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Terrorism and Political Violence

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Israel's Counter-Terrorism Policy: How

Effective?
a
Charles David Freilich
a
Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
USA
Published online: 20 Jul 2015.

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Terrorism and Political Violence, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2015.1044602

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ISSN: 0954-6553 print=1556-1836 online
DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2015.1044602

Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective?

CHARLES DAVID FREILICH

Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

The percentage of Israelis killed by terrorism is higher than in any other democracy.
The article analyzes the threats Israel has faced, the impact terrorism has had on
Israel, and the counter-terrorism policies Israel has adopted. Terrorism has had a
decisive effect on Israeli elections and national security decisions, but not the econ-
omy. Israeli counter-terrorism has often been conducted without a coherent overall
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policy, has failed to reflect and conflicted with broader objectives, and has greatly
undermined Israel’s international standing. Conversely, it has enabled Israel to live
in relative security and thrive, and provided its leaders with the latitude to pursue
various policies, including peace, should they wish to do so.

Keywords decision making, Israel, national security, policy making, strategy

Israel has faced ongoing terrorism from its earliest days, indeed, long before it was
established. The threats have run the entire gamut, including attacks on schools,
stabbings, shootings, suicide bombings, the unprecedented wave of terrorism embo-
died in the Second Intifada, and now Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ rocket arsenals. Israel
is particularly concerned today about the threat of cyber-terrorism and continues to
face the nightmare scenario of nuclear terrorism.1
This harsh reality has kept terrorism at the forefront of Israeli national security
for some seven decades. Consequently, Israel has become a world leader in
counter-terrorism and a case study of great importance for all nations facing threats
of terrorism. Indeed, many counter-terrorism measures commonly employed today
were first developed by Israel.2 The question addressed in this article is how effective
Israel’s counter-terrorism policies have actually been in practice. The article traces
the terrorist threat that Israel has faced and some of its responses from the earliest
times, but the primary focus is on the period since the 1980s, and especially since the
Second Intifada.
A great deal has been written about virtually every individual aspect of Israeli
counter-terrorism operations, but surprisingly little has been written in recent years
of an in-depth or comprehensive nature. A sharp exception to this rule is Byman’s
(2011) seminal work on the terrorist threats Israel has faced and the measures it
adopted in response. Kober’s (2009) work on Israel’s experience with wars of

Charles (‘‘Chuck’’) David Freilich is a Senior Fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School. A

former deputy national security adviser in Israel, he is now completing a book on Israel’s
national security strategy in an era of change.
Address correspondence to Charles David Freilich, Kennedy School, Harvard University,
79 JFK St., POB 134, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. E-mail: chuck_freilich@harvard.edu

1
 2 C. D. Freilich

attrition is also a partial exception. Morag (2005) provides important criteria for
assessing the success of Israeli terrorism, but the study is of limited scope. Catignani
(2008) and Lambeth (2011) have written about Israel’s experiences fighting
Hezbollah and Hamas. In recent years, much attention has been devoted to Israel’s
defenses against Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ rocket arsenals, including the works by
Rubin (2007, 2012, and 2015).3 Laish and Amir (2012), Siperco (2010), and Shafir
(2012). Unfortunately none of these works, or others, satisfactorily addresses the
bottom-line effectiveness question.

The Threat and Its Impact

The primary sources of terrorism Israel has faced have been the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) in the past and Hezbollah and Hamas today, though numerous
additional organizations have been involved. In recent years al-Qaeda and its various
offshoots have become increasingly active in Sinai, Gaza, and Lebanon, with indica-
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tions of an initial presence in the West Bank. The Nusrat Front and Islamic State
have become major players in Syria.
Terrorism has been a basic feature of the Arab-Israeli conflict from the beginning,
reflecting Palestinian opposition to Israel’s very existence, not, as is commonly misper-
ceived, just a response to the post-1967 occupation. During the eighteen-month-long
riots of 1920–1921, in many ways the ‘‘First Intifada,’’ 47 Jews were killed and 140
wounded; 33 were killed and 230 wounded during the 1929 riots.4 In 1950, two years
after Israel’s establishment, 50 civilians were killed in cross-border infiltrations, 97 in
1951, and 182 in 1952.5 Altogether, over 400 Israelis were killed between 1951 and 1956
in more than 6,000 cross-border attacks.6 The first terrorist attack by Fatah occurred
in December 1964, shortly after it was founded, well before the 1967 War.
Terrorism continued after the 1967 war, but at a lower level. From 1967–1973,
269 Israelis died in terrorist attacks; 1968 was the peak, with 1,480 attempted
cross-border attacks, and similar numbers in 1969 and 1970.7 The situation worsened
during the First Intifada. At its height, from December 1987–1989, 1,280 Israelis
were wounded in terrorist attacks, 12 killed.8
The Second Intifada, which began in September 2000 and dissipated by the
mid-2000s, was the worst period of terrorism Israel ever faced. In 2001, the first full
year, 207 Israelis were killed; 2002 was the worst year, with 452 killed in 53 suicide
attacks, an average of approximately one attack every week.9 Between 2000 and
2004, nearly as many Israelis died from terrorism as in the entire period from
1948 until 2000.10 By 2009, the Intifada had claimed the lives of 1,178 Israelis in
some 15,000 terrorist attacks (516 in 146 suicide attacks).11 More than 5,000 attacks
took place from Gaza alone.12
From the 1982 invasion of Lebanon until the final withdrawal in 2000, more
than 1,500 Israelis soldiers died in the battle against the PLO and later Hezbollah.13
In the five years before the withdrawal, Hezbollah conducted almost 5,000 attacks.14
Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ rocket arsenals are directed at Israel’s civilian popu-
lation and are thus primarily weapons of terrorism. Today, Hezbollah’s rockets
not only cover Tel Aviv and the entire center of the country, but almost all of the
south, including the reactor in Dimona. Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were first struck
by Hamas rockets in 2012 and came fully into range in 2014, at which time Hamas
also sought to hit the reactor.15 Both organizations consistently work to extend their
rocket ranges, payloads, and precision.
 Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective? 3

During the 34-day Lebanon War in 2006, Hezbollah fired a total of 4,228 rock-
ets at Israel.16 Fifty-three Israelis were killed, including 41 civilians; approximately
250 were severely wounded and 2,400 lightly so.17 Two thousand homes and apart-
ments were destroyed or severely damaged, and dozens of hospitals, utilities, and
factories were damaged. In Haifa, the port, refinery, and chemical industries sus-
pended operation and the naval base was forced to move to the south. Between
100,000 and 250,000 people fled from the north and an estimated million were forced
to stay in, or near, shelters, with northern communities turning into ghost towns.18
Hezbollah is estimated to have over 100,000 short-range rockets today,
thousands of intermediate-range ones, capable of reaching south of Tel Aviv, and
hundreds of long-range ones.19 Much of the arsenal is located in private homes in
some 160 villages throughout southern Lebanon.20 It is estimated that in a future
round Hezbollah may launch 400–600 rockets a day for over two months, a total
of some 24,000–36,000, of which 6,000 may be fired at Tel Aviv.21 Publicly available
estimates of the number of Israelis killed to be 300–500.22
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During the 21-day conflict in 2008, Hamas fired 813 rockets at Israel,23 1,500
during the 8-day conflict in 2012,24 and 4,564 rockets and mortars during the
51-day conflict in 2014.25 All told, between 2001 and 2013 Hamas fired more than
12,800 rockets at Israel,26 or well over 17,300 by the end of 2014. The numbers of
dead and wounded decreased precipitously after the Iron Dome rocket shield was
deployed in 2011. Hamas had an arsenal of approximately 15,000 rockets prior to
the conflict in 201227 and 10,000 on the eve of the operation in 2014.28 It had
approximately 2,000 rockets at the operation’s end.29
Until recently, the inaccuracy of Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ rockets meant that
they could only target population centers. Today, Hezbollah’s arsenal is increasingly
composed of precise missiles that can target specific civilian and military sites,30
thereby presenting a possible game changer. For the first time, an Arab force may
have the ability to disrupt the mobilization of Israel’s reserves; disrupt IDF offensive
activity; attack command and control facilities, such as the General Staff Head-
quarters and Prime Minister’s office; and attack sensitive national infrastructure
sites.31
These rocket arsenals have turned the terrorist, or guerrilla, threats that Israel
faces from a danger to individuals and small numbers of people, as it was in the past,
to a national level threat, engulfing entire regions, in the future probably the entire
country. From painful pinpricks, ‘‘rocket terrorism’’ has become a strategic threat, a
term first used by Premier Rabin in 1995, actually the primary threat Israel faces
today, other than the Iranian nuclear program.
The rocket arsenals can be used for multiple purposes, including strategic
attrition, to undermine Israel’s national resilience through prolonged and cumulative
attacks; military attrition, to diminish its ability to conduct effective warfare; deter-
rence and compellence, to prevent Israel from initiating, escalating, or continuing an
operation; terror and disruption; and diplomatic leverage, to determine when and
how the fighting will end, deny Israel victory, and even force it to accede to a cease
fire without achieving its military objectives, as happened during the 2006 Lebanon
War and 2008 operation in Gaza.32
Notwithstanding the heavy price terrorism has caused Israel, it has never
reached the level of an existential threat. There have, however, been times when it
was perceived as such by some officials, primarily the Second Intifada,33 while others
came to believe that it might become existential if Israel failed to suppress it.34 The
 4 C. D. Freilich

