postulate,thedemandtoclarify the
complex,untransparent relationships betweenbase and superstruc-
turebelongstoan obsoleteproblematic. ButtogiveBuirger hisdue,it
mustbe notedthatpreciselythispostulatemakesphilosophical schemes
likethoseofLyotard, Baudrillard, and Guillaume - however much
theyclaimsociological -
validity as unavoidable as theyareunverifi-

30. Marc Guillaume,"Effetspost-modernesde la modernisation,"unpub, ms.,

Groupe de recherchesurla culturede Weimar(Paris:Maison des Sciencesde l'Hom-
me, 1983).
31. Jean Baudrillard,Lesstrategiesfatales
(Paris:Grasset,1983).
32. PeterBfirger, "Das Alternder Moderne,"unpub. ms., Groupe de recherche
sur la culturede Weimar(Paris:Maison des Sciencesde l'Homme, 1983).
33. Ibid.

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166 toPostmodernity
FromModernity

able. Theirattraction comes fromthesuggestiveness thattheyradiate

in bestowingthe statusof proof upon concreteindices; since they
simultaneously pose as merepostmodern"narratives," or myths,they
avoid refutation, which,given the lack of metacriteria, cannot even
make itselfheard!
The impossibilityof any metadiscoursethatwould be more than
myththwartsthe pretentionsof a logos of self-reflection, and sub-
stitutesfortheidentityand authenticity of thislogos a multiplicity of
possible identificationswhichescape a unifying logicas wellas a logic
thatwould privilegeat leastone of theseidentifications. WalterBen-
jamin soughthis salvationin a "tiger'sleap" thatunexpectedlywould
reactualizethisor thatfragment fromthepast; Bloch soughthis in a
critiqueof ideologywhichemphasized non-synchronism - i.e., that
whichadheresto no dominantlogic. Baudelaire,forhis part,simply
held,inquasi-platonicfashion,thatartis splitintotwohalves,thetran-
sitoryand thelasting,theeternal.All of thesetheoreticalapproaches
show,at any rate,thatmodernity, as a resultofitsinabilitytoestablish a
and
unified unifying discourse,has become conscious of and
itself, that this
experience- whichmodernity was able to gain onlybya fundamen-
tal,paradigmaticchange of historicaltemporality (thus
his eighteen"Theses on the Philosophyof History,"or Benjamin'in
Bloch in his
earlycommentaryon Historyand Class Consciousness,as well as
Luki.cs'in the Concept of 'Progress'") - has
later in his "Differentiations
become to a heighteneddegreetheexperienceof postmodernity.
The question must be raised here as to whethermodernityalso
understandsthisexperienceas a historical taskor whetherit does not
ratheravoid thistask,as I have suggestedelsewhere.34
Pretendingto standat thecuttingedge of time,as Marx said about
themodernity ofhisownage," postmodernity givesup all reference to
praxis;itsettlesdown in thebreach.Today's barelyrefutedattackson
thedogma ofidentity and ofanyhistoricalrealizationofidentity areall
aimed at hinderingpraxis,while stillregistering new conditionsfor
praxis,postmodernconditionsforemancipation.
Postmodernismrepresentsa formofpositivismto theextent thatit
restson theacceptance of technicalrationality, and admitsany restric-
tionofitonlyin termsofpriority. Whatthemasterminds ofpostmodern
architecturefindat faultwith the modern movementis simplyits

34. Girard Raulet,"Zur Dialektikder Postmoderne";Raulet,"Marxismeet con-

ditionpost-moderne,"inPhilosophiques, 10:2 (1983); Raulet,"La finde la'Raison dans
l'histoire'?"inDialogue,
22 (1983); Raulet,"Modernesetpost-modernes,"in Weimarou
de la modernite,
l'explosion ed. GErardRaulet(Paris:Anthropos,1984).
35. Marx, "Contribution to thie Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right:
Introduction."

