See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/322695567

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF

THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN

Chapter · January 2014

CITATIONS READS

2 4,841

1 author:

Tomáš Čižik
Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs
14 PUBLICATIONS 34 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Tomáš Čižik on 25 January 2018.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND ITS IMPACT
ON THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF THE
3
UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN
Tomáš Čižik
List of contents
Introduction
Asymmetric warfare
Limits of military power
Conclusion

Introduction
The US military presence in Afghanistan was deeply influenced by
asymmetrical warfare and it was forced to adapt to these conditions. The
US is considered a hegemonic power and it should not have a problem
to reach its goals. First of all, the definition of hegemony and hegemonic
power is crucial for the purposes of this contribution. According to (Lebow
2010, 29; cf. Doyle 1986) “hegemony is generally understood to be the
capability of a great power to impose its preferences on the international
system as a whole.” So as Gilpin (1981) argues the hegemonic power
“resolves the question of which state will govern the system, as well
as, what ideas and values will predominate, thereby determining the
ethos of succeeding ages.” However, the US as a hegemonic power was
unable to prove its hegemony in Afghanistan. Many of the US goals in
Afghanistan were successful only partially. Military defeat of Al-Qaeda
and Taliban leaders was only partial, taking control over the Afghan
territory was unsuccessful, and transition of Afghanistan into stable
and functioning country was also successful only in part. The question
is how the asymmetric warfare influenced the military presence of the
United States in Afghanistan.

Asymmetric warfare
Asymmetric war became a new phenomenon in warfare already during
the Cold War. It is connected with the emergence of the new international
actors, such as international organizations or terrorist groups in
international affairs. However, the elements of asymmetry can be traced
to the time of Ancient Greece. To fully understand asymmetric warfare
it is necessary to first define “warfare.” Merriam-Webster (cf. Buffaloe
2006) defines warfare as “military operations between enemies, an

41
3 ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN

activity undertaken by political unit (as a nation) to weaken or destroy

another, or a struggle between competing enemies.”

Asymmetric war can be characterized as the “disproportion of strength

between the opponents at the outset, and from the difference in essence
between their assets and liabilities” (Galula 1964). Eichler (2006)
argues that the tactics of asymmetric warfare is to hit an opponent, that
possesses a larger army, with a small group of fighters and to cause huge
damages with an aim to decrease the morale of the army. Attackers do
not risk huge casualties, but on the other side, they are able to hit the
unprepared enemy hard.

Nowadays, the asymmetric warfare often takes the form of suicidal

attacks. Enemies of today have many faces and are using different
methods than just a few years before. These methods are “terrorism,
insurgency, war of information and ideas, war of disruptive threats,
attacks using bioweapons through the mail or cyber-attacks on the
Internet, war waged by non-state actors against the sole remaining
superpower” (Buffaloe 2006).

Limits of military power

Asymmetric warfare clearly influenced the military presence of the
US in Afghanistan. The limits of military power can be divided into
five categories – strategy; tactics; technology; casualties and collateral
damage; and withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Strategy
As Bowman and Dale (2009) argue “the strategy-making for Afghanistan
[was] particularly complicated, for two reasons: first, the broad range of
strategic objectives that should be achieved (security, civilian capacity-
building, rule of law, counter narcotics and others), and second, the
number of actors involved in Afghanistan. The US strategy in 2002
was to prevent attacks by terrorist networks; deny the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to rouge states and terrorist allies;
deny the terrorists the support and sanctuary of rouge state and deny the
terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching
pad for terror. This strategy was mainly territorially aimed, but it failed,
due to the huge surface area of Afghanistan and the fact that 80 % of

42
 Tomáš Čižik
3
Afghans are living in rural areas, which were impossible to control by
the low number of coalition forces at that time. In 2003, the strategy of
the US was influenced by so called “Iraqisation of Afghanistan. It was
the start of suicidal terrorist attacks, insurgency or using the improvised
explosive devices (IED’s) (Eichler 2010, 254). Moreover, the war in
Iraq significantly drained the resources of the US from Afghanistan.