strategic threat is far greater than the number of casualties and even the societal
impact. Terrorism had a decisive impact on most of the elections since the mid-90s.
In 1996, for example, the polls indicated a severe defeat for the Likud, but the result
was the opposite, primarily due to a massive wave of suicide terrorism. The Second
Intifada, which started when Labor was in power and the peace process at its height,
led to the rise of a Right-Wing Likud government in 2001.35 The fear of renewed
fighting with Hamas, after the inconclusive conflict during 2014, overshadowed
Israel’s most recent elections, in March 2015. Overall, Palestinian terrorism has
caused a major change in public opinion towards possible compromise and deci-
mated Israel’s peace camp. Rather than forcing Israel to make concessions, terrorism
has hardened the positions of the leadership and public as a whole.36
Terrorism has also had a decisive impact on Israel’s negotiating positions and on
its ability and willingness to make concessions.37 Premiers Rabin, Peres, and Barak
sought to isolate the peace process from terrorism and at times went ahead with
negotiations, despite ongoing terrorism. They were, however, repeatedly forced to
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go slow, back away from possible concessions, and Peres and Barak were ultimately
defeated electorally by terrorism. Hamas rocket fire following the withdrawal from
Gaza in 2005, and the Hezbollah attack that provoked the 2006 Lebanon War, led to
the demise of Premier Olmert’s plan for a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank.
Conversely, part of the significant public support in Israel for territorial compro-
mise in the West Bank stems from the sense of despair and revulsion generated by
Palestinian terrorism and from a consequent desire to separate from the Palestinians.
Similarly, the unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza reflected frustration
with the ongoing casualties and Israel’s inability to end the violence. In these cases,
terrorism had a significant effect on Israeli policy.
The fear of large-scale casualties and destruction by Hezbollah’s and Hamas’
rockets has also had a significant impact on Israeli decision-making, creating a form
of mutual deterrence.38 Israel, for example, hesitated to attack Hezbollah’s rapidly
growing rocket arsenal in 2000 and 2006, and in the years since then, as it has
Hamas’ arsenal in recent years.
For the most part, terrorism has not had a significant impact on Israel’s econ-
omy, though there have been some exceptions, mostly short term. Israel’s tourist
industry has been disrupted repeatedly, but has usually recovered rapidly. Major
operations, such as the 2006 Lebanon War, had a temporary effect, but the economy
rebounded surprisingly rapidly, almost as if the war had never happened, and overall
economic performance that year was not affected.39 Towns on the northern border,
or near Gaza, long subjected to Hezbollah and Hamas terrorism, have been affected
deeply, but the impact was local, not national. The Second Intifada was the major
exception—the only time terrorism had a significant economic impact nationally.40
Conclusive data on the effects of the 2014 operation are not yet available, but initial
assessments indicate some harm to the overall national economy, more than in the
previous operations in Gaza, but nothing compared to the heavy blow after the
Second Intifada.
Terrorism has caused ongoing disruption of civilian life and undermined the
public’s sense of security, especially in the last fifteen years, since the Second Intifada
and as Hezbollah and Hamas rocket arsenals grew. For parts of Israel the Hezbollah
and Hamas threat is ever present, with an ongoing psychological cost. A 2007 study
found that over 25% of adults and 72–94% of children living in the border town of
Sderot suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.41 During the Second Intifada,
 Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective? 5

all of Israel became a part of the terrorist war, at least psychologically, with an
emotional impact that has yet to fully dissipate. Beginning with the PLO bombard-
ment of the north in 1982, there have been repeated cases of civilian flight during
periods of heightened rocket fire, notably during the 2006 Lebanon War and the
2014 Gaza operation. Overall, however, the disruption of life has been temporary
and the public has demonstrated surprising societal resilience.42

The Response
Much as Israel does not have a formal defense doctrine, it does not have a
counter-terrorism doctrine either, although the National Security Council was
charged in 2014 with formulating one. The lack of a formal doctrine does not indi-
cate the absence of any conceptual framework, or operational guidelines. Indeed,
Israeli policy has always been predicated on the assumption that terrorism could
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never be fully suppressed, just minimized and reduced to a level that Israeli society
could tolerate,43 and there are other working assumptions. Much of Israel’s
counter-terrorism policy, however, has been the result of trial and error, rather than
a pre-thought-out and coherent doctrine.
Deterrence, prevention, and retaliation are at the heart of Israel’s
counter-terrorism policies, along with attrition warfare, designed to grind down ter-
rorist organizations, and the occasional spectacular counter-terrorist operation.44
For the most part, however, Israeli counter-terrorism policy, like its national security
strategy as a whole, has been ad hoc, benefiting from a flexible, pragmatic approach,
while at times suffering from a lack of conceptual coherence and long-term
strategy.45
Offensively, Israel’s counter-terrorism measures have included:

. Ongoing operations, often around-the-clock, ranging from small covert ones, to

major offensives.
. The ‘‘intelligence-operations circle,’’ a highly honed mechanism whereby intelli-
gence regarding an impending attack is transferred to air and=or ground forces
and turned into interdiction measures within minutes.46
. Interdiction of arms transfers to terrorist organizations, e.g., Israel’s reported air-
strikes in Sudan in 2009 and 2011 to prevent the transfer of Iranian weapons to
Hamas.47
. Blockade of Gaza to prevent the transfer of weapons and materials needed for the
construction of storehouses, bunkers, command posts, and more.
. Indirectly pressing terrorist organizations to cease attacks against Israel, by
exerting pressure on the civilian populations in which they are embedded, and=
or on the host governments.48
. Targeted killings of the political and military heads of terrorist organizations,
terrorists with essential skills, and those involved in particularly heinous attacks.

Defensively, counter-terrorism measures have included:

. Passive and active rocket defenses.