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 G&ardRaulet 167

underlying ideologyofprogress,itspresumption to changetheworld.36

Postmodernismin architecturepleads, completelyin Daniel Bell's
sense,for"an end to ideologies." It again proposestheidea ofa social
synthesis, butinthenon-dialecticalformofajuxtapositionofdifferent
codes. CharlesJencks'sproposed conceptof mutiple coding is sup-
posed to enable architecture to addresseverybody,thebroad masses
as wellas theexpertelite;stylisticeclecticismand thearbitrary citation
of past styles,i.e., postmodernhistoricism,both contributeto this.
One actsas thoughone werestriving forcommunicationbetweenthe
autonomous spheres of modernity,but then one is satisfiedwith
cementingthedivisionbyallowingthespheressimplyto existside by
side. WhenJenckssaysthat"multiplecoding" is "indubitablyschizo-
phrenic,"37he is suggestingthatit basicallyhas to do withwhat De-
leuze, for his part,designatedas decoding, destructionof the code.
Paradoxically,thepluralisticand eclecticinterest inthevernacularand
provincial corresponds to the de-territorialization produced by
capitalism.
Similarlyfor Lyotard,postmodernsocial bonds find expression
onlyin a loose, unknottednetofpragmaticrelationships;theorderof
discourseis transformed intoa generalagon,inwhichtheencounterof
is
pragmaticrelationships pure accident,kairos, theoccasion ofan "in-
vention."38 This of
freeplay speech acts, in which consensus is splin-
teredintotemporary is to
agreements, supposed guaranteethegreatest
measureof democracy- which,to be sure,can be assertedonlyas a
pious wish so long as technicaland technocraticrationality endures
and validatesitsstrategic languagegames. Lyotardmustadmit,more-
over,thatthealternativeremainingat theend of his book is sympto-
matic:"[T]hecomputerization of society... could become the'dream'
instrumentforcontrollingand regulatingthe marketsystem,exten-
ded to include knowledgeitselfand governedexclusivelyby theper-
formativity principle.In thatcase,itwould inevitably involvetheuse of
terror.But it could also aid groups discussingmetaprescriptives by
supplyingthem withthe informationtheyusually lack for making
knowledgeabledecisions.The line to followforcomputerizationto
takethesecondofthesetwopathsis,inprinciple,quitesimple:givethe

36. Charles Jencks,TheLanguageofPost-Modern Architecture

(London: Academy
Editions,1978), p. 10; Raulet,"La finde la raison,"p. 640 f.
37. Jencks,TheLanguageofPost-Modern p. 7.
Architecture,
38. Jean-FrangoisLyotard,ThePostmodern Condition:
A ReportonKnowledge,
trans.
GeoffBennington and BrianMassumi(Minneapolis:Univ.ofMinnesotaPress,1984),
pp. 14-17.

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168 toPostmodernity
FromModernity

public freeaccess to the memoryand data banks.""9Petitio principii,

wishfulthinking.
The concept of "an atomizationof the social into loose nets of
language games" corresponds,as does the multiplecoding of post-
modernarchitecture, totheacceptance
ofanirreducible whichis
complexity,
allowedto playitselfout.The cancellationofconsensusis understood.
"We should," Lyotardsays,"be happythatthe tendencytowardthe
temporarycontractis ambiguous:itis nottotallysubordinatedto the
goal ofthesystem,yetthesystemtoleratesit."40Lyotarddoes notdis-
tinguishbetweensystemand complexity:he simplyacceptsa positive/
negativeambivalenceof complexity.

4. RenewalofthePraxisConcept
When one examinesthe varioustheoreticalmodels thatcould be
used to challengethisacceptance,however,it is onlyfairto concede
thatthe perspectivestheyonce opened up are now partiallyclosed
again. Itis so muchmoreimperativethattheirreformulations ofrationality
be testedto determinewhatis recoverablefromthem.Ifmythesisis
correctthatpostmodernity representsa moreradical,certainly, but not
unprecedented, new crisisof modernity, then the question must be
asked whetherand to whatextentthetheoreticalinitiatives bywhich
modernitycomprehendeditscrisis-nature and fromwhichitunder-
stoodtheconsequencesare stillusefulin thepostmoderncontext.We
shalllimitourselveshereto thecontemporary revisionsof theMarxist
model.
a) In faceof thegeneraldecaywhichsummonsand justifieseclec-
ticism,thewholequestioniswhetherpostmodernity can stilldeal with
thefragment did. Postmodernaestheticpraxisin therealmof
as Adomrno
architecture thefailureofAdorno'snotionof
or thenovel41illustrates
the"mostadvancedmaterial,"42 butin no waydoes itprecludea poss-
ible recourseto thefragment in thesense
ifone sees in ita constellation,

