Josh Clough

General Philosophy Topic 1: Problem of Evil

Past Questions

● Are all varieties of the problem of evil equally hard? (2021 Long)
● Suppose that we were to discover that there is a heaven in which humans can
experience eternal bliss after death. Would the problem of evil be solved? (2021 Trinity)
● Is there a good solution to the evidential problem of evil? (2019 Long)
● Is the free-will defence a satisfactory way of dealing with the problem of evil? (2019
Trinity)
● Is denying the existence of God analogous to denying the omnipotence of God? (2018
Trinity)
● Is the existence of evil caused by humans compatible with the existence of God? (2018
Trinity)
● ‘The existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent God is inconsistent with the
existence of widespread human suffering.’ Discuss (2017 Long)
● ‘Theism may be able to explain why God allows humanly-caused suffering, but it cannot
explain why he allows suffering caused by natural disasters.’ Discuss (2017 Trinity)
● Should the believer in God worry about the existence of evil? (2016 Trinity)
● Could God possibly have created this world? (Long 2015)

Potential scope of question/subtopics:

● Evidential problem of evil vs Logical problem of evil
● Moral evil vs natural evil
● Isolate specific features of an OOO God
● Different variations of the problem of evil

Key terms/definitions

Logical problem of evil = the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of God,
where God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent

Evidential problem of evil = the actual evil of our world is strong evidence against the existence
of an OOO God

Moral evil = evil which is part of the free actions of rational beings (i.e. most humans) or is a
consequence of those actions

Natural evil = evil which is not part of the free actions of rational beings e.g. natural disasters
● When using examples for this, avoid ones that could be linked to humans (climate
change) by using an example that predates humans e.g. dinosaurs
Josh Clough

Omnipotence = can do anything that is possible/can be done (rules out things that are
impossible because these ‘actions’ are not actually actions)

Omniscient = all knowing

Omnibenevolent = all loving

Summary of key arguments/criticisms

The Evidential Problem of Evil - inductive argument

1) Assume for reductio that God is OOO
2) Whilst this God may permit some evils for various reasons (e.g. to highlight God’s
goodness, to distinguish between right and wrong) an OOO God would not permit
unnecessary evils
3) The evidence of unnecessary evils in our world suggests that God does not exist; it is
highly unlikely that every seemingly unnecessary evil has some reason for it of which we
are unaware

The Logical Problem of Evil (basically God exists, evil exists, incompatible) - deductive
argument
1) If God is omniscient, God knows everything that happens in every possible world
2) If God is omnipotent, God can choose to bring into existence any possible world
3) If God is omnibenevolent, God will bring into existence the best world of all possible
worlds
4) There is at least one logically possible world in which there is no evil and that world is in
other respects at least as good as any other possible world. Call it W
5) Were God to exist, God knows about W, God is disposed to bring it into existence, and
God can bring it into existence. So W would be the actual world
6) The actual world has at least a bit of evil in it
7) So the actual world is not W, it is W1
8) So God does not exist

Theistic response to the logical problem of evil (using second order evils and goods; basically
some evils are necessary for the greater good)

1) The problem of evil claims that all evil is incompatible with God (a strong claim)
2) Finding one example of evil that is compatible with God will rebutt this (a second order
good derived from a first order evil)
3) Second order goods are better than first order goods, and so a world with second order
goods would be better than a world with only first order goods ceteris paribus
● Second order goods are better because they require a rational capacity (in a
similar way to higher/lower pleasures)
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4) In order for second order goods to exist, evil must also exist
5) Therefore, the premise that any world with evil is worse than W is not true

- Point must be made that this possible world is at least as bad as any other possible
world
- Some evil is necessary for the greater good (by this we mean good stuff), but not like
‘torture to get necessary information’ because God could simply create an alternative
way to get the information that doesn’t involve evil
- Second order good = a good which derives from another good (e.g. gratitude is a second
order good because it is a response to a first order good)
- Some second order goods derive from first order evils (e.g. forgiveness, mercy), and
thus certain types of evil can exist in conjunction with God