. Security fences along the West Bank, Lebanese, Syrian, Gazan, and Egyptian
borders, which have virtually eliminated cross-border terrorism.
. Security zones, especially in southern Lebanon from the early 1980s until 2000.
 6 C. D. Freilich

. Roadblocks and checkpoints, which impede terrorists’ freedom of movement and

provide greater time for interdiction efforts.49
. Border patrols, security guards at public and private institutions, passenger and
baggage screening, and ‘‘hardening’’ of Israeli embassies.
. Arrests and administrative detentions, travel restrictions, deportations, curfews,
and more, designed to keep terrorists, or possible terrorist recruits, from operating
from the West Bank.50

Israel has also pursued diplomatic and cooperative measures to combat terrorism,
including:

. Counter-terrorism alliances and de facto cooperation with third parties, for

example, Egypt against Hamas during the 2014 operation, the Maronites in
Lebanon in the 1980s, and decades-long cooperation with Jordan.
. Counter-terrorism cooperation with the PA, including intelligence sharing and
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acquiescence to the provision of weapons and training to PA security forces by

Jordan and the U.S.51
. Strong cooperation with the U.S. and countries around the world in virtually all
areas of counter-terrorism.52
. Promotion of economic development in the West Bank and Gaza to create a
Palestinian stake in maintaining stability,53 for example, Israel’s repeated attempts
to reopen Gaza to trade following terrorist attacks, or after the 2014 operation, or
approval for the construction of the Palestinian city in the West Bank, Rawabi.
. Peace negotiations, which should be the most effective long-term means of
counter-terrorism.

Israel has built a multi-tiered response to the Hezbollah and Hamas rocket
threats. Offensively, Israel has succeeded in developing a partial capability to destroy
launchers from the air, albeit often only after they have been fired for the first time.54
At present, this is still limited primarily to long-range rockets, which are relatively
large and mounted on easily identifiable launchers, and thus comparatively easy
to attack. Israel is still far from having an effective capability to suppress the vast
number of short-range rockets.
The IDF has concluded that trying to find and destroy every launcher is simply
infeasible and that Hezbollah and Hamas will be able to continue firing rockets until
the end of future conflicts. Instead, IDF strategy is to employ massive air power to
diminish their capabilities and motivation to continue fighting, and to expedite the
diplomatic endgame, in the hope that this will reduce the need for ground maneuver
and shorten the duration of future rounds. In 2006 and 2014, this strategy met with
limited success at best. With Hezbollah and Hamas avowed to Israel’s destruction,
the objective is more prolonged periods of quiet between rounds, not to completely
resolve the problem.55
Israel has also developed a variety of passive and active defenses. Passive
defenses include shelters, ‘‘hardening’’ of buildings, the requirement that all apart-
ments have at least one reinforced concrete room, and more. The government for-
mally decided to ‘‘harden’’ all homes within seven kilometers of the border,
though implementation is contingent on scarce resources.56 Israel has also developed
a highly targeted early warning system, whereby citizens residing in areas under
attack are provided with the necessary warning, while those in other areas, some very
nearby, are able to continue life normally.57
 Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective? 7

Active defenses include two partly overlapping and mutually reinforcing

anti-rocket systems. Iron Dome is designed to intercept rockets with a range of up
to 70 kilometers.58 The estimated area defended by each battery ranges from over
60 km2 (about twice the size of Haifa) to an area of over 100 km2.59 Current plans
call for a total of 10–13 batteries,60 the minimum necessary to provide basic defense
for the entire country.61 Some estimate that 20 or more batteries will be required for
truly effective countrywide defense.62
The second system, Magic Wand, is designed to intercept short-range missiles,
long-range and precise rockets, and cruise missiles at a distance of 40–240 kilo-
meters.63 Current plans call for the deployment of 2–3 batteries, possibly by 2017.64
Iron Dome has proven highly effective. During the operation in 2012, Hamas
fired 1,506 rockets. As intended, Iron Dome did not intercept rockets that would
have fallen in open areas. Of the remaining rockets, virtually all of which would have
struck residential or commercial areas, Iron Dome achieved an interception rate of
84%. Just five Israelis were killed and 240 wounded by rocket fire. During the oper-
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ation in 2014, Hamas fired a total of 4,564 rockets and mortars at Israel, but Iron
Dome achieved an even more impressive interception rate.65 Only two people were
killed by rockets and the physical damage was minimal.66 Five civilians and ten sol-
diers were killed by mortars, however, which Iron Dome is incapable of intercepting.

The Counter-Terrorism Response: An Assessment

Israel’s counter-terrorism measures have produced a variety of outcomes, some suc-
cessful, others failed and even counter-productive. Given the exigencies of realpoli-
tik, they have also led to unintended consequences and inconsistencies, and raised
difficult quandaries.
The crowning success of Israel’s counter-terrorism policy is that it has enabled it
to live in relative security and thrive, regardless of the threat. With the exception of
brief periods and specific locales, terrorism has not materially affected life in Israel.
This is particularly true of ‘‘traditional’’ terrorism, though the Second Intifada and
the Hezbollah and Hamas rocket arsenals do pose growing threats of short-term dis-
ruption. Moreover, the level of security achieved has, for the most part, provided
Israel’s decision-makers with the latitude necessary to pursue policies of their choos-
ing, domestic and foreign. These achievements cannot be overemphasized.
Arguably the main weakness of Israel’s counter-terrorism policy, much like its
defense doctrine generally, is that operations have been conducted largely in the
absence of an overall strategy, without clearly elucidated long-term objectives and a
sufficient appreciation of their ramifications. Consequently, operations have at times
failed to reflect broader national security objectives and even conflicted with them.67
The following illustrates some of the achievements and difficulties encountered.
Effective deterrence of terrorism commonly requires a disproportionate response
to dissuade terrorists from further attacks. Some have argued that Israel’s harsh
initial response during the Second Intifada may have led to an increase in the overall
level of violence, though it did have a significant long-term deterrent impact on the
West Bank population. The ostensibly failed 2006 Lebanon War also had a strong
deterrent impact, whereas the operations in Gaza in 2008 and 2012 did not, even
though they were waged more effectively. Israel often suffers from an asymmetry
of deterrence. Its enemies are less sensitive than it to casualties, have a threshold
for pain that often exceeds Israel’s willingness to mete it out, and view
 8 C. D. Freilich

restraint and proportionate responses as signs of weakness and proof that violence
works.68
The battle against terrorism often leads to no-win situations. An Israeli failure to
respond to attacks may embolden its enemies and dishearten its people, but retali-
ation can exacerbate the situation, lead to even more casualties, and elicit inter-
national opprobrium.69 Israel’s default preference for the status quo undermines its
deterrence, e.g., in the confrontation with Hezbollah between 2000 and 2006 and
Hamas since 2008. Premier Barak’s decision not to implement his declared policy
of massive retaliation and to respond to a Hezbollah attack in October 2000, follow-
ing the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, was a particularly problematic case.
While Israel has been successful at times in deterring terrorism for limited periods
of time, it has not been able to deter the buildup of terrorist capabilities,70 nor, in
the end, the use of terrorism as a means of threatening Israel.
Israel’s attempts to force the Lebanese government into evicting the PLO from
Lebanon, and later Hezbollah, by applying pressure on the local population, not
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only failed, since the government simply did not have the wherewithal to do so,
but ended up increasing popular willingness to take up arms against Israel. Con-
versely, the attempts to hold the Jordanian government accountable for terrorism
emanating from its territory proved effective. The expulsion of the PLO from
Lebanon in 1982, a major success in its own right, created a power vacuum that
enabled the rise of a far more lethal enemy: Hezbollah. Israel’s highly successful
efforts to prevent cross-border terrorism, including through the establishment of
security zones, fences, and more, led Hezbollah and Hamas to seek an alternative
response, resulting in the rocket threat.71
On a number of occasions Israel’s responses to terrorism have risked, or actually
caused, a broader confrontation. Israel’s attempts to counter PLO and later Hezbol-
lah terrorism from Lebanon, for example, repeatedly risked an escalation with Syria
and even caused a significant clash in 1982. The operation against Hamas in 2008
strained Israel’s relations with Egypt, and the operation in 2012, when the Moslem
Brotherhood was in power, actually threatened the peace treaty. In 2014, conversely,
when the Sisi government was in power, Israeli-Egyptian cooperation during the
fighting with Hamas was significant.
Targeted killings of terrorist leaders and fighters have disrupted, postponed,
and limited the ability of terrorist organizations to initiate attacks, with a signifi-
cant impact on their overall effectiveness.72 Conversely, some evidence indicates
that targeted killings during the Second Intifada have resulted in a significant
increase in suicide bombings,73 and have caused collateral damage, at times signifi-
cant. The elaborate network of checkpoints may have helped prevent some acts of
terrorism, but has contributed to overall hostility and anger and, possibly, to
further terrorism. Israel has tried to stake out an uncompromising policy on nego-
tiations with terrorists, but on a number of occasions has exchanged terrorists for
hostages on hijacked airplanes, abducted Israeli soldiers, and even the bodies of
Israeli soldiers.
Israel made every effort to conduct peace negotiations with the Palestinians dur-
ing the early part of the Second Intifada (the talks leading to the ‘‘Clinton Para-
meters’’), but the large number of casualties made it difficult for Palestinian
leaders to make concessions. Israel’s well-meaning attempts to separate the peace
talks from counter-terrorism operations, i.e., to pursue both concomitantly, largely
failed. Moreover, they were counterproductive, leading Israel to acquiesce to a level
 Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective? 9

