HAZARD AND OPERABILITY

(HAZOP) STUDY OF
CONDENSATE OIL REFINERY.

Introduction:
A HAZOP analysis is a highly disciplined procedure to identify how a process may deviate from its
design intent. It is defined as applying a formal, systematic critical analysis of the process and the
engineering objectives of new or existing facilities to determine the potential for malfunctioning of
individual pieces of equipment and the resulting impacts on the facility as a whole. Its success lies in the
strength of that methodology in following a system’s Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) and Piping and
Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), breaking the design into manageable sections with definite
boundaries called nodes, so ensuring the analysis of each piece of equipment in the process. The analysis
is carried out by a small multidisciplinary team whose members should have enough expertise and
competence to address most queries on the spot.
The members are carefully chosen and given the authority to recommend any design changes that are
required.
Executing the method relies on using guidewords (such as no, more, less) combined with process
parameters (e.g., temperature, flow, pressure) that aim to reveal deviations (such as less flow, more
temperature) of the process intention or normal operation. This procedure is applied in a particular node
as a part of the system characterized for a nominal intention of the operative parameters. Having
determined the deviations, the expert team explores their possible causes and their possible consequences.
Each cause-and-effect pair must determine actions that could avoid, detect, control, or minimize the
hazardous situation.
Finally, if the precautions are insufficient to fix the situation, it is necessary to consider making
recommendations.
HAZOP study concept first appeared intending to identify possible hazards present in facilities that
manage highly hazardous materials. The purpose was to eliminate any source leading to major accidents,
such as toxic releases, explosions, and fires. However, over the years, HAZOP’s application readily
extended to other types of facilities because of its success in identifying hazards and operational
problems.[30]

HAZOP Methodology for Condensate Oil Refinery:

1. Identify the critical section of process /plant (NODE) is marked on the proposed Piping and
Instrumentation Diagram
2. Identify the deviation concerning guide words.
3. Identify possible causes, related consequences, available safeguards and deviation in the proposed
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

13.3 Nodes:
The Nodes which are selected are as followed:
Node 1: From Storage tank(S-100) to Outlet of Pump (P-100)
Node 2: From inlet of Heat Exchanger (E-100) to outlet of Furnace (E-103)
Node 3: Condensate Splitter (T-100)
Table 5.1: Guide Words used in HAZOP study:
Guide Word Meaning
 NO No flow at all
Less of Less of flow, temperature, pressure etc.
More of More of flow, temperature, pressure etc.
Part of System Composition different
More than More thing present
Other Other than normal operation
Reverse Opposite of what is to be

RESULT AND DISCUSSION:

The HAZOP study was conducted using the procedure described above. For
simplification, each important equipment was considered as a Node.

5.1 Node 1: From Storage tank(S-100) to Outlet of Pump (P-100):

First node starts from the ‘Storage Tank (S-100)’ in which the condensate was stored
and ends at Outlet of Pump (P-100). In this case 04 consequences were predicted for
06 possible causes. The malfunctioning of storage line (4”-C-CS-101-40).and failure of
pump (P-100) were found responsible for major deviations. Total 04 action were
recommended to overcome the deviations.
Table 5.2: Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Sheet of Node 1
Node 1: Storage Tank (S-100) to Pump (P-100)

Process Guide
Possible Causes Consequences Action Required
Parameters Words
Leakage in stream Failure of Pump (P- Installation of Flow
(4”-C-CS-101-40). 100). indicator controllers at
Drain valve of Cavitation in Pump stream (4”-C-CS-101-
storage tank(S-100) (P-100). 40).
remained open. Installation of level
LT-01 malfunction. indicator at storage
tank(T-100).

FLOW No/Less
 High pressure in Damage of Pump (P- Install high level alarm
stream (4”-C-CS- 100). at T-100
101-40). Over pressurization Drain valve are installed
Increase level in leading to rupture of on upstream and
storage tank (S- stream (4”-C-CS- downstream of pump
100). 101-40 (P-100).
More LT-01 malfunction.