In 2009 the security environment in Afghanistan has deteriorated. The

US changed its strategy in 2009 to controlling the population centres
with counterinsurgency (COIN) as one of the most important elements.
The main aim of COIN strategy was to “protect civilian populations,
eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure, and help establish a
legitimate and accountable host-nation government able to deliver
essential human services” (Eikenberry, 2013). Therefore as Kotorová
(2013) further argues, counterinsurgency has to be aimed to development
of human living conditions, not only to defeat the insurgents. What’s
more, for successful counterinsurgency efforts, it is necessary to isolate
the insurgents from ordinary civilian population. However, this step
is hard to achieve, mainly due to the large territory of Afghanistan
and the efforts of insurgents who are using the civilian population as
disguise and undertake surprise attacks on counterinsurgency forces.
Therefore, the population centre strategy allowed the US to hold their
forces in relatively safe areas in cities and lower the casualties caused
by the Taliban and insurgent attacks. For those purposes the number of
the troops on the ground had to be raised. In January 2009, president
Obama sent another 33, 000 troops to support the 34, 000 troops that
were already in Afghanistan. In 2010, another 30, 000 troops were
sent to Afghanistan, bringing the total troop level to roughly 100, 000
(Aljazeera 2011). Also, the number of incidents has risen to 898 in the
first 7 months of 2009, but also IED incidents have risen by 60% from
previous year (UN 2009).

“The COIN-surge plan for Afghanistan rested on three crucial

assumptions: that the COIN goal of protecting the population was
clear and attainable and would prove decisive, that higher levels of
foreign assistance and support would substantially increase the Afghan
government’s capacity and legitimacy, and that a COIN approach by the
United States would be consistent with the political-military approach
preferred by Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Unfortunately, all three
assumptions were spectacularly incorrect, which, in turn, made the
counterinsurgency campaign increasingly incoherent and difficult to
prosecute. In short, COIN failed in Afghanistan” (Eikenberry 2013).

43
3 ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN

Another effort of the United States was to establish self-sufficient Afghan

National Security Forces (ANSF). For this purpose were used the forces
of the NATO member states and other contributing nations, who trained
ANSF for their future mission. ANSF are composed of Afghan National
Army, Afghan National Police and Afghan Air Force. According to the
NATO (2013) the Afghan National Army has at the time of this writing
approximately 185, 300 personnel including nearly 11, 000 special
forces. Afghan National Police have 152, 600 personnel and Afghan
Air Force has 6, 700 personnel.18 The training of ANSF will continue
in a new mission that will replace ISAF – titled the Resolute Support
mission. In September 2014, the United States and Afghanistan signed
the security agreement that will allow U.S. troops to stay in Afghanistan
beyond the previous December deadline. ANSF face many problems.
According to RT news (2014) ANSF have a problem with discipline –
“the Afghan population is very diverse and that diversity actually shows
in the armed forces.” Another problem according to Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (2014) is illiteracy. Illiteracy
rates are very high – only 13% of Afghan security forces can read or
write. Desertion is another big problem of Afghan National Security
Forces. “Desertion runs at about 10 per cent per year. Failure to re-enlist
runs at about 20 per cent per year. In other words, as many as 60, 000
additional soldiers need to be recruited each year just to maintain current
levels” (Lockyer 2012). According to Norris (2012) big problem is
the addiction to drugs. “One ANA leader estimates that 74 percent of
soldiers use hashish. Other estimates place the number as high as 85
percent. The ANA acknowledges that despite drug testing, many of the
soldiers it recruits are drug addicts.”