Mackie response: washes out

1) The very capacity which makes it possible to have second order goods (rational
capacity) also makes it possible to have second order evils
2) Second order evils are worse than first order evils in the same way that second order
goods are better than first order goods
● Second order evil in response to first order evil e.g. sadism - pleasure taken evilly
in response to a first order evil; non-consensual infliction of pain for the
enjoyment of the inflicter
● Second order evil in response to first order evil e.g. jealousy
3) If second order goods are good enough to make up for the first order evils needed for
the, then by parity of reasoning, the second order evils are bad enough to cancel the first
order goods needed for them.
4) Second order goods are cancelled out by second order evils and so first order evils still
make world W1 worse than world W (W = no evil at all)

Free will response: basic (to second order evils)

- Free will = with a morally significant choice between A (good) and B (bad) it must be
possible that you can choose either option otherwise there is no free will. Free will is a
good of such importance that we should have the possibilities of evil for this to be able to
occur.
- Second order evils are the result of free will (as are many first order evils)
- But free will is so valuable that it outweighs these evils
- So therefore second order evils are necessary for the best possible world

- Basically: God and evil both exist but they are compatible because free will is so
valuable such that it makes up for any (including second order) evil brought into the
world through its exercise
- Thus, we can allow for evil
Why can’t God make us always choose the good option
Josh Clough

- Because this is logically impossible; to be free, our choices cannot be determined. God
cannot do something that is impossible (as is under our definition of omnipotence)

Response to basic free will: Mackie

1) Necessarily, you are free with respect to a morally significant choice you face only if you
can act well or badly
2) For each morally significant choice you face, you can act well
3) If you can act well with respect to each morally significant choice you face, then you can
act well with respect to every morally significant choice you face
4) You can act well with respect to every morally significant choice you face
5) If you can act well with respect to every morally significant choice you face, then so can
everyone else
6) Everyone can act well with respect to every morally significant choice they face
7) So, there is a possible world in which everyone acts morally correctly
8) An OOO God would bring this world into existence
● This is because God actualises about a possible world in its totality; his nature of
being omniscient would mean that he knows every decision anyone has made
and ever will make, and being omnibenevolent and omnipotent would mean that
he would make these decisions good and make them happen
9) It is not the case that everyone acts morally correctly in every decision
10) So therefore God is not OOO

OR (better):
However, this response of logical impossibility is problematic (Mackie); second-order evils are
not logically necessary for free will
- It is possible to freely choose what is good on one occasion
- If it is possible to freely choose what is good on one occasion, then it is possible to freely
choose what is good on every occasion (it is logically possible)
- God can create any logically possible world
- Therefore, it is possible for God to create a world in which creatures are free and freely
choose only what is good
- It is not the case that this logically possible world is the actual world in which we live
because second order evils exist
- Therefore, God is not OOO

Free will response/Response to Mackie rebuttal: Plantinga

Why does God not bring into existence only people with free will who always choose the
good option?
- A world containing free creatures is better than a world containing no free creatures
- God can create free creatures
- To be free is to be capable of both moral good and moral evil
Josh Clough

- If free creatures were caused to do only what is right they would not be free
- Therefore, God cannot cause free creatures to do only what is right
- Therefore, God can only eliminate the moral evil done by free creatures by eliminating
the greater good (from free will) of free creatures
- The existence of evil, therefore, including second order evil, is consistent with the
existence of God
THERE WILL BE EVIL BECAUSE OF TRANSWORLD DEPRAVITY
- Transworld depravity = or any rational being which can exist that rational being is such
that in any world in which it exists it will perform at least one evil action
- Every person that could be created suffers from transworld depravity

- God isn’t able to guarantee the outcome he most desires because everyone suffers from
transworld depravity; how the gift of freedom is used is up to the person who has it. It is
possible that every person created will use their gift of freedom wrongly once. An
omnipotent being cannot permit freedom whilst always preventing its misuse: this is
logically impossible, for freedom requires the ability to not be manipulated or influenced
(this is why we need the definition of omnipotence under which God cannot do
impossible actions)
- Therefore free will does not contradict God’s omnipotence or omniscience because he
knows all that will happen and it is impossible to stop given free will
- Securing the range of value that comes with free will is a magnificent enough good for
God to permit the evil resulting from its misuse.