39. Ibid.,p. 67.

40. Ibid.,p. 66.
41. BurghartSchmidt,"La peur agressivedes conflits:la post-modernit6 et sa
dialectique de l'apparence," in MSH-INFORMATIONS,No. 46 (Paris: Maison des
Sciences de l'Homme, 1984), an Englishversionof whichappeared in SocialScience
23:3 (1984),589-602; Krysinski,
Information, "Fragmentetfragmentation: Le destinde
la modernit6,"inSocialScience 23:3 (1984),577-588;shortversionofthelat-
Informnation,
terin MSH-INFORMATIONS, No. 46 (Paris:Maisondes Sciencesde l'Homme, 1984).
42. PeterBiirger,"Das Vermittlungsproblem in der KunstsoziologieAdornos,"
inMaterialienzurAsthetischen T.W.Adornos
Theorie: Konstruktion
derModerne,
ed. B. Lindner
and M. Liidke (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,1979); Buirger,"Das Alternder
Moderne."

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 GerardRaulet 169

whichNegative Dialectics
gave thisterm.The DialecticofEnlightenment,
whichconfirmsthereversionofreasonto myth,paradoxicallyfindsin
the lattera new model of experience,in short,the notionof a "new
mythology"whichcould serveto reformthought.In the Dialecticof
Enlightenment, mythis understoodas a locallyrestricted praxis(to this
extent,itis connectedwith"polytheism"), whichreasonhas repressed
bysubstituting thenotionofa universalpraxis.Hence, thestructure of
thisworkas well is hardlysystematic: in theirforeword,Adorno and
Horkheimerexplicitlycharacterizethe book as a collectionof frag-
ments.Thus theyalso takeseriouslythenewstatustowhichreasonhas
been pushed back in itsrelapseintomythology. The fragment corres-
ponds to thissituation.It in
halts, thewords of theDialecticofEnlighten-
ment, "beforethepropername,"beforethatwhichcannotbe expressed
by means of other names, thatwhich cannot be exchanged in any
exchangesystembutmustremainparticular.Thisattentiontothepar-
ticularis whatmakes the constellationpossible. If the subjectin his-
tory,as reconstructedin the DialecticofEnlightenment, has been the
guarantor of the reciprocalexchangeability of the ifit has
dissimilar,
playedtheroleoftheuniversalequivalent,and ifithas foundedformal
equivalence,thena newconceptionofthesubjectisalso impliedbythe
constellation;inviewofthepoststructuralist destruction ofthetheory-
subject,thisis of decisivesignificance.The constellationrejectsany
subjectthatwould amounttomorethana momentary agreementwith
theobject.Againstthe"paranoid zeal" ofthegrandsystems,43 against
that"rage"which,ina thoroughly manner,takesover
anti-polytheistic
thelegacyofmonotheism,Adornoadvocatesa polytheistic experience
and a schizophrenicsubject.This subjectis notannihilated,butitdoes
lose itsqualityas base and center.These observationswould notonly
seemtomakeanotherreadingoftheDialectic ofEnlightenment necessary,
but would also call fora "postmodern"readingofNegative Dialectics.
b) Secondconceptionofthefragment:The Benjaminianmodel ofprofane
illuminationprefersa historyofdiscontinuity. A futurewhichcannot
be named - somethingunnameable deservingofthename Sublime
- momentarilycoincideswitha fragmentfromthe past,becoming
unexpectedlyactualized. Benjamin calls thisthe New. For him, the
meaning of historygrows from this encounterof two meaningful
elementsoffundamentally different thismeaningis notpre-
origins:44
determined.But theweaknessof such a model is obvious: itdoes not

43. TheodorW. Adorno,Negative trans.E.B. Ashton(NewYork:Seabury

Dialectics,
Press,1973), p. 22.
44. Raulet,"Marxismeet conditionpostmoderne,"300 ff.

