Josh Clough

Moral Philosophy topic 1: Higher vs Lower pleasures

Past Questions

● ‘Without a distinction between higher and lower pleasures utilitarianism is unappealing,

but there are no utilitarian grounds for such a distinction. Hence utilitarianism must be
rejected.’ Discuss.
● Can we secure a distinction between higher and lower pleasures that maintains a notion
of hedonism acceptable to a utilitarian?
● Does Mill’s distinction between higher and lower pleasures entail that he is not really a
hedonist?
● Why does Mill distinguish between higher and lower pleasures? Does such a distinction
conflict with hedonism?
● Why does Mill draw a distinction between higher and lower pleasures? Are there really
such distinct kinds of pleasures?
● Is Mill’s hedonism consistent?

Potential scope of question/subtopics:

1) No utilitarian grounds for higher pleasures
2) Higher and lower pleasures are inconsistent with hedonism

Key terms/definitions

Hedonism - A theory of welfare which says that what is good for an individual is pleasure and
what is bad for an individual is pain. Pleasure and pain alone are fundamentally valuable
- Theory of welfare - an account of what makes a life go well or badly for an individual
- Psychological hedonism - we are motivated solely by pleasure and pain to maximise
what we perceive as our own good - if we think an action will bring about the most
pleasure, we will act in that way

Maximising hedonic act-utilitarianism (Mill & Bentham) - an act is right iff and because it
produces at least as much welfare, hedonistically conceived, overall - where everyone’s welfare
counts equally - as any other action available to the agent. An action is obligatory iff it has more
overall value than any other
- Bentham - the amount of pleasure and pain, and thus of the value caused, is determined
by the pleasure/pain’s intensity and duration
- Mill - the amount of pleasure and pain, and thus of the value caused, is determined by
the pleasure/pain’s intensity, duration and quality

Bentham’s quantitative hedonism - we know about pleasure and pain, and whenever we identify
an experience which is good for us, we realise that its goodness derives from the pleasure it
Josh Clough

directly or indirectly provides us (and its badness derives from the pain it provides us).
Goodness or badness for me derives from something’s relationship to my experience, in
particular the pleasant or painful aspects of that experience. Pleasure and pain can be
measured, and thus experiences can be traded off against one another. The value of pleasure is
measured by duration and intensity. Welfare obtained from an experience is subjective. ‘A
motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure and pain operating in a certain manner’

Mill's qualitative hedonism - Mill argues similarly to Bentham that pleasure and pain are the only
motives of our actions. ‘To desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a
physical and metaphysical impossibility’. Mill overcomes the problem with Bentham’s cardinal
system by presenting an ordinal system involving higher pleasures that are ‘trumps’.

Higher pleasure - a pleasure such that no amount of certain lower pleasures will ever be more
valuable for the person who experiences them than some finite amount of the higher pleasure.
An activity that exercises our higher intellectual capacities. Introduces quality as one of the ways
of measuring pleasures
- A discontinuity is created from lower to higher pleasures, which implies that there is a
point at which a small change results in an infinitely large increase in value. While this
solves the Haydn and the Oyster problem, are not some lower pleasures necessary
conditions of higher pleasures e,g, physical comfort
- Ordinal scale now as opposed to cardinal - pleasures are ordered but cannot be
compared numerically as such, as in Bentham’s cardinal quantitative hedonism

Summary of key arguments/criticisms

- Mill can no longer consider himself a (full) hedonist (Rashdall, Moore, Sidgwick): a full
hedonist must accept that what makes one experience more valuable than another can
only be its pleasantness / pleasurableness. In denying the cardinal commensurability of
pleasures (a necessary condition of hedonism) through the introduction of higher
pleasures, Mill must accept that the higher pleasures are more valuable for some reason
other than their being more pleasant (e.g. they enable those experiencing them to
realise their true selves), and thus he is not a full hedonist. He can still argue that welfare
consists of higher pleasures, but must concede that the good-making property of these
pleasures is not their pleasurableness alone.
● Mill can respond to this by suggesting that it is the quality of the pleasurableness
alone in higher pleasures that makes them infinitely greater than lower pleasures,
and that the only way in which a lower pleasure could outweigh a higher pleasure
would be for its nature to be transformed from lower to higher. There is no
good-making property other than pleasurableness. Thus he keeps the
higher/lower distinction and remains a hedonist
● Critics respond to this by pressing the point: what is it about the nature of higher
pleasures that makes them more valuable for the person experiencing them?
Surely it is that they have another good-making characteristic
Josh Clough