Tactics
As Eichler (2010, 249) argues US used the combination of air attacks
with the operations of the special forces – so called “seek and destroy”
tactics, although the Northern Alliance was used as an internal armed
opposition that “fulfils the ungrateful and dangerous goal on the ground.”
Eichler continues with a description of the United Forces approach:
“Aerial attacks destroyed or paralysed the military structures of Al-
Qaeda and Taliban” and then special forces found the hideouts of Al-
Qaeda leaders. To minimise the casualties of civilians the Joint Direct
Attack Munition (JDAM) is used for the precise elimination of targets.
1 Security transition of Afghanistan to the responsibility of Afghan National Army has five
phases. It started in 2011 and it is to be finished in the end of 2014. For more details see
(Brooke-Holland and Taylor, 2012) and (Radin, 2013).

44
 Tomáš Čižik
3
Aerial attacks in conjunction with the use of special forces appeared as
a successful tactic.

Even though the special forces are one of the main elements of COIN,
the tactics that “the U.S. military in Afghanistan calls its safest and
most effective tool to capture or kill insurgent leaders actually helps
turn the Afghan population against the United States” (Schifrin, 2011).
The special forces conduct operations during night, which gives them
the advantage of surprise and allows to eliminate or capture them more
easily.

Another tactic used by the United States is the “targeted killing.” The
UN report (2010) describes targeted killing as a situation when the
“lethal force is intentionally and deliberately used, with a degree of pre-
mediation, against an individual or individuals specifically identified
in advance by the perpetrator.” For these purposes, the unmanned
aircraft vehicles (UAV) are used. “The primary focus of U.S. targeted
killings, particularly through drone strikes, has been on the Al-Qaeda
and Taliban leadership networks in Afghanistan and the remote tribal
regions of Pakistan” (Masters 2013). Nevertheless, in connection with
these ops emerges the problem when drones often hit the target who
is not involved in combat operations, which is prohibited according to
international humanitarian law, but these attacks are justified by a claim
that they are taking part in hostilities against the US. “The White House
maintains that the U.S. right to self-defense, as laid out in Article 51
of the UN Charter, may include the targeted killing of persons such as
high-level Al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks, both in and out of
declared theatres of war” (Masters 2013).

Another important duty that has been part of the US tactic in Afghanistan
has been the establishment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs). PRTs are civil military units, whose main goal is to support local
government in doing its job more effectively. As Hynek and Marton (2011,
3) argue, PRTs “remained staffed predominantly by military personnel,”
while the rest of these units have been composed of civilian experts from
various ministries. Their core activities are building or reconstruction of
hospitals, schools, local or agricultural buildings and the protection of
human rights. According to Bebber (2008), “PRTs have been an integral
part of the Allied counterinsurgency strategy addressing peacekeeping
and stability operations.” Stable and strong local government would be
able to successfully fight the insurgency and prevent it from coming
back. According to Maley (2007), PRTs are part of the “win the hearts

45
3 ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN

and minds” strategy in Afghanistan and he further argues that the

establishment of PRTs was a reaction to the logistical inability of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to expand beyond the
Kabul area. The role of PRTs is to establish better relations with the
citizens from the rural areas with the local institutions and thus strengthen
the central government. Citizens of Afghanistan did not have experience
with the central government, and therefore they did not believe in its
decisions. Thus much better strategy has been to aim the efforts to local
governments that were much closer to the citizens and which enjoyed
more respect of its decisions. Nevertheless, the PRT concept was not
much successful, due to the political and socio-economic reasons at play
in Afghanistan. As Marton and Wagner (2012) argue Hungarian PRT
largely failed to fulfil their mission. Hungarians took the responsibility
over Baghlan province from the Netherlands. “Baghlan is a strategically
important province of Afghanistan where the security situation changed
significantly over the years. In most of Baghlan’s districts, the situation
gradually worsened from at least 2006 on. [...] Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara
and other groups increasingly alienated themselves from the provincial
leadership and especially the Tajik-dominated security institutions”
(Marton and Wagner 2012). Authors sum up the Hungarian failure and
attribute it to the “scale of the challenges and scarcity of resources at the
PRT’s disposal [that] were fully realised on the ground.”