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170 FromModernity
toPostmodernity

preventa multiplicity of such encounters;more precisely,the meta-

phor of "heliotropism"suggeststhatthe sun, whichis supposed to
determinethevisiblyeccentriccourseoftheconstellations, "is risingin
theskyofhistory."45This astrologicalmetaphoris philosophicallyim-
printed:it derivesfromKant,who uses it in a teleological sense in the
introduction to his"Idea fora UniversalHistoryfroma Cosmopolitan
PointofView"(1784),wherehe arguesthathistory has onlytowaitfora
futureKepleror Newton,who willsubject"the eccentricorbitsofthe
planets,in an unexpected manner,to definitelaws."46 At the very
momentinwhichBenjaminrejectsteleology,he seemsto reintroduce
it behind his back; he points to a new conceptionof knowledge,in
whichtheunexpectedNew drawsitsmeaningfroma telos.Certainly
thismeaningdepends on an unutterable,posthistorical momentthat
is understoodas being stillonly "rising,"while Kant's teleological
critiqueofjudgmentallowsan orderwhichhas alwaysexistedmerely
tobecomemanifested. ButBenjamin'sconceptofknowledge redeems,in
itsownway,theproblematicofmeaning,whichhe simplytransfers to
anotherhistoricaltemporality- just as Kant altered his concepts
when he proceeded to the teleologicalcritiqueofjudgment.Conse-
quently,one cannot counterLyotard'sidea of the Sublimewithany
decisive argumentwhen he proteststhatwhat is unnameable must
remainunnameable;thatitisalwaysonlythe"inventionofallusionsto
the conceivablewhichcannotbe presented."47
c) TheBlochianmodelis even less tenable.BurghartSchmidtis clearly
rightto see in postmodernity theemergenceof non-synchronisms.48
Butbywhatcriteria can one stilldefineas non-synchronous themanifes-
tationsofa historythathenceforth consiststotallyofnon-synchronous
events;wheneverymanifestation is different
onlyin relationtoanoth-
er - and so on endlessly- and when thereis no available meta-
criterionbywhichto establishat leasta provisionalor purelyheuristic
criterion,and so to bringorderto themanifestations! Thus indeed do
historicismand eclecticismtriumph.
I haveshownelsewherethatBlochhas proposed,withhisconceptof
theAuszugsgestalt,a "look at theproduct"as an alternativeto Lukics'
"standpoint of the The Auszugsgestalt
proletariat.""49 is a symboliccon-

45. WalterBenjamin,"Theses on the Philosophyof History,"in Illuminations,

trans.HarryZohn, ed. Hannah Arendt(New York:SchockenBooks, 1969), p. 255.
46. ImmanuelKant,"Idea fora UniversalHistoryfroma CosmopolitanPointof
View." (My translationfromthe German.)
47. Lyotard,"What Is Postmodernism?"p. 81.
48. Schmidt,"La peur agressive."
49. G6rard Raulet, Humanisation de la nature,naturalisation
de l'homme(Paris:
Klincksieck,1982).

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 GgrardRaulet 171

figuration thathas itsmeaninginitself,drawingitneitherfroman onto-

nor
theology necessarily from an eschatology.To be sure,thefigureof
the subject/objectis presentin Bloch, but ifone agrees thatitspro-
letarianidentification is only tentativeand thatthe question of its
on
dependence final salvation mustremainundecided,thenthefigure
becomes morelikeAdorno's constellation.To thedegreethatitreha-
bilitatesthe particularand proceeds no longerfromthe subject,but
fromtheobject,itappears to be a crystallization of theobjectiveand
thesubjective,in whichthe I of thesubjectappears onlythroughthe
medium of the Other.As such, it is firstan aesthetic and,
rationality,
further, a communicative rationality,inwhichthesubjectexistsonlyin a
specific"languagegame," in a languagewhosegrammaris thatofthe
dialecticalexchangeswithnature.The constellation,or theAuszugs-
makes it possible to remain close to the particular,but with
gestalt,
Bloch it includesalso themomentofworkas well as thealterationof
theworldbyhumans.Here too,thesubjectis no longerbase and cen-
ter.Even ifthemultiplicity is not actuallyovercome,itpresentsitself
now as a symbolicfigure.Bloch'sAuszugsgestalt unitesthesymbolic pre-
appearance(Vorschein) ofmonotheistic withtheallegorical
religion50 pre-
appearanceofart,which,as "theconfusedscattering ofcorrespondences
in theworld,"5'notonlymeans dispersionin space, but is also bound
up in arthistorywithpolytheism.Here, I believe,is thedecisivepoint
ofdepartureforan actualizationofBlochwithinthepostmoderncon-
text.Beyondthat,theBlochianmodel,sointerpreted, reintegratesnature
in the scheme of meaning and thus, faced with the modern and
postmodernlogicofthedestructionofthelifeworld, servesa value in
need ofprotection.His model givesan answerto thefearoflosingthe
lifeworld'sorganicfoundations,a fearwhichis one ofthepathologies
of postmodernity.52
d) Even ifit needs to be complementedby thisconceptionof an
aesthetic-communicative rationalitywhich integratesnature in the
scheme of meaning,Habermas'concept ofcommunicative actionmust be
consideredas a fourthmodel inasmuch as it relatesdirectlyto the
postmodernfateof reason and is presentedby Habermas in his self-
commentariesas an answerto it.Habermas explicitlysituateshispur-
pose in relationto theCriticalTheoryofthe1930s,53in relationtothat