● Mill replies no - they are more valuable because their nature makes the
enjoyment of them more valuable. Why does their nature make them more
enjoyable? Because it does and this must be accepted as good without proof. A
mental pleasure is more valuable than a bodily one, where the property of being
‘mental’ is not good-making in the same way that ‘lasting 4 minutes’ is also not a
good-making property. They affect the value in the same way
● This is wrong - value-affecting properties such as nobility are good-making
properties. They are not like intensity or duration which, when isolated, neither
increase or decrease value independent of enjoyableness. E.g. in the case of
pains, greater intensity reduces value whereas in pleasures greater intensity
increases value. Value-affecting properties such as nobility always increase value
and thus are good-making properties. Mill does not accept this, arguing still taht
only pleasure is good and we desire only pleasure. This view is too narrow -
there are many properties of our lives which add to their value independently of
enjoyableness
● Parfit offers a modification of Mill’s view to counter this conclusion - that pleasure
is a necessary condition for something independent of pleasure’s (e.g.
knowledge) being valuable; knowledge alone is of no value but knowledge
enjoyed is valuable. The value emerges from both the knowledge and the
enjoyment. However this faces a similar problem - if nobility, e.g., can affect value
independently of pleasure but only in its presence, the reason for its being unable
to add value when pleasure is absent remains obscure.

OTHER RELEVANT VIEWS/CRITICISMS:

Higher/lower are comparative terms - one cannot classify a pleasure as being higher or lower
without saying exactly what it is being alleged to be higher or lower than. Mill intends the
comparison to be made between intellectual and sensual pleasures, but it seems to be limited in
this respect - comparing two lower pleasures or two higher pleasures is an issue, and the
ordinal system with a discontinuity between lower and higher pleasures implies that there is a
point at which a small change makes an infinitely large increase in the value of an act.
Discontinuity solves the Haydn and the Oyster problem but creates this new issue.

Desire satisfaction (Rashdall) - this argues that pleasure is not the object of our desire, rather it
is the result of the satisfaction of a desire which is directed towards an object. For example,
when we feel hunger, we have the desire for food which, when consumed, gives us the feeling
of pleasure. We are not ‘doing it for the sake of pleasure’ - we naturally desire the food in the
interest of self-preservation. The pleasantness of the object is created by the desire, not the
other way around. Therefore there are at least some desires which are not desires for pleasure.
- Ambiguity of Mill’s definition of pleasure: It may mean (a) agreeable feeling or the feeling
of satisfaction after the attainment of an object, or (b) the object that gives pleasure or
satisfaction. In the latter sense we speak of’ a pleasure’
Josh Clough

Self-defeating hedonism (Sidgwick) - ‘The impulse towards pleasure, if too predominant, defeats
its own aim’. The more we seek pleasure, the less we get it. The best way to get it is to forget it
for the time being (Paradox of hedonism)
- This is not true of all pleasures. It is true chiefly of the pleasures of pursuit. We require a
certain degree of disinterestedness in order to obtain full enjoyment. When we witness a
drama, we should fix our mind on the drama, and not on the pleasure that we derive
from it. If we consciously aim at pleasure, we are sure to miss it.

Basic argument structure - higher and lower pleasures inconsistent with hedonism
(modify structure to fit different prompts)

Intro

Part 1: The problem

1) Bentham quantitative hedonism briefly presented as the hedonism Mill is inconsistent
with
2) Mill’s higher pleasures that create discontinuities that overcome problem with Bentham’s
(Haydn and the Oyster - animalistic example for sensual pleasures)
3) Sidgwick/Rashdall et al. argue that with higher/lower distinction Mill cannot be
considered a hedonist as there must be some other value-affecting property

Part 2: The Millean response

1) It is the quality of the pleasurableness alone in the higher pleasures that is different in
nature / intrinsically to the lower pleasures that distinguishes them. Thus remaining a full
hedonist
2) What about their nature - surely a good-making characteristic
3) Mill replies no - they are more enjoyable because their nature makes them so. Why does
their nature make them so? Because it does - this must be accepted as good without
proof

Part 3: The new problem

1) This is wrong - value-affecting properties such as nobility are good-making properties.
They are not like intensity or duration which, when isolated, neither increase or decrease
value independent of enjoyableness. Value-affecting properties such as nobility always
increase value and thus are good-making properties.
2) Mill does not accept this, arguing still that only pleasure is good and we desire only
pleasure. This view is too narrow - there are many properties of our lives which add to
their value independently of enjoyableness. Whilst Mill remains a hedonist, his view is
too narrow. Whilst Mill’s view remains consistent with classical hedonism, it is wrong.
3) Modifications to Mill’s view, such as Parfit’s which states that enjoyment is a necessary
condition of value (knowledge itself is of no value, knowledge enjoyed is valuable) still
suffer the same problem - that pleasurableness is not the only good-making
characteristic.
Josh Clough