of violence that was politically untenable domestically, and that reduced the
Palestinians’ incentive to clamp down, in the knowledge that heightened terrorism
might produce further Israeli concessions.74
The withdrawal from Lebanon enabled Hezbollah to claim that it was the first Arab
force to have ever successfully coerced Israel into withdrawing from territory, without
gaining anything in return. It thus greatly strengthened Hezbollah’s stature and was
cited by the Palestinians as a model to be emulated and as a reason for the outbreak
of the Second Intifada. Israel’s repeated inability to achieve decisive outcomes in the
operations against Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas since then, including the lengthy oper-
ation in 2014, enabled them to claim victory, further strengthening their stature.
Similarly, the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 ended up strengthening Hamas. By
denying Palestinian moderates the ability to take credit for the achievement, the
withdrawal strengthened Hamas’ claim that it was violence, not the PA’s attempts
at negotiations, that forced Israel out. When one adds Israel’s weakening of the
PA’s security forces to the picture, as part of its response to the Intifada, and the
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power vacuum in Gaza following the withdrawal, the highly unintended conse-
quence was that Israeli policy greatly abetted Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007.
Israel’s counter-terrorism measures at times also forced Jordan to show solidarity
with Hamas and had a highly deleterious effect on relations with Turkey.75
Israel tried to apply pressure on Hamas by imposing an embargo, but removed
most of the restrictions under international pressure. In so doing, Israel undermined
the deterrent logic of its own policy, but not before paying a heavy price in inter-
national condemnation and raising questions of international law. Following the
operation in 2014, Israel even found itself in the awkward position of having to
champion reconstruction of Gaza.76 The embargo itself had been only partially effec-
tive in the past in preventing arms from reaching Gaza, though it has become far
more effective since Egypt also closed its border with Gaza, following the rise of
the Sissi government. Economically, the embargo has not forced Hamas to make
concessions, but in 2014 it appears to have become so effective that it backfired
and led to Hamas’s decision to escalate, and to the outbreak of fighting, out of
Hamas’ sense of desperation and that it had nothing to lose.
Domestic politics have long had a major impact on Israel’s counter-terrorism
responses. This was true of the responses to the Fedayeen attacks in the 1950s,77
the Second Intifada in the 2000s, and the major operations in Lebanon and Gaza
ever since. Politics are a legitimate part of national security policy, but they certainly
effect, and at times skew, decisions.
Israel’s focus on counter-terrorism operations has led some to propose that it
give greater consideration to a counter-insurgency strategy, i.e., one that takes into
account the political and societal factors that give rise to terrorism, rather than
merely trying to suppress it. To an extent, Israel has certainly done so, for example,
in the repeated efforts to reach a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians (Camp
David and the Clinton Parameters in 2000, the Olmert Proposals in 2008). One can
argue that more should have been done. There is no doubt that some Israeli policies
have exacerbated the situation, but the Palestinians have proven averse to even the
most far-reaching peace proposals. Moreover, trying to win over the hearts and
minds of the Palestinians, or Shiites in Lebanon, not to mention the al-Qaeda off-
shoots now on Israel’s borders—the essence of a counter-insurgency strategy—is
simply unrealistic in Israel’s context, at least pending a final peace agreement, and
likely long thereafter. After decades of conflict, the enmity is too deep.78
 10 C. D. Freilich

Morag has suggested the following criteria for assessing the effectiveness of
Israel’s counter-terrorism policy: the number of Israeli casualties, the number of inno-
cent enemy casualties, the socio-economic impact of terrorism on Israel, and the
impact on domestic and international support for both Israel and the Palestinians.79
Drawing on this approach, a number of conclusions can be drawn.
Throughout most of its history, Israel’s counter-terrorism efforts have succeeded
in keeping the number of Israeli casualties very low, the primary policy objective.
With the exception of a few periods, primarily the Second Intifada, the effect of ‘‘tra-
ditional’’ terrorism has been limited, with few casualties and minimal disruption of
life. The impact of Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ rocket arsenals has been greater, with
lengthy periods in which life was disrupted in entire regions, but again the number
of casualties has been low.
Israel made major efforts over the decades to prevent innocent enemy casualties,
limiting its military objectives and operations, devising special tactics, and at times
risking IDF personnel and its own civilian population; and its record is certainly
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favorable compared to other countries. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Dempsey,

for example, stressed that Israel went to ‘‘extraordinary lengths’’ to limit civilian
casualties during the 2014 operation.80 Nevertheless, the number of innocent victims
in counter-terrorism operations has been significant in recent years, especially as
Hamas and Hezbollah have embedded their forces among their civilian populations.
The impact of terrorism on Israeli society has been limited. Indeed, extensive
research in recent years has demonstrated the remarkable resilience of Israeli society
in the face of decades of terrorism.81 With the exception of the Second Intifada, the
impact of terrorism on Israel’s economy, as noted, has been limited, typically local,
and usually fleeting.
The domestic and international impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism
operations, for both Israel and the Palestinians, has been mixed. Domestically, posi-
tions have been hardened on both sides, providing legitimacy to hardline policies.
Terrorism, as noted, especially the Second Intifada, had a dramatic impact on Israeli
politics, while Hezbollah and Hamas rocket fire convinced much of the public that
the unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza were mistakes never to be
repeated. Nevertheless, Palestinian terrorism has buttressed support for territorial
compromise among some parts of Israel’s public.
Israel’s counter-terrorism measures have contributed significantly to the deterio-
ration in its international standing, particularly when viewed as disproportionate.82
The international community’s long-standing opposition to Israel’s occupation of
the West Bank, and of Gaza and southern Lebanon in the past, has had a consider-
able impact both on its attitude towards terrorism against Israel and Israel’s
responses. Much of the international community, especially the Western countries,
formally denounces terrorism and recognizes Israel’s legitimate right of self-defense.
Nevertheless, it has demonstrated greater understanding of terrorism perpetrated
against Israel than against other countries and has only very rarely recognized that
Israel’s counter-terrorism operations were, indeed, conducted in pursuit of this
legitimate right.
Palestinian terrorism has had a mixed impact on their international standing. On
the one hand, spectacular terrorism succeeded in putting the Palestinian cause on the
international agenda in the 1960s and 1970s and led to a dramatic change in their
international stature.83 Ongoing terrorism since then has kept the Palestinian cause
in the limelight and convinced many of the need to redress their grievances.
 Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective? 11