50. ErnstBloch,Experimentum mundi(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,1975),pp.

206 ff.
51. Ibid.,p. 202.
52. Habermas, Theorie deskommunikativenHandelns,II, p. 579 f.
53. Ibid.,pp. 548 ff.;Habermas, "Dialektikder Rationalisierung:JfirgenHaber-
mas im Gespr~ichmitAxel Honnethet al.," inAsthetik
undKommunikation, 45-46 (Oct.

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172 FromModernity
toPostmodernitCy

"dead end," therefore, withwhichI began. He clearlyintendstobreak

withthe"emphaticconceptofreasonofthephilosophicaltradition,"54
towhich,inhisopinion,thefirst generationofCriticalTheoryheldfast
- includingAdorno in Negative - althoughthatgeneration
Dialectics
was thefirstto recognizethatthisreason had become "utopian": "It
seems to me that,fromtheperspectiveoftheDialectic ofEnlightenment,
the self-dementia of reason had progressedso farthatHorkheimer
and Adorno,as wellas Pollockwithhis theoryofstatecapitalism,saw
thepoliticalinstitutions thoroughly emptiedofall tracesofreason -
all social institutionsas well as ordinarypraxis.Reason forthemhad
become literallyutopian,had lostall locale: and thatis whatbrought
theentireproblematicofNegative Dialectics
to thedrawingboard."55
Communicativerationality is supposed to eliminatethetraditional
emphaticconcept of truth.At the same time,it promisesto solve,
withinthepostmoderncontext,thedecisivemetacritical questionthat
has repeatedlyarisenhere in thisform:If reason is on thewane, by
whattheoretically sound criteriacan the end of reasonbe analyzed?
Habermas not only renouncesthe foundingof reason on a prima
philosophia, but also its foundingon the historicalprocess. Untilthe
Theory ofCommunicative Action(1981), the notionborrowedfromK.O.
Apel ofan "aprioriofthecommunicatingcommunity"was identified
withthe historyof the species and had, as a result,a quasi-transcen-
dentalstatus.The Theory ofCommunicative Actionrenouncesnotonlythe
notionof a "transcendentalpragmaticsof language,"as Apel devel-
oped it,butalso thequasi-transcendental variantarisingfromHaber-
mas' conceptionof interaction. This renunciationputsan end to the
hesitationof the consensus theory,which heretoforehad vacillated
betweenthenormativeideal ofan ideal speechsituation(whichcould
onlybe anticipatedcounterfactually) and a real speech situation,and
whichcould adequatelymediatebothonlybyreferenceto thehistory
of the species: namely,by a dialecticof "workand interaction,"in
which the species would be realized and in whichthe ideal speech
situationwould be presentas a "horizon" - as "partiality forreason"
or as "emancipatoryinterest."In his Theory ofCommunicative Action
Habermas observes:"The utopiandesignofan ideal communicating
communityleads to errorif one misunderstandsit as a guide to a
philosophyof history."'56In certaincases it can serveonlyas a foilof

1981), 131 ff.An abridged Englishversionhas appeared in Telos,49 (Fall 1981), 5-

31.
54. Habermas, "Dialektikder Rationalisierung,"131.
55. Ibid.,pp. 132-34.
56. Habermas, Theorie deskommunikativen
Handelns,II, p. 163.