Conclusion

Examples bank

Instead of Haydn and the Oyster: a show dog and it’s owner. You are offered the choice
between experiencing the pleasures of a show dog or the pleasures of its owner after they have
won a competition. The prize for winning the competition is an infinite supply of dog treats, and
so the dog gets to enjoy as much of the lower pleasure that is eating dog treats as he desires,
and the dog enjoys the nth treat as much as the first. The owner enjoys a finite amount of the
higher pleasure that is reflecting upon the hard work and effort that was required for the win, and
this brings the owner great pleasure as he is proud of his well-earned achievement. Assume the
dog has no intellectual capacity - that is to say he is unable to experience the same higher
pleasure experienced by his owner. The Benthamite would choose to have experience of the
show dog as the infinite duration of the pleasure of eating treats will eventually render the total
pleasure to be greater than the shorter but more intense pleasure experienced by the owner.
Mill finds a problem in this, namely that the more noble pleasure of reflection upon hard-work
that resulted in a victory should be preferred over the mere pleasure of eating. This problem he
overcomes with his notion of higher and lower pleasures.
- This is the basic form of the example to use in part 1 when initially presenting the
problem that Mill’s higher and lower pleasures overcomes
- When considering Sidgwick’s response, the nobility of his achievement is value affecting
- Mill replies no, it is merely the nature of the pleasure that makes it more valuable, and
this is just so. Quality, intensity and duration are still the only value affecting properties.
- Mill’s view is too narrow and disregards value-affecting properties such as nobility

Key quotes

‘A motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure and pain operating in a certain manner’ -
Bentham
‘To desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and
metaphysical impossibility’ - Mill

Introduction - Mill’s utilitarianism is inconsistent with classical hedonism

Mill’s maximising hedonic act-utilitarianism has been criticised by many as being contradictory to
hedonism itself. The subject of most criticisms is Mill’s notion of higher pleasures, which are
intellectual pleasures such that no amount of certain lower, sensual pleasures will ever be more
valuable for the person who experiences them than some finite amount of the higher pleasure.
Sidgwick’s argument that Mill’s higher pleasures imply value-affecting properties beyond quality,
Josh Clough

duration, and intensity will be the primary focus of this essay. I will begin by presenting
Bentham’s classical hedonism, the form of hedonism Mill is accused of contradicting, before
demonstrating how Mill’s higher and lower pleasures overcome the problem with Bentham’s
hedonism. I will subsequently present Sidgwick’s criticism of higher and lower pleasures, before
eventually concluding that Mill’s maximising hedonic-act utilitarianism takes a view that is too
narrow on which properties are value affecting, and whilst his utilitarianism may not be
inconsistent with hedonism, it is fallacious.

Opening paragraph with definitions

Both Bentham and Mill argued for a form of maximising hedonic act-utilitarianism; that an act is
right if and only if and because it produces at least as much welfare, hedonistically conceived,
overall, where everyone’s welfare counts equally, as any other action available to the agent.
Welfare is the sum of pleasure minus pain caused by the action. For Bentham, the value of a
pleasure or a pain can be measured by its duration and intensity, where the longer pleasure is
strictly preferred to the shorter pleasure, and the more intense pleasure is strictly preferred to
the less intense pleasure. The same reasoning applies to pain. Mill’s problem with this was…..
Dog and dog owner example

Timed example essay - Can we secure a distinction between higher and lower pleasures
that maintains a notion of hedonism acceptable to a utilitarian?

Mill’s maximising hedonic act-consequentialism is often criticised as being contradictory

to hedonism. The subject of most criticisms is Mill’s notion of higher pleasures, which are
intellectual pleasures such that no amount of certain lower, sensual pleasures will ever be more
valuable for the person who experiences them than some finite amount of the higher pleasure.
Sidgwick’s argument that Mill’s higher pleasures imply value-affecting properties beyond quality,
duration, and intensity will be the primary focus of this essay. I will begin by presenting
Betnham’s classical hedonism, the form of hedonism that Mill is accused of contradicting, before
demonstrating how Mill’s introduction of higher and lower pleasures overcomes the problem with
Bentham’s hedonism. I will subsequently present Sidgwick’s criticism of Mill’s higher and lower
pleasures - that higher pleasures imply value-affecting properties beyond quality, duration, and
intensity and thus are not hedonistic - before concluding that whilst Mill’s utilitarianism is not
inconsistent with hedonism, it takes a view too narrow on what properties are value affecting,
and so whilst we can secure a distinction between higher and lower pleasures that maintains a
notion of hedonism acceptable to a utilitarianism, this distinction is fallacious.