Technology
The US forces exploit their Air Forces to great extent, and in combination
with the Joint direct attack ammunition (JDAM) they are able to precisely
hit their targets. JDAM is used for precise elimination of insurgents
located in dangerous areas, where the lives of soldiers are threatened.
Eichler (2010, 250) argues that to reduce the cost of war, the B-1 and
B-52 bombers were used to carry JDAMs to approximate destination.

For transportation purposes the US deployed the Mi-8s. The US relies

mostly on their Air Forces and special operation forces, with the tank
support. First US tanks were put in place in 2010 to help “ground forces
to target insurgents from a greater distance – and with more of a lethal
punch – than is possible from any other US military” (The Guardian
2010). The M1 Abrams tanks are used for this purpose. However, the
Northern Alliance is using T-55 tanks from the start of the US presence
in Afghanistan. Those tanks were delivered by Russia to support the
opposition forces in a struggle with the Taliban. “Old Soviet T-55 tanks,
military helicopters, Kalashnikovs, Igla and Shilka mobile anti-aircraft

46
 Tomáš Čižik
3
missile and armoured fighting missiles are reported to have been among
the first deliveries to Afghanistan” (O’Flynn 2001).

The drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were extensively used

in Afghanistan after Obama took office. According to the Bureau of
Investigative Journalism (2014) Obama launched 351 drone strikes since
2009, compared to only 51 drone strikes launched by G.W. Bush since
2004 (the year when the drone war has commenced). Needless to say,
the so called drone war evoked intensive debate about the legitimacy of
those strikes. Robinson (2013) argues that “drone attacks in Afghanistan,
Pakistan and other countries may be militarily effective, but they are
killing innocent civilian in way that is obscene and immoral.” Currier
(2013) argues that the benefit of the drone strikes is that “they don’t put
American troops in harm’s way.” However, even though drones are not
inherently illegal weapons, this practice may abuse the international law
and the protection of human rights and humanitarian standards.

Drones are operated by the CIA, and they are able to fulfil their mission
“virtually 24 hours a day, observing and tracking targets, then unleashing
missiles on their quarry” (Perlez 2010). Drones are also used in North
Waziristan29 in Pakistan, where Taliban and Al-Qaeda have their safe
havens. According to Alexander (2013) drone attacks are causing huge
resentment among the people. He continues “the resentment created by
American use of unmanned strikes is much greater than the average
American appreciates” and he warns that the “over use [of drones] could
jeopardise Washington’s broader objectives.”

“Advanced night-vision and target acquisition technologies have

enabled U.S. Forces in Afghanistan to achieve technological superiority
over its adversaries. Nevertheless, while American soldiers may “own
the night,” the enemy is learning to counter these high-tech devices with
their own access to technology” (Slabodkin 2012).

Casualties and collateral damage

Strategy, tactics and technology used in Afghanistan had directly
influenced the casualties and collateral damages caused by the presence
of the US in the country. The number of killed soldiers of the Coalition
forces have been 3, 426 by the time of this writing and there have been
2 North Waziristan is an area in Pakistan neighboring with Afghanistan from where Taliban and
Al-Qaeda fighters conduct attacks on the territory of Afghanistan, and after the attack they run
across the border back to Pakistan.

47
3 ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN

19, 665 wounded soldiers according to CNN (2014). Since the start of
UNAMA documenting civilian deaths in Afghanistan in 2007, total
civilian casualties are over 17, 500 to date (UNAMA 2013). According
to the Cost of War (2013), the number of civilians killed in Afghanistan
since October 2001 - September 2013, is around 18, 044 - 20 332.

Long decades of war in Afghanistan evoked a huge wave of refugees.

During the presence of the US in Afghanistan the total number of refugees
was more than 2.5 million (UNHCR 2012). The main destinations for
these refugees were Iran and Pakistan, same as in the Soviet case. Koser
(2013) argues that according to UNHCR, a total of 534, 006 people were
internally displaced.