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 Grard Raulet 173

referencefor understandingthe project of an unrestrictedpublic

spherewhichhas imaginedby historicalmodernity(cf.Haber-
been.
mas,Strukturwandelder On theotherhand,thedialecticof
Offentlichkeit).
workand interaction conferred a historicalmeaningon Apel's concep-
tion, according to which the ideal speech situation is always
presumed.
Accordingto Apel, the ideal speech situationis presentprecisely
when the rules of rationalargumentationare apparentlyrejected."7
Theirtotalabolitionwould mean a "self-negation" and an "act ofself-
destruction"of human-ness."8 Apel goes on to emphasize thatman
cannotescape thisinstitution withoutpayingwiththeloss ofanyposs-
ible ego-identity,59 and he particularly notesthatit is thisloss of ego
which invokes the pathologicalprocessof autisticparanoia.60
We have seen thatmattershavecome to preciselythatpoint.Incap-
able of praxis,postmodernismreflectsby thematizingso-called de-
coding and de-territorialization, i.e., eclecticism,atomizationand
eradication,nothing other than the extremeboundaryofthatlogicof
decay which Hegel already called modern, and whichmodernityhas
experienced in the form of fragmentation. IfDeleuze is rightin speak-
ing of a "schizophreniccapitalism," it is because autonomism and
autarchybelong distinctively among the of
phantasms postmodern
manifestations of protest.6'The decay of consensus,or of a basis for
communication thatpretendsto universality, summonsforthautism.
Apel further contraststhelanguagegame oftheideal speech situa-
tion,the meta-institution of everyhuman institution, to those insti-
tutionswhich,restingon mere conventions,regulatethe language
gamesin thewaythatWittgenstein imaginedthe"lifeforms."62 Indeed,
Habermas'renunciation ofanyapriori activates a newinterestinWittgen-
stein,whichis significant insofaras it can be no accidentthatat the
same time- forinstance,withLyotard- languagegamesprovetobe
one of thepreferredtheoreticalmeans of "postmodernknowledge."
The essentialcharacteristic oflanguagegames in thesenseofthelater
Wittgenstein is thattheycontaintheirown foundationand thatthere-
foreany recourseto a metalanguagebecomes impossiblejust as the

57. K.O. Apel, "La question d'une fondationultimede la raison," in Critique

(1981), 927; Germantrans.in Festschrift undErkenntnis,
Frey:Sprache
fiirGerhard ed. B.
Kanitscheider(1975).
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.,926.
60. Ibid.
61. Raulet,"Marxismeet conditionpostmoderne,"310.
62. Apel, "La question," 926.

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174 FromModernity
toPostmodernity

problematicof theircorrespondenceto realityvanishes."[O]rdinary

languageis itsown metalanguage."63 Furthermore, Wittgenstein pro-
poses no theorywhichwould intendto normalizeor to modifythe
language games; he suggeststhatphilosophyshould restrict itselfto
theirdescriptionand leave themjust as theyare - a notionwhich
Habermas in factwished to overcome in his debate withJohn R.
As such, language games imply an acknowledgmentof
Searle!"''64
decay. "Everylifeform,everylanguage game, is itselfan enclosed
totality, and constitutesitsown unique standardsof rationality."'"65
The "Second IntermediateReflection"oftheTheory ofCommunicative
Action66 draws a parallelbetween, on the one hand, the conceptofthe
lifeworld,which is opposed to the system in the same wayas unques-
tionedtraditionis to instrumental knowledge, and Wittgenstein's life
forms,on theother;thelifeworldwould be equivalentto that"back-
groundknowledge"Wittgenstein speaksabout in"On Certainty." The
lifeworldsignifiesthe fieldof total communicativeaction,67or the
"source,"fromwhichcommunicativerationality drawsin orderto be
able to develop. In thissense,thelifeworldis also myth,i.e., the"un-
differentiated lifeforms"fromwhichreasonproceedsand ofwhichit
is constituted.This is theground,moreover,fortheseeminglywhole-
sale critiquethatHabermaslevelsatthepostmodernswhenhe accuses
themofreturning to "undifferentiatedlifeforms."'"68
In fact,accepting
languagegameswithoutopeningup thedialecticofrationalization-
whichwould expose the"lifeworld," or the"lifeforms,"toinstrumen-
talor functionalrationality fromwhichtheyare therefore inseparable
- amountstoan acceptanceof"myth"or,rather,ofthatwhichposes as
myth,thatwhichornamentsthemanifestations ofdecaywiththeaura
of originality.
IfWittgenstein's conceptionis followed,anylanguagegame can be
takenas an actthatallowsthemanifestation ofsomethingunutterable
whichis thegroundfortheactin thesame waythatmythis theground
forreason;theDialecticofEnlightenment correctly remindsus thatreason
arose frommyth.The languagegame translatestheunutterableinto