The problem solved by higher and lower pleasures

Bentham and Mill both argued for a form of maximising hedonic act-consequentialism;
that an act is right if and only if and because it produces at least as much welfare, hedonistically
conceived, overall as any other action available to the agent. Welfare is considered to be the
Josh Clough

total sum of pleasure minus pain, and the welfare of all agents counts equally. For Bentham, the
value of a pleasure or pain is measured by its intensity and duration, where the longer pleasure
is weakly preferred to the shorter pleasure, and the more intense pleasure is weakly preferred to
the less intense pleasure.
Consider the following case: you are given the choice between experiencing the exact
pleasures experienced by a show dog or the exact pleasures experienced by its owner after
they have won a competition. The prize for winning the competition is an infinite supply of dog
treats, and so the dog gets to enjoy as much of the lower, sensual pleasure that is eating dog
treats as he desires. The nth treat is enjoyed by the dog just as much as the first. The owner
enjoys a finite amount of the higher pleasure that is reflecting upon the hard work and effort that
was required for the win. Assume that the dog has no higher capacities - that is to say that he is
unable to experience the same higher pleasure that his owner experiences. The Benthamite
would choose to have the experience of the show dog, as the infinite duration of the low
intensity pleasure experienced by the dog will eventually outweigh the shorter but more intense
higher pleasure experienced by the owner.
Mill observed a problem with Bentham’s hedonism which he seeks to overcome by
introducing his notion of higher pleasures. He argues that the more noble pleasure that is
reflection upon a hard-earned victory should be invariably preferred to the mere sensual
pleasure of eating. The notion of higher pleasures thus overcomes this problem, by creating a
qualitative difference between higher and lower pleasures. Mill thus adds quality to the list of
properties that influence the value of a pleasure or pain.
Sidgwick criticises Mill, arguing that he can no longer consider himself a full hedonist. A
full hedonist must accept that what makes one experience more valuable than another can only
be its pleasurableness. In denying the cardinal commensurability of pleasures, a necessary
condition of hedonism, through the introduction of higher pleasures, Mill must accept that the
higher pleasures are more valuable for some reason other than their being more pleasant. For
example, the dog-owner’s pleasure is a higher pleasure because it is noble to reflect upon
hard-earned victory, and the nobility of this pleasure is one of it’s good making properties. Mill
thus cannot secure a distinction between higher and lower pleasures that maintains a notion of
hedonism acceptable to a utilitarian.

The Millean response and it’s flaws

Mill would disagree with Sidgwick’s criticism, arguing instead that it is the quality of
pleasurableness alone in higher pleasures that distinguishes them from lower pleasures. Higher
pleasures are different in nature to lower pleasures; their nature makes the enjoyment of them
more valuable. Why does the nature of higher pleasures make them more valuable? It just
does, Mill argues, and this must be accepted as good without proof - a brute fact. The only way
for a lower pleasure to outweigh a higher pleasure would be for its nature to be transformed so
that it would no longer be a lower pleasure; there are no other value-affecting properties. A
mental pleasure is more valuable than a bodily pleasure, but the property of being ‘mental’ is not
good-making in the same way that ‘lasting 5 minutes’ is not a good-making property.
Mill’s response here denies outright the existence of other value-affecting properties and
thus his utilitarianism is consistent with Bentham’s classical hedonism. He succeeds in securing
Josh Clough

a distinction between higher and lower pleasures that maintains a notion of hedonism
acceptable to utilitarianism. However, he does this at the cost of creating a view too narrow: the
fact that other value-affecting properties exist is rejected. An experience which is highly noble
but nevertheless not enjoyable can add something of value to one’s life. Properties such as
nobility are not like intensity or duration which, when isolated from enjoyableness, neither
increase or decrease the value of an experience. These properties will always increase the
value of one’s life regardless of the enjoyableness of a situation, and so can be considered
value-affecting. For example, a heart surgeon may not enjoy the work they do but it’s nobility
makes it a valuable experience for them nonetheless. Whilst Mill maintains a view consistent
with hedonism, it is fallacious in that it rejects the fact that other value-affecting properties exist.

Conclusion

I began this essay by presenting the problem of Bentham’s classical hedonism - it’s inability to
account for intellectual pleasures - and Mill’s solution to the problem, his notion of higher
pleasures. I then presented Sidgwick’s criticism of Mill, which argues that higher pleasures
contradict hedonism in that there must be some other value-affecting property that makes a
pleasure a higher pleasure. Whilst Mill is able to maintain a distinction between higher and lower
pleasures consistent with hedonism by arguing that it is only the nature of the enjoyableness of
the higher pleasure that distinguishes it from the lower pleasure, I argued that this view is too
narrow and should be rejected as it rejects the fact that other value-affecting properties exist.