Material losses of military equipment of the US in Afghanistan are

hard to estimate, because no official statistics exists. As the most of
the US troops will be withdrawn from Afghanistan, the US is looking
for the way to deal with the military equipment. Some equipment has
been destroyed, because it was cheaper than the costs of transportation
back to the US. According to Craig (2014), “some of it could be driven
across the border and handed over to Pakistan, part of an effort by the
Pentagon to unload excess military supplies to U.S. allies at no cost.”
Bilmes (2013) shows that the United States spent in Afghanistan and
Iraq almost two trillion dollars, but states that reconstruction, military
operations and other direct costs of war are only a small fraction of
total costs. She estimates that indirect costs of Afghan and Iraqi war will
reach four trillion dollars.

Withdrawal
Withdrawal from the country significantly influences the future of
Afghanistan, notably at the time when it is not fully self-reliant
and stabilized. Without further economic and military support all
achievements can be possibly threatened. Needless to say, the security
situation in Afghanistan is still not ideal. After 13 years spent in
Afghanistan, the US and coalition states are reducing the number of
forces in the country, with the goal to withdraw most of them by the end
of 2014. However, the presence of the allied forces will continue on with
the Resolute Support mission. By that time, Afghan National Security
Forces should be able to successfully hold the security of Afghanistan in
their hands. On 22 June 2011, Obama announced that “the United States
had largely achieved its goals in Afghanistan” and that 10, 000 troops will

48
 Tomáš Čižik
3
be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2011 (Landler and Cooper
2011). Other 23, 000 soldiers left Afghanistan in the summer of 2012. In
May 2012, the “enduring strategic partnership agreement” between the
United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was
signed by Obama and Karzai, where the “Parties reaffirm their strong
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and
national unity of Afghanistan” (White House 2012). The agreement was
a part of the Obama plan to hand over the security of Afghanistan and
responsibility for combat operation to Afghan security forces in 2013.
Coalition forces will continue to train and advise the Afghan forces also
after 2014. However, in September 2014, the US and Afghanistan signed
the security agreement that will allow U.S. troops to stay in Afghanistan
beyond the previous December deadline. In addition, the presence
of NATO troops will continue through the new NATO-led mission
Resolute Support. In it, “approximately 12,000 personnel from both
NATO and partner nations will be deployed in support of the mission.
The key activities will include – supporting planning, programming
and budgeting; assuring transparency, accountability and oversight;
adherence to the principles of rule of law and good governance; and
further recruiting, training and managing of personnel” (NATO, 2014).
Simultaneously with the military support, the financial support is crucial
for the future stability of Afghanistan and to maintain the capability of
Afghan national forces to hold Taliban and Al-Qaeda outside the country
and provide secure environment for the Afghan citizens. Security in
combination with further financial support is the key element for the
future development of political and economic reforms that can change
Afghanistan to a stable and well-functioning state.

Conclusion
Asymmetric warfare clearly influenced the military presence of the
US in Afghanistan. Asymmetry had impact on the strategy, tactics,
technology, collateral damage and also withdrawal of forces from
Afghanistan. To sum up, Afghanistan provides the ideal territory for
asymmetric warfare. The combination of mountainous terrain, weak
central government, strong local governors or warlords, insurgents,
strong regional involvement of Afghan neighbours and disrespect
of Afghan traditions represents the insurmountable problem for all
countries involved in this country. Guerrilla tactics in combination
with ambushes, IED’s and surprise attacks are very effective against
the conventional army. Therefore the US had to change its strategy. To

49
3 ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN

protect the lives of the soldiers and civilians the combination of aerial
tactics, drones and special forces were used. The US relied also on the
most advanced military technology in the fight against Taliban, Al-
Qaeda and insurgents, such as night-vision goggles, JDAM ammunition
or UAV’s. However, even these technological advances did not help the
US to reach its goals. The total cost of war in Afghanistan (and Iraq) is
estimated at four trillion dollars and further investments are necessary.
That said, it is important to note that Afghanistan is much safer country
than it was 13 years ago, but there is still much to be accomplished.
For successful transition of Afghanistan into a stable country, further
financial and military support of Afghan government is necessary.