Conversely, the excesses of the Second Intifada turned parts of the international
community away from the Palestinians and led to greater understanding for Israel’s
security concerns. Palestinian terrorism has also had a particularly negative impact
on their relations with the U.S. Hezbollah and Hamas have not succeeded in eliciting
much international support.
Israel’s tough response to the Second Intifada turned Palestinian public opinion
at least partially against violence, not in principle, but because of the heavy costs
incurred. The 2006 Lebanon War had a similar deterrent effect on the Lebanese
population. It remains to be seen if the same will prove to be true of the Gazan popu-
lation following the 2014 operation. What Israel and many in the international com-
munity consider to be totally unjustified terrorism is viewed by much of the
Palestinian population as legitimate resistance. Facing a strong public consensus, vir-
tually no Palestinian leader has ever condemned terrorism on the normative level,
although President Abbas has repeatedly called it counterproductive. The bottom
line is that terrorism remains an accepted policy tool for the Palestinians, Hezbollah,
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and Hamas.
Unsurprisingly, Israel has been most successful in combating terrorism when it
was in firm control of the territory the terrorists operated from and was thus able to
prevent them from gaining refuge and a base to operate form. ‘‘Intelligence control’’
of the territory has proven essential, as has development of the ‘‘intelligence-
operations circle’’ mentioned above. Following the Oslo Accords, the IDF withdrew
from the populated areas of the West Bank and lost control over the territory. It
was only when it reoccupied the Palestinian cities at the height of the Intifada that
the conditions for effective intelligence control were reestablished. Since the with-
drawals from Lebanon and Gaza, Israel has not enjoyed intelligence control in these
areas.
Offensively, Israel is not likely to have an effective response to Hezbollah’s and
Hamas’ rocket arsenals for the foreseeable future.84 The vast numbers of short-range
rockets pose enormous technological and operational difficulties, greatly exacer-
bated by the fact that they are deeply embedded among the civilian population
and hidden in deep underground tunnels. Dealing with the rocket threats, as demon-
strated in both the 2006 and 2014 operations, can require weeks of offensive action
during which Israel’s civilian population is under continual attack, and is only partly
effective, as Hezbollah and Hamas retained a significant portion of their arsenals at
the fighting’s end.85
Indeed, 51 days of intensive airstrikes during the 2014 operation were insuf-
ficient to put an end to Hamas rocket fire, which continued in large numbers to
the very end. Moreover, Hamas rejected repeated cease-fire proposals, its motivation
to continue fighting unaffected by the severity of the damage to Gaza. In the absence
of a crushing defeat, Hamas was able to claim that it had withstood Israel’s superior
might and thus emerged victorious, just as both it and Hezbollah had done in earlier
rounds. This ability to claim victory, even just for PR purposes, is highly problematic
for Israel’s deterrence.
Israel’s difficulties confronting Hezbollah and Hamas reflect a fundamental
quandary. As painful as the rocket fire and other forms of terrorism have been,
Israel clearly does not wish to reoccupy Lebanon or Gaza and to pay the price that
would be required to root out the rockets—the solution some have advocated as the
only effective means of resolving the problem. The reluctance to reoccupy these areas
does not reflect a lack of confidence in Israel’s ability to do so, so much as the belief
 12 C. D. Freilich

that even success will provide little more than a brief respite. Even more radical
adversaries may fill the power vacuum, Hezbollah and Hamas may rebuild their
rocket arsenals once Israel withdraws, the number of casualties involved will be very
high on both sides, and the international ramifications severe. As a result, Israel has
refrained from a major ground operation and from trying to topple Hezbollah in
2006 and Hamas ever since.
In terms of rocket defense, conversely, Iron Dome has been a resounding success,
at least in limited conflicts, such as in 2014. The number of casualties was
brought down to minimal levels and most of the country, though not communities
in the immediate vicinity of Gaza, was able to continue daily life with little
interruption.86
Moreover, Iron Dome provided Israel’s leaders with far greater decision-making
latitude, a possible alternative to preemption or immediate counter-attack, and
broader options.87 During the 2012 Gaza operation the government did not launch
a ground attack, since Iron Dome provided sufficient protection, and the ground
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operation launched in 2014 was limited to the new tunnel threat, not the rockets.
The sense of at least partial protection also greatly reduced the public’s sense of help-
lessness and contributed to its resilience.
The success of Israel’s rocket defenses constitutes a severe blow for Hamas and Hez-
bollah, as well as Iran, which built their military postures on the assumption that Israel’s
home front would be exposed and desperate for an end to the fighting.88 The 2014 con-
flict operation clearly marked a turning point, which they will have to weigh carefully.
Nevertheless, Israel’s rocket defenses suffer from a number of important
financial, operational, and strategic constraints. Financially, the severe disparity
between the inexpensive cost of the incoming rockets and Israel’s expensive defensive
systems poses a significant problem. Each Iron Dome interceptor is estimated at
between $35,000 and $50,000 and each battery between $60 and $80 million. Each
Magic Wand interceptor is estimated to cost $700,000–$1.25 million.89 In contrast,
the cost of Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s rockets is a few thousand dollars.90
Providing effective defense to the entire country may require twenty or more
batteries, at a cost which Israel will be hard-pressed to bear, but may have to none-
theless. The overall cost of the planned rocket and missile defense systems (including
Arrow, designed to intercept missiles from Syria and Iran) is over $10 billion accord-
ing to one source, a whopping figure for Israel, and far more according to another.
As a result, these sources argue that defense does not provide an effective overall
response to the missile and rocket threats Israel faces.91
Others argue that when broken down on a multi-year basis these costs do not
exceed Israel’s capabilities, especially if the U.S., which has funded nearly half of
the Iron Dome program,92 continues to do so. Moreover, the defensive systems’
otherwise exorbitant price becomes more palatable when the overall costs of con-
frontations with Hamas and Hezbollah are factored in, not just the price of the
incoming rockets. The precise figures are a source of dispute, but the following is
indicative: the direct military cost of the 2006 Lebanon War has been estimated at
$2.3 billion, and the combined cost of the three operations in Gaza since 2008 at over
$3.7 billion. This does not include the indirect costs to the economy estimated at
$850 million in 2006 alone.93 Together, these costs already near the above $10 billion
figure, and further conflicts are likely.
For limited confrontations such as those with Hamas to date, the defensive systems
thus provide a relatively good and cost-effective response. The truly big question is how
 Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective? 13

effective they will be in a future confrontation with Hezbollah’s huge arsenal and in the
event of a multi-front confrontation involving Hezbollah, Hamas, and possibly even
Syria. The problem will grow even worse and more difficult to counter as the number
of precise rockets Hezbollah and others have increases, thereby creating a need to inter-
cept an increasing percentage of them. Today, most are highly inaccurate and fall in
open spaces, and to save costs, Iron Dome does not bother to intercept them.
Operationally, the minimum range required for an Iron Dome interception is esti-
mated to be 5–7 kilometers. Communities within this distance of the border are thus
not protected, nor does the system provide defense against mortars. Magic Wand
has yet to be tried in combat and its interception rates are unknown. Both Iron Dome
and Magic Wand may face a danger of saturation should large-scale salvos be fired,94
and the broader areas requiring defense in the future, as well as various improvements
that Hezbollah and Hamas will presumably make, may also reduce their effectiveness.95
Strategically, as effective as Iron Dome has been, civilian life is nevertheless
greatly disrupted; the population still has to seek shelter, schools and places of
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employment are closed, and socio-economic activity is largely paralyzed, with a sig-
nificant impact on morale.96 Moreover, the Hezbollah rocket threat is infinitely great-
er than that posed by Hamas, and the success achieved against the latter during the
2014 operation should not be construed as an indication of what a future round with
Hezbollah will look like. The physical damage and number of casualties is likely to be
heavy. Furthermore, until a full nationwide Iron Dome shield can be deployed, deci-
sions will have to be made regarding which areas are be defended, e.g., strategic mili-
tary installations, such as airbases, major infrastructure sites, such as power stations,
or population centers. Since airbases are essential to winning the war, the tendency, in
large-scale confrontations, will be to deploy Iron Dome to defend them.97
In conclusion, Israel has faced ongoing terrorism from its earliest years, running
the entire gamut, from low-level attacks to the national-level threat posed by Hezbol-
lah’s and Hamas’ rockets. Together, these threats have caused heavy civilian and
military casualties; indeed, the percentage of Israel’s population killed by terrorism
is higher than in any other democracy,98 and few other countries have ever con-
fronted the ravages of a greater terrorist threat than the Second Intifada. Terrorism
has had a decisive effect on Israel’s electoral processes and national security
decision-making, but for the most part has not significantly affected its economy
or society, beyond limited disruptions.
Israel’s counter-terrorism policy has been a mix of achievements and failures. It has
not been anchored in a coherent overall strategy, with many cases of inconsistencies and
counterproductive operations, and has had a deleterious impact on Israel’s international
standing. Overall, however, Israel’s counter-terrorism policy has enabled it to live in
relative security and thrive, and provided its leaders with the latitude to pursue various
courses of action. Israel’s borders have been effectively, if not hermetically, sealed. The
Second Intifada was suppressed, disproving the common wisdom that conventional
armies cannot defeat terrorism and insurgencies.99 The primary terrorist threat Israel
faces today is from Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ rocket arsenals, to which it has begun to
achieve a defensive shield, though it still lacks an effective offensive response.