Problem with Plantinga:

- Whilst this may aid us in explaining the moral evils, the free will response does little to
explain natural evils
- We can formulate the evidential problem of evil in such a way so as to overcome
Plantinga’s response:
● Assume for reductio that God is OOO
● Whilst this God may permit some evils for various reasons (moral evils permitted
to allow for free will) an OOO God would not permit unnecessary (natural) evils
● The evidence of unnecessary (natural) evils in our world suggests that God does
not exist; it is highly unlikely that every seemingly unnecessary (natural) evil has
some reason for it of which we are unaware

Basic argument structure (modify structure to fit different prompts)

Introduction
Logical PofE
Second order goods accounts for this
But second order evils (wash out; mackie) -
Free will: second order evils are necessary for the best possible world
Josh Clough

- God can’t make us always choose the good option because this is logically impossible:
to be free our choices cannot be determined, and God can’t do something that is
impossible
Jeremy/Mackie response: second-order evils are not logically necessary for free will, and God
can make any logically possible world including one in which we never choose bad options (i.e.
second order evils); the existence of second order evils logically disproves God
Plantinga: transworld depravity (if free creatures were caused to do only what is right they would
not be free; we all will perform some evil act)
This accounts for moral evil but not natural evil
Natural evil version of the evidential argument
Conclusion: problematic

Detailed argument structure

Introduction
- I will begin this essay by presenting a basic form of the logical problem of evil, which
argues that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of God. I will
consider various responses to this problem. The first part of my essay will consider the
necessity of evil for second order goods. The second order goods response argues that
certain evils are necessary for second order goods, and these second order goods
outweigh the first order evils needed to create them. However, I will then present Makie’s
response to this, which argues that in the same capacity that we have these second
order goods, we also have second order evils and the existence of these eliminates the
goodness of first order goods. The second part of my essay, then, will consider various
forms of the free will response, which argue that the possibility of evil is necessary for us
to have free will. I will conclude that whilst Plantinga’s version of this response enables
us to overcome the problem presented by moral evils, the evidential problem of evil can
be formulated in such a way using natural evils that it is impossible to overcome.

Logical problem of evil

- Start by defining OOO
● Omnipotence is the power to do anything that is possible (i.e. God can’t do
impossible things such as creating a four-sided triangle)
● Omniscient = all-knowing
● Omnibenevolent = all-loving (i.e. wants the best for mankind and animals)
- Set out 2 ish sentences on why we need all 3 OOO:
● If God isn’t omnipotent, he knows evil exists and is willing to stop it but is unable
to
● If God isn’t omniscient, he is willing and able to stop evil but doesn’t know it
exists
● If God is not omnibenevolent, he is able to stop evil and knows it exists but
doesn’t want to stop it
● All three are individually necessary and jointly sufficient
- Then set out the problem of evil:
Josh Clough

● If God is omniscient, God knows everything that happens in every possible world
● If God is omnipotent, God can choose to bring into existence any possible world
● If God is omnibenevolent, God will bring into existence the best world of all
possible worlds
● There is at least one logically possible world in which there is no evil and that
world is in other respects at least as good as any other possible world. Call it W
● Were God to exist, God knows about W, God is disposed to bring it into
existence, and God can bring it into existence. So W would be the actual world
● The actual world has at least a bit of evil in it
● So the actual world is not W, it is W1
● So God does not exist

Initial theistic response: second order goods

- The strong claim that evil is absolutely incompatible with God can be overcome by one
counterexample which shows that God and evil are compatible
- This counterexample comes in the form of second order goods, which are goods that
derive their goodness from either a first order good or a first order evil
- Second order goods are better than first order goods because they require rational
capacity
- The goodness of second order goods accounts for the badness of first order evils and
some, and thus the logical PofE is problematic; some evils are necessary for the best
possible world (i.e. a world with second order goods)
- Therefore W1 is better than W

Mackie second order evils reply:

- The rational capacities that allow for second order goods also allow for second order
evils
- These second order evils are worse than first order evils in the same way that second
order goods are better than first order goods (by parity)
- The existence of second order evils washes out the benefits of second order goods, and
so world W1 (with second order goods and evils and first order evils) is not better than W
(no evil at all)

Basic free will allowance for second order evils

- Free will = with a morally significant choice between A (good) and B (bad) it must be
possible that you can choose either option otherwise there is no free will. Free will is a
good of such importance that we should have the possibilities of evil for this to be able to
occur.
- Second order evils are the result of free will, but free will is a good so magnificent that it
outweighs second order evils and first order evils
- World W1 has free will and is therefore the best possible world

Mackie response to basic free will

Josh Clough

- Second order evils are not logically necessary for free will; it is logically possible for us to
live in a world with free will and not have second order evils
- Summary of Jeremy’s argument: if you can choose the good option in one morally
significant situation, then you can in every morally significant situation, and if you can, so
can everyone else. An OOO God would make this logically possible world a reality, but
this world is not reality so therefore God is not OOO