Reference
Alexander, David. 2013. Retired general cautions against overuse of “hated” drones. Reuters.
Accessed January 13, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/us-usa-afghanistan-
mcchrystal-idUSBRE90608O20130107.

Aljazeera. 2011. Interactive: Ten years of war. Accessed November 2, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.
com/indepth/interactive/2011/06/201162215293134264.html.

Bebber, Robert J. 2008. The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Counterinsurgency
Operations: Khost Province, Afghanistan. Small Wars Journal. Accessed January 13, 2014. http://
smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-role-of-provincial-reconstruction-teams-in-counterinsurgency-
operations.

Blimes, Linda. 2013. Counting the Costs of War. Harvard Kennedy School. Accessed January
11, 2014. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/publications/impact-newsletter/archives/
summer-2013/the-costs-of-the-iraq-and-afghanistan-wars.

Bowman, Steve, and Dale Catherine. 2009. War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and
Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. Accessed December 12, 2013. Retrieved
from: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40156.pdf.

Brooke-Holland, Louisa, and Taylor Claire. 2012. Afghanistan: The Timetable for Security
Transition. House of Commons Library. Accessed November 26, 2014. file:///C:/Users/
U%C5%BE%C3%ADvate%C4%BE/Downloads/sn05851.pdf.

Buffaloe, David L. 2006. Defining Asymmetric Warfare. The Land Warfare Papers No. 58.
Accessed on October 31, 2014. https://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ILW%20Web-
ExclusivePubs/Land%20Warfare%20Papers/LWP_58.pdf.

CNN. 2014. Casualties. Accessed March 25, 2014. http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/war.

casualties/.

Cost of War. 2013. Human Costs of War. Accessed March 30, 2014. http://costsofwar.org/sites/
default/files/HMCHART_2013-10-04.pdf.

Craig, Tim. 2014. Pakistan eyes U.S. military equipment in Afghanistan. The Washington Post.
Accessed on March 26, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistan-eyes-us-military-
equipment-in-afghanistan/2014/03/16/0478d99f-8d6a-4f08-b3df-b6fe8599cc9e_story.html.

50
 Tomáš Čižik
3
Currier, Cora. 2013. Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes. ProPublica. Accessed
November 12, 2014. http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-so-far-about-drone-
strikes.

Eichler, Jan. 2010. Terorismus a války v době globalizace. Praha: Karolinum.

Eichler, Jan. 2006. Mezinárodní bezpečnost na počátku 21. století, Praha: Ministerstvo obrany
České republiky – AVIS.

Eikenberry, Karl W. 2014. The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs.
Accessed November 5, 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139645/karl-w-eikenberry/
the-limits-of-counterinsurgency-doctrine-in-afghanistan.

Galula, David. 1964. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York: Praeger.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hynek, Nik and Marton Péter. 2011. Introduction, in Hynek and Marton (eds.). Statebuilding in
Afghanistan: Multinational contributions to reconstruction. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-27.

Koser, Khalid. 2013. Afghanistan 2014: A Crisis of Internal Displacement. Brookings. Accessed
January 17, 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/30-afghanistan-
internal-displacement-koser.

Kotorová, Jana. 2013. Protipovstanie a sily pre špeciálne operácie. Prípadová štúdia 5. Pluku
špeciálneho určenia. Diplomová práca. Banská Bystrica: Univerzita Mateja Bela.

Landler, Mark, and Cooper Helene. 2011. Obama will Speed Pullout From War in Afghanistan.
The New York Times. Accessed March 28, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/
asia/23prexy.html?hp&_r=0.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 2010. Why Nations Fight – Past and Future Motives for War. New York:
Cambridge University Press.