5.2 Node 2: From inlet of Heat Exchanger (E-100) to outlet of Furnace

(E-103):
Second node covers the area starting from “Heat Exchanger (E-100) to Furnace Outlet
(E-103)”. In this case 05 consequences were predicted for 03 possible causes. Total 04
action were recommended to overcome the deviations. The malfunctioning of heat
exchanger was found responsible for major deviations in the particular node.
Table 5.3:Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Sheet of Node 2
Node 2: Heat Exchanger (E-100) to Furnace (E-103)
Process Guide
Possible Causes Consequences Action Required
Parameters Words
Installation of
Overheating of
High temperature
process fluid results
alarm on
in vapor formation.
High flow of heating downstream of (E-
Rupture of(4”-C-
medium in stream 103).
High CS-104-40).
(3”-N-CS-119-40). Install TI on
Corrosion in tubes
downstream of P-
of heat exchanger in
101, P-102 and P-
(E-100 to E-103).
103.
TEMPERATUR
E Installation of low
temperature alarm
Low flow of heating Increase in furnace on upstream and
medium in stream load (E-103). downstream of (E-
(3”-N-CS-119-40). Process fluid 103).
Low
Scaling in tubes of temperature too Install TI on
heat Exchangers. low. downstream of P-
101, P-102 and P-
103.

5.3 Node 3: Condensate Splitter (T-100)

Third node covers the area of “Condensate Splitter (T-100)”. In this case 29
consequences were predicted for 25 possible causes. Total 20 action were
 recommended to overcome the deviations. The major malfunctioning included failure
of vent valve, tower temperature & pressure.
Table 5.4: Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Sheet of Node 3
Node 3: Condensate splitter (T-100)
Process Guide
Possible Causes Consequences Action Required
Parameters Words
Install low level
Blockage in Condensate splitter alarm at T-100
stream(8”-C-CS-107- T-100 dry out. Check
No/Less 40). No operation in T- maintenance
Control valve failure. 100. procedure and
schedule.

Install high level

Flooding in the alarm at T-100
column T-100 Install FRC at (8”-
FLOW Changes in product C-CS-107-40).
quality Drain valve are
Control valve is fully
Damage of pump installed on
opened
(P-100) head and upstream and
More Pump (P-100)
shaft. downstream of
malfunction.
Temperature pump (P-100).
decrease T-100. Check
T-100 level maintenance
increases. procedure and
schedule.

Process Guide
Possible Causes Consequences Action Required
Parameters Words
Blockage of stream Install high level
(8”-C-CS-108-40). Condensed liquid alarm at T-100
Control valve is fully flow back to T-100. Check
High
opened. Flooding in T-100. maintenance
No Steam Supply. Off Spec Product procedure and
schedule.
Install low level
alarm at T-100
Check
LEVEL Control Valve Condensate splitter
maintenance
malfunctioned. T-100 dry out.
procedure.
Blockage in stream No operation in T-
Low (8”-C-CS-107-40). 100.
Low level in storage Cut distribution
tank (S-100). disturbed.
Process Guide
Possible Causes Consequences Action Required
Parameters Words
Install high
Off specification
pressure alarm and
products
PIC.
No or less feed flow Excessive
Check
Failure of vent valve entrainment
maintenance
High Blockage in stream Vapor velocity
procedure and
(8”-C-CS-108-40). increases
schedule
Steam valve
Install PSV at T-
malfunction.
100.
PRESSURE
Install low
Off specification
pressure alarm and
Control valve is fully products
PIC
opened Weeping will occur
Check
Low Vent remained open in T-100.
maintenance
Vent malfunction. Products collection
procedure and
stop.
schedule

Process Guide
Possible Causes Consequences Action Required
Parameters Words
Failure of
Install high
temperature
temperature alarm
controller Off specification
Install TRC as well
AC-100 malfunction. products
as FRC.
Blockage in Vapor velocity
High Check
stream(8”-C-CS-108- increases
maintenance
40). Pressure of column
procedure and
TEMPERATUR Steam valve increases.
schedule.
E malfunction.

Install LTA and

Off specification
TRC.
High feed rate products
Check
Low Failure of vent valve Pressure decreases
maintenance
Steam valve closed. Reflux ratio
procedure and
increases.
schedule.