63. Habermas, Knowledge and HumanInterests,trans.JeremyJ.Shapiro (Boston:

Beacon Press,1971), p. 168.
64. See Habermas,"Was heisstUniversalpragmatik?" inSprachpragmatik
undPhilo-
ed. K.O. Apel (Frankfurt
sophie, am Main: Suhrkamp,1976). In Englishin Habermas,
CommunicationandtheEvolution (London: Heinemann, 1969). Cf. also Theory
ofSociety of
Communicative
Action, I, ch. 3 ("IntermediateReflections").
65. Habermas, "Dialektikder Rationalisierung,"134.
66. Habermas, Theorie deskommunikativen Handelns,II, p. 171 ff.
67. Habermas, Theory ofCommunicative I, p. 376.
Action,
68. Habermas, Theorie deskommunikativen Handelns,II.

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 GerardRaulet 175

the medium of reason. "All ordinarylanguage allows reflexiveallu-

sionstowhathas remainedunstated.""69 WhereasLyotardcallsfor"in-
vent[ing]allusions to the conceivablewhichcannotbe presented,"'7
Habermas stressesthat"[t]hespecificcharacterofordinarylanguageis
thisreflexivity."71
That stillapplies to theordinarylanguagewhich,in
theTheory ofCommunicative Action,becomes thebasis ofcommunicative
rationality. "(This lifeworld)is givenin communication,but also in
cognitiveprocesses,always only in a uniquelypre-reflexible formof
backgroundassumptions,of backgroundabilities,or of background
relationships."72
Atthemomentinwhichthelifeworldis reflected, thatis,as soon as it
"turnsintoexplicitutterances,"73 theimplicitpre-knowledge becomes
problematical;itloses itsquestionablecharacter.74 Atthispointdistor-
tions can make themselvesfelt:at the momentin which rationality
begins,thequestionarisesas towhatkindofrationality itis.This point
isalso the"boundary"betweenlifeworld andsystem.In thedevelopment
ofrationalization, i.e.,oftheinstitutionalization
ofpurposive-rational
action,whichHabermas,based on Weber,analyzes,"systematic mech-
anisms repressformsof social integration even in thoseareas where
consensus-basedcoordinationofactioncannotbe substituted:thatis,
where the symbolicreproductionof the lifeworldis at stake.The
mediatizationofthelifeworldthentakestheformofa colonization."75
This categoryofcolonization,whichwas introducedintheObservations
on theSpiritual Situation oftheAge(1979),76 pointsto the attackswhich
rationalcontrolinflicts on thestructuresofthelifeworld. These attacks
summon forththe "pathologiesof thelifeworld."77
It is notpossible hereto retracethegeneratingmechanismsofsuch
pathologiesin detail (thatwould mean summarizingthe entirelast
chapteroftheTheory ofCommunicativeAction).We shallbe satisfiedwith
callingattentionto the followingdecisivepassages,whichno longer
situatethe conflictsof developed industrial- or, ifyou will,"post-
industrial"- societieswithintherealmofmaterialreproduction,but

69. Habermas,Knowledge and HumanInterests, p. 168.

70. Lyotard,"What Is Postmodernism?"p. 81.
71. Habermas,Knowledge andHumanInterests, p. 168.
72. Habermas, "Dialektikder Rationalisierung,"138.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.;Habermas, Theorie
deskommunikativen Handelns,II, p. 589.
75. Habermas, TheoriedeskommunikativenHandelns,II, p. 293.
76. Habermas,Observationsonthe"Spiritual oftheAge"(Cambridge,Mass.:
Situation
MIT Press, 1984).
77. Habermas, TheoriedeskommunikativenHandelns,II, p. 565 ftf.