Lockyer, Adam. 2012. Brothers in arms: Why the Afghan National Army will fail. The Drum
TV. Accessed November 25, 2014. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-12-28/lockyer---
afghanistan/4445782.

Maley, William. 2007. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – how they arrived and
where they are going. NATO Review. Accessed February 25, 2014. http://www.nato.int/docu/
review/2007/issue3/english/art2.html.

Marton, Péter, and Wagner Peter. 2012. Hungary’s involvement in Afghanistan: proudly going
through the motions? In Marton and Hynek (eds.). Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational
Contributions to Reconstruction. London and New York: Routledge.

Masters, Jonathan. 2013. Targeted Killings. Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed February 25,
2014. http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627.

Norris, Keith W. 2012. The Afghan National Army. Has capacity building become culture building?
Military Review. Accessed November 25, 2014. http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/
Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20121231_art007.pdf.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2013. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Accessed
February 2, 2014. http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_10/20131018_131022-
MediaBackgrounder_ANSF_en.pdf.

51
3 ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2014. NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in

Afghanistan. Accessed November 5, 2014. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/
search?q=cache:LbtWZmN4wBAJ:www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm+&cd=1&hl=s
k&ct=clnk&gl=sk.

O’Flynn, Kevin. 2001. Russia in multi-million arms deal with Northern Alliance. The Guardian.
Accessed March 25, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/23/afghanistan.russia.

Perlez, Jane. 2010. Drones Batter Al Qaeda and Its Allies Within Pakistan. The New York Times.
Accessed March 25, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/05/world/asia/05drones.html?ref=un
mannedaerialvehicles.

Radin, CJ. 2013. Afghan National Security Forces take over security operations. Long War Journal.
Accessed November 26, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/afghan_national_
secu.php.

Robinson, Eugene. 2013. President’s Obama immoral drone war. The Washington Post. Accessed
November 12, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/eugene-robinson-president-
obamas-immoral-drone-war/2013/12/02/f25cc0aa-5b82-11e3-a49b-90a0e156254b_story.html.

RT News. 2014. Afghan armed forces have serious problem with discipline. Accessed November
25, 2014. http://rt.com/op-edge/178404-afghanistan-shooting-security-soldiers/.

Schifrin, Nick. 2011. Challenging the US Military’s Favorite Tactic in Afghanistan. ABC News.
Accessed on March 23, 2014. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/09/challenging-the-
us-militarys-favorite-tactic-in-afghanistan/.

Slabodkin, Greg. 2012. Advanced optics give ground forces operational advantage. Defence
Systems. Accessed March 25, 2014. http://defensesystems.com/articles/2012/10/25/c4isr-1-
advanced-night-vision.aspx.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. 2014. Afghan National Security Forces:
Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain about Literacy Program Results, Contract
Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment. Accessed November 25, 2014. http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/
audits/SIGAR_14-30-AR.pdf.

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2014. Get the Data: Drone Wars. Accessed November 11,
2014. http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/.

The Guardian. 2010. US tanks head for Afghanistan. Accessed March 25, 2014. http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/19/us-tanks-afghanistan-i-abrams.

The United Nations. 2009. The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international
peace and security. Accessed November 2, 2014. http://www.afghanistan-un.org/wp-content/
uploads/2010/11/S20094751.pdf.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. 2013. Afghanistan. Annual Report 2013.
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Accessed March 25, 2014. http://unama.unmissions.org/
Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2012. Displacement – The New 21st Century
Challenge. Accessed March 25, 2014. http://unhcr.org/globaltrendsjune2013/UNHCR%20
GLOBAL%20TRENDS%202012_V05.pdf.

United Nations. 2010. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions, Philip Alston. Accessed March 23, 2014. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf.

52
 White House. 2012. Enduring strategic partnership agreement between the United States
of America and the Islamic republic of Afghanistan. Accessed March 25, 2014. http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.

53

View publication stats