Notes
1. Charles D. Freilich, ‘‘The Armageddon Scenario: Israel and the Threat of Nuclear
Terrorism,’’ Mideast Security and Policy Studies 84 (2010, April).
 14 C. D. Freilich

2. Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 9.
3. Uzi Rubin, ‘‘Israel’s Air and Missile Defense during the 2014 Gaza War,’’ Mideast
Security and Policy Studies 111 (Ramat Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies,
2015).
4. Itzhak Ben-Israel, Israel’s Defense Doctrine (Hebrew) (Ben Shemen, Israel: Modan,
2013), 20; Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 19.
5. Sergio Catignani, Israeli Counterinsurgency and the Intifada: Dilemmas of a
Conventional Army (London: Routledge, 2008), 47.
6. Martin Gilbert, Israel: A History (New York: Harper, 2008), 291.
7. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 32, 38, 40.
8. Catignani, Israeli Counterinsurgency (see note 5 above), 82.
9. Government of Israel, Israel Security Agency, 2012 Annual Summary, ‘‘Terror Data
and Trends and the Interdiction Response’’ (Hebrew), 2012, http://www.shabak.gov.il/pub-
lications/study/Pages/summary2012.aspx.
10. Avi Kober, Israel’s Wars of Attrition: Attrition Challenges to Democratic States
(London: Routledge, 2009), 87.
11. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 115, 142; Ben-Israel, Israel’s Defense Doctrine
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(see note 4 above), 88–89; ‘‘Government of Israel, Israel Security Agency,’’ Analysis of Attacks
in the Last Decade 2000–2010, www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/decade/Fatalities/
Pages/default.aspx (accessed June 4, 2015); Government of Israel, Israel Security Agency,
Analysis of ‘‘Character of Terrorist Attacks During Last Decade’’ (Hebrew), www.shabak.
gov.il/SiteCollectionImages/Hebrew/TerrorInfo/decade/DecadeSummary_he.pdf (accessed
June 4, 2015).
12. Israel Defense Forces, ‘‘Israel under Fire, 2014,’’ www.idfblog.com/facts-figures/
rocket-attacks-toward-israel/ (accessed June 4, 2015); Byman, High Price (see note 2 above),
183.
13. Stuart Cohen, Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion (London: Routledge,
2008), 41.
14. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 228–240, 256.
15. Amos Harel, ‘‘On the Day after the Bodies of the Hostages Were Found, a Severe
Danger of a Security Deterioration,’’ Haaretz (Hebrew), July 1, 2014, 3; Gili Cohen, Shirley
Saidler, Barak Ravid, and Jacky Houri, ‘‘Rockets Fired for First Time During Operation
on Zichron Yaakov and Dimona,’’ Haaretz, July 10, 2014, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/
politics/1.2372343.
16. Uzi Rubin, The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War (Ramat
Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Mideast Security and Policy Studies 71,
June 2007), 9, 10, 13, 18; Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Operations in Israel’s War against
Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza (Santa Monica: RAND,
2011), 145.
17. Kober, Israel’s Wars of Attrition (see note 10 above), 91.
18. Rubin, The Rocket Campaign (see note 16 above), 14–15, 17; Noam Ophir, ‘‘The
Solution Is Not in the Skies: How the Air Force Coped with Rocket Launchers,’’ Strategic
Memorandum (Hebrew) 9, no. 3 (October 2006): 15.
19. Itai Brun, Head of Research Division, IDF Military Intelligence, lecture on
counter-terrorism at Conference at Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, June 10, 2014.
20. Dan Williams, ‘‘Hoping to Deter Hezbollah, Israel Threatens Lebanese Civilians,’’
Reuters, January 29, 2014, quoting IAF Commander Eshel; Gabi Siboni, ‘‘Combat Challenges
in Densely Populated Territories,’’ Army and Strategy (Hebrew) (Special Edition, April 2014):
5.
21. Yossi Melman, Haaretz, April 8, 2011.
22. Amos Harel, Haaretz, August 2, 2012 and March 29, 2013.
23. Yossi Zilberman, ‘‘The Fighting in Gaza; All The Numbers’’ (Hebrew), January 18,
2009, http://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security/Article-1ec4d0ea599ee11004.htm.
24. Yiftah Shafir, ‘‘Iron Dome – Queen of the Operation,’’ in Shlomo Brom, ed., Follow-
ing Operation ‘‘Defensive Pillar’’: Gaza Strip, November 2012 (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: INSS,
Memorandum 123, December 2012), 34; Amir Rapaport, ‘‘The IDF and the Lessons of the
Second Lebanon War,’’ Mideast Security and Policy Studies 85 (December 2010): 31–32.
 Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective? 15

25. Jodi Rudoren and Fares Akram, ‘‘As Ceasefire Holds, Dazed Gazans Get to Work,’’
New York Times, August 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/
gaza-strip.html.
26. Israel Defense Forces, ‘‘Israel under Fire’’ (see note 12 above); Byman, High Price
(see note 2 above), 183.
27. Shafir, ‘‘Iron Dome’’ (see note 24 above), 34.
28. Itai Brun, Head of Research Division, IDF Military Intelligence, lecture at
Conference at Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, June 10, 2014; New York Times, July 9, 2014.
29. Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon, conference on the Lessons of Operation Defensive
Edge, INSS, Tel Aviv, September 30, 2014.
30. Interview with Dan Meridor, February 24, 2013; Amos Harel, ‘‘All of Israel Missiles
and Missiles,’’ Haaretz (Hebrew), April 16, 2010, http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1197871;
Amos Harel, Avi Issascharoff, Tal Levy, and Revi Stein, ‘‘2 Grads Were Fired from Sinai
to Eilat and Aqaba: The Assessment—al-Qaeda is Responsible’’ (Hebrew), Haaretz, April
23, 2014, http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1198726 Yuval Steinitz, ‘‘Comments on the
Defense Concept,’’ Maarachot (Hebrew) 398 (January 2005): 5–6.
31. Giora Eiland, ‘‘Fundamentals of the Response of the State of Israel,’’ Army and
Strategy (Hebrew) 2, no. 1 (June 2010): 60.
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32. Gur Laish and Roni Amir, ‘‘Surface to Surface Missile Warfare: The Offensive
Strategies and Defensive Response,’’ Maarachot (Hebrew) 442 (April 2012): 14–15.
33. ober, Israel’s Wars of Attrition (see note 10 above), 43; Efraim Lavie, ‘‘How Israel
Coped with the Intifada: A Critical Examination,’’ Strategic Memorandum (Hebrew) 13, no.
3 (October 2010): 87; Catignani, Israeli Counterinsurgency (see note 5 above), 107, 138;
Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 140; also see Ephraim Inbar, ‘‘Israel’s Small War:
The Military Response to the Intifada,’’ Armed Forces and Society 18, no. 1 (Fall 1991):
29–50.
34. Moshe Kaplinsky, ‘‘The IDF in the Years before the War,’’ Army and Strategy
(Hebrew) 1, no. 2 (October 2009): 19.
35. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 87; Zaki Shalom and Yoaz Handel, ‘‘The
Unique Characteristics of the Second Intifada among Israel’s Wars,’’ Army and Strategy
(Hebrew) 3, no. 1 (May 2011): 17.
36. Catignani, Israeli Counterinsurgency (see note 5 above), 107–108.
37. Former National Security Advisor Uzi Dayan, lecture, ICT conference on terrorism,
Herzliya, September 8, 2013.
38. Dan Meridor interview, December 24, 2012.
39. Bank of Israel, ‘‘Inflation Report 2006 - The Second Half’’ (Hebrew), 2007,
www.boi.org.il/he/NewsAndPublications/RegularPublications/Pages/heb_inf0602h.
aspx.
40. Catignani, Israeli Counterinsurgency (see note 5 above), 142.
41. Israel Defense Forces (see note 12 above); Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 183.
42. See the works by Meir Elran, including ‘‘Israel’s National Resilience: The Influence of
the Second Intifada,’’ Strategic Memorandum 8, no. 1 (January 2006); ‘‘The Home Front in
Operation Cast Lead: Appropriate Behavior in the Face of the Limited Threat, Ramifications
for the Future,’’ Strategic Memorandum (Hebrew) 11, no. 4 (February 2009).
43. Catignani, Israeli Counterinsurgency (see note 5 above), 48.
44. Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani, eds., Israel and Hezbollah: An Asymmetrical
Conflict in Historical and Comparative Perspective (London: Routledge, 2010), 68; David
Rodman, Sword Shield of Zion: The Israel Air Force and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
1948–2012 (Brighton, UK: Sussex, 2013), 3, 11.
45. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 5–6, 344–346.
46. Giora Eiland, ‘‘The Changing Nature of Wars – Six New Challenges,’’ Strategic
Memorandum (Hebrew) 10, no. 1 (June 2007): 15–16; Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 4.
47. Amos Harel and Barak Ravid, ‘‘Assessment: The Weapons Attacked in the Attack in
Sudan Included Long Range Missiles Which Can Reach Tel Aviv from Gaza,’’ Haaretz
(Hebrew), March 27, 2009, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1252764; Yossi
Melman, Amos Harel and Barak Ravid, ‘‘Air Force Planes Attacked Tens of Trucks in Sudan
Carrying Weapons from Iran to Gaza,’’ Haaretz (Hebrew), March 26, 2009; Avi Isacharoff
and Amos Harel, ‘‘There Is No that Israel is the One that Attacked Our Territory,’’ Haaretz
 16 C. D. Freilich