Plantinga solution: transworld depravity

- If free creatures were caused (by God) to do only what is right, they would not be free
(logically impossible) and therefore God cannot make it this way because it is logically
impossible. An omnipotent being cannot permit freedom whilst also preventing its misuse
- ALSO we have transworld depravity: it is up to us how we use our freedom, and
everyone will use their freedom wrongly at least once.
- Securing the range of value that comes with free will is a magnificent enough good for
God to permit the evil resulting from its misuse, which includes second order evils
because of transworld depravity

Natural evil version of evidential problem of evil

- Plantinga’s solution enables us to account for moral evil (which is evil that is part of the
free actions of human beings) but not for natural evil (which is evil that is not part of the
free actions of human beings)
- Rephrasing the evidential problem of evil is most problematic:
● Assume for reductio that God is OOO
● Whilst this God may permit some evils for various reasons (moral evils permitted
to allow for free will) an OOO God would not permit unnecessary (natural) evils
● The evidence of unnecessary (natural) evils in our world suggests that God does
not exist; it is highly unlikely that every seemingly unnecessary (natural) evil has
some reason for it of which we are unaware

Conclusion
- Whilst Plantinga’s response is successful in overcoming the problem of moral evil, the
evidential problem of natural evil cannot be overcome and allows us to reasonably
conclude that God is either not OOO or does not exist

Examples bank

Dinosaurs - use for evidential natural evil final point

- For us to conclude that God and evil are compatible, it would have to be the case that for
every instance of evil, there is a reason behind the instance of evil that is such that this
evil brings about greater overall good (either it prevents something equally bad or worse,
or it brings about something greater). It would have to be the case, then, that for every
living animal killed when an asteroid collided with the Earth millions of years ago, there
was some greater good achieved from their deaths. This seems highly improbable, and
thus we can deduce that God is not OOO.
Josh Clough

Transworld depravity - innately inclined towards evil

- 3 boys sharing ice cream: they either go in one of three possible rooms (worlds). The
bedroom, in which the sharing will result in a quarrel for top bunk, the living room, in
which the sharing will result in a quarrel for who chooses the TV channel, or the kitchen,
in which the sharing will result in a quarrel for who eats the last cookie. They can either
share nicely, or share and quarrel and they are inclined to quarrel.

Second order stuff:

- Second order good from first order good: gratitude
- Second order good from first order evil: forgiveness
- Second order evil from first order good: jealousy
- Second order evil from first order evil: sadism

Key quotes

Introduction (written)

I will begin this essay by presenting the logical problem of evil, which argues that the
existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of God. The first part of my essay
will primarily consider Mackie’s development of this argument, given an initial response that the
existence of second-order evils renders God and evil compatible. The second part of my essay
will consider at first a basic form of the free will response, followed by Plantinga’s development
of this response. I will ultimately conclude that whilst the free will response is successful in that it
enables us to account for moral evils, the evidential problem of evil can be formulated using
natural evils such that it is impossible to overcome.
For the purposes of this essay, I will consider ‘theism’ in the narrow sense: a theist is
someone who believes in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent
being who created the world. This will limit my discussion to the Abrahamic conception of God,
as opposed to the divine beings of other religions.

Opening paragraph with definitions (written)

Before discussing the logical problem of evil, I must first define what it is for a God to be
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (OOO). An omnipotent being has the power to do
anything that is possible; God cannot do things that are impossible, such as create a four-sided
triangle. God’s omnibenevolence means that he is wholly good, and thus God always eliminates
as much evil as possible. Finally, the nature of God’s omniscience is such that he knows
everything, including human desires and suffering, and the existence of evil.
The logical problem of evil can be set out as such:
1) If God is omniscient, God knows everything that happens in every possible world.
Josh Clough

2) If God is omnipotent, God can choose to bring into existence any possible world.
3) If God is omnibenevolent, God will bring into existence the best world of all possible
worlds.
4) There is at least one logically possible world in which there is no evil and that world is in
other respects at least as good as any other possible world. Call this world W.
5) Were God to exist, God knows about W, God is disposed to bring W into existence, and
God can bring it into existence. So W would be the actual world.
6) The actual world has at least a bit of evil in it
7) So the actual world is not W, it is W1
8) So God does not exist.

Timed example essay