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176 toPostmodernity
FromModernity

"ratherin realmsofculturalreproduction."78 "It does nothave to do

primarilywithsecuritiesthatthe social statecan provide,but rather
withthe defenseand restitution of endangeredlifestyles, or withthe
implementation of reformed In
lifestyles. short, thenew conflicts
are
notignitedbyproblems but
ofdistribution, ratherbyquestionsofthegram-
maroflfeforms"79 - a formulationthatcould have come fromWitt-
genstein.Thisformulation emphasizesagainthatdecadentmodernity
can no longerbe coped withunless one beginswherethe language
games prove to be the preferredtheoreticalmeans forpostmodern
knowledge- theyare suitedforcomprehendingboth multiplecod-
ing in architectureand also Lyotard'sdescriptionof postmodern
society- thatone begins,in otherwords,wherethe pathologiesof
postmodernity findexpression.Ifone tries,likeHabermas,to under-
standthemas themanifestations ofa rationalization,one willtranslate
themback intoaprocess which,carriedbythetensionbetweensystem
and lifeworld,sketchesa dialecticof modernityreminiscentof the
DialecticofEnlightenments80
and which thus saves the possibilityof a
dialectizationofdecay- howevermuch Habermasaccountsforand
confirms the decline of the historical-philosophical model of
modernity.

An Uncompleted
5. Modernity: Project?
Modernityis uncompletedonlyifone understandsbythisdescrip-
tionthatithas notlivedup to itspromise.Ifpromisingand keepinga
promise are two different things,modernityhas at least given us,
withoutguarantee,the means to salvage somethinginsofaras post-
modernity, althoughitmaypose as an unprecedentedinnovationand
as a "major break,"" is certainlynotwithoutitsmodels. This being-
without-models is itsNietzscheanphantasm,justas itsresignationand
are
helplessness presented in the guise of cheerful
affirmation,pre-
tendingtoputan endtothe"melancholy science"ofmodernity(Adorno,
Benjamin).Includedhereare theefforts to reinterpret
theSublime.
If,ratherthantransfiguring disintegration,one attemptsto recon-
structa new practicalrationality, one mustbegin by consideringthe
manifestations ofdissolution.The newrationality must,ofcourse,dis-

78. Ibid.,p. 576.

79. Ibid.
80. Raulet,'Marxismeet conditionpost-moderne."'
81. MichelFoucault,"Umrn welchenPreissagtdie Vernunft die Wahrheit?Ein Ges-
praichmitG6rardRaulet,"inSpuren,Nos. 1and 2( 1983);Foucault,"Structuralismand
Post-Structuralism:
An Interview,"in Telos,55 (Spring1983), 195-211.

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 GirardRaulet 177

pensewithall charismaticbrilliance.Butto thedegreethatthecharac-

teristicsof disintegrationare at the same time the consequences of
modernizationand so belongobviouslyto therealhistoricaldialectic,
theyopen up theonlyaccess thatcan stilllead to praxis.In doing so,
theyclearlyimplya radicalbreakwiththetraditionalmodel ofhistori-
cal reason,sincein factthelatterhas been completedequallyas decay.
Beyond the stilleddialecticof postmodernity, several directions
open up: the conjurationofa Sublime thatis noteven likethepositive
barbarismofBenjamin's,sincethelatterstillbased itselfon a historical
and dialecticalmovementand was destroyedby it; or theflightinto
mere appearance, which characterizespostmodernarchitecture.82
Both of thesedirectionshave in common therenunciationofpraxis.
Thethirddirection could be sketchedby combiningthreetheoretical
models:the"constellation" ofAdorno,whichsimultaneously accounts
forthefragmentary and assignsa newstatustothesubject;theobjective-
real hermeneuticsof Bloch, whose Auszugsgestalt is in a position to
establisha new relationshipwithnatureas the futureOther,and on
this basis to withstandthe attackson the organic principlesof the
lifeworld;and finally,Habermas' conception of a communicative
rationalitythatrelinquishestheemphatichistorical-philosophical con-
ceptoftruth,but,as I haveshown,renouncesneither"history"- that
procedural,dialecticalrelationshipbetweensystemand lifeworld-
nor "reason" - that dialecticalrelationshipbetween background
knowledgeand communication,mythand reason.

byMax Reinhart
Translated

82. Schmidt,"La peur agressivedes conflits."

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