(Hebrew), April 7, 2011, http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1170382; Amos Harel, ‘‘After the

Reports of an IDF Attack in Syria: Concerns in Israel over Hezbollah Revenge,’’ Haaretz
(Hebrew), January 31, 2013, http://old.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/arch/ArchArticle.jhtml?_
DARGS=%2Fhasite%2Fobjects%2Fdata%2FArchiveSearchResults.jhtml.1; Amos Harel,
‘‘Senior American Officials: The Missiles Israel Attached Are Iranian,’’ Haaretz (Hebrew),
May 5, 2013, http://old.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/arch/ArchArticle.jhtml?_DARGS=%2
Fhasite%2Fobjects%2Fdata%2FArchiveSearchResults.jhtml.1; and Amos Harel, Haaretz,
August 7, 2013.
48. Catignani, Israeli Counterinsurgency (see note 5 above), 48; Byman, High Price
(see note 2 above), 364; Jones and Catignani, Israel and Hezbollah (see note 44 above), 68.
49. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 159.
50. Catignani, Israeli Counterinsurgency (see note 5 above), 84; Byman, High Price
(see note 2 above), 84, 160.
51. Aluf Benn, ‘‘Israel to Transfer Hundreds of Military Vehicles and Protective Vests to
PA,’’ Haaretz, August 8, 2008, http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1341689.
52. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 4, 63.
53. Ibid., 360.
54. Ben-Israel, Israel’s Defense Doctrine (see note 5 above), 120; Rubin, The Rocket
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Campaign (see note 16 above), 18.

55. Barbara Opall Rome, ‘‘Israel Air Force Plan Shoots for 10-Fold Boost in Bombs on
Target,’’ Defense News, October 27, 2013, http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20131027/
DEFREG04/310270010/Israel-Air-Force-Plan-Shoots-10-Fold-Boost-Bombs-Target; Dan
Williams, ‘‘Hoping to Deter Hezbollah, Israel Threatens Lebanese Civilians, 2014,’’ Reuters,
January 29, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/29/us-israel-lebanon-hezbollah-
idUSBREA0S1PS20140129; Yossi Erez and Gal Perel, ‘‘Integrating Technologies for Defend-
ing the Home-front against Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threats,’’ Military and Strategy
(Hebrew) 5, no. 3 (December 2013): 77.
56. Erez and Perel, ‘‘Integrating Technologies’’ (see note 55 above), 5–93.
57. Amos Harel, ‘‘All of Israel’’ (see note 30 above).
58. Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff, ‘‘Not Enough,’’ Haaretz (Hebrew), March 16,
2012, http://old.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/arch/ArchArticle.jhtml?_DARGS=%2Fhasite
%2Fobjects%2Fdata%2FArchiveSearchResults.jhtml.1; Shafir, ‘‘Iron Dome’’ (see note 23
above), 67.
59. Ian Siperco, ‘‘Shield of David: The Promise of Israeli National Missile Defense,’’
Middle East Policy 17, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 132; Yiftah S. Shafir, ‘‘Lessons from the Oper-
ation of ‘Iron Dome,’ ’’ Military and Strategy (Hebrew), 5, no. 1 (May 2013): 71.
60. Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff, ‘‘Not Enough’’ (see note 58 above); Shafir, ‘‘Lessons
from the Operation’’ (see note 59 above), 68; Yoav Zitun, Ynet, August 24, 2013; Amos Harel
and Gili Cohen, ‘‘Money from the US Will Enable Production of More Iron Dome Batteries,
but There Aren’t Enough Soldiers to Staff Them’’ (Hebrew), Haaretz, March 13, 2014, http://
www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium-1.2268424.
61. Amos Harel and Gili Cohen, ‘‘Money from the US’’ (see note 60 above).
62. Amos Harel, ‘‘All of Israel’’ (see note 30 above); Meir Elran quoted by Amos Harel,
‘‘Report: Israeli Rear Lags Behind Growing Missile Threat’’ (Hebrew), Haaretz, July 24, 2013,
A6; Yoav Zitun, ‘‘Assad’s Arsenal: One Hundred Thousand Missiles and Rockets,’’ Ynet,
August 24, 2013, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4421636,00.html; Shafir, ‘‘Lessons
from the Operation’’ (see note 59 above), 71; Laish and Amir, ‘‘Surface to Surface Missile
Warfare’’ (see note 32 above), 13.
63. Siperco, ‘‘Shield of David’’ (see note 59 above), 132.
64. Anshel Pfeffer, ‘‘Behind the Scenes of Iron Dome’’ (Hebrew), Haaretz, November 23,
2012, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1871793; Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff,
Haaretz, March 16, 2012; Amos Harel and Gili Cohen, Haaretz, March 13, 2014.
65. Jody Rudoren, ‘‘As Ceasefire Holds, Dazed Gazans Get to Work,’’ New York Times,
August 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/gaza-strip.html.
66. Ibid.; Haaretz.co.il=news=politics=1.239322; www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/604/
437.html.
67. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 4–6.
68. Ibid., 362, 364.
 Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective? 17

69. Ibid., 2.
70. Nitzan Nuriel, lecture at Tel Aviv University, December 3, 2012.
71. Yaakov Amidror, ‘‘The Range of Threats Facing the State of Israel,’’ Army and
Strategy (Hebrew) 2, no. 1 (June 2010): 12.
72. Ben-Israel, Israel’s Defense Doctrine (see note 5 above), 112.
73. Kober, Israel’s Wars of Attrition (see note 10 above), 149.
74. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 85, 125, 375.
75. Ibid., 29, 44, 133, 143, 182, 362, 368–370, 374; Jones and Catignani, Israel and
Hezbollah (see note 44 above), 77–78.
76. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 364, 368.
77. Ibid., 143, 368–370, 374; Or Honig, ‘‘The End of Military Restraint,’’ Middle East
Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 63–74.
78. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 378.
79. Nadav Morag, ‘‘Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case,’’
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38 (2005): 307–320.
80. Lahav Harkovi, quoting former Commander of British forces in Afghanistan,
Jerusalem Post, JP.com, September 3, 2014; see also US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ‘‘Israel
Tried to Limit Civilian Casualties in Gaza: U.S. Military Chief,’’ Reuters, November 6, 2014,
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www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/06/us-israel-usa-gaza-idUSKBN0IQ2LH20141106.
81. See Elran, ‘‘Israel’s National Resilience,’’ ‘‘The Home Front’’ (note 41 above).
82. Shalom and Handel, ‘‘The Unique Characteristics’’ (see note 35 above), 17.
83. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 30.
84. Reuven Pedatzur, ‘‘Dead End in the Gaza Strip,’’ Haaretz, October 30, 2012, http://
haaretz.ubik.net/opinions/1.1852576; Amos Harel and Avi Isacharof, ‘‘The Operation in
Gaza: Another State in Maintaining Israel’s Deterrence’’ (Hebrew), Haaretz, November 24,
2012, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1871729.
85. Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon, INSS conference on the Lessons of Defensive Edge,
Tel Aviv, September 30, 2014; Gili Cohen and Jackie Huri, ‘‘Hamas Has 20% of the Supply of
Rockets It Had on the Eve of Operation Defensive Edge,’’ Haaretz (Hebrew), September 29,
2014, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.2445919.
86. Amos Harel, Gili Cohen, and Shirley Saidler, ‘‘The Cabinet Discussed the Widening
of the Operation in Gaza, a Youth Was Badly Wounded by a Rocket in Ashkelon,’’ Haaretz
(Hebrew), July 14, 2014, 3; and Amos Harel ‘‘Despite the Pressure, Hamas Still Not Showing
Signs of Breaking,’’ Haaretz (Hebrew), July 14, 2014, 3.
87. Shafir, ‘‘Lessons from the Operation’’ (see note 59 above), 73; Uzi Rubin, ‘‘Palestinian
Rockets Versus Israeli Missiles in the Second Gaza War: A Dress Rehearsal for an All-Out
War?’’ Perspectives Papers on Current Affairs 173 (July 3, 2012): 5–6; Shlomo Brom, ‘‘The Lim-
itations of the Existing Active Defense Systems,’’ in Meir Elran and Alex Altschuler, eds., The
Complex Mosaic of the Civilian Front in Israel (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security
Studies, Memorandum 120, July 2012), 49; Shafir, ‘‘Iron Dome’’ (see note 24 above), 35; Amos
Harel, ‘‘Senior Office in Air Force: Iron Dome’s Success Saved the IDF Another Operation in
Gaza,’’ Haaretz (Hebrew), July 26, 2011, http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1181600.
88. Amos Harel, ‘‘Despite the Pressure, Hamas Still Not Showing Signs of Breaking,’’
Haaretz (Hebrew), July 14, 2014, 3.
89. Yuval Azulai, ‘‘Magic Wand, the Next Generation of Israeli Interception Systems,’’
Globes (Hebrew), www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000954494 (last accessed June 7,
2014); ‘‘Israel Successfully Tests Magic Wand System, Israel High Tech and Investment Report,’’
2012, www.ishitech.co.il/1212ar2.htm; Yoav Zitun, ‘‘One Million Dollars Per Missile: Watch
Magic Wand Test,’’ Ynet, 2012, www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4312556,00.html.
90. Siperco, Shield of David (see note 59 above), 133; Moti Basuk and Zvi Zarachia, ‘‘The
First Bill for Defensive Pillar 750 Shekels Million for Iron Dome,’’ The Marker (Hebrew),
November 17, 2012, http://www.themarker.com/news/1.1866799; Shafir, ‘‘Lessons from
the Operation’’ (see note 59 above), 70; Anshel Pfeffer, ‘‘Behind the Scenes of Iron Dome,’’
Haaretz (Hebrew), November 23, 2012, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1871793.
91. Nathan Praver, cited by Reuven Pedatzur, ‘‘Another Concept?,’’ Haaretz (Hebrew),
November 10, 2013, http://old.haaretz.co.il/arch/objects/data/logon.jhtm; Yossi Arzi, ‘‘The
Advantages of a Powerful Laser System,’’ in Elran and Altschuler, The Complex Mosaic (see
note 87 above), 41–42.
 18 C. D. Freilich

92. Erez and Perel, Integrating Technologies (see note 55 above), 99; Inbal Orpaz and
Amir Taig, Tech Nation, in ‘‘Iron Dome; Just the Beginning of the Road,’’ Haaretz (Hebrew),
November 23, 2012, http://www.themarker.com/technation/1.1871450; Moti Basuk, ‘‘Who
Was the First to Identify? How Iron Dome Was Born,’’ The Marker, November 19, 2012,
http://www.themarker.com/news/macro/1.1868069.
93. Siperco, Shield of David (see note 59 above), 133; Amos Harel, ‘‘The Defense Estab-
lishment Wants a Blank Check – and the Investigation Can Wait,’’ Haaretz, September 16,
2014, 5 and September 19, 2014, 3; Laish and Amir, ‘‘Surface to Surface Missile Warfare’’
(see note 32 above), 14; Moti Basuk, ‘‘The Defense Establishment Asked for Another 5 Billion
Shekels-p and then ‘Defensive Edge’ Broke Out,’’ The Marker (Hebrew), July 9, 2014, 3;
Shafir, ‘‘Iron Dome’’ (see note 24 above), 36.
94. Shafir, ‘‘Lessons from the Operation’’ (see note 59 above), 70; Brom, ‘‘The Limita-
tions of the Existing Active Defense Systems’’ (see note 87 above), 13; Yiftah S. Shafir,
‘‘Nonconventional Solutions for Nonconventional Dilemmas,’’ in Uri Bar-Joseph, ed., Israeli
National Security Towards the 21st Century (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 155; Amos Harel and
Avi Isacharof, Haaretz, November 21, 2012.
95. Yoav Zitun, Ynet, August 24, 2013.
96. Shafir, ‘‘Iron Dome’’ (see note 24 above), 36; Ephraim Kam, ‘‘Following the Oper-
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ation: the Two Sides’ Balance,’’ in Brom, Following Operation ‘‘Defensive Pillar’’ (see note
24 above), 15.
97. Shafir, ‘‘Lessons from the Operation’’ (see note 59 above), 71–72; Uzi Rubin, ‘‘ ‘Iron
Dome’ vs. Grad Rockets: A Dress Rehearsal for an All-Out War?’’ Perspectives Papers on
Current Affairs 173 (July 3, 2012): 5–7; Amos Harel, ‘‘All of Israel’’ (see note 30 above); Meir
Elran quoted by Amos Harel, ‘‘Report: Israeli Rear Lags behind Growing Missile Threat,’’
Haaretz (Hebrew), July 24, 2013, A6; Yoav Zitun, ‘‘Assad’s Arsenal: One Hundred Thousand
Missiles and Rockets,’’ Ynet (Hebrew), August 24, 2013, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/
0,7340,L-4421636,00.html; Laish and Amir, ‘‘Surface to Surface Missile Warfare’’ (see note
32 above), 4–15.
98. Byman, High Price (see note 2 above), 372.
99. Kober, Israel’s Wars of Attrition (see note 10 above), 158, 170; Ben-Israel, Israel’s
Defense Doctrine (see note 4 above), 115; Amos Harel and Avi Isacharof, ‘‘A Reminder from
a Forgotten War,’’ Haaretz (Hebrew), September 19, 2007, http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/
1.1442789; Shalom and Handel, ‘‘The Unique Characteristics’’ (see note 35 above), 16;
Amidror, ‘‘The Range of Threats’’ (see note 71 above), 12 and ‘‘The Necessary Conditions
for Success in the War on Terrorism,’’ Maarachot (Hebrew) 412 (2007): 32.